Submission number: 10215
PDW: Managing Change in Extreme Contexts
Academy of Management Conference
09.00 to 12.00, Friday August 7, 2009, Chicago, Illinois
Primary Sponsor: Practice Theme Committee
Co-sponsorship sought from
Organizer and chair
Organizational Behaviour Division
Organization Development and Change Division
Organization and Management Theory Division
David A. Buchanan
Professor of Organizational Behaviour
Cranfield University School of Management
Cranfield
Bedfordshire, MK43 0AL, UK
T: + 44 (0) 1234 751122 x 3481
F: + 44 (0) 1234 751806
E: David.Buchanan@Cranfield.ac.uk
M: + 44 (0) 7850 143 602
Presenters
Dr Elena Antonacopoulou
E.Antonacopoulou@liv.ac.uk
Professor of Organizational Behaviour
University of Liverpool Management School, UK
Dr Gregory Bigley
GBigley@u.washington.edu
Associate Professor of Management
University of Washington School of Business, USA
Dr David Denyer
David.Denyer@cranfield.ac.uk
Lecturer in Organization Studies
Cranfield University, School of Management, UK
Dr Dominic Elliott
D.Elliott@liverpool.ac.uk
Paul Roy Professor of Business Continuity and Strategic Management
University of Liverpool Management School, UK
Dr Robert P. Gephart Jr
Robert.Gephart@ualberta.ca
Professor of Strategic Management and Organization
University of Alberta School of Business, Canada
Dr Clare Kelliher
Clare.Kelliher@cranfield.ac.uk
Senior Lecturer in Strategic Human Resource Management
Cranfield University, School of Management, UK
Dr Carole Lalonde
Carole.Lalonde@fsa.ulaval.ca
Associate Professor, Department of Management
University Laval, Quebec, Canada
Martina Linnenluecke
M.Linnenluecke@business.uq.edu.au
Doctoral Candidate
The University of Queensland Business School, Australia
Dr Sotirios E. Paroutis
Assistant Professor of Strategic Management
University of Warwick Business School, UK
Sotirios.Paroutis@wbs.ac.uk
Dr Colin Pilbeam
Colin.Pilbeam@cranfield.ac.uk
Senior Research Fellow
Cranfield University, School of Management, UK
Dr Rangaraj Ramanujam
Ranga@owen.vanderbilt.edu
Associate Professor of Management
Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, USA
Dr Roy Suddaby
Roy.Suddaby@ualberta.ca
Rice Faculty Fellow
University of Alberta School of Business, Canada
Dr Bridgette Sullivan-Taylor
Bridgette.Sullivan-Taylor@wbs.ac.uk
Assistant Professor of Strategy and Organization
Warwick Business School, UK
Dr Kuo-Hui Frank Yu
AOM Practice Theme Committee PDW Chair
University of California, Berkeley, USA
Kuoyu@haas.berkeley.edu
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Abstract
This Workshop addresses theoretical and methodological challenges in understanding
organizational change in contexts following abnormal, exceptional, or extreme events. This
typically involves attempting to prevent or to reduce the future probability of accident, attack,
crime, disaster, disruption, failure, fraud, loss, misconduct, theft, and other adverse, ‘sentinel’,
untoward or non-routine events. In the aftermath of an extreme event, the focus often lies
first with causality (why did this happen?), then with attribution of blame (whose fault was
it?), and finally with remedy (how do we stop this happening again?). Once the remedy is in
place - recommendations or ‘lessons learned’ from an enquiry - media attention and public
debate fade. Research has mirrored this profile of concern. But those lessons are not always
implemented, and we do not know why this should be so. We will explore theory: how to
explain successful and stalled processes. We will explore methodology: how to sample and
use cases which are unique. We will explore practice: how to manage change in extreme
contexts. This Workshop will be of interest to research faculty and doctoral candidates
seeking research topic inspiration, and to practitioners seeking solutions. One overarching
aim is to bridge scholarship from separate but related fields: normal accidents, high reliability
organizations, risk and crisis management, sensemaking in crises, the role of public enquiries,
change management. A second aim is to create a durable international network, to scope and
progress the research agenda, and to develop a theory-based contingency framework for
managing change in extreme contexts.
Green management matters: Many extreme events raise environmental and social concerns
(Bhopal, Katrina, Exxon Valdez), and our ability to understand and to manage the aftermath
is fundamental to sustainability. We will focus on the broad category of extreme events,
seeking common patterns and significant variances that will contribute to our understanding,
and to our ability to manage change following events of this kind.
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Workshop Overview
A mistake, accident, or other disaster has occurred in your organization. Damage has
been done. An investigation or inquiry has been conducted. Recommendations for
change have been published.
Implement these changes, and this event should never occur again. Sometimes
change is rapid. But sometimes nothing happens.
The changes are not implemented. A similar event does happen again. Why?
workshop goals
1.
To determine the outlines of a research agenda to explore this topic; what questions
should we be asking, what problems do we need to solve?
2.
As a number of different research traditions contribute to this subject area, to share
perspectives with a view to synthesizing more powerful explanatory frameworks.
3.
To identify the features of ‘extreme events’ that make managing change in their
aftermath straightforward in some cases, and difficult in others.
4.
To explore the implications of extreme settings for the role of change agents,
champions, or leaders responsible for implementing the change agenda.
5.
To begin the development of a contingency framework for deciding how best to
manage the change agenda in extreme contexts.
The first three goals are the primary conceptual and theoretical focus of this Workshop. The
substance of the other two goals, implications for practice, will be addressed as time allows.
the knowledge gap
This Workshop addresses a major gap in our understanding - the implementation of change in
organizational contexts that are abnormal, exceptional, or extreme. This can involve changes
required to prevent or limit the recurrence of accident, attack, catastrophe, crime, crisis,
disaster, disruption, failure, fraud, interruption, loss, theft, or other untoward, ‘sentinel’ or
non-routine events. Hurricane Katrina, which hit the Gulf Coast in 2005, and the current
global financial crisis (October 2008) fit this category. While research has focused on major
incidents, extreme events also occur beyond the public gaze. Extreme events are socially
constructed, rather than a clearly defined category; the hospital ‘superbug’ clostridium
difficile is more dangerous than MRSA, but in Britain, the latter attracted more media
attention. The ‘9/11’ attacks in New York (2001) which killed around 3,000 people triggered
a global war on terror; around 3,000 people are killed annually in road accidents in Britain,
but this has not triggered a response of comparable magnitude (The Royal Academy of
Engineering, 2005). The role of the media in shaping public perceptions of risk is
controversial, and may be limited (Petts et al., 2001), but pilot interviews indicate that the
media do influence focus of attention, and understanding of cause when extreme events occur.
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what is an extreme context?
Does it make sense to talk about ‘extreme contexts’ following serious events, as though such
contexts belonged to a common category, with shared properties? What features characterize
events that shape such contexts? An extreme event (or rather an event sequence) is likely to
display some or all of the following (idealized) attributes:
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unique or rare event, with no or few precedents, or an event which has happened for
only the second or third time (‘repeat mistakes’), in this manner and/or context;
significant loss and/or disruption, actual or potential, including loss of money,
property, sensitive information, livelihood, or life;
front page news, typically for a significant period - days or weeks;
complex causality, involving a combination of factors and circumstances;
exposure of gaps and flaws, in current organizational arrangements - structures, roles,
rules, controls, priorities, working practices, leadership, management style, behaviour;
trial by tabloid, resulting in career damage for individuals held accountable;
high expectations, of rapid effective remedial action;
clear role demarcations, as those who have developed recommendations for changes
will rarely be responsible for making them happen;
eventual decay of media interest, once remedies are identified, unless these are
ineffective, or raise other concerns, thus maintaining the perception that conditions
remain abnormal in which interest may persist - for a time.
challenge to the basic assumptions of members of the system affected, triggering
either defence mechanisms, or revision of those assumptions.
The mainstream literatures focus on routine change involving restructuring, quality initiatives,
process redesign, product innovation, working practices, and new technology - aimed at cost
reduction, product quality, time to market, ‘agility’, customer service, market share, and
profitability (Palmer et al., 2006; Coghlan and Rashford, 2006; Osborne and Brown, 2005).
Does ‘routine’ advice apply to exceptional contexts, or are other perspectives relevant?
After extreme events, the focus often lies with causality (why did this happen?), attributing
blame (whose fault?), and remedy (how do we stop this?). Once the remedy (an inquiry’s
recommendations) has been published, media attention and wider debate fade. Research has
mirrored this profile of concern. There are traditions studying the ‘incubation phase’ (Turner
and Pidgeon, 1997), risk management (Gephart et al., 2009), ‘normal accidents’ (Perrow,
1999; Vaughan, 1999), ‘the critical period’ (Stein, 2004), sensemaking in crisis (Weick, 1993;
Sullivan-Taylor and Wilson, 2007, and forthcoming), crisis management (Lagadec, 1997;
Lalonde, 2007; Pearson et al., 2007), the features of ‘high reliability’ organizations (Weick
and Roberts, 2003; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007), and the role of public inquiries (Brown, 2000;
2003). The learning from public inquiries in particular has focused on policy, rather than
impact on practice (Elliott and Smith, 2006).
Change in extreme contexts should be welcome. Change agents should have a powerful
mandate and access to resources. Expectations and receptiveness should be high, resistance
low. But the context after an extreme event may itself be non-routine. Receptiveness may be
low if the incident is seen as unrepresentative. What some regard as obvious may be seen by
others as a costly overreaction. In cases of mistake or misconduct, controls imposed to deter
‘the guilty’ apply also to ‘the innocent’, fostering resentment. The membership and skillset of
an investigating team influences both the nature and credibility of recommendations, and
different stakeholder and advocacy groups may not agree with each other’s opinions, and may
use the incident to pursue other agendas (Smith and Elliott, 2007). Externally imposed
change, say by a regulatory body, may not be seen as legitimate. Introducing changes while
emotions are running high may heighten anxiety and resistance; change under ‘normal’
conditions is often stressful, without the complication of an extreme event.
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why is change unwelcome?
The assumption that change in extreme contexts will be welcome may thus be incorrect. We
know that extreme events are often caused by a complex combination of factors, involving
aspects of the context, features of the organization, and individual cognition and behaviours
(Perrow, 1999). Attributing blame, attention often focuses on specific factors; technical
failure, human error. But what caused the NASA Challenger shuttle failure - the faulty ‘Oring’, or NASA’s organization structure and management culture (Vaughan, 1996)? This
‘interactive complexity’ renders problematic the framing of an effective change agenda.
With many extreme events, closure seems to be achieved with the publication of ‘lessons
learned’, overlooking ‘lessons applied’. Exploring ‘adverse events’, in healthcare in Britain,
Donaldson (2000) distinguishes passive learning from active learning - embedding change in
practice. Andrew Brown and colleagues have studied how public inquiries depoliticize
disasters (Piper Alpha, for example), concluding that such reports can be read in terms of
sensemaking and impression management, to allay public panic by asserting our (alleged)
ability to regulate and control, and hence to prevent, a recurrence (Brown, 2000 and 2003).
The case of Victoria Climbié, an eight-year-old girl abused and murdered by her guardians in
the UK in 2000, illustrates the problems. The public inquiry into Victoria’s death, chaired by
Lord (William) Laming (2003), revealed systemic incompetence among the agencies
responsible for monitoring vulnerable children. The inquiry made 108 recommendations, and
led to the creation of the Office of the Children’s Commissioner. However, speaking on BBC
radio in January 2008, five years later, Laming noted that many child protection agencies had
ignored his recommendations (BBC, 2008). Asked how he felt about similar cases of child
abuse occurring since his report, Lord Laming replied, ‘I despair about the organizations that
have not put in place the recommendations which I judged to be little more than good basic
practice. I reject the notion that any of this is rocket science. I believe this is about good
practice, day by day good practice, and I am disappointed if there are organizations that took
several years to address and put in place recommendations that I judged could be put in place
within a matter of months’. At the end of the interview he argued that, ‘It is not about
bureaucratic issues, it’s not about organizational niceties, it’s not about turf wars. It’s about
putting the child at the centre’. But perhaps it is about bureaucracy, organizational niceties,
and turf wars - and in this case the problems with multi-agency collaboration.
Insights may be derived from diffusion of innovation studies. Walton (1975) explored why
new manufacturing work practices were adopted by some companies, and not others. Part of
his answer lies with the asymmetrical rewards and sanctions applied to those who innovate
(first movers), and those who emulate (who copy or adapt). The innovators are rewarded if
they succeed, and are praised as risk-takers if they fail. The emulators are unlikely to attract
rewards if they, in turn, are also successful (‘it’s been done’), but their reputations will suffer
should they not succeed. How might this reasoning apply to the agencies within the scope of
Lord Laming’s recommendations? Implementing his advice will take time (Laming himself
suggested several months) and energy, and this project will be competing with several other
concurrent initiatives (some internal, some policy driven), which could be just as important,
and potentially more interesting. Success in implementing the recommendations will attract
no reward (remember that these concern ‘good practice’ - you should be doing this anyway).
And there may be no sanctions for failure to implement as, should a similar case arise, given
what we now know about the causality of such incidents, blame can readily be shifted to other
individuals, units, professional groups, agencies, systems and procedures.
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the implementation challenge
What are the implementation issues? What combination of opportunities and barriers arises
in such settings? Do those responsible require special capabilities? Is it necessary to design
tailored processes? If there is an expectation of rapid change, then it may not be possible to
follow routine advice concerning communication, and the participation of those whose work
will be affected. With regard to communicating change, the media will in many instances
have already provided blanket commentary; does that matter? Do unique problems arise in
situations that involve changes to prevent future events, which have still to happen? Are
changes introduced in extreme contexts more likely to be sustained, or are they more prone to
decay, as conditions - and emotions - return to normal ? A study of these issues will
contribute both to theory and practice with regard to managing change in extreme contexts,
and also to the management of change in normal, or less extreme conditions, too.
the methodological challenge
The study of extreme events relies, inevitably, on cases that are maverick, idiosyncratic,
‘outliers’, and representative sampling does not apply. This does not mean that theorybuilding is impractical, although some commentators take that view (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Pettigrew (1990) argues that idiosyncrasy is a valuable
selection criterion, as the potential for learning is heightened. There is now an extensive
literature exploring the epistemology of the singular, based on analytical (not statistical)
generalization (Rueschemeyer, 2003; Tsoukas, 1989) or analytical refinement (Tsoukas,
2009), and emphasizing the transferability of findings (naturalistic generalization) to similar
settings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Stake, 1994; Williams, 2000).
the theoretical challenge
This approach is embedded in an epistemological position which argues that such events
cannot be understood with variance-based explanations, and that a process theoretical
approach is more appropriate (Mohr, 1982; Langley, 2009). This Workshop will invite
participants to develop, critically and creatively, a process narrative perspective (Gephart,
1993; Buchanan and Dawson, 2007). This involves exploring the context and event sequence
leading up to an extreme event, the incident itself, and the consequences - the conduct of
investigation, the development of recommendations, and the subsequent implementation of
change. A processual perspective looks for conjunctural causality, across event sequences
that display attributes of path-dependency. Theoretical narratives identify why events
unfolded as they did, why decisions were taken and recommendations made, why changes
have or have not been implemented, and the consequences.
A process narrative perspective is a powerful tool for theory development, and is a
compelling communications mode for disseminating findings. Within-case analysis focuses
on key actors and decisions, defining moments in the flow of events, factors shaping
recommendations, the substance of the changes, attributes of the context, key individuals and
groups, conditions promoting and inhibiting implementation, and outcomes. Cross-case
analysis allows the identification of common themes in different settings, and the
identification of shared conjunctures or patterns of context and process over time. Other
methodological problems arise. Interviewing participants in extreme contexts raises logistical
and ethical issues; timing of data collection and questioning may be constrained. Reliance is
inevitably placed on recall which may be influenced by media reports, vested interests, and
emotional responses. Senior managers and other key figures (chairs of inquiries, for example)
may be impossible to reach. It may be necessary to combine traditional and unconventional
data sources; newspaper reports, television programmes, internet sites, radio broadcasts.
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Why is this workshop topic interesting?
This Workshop is submitted to the Practice Theme Committee. We are seeking cosponsorship from the Organizational Behaviour Division, the Organization Development and
Change Division (this is an under-researched facet of organizational change), and the
Organization and Management Theory Division (explaining these events encourages the
development of innovative and unconventional theoretical perspectives).
The research focus on understanding the causality of extreme events, and ‘learning the
lessons’, appears to have diverted attention away from the implementation of those lessons.
Part of the problem in practice may lie with the conceptualization of events in terms of
organizational learning, overlooking the change processes that need to unfold if lessons are to
be implemented effectively and sustained.
This is a topic that encourages the creative combination of concepts, theories, frameworks,
and evidence from otherwise loosely-related (if not unrelated) research traditions including:
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change agency and change leadership
change management
crisis management
health and safety
high reliability organizations
normal accidents
organization development
organizational learning
patient safety (in healthcare)
public inquiries
risk management in organizations
sensemaking
Explanations for the event sequences surrounding extreme events move us away from
traditional (synchronic) variance-based thinking into (diachronic) process narrative
perspectives, which are potentially more powerful in terms of understanding the causal
texture of such complex events, and also in terms of informing practice.
This area presents methodological and theoretical challenges, particularly in terms of the
nature of the evidence - idiosyncratic, unrepresentative, outlier case studies. The sensitivity
of the incidents, and the emotional climate which they often engender, also raise questions
concerning the timing of data collection, access to informants, and the ethics of particular
lines of questioning. In some cases, significant amounts of material come into the public
domain, in different forms and formats, presenting the challenge of collating and interpreting
that material, some of which may be of uncertain provenance. In some settings, the media
affect the pace of events, focus of attention, and attribution of blame - sometimes erroneously.
This Workshop combines theoretical, methodological, and practical aims concerning the
research agenda, features of extreme events, implications for change agency, and the
development of a management contingency framework. These aims represent the outcomes
that the Workshop will seek to achieve, or to reach towards, in Chicago. We hope also to be
able to devote time to a discussion of how and where to publish research in this domain, and
to translate research into teaching materials. This Workshop will therefore be more than an
informal sharing of views and experiences, and will be a component of an ongoing platform
for the development and dissemination of new understanding, fresh theoretical perspectives,
novel methodological approaches, and significant contributions to organizational practice.
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Workshop format (three hours)
This Workshop will be supported by a dedicated interactive website, available from
November 2008. To encourage an ongoing international exchange of ideas and evidence
among the interested research communities, this website will be fully maintained following
the Conference, and can be found at: http://www.managingextremechange.com. This PDW
will have overlapping participation with the EGOS 2009 Colloquium Track, ‘Organization
Operating at the Extreme’, convenor Dr Bridgette Sullivan-Taylor;
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/research/solar/security/2009/
We will invite participants to engage with the Workshop themes, and with each other through
the website in advance. This will reduce the requirement for lengthy introductions and formal
contributions. We will open with a short welcome and orientation. The Workshop will be
divided into three phases: updates, focus groups, and plenary, each lasting about an hour.
Phase 1: updates
Participants will be invited to share brief updates of their work in this area. These voluntary
contributions will be limited to five minutes each.
Phase 2: focus groups
Participants will be asked to split into focus groups each with four or five members, ensuring
as diverse a mix of experience and interest as participation allows. We will ensure where
possible that doctoral candidates and new researchers are not concentrated in their own
groups but work with more experienced faculty whose interests do not necessarily align
closely. Each group will be asked to focus on one part of the agenda, recognizing that these
are not watertight categories, and that it will be necessary in discussion to transgress these
boundaries, drawing from and synthesizing unconventional perspectives from sociology,
psychology, engineering, medicine, and elsewhere:
Theory focus: theoretical perspectives for understanding the management of change in
extreme contexts
Methods focus: methodological and epistemological issues in studying extreme
organizational contexts
Management focus: practical implications for managing change in extreme contexts
Phase 3: plenary
Establishing integration across focus groups discussions is imperative, and visual mapping
methods will be used to support this outcome. In reporting to the Workshop, participants will
use flipcharts and whiteboards, or visual mapping software (e.g., MindManager Pro 7). MS
PowerPoint is banned as a presentation tool. Focus groups may concentrate on their primary
theme, but will be expected to explore linkages across the agenda. Timing of presentations
will be adjusted according to participant numbers. Visual mapping is the main tool that the
organizers will use to capture and share the conclusions of this Workshop.
Organizer’s statement
I have received signed statements from all intended participants agreeing to participate for the
entire workshop, and that these participants are not in violation of the Rule of Three + Three.
9
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