Do Elections Foster Separatism?
The Case of Telangana
By Dean E. McHenry, Jr.
Claremont Graduate University
A paper prepared for presentation at the South Asia Conference, Loyola
Marymount University, Los Angeles, April 27-29, 2007
Do Elections Foster Separatism?
The Case of Telangana
By Dean E. McHenry, Jr.
Claremont Graduate University
I. The Question
The purpose of this paper is to seek an answer to the question posed in its title, i.e., “Do
elections foster separatism?”
Most observers of the two key elections held in Andhra Pradesh in the last few years, the
Lok Sabha/Vidhan Sabha elections of 2004 and the Karimnagar By-election of 2006,
have answered a qualified “Yes” for the first and an unqualified “Yes” for the second.
The grounds for such a conclusion are to be found in the success of the Telangana
Rasthra Samiti (TRS), a political party whose overriding objective is the creation of the
state of Telangana. Both elections provided settings at which the separatist cry might be
easily voiced. The 2004 elections brought 26 of its members into the Legislative
Assembly and 6 into the Lok Sabha. The 2006 by-election brought the leader of the TRS,
K. Chandrasekhar Rao (KCR), an overwhelming victory and an admission by leaders of
all parties that there had been a great upsurge of “Telangana sentiment” during the
election. Thus, the prima facie evidence derived from these cases supports the
conclusion that elections foster separatism.
Yet, a closer examination suggests that there are numerous factors upon which any
answer to the question is contingent. The reality is that elections may, or may not, foster
separatism. The real task is to uncover the array of factors that determine the degree to
which elections are supportive or not.
Three clarifications are appropriate at the start. First, on scope of applicability of
findings: Although phrased in general terms, our empirical study is confined to a single
case: the Telangana movement in Andhra Pradesh. Nevertheless, it possesses
characteristics shared by other separatist movements, so the findings have broader
relevance than the case alone. The movement is one which seeks to separate a part of an
existing state, using legal means, in order to create a new state within the same country.
The most recent successful movements of this type in India, Uttaranchal, Jharkhand and
Chhattisgarh were created out of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, respectively,
in accord with constitutional provisions in late 2000.
Second, on the causal significance of findings: A variety of causal factors have been
identified as contributors to separatism, including the sense of deprivation and/or
exploitation, feelings of neglect, recognition of cultural differences, unequal economic
development, historical wrongs committed against the people of the area, and so on.
Very little attention has been given to the influence of elections on success of
movements. Nevertheless, we contend that the study is justified because circumstantial
2
evidence suggests that elections may have a significant impact promoting such
movements.
Third, on the range of elections examined: In this study, we will focus primarily upon
the impact of the 2004 general election and a 2006 by-election in the Telangana portion
of Andhra Pradesh. Nevertheless, we will make reference to two intervening local-level
elections, the civic elections of 2005 and the panchayat raj elections of 2006. If an
electoral victory by TRS is the measure of an election’s impact on separatism, the results
of both undermine the “Yes” answer to the research question.
II. The Approach
The answer to the research question, including the extrication of the factors that affect
how elections impact separatism, will be sought primarily through the interpretation of
secondary information—guided by a set of questions probing possible impacts of
electoral support for TRS and its goal of Telangana statehood.
1. Source of data
Much of the information about recent elections in Andhra Pradesh comes from
newspaper accounts of events about the elections in 2004, 2005 and 2006. The
interpretation, of those accounts is affected by interviews the author conducted while he
was conducting research on the Telangana movement in Hyderabad during 2002 and
2005.
2. Legal requirements for separation
Any attempt to determine whether elections fostered the separation of Telangana from
Andhra Pradesh requires a measure of “fostered,” i.e., of progress. In this case, progress
means movement toward the creation of the state of Telangana. Since we are looking at a
movement operating within the legal parameters set by the constitution and laws of India,
progress refers to how far along those parameters the effort has moved. In India, new
states may be created by a majority vote of the Lok Sabha and the acquiescence of the
Rajya Sabha. Some “consultation” with the state from which the new state is to be
carved is needed, but the approval of the “mother” state is not a requisite for the division
of existing states. The “mother” state’s approval may boost the chances of that the central
parliaments will agree, or its disapproval may reduce the chances of their agreement. For
that reason, an endorsement by the Vidhan Sabha may be sought by those who favor
and/or by those who oppose the creation of the new state. Yet, the actual decision is
dependent upon a majority vote of members of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. So,
progress would be movement toward a favorable decision by these two bodies.
3. Factors affecting the assessment of progress
The measurement problem is not solved by saying progress is “movement toward a
favorable decision” of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. Whether the process, or the
3
outcome, of an election constitutes such movement is not simply determined. It requires
interpretation and is likely to be contingent upon many factors other than the election
itself. Indeed, until separation is achieved, it may not be possible to determine whether
progress is taking place. What we will do to measure progress is to examine the extent of
support for TRS and take into account possible implications of that support for a
favorable Lok Sabha vote. Among the implications considered are:
•
Does the success of TRS persuade the leaders of other parties that promising
separation is likely to provide them with access to a valuable vote bank which will
significantly increase their chances of electoral victory?
•
Does the success of TRS give it sufficient seats to hold the balance of power at
the state and/or center level that would allow the party to bargain with the
potentially ruling coalitions for a commitment to Telangana statehood?
•
Does the success of TRS empower supporters of Telangana statehood within
other parties to force their leaders to support separation?
•
Does the success of TRS threaten to lure away separatist supporters and leaders
from other parties forcing those parties to support separation to avoid their
departure?
•
Does the success of TRS unify virtually all people in Telangana and raises the
intensity of demand to such a level that the peace and tranquility of the area is
threatened forcing the government to concede separation?
In each case, opponents of separation may be expected to develop strategies to thwart the
possible implications of TRS electoral success for separatism. Thus, our examination
will involve not only the possible implications of electoral success on the separatist goal,
but also the counter-measures developed by opponents. All these factors affect the
interpretations we make of the events surrounding the elections we examine and the
importance of those elections for the achievement of statehood for Telangana.
III. The Setting
At independence in 1947, the state of Andhra Pradesh did not exist. The Telangana part
of the current state was under the rule of the Nizam of Hyderabad, while the remainder
was under the Madras Presidency. In 1948 the Nizam was forced to give up his
territories which came under the Indian Union as the state of Hyderabad. As the
linguistic states movement developed, the Telegu-speaking parts of the Madras state were
split off on October 1, 1953 to form the state of Andhra. The subsequent States
Reorganization Commission (SRC) concluded that Telangana should remain separate
from Andhra, despite the fact that both were Telegu-speaking. Nevertheless, the
Commission was overruled by Nehru and on November 1, 1956 the state of Andhra
Pradesh was created combining the Telangana portion of Hyderabad state with the state
of Andhra to form the state of Andhra Pradesh.1
4
1. Prior separatist efforts
Prior to the most recent separatist effort, the subject of this paper, the Telangana area had
seen two significant uprisings. The first was in 1945-51. There was a struggle led by the
Communist Party of India to rid the area of landlords who initially were supported by the
Nizam and then by the government of India.2 The second was in 1969-71. There was a
major effort to split Telangana from the rest of Andhra Pradesh (AP), an effort justified
by claims that the area was backward and exploited by “Andhras.” The Telangana Praja
Samithi was formed to champion the cause, but in 1971 it was merged into the Congress
in what many argue was a sell-out by its leader, and a subsequent Chief Minister, Channa
Reddy.3
As a result of both these efforts, and to mitigate discontent over the decision to overrule
the SRC recommendation that Telangana be given separate statehood, agreements were
reached that special benefits should be given to the people of that area. Frustration with
the continued lack of development of most of the territory, the dominance of people from
other parts of the state, and the failure to fully implement prior agreements regarding
Telangana kept the potential for a separatist movement alive over the subsequent 30
years.
Although there are some parallels among the three periods of Telangana activism,
observers have pointed to differences in both the context and the means used: (1) The
first was more directly a struggle against landlords and governments which supported
them than the later movements; (2) unlike the first and second period “…at least two
generations of settlers (originally people from coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema region)
have grown up in Telangana and they are as much sons of the soil as the others born to
the original ‘mulkis’ (inhabitants of Telangana);”4 and, (3) “… KCR is trying to achieve
his goal in a non-violent manner, through legitimate political process.”5 That was not the
case in the first two periods of Telangana activism.
2. The political parties
The political situation both in Andhra Pradesh and in New Delhi had an important impact
on the implications of the elections for separation. The Telugu Desam Party (TDP), a
regional party, had controlled the Legislative Assembly since 1994. Although a secular
party, it had joined the BJP-dominated National Democratic Alliance (NDA) at the center
prior to the 1999 Lok Sabha elections. The victory of the NDA gave the TDP
considerable power for its 29 Lok Sabha members were critically important for the
maintenance of the coalition. The alliance at the center meant an alliance with the BJP in
the state.
While the BJP gained at the center, it had to modify its policies in Andhra Pradesh. In
1997, the AP BJP had passed a resolution in support of a separate state of Telangana; in
the 1998 Legislative Assembly elections it had campaigned with the slogan “one vote,
two states,” meaning that it intended to create a separate Telangana state. But, when the
5
TDP joined the NDA, the ““high command”” in the BJP blocked the state BJP from
advocating Telangana’s separation.
The Congress Party was affected similarly by its ““high command”.” Within the state,
there were significant sections of the party which favored a separate Telangana. There
was a constant struggle on the part of the ““high command”” to keep those sections from
committing the party to a division of the state. Yet, as the 2004 Lok Sabha elections
neared, the party’s leaders in New Delhi concluded that for it to challenge the NDA’s
dominance, it had to work out alliances with other parties.
The TRS was led by KCR after he broke from the TDP and A. Narendra after he broke
from the BJP. It’s growing strength prior to the 2004 elections made it a possible ally of
Congress in Andhra Pradesh.
The Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M) or CPM) was ideologically opposed to
the division of AP, though the Communist Party of India (CPI ) was at times opposed and
at times favorable to a Telangana state.
Thus, the separation issue divided parties and divided the top party leaders from leaders
of the state party. Furthermore, the stand of the parties in Andhra Pradesh was affected
by the party alliances made in order to achieve sufficient votes in the Lok Sabha to rule
the country. Thus, votes in elections were likely to reflect matters other than whether
people wanted or opposed the creation of Telangana.
3. The spark
The spark that ignited the current movement was the success of the efforts to create the
new states of Uttaranchal, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh in late 2000. KCR left the Telugu
TDP and founded TRS on April 27, 2001; A. Narendra left the (BJP) founded the
Telangana Sadhana Samiti on September 19, 2001; then, the two parties merged into TRS
on August 11, 2002. The party’s central goal was the separation of Telangana from
Andhra Pradesh.
IV. The Elections in Andhra Pradesh
Our primary concern in this paper are the Lok Sabha/Vidhan Sabha elections of 2004 and
the Karimnagar Lok Sabha by-election of 2006 because these are the elections which are
most directly related to Telangana separatism. The former was the first regular national
and state election since the founding of TRS and it resulted in the 14th Lok Sabha and a
new Vidhan Sabha, bodies whose support or opposition could decide the fate of
Telangana. The latter was widely viewed as a referendum on Telangana separatism,
despite the effort of non-TRS parties to deny the claim.
Sandwiched between these two elections were two others for local bodies, the civic
elections of 2005 and the panchayat raj elections of 2006. Although they were for local
bodies that had no say in the decision to create a separate state, the widespread defeat of
6
TRS candidates undermined the significance given to the demand for a separate
Telangana by those who had the power to decide thereby setting back the separatist
effort.
Thus, in addition to describing and assessing the general and by-elections, we will briefly
examine the local “sandwiched” elections.
A. The 2004 General Election
The prospect of the 2004 general elections and the participation of TRS with its statehood
demand affected each of the parties and challenged their stands on the separatist effort;
the outcome was a qualified TRS victory and a major Congress victory; the implications
of the election for the TRS goal were mixed.
1. Prelude to the elections
The significance of TRS and the Telangana state issue to the forthcoming 2004 elections
had become obvious by early 2003. An editorial in the Deccan Chronicle referred to the
Telangana region as the “Achilles’ heel” for the major parties. The editors argued that
unlike the situation in the 1999 elections, “the entry of the TRS as a major player makes
it a triangular battle in this region.” Presumably, at the other corners of the triangle were
the Congress and the TDP. They noted that the TRS had demonstrated its strength
through its bandh on December 27, 2002 and through other activities. And, they
observed that “The Congress has more to worry about than the other parties for the
simple reason that it is hopelessly divided between the proponents of a separate
Telangana State and the ‘status quoists’ in the party.” So far, they said, the ‘status
quoists’ have been successful in maintaining the support of the “high command”. The
BJP “which had told the electorate in the 1998 Lok Sabha elections ‘to give one vote and
take two States’ (with Andhra Pradesh’s bifurcation), had gone back on its promise in the
1999 elections due to the poll alliance with the TD.”6
a. The impact of the prospect of the elections on the Congress Party’s position on
Telangana
The “hopelessly divided” Congress fought out their disagreement over how to deal with
the Telangana issue. A report in The Hindu in the middle of the year highlighted the
struggle both within AP and over the favor of the party’s “high command”. The reporters
noted that at an informal meeting on June 30, 2003 “leaders from Andhra and
Rayalaseema regions took up cudgels against the Congress Forum for Telangana (CFT)
for running a campaign which is said to be hurting the sentiments of people of other
regions….They were sore that the CGT, in a bid to highlight the cause of Telangana, did
not hesitate to target the party leaders from other regions and virulently oppose irrigation
projects like Pulichintala on river Krishna intended to benefit Andhra region.”7 Congress
leaders from outside Telangana decided to send a delegation to Delhi to meet Sonia
Gandhi on July 14, the report stated, “and urge her to ‘rein in the Telangana colleagues’
in the interests of the party. They are keen that the party should send a strong message in
7
favour of an ‘integrated’ Andhra Pradesh in order to effectively take on the TDP in the
coming elections.” CFT leaders had been lobbying the “high command” for months.
They said they had met with Sonia Gandhi “‘a dozen times and she is favourably inclined
to the demand for a separate Pradesh Congress Committee for Telangana region….”8
The internal struggle was reflected in contradictory pronouncements about possible
alliances with the TRS. Proponents of a separate Telangana tended to favor such a link,
while opponents tended to oppose it. In June of 2003, a senior All India Congress
Committee (AICC) member suggested that if TRS ran as a third party, that would benefit
TDP. But, if Congress allied with TRS, then the combine will have a clean sweep of
Telangana.9 In July of 2003 the CTF “welcomed Pradesh Congress Committee president
M Satyanarayana Rao’s views on separate Telangana and his proposal for an electoral
alliance with the Telangana Rashtra Samiti.”10 While M Satyanarayana Rao (MSR) sided
with the Telaganites and an alliance with TRS, the Congress Legislative Party Leader
YSR completely rejected “forging an alliance with the TRS for the next Assembly
elections….”11 Nevertheless, both sides recognized that the ultimate decision would be
in the hands of the “high command”.
By late 2003 the pressures for a pact with the TRS had grown, but YSR’s efforts to put
off such a pact continued. A Deccan Chronicle reporter wrote:
With the Telangana issue turning out to be a crucial factor in the forthcoming
elections, the State Congress is under tremendous pressure to spell out its stand on
the issue and decide on forging an alliance with pro-Telangana forces,
spearheaded by the Telangana Rashtra Samiti….The Congress Forum for
Telangana has been vociferously demanding the “high command” to take a clear
stand on the Telangana issue, since polarization of pro-Telangana forces is the
only way to rout the TD in the region. The CFT leaders even threaten to come out
from the Congress and join TRS in the event of the party failing to decide on the
Telangana issue and having alliance with the TRS.12
Meanwhile, YSR declared “‘We will discuss it in February or March. It is too early to
talk about these possibilities. Right now we want to focus on strengthening and
preparing our party for the polls….’”13 Nevertheless, he gave voice to the “high
command”’s view that the Congress would try to link up with all secular parties in the
forthcoming elections.
At the end of 2003, the “high command” sought to reign-in Telangana advocates within
the party by reestablishing the Telangana Regional Congress Coordination Committee
(TRCC) to be headed by the Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee President, D Srinivas.
Former Congress MLA, Chinna Reddy, was appointed “convenor.” In announcing the
recreation of the TRCC, the Congress Working Committee (CWC) member in charge of
Andhra Pradesh, Ghulam Nabi Azad, dissolved the more independent Congress
Legislative Front for Telangana and the CFT.14 The organizational changes did not
eliminate the internal split over a separate Telangana, but they appear to have restrained
the more outspoken Telanganites.
8
Nevertheless, Congress considered an alliance with TRS a necessary step. The biggest
obstacle was KCR’s demand that Congress commit itself to a separate Telangana state as
the price for the alliance. Had it complied, the party may have split and Andhra Pradesh
may have been lost in the election. Had KCR not succeeded in getting the support of
Congress for a separate Telangana, he may have lost support within and outside TRS.
The incompatible positions were resolved through a statement which could be interpreted
by each party as it wished:
‘While respecting the report of the first SRC, the Congress notes that there are
many valid reasons for the formation of separate states in Vidarbha and
Telangana. However…the party feels the whole matter could be best addressed
by another SRC’15
It “respected” the first States Reorganisation Committee’s call for a separate Telangana—
TRC’s position—and said the best solution was a second States Reorganisation
Committee—Congress’ position. According to a Deccan Chronicle reporter, KCR
interpreted the statement as follows: “They had clearly obtained a resolution from the
Congress Working Committee, supporting the first SRC recommendations with regard to
Telangana, while endorsing the need to constitute a second SRC to deal with similar
demand for other smaller States.”16 He seemed to feel that this meant the Congress
candidates in Telangana, including YSR, had to speak out in favor of a separate
Telangana.17 Needless to say, YSR’s interpretation was confined to the words in the final
sentence.
With this agreement worked out, the difficult process of seat selection took place. KCR
drove a very hard bargain. He did this, according to observers, through skilled
bargaining. First, “By hogging the media headlines, he has given the picture that his party
is bigger than it is. This came in handy for demanding and getting a large share of the
107 tickets in Telangana. Second, his personal attack on Chandrababu Naidu served to
show the chief minister as a caricature and not the high visionary the TDP claimed he
is.”18 Thus, KCR was seen as an effective tool to use against the TDP. He made
“vitriolic attacks on YSR in order “to paint the Congress leader as a figure hostile to
Telangana’s regional aspirations and thereby attract support to PCC chief D Srinivas, a
Telangana leader, who was instrumental in striking a seatsharing deal with the TRS.”19
The tie-up was announced February 25, 2004. TRS got 6 Lok Sabha seats and 42 Vidhan
Sabha seats, the former being his lucky number and the latter totaling to his lucky
number.20 The seat-sharing may have appeared as a success for the TRS and the
separatist cause, but it had a negative impact, too. The TRS’s “success” meant the denial
of seats to many Congress candidates who supported separatism, creating conflict which
detracted from the effort to achieve a common goal.
b. The impact of the prospect of the elections on the TDP’s position on Telangana
The TRS attack on the TDP leader N. Chandrababu Naidu may have won him “points”
with Congress leaders, but it did not win him “points” with the TDP. In August of 2003
9
the Deccan Chronicle reported: “The growing popularity of the Telangana Rashtra
Samithi has pressed the panic button in the ruling Telugu Desam forcing the party
leadership to launch an all out offensive against TRS chief K Chandrasekhar Rao.”21 The
attack on KCR was an attack on the Telangana separatist effort. Indeed, the TDP
distinguished itself as the foremost supporter of a united Andhra Pradesh. From the point
of view of TRS, its overthrow was a necessary condition for a separate state of
Telangana. It was the party in power in Andhra Pradesh and, therefore, it was
responsible for the failure to remedy the many problems affecting the Telangana people.
In the run-up to the elections, the TDP seemed to feel that it would gain more by directly
opposing TRS rather than by any sort of accommodation to separatist aspirations.
c. The impact of the prospect of the elections on the BJP’s position on Telangana
Of all the parties, the BJP in Andhra Pradesh was hurt the most by its “high command”.
In order for it to gain and retain power in New Delhi, the TDP was made an important
partner in the NDA. BJP’s “payment” for TDP’s support was the subordination of the
BJP to the TDP in Andhra Pradesh. That meant the BJP had to renounce the position it
had taken in 1997 in support of a separate Telangana. From time to time individual
leaders or members of the party would express support for a Telangana state, but they
would have to back down under pressure from the “high command”.
The TRS leaders were cognizant of the BJP’s former position. Indeed, A. Narendra had
been a leader of the BJP before he left and eventually joined TRS as a result of BJP’s
change of position on the Telangana issue. In early 2003, TRS was reported to have tried
to forge an alliance with the BJP. The Andhra Pradesh BJP president, Chilakam
Ramachandra Reddy, said he felt it would be a good thing—though the decision was up
to the party “high command”.22 The party “high command” needed to sustain the NDA
coalition, so it would not permit the Andhra Pradesh BJP to support a separate Telangana.
d. The impact of the prospect of the elections on the Left Parties’ position on
Telangana
As we have noted, the Left parties did not support a separate Telangana. CPI, though,
seemed less firm in its opposition than CPM. Because Congress wanted the Left’s
support and TRS would not support Congress’ links with the Left parties unless they
supported the separation of Telangana, further friction was created over seat sharing.
2. Outcome of the elections
Both the Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha elections were called prematurely, i.e., prior to the
date they would have been required to be called. The timing had nothing to do with the
separation of Telangana, but everything to do with the calculation that the early elections
would be advantageous to the incumbents, the TDP and the NDA.
N. Chandrababu Naidu dissolved the Vidhan Sabha in mid-November of 2003, seeking to
hold elections in February. The apparent reasoning behind the action was the belief that
10
the TDP would get sympathy votes because of what appeared to be an attempt on Naidu’s
life when a bomb went off as he traveled to Tirupati on October 1, 2003. The Election
Commission (EC) did not agree with the timing. Then on February 6, 2004, the Prime
Minister, Vajpayee, prematurely prorogued the Lok Sabha because he felt there would be
an electoral advantage. The EC then scheduled the Andhra Pradesh Legislative
Assembly elections for May 11, 2004 and the Lok Sabha elections for two days later.
The campaign itself involved an articulation of the positions we have described. There
were no major deviations from the positions previously described. The creation of a new
state of Telangana was a goal continuously articulated by TRS. The TRS-Congress
alliance and the Left parties attacked the TDP’s rule continuously.
On the eve of the Assembly elections, an editorial in the Deccan Chronicle stated that
The 2004 Assembly elections will long be remembered in Andhra Pradesh for
throwing up a divisive force in State politics. The Telangana Rashtra Samiti,
launched by former minister K Chandrasekhar Rao to expouse the cause of a
separate State for this backward region, is set to emerge as an important player in
the unfolding drama….If the Congress comes to power…TRS leaders KCR and A
Narendra may turn out to be a nightmare for any Congress Chief Minister.23
The editorial ends: “If the Congress garners a simple majority in the Assembly on its
own, it would not hesitate to dump its troublesome ally into the Musi.”24 Indeed, the
aftermath of the elections led to considerable Congress-TRS conflict.
The results of the Vidhan Sabha elections are given in Table I:
Table I
Results of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly Elections, 2004
Political Party
Seats Won
Percent of Total Vote
Congress
185
38.56
TRS
26
6.68
TDP
47
37.59
BJP
2
2.63
CPM
9
1.84
CPI
6
1.53
AIMIM
4
1.05
Others
4
10.12
Total
283
100
SOURCE: Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 2004
to The Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh (New Delhi: Election Commission of
India, 2004).
In the Lok Sabha elections, the TRS did proportionately better, winning 5 of 6 seats.
11
3. Implications of the elections
The general conclusion of observers of the elections was that they served to strengthen
the separatist effort—but the “progress” was ambiguous. A columnist for the Economic
and Political Weekly contended that “in the 2004 elections people expressed
unambiguous support for the Telangana demand.”25 The number of seats TRS won in the
Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha was many times greater than the number it had prior to the
elections. A Deccan Chronicle report asserted: “For a party which has fought its maiden
Lok Sabha polls, it is quite an achievement. Significantly, its tally of five seats equaled
that of the Telugu Desam, which contested in as many as 33 LS constituencies.”26 YSR
acknowledged that Telangana sentiment was a factor in Congress’ success: “He said he
certainly thought that the TRS’ contribution was present in the Congress party’s own
tally of 189.”27
An analyst for The Hindu agreed with YSR’s assessment:
The Congress reaped large rewards from its alliance with the Telangana Rashtra
Samiti (TRS), which brought the demand for a separate Telangana once again to
the fore….the tie-up with the TRS gave it the momentum that it acquired towards
the end of the campaign. It is doubtful if the Congress would have had the kind of
victory it has achieved in the absence of this alliance.28
a. Failure to gain strategic position
There was irony in this success. An analyst writing in the Times of India put it this way:
The TRS’s five seats out of six contested—and the 26 seats in the Assembly—
ought to have made its president happy, but the equation that fell to him at the end
of this long election season is not conducive to a quick attainment of the party’s
raison d’etre, the creation of a separate state of Telangana.29
The overwhelming victory of Congress, left it “free from any dependence on its ally, the
TRS both in the state and at the Centre.” 30 KCR, in the words of a Deccan Chronicle
reporter,
was hoping that the Congress would fall short of an absolute majority and it
would depend on the TRS for forming the government, so that the TRS could
‘control the post-results scenario in the State’ and achieve the goal of a separate
Telangana….KCR’s only hope now to achieve a separate Telangana is to…join
the Congress-led coalition government at the Centre….31
b. Questions about the role of Telangana statehood
Besides the loss of the strategic position in the coalition governments, analysts suggested
that the results did not seem closely tied to the issue of creating the Telangana state. The
12
TDP did as poorly in areas outside Telangana as inside it. This led one analyst to argue
that “The pattern of voting is a clear indicator that besides regional factors like drought,
water and Statehood sentiments, the anti-incumbency factor weighed heavily against the
ruling party.”32 Sanjaya Baru, a columnist for The Indian Express, went further. He
suggested that “Those who assumed Congress would win thanks to a pro-TRS wave are
now wondering whether TRS won on a pro-Congress vote, or, to be precise, an anti-TDP
wave.”33 And, a Times of India analyst observed, “While the election campaign was so
dominated by separatist discourse, there was little resonance of it in the verdict….The
TRS won a handsome tally but its leader K Chandrasekhar Rao was not given the edge he
had hoped to have.” 34
c. Status of supporters in other parties
The election, also, appears to have weakened the supporters of a Telangana state within
Congress. Syed Amin Jefri observed,
Most of the Telangana protagonists in the Congress are an unhappy lot because
the alliance with the TRS has done more harm than good to their interests. Many
members of the self-styled Congressmen’s Forum for Telangana and Telangana
Congress Legislators’ Forum had thought that a poll tie-up with TRS would serve
their individual interests and afford them the opportunity to win the polls
effortlessly. But the TRS successfully bargained for 42 assembly seats and six
Lok Sabha seats, spoiling the chances of many a Congress leader.35
Perhaps, recognizing the outcome might turn out to be a loss when it appeared to be a
win, KCR threatened an agitation if Congress did not set up Telangana state.36
d. Post-election steps forward
Despite the concern that the results of the election might not turn into the success of the
separatist efforts, several steps were taken that had the potential of furthering the
separatist goal.
KCR took up a position in the Union Cabinet as Minister for Shipping. In response to
criticisms, he said “ ‘Remember, only the Union government and Parliament can deliver
a separate Telangana, and I am part of the set up now. We are not here with any selfish
motive and our primary concern is to further the cause of statehood for Telangana. And
this, I feel, can be achieved by my serving in the Union Cabinet where I will be in close
proximity with the powers that be…’”37 Almost immediately, on May 25, 2004, he
relinquished the Shipping portfolio in order to help Congress allay the concern of a DMK
member who wanted it. At that point he became a minister without portfolio.
The TRS goal was included in the Common Minimum Program (CPM) of the new United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in New Delhi, but it was “watered down”
because of the opposition of CPI (M). The wording adopted on May 27, 2004 was: “The
UPA Government will consider the demand for the formation of a Telengana State at an
13
appropriate time after due consultations and consensus.”38 Despite TRS pressure, the
Union Government made clear that “it has fixed no time-frame for the formation of a
separate Telangana State.”39
The President’s address on June 7, 2004, included a similar statement: “‘The government
will consider the demand for the formation of a Telangana state at an appropriate time
after due consultations.’” A. Narendra contended that this was a great advance over the
CMP wording for it did not contain the conditionality of implicit in the word
“consensus.” In fact, the President’s one sentence statement was received by proponents
of the Telangana state very positively. One report said: “In Hyderabad, TRS leaders put
their party president K Chandrashekhar Rao in the Mahatma Gandhi league of
sainthood.” 40 The Times of India reported the reaction in Telangana as follows:
As news of the inclusion of Telangana in the President’s speech spread, TRS
activists hit the streets to celebrate. They distributed sweets, burst crackers and
threw gulal on each other. Osmania University students assembled at Arts
College and celebrated the ‘victory’. At the Telangana memorial at Gun Park,
slogans of ‘Jai Telangana’ and ‘KCR zindabad’ rented the air. Similar
celebrations were held at Secunderabad clock tower and RTC crossroads. In
Warangal and Karimnagar districts, TRS legislators organized victory marches.41
Yet, in the Governor’s address to the Assembly on June 1, 2004, there was no reference
to the creation of the Telangana state. The TRS floor leader, G. Vijayarama Rao, said
that “the ‘competent authority’ to decide on separate Telangana was Parliament and not
the Assembly. He said the Congress-led Government at the Centre had given clear
commitment on Telangana and the TRS was not unduly worried about the lack of any
mention in the Governor’s address.”42
On June 23, 2004, six TRS legislators became ministers in the Andhra Pradesh
government, apparently on the instructions of the Congress Party’s ““high command”.”
While this outcome of the election may have enhanced the power of these TRS
legislators, it fostered anger among AP Congress members. The Hindu reporter,
W. Chandrakanth,suggested that the TRS “succeeded in uniting Congress leaders against
the regional outfit.” K. Kesava Rao, a leader positively oriented toward the separatist
movement, openly protested. There had been an agreement that MLAs from Andhra and
Telangana would divide Cabinet berths in a 60:40 ratio, respectively. But the allocation
of berths to TRS members changed that proportion. The author noted that if the same
proportion of ministers to non-ministers in the legislative assembly was applied to TRS, it
would get only 4 posts rather than 6. He concluded: “The APCC is unable to
comprehend the AICC ‘soft corner’ for the TRS.”43
When YSR was asked about the feeling that KCR was “able to cast a spell on the AICC
and Sonia Gandhi and get away with what he wants….,” he said that Congress was just
getting used to managing a coalition and that “is why the party president is dealing with
every ally with unusual respect.”44
14
e. Set-backs
By late in 2004, the hope of the Telangana separatists engendered by the election had
changed: “A separate Telangana seemed just around corner in 2004. However, as the
year ends, it seems to be a receding spectre. The formation of a separate Telangana was
one of the major issues that influenced the political agenda and alliances in the State in
the last one year. This is not to say that the demand is new. Only that it has been
articulated like never before.”45 Indeed, the growing frustration only deepened over the
subsequent two years.
B. The Local Elections of 2005 and 2006
TRS tried in many ways to move the separatist agenda forward over the next year, but
was blocked every time. It eventually got Congress to set up a committee, the Pranab
committee, to look into the Telangana issue, but no decision was made; the A.P. ministers
were unable to leverage their positions into a supporting resolution in the Vidhan Sabha;
and KCR’s talks with Sonia Gandhi did not move the matter forward. Frustrated, KCR
withdrew the six TRS ministers from the Andhra Pradesh government in July of 2005.
This was the context for the elections held for representatives to municipal governments
in Andhra Pradesh on September 24, 2005.
1. The 2005 municipal elections
The estrangement between Congress and TRS manifested itself in a decision to forego
the alliance in the municipal elections. As early as April of 2005, a Deccan Chronicle
reporter observed that “The Congress and the TRS are likely to go it alone in the
municipal polls. Both the parties are not keen on giving up too many seats….Even if the
TRS agrees to strike an alliance, it will insist that the Congress “high command” step in
to bring about an equitable seat-sharing formula.”46 By early September of 2005, it was
reported that though the PCC president, K. Keshava Rao, had wanted an alliance with
TRS, TRS was hesitant to do so.47 Indeed, three weeks before the election A. Narendra
“said that the TRS has decided against an alliance between the two parties even at the
local level due to Mr. Reddy’s opposition against formation of Telangana.”48
Yet, at lower levels within TRS, there was uncertainty about the municipal elections:
…the TRS cadres are confused as to what the party leadership is planning to face
the polls. They are also not sure on whether there would be any pact with the
Congress, especially because the PCC president has been saying that there would
be an understanding. And with TRS president and Union Minister for Labour K.
Chandrasekhar Rao sitting in Delhi because of Parliament session, there is none to
clarify the position.49
On the eve of the election, a Times of India reporter described the problem TRS was
having with its message:
15
“This is not an Assembly or Lok Sabha poll. The voter is concerned more about
health, sanitation, potable water and civic issues. But the TRS leaders are talking
about Telangana,” says K Siddheshwar Rao, a businessman in
Siddipet….Echoing similar sentiments, M Goverdhan, headmaster of the Mandal
Parishad Upper Primary School in Jagtial, says: “Even if you don’t highlight civic
problems, you should talk of jobs. But the TRS is not coming up with ways to
generate local employment or promote small business. All they are talking about
is the betrayal of the Telangana cause. This does not work.”50
Reports of the results used phrases like “debacle” and “humiliating defeat” for TRS’s
showing. These results are summarized in Table II:
Table II
Results of Elections to Civic Bodies, September 24, 2005
Political Party
Congress
TDP
TRS
BJP
Others
Total
Number of Municipalities
Won
74
10
2
0
10
96
Number of Municipal
Corporations Won
9
0
0
0
1
10
SOURCE: Syed Amin Jafri, “Lessons for TRS,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web,
September 27, 2005. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/Colulmnists/Columnists.asp#Lessons%20for%20TRS Accessed
September 26, 2005.
One Times of India columnist said,
The entire blame for the debacle is now being placed at Chandrasekhar Rao’s
doorstep….he was unable to sustain his movement, because the TRS remained a
one-man party….No organizational elections were held and in fact no party
organization was set up to follow up on the success of 2004. There were no party
cadre and worse still, no attempts to build one….In fact, the TRS leader did
nothing to use his clout as a cabinet minister in Delhi to push his agenda
forward….51
He observed that KCR’s “party had been comprehensively routed, taking down along
with it all hopes of a separate Telangana state.” And, he quoted a less extreme analyst as
saying, “‘This is a serious blow to the Telangana cause. Though nobody can say that the
issue has been given a burial, the fact is that the TRS was the most visible face of the
demand for a separate state….’”52
16
A similar theme characterized the assessment of Syed Amin Jafri, a columnist who had
little sympathy for the Telangana cause. He asserted that this was an “unmitigated
disaster,” that TRS leaders had “lost their credibility,” that people in urban areas “seem
unconcerned with the Telangana demand,” that “its victory in the 2004 Assembly and
Lok Sabha polls had much to do with its alliance with the Congress rather than the
Telangana sentiment.” And, he concluded, a “widely-held perception that the emotive
issue of separate Telangana has ebbed since the 2004 general elections has been
vindicated by the civic poll outcome.”53
The mitigating circumstances raised by TRS supporters “that it was a late starter in the
campaign. The rank and file were in a state of confusion till the last minute on whether
or not there would be an alliance with the Congress and for this reason too, proper
candidates could not be chosen and an effective campaign waged” were referred to as
efforts by TRS to hide its embarrassment.54
2. The 2006 panchayat elections
Early in 2006, it was clear that TRS was worried about the up-coming panchayat raj
elections. As one reporter said, “It is afraid to contest alone in the elections against the
backdrop of failure in the last Municipal elections.” Its dilemma is that it would like an
alliance with Congress “on the condition that congress issues statement in favour of
Telangana.” But, Congress was not ready to do that. Furthermore, the reporter observed,
“If TRS looses in the coming up Panchayati elections, it would be a death-knell to the
party in the region. This is worrying TRS.”55
KCR authorized A. Narendra to discuss the possibility of an alliance with party leaders
and negotiate with Congress. Although some MLAs were opposed to an alliance, most
favored one since they feared a resurgence of the TDP without it. One new issue came
up: that of TRS merging into Congress. A Congress Working Committee member, Mr
Venkataswamy, “reportedly suggested that the task would be easier, if the merger took
place. The TRS leaders admitted that such a talk was going on New Delhi, too, but the
TRS-Congress merger could be worked out only after the formation of Telangana
State.”56 Memory of the merger of the TPS into Congress in 1971 caused the TRS
leaders to react negatively to the proposal.
TRS leaders sought, also, to disconnect the panchayat polls from the separatist effort,
arguing that they were not referenda on a separate Telangana. One such leader was
reported to have said: “‘How many times should people of Telangana participate in the
referendum? They have given their veredict in the 1971 and 2004 Lok Sabha polls….’”57
The same point was made by A. Narendra: “Addressing presspersons, the senior TRS
leader pointed out that elections based on local issues would not have any impact on
macro issues such as formation of a separate State.”58 Both statements reflected the
concern of TRS with the panchayat polls.
The results are provided in Table III:
17
Table III
Panchyat Raj MPTC and ZPTC Third Ordinary Elections, 2006
Political Parties
Congress
TRS
TDP
BJP
Others
Totals
MPTC Results
8234
381
6165
137
1213
16130
MPTC Percent
51.05
2.36
38.22
0.85
7.52
100
ZPTC Results
675
25
347
2
48
1097
ZPTC Percent
61.53
2.28
31.63
0.18
4.38
100
SOURCE: Andhra Pradesh, State Election Commission, MPTC/ZPTC Elections, 2006,
Comparative Statement of Panchayat Raj Elections, 2001 and 2006. URL:
http://www.apsec.gov.in:8080/apsec/REPORTS/PR2006/comp_pr_elections.htm
Accessed April 18, 2007.
NOTES: The MPTC and ZPTC elections took place in two phases, on June 28, 2006 and
July 2, 2006. Voting did not take place in three MPTCs. The gram panchayat elections
are non-partisan, i.e., candidates are not affiliated with political parties. Those elections
took place in three phases, on July 29th, August 2nd and August 6th of 2006.
A reporter from the Deccan Chronicle summarized the results: “While all parties
celebrated, the only losers were the Telangana Rashtra Samiti, which won a small
percentage of the seats in Telangana, and the BJP which was almost invisible.”59 The
reporter noted that the TDP “took the Congress-TRS combine by surprise in Telangana
though the party was opposed to the demand for Statehood for the region.” 60 It won 166
seats there, while Congress won 207 and TRS won 22. 61 The TDP’s success, according
to another columnist in the Deccan Chronicle, has created an impression
that the Telangana issue has lost its support among the people. Prof.
Jayashankar, however, rejected the theory. ‘It may be a setback for the TRS but
certainly not for Telangana sentiment. The issue is still alive among the people.
The poor show by the TRS is only because the Congress did not honour the
alliance. The Congress should realize that if Telangana Statehood is not given,
there is every possibility that the TD will bounce back in the next elections,’ he
said.62
A. Narendra blamed Congress, too, saying the poor showing was because of a “’betrayal
by Congress.’” 63 Syed Amin Jafri had the opposite interpretation. He argued that “rather
than blaming the Congress for their dismal performance, the TRS leaders should thank
their stars that the party was saved from the ignominy of total rout by aligning with the
Congress. Its fate would have been worse if it had contested the elections alone as it did
in civic polls.”64 YSR concluded that the Congress-TRS combine did not do well in
Telangana “because of the message of disaffection between the two UPA partners.”65
18
The APCC president, K. Keshava Rao, blamed TRS “for the not-so-impressive
performance put up by the Congress in Telangana region.” 66 And, he said, “that the TRS
had sank and it took its allies too along with it.”67 The angry exchanges between TRS
and Congress leaders was soon to precipitate KCR’s resignation from the Lok Sabha.
Failure in both local government elections and increasing animosity between Congress
and TRS led to a real concern that Sonia Gandhi would not move ahead on the Telangana
statehood issue.68
C. The 2006 By-election
TRS was in a difficult position with its deteriorating relations with Congress and its
repeated losses in local elections. The discouragement among supporters of Telangana
statehood was widespread. All that seemed to change as a consequence of one byelection.
1. Prelude to the elections
The failure of TRS leaders to get Congress to move forward on the statehood issue led
both KCR and A. Narendra to quit the Union Cabinet on August 22, 2006. Rather than
ending the squabbling, the intensity of the conflict grew with Congress leaders citing the
poor showing by TRS in the two local government elections to support their view that
what success TRS had was due to Congress support. 69 KCR rejected the assertion and
said that “it was the Congress that had got a new lease of life because of the Telangana
movement….He accused Congress of going back on its pre-poll assurance and beating
around the bush although a consensus had emerged on Telangana at the national level.”70
a. Congress-TRS challenges and KCR’s resignation from the Lok Sabha
Jafri wrote that “the confrontation between the allies-turned-foes—the Congress and the
TRS—is turning into a no-holds-barred war of nerves. The latest round concerns the
resignation drama….71 He described what had happened as follows:
It was Mr Chandrasekhar Rao who had started this unending drama with his open
challenge to Congress MLAs and MPs from Telangana to quit their posts and
seek a fresh mandate on the Statehood issue. The TRS president claimed that all
the TRS MLAs and MPs were ready to resign and seek re-election, if the
Congress members accepted his challenge.72
The Congress AP Minister for Information and Public Relations, Mohd Ali Shabber,
picked up the challenge but argued that a more focused confrontation would suffice. He
argued,
“Why should all the MLAs and MPs resign? It would only result in a
Constitutional crisis and development will come to a grinding halt. Instead, I am
prepared to quit my Assembly membership from Kamareddy. Let senior TRS
19
leader A. Narendra resign from his Medak Lok Sabha seat. I am making this
offer, because my Assembly segment is part of Medak parliamentary
constituency. Let us contest against each other and find out whether the people
are supporting the Congress or the TRS….”73
There is conflicting information over whether KCR or MSR resigned first. KCR resigned
his seat in the Lok Sabha on September 12, 2006. MSR, the AP Congress Minister for
Sports, “offered to step down from the Cabinet and quit as MLA but on two conditions.
He asked only Mr. Chandrasekhar Rao to contest against him and take ‘political sanyas’
in the event of the latter’s defeat. On his part, he would quit public life if trounced by the
TRS chief.”74 According to Jafri, “Mr Satyanarayana Rao was taken aback at the instant
response and initially sought to back off but was persuaded by State Congress president
K. Keshava Rao to keep his word. Dr Keshava Rao himself carried his letter of
resignation to the Chief Minister. 75 And, he said he would urge “the Election
Commission to conduct the by-election within a month.” 76
To KCR, the by-election was something much more than a contest between MSR and
him, but really a contest between TRS and the entire Congress. He argued, “‘Let us go to
the people on a single point agenda: whether the people want separate Telangana or not.
Let the people know who has gone back on the Telangana issue and who has ditched the
cause….’”77 MSR, on the other hand, described the likely by-election as a personal fight
and not a referendum on Telangana.78
b. Concern on the part of the Congress “high command”
Yet, AP Congress Committee President K. Keshava Rao responded the next day,
September 13, 2006 by saying that “the resignations by Telangana Rashtra Samiti chief
K. Chandrasekhara Rao and Sports Minister M. Satyanarayana Rao were ‘hasty reactions
to an uncalled for situation.’” He said his remarks were ‘unintentional’ and hoped KCR
would withdraw his resignation. Similarly, MSR said he withdrew his statements against
KCR, too. K. Keshava Rao said “‘We are UPA partners and friends and work under the
same umbrella.’”79
KCR replied that he would not retract his resignation as K. Keshava Rao had requested
“unless, of course, the Congress “high command” gave a time-bound commitment on
Telangana.”80 According to a report in The Hindu, Dr. Keshava Rao’s volte face from his
fiery statements during the past few days was the result of the Congress “high
command”’s advice to party leaders to exercise restraint in a bid to defuse the tension.” 81
c. The separatist issue in the campaign
The Election Commission eventually set the date for the by-election on December 4,
2006. Congress decided not to put up MSR, but nominated T. Jeevan Reddy as its
candidate; TDP nominated ; and, BJP nominated Ch Vidyasagar Rao who had been the
MP from the Lok Sabha district and Union Minister of State for Commerce prior to the
2004 election.
20
The campaign was a very hard fought one. KCR characterized it as a referendum on
Telangana; Congress characterized it as a personal one. S. Nagesh Kumar, a reporter for
The Hindu, summarized the campaign with the observations that “Few electoral contests
in recent years in Andhra Pradesh have attracted as much attention as the byelection to
the Karimnagar Lok Sabha seat.” Why? TRS “is projecting it as a referendum on
separate Telangana.” The other parties reject the idea, contending that a single byelection “cannot reflect the mood of the entire region. But, they fear the result could
significantly strengthen the TRS and its demand. Congress and BJP are, therefore,
leaving no stone unturned to appropriate the Telangana plank.” The BJP says it will
introduce a private member’s bill on the matter, while Congress says it will bring
development. “Congress’ commitment to development of this region is blunted by the
TRS’ efforts to raise the ‘Telangana sentiment’, a euphemism for support for a separate
State.”82
KCR and the TRS were very successful in focusing the campaign on the separatist issue.
A report in the Deccan Chronicle put it this way:
‘Telangana’ appears to have become the buzzword in the run-up to the December
4 byelections. Common people, politicians, intellectuals and academics talk and
hear ‘Telangana’ in every nook and corner of Karimnagar district….Besides,
lecturers, readers and professors from Osmania and Kakatiya Universities have
been camping in Karimnagar conducting meetings and workshops to lure the
middle class and elite sections towards the Telangana idea. Student groups from
degree and PG colleges from neighbouring Nizamabad, Medak, Ranga Reddy,
Hyderabad and Warangal have been extensively touring the villages and knocking
every door to propagate Telangana.”83
Stanley Theodore, an insightful correspondent for The Statesman, followed KCR through
five of the seven Assembly segments of Karimnagar district. He observed that KCR
… barely interacts with local TRS leaders. But then there is no local TRS
leadership to speak of after the party was wiped out in the local body
elections….Mr Rao starts his campaign late – around 3 p.m. and winds up in five
hours or so. The Congress, TDP and BJP candidates begin at dawn and return
home past midnight. Mr Rao visits only large villages and draws modest crowds.
When he speaks the crowd is attentive but offers little response. 84
He found that it was the idea of a separate state of Telangana and not KCR that won
votes:
Upfront, the people are passionate about a separate Telangana and say they have
decided to vote for the car—the TRS symbol. But would they vote for a
candidate who has failed to attend to any of their needs so far? ‘No, we are not
voting for him. We are voting for Telangana,’ is the stock reply.
21
At Sircilla, a citizen went so far as to say: ‘If he wins, let him do as he pleases.
We are voting for Telangana, not for him.’ How could one constituency election
guarantee statehood? ‘Maybe not. But he is the only man who is openly speaking
about a separate Telangana. We need him,’ was a contrary opinion.85
Besides the four major candidates, there were nine others engaged in the contest. The
turnout was just under 57%. A. Narendra attributed such a low figure “to the hectic
agriculture work and heavy deployment of security forces….”86 But, the extent of KCR’s
victory surprised many.
2. Election outcomes
He received more votes than those received by the Congress, TDP and BJP candidates
combined. The results are shown in Table IV:
Table IV
Results of the Karimnagar By-Election, December 4, 2006
Candidates
K Chandrasekhar Rao
T Jeevan Reddy
L Ramana
Ch Vidyasagar Rao
Party
TRS
Congress
TDP
BJP
Votes
378,030
176,448
170,268
21,144
SOURCE: K.M. Dayashankar, “TRS Chief’s War Cry to Congress Leaders,” The
Hindu, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.hindu.com/2006/12/08/stories/2006120804880400.htm Accessed December
7, 2006.
3. Implications of the elections
The 2004 Lok Sabha/Vidhan Sabha elections had provided the Telangana movement
modest progress; the two local government polls had led to regress; the Karimnagar byelection appeared to have provided substantial progress toward the goal of a state of
Telangana. An editorial in the Deccan Chronicle said that KCR’s victory “…gives a
fresh lease of life to the TRS and marks the revival of the sentiment in favour of
Statehood for Telangana….As a fall-out of the Karimnagar result, the demand for the
granting Statehood to Telangana is likely to become more strident….”87 N. Kodanda
Ram, writing in the Economic and Political Weekly, observed that “The movement has
now gained wide support among the people of Telangana….people voted for TRS
irrespective of their political affiliations only to show that they support the demand for
separate Telangana.”88
22
The impact of the by-election on the vanquished political parties was to strengthen the
pro-separation factions in each.
a. Impact on TDP and statehood
K. Venkateshwarlu, a columnist for The Hindu, contended that
Having reluctantly conceded the existence of a ‘Telangana sentiment’ that
enabled the much-maligned TRS chief K. Chandrasekhara Rao to retain the
Karimnagar Lok Sabha seat with a handsome margin, pressure is mounting on the
leadership of Telugu Desam Party, a strong votary of integrated State, to recast its
political strategy in the region.
‘Change the strategy or we may fare badly’ seems to be the silent refrain of senior
TDP leadrs from the region who had camped in Karimnagar and campaigned hard
for the party. There is an increasing feeling among them that as a mainstream
political party, TDP could not be oblivious to the grount realities. It has to
refashion its strategy in sync with the feelings of the people of the region, as
general elections are just about two-and-a-half years away, they contend.89
Nevertheless, N. Chandrababu Naidu seemed to think that Telangana sentiment may be
fleeting and he was not ready to change the party’s commitment to a united Telugu
State.90 An editorial in the Deccan Chronicle suggested that he might be forced to change
his position on the separatist issue:
At last, the simmering cold war in the Telugu Desam over Telangana Statehood
issue is out in the open. Facing discontent over the party’s unequivocal stand in
favour of ‘Samaikya’ Telangana led by former home minister T. Devender Goud,
TD president N. Chandrababu Naidu has initiated a damage control exercise.91
The editorial concluded,
Mr Naidu’s high-handed attitude towards Mr Goud and other separate Telangana
protagonists may prove harmful to the party’s efforts to regain power in the State
in the Assembly polls in 2009. Mr Naidu must realize that he cannot brush aside
the Telangana issue by clamping a gag order on partymen not to talk about it.”92
Naidu’s contention that a united A.P. would benefit the TDP outside Telangana was
belied by its loss to the Congress in the Bobbili bypoll that was held at the same time as
the Karimnagar by-election.
b. Impact on BJP and statehood
In both by-elections, the BJP candidates lost their deposits. That in Karimnagar was
especially worrisome because its candidate, Vidyasagar Rao, had won the seat in 1998
and 1999. Yet, its break with the TDP and its revival of a pro-Telangana statehood stand
23
were considered appropriate in the light of the TRS success. An analysis in the Deccan
Chronicle reported that “party leaders are upbeat about the Telangana sentiment and want
the Centre to introduce a Bill for creation of separate Telangana in the ongoing Winter
Session of the Parliament….”93 The BJP contended that “…TRS chief K.
Chandrasekhar Rao’s victory reflected the Telangana sentiment.” 94 And, the BJP State
President, Bandaru Battatreya, “…said the development slogans by Congress and Telugu
Desam had created a sense of fear among the voters that the Telangana issue would die
down if the TRS was defeated.”95 The by-election confirmed the popularity of Telangana
statehood and the correctness of the BJP support for it.
c. Impact on Congress and statehood
The impact of the by-election on Congress’ stand on Telangana statehood appears likely
to be significant. An editorial in the Deccan Chronicle said that the outcome “comes as a
rude shock to the ruling Congress, which had converted this bypoll into a mother of all
electoral battles in Andhra Pradesh.”96 It went on to say that the size of KCR’s victory
“should be a cause of worry for those Congress leaders who were claiming that
Telangana sentiment had disappeared in this backward region in the last two-and-a-half
years.”97 And, it “…gives a fresh lease of life to the TRS and marks the revival of the
sentiment in favour of Statehood for Telangana….the demand for the granting Statehood
to Telangana is likely to become more strident….”98 The editorial suggested another
problem for Congress:
For Chief Minister Y.S. Rajasekhar Reddy, who has been harping on the
development of Telangana to counter the demand for Statehood, Mr
Chandrashekhar Rao’s victory spells danger in the sense that Telangana
protagonists in the party may join forces with his bete noire to corner him. It will
be premature to expect the Congress to take immediate steps to sort out Telangana
issue but the party cannot continue dilatory tactics to drag the matter till 2009
Assembly polls.99
YSR’s response to KCR’s victory in Karimnagar suggested he foresaw no change in
Congress policy toward the separatist movement. He said “‘Mr Chandrasekhar Rao has
proved that the Telangana sentiment exists. I congratulate him on his win….’” Yet, he
added that the Congress has always recognized the Telangana sentiment. Indeed, he said,
“‘The Congress had announced the Second States Reorganisation Commission (SRC)
because it recognizes the Telangana sentiment,’ he said.’”100 That nothing significant had
been done about the SRC was indicative of the “no change” attitude of the Chief
Minister. Yet, the pro-statehood faction within Congress had been stirred. The Deccan
Chronicle reported that “a section of the Congress MPs and leaders want the party
leadership to at least now seriously consider the demand for a separate
Telangana….Telangana Regional Congress Committee members V. Purushotham Reddy,
senior party leader P. Goverdhan Reddy, said the Karimnagar bypoll was a pointer to
Telangana sentiment.”101 The APCC President, K. Keshav Rao, seemed to support the
TRCC members when he “congratulated the TRS leader” and conceded “that the
outcome was a result of a strong Telangana sentiment that cut across party lines.”102
24
The losing Congress candidate in Karimnagar, T. Jeevan Reddy, “said the verdict there
was not against the Congress plank of development but a positive vote for Telangana
sentiment.”103 This was a clear affirmation of the view of the pro-Telangana faction of
Congress.
MSR “owned moral responsibility for the debacle and sent in his resignation to Chief
Minister Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy, but it was not accepted.”104 He insisted that it be
accepted, and it was on December 10, 2006. He said his challenge to KCR was
misunderstood: “‘I meant it to be a fight on a non-party basis between us to disprove
KCR’s claim that I won the Karimnagar Assembly seat only because of his party’s
support.”105 It turned out to be something which would boost the possibility of
Telangana statehood. Ironically, that is what he committed himself to do following the
party’s “debacle.” He said he would “work actively for Telangana and appraise the
AICC about the situation. At the same time, he would no longer criticize TRS president
K. Chandrasekhar Rao as he had secured a massive mandate.”106 He contended that
Telangana “would be realized only under Congress rule….”107 Furthermore, he advised
KCR “‘to realize that the Karimnagar vote is for Telangana, but not for him.’”108
d. Impact on TRS and statehood
TRS, and its separatist goal for Telangana, seemed to be the big winners. S. Nagesh
Kumar, writing for The Hindu, noted: “Mr. Chandrasekhar Rao, rejuvenated by the
verdict which he described as a referendum on Telangana, is bound to make things
difficult for the United Progressive Alliance at the Centre and the Congress in the State
by re-doubling his efforts for introduction of a Bill in Parliament for carving out a
separate state.”109 Four days after the by-election KCR said “that the Karimnagar victory
would be used as a springboard to launch a full-scale movement for a separate Telangana
….He pointed out that the TRS victory was not a mere [expression of] Telangana
sentiment, but the desire of the people for a separate State. He added said Hyderabad
would continue to be part of the separate State, as it was built with sweat and blood of the
forefathers of Telaganites.”110
The impact of the Karimnagar Lok Sabha by-election may be summarized by reference to
the observations of a scholar and a columnist in the Deccan Chronicle at the end of the
year. The scholar, C.H. Hanumantha Rao, wrote:
In the recent by-election to the Lok Sabha from Karimnagar constituency in
Andhra Pradesh, the voters were confronted with a choice between ‘development’
(within an integrated State) and a ‘separate Telangana.’ The verdict went
overwhelmingly in favour of a separate Telangana. By attributing this verdict to
the ‘sentiment’ (for Telangana), some sections of the political leadership are
evading the real issue….The simple and straightforward explanation is that the
people perceive that ‘development’—in the sense of equitable share in water
resources, jobs, opportunities for enterprise and career advancement, and adequate
25
voice in political decision-making—is not possible within the integrated State and
that separate statehood alone can ensure justice for them.111
The columnist wrote,
The Telangana movement, which was ailing and weak in the beginning of 2006,
looked bright and full of life as the year came to a close. In fact, the movement
has become so vigorous at present that even die-hard integrationists such as the
Telugu Desam and Communist parties are having second thoughts on the demand
for a separate State.112
The author added, “The antics of the Congress literally turned the bypoll into a
referendum on Telangana and forced people to take sides, and they sided with the TRS.
Now, with a resurgent TRS reviving the demand for a separate state in a strong way,
other parties are having second thoughts on the issue.”113 Clearly, most observers have
concluded that the by-election gave the separatist movement a big boost.
IV. Conclusion
The contention that elections always foster separatism is not borne out by this study.
They may have a significant positive impact, as in the Karimnagar Lok Sabha by-election
in 2006; a moderate positive impact, as in the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections in
2004; or, a negative impact, as in the 2005 municipal elections and the 2006 panchayati
raj elections. The role of elections in fostering or undermining separatist movement is
contingent upon such a wide range of factors that they appear to constitute relatively
unique clusters in each case.
Among the factors that constitute the clusters are the degree to which political parties can
be lured to believe that the separatist area is a valuable vote bank and support for
separation is necessary to tap it; whether a party holds the balance of power at the center
and/or in the state; the strength of pro-separatist factions within existing political parties;
the strength of party loyalty relative to the strength of the aspiration for separation; the
degree to which inhabitants of the separatist area support separation; the significance of a
separatist area to the rest of the state; whether the election is a local election or one that
links the area to the rest of the state or the center; the ability of non-separatist parties to
“buy off” separatist leaders; the ability of separatist leaders to incite followers; the
divisiveness of internal struggles in other parties…the list might go on and on.
Elections are like stages on which many different plays may take place. They are not the
keys to what is performed—that is in the hands of many others each with a variety of
concerns.
Finally, whether the audience consists of members of the Lok Sabha and how they react
to the play is difficult to predict. Obtaining a majority vote in the Lok Sabha may have
little to do with the uniformity and intensity of the demand for separatism reflected in an
election in a particular part of the country. The party alignment, commitment of top
26
leaders of parties, the impact on the stability of the coalition, and a myriad of other
factors will condition a vote on whether or not a new state is to be created.
27
ENDNOTES
1
As part of the struggle over Telangana, the history of the formation of Andhra Pradesh is interpreted in
different ways. For example, a reporter for the Deccan Chronicle suggested that the SRC submitted its
report in 1955 and its “recommendations were open-ended, leaving the ultimate decision to the Central
government to opt for either Visalandhra [a united Telegu-speaking state] or two separate Telugu States
(Telangana and Andhra). Nehru went for Visalandhra “to placate Andhra leaders” and the state was
formed. See “Decision Time,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, March 8, 2004. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/MonEditorial/Editorial.asp Accessed March 7, 2004.
2
For a history from the point of view of CPI and CPM leaders, see P. Sundarayya, Telangana People’s
Struggle and its Lessons (Delhi: Foundation Books, 1972—reprinted 2006).
3
For a brief history, see Keshav Rao Jadhav, “Towards a History of the Telangana Movement,” in S.
Simhadri and P.L. Vishweshwer Rao, eds., Telangana, Dimensions of Underdevelopment (Hyderabad:
Centre for Telangana Studies, 1997), pp. 5-14. Innaiah Narisetti noted (1) in the Lok Sabha elections of
1971, the Telangana Praja Samithi ran 14 candidates, 10 of whom won. (2) Channa Reddy merged TPS
into Congress on September 18, 1971. And, (3) he uses the following words to describe Channa Reddy: “a
reactionary,” “a bully,” “corrupt to the core,” “preaches non-violence, but practices violence,” and “the
worst facist Chief Minister this State had ever witnessed.” See his A Century of Politics in Andhra Pradesh
(Hyerabad: Rationalist Voice Publications, 200), pp. 91. 92. and 123, respectively.
4
“TRS’ Dynamic Duo,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, May 11, 2004. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/TueEditorial/Editorial.asp Accessed May 10, 2004.
5
“It was a Free for All at the T-party,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web,” December 22. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#It%20was%20a%20free%20for%20all%20at%20the%20Tparty Accessed December, 21, 2004.
6
“Telangana is the Key,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, January 8, 2003. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/editorial/default.shtml Accessed January 7, 2003.
7
“Telangana Issue Turns Thorny for Congress,” The Hindu, July 4, 2003. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2003/07/04/stories/2003070405920400.htm Accessed July 7, 2003.
8
“Telangana Issue Turns Thorny for Congress,” The Hindu, July 4, 2003. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2003/07/04/stories/2003070405920400.htm Accessed July 7, 2003.
9
“ ‘Desam Will Win if TRS Joins Fray,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, June 1, 2003. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/headliners/top 4.shtml Accessed May 31, 2003.
10
“MSR’s Telangana Support Lauded,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, July 7, 2003. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/city/default.shtml#MSR%E2%80%99s%20Telangana%20support%20lauded
Accessed July 6, 2003.
11
“AICC in Touch with TRS over Telangana, Says KCR,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, July 22, 2003.
URL:
http://www.deccan.com/city/default.shtml#AICC%20in%20touch%20with%20TRS%20over%20Telangan
a,%20says%20KCR Accessed July 21, 2003.
12
“PCC Dithers Over Pact with TRS,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, November 14, 2003. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/city/default.shtml#PCC%20dithers%20over%20pact%20with%20TRS Accessed
November 13, 2003.
28
13
“TRS Tie-up Can Wait: Congress,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, November 17, 2003. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/headlines/lead7.shtml Accessed November 16, 2003.
14
“24 Named to Congress T-party,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 20, 2003.
http://www.deccan.com/headlines/lead5.shtml Accessed December 19, 2003.
15
“Second SRC to be Bedrock of Alliance,” The Times of India Online, March 5, 2004. URL:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/538521.cms Accessed April 21, 2007.
16
“YSR’s Grahacharam Isn’t Good: KCR,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, May 6, 2004. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/home/homedetails.asp#YSR%E2%80%99s%20grahacharam%20isn%E2%80%99t
%20good:%20KCR Accessed May 5, 2004.
17
“YSR’s Grahacharam Isn’t Good: KCR,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, May 6, 2004. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/home/homedetails.asp#YSR%E2%80%99s%20grahacharam%20isn%E2%80%99t
%20good:%20KCR Accessed May 5, 2004.
18
Ch Sushil Rao, “A Whole New T Party,” The Times of India Online, April 18, 2004. URL:
http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/623534.cms Accessed June 23, 2004.
19
“Hands Off Hyderabad, KCR tells YSR,” The Times of India Online, May 7, 2004. URL:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/662819.cms Accessed April 7, 2004.
20
“KCR’s Six Fetish Delayed Alliance,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, February 26, 2003. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#KCR%E2%80%99s%20six%20fetish%20delayed%20alliance
Accessed February 25, 2003.
21
“Desam-TRS Slanging Dips to a New Low,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, August 2, 2003. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/city/default.shtml#Desam-TRS%20slanging%20dips%20to%20a%20new%20low
Accessed August 1, 2003.
22
“Telangana Party-BJP Pact on Cards,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, January 8, 2003. URI:
http://www.deccan.com/regional/default.shtml#Telangana party-BJP pact on cards. Accessed January 7,
2003.
23
“TRS’ Dynamic Duo,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, May 11, 2004. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/TueEditorial/Editorial.asp Accessed May 10, 2004.
24
“TRS’ Dynamic Duo,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, May 11, 2004. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/TueEditorial/Editorial.asp Accessed May 10, 2004. The Musi is a river that flows
through Hyderabad.
25
M. Kodanda Ram, “Movement for Telangana State: A Struggle for Autonomy,” Economic and Political
Weekly, January 13, 2007, p. 93.
26
“TRS’ Delhi Debut: Five from Six Seats Fought,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, May 14, 2004. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#TRS%E2%89%99%20Delhi%20debut:%20Five%20from%20
six%20seats%20fought Accessed May 13, 2004.
27
“Obedient Soldier to Follow Delhi Diktat,” The Times of India Online,” May 12, 2004. URL:
http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/archive/year-2004,month-5,starttime-38119.cms Accessed June
23, 2004.
29
28
“Pro-rich Image, Pessimism About Reforms Did Naidu In,” The Hindu, May 12, 2004. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2004/05/12/stories/2004051207311100.htm Accessed May 12, 2004.
29
“TRS is Both Winner and Loser in AP,” The Times of India Online,” May 14, 2004. URL:
http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/archive/year-2004,month-5,starttime-38121.cms Accessed June
23, 2004.
30
“TRS is Both Winner and Loser in AP,” The Times of India Online,” May 14, 2004. URL:
http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/archive/year-2004,month-5,starttime-38121.cms Accessed June
23, 2004.
31
“Catch 22 Situation for TRS,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, May 12, 2004. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#Catch%2022%20situation%20for%20TRS Accessed May 11,
2004.
32
“Land Slides Under Naidu,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, May 12, 2004. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/home/homedetails.asp#Land%20slides%20under%20Naidu Accessed May 11,
2004.
33
Sanjaya Baru, “No, Don’t Blame the Laptop, it was a Revolt of Rising Expectations,” The Indian
Express, May 12, 2004. URL: http://iecolumnists.expressindia.com/print.php?content_id=46783
Accessed July 23, 2004.
34
“Landslide YSR Landslide YSR,” The Times of India Online, May 12, 2004. URL:
http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/670673.cms Accessed June 23, 2004.
35
Syed Amin Jafri, “KCR Checkmates the Congress,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, June 16, 2004. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/Columnists;Columnists.asp#KCR%20checkmates%20the%20Congress Accessed
June 15, 2004.
36
“TRS Threatens Agitation if Cong Backtracks on Telangana,” Times of India Online, May 11, 2004.
URL: http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/archive/year-2004,month-5,starttime-38118.cms Accessed
June 23, 2004.
37
“Only Centre Can Deliver Telangana: KCR,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, May 25, 2004. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#Only%20Centre%20can%20deliver%20Telangana:%20KCR
Accessed May 24, 2004.
38
“UPA Government to Adhere to Six Basic Principles of Governance,” The Hindu, May 28, 2004. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2004/05/28/stories/2004052807371200.htm Accessed May 27, 2004. This is the
text of the Common Minimum Programme.
39
“It’s Official, No Telangana for Now,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, August 27, 2004. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#It%E2%80%99s%20official%20no%20Telangana%20for%20
now Accessed August 26, 2004.
40
“Telangana Issue Included in Prez Address,” The Times of India Online, June 7, 2004. URL:
http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/archive/year-2004,month-6,starttime-38145.cms Accessed June
23, 2004.
41
“Kalam Sends TRS into a Trance,” The Times of India Online, June 8, 2004. URL:
http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/725176.cms Accessed June 23, 2004.
30
42
“No Reference to Telangana in Governor’s Address,” The Hindu, June 2, 2004. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2004/06/02/stories/2004060206500400.htm Accessed June 1, 2004.
43
W. Chandrakanth, “TRS Demand: Trouble in Congress,” The Hindu, June 19, 2004. URL:
http://www.hindu.com/2004/06/19/stories/2004061915790500.htm Accessed June 18, 2004.
44
K. Srimali, “ ‘AP Needs Twin Track Strategy,’” The Times of India Online, June 18, 2004. URL:
http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/archive/year-2004,month-6,starttime-38156.cms Accessed June
23, 2004.
45
“It was a Free for All at the T-party,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web,” December 22. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#It%20was%20a%20free%20for%20all%20at%20the%20Tparty Accessed December, 21, 2004.
46
“TRS Eyes Civic Polls,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, April 22, 2005. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#TRS%20eyes%20civic%20polls. Accessed April 21, 2005.
47
“Hopes of Poll Pact Diminished,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, September 6, 2005. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#Hopes%20of%20poll%20pact%20diminish Accessed
September 6, 2005.
48
“TRS to Decide Plan of Action After Municipal Polls, Says Narendra,” The Hindu, September 4, 2005.
URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2005/09/09/stories/2005090407140300.htm Accessed September 3, 2005.
49
“Poll Fever Yet to Catch TRS,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, August 31, 2005. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#Poll%20fever%20yet%20to%20catch%20TRS Accessed
August 30, 2005.
50
“High Decibels Leave Voters Cold,” The Times of India Online, September 21, 2005. URL:
http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/archive/year-2005,month-9,starttime-38616.cms Accessed
October 14, 2005.
51
“Chandrashekhar Rao’s Dreams Wiped Out,” The Times of India Online, September 27, 2005. URL:
http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/archive/year-2005,month-9,starttime-38622.cms Accessed
October 14, 2005.
52
“Chandrashekhar Rao’s Dreams Wiped Out,” The Times of India Online, September 27, 2005. URL:
http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/archive/year-2005,month-9,starttime-38622.cms Accessed
October 14, 2005.
53
Syed Amin Jafri, “Lessons for TRS,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, September 27, 2005. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/Colulmnists/Columnists.asp#Lessons%20for%20TRS Accessed September 26,
2005.
54
“‘Voters Say Separate State is a Distant Dream,’” The Times of India Online, September 27, 2005. URL:
http://www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1243548.cms Accessed October 14, 2005.
55
“TRS Dilemma Over Forthcoming Panchayati Elections,” Andhra Herald, February 4, 2006. URL:
http://www.justandhra.com/index/news/comments/trs_dilemma_over_forthcoming_panchayati_elections/
Accessed March 7, 2006.
31
56
“TRS MLAs Oppose Poll Pack,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, June 1, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#TRS%20MLAs%20oppose%20poll%20pact Accessed May
31, 2006.
57
“TRS in a Fix over Ties with Congress,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, June 21, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#TRS%20in%20a%20fix%20over%20ties%20with%20Congres
s Accessed June 20, 2006.
58
“Narendra Discusses Poll Tie-up with YSR?” The Hindu, June 4, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/06/04/stories/2006060412390400.htm Accessed June 4, 2006.
59
“Telangana Ruins T-Party,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, July 5, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/home/homedetails.asp#Telangana%20ruins%20T-party Accessed July 4, 2006.
60
“Telangana Ruins T-Party,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, July 5, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/home/homedetails.asp#Telangana%20ruins%20T-party Accessed July 4, 2006.
61
“Telangana Ruins T-Party,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, July 5, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/home/homedetails.asp#Telangana%20ruins%20T-party Accessed July 4, 2006.
62
“TRS May See Exodus after Debacle,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, July 6, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#TRS%20may%20see%20exodus%20after%20debacle.
Accessed July 5, 2006.
63
“Telangana Ruins T-Party,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, July 5, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/home/homedetails.asp#Telangana%20ruins%20T-party Accessed July 4, 2006.
64
Syed Amin Jafri, “Lessons from Polls,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, July 6, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/Columnists/Columnists.asp#Lessons%20from%20polls Accessed July 5, 2006.
65
“We Lost T Due to Ill-will: CM,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, July 6, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/Nation/NationalNews.asp#We%20lost%20T%20due%20to%20ill-will:%20CM
Accessed July 5, 2006.
66
“KK Blames TRS for Poor Show,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, July 10, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#KK%20blames%20TRS%20for%20poor%20show Accessed
July 9, 2006.
67
“KK Blames TRS for Poor Show,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, July 10, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#KK%20blames%20TRS%20for%20poor%20show Accessed
July 9, 2006.
68
“TRS May See Exodus after Debacle,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, July 6, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#TRS%20may%20see%20exodus%20after%20debacle.
Accessed July 5, 2006.
69
“Chasm Widens Between TRS, Congress,” The Hindu, September 13, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/09/13/stories/2006091320410500.htm Accessed September 12, 2006.
70
“TRS President Quits Lok Sabha, MSR Too Offers to Step Down,” The Hindu, September 13, 2007.
URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2006/09/13/stories/2006091321010100.htm Accessed September 12,
2006.
32
71
Syed Amin Jafri, “War of Nerves on T-State,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, September 14, 2006.
URL: http://www.deccan.com/Columnists/Columnists.asp#War%20of%20nerves%20on%20T-State
Accessed September 13, 2006.
72
Syed Amin Jafri, “War of Nerves on T-State,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, September 14, 2006.
URL: http://www.deccan.com/Columnists/Columnists.asp#War%20of%20nerves%20on%20T-State
Accessed September 13, 2006.
73
“Ali Takes up TRS Gauntlet,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, September 10, 2006. URL:
http://ww.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#Ali%20takes%20up%20TRS%20gauntlet Accessed September
9, 2006.
74
“TRS President Quits Lok Sabha, MSR Too Offers to Step Down,” The Hindu, September 13, 2007.
URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2006/09/13/stories/2006091321010100.htm Accessed September 12,
2006.
75
Syed Amin Jafri, “War of Nerves on T-State,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, September 14, 2006.
URL: http://www.deccan.com/Columnists/Columnists.asp#War%20of%20nerves%20on%20T-State
Accessed September 13, 2006.
76
“TRS Chief Resigns from Lok Sabha,” The Statesman, September 13, 2006. URL:
http://www.thestatesman.net/page.arcview.php?clid=2&id=157104&usrsess=1 Accessed September 12,
2006.
77
“KCR Picks up MSR”s Gauntlet, Both Resign,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, September 13, 2006.
URL:
http://www.deccan.com/home/homedetails.asp#KCR%20picks%20up%20MSR%E2%80%99s%20gauntlet
,%20both%20resign Accessed September 12, 2006.
78
“TRS President Quits Lok Sabha, MSR Too Offers to Step Down,” The Hindu, September 13, 2007.
URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2006/09/13/stories/2006091321010100.htm Accessed September 12,
2006.
79
“Resignations Hasty, Says Keshava Rao,” The Hindu, September 14, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/09/14/stories/2006091413880400.htm Accessed September 13, 2006.
80
“Keshava Rao Backtracks on Statements on TRS Chief,” The Hindu, September 14, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/1006/09/14/stories/2004091411850100.htm Accessed September 13, 2006.
81
“Keshava Rao Backtracks on Statements on TRS Chief,” The Hindu, September 14, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/1006/09/14/stories/2004091411850100.htm Accessed September 13, 2006.
82
S. Nagesh Kumar, “Telangana Issue in the Spotlight,” The Hindu, November 30, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/11/30/stories/2006113005590400.htm Accessed November 29, 2006.
83
“Karimnagar Swings to Telangana Tune,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 1, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/Region/RegionNews.asp#Karimnagar%20swings%20to%20Telangana%20tune
Accessed November 30, 2006.
84
Stanley Theodore, “In Telangana, Statehood Matters More than Chandrashekar Rao,” The Statesman,
December 1, 2006. URL: http://www.thestatesman.net/page.arcview.php?clid=2&id=165952&usrsess=1
Accessed November 30, 2006.
33
85
Stanley Theodore, “In Telangana, Statehood Matters More than Chandrashekar Rao,” The Statesman,
December 1, 2006. URL: http://www.thestatesman.net/page.arcview.php?clid=2&id=165952&usrsess=1
Accessed November 30, 2006.
86
“Narendra Prays for KCR Win,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 5, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/Region/RegionNews.asp#Narendra%20prays%20for%20KCR%20win Accessed
December 4, 2006.
87
“KCR’s Victory,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/FriEditorial/Editorial.asp Accessed December 7, 2006.
88
M. Kodanda Ram, “Movement for Telangana State: A Struggle for Autonomy,” Economic and Political
Weekly, January 13, 2007, p. 93.
89
K. Venkateshwarlu, “Post-bypoll Telugu Desam Party Rethinking Strategy on Telangana?” The Hindu,
December 9, 2006. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2006/;12/09/stories/2006120911960400.htm
Accessed December 8, 2006.
90
K. Venkateshwarlu, “Post-bypoll Telugu Desam Party Rethinking Strategy on Telangana?” The Hindu,
December 9, 2006. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2006/;12/09/stories/2006120911960400.htm
Accessed December 8, 2006.
91
Editorial, “Divisions in TD,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, January 12, 2007. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/FriEditorial/Editorial.asp Accessed January 11, 2007.
92
Editorial, “Divisions in TD,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, January 12, 2007. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/FriEditorial/Editorial.asp Accessed January 11, 2007.
93
“BJP Fires Blanks in Bypolls,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#BJP%20fires%20blanks%20in%20bypolls Accessed
December 7, 2006.
94
“BJP Fires Blanks in Bypolls,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#BJP%20fires%20blanks%20in%20bypolls Accessed
December 7, 2006.
95
“BJP Fires Blanks in Bypolls,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#BJP%20fires%20blanks%20in%20bypolls Accessed
December 7, 2006.
96
“KCR’s Victory,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/FriEditorial/Editorial.asp Accessed December 7, 2006.
97
“KCR’s Victory,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/FriEditorial/Editorial.asp Accessed December 7, 2006.
98
“KCR’s Victory,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/FriEditorial/Editorial.asp Accessed December 7, 2006.
99
“KCR’s Victory,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/FriEditorial/Editorial.asp Accessed December 7, 2006.
100
“cm: t-ISSUE Helped TRS, Bobbili Voted Development,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 8,
2006. URL: http://www.deccan.com/home/homedetails.asp#CM:%20Tissue%20helped%20TRS,%20Bobbili%20voted%20development Accessed December 7, 2006.
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101
“Telangana State Gains Support,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#Telangana%20State%20gains%20support. Accessed
December 7, 2006.
102
W. Chandrakanth, “TRS Chief Retains Karimnagar Seat,” The Hindu, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/12/08/stories/2006120804990100.htm Accessed December 7, 2006.
103
“KCR Victory Causes Ripples in Congress,” The Hindu, December 12, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/12/12/stories/2006121206280500.htm Accessed December 11, 2006.
104
W. Chandrakanth, “TRS Chief Retains Karimnagar Seat,” The Hindu, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/12/08/stories/2006120804990100.htm Accessed December 7, 2006.
105
W. Chandrakanth, “Challenge to KCR was Misunderstood: MSR,” The Hindu, December 10, 2006.
URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2006/12/10/stories/2006121006420100.htm Accessed December 9, 2006.
106
“KCR Victory Causes Ripples in Congress,” The Hindu, December 12, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/12/12/stories/2006121206280500.htm Accessed December 11, 2006.
107
“Governor Accepts MSR’s Resignation,” The Hindu, December 11, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/12/11/stories/2006121106290100.htm Accessed December 10, 2006.
108
“Governor Accepts MSR’s Resignation,” The Hindu, December 11, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/12/11/stories/2006121106290100.htm Accessed December 10, 2006.
109
S. Nagesh Kumar, “Parties Grope for Credible Excuses,” The Hindu, December 8, 2006. URL:
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/12/08/stories/2006120804860400.htm Accessed December 7, 2006.
110
“KCR to Mobilise Support,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 9, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#KCR%20to%20mobilise%20support Accessed December 8,
2006.
111
C.H. Hanumantha Rao, “Statehood for Telangana: New Imperatives,” The Hindu, January 8, 2007.
URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2007/01/08/stories/2007010801931000.htm Accessed January 7, 2007.
112
“The Resurrection of Telangana,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 31, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#The%20resurrection%20of%20Telangana Accessed
December 30, 2006.
113
“The Resurrection of Telangana,” Deccan Chronicle on the Web, December 31, 2006. URL:
http://www.deccan.com/City/CityNews.asp#The%20resurrection%20of%20Telangana Accessed
December 30, 2006.
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