PART FOUR
URBAN POLITICS
AND POLICY:
CONTEXT AND
CONSTRAINTS
Nothing is harder than to make people think about what they're going to do .
Andre Malraux, Man's Fate
CHAPTER
9
The Styles and Stages
of Urban Policy
Dreams and Reality: "World Enough and Time"
In the prescriptive-democratic theory of philosophers' musings, public policy
is a completely rational enterprise. Goals are plainly stated. Means to ends are
carefully considered. And goals are always achieved effectively and effi
ciently—which is to say, actions produce their intended effect with the least
expenditure of time, money, and other things of value. What is more, those
who construct this rational policy always keep in the forefront of their minds
a well-considered vision of the public interest. Consider, for example, the fol
lowing fanciful dialogue among rational policymakers.
First Policymaker:
Second Policymaker:
Third Policymaker:
What is the problem? Exactly what are we trying to
achieve?
What has been tried in other places? And how has it
worked?
Which among these many possible solutions is most
likely to solve the problem that confronts us? Would an
alternative solution work just as well—but cost us less in
terms of money, time, and effort?
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Urban Politics and Policy
Fourth Policymaker:
Well then, are we all agreed? We try our preferred solu
tion for a limited time? And if it doesn't do what we
hope it will do, we try something else?
In the real world, this scenario is rarely, if ever, enacted. Anyone who
attends a meeting of a city council (or county commission, or state legisla
ture, or Congress) quickly learns that the give and take of policy discussion
bears little resemblance to the rational style and courtly utterances of a
Platonic dialogue. In the real world, policymakers operate within constraints
that limit rational problem solving. First, they are constrained by resources—
time, knowledge, and money. Second, they are constrained by selective per
ceptions and the screening out of information that contradicts the policy
makers' dominant ideologies. [The theory of ideology.] And third, they are
constrained by the piecemeal responsibilities and scattered jurisdictions of
local government (e.g., Ripley and Franklin 1987, Herson 1986). [The theory
ofgrass-roots democracy.]
Constraints Imposed by Limited Knowledge
In creating rational policy, no resource is more important than knowledge.
Those who aspire to rational policy need to be able to choose from alterna
tive courses of action. Moreover, they need to know how and why things hap
pen—which is to say, they need well-validated descriptive theories.They need
to know the likely costs and benefits of an intended course of action. And, to
the best of their abilities, they must anticipate the unintended consequences of
any proposed policy (Rivlin 1971, Rein 1976).
Unanticipated and Other Consequences
Who could have foreseen the unintended consequences of the great high
way building projects of recent decades? Highways were built primarily to
link distant cities and to ease traffic congestion within cities, but their unan
ticipated consequences have been awesome—and some would say, devastat
ing. The new freeways contributed to the flight to the suburbs of an afflu
ent and mostly white middle class, leaving the central cities with an
increasingly poor, black, and Hispanic population. Freeways cut through old
established neighborhoods, dislocating the mostly poor and elderly who
lived there. And in cutting through old neighborhoods and tearing down
houses that were in the way, freeways also depleted the stock of low-rent
housing available to the poor. In all, 330,000 housing units were destroyed
between 1957 and 1968, displacing more than a million people (Mohl
1993b). Freeways also destroyed many small, family-run businesses. They fre
quently isolated what was left of older neighborhoods. In these and other
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The Styles and Stages of Urban Policy
ways they broke the social and economic bonds that had once served to crer
•
ate a sense of community.
1
Equally important for what might be called the economic good-health
of the cities, freeways also helped close down the central city's business area as
a lively shopping place. They accomplished an unanticipated deterioration of
downtown by making commercial property on the city's rim easily accessible
by car. Shopping malls sprang up on what had once been farmland. Compared
to downtown land prices, mall developers got cheap land and often put
cheaply constructed store spaces on them. Merchants were attracted by rents
lower than those downtown, and customers were lured by unlimited free
parking and the visual pleasure of modern shops built in a consistent architec
tural style. Shopping malls became urban gathering places. To go there was
more than a shopping trip; it was to see and be seen,an important social occa
sion. (For the young, a Saturday at the shopping mall has become a replace
ment for yesteryear's Saturday movie matinee.) Meanwhile, in many cities,
downtown shopping went into steep decline. Stores and cinemas were
boarded up and abandoned by their owners to avoid high property taxes. In
many cities, the once-bustling downtown has been transformed into a park
ing-lot desert, its sidewalks menacingly empty, its stores gone away.
Thus, freeway building may have begun as an enterprise in improved
transportation. Whether intended or not, it solved one problem, but created a
host of others.
Urban Policies: A Problematic Context
As will be said several times in this book, most of society's important problems
are located in the city, but not created by the city. They are visible in the city,
but like icebergs, their mass lies elsewhere, in the larger society. Urban policy1. In Miami, 1-95 largely destroyed eighty-seven acres of housing and commercial
property in the center of Overtown, a black ghetto in the city. In St. Paul, 1-94 displaced
half of the city's black population. In Richmond, an expressway was built through a stable
black community north of the central city. And in Nashville, the Tennessee Highway
Department routed 1-40 through the center of the black business district (Mohl 1993b). Just
as disruptive as the destruction of black neighborhoods, however, was the way highways iso
lated them from the rest of the city. In Tampa and Orlando, 1-4 created a physical barrier
separating black and white areas of the city. In Gary, the Tri-State expressway separated blacks
on the north side of the city from whites on the south side. Highways created similar bar
riers in Los Angeles, Memphis, Hamtramck, Charlotte, Charleston, El Paso, Flint,
Indianapolis, Kansas City, and Ossining, New York (Mohl 1993b, Rabin 1987). In at least
some of these cases, the isolation of black neighborhoods seems to have been the determin
ing factor in selecting the highway's route. For example, in Atlanta, highways were designed
as racial barriers built "to sustain racial ghettos and control black migration" (Bayor 1988, 3).
2. Studies detailing the impact of the automobile on cities are numerous. See, for
example, Caro (1974), Garreau (1991), and Frieden and Sagalyn (1989). Yergin (1991,
13-15) notes, "It is oil . . . [and the car] that makes possible where we live, how we live,
how we commute to work, how we travel—even where we conduct our courtships."
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Urban Politics and Policy
makers can and do attempt to pound at the iceberg's tips, but they realize that
if the larger mass is to be moved or made smaller, only the national govern
ment may be equal to the task (Ripley and Franklin 1987). Urban policy
makers may try to solve the city's social problems, but their efforts are marked
by a gnawing sense that as far as effectiveness goes, most city policy can do no
more than touch the iceberg's tip.
Even in touching the iceberg's tip, however, urban policies often suffer a
fatal flaw: In all too many cases, our stock of empirical theories is deficient. We
are far from certain that we know the causes of a problem we are attempting
to solve. Moreover, what we see as a cause of the problem may not be the
cause at all, but the consequence of the viewers' beliefs and values. [Tlie theory
of ideology.] Take, for example, poverty (or for that matter, homelessness,crime,
urban gangs, or the widespread use of illegal drugs). Is poverty (or homeless
ness,or crime, or gang warfare, or drug use) the result of a personal failing? Or
is poverty (or any other social problem) a consequence of our economic sys
tem, or perhaps a failure of our society to wipe out racism, or perhaps of our
society's failure to take proper care of its poor and its maladjusted?3 (See the
aptly titled The Dilemmas ofSocial Reform, by Marris and Rein, 1973.4)
Our stock of empirical theories is deficient in a second important sense.
Careful observation may help us to see what changes, if any, came after a new
policy was put in place; but given the tangled skein of all that constitutes
human nature and human motives, we are far from certain that any specific
policy resulted in (caused) the changes that followed. For example, if student
performance on college entry tests improves over time, shall we assume that
the improvement was caused by different teaching methods or by such other
factors as a change in the motivation or social class of those seeking college
admission (see Rivlin 1971)?5
3. As an example, three causal interpretations of alcoholism abound in our society:
the moral interpretation (i.e., alcoholism as a character flaw), the medical interpretation
(i.e., alcoholism as a disease), and the social interpretation (i.e., alcoholism as a result of the
demands placed on an individual by a drinking society). For a discussion of these per
spectives, see Watts (1982).
4. James Q. Wilson (1975) offers a spirited critique of policymakers who attempt
to fight urban crime on the basis of the search for its root causes. The search for root
causes, he argues, is perforce an exercise in futility. Better, he says, to concentrate policy
energies on dealing with criminal behavior and on lessening opportunities for such behav
ior.
5. It is not surprising that the problem of discovering and tracing social causation
has vexed social scientists for a very long time (e.g., Maclver 1942). In fact, as Thomas
Haskell (1977) so brilliantly demonstrates, the establishment of modern social science dis
ciplines came about because the academic community had grown impatient and mistrust
ful of amateur scholars asserting that they had discovered the "true" causes of social change
and the links between social behaviors and root causes. Most contemporary social scien
tists are (as are lawyers) content to work at discovering "proximate" rather than root causes.
For a joining of the physicists and social scientist's concerns over causality, see Norwood
Hanson (1958).
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The Styles and Stages of Urban Policy
If we are unsure about what it was in past policies that "really worked";
if we are unsure about the "real" causes of a problem; and if we are also prone
to ideological quarrels over the "best" steps we can take to meet the prob
lem—most likely, our policy steps will be halting, reluctant, and small. (There
is an old saying in politics: The bigger the problem, the smaller will be the
steps to resolve it.)
Given our society's success at solving technical problems ("We put a
man on the moon, didn't we?"), it is understandable that we are reluctant to
concede that our most important social problems may be unsolvable. ("Well,
then, why can't we stop drug addiction? Why can't we solve the problems of
the homeless?)6 But social problems contain too many imponderables to admit
any easy solution—or perhaps any solution at all! And that being the case,
those who make social policies labor under few illusions that they are going
to solve those problems. They know that they will do well if only they can
cope with (and perhaps, alleviate) social problems by tackling them one small
step at a time.
Incremental versus Reconstructive Public Policy
To create public policy in small steps is, of course, an attempt to make social
and political change also in small steps. This style of small-step policy and
change is not confined to cities. It is a style in general use at all levels of
American government. [Tlie theory of social learning.]
Incremental policy. This incremental style of policy making (to give it its
social-scientific label) is, in fact, common to all democratic societies. The rea
sons for its widespread use are several. First, incremental policy is relatively
nonthreatening to the status quo (proposed changes are small). Second, the
monetary costs of incremental changes are also relatively small. Third, incre
mental changes are less likely to unroll a long chain of unanticipated conse
quences—or, if they do (and if they are unwelcome), policymakers can then
attempt corrective action.
Incremental policies abound on the local level, the most obvious exam
ple being the city's annual budget. Policymakers invariably decide on what is
to be spent (and where the money is to come from) by building on the city's
present budget—adding a program here and there, putting additional money
into selected programs, taking funds from others (Wildavsky 1979b).
Of course, it would be an almost impossible task for the city council to
start afresh every budget year, with no established plans or commitments.
Every city has standing programs and obligations (fire protection, police, parks,
and so forth). To begin at the beginning every year, with every expenditure
6. For an insightful exploration of the moon-ghetto metaphor, see Nelson (1974).
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Urban Politics and Policy
and every program to be (potentially) terminated would be unthinkable—a
time-consuming and wearying process. It would lead budget makers into a
swamp of indecision and delay (not to mention interest group anxiety over
threatened programs). Thus, budget makers tinker with last year's budget and
then proceed by means of incremental changes.
Reconstructive policy. Reconstructive policy stands in sharp contrast to
incremental policy. As its name is intended to suggest, reconstructive policy
seeks to alter and reconstruct the status quo. Reconstructive policy usually
tries to alter and remedy a fairly wide range of social, political, or economic
affairs. It is often the goal (or consequence) of reformers and reform move
ments, and though urban policymakers do not attempt to reconstruct the eco
nomics of city life, other types of reconstructing policies do get tried. [The the
ory of social learning./ As the earlier discussion of the Progressive era (chapter 4)
indicates, what is presently in place as the urban reform package is a note
worthy example of reconstructive urban policy.
Symbolic versus Substantive Policy
Both incremental and reconstructive policies attempt genuine change. Their
intent is substantial and thus substantive; they are intended to deal effectively
with a problem or an issue. Symbolic policy, in contrast, deals only with the sur
face of an issue (Edelman 1964). Symbolic policies are cosmetic in that they
seek to cover or disguise the problem; they do not assault, obliterate, or rem
edy the problem. It is often the case that urban policymakers, when puzzled
about what to do, or hesitant about incurring the costs of substantive policy,
will escape into symbolic policies. Thus, as a familiar form of symbolic deci
sion (and symbolic policy), city councils often appoint a committee of inquiry
to study and make recommendations for future council consideration of an
important problem or issue (e.g., violence in the schools, a rising rate of build
ing abandonment, the decline of downtown shopping). Or, as another form of
symbolic policy, urban administrators may make a visible display of what the
public is intended to see as "action." Thus, if the crime rate is perceived as ris
ing, or if murders go unsolved, those making law-enforcement policy may
7. In general, reconstructive policy is the province of the national government. Such
policy usually occurs in a time of crisis (war, economic depression, and the like). As will
be noted in chapter 12, many of the national government's policies of the 1960s were
reconstructive in intent (the War on Poverty, the Civil Rights acts) and directly affected
the cities. Another explanation for the fact that cities do not attempt reconstructive pol
icy intended to alter the economic status quo is consistent with the theory of influence
and is persuasively advanced by Bachrach and Baratz (1962). The city's economic elites,
they argue, usually have sufficient influence to prevent such policies from rising high on
the urban political agenda.
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The Styles and Stages of Urban Policy
conduct street-sweeps of suspicious persons or increase the frequency of
police patrols in a high-crime area.
Symbolic policy offers the symbols of change. It affords the policymak
ers (and sometimes a clamoring public) the sense that something is being
done. By its nature, symbolic policy is low in cost. It is therefore a form of
coping with difficult and perhaps unsolvable problems without great expendi
ture. Moreover, it buys time. And meanwhile, perhaps, public attention will
flag. The heat will be off the policymakers. And perhaps—just perhaps—the
problem will go away all by itself.
Limitations of Time
Though symbolic policy will sometimes buy time for policymakers, it must
also be recognized that time itself is an important constraint on policymakers'
ability to achieve effective and rational policy. In most cities, the council's
agenda is crammed to overflowing. There are taxes to be levied, a budget to
be passed, complaints and petitions to be heard, contracts to be approved, and
ordinances to be considered. The bigger the city, the fuller the agenda. And
with only rare exceptions, councils do not employ an administrative or a
research staff to help with their work. Thus, to be a council member is usu
ally to have too much to do and too little time to do it.
But to conclude that the constraints of time do nothing more than
limit the amount of information (or careful canvass of alternatives) available
to council members is only to state the obvious. Other, more subtle con
straints are also at work. First, as was noted in chapter 6, council members in
most cities serve on a part-time basis, deriving their principal incomes else
where. They tend to hold jobs that permit (or are enhanced by) council ser
vice. In most cities, council members are lawyers, real-estate brokers, insur
ance agents, employees of banks and public utility companies. Occasionally,
they are union officials. Thus, they carry into the council a view of the pub
lic interest that is biased by their occupation and social standing. [The theory
of ideology.]
A second consequence for policy follows from the first. With too much
to do and too little time to do it, city councils tend to get information (con
cerning costs, the experience of other cities, and so forth) either from the city
administrators or from data furnished by persons and groups interested in a
particular policy or an item of legislation. Thus, councils may often frame pol
icy around the testimony and viewpoints of organized groups: the chamber of
commerce, real-estate developers and the like—all of whom have a direct and
8. It may have high opportunity costs, however. That is, the opportunity to develop
a substantive policy that may prove useful in ameliorating a problem is lost when a sym
bolic policy is implemented.
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Urban Politics and Policy
obvious interest in policy formation and policy outcomes. [The theory ofpower
and influence./
A third consequence that follows from time constraints has to do with
the style of urban public policy. Again, our reference point is prescriptive
democratic theory. In an ideal democracy, public policy ought to be far seeing
and carefully arranged with respect to thoughtfully considered priorities.
Policy ought not be a hasty response to a single, immediate problem, but a
considered response to a host of connected problems. In short, policy ought to
be proactive rather than reactive.
But in the real world, most urban policy is reactive—a specific reaction
to a specific problem. Douglas Yates (1977) calls this style of policy "crisis
hopping," putting out fires already lit and burning, using resources of govern
ment to take care of present problems, but paying little attention to those that
may lie ahead. And while this may not always and in every case make for non-
rational policy, it surely leads (through the connection between time and reac
tivity) in a direction away from policy at its most rational best.
The Politics of Policy Making: Four Types of Policy
The previous classification of urban policies has led us to distinguish between
substantive and symbolic policies, and between incremental and reconstructive
policies. But however informative these distinctions, it must be confessed that
in real-world practice, they are not always sharp and clear. For example, sym
bolic policies, however cosmetic their intent, sometimes have substantive out
comes. Thus, beefed-up police patrols and periodic street-sweeps may bring
new ideas about how best to use police personnel—which, in turn, may bring
a reassessment of the most efficient use of motorized equipment.
Nevertheless, distinctions and classifications provide useful details. They
help convey the realities of city government-in-action. And they also intro
duce us to the politics of policy making: what the stakes may be, who wins
and who loses, who the players are, and what strategies are most likely to be
used by those seeking to influence policy outcomes.
To introduce the politics of policy making, four other types of policy
will be sketched; but once again, it is easier to assert a set of policy types in
the abstract than to find them neatly separated in real-world use.
Regulatory Policy
Regulatory policy involves the direct and open attempt to control citizens'
and business firms' behavior. Most typically, regulatory policy deals with mat
ters of health, safety, and morals. Familiar forms of regulatory policy are ordi
nances that deal with crime, prostitution, the quarantine of those with com
municable disease, the regulation of barbershops, taxicabs, restaurants, and
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The Styles and Stages of Urban Policy
automobile traffic. Regulatory policy also establishes standards for building
construction and maintenance and extends to zoning—restricting certain
kinds of businesses and buildings to designated areas of the city.
As might be expected, every regulatory policy falls more heavily on
some persons (and groups) than on others. Regulatory policy makes a differ
ence in the way persons or groups are treated—some being restricted in what
they do, others being let alone. Thus, as it is being framed and as it is being
enforced, regulatory policy almost always produces conflict and bargaining:
protests, arguments, petitions from those who stand to win most and from
those who stand to lose most. Such actions, of course, are the essence of ordi
nary, everyday politics; it is for this reason that regulatory policy is usually per
ceived by policymakers (and the general public) as being part of the ordinary
process of government and a necessary activity on behalf of the public good.
As a consequence, quarrels over regulatory policy are fairly subdued, often
being resolved in the courts. They usually entail argument over the wisdom or
usefulness of the policy, not die-hard, acrimonious protest from those who
will be adversely affected. (However,for exceptions to this general rule, see the
discussion of zoning in chapter 12.)
Distributive Policy
As the term may suggest, distributive policies are those that parcel out the ser
vices and resources of government among and between the citizenry. Garbage
collecting, street paving, police and fire protection are among the commonest
forms of distributive policy. Distributive policies can be broken down into two
sub-types: those (e.g., street paving, police and fire protection) intended to be
evenhanded and to distribute benefits equally among the citizenry; and those
that single out groups and geographic areas for benefits and assistance (e.g.,
neighborhood parks, shelters for the homeless, high intensity street lights, pub
lic swimming pools).
Distributive policies sometimes invite more intense political conflict
than regulatory policies; the reason lies in the fact that no matter what the
intent, distributive policies can never operate according to a principle that
everyone agrees is fully just and fair and equal. For example, in the abstract,
most would agree that benefits for the poor are morally and politically justi
fied, but disagreement often follows when questions are raised as to whether
benefits to the poor should take priority over, say, installing needed street
lights or beautifying downtown to attract new business and thus provide more
jobs for the city's poor.
More difficult still is deciding how to weigh the special needs of areas
and neighborhoods against equal treatment for all areas and neighborhoods.
Consider, for example, street paving, fire and police protection, and garbage
pickup. No matter how policymakers may attempt an even-handed distribu209
Urban Politics and Policy
tion of services, the distribution will be open to challenge. Again, consider fire
protection: City policy may call for one fire station for every three square
miles. Under this standard, fire protection could be said to be equally distrib
uted. But by another standard, it is not. Neighborhoods with newer housing
and fewer persons per living unit will have fewer fires than areas of older
housing, higher population density, and lower per capita income. Perhaps,
then, the decision rule ought to be one that allocates personnel and equip
ment according to the number of fires likely to occur in an area. If that is the
decision rule (and in many cities it is), those with property in less-protected
areas are likely to complain that, as a consequence of the rule, their fire insur
ance rates are too high.
In essence, distributive policies are arranged according to decision rules
built around ideas concerning equality and equity (of which more later), and
it is argument over what constitutes equal benefits that fuels the politics of dis
tributive policy. Argument over equality and equity also helps blur the dis
tinction between distributive and redistributive policies.
Redistributive Policy
These are the most conflict-laden policies. They seek to redistribute the
resources of government (and in the long run, of society) from one social and
economic class to another. Usually, this redistribution runs from those better
off to those least well off. The income tax is the basic vehicle of redistributive
policy. Under its terms, those whose incomes are highest usually contribute
most to government. This arrangement comports with what has become a
basic precept of our society: Equity and social justice—"a fair share for every
one"—require that each member of society be brought up to some minimum
standard with respect to those things necessary to maintain a reasonably
decent and healthy life.
This precept is at the center of ideological dispute (and thus, of politics)
in America today. Some would ask, What is fair about fair shares? Is it fair to
take money from those who have earned it to help those who have not? Others
would ask, Is it not the case that those who have earned money have been able
to do so because the government (which after all, represents all the people) has
maintained and protected the economic system that makes possible the accu
mulation of wealth? But even if such points and counterpoints are not readily
resolved, most in our society accept the concepts of equity and social justice but
continue to disagree on their real-world application—just how much by way of
government benefits and services does it take to achieve fair shares?
In our political system, most redistributive policies lie with the national
government (Ripley and Franklin 1987). But while wealthy towns and sub
urbs engage in virtually no redistribution at all, central cities with sizeable
numbers of poor do what their politics and resources permit: city funding in
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The Styles and Stages of Urban Policy
support of hospital emergency care, shelters for the homeless, counseling for
drug users and the mentally disturbed, the rehabilitation of run-down, lowincome housing. (For details concerning redistributive policy in New York,
see Morris 1980.) Most such redistributive benefits are undertaken as part of
larger federal- and state-supported welfare programs, with city funds being
used to supplement those programs. Even so, the politics of city redistributive
policies assume a familiar ring. How much is our city's fair share? Should our
money be used for other purposes?
Development Policy
Development policies aim to ensure the economic growth and prosperity of
the city (P. Peterson 1981). Familiar examples of development policies are pro
posals to build a sports arena or convention center, to bring new industry to
the city, and to revive the central business district (Pelissero et al. 1992, Bairn
1994, Rosentraub et al. 1994). /The theory ofcommodification of land and buildings.]
Development policies often require levying additional taxes (or issuing
bonds to be repaid with tax revenues over the next decade) to build the pro
posed sports arena and convention center and to rebuild downtown. Bringing
new business to the city often requires the lure of tax abatements (relinquish
ing a tax ordinarily collected). Development policies are advanced as being
good for the entire city. ("It will bring new jobs to our town. It will be some
thing we can all be proud of") But oftentimes, as is the case with most pol
icy proposals, argument erupts over who will derive most benefit, who will
pay a disproportionate share of new taxes, and who will lose most in city ser
vices if the arena is built or the tax abatement is used to bring new industrial
development.'
Development policies have a considerable allure, but they also entail
social costs. In 1980, for example, the city of Detroit, suffering from high
unemployment, attempted to keep General Motors from locating a proposed
new plant elsewhere. To make it possible to build the new factory inside the
city, Detroit used its powers of eminent domain to clear a large tract of land
and turn it over to General Motors.
9. These tax abatement programs and other inducements to private developers have
been widespread and massive. For example, the New York State Commerce Department's
Job Incentive Board granted hundreds of millions of dollars in ten-year tax credits between
1975 and 1980, with beneficiaries including the Long Island newspaper Newsday ($16.2
million), Lehman Brothers ($3.4 million), Morgan Stanley ($5.6 million), Proctor &
Gamble ($14 million), Hooker Chemical Company ($40 million), Alien & Company ($1.3
million), and WKBW-TV ($1.7 million). For a discussion of the New York (and other) tax
abatement program and for a critical assessment of the use of tax abatements, see Tabb
(1984).
10. Eminent domain is "a government's right to take private property for the pub
lic's use," on payments of fair compensation (Shafritz 1988).
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Urban Politics and Policy
Under the terms of the clearance, eleven hundred homes (along with
146 schools, businesses, and churches) were razed in an old neighborhood
called Poletown (a sobriquet connoting the area's ethnic inhabitants). The new
factory built on the Poletown site was designed to provide six thousand new
jobs for auto workers. But choosing Poletown was an excruciating policy
decision. Should the city destroy an old neighborhood with its distinctive way
of life,its shops, its parish church, its houses that represented a lifetime of pride
and ownership, in order to bring new jobs to the city? Or should it risk the
almost certain outcome that an industry that had been a mainstay of Detroit's
employment for three-fourths of a century would relocate elsewhere?
In the end, despite mass demonstrations by the people of Poletown and
their angry and emotional appeals to save their way of life [The theory of
lifestyle and territory], the argument of the greatest good for the greatest num
ber prevailed. Poletown was torn down. But for those who once lived there,
the psychological scars remain. (For more details of the Poletown saga, see
Kantor and Savitch, 1993; for news reports of the event, see the New York
Times, March 15, 1981 and April 30, 1981.)
As the story of Poletown suggests, development policy aims at the com
mon good, but achieving the common good may have its price. To explore
this tension more fully, it will be useful to look at other examples of develop
ment policy. Doing so will further sketch the politics of making policy and
lead to an outline of the several stages of policy making.
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