Presented April 2009
Dr. Rami Gabriel
Psychology as human nature project
Modern experimental psychology, although it is rarely explicitly acknowledged,
is a human nature project – it aims to create a model of what it is to be human. Its method
is piecing together empirical evidence about the abilities that every human possesses into
a coherent picture of the functional structure of the human mind. Modern psychologists
claim the mind is caused by, or grounded in, a biological substrate, the body and more
specifically, the brain. Early evidence in favor of this approach in the last fifty years is
the successful mapping of a coherent and species-wide anatomical model of the human
brain. If the main characteristic all humans share is in fact the mind, then modern
psychology is a human nature project because it is the study of the mindbrain. In this
paper, I discuss the neural theory of human nature and some problems that this project
must face up to.
What kind of human nature project is the neural theory of modern psychology?
We can start by delineating what kind of project it is not. The neural theory is not
moralistic nor is it prescriptive, it is a description, so just like “little black box” is neither
moral nor prescriptive, the neural theory of human nature only goes beyond description in
two cases. It shades into a causal explanatory theory once we ask clinical questions, for
example, if a human brain acquires a lesion in the temporal lobe, what effects might one
encounter? An historical form of explanation is also available as the neural theory
includes an evolutionary portrait of the adapted mindbrain.1 The neural theory is not
totalizing, it simply describes the biological basis of the human form in terms of evolved
mental capacities. This means that interactional and environmental factors remain to be
studied by social scientists and ecologists.2 It also leaves room for a cultural sphere that
emerges from the interaction of human beings, the study of which belongs most
appropriately in the humanities as well as traditional social sciences (i.e. anthropology
and sociology). The basis of psychology as a human nature project is ontological
materialism and epistemological empiricism. It is only as politically involved as its
institutions and researchers although the project may take on more of a political edge
once it attains an undeniable level of certainty, which many think has already happened
and thus its findings are already included in the court of law3 and in popular culture.4
1
Although this element of the neural theory of human nature is controversial as there are
many difficulties in assessing whether a feature of the mindbrain is an adaptation or a
evolutionary byproduct (see for example the Spandrels debate between Richard Dawkins
and Stephen Jay Gould).
2
See the work of Richard Lewontin and other dialectical biologists.
3
Although see Curran and Gabriel (forthcoming, Journal of Consciousness Studies) on
how cognitive neuroscience has been used in the court of law and some prescriptions for
ameliorating how it is incorporated.
4
For example, Time magazine and New York Times frequently publish editorials or
feature articles about the evolved nature of the brain, especially after a controversial
paper comes out in Science, Nature, Nature and Neuroscience, or PNAS.
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Presented April 2009
Dr. Rami Gabriel
What does the project consist of? After describing the anatomy of the brain, the
next step is delineating the functions, or the abilities, of the mindbrain. Within the latter
task, a problem arises as to how to define what constitutes an “ability.” For example,
peripheral vision is a general ability, whereas seeing a 3D hologram is a specific ability
within vision. Where along this continuum of abilities should psychologists set their
sights? This is referred to by some as the domain general vs. domain specific problem
since it differentiates between abilities that target a specific adaptational problem and
abilities that solve a range of adaptational problems.
To put this into further perspective, consider; if psychologists aim to delineate a
human nature, then at the level of abilities we must find a common ground across cultural
and historical differences. This is a very hard and possibly irresolvable task since a
sufficient explanation of human nature must take place at a level prior to “extrabiological” (i.e. cultural) factors, if this is possible. Transhistorical and transcultural
“abilities” and behaviors are thus hard to demonstrate. That is why we suggest modern
psychology change the level at which it aims the search for human nature from “abilities”
to cellular and chemical processes that function prior to the level of conscious “abilities”.
For example, although my cultural sphere is vastly different from a Japanese person who
was alive in 1680, we do share the same set of brain chemicals (neurotransmitters), we
are obviously different in many ways, but at the level of the genome and neural structure
we are more or less the same. Jaak Panksepp, the founder of the field of Affective
Neuroscience, suggests that there are a number of low-level general abilities that are
shared across all humans and mammals: lust, play, fear, seeking, rage, care, and panic.
These nonconscious abilities are biologically grounded in evolutionarily developed
chemical neural systems. These basic processes are shared across all humans yet
manifest, and configure, differently depending on cultural circumstances. It is these basic
systems, rather than the specific domain general or domain specific abilities I spoke of
earlier that are the most appropriate level at which to describe the neural basis of human
nature. A notable element of using Panksepp’s basic affective processes as a basis for the
neural theory of human nature is that we humans share these evolved processes and brain
regions with all other mammals. Neural human nature can be further distinguished from
the neural nature of other animals by our unique neocortical structures including the
frontal lobe that seems to make possible our reflective, rational abilities.
In general, the neural model of human nature has much to its favor including
empirically testable claims, several viable future avenues of research, and a set of
educational institutions for learning, teaching, and research.
Caveats
Modern psychology claims it is possible to ground human nature in
neurochemistry because the latter is a biological level of reality prior to cultural factors.
Like previous human nature projects – for example Sigmund Freud’s attempt to explain
the structure and functioning of the human mind – there looms the problem of reification,
that is, the simplification of reality into things, or concepts, that may not be real.
The most obvious reifications in modern psychology are:
1) The use of the model of evolution to explain final causes, specifically, that the mind
was designed for biological purposes based on what is most beneficial for survival of the
organism and its genes.
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Presented April 2009
Dr. Rami Gabriel
2) The positing of mechanical and computational processes or metaphors.
3) The religious connotations of the study of Nature qua Science in which scientists play
the role of priests and Nature plays the role of God.
And finally, 4) The claim that our concepts pick out natural kinds, that the human
endeavor of science and rationality can carve nature at its joints.
Some thinkers argue these four forms of reification endanger the validity of the
neural model of human nature but there are convincing reasons why these worries are
misplaced. First of all, evolution has considerable success in explaining the origins and
structure of biological phenomena. Of course, to use evolutionary theory on the mind
entails that the mind – that great glass temple of stars and shaky shibboleths – is entirely
grounded in material phenomena. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, this seems to be
correct. Also, evolution is a natural science and there are separate compelling reasons to
welcome naturalism itself.5
The mechanical and computational reification is another worry but many in the
field of psychology are going beyond computational models, or are expanding
computational models to include a number of non-computational processes like
volumetric and dynamic modeling. The true challenge for the future is to find ways to
model fundamental processes that we do not have adequate metaphors to use as a basis
for modeling.6
In regards to the reification of Science – Science as the new Religion - I believe
that it is the job of philosophers of science to delineate exactly which questions do and do
not fall under the purview of science. That is, some questions do not seem to be capable
of being understood sufficiently through the scientific method, a notable example is
aesthetics. If we can understand which elements of Nature and culture are appropriately
understood through the scientific method and which are not, we can avoid the mistake of
reifying Science, which will be seen as one among many significant paths towards
knowledge. This will require that humanities scholars accept scientific findings and
appropriately delineate how the cultural sphere while depending on material phenomenon
is primarily constituted by emergent entities best understood through the discursive
method. It will also require scientists give due weight and space to other levels of reality
whose explanations and explorations are incommensurate with the scientific method.
These steps are only possible through respect, experience across fields of study, and a
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There are four sets of reasons for adopting naturalism. One is historical: it is the success
of the hypothetico-deductive model and the rise of science (through thinkers such as
Francis Bacon and Giordano Bruno), which led to a corresponding loss of faith in
supernatural explanation. Another argument for naturalism is pragmatic, Galileo claimed
that of Aristotle’s four causes (material, formal, efficient, and final), only the material
and formal causes could be tested, this is similar to Newton’s reasoning such that we
should proceed upon the assumption of materialism because we are able to gain traction
on problems through the empirical naturalist method. Epistemologically, Hume, and Kant
to some extent, argued that naturalism leads to better knowledge than supernaturalism.
Ontologically, more radical claims were made for naturalism by La Mettrie, with his
notion that man is a machine, and Feuerbach with his espousal of dialectical materialism.
6
For example, models that require multiple dimensions of space and time, etc,
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Presented April 2009
Dr. Rami Gabriel
great dose of humility in the face of the incredible world, this incredible society, and the
incredible mind.
As to the reification of rationality, once we understand the limitations of our
cognitive processes, we must trust them within those bounds. Even if rationality proves to
be fundamentally incapable of representing the world, we are nevertheless tied to it, and a
life lived in distrust of the basic capacities of the human mind is bound to be a life of
nihilism and moral decay. Furthermore, the conclusions we inevitably draw will apply to
reason and the human mind regardless of the veridicality of those conclusions, so whether
or not the mind can represent reality in itself, reason is all we have to interface with the
world, so it will have to do, if not on the deep ontological level - which may remain a
transcendent and ephemeral absolute - then on a pragmatic day-to-day level.
One more issue needs to be raised concerning the downfall of past human nature
projects, namely that the individuals and groups who put forth the definition of human
nature must not be from solely one sector of society. Due to the injustices carried out in
the name of human nature, most recently in the early twentieth century with social
Darwinism, human nature projects have been, in an unspoken manner, off limits. The
way to surmount this worry is that in the case of the neural theory of human nature, the
empirical evidence must be beyond differences of opinion, it must be a solid actuality
that cannot be mistaken or manipulated in itself, the way this can be achieved is through
empirical replication and a broadening of the pool of scientists.
To explain or not to explain?
My final point is that although some view the debate on human nature as the old
human sciences debate of can we explain ourselves, I believe the real question at this
point is, do we want an explanation of ourselves?
This is a question of responsibility and meaning, an ethical question. At some
level, we each answer it according to what we want the truth to be. We can answer it with
our hearts, with our minds, or with our loins, that is, with what we feel is right, with what
seems to be logically correct, or with what we wish were true. Some deny explanation
because it treads on the mystery of life, while some embrace our present historical
moment. For modern psychologists, human nature will be a description of neural,
chemical, and electrical circuitry. The magic that is humanity will not be explained away
– just like the fresh taste of water did not change after it was revealed to be two Hydrogen
atoms and one Oxygen atom. Nor will the wide range of possibilities that humans can
manifest be limited by this knowledge. The explanation of human nature as a set of
neural processes will simply provide us with the mechanical backdrop that under girds
the value-ridden extra-biological forces we each bring to this ever so short cosmic waltz.
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