Journal of Research in Peace, Gender and Development Vol. 1(4) pp. 121-128, May 2011
Available online@ http://www.interesjournals.org/JRPGD
Copyright © 2011 International Research Journals
Review
Elections and conflict prevention in post conflict
societies
Kiven James Kewir (MA, PGD, BSc) and Banlilon Victor Tani (PHD)
Department of Political Science and Public Administration University of Buea P.O BOX 63, Buea, Cameroon.
Accepted 19 May, 2011
Elections in post-conflict societies have been increasingly used since 1992 in an effort to end
wars but more importantly, to prevent the re-emergence of hostilities. This paper focuses on the
role of elections in preventing the return of violence in post conflict societies. It examines two
cases, namely El Salvador and Angola, where they have been introduced or used after conflict to
safeguard peace. It shows that while they are not a panacea for conflict prevention in countries
that have experienced violent conflict, they do provide a real opportunity to build more cordial
relations between parties, a government resting on the popular will of the people and hence an
opportunity to prevent the return of destructive conflict.
Key words: Elections, Conflict prevention, post conflict societies, cordial relations.
INTRODUCTION
Post-conflict peace is very fragile. Over half of the world’s
civil wars are due to post conflict relapses (Collier, 2003).
Thus taking steps to prevent the relapse into conflict in
societies emerging out of destructive conflict should be
treated as a priority by the post-conflict governments and
the international community. Conflict prevention involves
primarily all efforts to identify underlying causes, clear
misperceptions and mistrust, seeking frameworks to
which parties can agree and developing capacity for
conflict transformation.
Several approaches have been advanced as to how
conflict can be avoided in post conflict societies. These
can be broadly classified under political and
economic/developmental methods. While economic views
lay emphasis on the improvement of the purchasing
power of households and reconstruction, political
approaches are rooted in the argument that power
struggles are the main feature of post conflict situations.
As such, political issues such as election and generally
democracy and democratic values are given priority in the
latter case.
The introduction of elections in societies emerging out
*Corresponding Author E-mail: jameskewir@gmail.com
of destructive conflict has been a core element in conflict
prevention efforts since 1990. Although literature
abounds on the importance of post conflict elections for
preventing a relapse into conflict, the debate is far from
being settled. Recent election outcomes like the Ivorian
election of 2010 are a clear indication that simply
organising elections in a post conflict setting may not
suffice to resolve the crisis. To better understand whether
there are specific conditions under which elections in
countries emerging out of destructive conflict need to be
organised to have the desired effect, a comparative
review of cases where they have been used can be very
useful. El Salvador and Angola are good examples that
can be used in such and enquiry.
These cases are chosen because in both, the conflict
led to the loss of thousands of lives. Also elections were
used in both in an effort to end the conflicts sustainably.
Furthermore, the international community was involved in
efforts to resolve both conflicts. However, the introduction
of elections appears to have had different outcomes. An
examination of such cases may thus reveal the reasons
why elections fail or succeed in preventing the return of
hostilities in post-conflict states.
The main aim of this paper is therefore to examine the
role of elections in preventing the return of violent conflict
in post conflict societies. The foregoing is an introduction
122 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
which is the first part, it is followed by part II which
examines the relationship between democracy and
elections and situates the study within a theoretical
frame. Part III examines the nature of post conflict states.
Part IV looks at the experience with post conflict elections
in El Salvador and Angola with emphasis on the lessons
that can be drawn from the two cases. The last part
concludes the paper.
Elections and Democracy
Elections can be defined as the symbolic competitive,
periodic, inclusive, definitive processes in which the chief
decision-makers in a government are selected by citizens
who enjoy broad freedom to criticize government, to
publish their criticism and to present alternatives
(Kirkpatrick J). Although three common types of electoral
systems can be identified, namely: proportional
representation, majority system and the mixed electoral
system a relevant distinction applicable to post conflict
situations can be done to differentiate between
democratic and staged or undemocratic elections. This
distinction is important because it has been observed that
of all three electoral systems motioned above, none
appears to be more democratic than the other. The
definition of elections given above thus describes
democratic elections, whether in a proportional, majority
or mixed system. Undemocratic elections usually lack
one or more of the adjectives used to describe elections
above. It should be noted that when people use the term
election, they more often mean democratic elections.
Democratic peace theory is thus one of the major
reasons for supporting the use of elections to advance
peace in post conflict scenarios. This especially as
elections can be considered a key component in
democratic practice. Democracy has even been confused
with if not described as elections by some scholars.
Friedrich Hayek (in Peacock M. 2004) argued in this light
that:
Whenever it is necessary that one of several
conflicting opinions should prevail and when one would
have to be made to prevail by force if need be, it is less
wasteful to determine which has the stronger support by
counting numbers than by fighting. Democracy is the only
method of peaceful change that man has yet been
discovered.
Similarly or better more explicitly, Aaron Wildavsky
(1994 in Rist R. 1994) defined democracy as the
“willingness to leave office when defeated in the polls.”
He considered the “alternation of political parties in office”
as the criterion for the existence of democracy.
Although this paper does not consider democracy as
elections, it is important to underscore this strong
relationship between democracy and elections for a
better understanding of the subject of this work. We shall
thus consider democracy as a form of government where
there exist constitutional safeguards for individual and
political rights, the independence of the courts and free
and fair elections. A distinction can be made between two
types of democracy- representative and direct
democracy. Direct democracy is often described as true
democracy. It involves the direct choosing or sanctioning
of leaders and the involvement of citizens in rule making.
Supporters of direct democracy like Wilcox (1912 in
Dinan, 2007) believed that direct democracy will protect
citizens from the special interest of a minority, while the
term representative democracy is used to describe a
government in which power is wielded by the people and
exercised indirectly through elected representatives who
make decisions (Milkis, 2007). The latter type of
democracy, which is also often dubbed as majority rule is
the most widely used variant in the contemporary
situation.
Theoretical Framework
Efforts to consolidate peace in countries emerging out of
conflict through election have been largely inspired by
democratic peace theory. Proponents of this theory like
Rummel R. and Lyons T. are among those who will
fervently defend the use of elections in post conflict
societies as a means of preventing a relapse into conflict.
These scholars argue that democracies are stable, rarely
go to war and do not fight each other (Rummel, 1997).
Although the democratic peace theory was initially used
to examine the problem of inter-state conflict, recent
studies have found it relevant in studying internal
conflicts. (Ramsbotham et al., 2005) for example argue
that ‘there is evidence that settled democracies are less
prone to civil wars than other regime types.’ It should
however be noted that other theories like the human
needs theory and Edward Azar’s theory of protracted
Social conflict also offer opportunities for analysis. Thus it
can be argued in the light of human needs theorists like
John Burton for example that the failure to ensure that
human needs like security and housing in post-conflict
states will indefinitely lead to the return of hostilities or in
Azar’s perspective that in protracted social conflict, the
identity group is the most basic unit of analysis. Hence
the reason why violence returns is tied to the relationship
between identity groups and the states. Democratic
peace theory offers a way out of both problems since it
can be argued that the needs of people will more likely be
met where they have the opportunity to choose those that
will best represent their interests. Furthermore, when it is
very likely that another party will be in power other than
the incumbent’s, more can be done by the latter to make
their return to the helm of affairs possible in future. In this
manner, it is more beneficial to take into consideration the
interests of as many people as possible including those
from minority identity groups because every vote counts
in a democratic dispensation. It is in this light that Okene
Kiven and Banlilon 123
A. ( in Yakubu; deboye et al., 2005) observed in the case
of Nigeria that:
… identity based conflicts are not entirely due to multiethnic or multi-cultural nature of Nigeria. If anything,
violent conflicts, more oftern are caused by the
undemocratic activities of the nations ruling class who
transcends the normal democratic curve to become
autocratic, employing divide and rule system, excluding
large segments of the populace from politicoadministrative participation, failing to protect the people’s
liberties and indeed denying the public good and benefit
from equal access to social provisions and economic
resources of the nation.
It will thus be tempting to argue that democratization
in post conflict states is a potent means of preventing the
recurrence of civil strife. This democratisation takes the
form of creating democratic institutions that will transform
avenues of conflict into opportunities of legitimate political
and legal contestation. Thus since elections can be seen
at least as the central benchmark of democratic
representative governments, recent practice in conflict
prevention in post-crisis situations has been to employ
them as a first step toward democratisation.
Experiences in conflict prevention in countries
emerging out of crisis also show that elections have been
increasingly used since 1990. Examples include Angola
in 1992, Cambodia in 1993, Mozambique in 1994, El
Salvador in 1994, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996,
Liberia in 1997, the Democratic Republic of Congo in
1996, Tajikistan in 1999-2000 (Lyons, 2004), Ivory Coast
in 2010 and the Central African Republic in 2011. The
democratic peace theory is therefore very suitable for
understanding conflict prevention efforts in states
emerging out of destructive conflict.
The Nature of Post Conflict States
As Diamond has argued, the major challenge to efforts at
preventing conflict in post conflict states is not only where
relevant, how to pressure authoritarian state leaders to
surrender power (e.g. Liberia) but rather how to
regenerate legitimate political power (Diamond, 2006).
We can identify three types of post conflict situations
which most probably require different levels of effort and
perhaps different recipes for successful prevention.
First, are post-conflict states in which one of the
parties emerges victorious over the other(s). In this case,
experience shows that elections and much less
democracy will have little or no chance to triumph as the
victory of one party leads to the reinstitution of autocratic
rule or the replacement of one form of autocracy with
another- a good case in point is the post-conflict situation
in the DRC after the overthrow of Mobutu S. by Kabila L.
D., 1997-2001 (Weiss, 2004). Second, we can isolate
post conflict states in which there exist a patchwork of
warlords and armies with no real central power as in
Somalia or with a very weak state government as in
Afghanistan (Diamond, 2006). Here, organised authority
is difficult to establish and the conflict may wax and wane
in decentralised fashion as in Iraq today. Situations
where the problem of stateness exists fall within this
category. This means that there is very little attachment
to the state by a group(s) or typically that the monopoly of
the use of force to maintain the rule of law is lost. Linz
and Stephen (1996) see this problem of stateness as the
main obstacle to democratic consolidation in transition
states. Third is the case where an international actor or
group of actors intervenes temporarily to provide some
transitional political and coercive leadership (Diamond,
2006).
These different cases give us an insight into the
caution that needs to be exercised when seeking
solutions for prevention in post conflict settings. While we
can qualify post conflict settings generally as being
delicate, three aspects are worthy of mention. In the first
instance, these states have weak institutions that have
suffered wreckage from the conflict, the widespread
corruption that usually comes with conflict and economic
crisis. Second, these states lack social capital
(http://www.infed.org/biblio/social_capital.htm ) and the
usually much needed human expertise, required to
address fully the complex issues of economic growth, the
pacific resolution of crisis and conflict prevention. Most
often, these valuable human resources are marginalised
or in exile (brain drain) as a result of suspicion, fear, bad
governance and economic constraints just to name a few
(Ould-Abdalah, 2007). Third, countries emerging out of
violent conflict do not only have difficulties with mobilising
national resources, they often have very limited financial
and infrastructural resources at their disposal. It is often
argued that the international community should play a
role in organising available resources and providing
additional material support (Ould-Abdalah, 2007).
It is in the context of such circumstances that postconflict elections are thought to be useful in preventing a
relapse into conflict. To critically analyse this argument,
we shall in discussing the selected cases seek to
understand the political and social context in which the
elections took place, how the elections contributed to
furthering/promoting or undermining democratisation and
more specifically preventing further conflict and the
lessons that each case inspires.
Post Conflict Elections in El Salvador and Angola
Angola and El Salvador both witnessed post-conflict
elections in 1992, after negotiated cease fire agreements
that were encouraged or even influenced by the
international community including most especially the
United States of America and the United Nations (UN).
While these elections were successful in El Salvador,
they failed to cement the moment of peace that the
124 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
Peace Accords had occasioned in Angola. Thus following
the discussion on the nature of post-conflict states, a
closer look at these two cases can enable us have a
clearer view on the question of the role of elections in
promoting the post-conflict peace process.
The Salvadoran Post Conflict Elections
El Salvador is a Central American state, bordering the
North Pacific, between Guatemala and Honduras, that
gained independence from Spain in 1821 and from the
Central
American
Federation
in
1839
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/print/es.html). It has a total surface area of
2
2
21,040 km of which water occupies 320 km . El Salvador
has a population of 60,704,932 (July 2005 est.). The
Population is made up of Metizo: 90%, White: 9% and
American Indian: 1%. Salvadorans are of Roman
Catholic: 87% or Protestant faith: 14% and speak English
and/or
Nahua
(http://www.chron.com/content/interactive/special/humanr
ights/elsalvador/overview.html).
The worldwide depression and the consequent fall in
coffee prices in the 1930s had a damaging impact on the
economy and primarily on the Campresinos, already
living under extreme poverty. Most of the population
relied on earnings that coffee trade generated and most
of the land was used for its production. Thus the
depression made it difficult for most Salvadorans to buy
or grow food.
The increasing extreme misery that came with this
situation culminated in clashes between the elite and the
poor disenfranchised masses of the Campresinos in
1932, putting an end to the relatively peaceful rule of the
coffee republic that had reigned from 1927-1929 under
President
Pio
Romero
Bosque
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2033.htm). For over six
decades, the country suffered from bad rule and violence.
Sustainable peace was only given a chance when the
intervention of the international community led to the
signing of a Peace Agreement on 16 January 1992
(http://www.usip.org/library/pa/el_salvador/pa_es_011619
92_doc.html) between the government and the leftist
rebels. This especially as the agreements addressed key
roots to the crisis like land redistribution, respect for
human rights and freedoms, effective demilitarisation and
political inclusion. Consequently, the post-conflict
elections that followed in the same year, saw the
participation of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la
Liberación Nacional party (FMLN), the main opposition
party. In particular, the consultative mechanisms set up
under the agreements helped give the elections the
necessary representative touch that should characterise
what we prefer to call “democratic or positive post-conflict
elections” as against “undemocratic, false or staged postconflict elections.” It is certainly for this reason that as
Lyons T. observed, voters “went to the polls with greater
confidence in the peace process and less fear that the
war would return, allowing them to perceive a greater
range of choice in selecting a candidate to support.”
Thus, that the ruling party won the elections did not lead
to a return to violence or the denial of results by the
opposition that won a significant representation in the
government. All this has led to a reasonably effective
democratic system.
As has been observed above, the root causes of the
Salvadoran crisis lay in the patterns of economic social
and political exclusion that developed after 1929. The
1992 elections in El Salvador served as a gateway to
more inclusive political practice and also created
circumstances enabling more equitable exploitation of the
countries economic resources and facilitating social
inclusion. After the elections for example, the mandate of
the regular army was limited to defence. The FMLN gave
up completely all insurgent activities and its combatants
were integrated into the police force. This new police
force deployed its first forces in March 1993, and was
present
throughout
the
country
by
1994
(http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/el_salvado
r_0399_bgn.html). Furthermore, land was distributed to
ex-combatants of both sides including supporters of the
FMLN. With at least a minimum of effort done to
demilitarise politics and provide for more social justice
notably through the distribution of land, democratisation
and hence peace was given a chance. Even more
inclusive elections were held in 1994, 1997 and 2000 that
saw the FMLN wining an increasing number of legislative
seats and municipal elections in 1997 and 2000 (Wood,
2003). The results of the 2006 legislative elections in
which the FMLN won 32 against 34 seats for the ruling
ARENA, showed that the elections have remained
competitive and recognised as a convenient way for
impacting governance and contesting for power. The
sixth municipal and legislative elections held this January
2009 with the opposition FMLN winning (FMLN wins
majority in El Salvador Election, CNN January 19th, 2009
10:08AM) are a clear confirmation of this position. The
victory of the FMLN in the presidential elections that
followed with the first non combatant at its head, Mauricio
Funes is a clear indication that Salvadorians have chosen
the ballots and not bullets as a way of capturing and
wielding political power. Thus it can be said that the
significant democratic character of the 1992 post conflict
elections in El Salvador helped deepen the peace
process that started with the Peace Accords of January
1992 and thereby preventing the return of violence
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2033.htm).
The
Salvadoran experience of post-conflict elections contrasts
that of Angola for several reasons. In the discussion of
the Angolan experience that follows, an effort is made to
identify the reasons why the 1992 elections in Angola did
not mark the start of a sustainable democratisation
process and hence consolidate peace.
Kiven and Banlilon 125
The Angolan Post-Conflict Elections of 1992
The Republic of Angola is a Southern African state
bordering the South Atlantic Ocean, to the North East by
the Congo and the DRC, to the East by the Zambia and
Namibia to the South. It has a total surface area of
481,350 km2. Most of the land is desert or savannah with
some hard forest to the North East. The population of
Angola was estimated in 2007 at 12,263,596. The official
language in Angola is Portuguese. Religions include:
Indigenous 47%, Roman Catholic 38%, Protestant 15%
(1998 est.). The economy is primarily agrarian, 85% with
industry taking the other 15%. The main industries are
petroleum; diamonds, iron ore, phosphates, feldspar,
bauxite, uranium, and gold; cement; basic metal
products; fish processing; food processing, brewing and
tobacco.
Angola entered into a civil war at independence in
1975 with the dissident National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) as the
major opponents.
In May 1991, a ceasefire agreement was reached
after over two decades of armed struggle with the United
States, Portugal, the Soviet Union, and the United
Nations playing a major role (Cohen, 1992). This enabled
the first multiparty twin elections to be held on September
29 and 30, 1992 under the auspices of Angola’s National
Electoral Council (NEC) in the presence of international
monitors (Ibid Cohen). The cease fire however was very
short lived as violence returned after elections failed. The
legislative elections were conclusive but presidential
elections raised a conflict of credibility. No candidate
obtained 50% of the votes and a second round was
envisaged this time between the two most popular parties
to separate Jonas Savimbi (UNITA) from Dos Santos
(MPLA). Unfortunately, this second round never held as
Savimbi refused to recognise the results of the first round
accusing the government of rigging. In October 1992, the
cease fire was violated by the UNITA, ceasing certain
districts as a result of this stalemate. Nonetheless,
elections remained or continued to be perceived by both
the international community and Angolans as crucial for a
sustainable peace process. In support of this position,
Secretary Cohen (1992) for example stated that “A
presidential runoff election, as expressly prescribed by
the peace accords and the electoral law, is essential to
bringing the peace process to a closure and installing a
legitimate new government.” Thus on 15 November 1994
a Protocol was signed by UNITA and the MPLA in the
presence of representatives of observer states of the
Angolan Peace Process: the United States, Portugal and
the Russian Federation to conclude the implementation
of the “Acordos de Paz para Angola” signed on 31 May
1991 in Lisbon. This protocol emphasized the need for
the second round of the Presidential elections to be held
with the UN required this time to ensure their proper
organisation
(http://usip.org/library/pa/anglola/lusaka_11151994_anex.
html#7). The 1994 Protocol also envisaged a coalition
government and sought by this to achieve effective
demilitarisation. However the country only experience an
uneasy peace for four years as Savimbi again defied the
terms of the new accord, resisting demilitarisation of his
fighters, holding on his strongholds and even taking more
territory. Elections were planned for 1997 but were
repeatedly delayed. Legislative elections were finally held
in September 2009 with the Ruling MPLA winning about
82% of the votes cast. Presidential elections are
expected
to
hold
in
2009
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6201093.stm).
Savimbi was killed by government troops on the 22,
February 2002. Following this event, rebel leaders signed
a peace deal with the government on April 4, ending 30
years of Civil War that by this time left over half a million
Angolans faced with starvation. More recently in August
2006, a peace deal was signed with separatist rebels
from the Cabinda region. This deal ended the clash that
has been called Angola's “forgotten war.” About 65% of
Angola's oil comes from this region.
Commenting on the 2002 peace deal and the need for
democratic elections for a realistic peace process in the
new post conflict order, Adalberto Costa, Spokesperson
for the former insurgent group UNITA told the French
News Agency AFP that if 2002 marked the end of the civil
war, then President Dos Santos will have been exercising
power without legitimacy for seven years by 2009
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6201093.stm).
This view clearly shows that despite the poor experience
of the 1992 elections, Angolan’s like most international
observers believe that successful elections will be the
most appropriate means of legitimising rule and thus
effectively preventing the return of violent conflict.
It is evident from the above recount of the Angolan
situation that unlike that of El Salvador, the peace
accords of 1991 and the efforts to facilitate their
implementation with Protocol of 1994 did not lead to the
establishment of important pre-election conditions that
would guarantee successful post-conflict elections. While
for example it can be argued that whereas minimal preelection conditions were met in El Salvador before the
elections as seen above, this was not the case in Angola.
We can from the foregoing identify reconciliation, a
credible
transitional
administration,
effective
demilitarisation, the use of positive rhetoric in
campaigning, a satisfactory degree of collaboration and a
trusted body to organise elections as determining
elements of good pre-election conditions.
a) Reconciliation for example, helps ensure that all
parties believe and accept as fair and free, the electoral
process and its outcome. Reconciliation here means a
b) sum
of
activities
(http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/reconciliation/)
from meetings to concessions that culminate in parties to
126 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
c) a conflict agreeing and working in a relatively
harmonious way to achieving peace with each trusting in
the institutions and processes put in place for this
purpose. It must often be distinguished from forgiveness
which goes beyond parties collaborating for peace and
accepting to tolerate each other to endeavouring to view
the offender with benevolence, compassion and even
love (Enright and Fitzgibbons, 2000). Stressing how this
absence of reconciliation affected the efforts made
towards having successful elections in the Angolan
situation, Secretary Cohen (1992) stated that “Most
evident and troubling was each side’s refusal or inability
to give meaning or direction to serious national
reconciliation--the key and irreducible goal in this
process.” The main protagonists in Angola therefore
remained protective of sectional interests, whereas in El
Salvador, there was a strong belief that nothing more
could be done about the past other than burying it and
moving on. Amnesty thus served in here as the backbone
of the reconciliation process as people were able to
engage with each other and vote not on sectional lines
but in directions they thought best for national interests.
d) A credible transitional administration helps pull
resources that could well be dubbed national under a
trusted body. Control and accountability helps secure
more resources for the electoral process. Such and
administration thus serves to assure parties that
resources will be equitably distributed. In Angola for
example, the parties failed to set-up a credible transitional
or cease fire administration trusted by all. Savimbi for
example continued to control the about 80% of the
Country’s diamond trade (Special U.N. envoy Alioune
Blondin Beye, September 20, 1997 on CNN news). This
would not have been so if he trusted the pre-election
administration that followed the cease fire. The Cabinda
rebels also continued the cessationist war in Angola.
These raise questions as to whether the problem of
stateness and or whether resources were not major
factors in the failure of elections in Angola. However, it
can be observed that Angolans’ despite ethnic diffences
like Salvadorans’ fairly believe they are a nation. The
electoral process would have thus been more successful
in Angola if all parties participated satisfactorily in the
making of the transitional administration. Also, it will be
wrong as considered above to consider economic factors
or resources as a reason for the failure or success of
elections in these cases. The temptation will be to
assume that the process succeeded in El Salvador
because of a near lack of resources. The implications of
the reforms that accompanied the electoral process
meant that privileged landowners and supporters of the
ruling ARENA party will surrender some of the land they
controlled in due course. Land is historically a very
treasured resource and it should be expected that where
e) parties in a post-conflict situation are not ready to
recognise the authority of a fair enough transitional
administration over resources they controlled, elections
may be tainted with hostility especially where such
resources are likely be redistributed.
f)
Demilitarisation is very important as a preelection condition in countries emerging out of destructive
conflict, that it cannot be considered optional. The
temptation of using the gun to is strong when elections
are being prepared with the parties still fully armed. One
of the reasons why the Angolan elections for instance
were not successful is thus arguably that demilitarisation
was not achieved as was the case in El Salvador before
the elections.
g) Also worthy of mention is the need for `measured
language` to be used by all parties in electoral
campaigns. That is, subversive electoral campaign
rhetoric needs to be discouraged as it stirs fear of the
other and could easily attract violence under the delicate
environment of post-conflict states. Efforts should thus be
made to ensure that candidates to the elections do not
prefer threatening language or abusive language as a
way of swaying to their side the votes. In Angola for
example, the negative campaign rhetoric of Savimbi and
to a lesser extent that of Dos Santos reinforced the
legacy of fear that needs to be contained for post conflict
elections to be successful. This was reflected in
Secretary Cohens (1992) position that “Another essential
step that the parties must take to reduce the high level of
tension is to put an immediate end to inflammatory
rhetoric.” Similarly, Lyons (2004) asserted that “In a
context of high mistrust, parties fear that their opponent
will capture the electoral commission and tilt the rules.”
h) Another important requirement for successful
post conflict elections which is very much related to
others above is the need for collaboration. Considering
how this affects the electoral situation we can observe
that in Angola, there was very little contact and probably
no willingness by both Savimbi and Dos Santos to
collaborate, not to mention sharing power. This near
absence of collaboration reinforced in the MPLA a winner
take all attitude that post-conflict electoral efforts need to
prevent as the example of El Salvador shows, to ensure
success. This can be understood because losers may
prefer war as an occupation to return to, rather than an
uneventful civilian life with no guarantees on their means
of subsistence.
i)
Finally the elections commission should be
constituted and run in a manner endorseable by all
contenders. The extent to which the body organising the
elections is accepted helps ensure that they have a
definitive outcome. From the above examples it can be
seen that the Angolan elections commission unlike that of
El Salvador was not constituted and run in a manner
open, participatory and independent enough to prevent
conflict over election results. This was worsened by the
delay in the vote counting and the piecemeal manner in
which the partial results were released.
Kiven and Banlilon 127
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
The above examples and arguments show that post
conflict elections more than anything else paved the way
for sustainable peace in El Salvador but failed to create
an atmosphere where future conflicts can be resolved
peacefully in Angola. The geographical and economic
picture of these countries as presented and in particular
the dynamics of the post conflict electoral process brings
out in the former case the reasons for success and in the
latter, the reasons for failure. Considering the alternative
terminology used to distinguish between elections earlier
on, the Angolan election fits in the category of staged or
undemocratic elections while those in El Salvador can be
considered democratic.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that organising
democratic elections may not suffice to prevent conflict.
At least implicit in the analysis is also the idea that
poverty and other economic factors postulated by the
economic model impact on the outcome of elections.
These factors therefore also need to be addressed in the
post election period to prevent a relapse into conflict. It is
also worthy to recommend that the post conflict
transitional/interim administration should be neutral
enough and powerful enough to enforce the minimum of
collaborative process. In particular the credibility of the
electoral commission should be determined at all stages
by all the major parties. In support of this, Lyons argues
that “ex-militias and political parties recognise that the
rules and administrative bodies that manage how an
election will be run have implications for their political
aspirations.” In extreme cases, the lives of losers depend
on these rules. More also demilitarisation should not be
considered an option but a must. Consultative processes
are required to transform militias into political parties and
address the special needs of former child soldiers in a
way that ensures their transformation into responsible
adults either through training and integration into public
services upon maturity or support and monitoring of
creative individual business and other productive
ventures.
Thus while this paper does not purport to present
elections as a panacea for preventing the return of
hostilities in countries emerging from violent conflict, it is
clear that when organised appropriately they can provide
a real opportunity for sustainable peace as other
experiences apart from El Salvador like Mozambique,
1993 (Lyons T. 2004) and recently Liberia October 2005
(http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3646),
among others, demonstrate. It is indeed difficult to
imagine a process other than elections with the same
capacity for legitimising leadership and restoring
collaborative relations between representatives of
different parties in a post conflict situation.
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