Journal Research in Peace, Gender and Development (JRPGD) Vol. 4(1) pp. 8-14, February, 2014
DOI: http:/dx.doi.org/10.14303/jrpgd.2014.007
Available online http://www.interesjournals.org/ JRPGD
Copyright © 2014 International Research Journals
Review
Citizenship, indigeneship and settlership crisis in
Nigeria: understanding the dynamics of Wukari crisis
1
Jaja Nwanegbo, *2Jude Odigbo and 3Ngara Christopher Ochanja
1,*2
Department of Political Science, Federal University, Wukari, Wukari- Nigeria.
National Institute for Legislative Studies, National Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria.
*Corresponding author email: judeodigbo@gmail.com; +2348037549721
3
ABSTRACT
This study examined citizenship, indigeneship and settlership crisis in Nigeria with a view to explaining
the violent conflicts of February and May 2013 in Wukari, Taraba State. The paper contended that the
several inter-ethnic conflicts between the Junkuns and the Tivs, Kutebs, and the Hausa settlers in the
past were significant in shaping the dynamics of the recent Wukari crisis. It adopted focus group
discussions, observation technique as well as secondary method of data analysis. With the aid of
Marx’s conflict view point, the paper argued that the Wukari crisis was as a result of accumulated
grievances, anger and frustration arising from suspicion, mutual distrust and manipulative indigeneship
and citizenship status in the struggle for power and scarce communal resources between minority
Jukun Muslims and majority Jukun Christians cum Traditionalists. The paper recommended that
government at all levels and Wukari community leaders would collaborate and constitute a joint
reconciliatory panel to resolve outstanding grievances through dialogue and town hall meetings and
ensure that relevant laws are reviewed in the on-going constitutional amendment process to give all
Nigerians sense of belonging wherever they reside. It also recommended the establishment of mass
media outfit to bridge information gap among the people.
Keywords: Indigenship, Settlership, Citizenship, Crisis and Wukari.
INTRODUCTION
Globally, communal crisis, religious, ethnic, inter and
intra-state conflicts appear to have remained the most
destabilizing feature of politics in the third world countries
especially in Africa. In Nigeria, since the return to civil
rule in 1999, domestic instability arising from ethnoreligious, inter and intra communal conflicts of varying
degrees and dimensions have been recorded. The
implications of these crises to national security,
development and democratic survival and consolidation
are well captured in the works of Jega, (2002); Osaghae
and Suberu, (2005); Nwaomah, (2011); Egwu, (2013);
Nwanegbo (2012); Salawu, (2010); Osaghae, (1992);
Fawole and Bello, (2011); Imobighe, (2003); and Egwu
(2003). The humanitarian tragedies that have
accompanied these ethno-religious violence have been
prohibitive (Egwu, 2013:26; Nwanegbo 2012:29). Studies
over the years have shown that indigene/ settler
dichotomy and issues of citizenship that is rooted in the
nebulous national constitutional misconstruction and
discriminatory tendencies of elitist politics have been the
reinforcing factors for ethno-communal violence in
Nigeria (see Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010; Aluaigba, 2008).
Thus, the political use and misuse of citizenship and
indigeneship has promoted dual conceptual explanations
and application of the notion of indigeneity. In this regard,
a Nigerian citizen may be excluded or denied
opportunities in Nigeria owing to his/her parental
genealogy. Nigerians, who have their ethnic genealogy
elsewhere, even if they were born in a particular state or
lived all their lives there, are regarded as “settlers”
(Ibrahim, 2006). This discriminatory tendency especially
at the local levels has been a major and potential source
of conflict. For instance, discrimination on the basis of
indigeneship or citizenship is quiet problematic because it
is directly tied to individual or group access to societal
resources including political opportunities. This has
Nwanegbo et al. 9
served to further sharpen the “we” and the “you” divide.
It should be noted that ethnic conflicts in 1959, 1980,
1990, 1994, 1991, 1992 and 2001 between the Jukuns
and the Tivs, Kutebs and Hausa settlers have had far
reaching impact on the Jukuns people (see Mustapha
2002). Today, the popular use of indigene/settler as a
means of discriminating against other ethnic groups or
separating owners of the land from migrants has become
an important factor in the socio-political life of the Jukun
society. In fact, for the Christian Jukuns and the
traditionalists, the Jukuns/Hausa Muslims are settlers and
should be prevented from playing central role in the
affairs of the Jukuns and/or partaking in opportunities
meant for the Jukuns. Conversely, Jukun Muslims or
those
with
Hausa
blood
(regarded
by
the
Christian/Traditionalists Jukuns as Hausa people) have
equally strong claim to the Jukun society as land of their
paternal or maternal ancestry and thus see themselves
as equal stakeholders in all Jukun affairs. These
discriminatory tendencies over the years have led to the
buildup of accumulated grievances and tension among
the Jukuns. Thus, the football argument that led to the
gruesome murder of a non Muslim youth on the football
pitch on the February 23, 2013 and the consequent
violence was just a trigger that unbounded long years of
mutual anger, frustration, suspicion and mistrust.
The crises led to massive human and material
destruction. Till date, the number of casualties have not
been ascertained especially when evidences on ground
surpass the number of people reported to have been
killed. The crisis dislocated many families, shut down
businesses and property worth millions were destroyed.
An even more disturbing fact is that residency in Wukari
town is now patterned along religious divide. While the
Christian/traditionalists Jukuns occupy the part of the
town (regarded as the main Jukun land), the Jukun
Muslim/ Hausa settlers occupy the other parts (regarded
as the settler’s quarters).
Indeed, the above scenario has raised fundamental
questions on what constitutes citizenship in Nigeria. What
are the implications and dangers associated with the
usage and application of indigene-settler issues? Is it to
limit individuals or group access to community resources
and dispensation of political opportunities? What is
responsible for misconception and juxtaposition of
citizenship with indigeneship in Nigeria? To what extent
has this contradiction sustained perennial conflicts in
Wukari? The aim of this study is to examine the historical
experiences of Jukuns ethno-religious conflicts with their
neighbors with a view to determining how this history has
contributed to the recent fratricidal conflicts in Wukari
between Christian/Traditionalists Jukun on one side and
Jukun Muslims and Hausa settlers on the other.
Problematizing Citizenship in Nigeria
In most recent years, there has been unimaginable high
spate of conflicts in Nigeria and the threat of others
(Nwanegbo, 2012:24). It is undisputable fact that millions
of Nigerians find themselves living in states, communities
or among ethnic groups they have ever known. This
situation is not peculiar to a particular zone, region or
place. In fact, different ethnic nationalities have
conceived and adapted different attitudes to what
connotes citizenship in Nigeria, making effort at resolving
citizenship problems almost impossible.
Thus, constitutional loopholes seem to have
exacerbated citizenship crisis in Nigeria. For instances,
Section 147 of the 1999 Constitution states that indigene
of each state shall be considered in ministerial
appointment without explicit definition of the term
indigene. The concept of indigeneship in Nigeria has
been subject to manipulation. Many interpretations are
assigned to it by different groups, ethnic nationalities and
persons for the purpose of excluding others and/or
gaining economic and political advantage. According to
Ibrahim in Yisa (2005:8), the consequences of Section
147 of the 1999 Constitution is that it has created four
types of Nigerians:
The lucky ones who belong to the indigenous
communities of the state of residence; the indigenes of
other states who are expected to go back to their own
states for any benefits; Nigerians who are unable to
prove membership of any indigenous group in any state
of the country and women who are married to men in
states other than their own, who are neither accepted in
their states of origin nor in their husbands (Ibrahim cited
in Yisa, 2005:8).
Explaining this further, Egwu (2013:27) posits that
what obtains in Nigeria is a bifurcated system of
citizenship by which a pan-Nigerian notion of citizenship
operates at the national level while indigeneity operates
at the local level. For him, this ignores the rich history of
migration and constant mingling of Nigerian peoples and
creates a distinction between “indigenes” and “nonindigenes” or between “natives” and “settlers” (Egwu,
2013: 27). Thus, the controversies and complexities of
citizenship in Nigeria could be explained from the
outcome of politics that necessitated its usage. In this
direction, citizenship is used to gain access to power,
employment, claim benefits and sometimes ensures
denial to others. The implication is perennial conflict
arising from disagreement among individuals, groups and
ethnic nationalities. Thus, the spate of recent violent
conflicts in Wukari, Taraba State can be mirrored from
the perspective of a struggle by the Jukuns with mixed
blood to assert or integrate themselves into the
mainstream of the Jukun political, administrative and as
well as traditional space. This attempt seems to have
been resisted by the Christian/Traditional Jukuns owing
to suspicion that the Jukun Muslims (also seen now as
settlers) have cultivated alliances and close relationship
with other ethno-religious groups particularly the Hausa
settlers in order to establish socio-economic and political
10 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
base. The mutual distrust and suspicion among them is
further compounded by information gap resulting in the
distortion of information, spread of falsehood and rumors
thereby causing a major crack among the Jukun people
who were united just a decade ago against their Tiv
neighbours in a communal warfare.
The vestiges of carnage left on Wukari town almost a
decade after the Tiv-Jukun conflicts speak volume of the
impact of the recent crisis on the psychic and socioeconomic development of the people and the state at
large. The 1994 the Tiv/Jukun conflict in Wukari led to the
death of an estimated 5,000 people (Hudgens and Grillo
cited in Egwu, 2013:27). Salawu (2010:347) states that
the killing of 19 soldiers by the Tiv group in 2002 led to
military invasion that cost the lives of more than hundred
and sixty (160) people. In the recent Wukari crisis of
2013, the National Emergency Agency (NEMA), put the
number of displaced at over 3,000 persons (see Itodo,
2013).
Beyond the humanitarian issues generated by the
recent crisis, it is noteworthy to assert that Wukari is
endowed with arable land and has over the years
attracted the Tivs who are mainly farmers and many
people from various parts of the country. Most of these
people eke their living through farming at subsistent and
commercial levels as well as other small scale
businesses thereby reducing the pressure on government
and the private sector for employment opportunities. The
recurring crisis in Wukari has not only dislocated families
from their base, but also forced many business concerns
to relocate to neighbouring towns. The implication of this
exodus is that the enormous natural and human
resources in Wukari would remain relatively untapped
with
severe
consequences
for
socio-economic
development.
Citizenship,
Indigeneship-Settlership
Conceptual and Theoretical Discourses.
Crisis:
Many states in Africa especially in the post-colonial era
seem to face the challenges of citizenship. This is mainly
because of colonial legacy of “divide and rule” that has
created a sense of superiority among aborigines and
inferiority among migrants or settler citizens in the same
country of nationality. This has produced a situation in
which a former president and a former prime minister
have been declared not to be citizens of the countries
they were president and Prime Minister – Zambia and
Cote d’ivoire respectively (Obe, 2004:277). This
precarious situation has made Obe (2004) to observe
that one must necessarily approach issues of citizenship
with a good deal of circumspection.
The indigene principle first appeared in the Native
Authority Law of 1954, which defined an indigene as
“someone whose genealogy can be traced to particular
geo-ethnic space within a local council or state in which
s/he is resident” (International Crisis Group Africa,
2012:3). In contrast, a non-indigene, settler or stranger is
a “native who is not a member of the native community
living in the area of its authority” (International Crisis
Group 2012). An indigene is one who claims to be the
‘son’ of the soil, a recognized citizen of a given space
while a non indigene or settler is a stranger, a migrant
who does not have rights of occupancy (Ojukwu and
Onifade, 2010:175). In the post colonial Nigerian society,
indigene could be seen as one whose lineage is traced to
a specific place or community and as well being
recognized by others as one of the legitimate owners of
the place. In fact, place of birth, conferment or
naturalization can only guarantee citizenship of Nigeria
but does not actually offer someone the status of an
indigene. It is no surprise that in many communities
where people have migrated or settled for more than
three decades in Nigeria, the people are hitherto
addressed as settlers. And they are persistently
discriminated from other rights and privileges due to them
as a citizen. These practices often nurture lots of
grievances among the people especially at the rural
areas, semi-urban communities where these crises
emanate and have serious negative consequences.
On the other hand, citizenship according to Gauba
(2003:269) denotes the status of an individual as a full
and responsible member of a political community. He
further states that citizenship is the product of a
community where the right to rule is decided by a
prescribed procedure which expresses the will of the
general body of its members. While ascertaining their will,
nobody is discriminated on grounds of race, religion,
gender, place of birth (Gauba, 2003). Thus, citizenship is
a relationship between the individual and the state in
which both are linked by reciprocal rights and duties
(Ifesinachi, 2010:1). For him, citizenship in the modern
state seems to proceed from the continuum of
individualism and communalism. Liberal citizenship
advances the principle of ‘citizenship right’ and places
particular stress on private entitlement and the status of
the individual as an autonomous actor (Heywood, cited in
Ifesinachi, 2010). Marshall in Egwu, (2009: 188) further
explains that it is much easier to define citizenship as a
status bestowed on those who are full members of a
community. For him, all those who possess the status of
citizens are equal with respect to the rights and duties
with which the status is endowed”. Following from the
above, one could decipher major problems associated
with citizenship related issues in Nigeria. This is because
it appears increasingly difficult to determine who is a full
member of a particular environment in Nigeria especially
when the major variable in determining such is tied to
land ownership in most places thereby reinforcing the
indigene/settler crisis.
Thus, Nigeria in it’s over half a century independent
existence and over a decade of democratic practice is
still grappling with plethora of ethno-religious and
communal conflicts arising from citizenship, indigene-
Nwanegbo et al. 11
settler feud. The constitutional ambiguity and controversy
surrounding the definition of citizenship in Nigeria seems
to have stalled scholarly efforts at achieving accepted
definition of the concept as many are concerned with
rights and obligations of a citizen. Indeed, misconception
or misuse of citizenship and indigeneship/settlership in
Nigeria has provoked numerous violent conflicts across
the country (see Egwu, 2013; Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010;
Norwegian Refugee Council, 2003; Aluaigba, 2008).
Hence, such violence tends to undermine the importance
and relevance of citizenship especially within the context
of migration, national integration and development.
Explaining the major cause of indigene/settler crisis in
Nigeria, Aluaigba (2008:12) posited that a more plausible
explanation lies in the failure of the Nigerian state to web
its numerous ethnic nationalities through the conscious
creation of a national structure that will enhance equal
rights and justice and access to social welfare for all
individuals and groups. For him, these centrifugal
identities built around religion, ethnic groupings,
‘indigeneity’, ‘settlership’, ‘nativity’, ‘migrants’, ‘nonindigenes’ ‘southerner’, ‘northerner’ etc have collectively
sharpened the dividing line between Nigerians thus
making cohesive nationhood a more convoluted task.
The 1999 constitution seems to be clouded in
providing explicit legal direction for the Nigerian
citizenship. For instance, Section 42 of Chapter IV of the
Constitution provides for the right to freedom from
discriminations. It also states that, a citizen of Nigeria of a
particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex,
religion or political opinion shall not (a) be subjected to
disabilities or restriction to which citizen of Nigeria of
other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex,
religions, political opinions are not made subject or (b) be
accorded any privilege or advantage that is not accorded
to citizen of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups,
places of origin, sex, religious or political opinions
(Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). However, the federal
character principle tends to pose serious threat in
determining the functionality of the above provisions.
Beyond the issue of fetching mediocre to leadership
positions, federal character principle tends to have
encouraged denial and discrimination among Nigerians.
For instance, the appointment of former finance minister
from Lagos was keenly contested by the Lagos state
government based on his indigeneity. In his view, Aluba
(2009), argued that:
the current constitution is duplicitous in dealing with
the indigene/ settler questions. It espouses universal
criteria for Nigerian citizenship but also recognizes
indigenes for purposes of appointment of ministers. In
daily existence, residency is discarded in favour of
indigene/ settler. Again, where is the national unity,
especially that there is no opportunity for settlers to
convert to indigenes? The experience underscores the
nature of one country where citizens have different
structures of opportunities not because of any objective
criteria but due to ethnic origins. This situation perhaps
explains why previous peaceful coexistence between
ethnic and religious groups is now blighted by regular
bouts of violence (Alubo, 2009:15).
Indeed, the problem of citizenship in Nigeria today
largely stems from the discriminations and exclusion
meted out to people on the basis of ethnic, regional,
religious and gender identities (Adesoji and Alao, 2009).
This according to them is because those who see
themselves as “natives” or “indigenes” exclude those
considered as “strangers” from the enjoyment of certain
rights and benefit that they ought to enjoy as Nigerians
upon the fulfillment of certain civic duties, such as the
payment of tax. The implication is that the political system
has continued to witness ethno-religious, communal and
political conflicts of immense proportion that posed
serious threat to unity, peace and development in
Nigeria.
The inability of the Nigerian state to evolve a legal
framework that would effectively resolve the uncertainty
surrounding citizenship could be well explained with
Marx’s conflict theory. The mode of production, for Marx
determines the super structure and the corresponding
social relationships i.e., polity, and religion, law, etc.
Similarly, social structure and the forces of production
and social relations of distributions constitute the
foundation for understanding the nature of human society
(Ritzer, 1996). One of Marx main assumption is that the
emergence of modern state has reproduced
irreconcilable differences among men and made conflict
inevitable. This is because the state has created different
classes with inherent contradictions which produce class
struggle with political derivations (see Akpuru-Aja, 1997;
Ritzer, 1996). Thus, the citizenship, indigene/settler crisis
in Nigeria and particularly in Wukari cannot be divorced
from colonial policy of divide and rule consolidated by
post colonial elite drive to exploiting ethno-religious gap
for political reasons and to sustain class competition
among the various ethnic elite groups. The struggle by
the different ethnic nationalities in Nigeria over scares
national resources has necessitated the manipulation of
indigeneship/citizenship issues by individuals, groups to
gain political and economic advantage and to exclude
others. The attempt by those excluded to assert or
integrate themselves into the mainstream of social,
economic and political life of their community against the
resistance of those at the mainstream has been the major
factor in explaining most of the ethno-religious and
communal violence in Nigeria.
A Brief Historical Perspective of the Jukuns
Wukari is a town in Taraba State-one of the States in
North-East Nigeria. Apart from being the traditional and
cultural headquarter of the Jukuns and many minority
tribes and ethnic group like the Alago, Agatu, Awe, Etilo,
etc in some of the present north-central states who
12 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
Jukun rulers of Wukari, with title "Aku Uka" Between 1833 till Date
Ruler
Zikenyu Tsokwa Tasefu
Agbumanu I Agbu
Ashumanu II Jibo Kindonya
Awudumanu I Abite
Agbumanu II Agbunshu
Ashumanu III Ali
Agbumanu III Amadu
Ashumanu IV Angyu Masa Ibi
Agbumanu IV Atoshi
Ashumanu V Adi Byewi
Awudumanu II Abe Ali
Agbumanu V Adda Ali
Shekarau Angyu Masa Ibi Kuvyon II
Commencement Year
1833
1845
1860
1871
1903
1915
1927
1940
1945
1960
1970
1974
1976
End of the Reign
1845
1860
1871
1903
1915
1927
1940
1945
1960
1970
1974
1976
Till date
Adapted from Wikipedia retrieved 6/6/2013
migrated alongside the Jukuns from the ancient
Kwararafa Kingdom in Sudan, it is the administrative
headquarter of Wukari Local Government Area. The
town which was established earlier before colonialism is
renowned for its historical significance as the modern
headquarters of the Kwararafa Kingdom. The Jukun were
established in Wukari from Sudan as early as the 17th
century. The paramount leader is known or rather
addressed as the Aku Uka of Wukari which is symbolic
as it represents the centre of the Jukun people. The
Jukuns were predominantly traditionalists prior to the
advent of Christianity and Islam. Their adherence to
rituals and traditional beliefs of complex character appear
to have played a significant part in the retention of their
cultural and societal values and beliefs till date.
The pre-colonial Jukun society is classified into the
Jukun Wanu and Jukun Wapa with the Wanus’ mainly
fishermen. Thus, the belligerent character of the primitive
Jukun society that is rooted in territorial expansionist
tendencies and the drive to acquire more subjects led to
power tussle and confrontations that disintegrated
kwararafa Kingdom and the consequent migration of
most of other tribes such as; Alago, Agatu, Rendere,
Gumai in Shendam, and others who left Kwararafa (see
Wikipedia). With the Fulani conquests at the beginning of
the 19th century, the Jukun-speaking peoples became
politically divided into various regional factions (Wikipedia
retrieved 13/7/2013). By 1920s, according to Meek
(1931:8) the Jukuns lived in scattered groups around the
Benue basin, in an area that roughly corresponded to the
extent of the kingdom of Kwararafa as it existed in the
18th century. He further explained that:
by the 1920s, the main body of the Jukun population,
known as the Wapâ, resided in and around Wukari,
where they were governed by the local king and his
administration. Other Jukun-speaking peoples living in
the Benue basin, such as those of Abinsi, Awei District,
Donga and Takum, remained politically separate from the
Wukari government, whilst the Jukun-speakers living in
Adamawa Province recognised the governorship of the
Fulani Emir of Muri (Meek, 1931).
In spite of this early divided loyalty, the Jukun throne
in Wukari has remained firm and resolute in administering
and providing traditional leadership since the 18th century.
Indeed, till date, thirteen (13) Jukuns have ascended the
throne of Aku Uka showing in the Table above.
However, it is important to note that cross-border
migratory influences, religious and cultural contacts with
other cleavages have nurtured some conflicts between
the Jukuns and most of its neighbours. The pre-colonial
era was characterized by wars and conflicts because of
the expansionist tendencies of the Jukuns to extend the
territorial space of the kwararafa kingdom and to acquire
more subjects. The colonial era was also marred with the
British divide and rule polices. With this policy most of the
Jukuns remained politically divided resulting in the
conscious or unconscious transfer of political allegiance
and loyalty by some Jukuns to other politically organized
thrones. The socio-economic and political expediency of
the present day Nigeria has not helped matters. More
often than not, the socio-political context have aided the
process of further division along socio-cultural, religious,
economic and political lines thus resulting in flashpoints
of violence and confrontations especially since the return
to democratic rule in 1999.
Wukari Crisis: The Building Blocks.
The Jukuns have experienced long years of violent
conflicts with their neighbours especially in the post
colonial Nigerian state. Apart from intermittent crisis
arising from expansionist tendencies of the Kwararafa
Kingdom, the pre-colonial Jukun society appeared
relatively peaceful and friendly. Anifowose (2003:49)
explained that peaceful co-existence between the Tivs
and the Jukuns predates colonialism. Indeed, the present
unrest and animosity are by-products of previous colonial
and immediate post-colonial inter-communal and
religious experience. This historical antecedence to a
greater extent is fundamental in shaping the perceptions,
Nwanegbo et al. 13
attitudes and behaviours of the Jukun people in
contemporary Nigerian society.
The genesis of the conflicts between the Jukuns and
their neighbours and more specifically the Tiv has been
traced to the colonial period. Avav and Myegba explained
that the British created a wedge between the Tivs and
Jukuns in the well known colonial policy of “divide and
rule” thus, engendering unhealthy rivalry between them
(cited in Jibo, 2001:2). In the view of Jibo (2001), violent
hostilities was dated back immediately before and after
1956 federal elections in which the Tivs who were
predominantly members of the United Middle Belt
congress (UMBC) fielded a candidate, Charles Tangur
Gadza, who defeated a Jukun opponent Sangari Usman
of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC). For him,
majority of Jukuns felt that since the Tivs with their
population advantage had secured seven federal seats, it
would be logical to cede Wukari Federal seat to a Jukun.
This embarrassment, which the Jukun suffered, amidst
the newly discovered political prowess of the Tiv in
Wukari, in part, contributed to the outbreak of the Tiv riot
of 1959-60, and again in 1964 (Best and Idyorough
2003:177). For them, the existing hostilities and division
between the Tiv and Jukun at this time simply abetted the
conflict which was marked by larger scale killings and
destruction of property, and population displacement.
This scenario appeared to have added more ill-feelings
on the existing acrimonious “colonial divide and rule”
policy.
Thus, in 1991/92, the Tivs and Jukuns engaged in a
serious conflict (Norwegian Refugee Council 2003:19).
The youths were heavily involved in the crisis, blocking
major roads, erecting illegal checkpoints along the roads
and killing each other and destroying property worth
millions Naira (Nigerian currency). Constant reprisal
attacks by both sides resulted in the deaths of many.
Between October 2001 and January 2002, land dispute
between the Tivs and Jukuns culminated in a total
breakdown of law and order. The Jukuns declared their
Tiv neighbours settlers, hence they are not entitled to any
land in Jukun communities.
Other conflicts that have impacted negatively on the
socio-economic development of Wukari and indeed the
lives of the Jukuns are the Jukun-Chamba/Kuteb conflicts which has been going on for years, although
there has been no large scale fighting since 1999. The
killing of a paramount chief in Kuteb and the boundary
disputes arising from some communities from Takum
refusal to join Ussa local government area were remote
and immediate causes of the Jukun-Chamba/Kuteb
violence.
The February and May 2013 Episodes
The year 2013 and precisely February 13 and May 4
would go down the memory lane for the Jukuns as one of
the most turbulent years in which they killed each other,
monumentally inflicted injuries among themselves and
destroyed property worth millions of Naira. As we noted
earlier, the remote cause of the fratricidal conflict can be
attributed to an accumulated grievances among the
Jukuns arising from several years of ill-feelings,
frustration and grudge due to discrimination on the basis
of indigene/settler dichotomy. Thus, what triggered the
recent violence was a mere argument between two
football enthusiasts which snowballed into a bloody battle
with deep religious sentiment (see Mkom, 2013; Itodo,
2013; Ayodele, 2013). In the heat of the altercation, one
person used pistol and killed his opponent which
immediately attracted mob action. The angry mob
lynched the accused and the act aggravated the crisis to
what could best be described as bloodbath. Hundreds of
private residential houses, business shops were burnt
and many people perished. The violence and carnage
was brought under control following the deployment of
troops and the imposition of a twenty four (24) hours
curfew which lasted for over a month.
Similarly, in May, 2013 while the soldiers were still on
ground, the Jukuns engaged in yet another major violent
confrontation against themselves after widespread
rumors of reprisal attacks were ignored by government
officials and security operative. The violence was sparked
by an attempt by some groups (alleged to be Hausas) in
the Karofi area of the town to prevent some traditionalists
from carrying out burial rites procession for a deceased
traditional Chief, Abe Ashumate, the Abon Ziken of the
town. The incident developed into a full blown
confrontation and within hours of the conflict, hundreds of
people were brutally murdered. Though, there were
conflicting reports on the number of people killed, the
available reports put death toll at hundred (100) (see
Ayodele, 2013), while about 300 houses were burnt
(Mkom, 2013). The violence crumbled socio-economic
activities for weeks; families were forced to migrate to
neighbouring villages and towns, the educational system
was badly affected as schools were shutdown including
the two universities (Federal University Wukari and
Kwararafa Univiersity-private) located in Wukari main
town. Other dominant tribes particularly the Igbos who
survived the crisis relocated with their businesses to
“safe-haven” with heavy negative implications for socioeconomic development of Wukari and by extension the
Taraba State at large.
The reoccurring violence in Wukari has thrown up
several fundamental issues for intellectual analysis which
relate to indigene/settler contestation. The impacts of
these crises on socio-economic political relations have
been fundamental. It has led to the erection of new
residency and settlement pattern along ethnic and
religious divide with the Jukun Christian/Traditionalists
occupying one part of the town and the Hausa/Jukun
Muslims occupying the other. The psychological impact
on both the adult and younger generation of those who
witnessed and experienced these conflicts has left a lot of
14 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
unresolved queries that would require long years of
concerted effort at peace and confidence building to heal
the emotional wounds that have been inflicted as a result
of the violence.
CONCLUSION
From our analysis, it has been established that
citizenship, indigene/settler dichotomy is germane in
understanding the remote causes of grievances that are
responsible for the recent fratricidal crisis in Wukari.
While we are not oblivious of the relative peace in place,
it is our position that the peace is unsustainable if
concerted effort is not made towards resolving
fundamental issues that have propelled these conflicts in
the first instance. In this regard, we recommend that
there is an urgent need for the review of the extant laws
bearing on indigeneship and citizenship in the on-going
process of the review of the 1999 constitution.
Accordingly, indigeneship should be replaced with
residency for a few stipulated years. Massive public
awareness campaign and enlightenment programme on
the need for peaceful co-existence is recommended.
Also, town hall meetings on issues of common interests
are encouraged. To bridge communication gap among
the people, government should set up radio and
television stations to meet the information needs of the
people and to dislodge the present trend of reliance on
rumors. Finally, there is need for federal, state and local
governments in collaboration with the Wukari community
leaders to constitute joint reconciliation panel that would
ensure
amicable
resolution
of
grievances,
misunderstanding and fears harbored by the people over
the years in order to guarantee long lasting peaceful coexistence among the Jukuns.
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How to cite this article: Nwanegbo J, Odigbo J and Ochanja NC
(2014). Citizenship, indigeneship and settlership crisis in Nigeria:
understanding the dynamics of Wukari crisis. J. Res. Peace Gend.
Dev. 4(1):8-14