Journal of Research in Peace, Gender and Development (ISSN: 2251-0036) Vol. 2(13) pp. 275-285, December 2012, Special Review
Available online@ http://www.interesjournals.org/JRPGD
Copyright ©2012 International Research Journals
Review
Internal conflicts the enemy of peace and democracy;
(Rebels, ethnic, religious and territorial conflicts have
become the enemies of peace and democracy in
African Countries: The case of Uganda, Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo)
John Charema
Director of Education, Mophato Education Centre, Box 605, Francis town, Botswana
E-mail charemajohn@yahoo.com; Fax number: 00267 2402275; Phone: 00267 2402268
Abstract
The spreading arc of African conflict is rooted in a toxic mix of colonialism, ethnic differences, poverty
and political ambition. The post-Cold War era has seen a proliferation of deadly, deep-rooted conflicts
between ethnic and other identity groups within and across nation states around the world. It has been
and continues to be a long and painful road, from Sri Lanka to Sudan, from Bosnia to Rwanda, from
Kosovo to East Timor, from Sierra Leon to Somalia, from Kenya to Zimbabwe and now from Uganda
which has almost the longest civil war in Africa to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These
conflicts have been marked, time and again, by violence against civilians, brutal repression, ethnic
cleansing, systematic mass killings, and genocidal policies. This paper explores the conflict caused by
the Lord Resistance Army rebels of Uganda in Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. The role of the United Nations in protecting human rights is critically examined.
Keywords: Conflict, ethnic cleansing, human rights, united nations, the lord resistance army, peace keeping,
poverty and political ambition, democratic republic of the Congo, Uganda, Sudan.
INTRODUCTION
The world has transformed rapidly in the decade since
the end of the Cold War. Today’s world is literally covered
with ethnic, religious, territorial, and nationalist conflicts
that are as serious, costly, and intense as in the past. An
old system is gone and, although it is easy to identify
what has changed, it is not yet clear that a new system
has taken its place. Old patterns have unfolded, and new
patterns are emerging, and yet it is still too soon to define
them clearly. Hauss (2001: 3) declares that the list of
potentially epoch-making changes is familiar by now; the
end of an era of bipolarity, a new wave of
democratization, increasing globalization of information
and economic power, more frequent efforts at
international coordination of security policy, a rash of
sometimes-violent expressions of claims to rights based
on cultural identity, and a redefinition of sovereignty that
imposes on states new responsibilities to their citizens
and the world community. These transformations are
changing much in the world, including the shape of
organized violence and the ways in which governments
and others try to set its limits. One indication of change is
the noteworthy decrease in the frequency and death toll
of international wars in the 1990s. There has been an
estimated 40 per cent decline in armed conflict around
the world since the 1990s, with recent research
(Simkhada, 2007: 4) crediting expanded United Nations
(UN) peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict prevention
activities as a major factor behind the decline. Subnational ethnic and religious conflicts, however, have
been so intense that the first post-Cold War decade was
marked by enough deadly lower-intensity conflicts to
make it the bloodiest since the advent of nuclear
276 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
weapons (Goodman and Mandell, 1994: 56). It is still too
soon to tell whether this shift in the most lethal type of
warfare is a lasting change. For example, the continued
presence of contested power by rebels in militarily potent
states; in Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), gives reason to postpone judgment. It
seems likely, though, that efforts to prevent or stop
outbreaks in such hot spots will take different forms in the
changed international situation.
Stein and Drunkman (2000:13) express the conviction
that a potentially revolutionary change in world politics
has been a de facto redefinition of “international conflict.”
International conflict still includes the old-fashioned war, a
violent confrontation between nation states acting
through their own armed forces or proxies with at least
one state fighting outside its borders, the latest example
being Russia and Georgia. But now some conflicts are
treated as threats to international peace and security
even if two states are not fighting. Particularly when
internal conflicts involve violations of universal norms
such as self-determination, human rights, or democratic
governance, concerted international actions, including the
threat or use of force being taken to prevent, conclude, or
resolve conflicts just as has been done during the oldfashioned wars. In this sense some conflicts within a
country’s borders are being treated as international since
they may spill over the State borders and raise
international concerns that may attract a response from
the international community. This brings in-cite the wars
and conflicts in Africa. A good example of such countries
in Africa include; Somalia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and (The
DRC, Sudan and Uganda) the case in point.
The spreading arc of African conflict is rooted in a toxic
mix of colonialism, ethnic differences, poverty and
political ambition. The post-Cold War era has seen a
proliferation of deadly, deep-rooted conflicts between
ethnic and other identity groups within and across nation
states around the world. It has been and continues to be
a long and painful road, from Sri Lanka to Sudan, from
Bosnia to Rwanda, from Kosovo to East Timor, from
Sierra Leon to Somalia, from Kenya to Zimbabwe and
now Uganda which has almost the longest civil war in
Africa. These conflicts have been marked, time and
again, by violence against civilians, brutal repression,
ethnic cleansing, systematic mass killings, and genocidal
policies (Kremenyuk, 1991: 110). They result in
humanitarian disasters, challenges to the fragile
humanitarian law and human rights regimes, and
massive impediments to economic and political
development in emerging states. This piece of work will
look at the political, ethnic, religious and territorial
conflicts caused by the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) a
“rebel” group from Uganda, in Sudan, Uganda and the
DRC. The conflictual role of the “rebels” is discussed in
relation to how it impacts on peace and democracy in the
three countries. The role of the United Nations in
protecting human rights is also discussed.
The LRA rebels of Uganda
The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), formed in 1987, after
president Tito Okello from the Acholi tribe was ousted by
President Yoweri Museveni in a coup deetat in 1985, is a
rebel self-proclaimed Christian guerrilla army operating
mainly in northern Uganda and parts of southern Sudan
and northern remote parts of the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). The group is engaged in an armed
rebellion against the Ugandan government in what is now
one of Africa's longest-running conflicts. The LRA claims
the source of conflict to be unequal treatment, unequal
distribution of resources, under-development and
marginalization of the Acholi people in the northern part
of Uganda. The LRA is led by Joseph Kony, who
proclaims himself the "spokesperson" of God and a spirit
medium, primarily of the Christian Holy Spirit which the
Acholi believe can represent itself in many manifestations
(Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 15 May, 2008). The
group claims to be establishing a theocratic state based
on the Ten Commandments and Acholi tradition. The
LRA is accused of widespread human rights violations,
including murder,
abduction,
mutilation,
sexual
enslavement of women and children, and forcing children
to participate in hostilities. Global Justice Prayer Network
(30 September, 2008) claims that almost two million
people have been displaced in what has been called one
of the world's worst crises. More than 25,000 children
have been abducted either to fight for the rebels or to
become sex slaves for the commanders (Wikipedia, the
free encyclopedia, 4 March, 2008), a total breach of the
UN charter and a crime against humanity according to
the 1998 Rome Statute. All these atrocities have been
committed in Uganda, Sudan and the DRC. However, the
government of Uganda claims the LRA has only 500 or
1,000 soldiers in total, but other sources estimate that
there could be as many as 3,000 soldiers, along with
about 1,500 women and children (Human Rights Watch,
2002; Global Security, 12 May, 2008; International Crisis
Group, 2002). The soldiers are organized into
independent brigades of ten or twenty soldiers. The dates
of the events of this conflict do not follow a chronological
order due to the fact that many activities were and are
happening at the same time in different places, either in
Uganda, Sudan and or the Democratic Republic of
Charema 277
Congo.
Conflict between the Ugandan government and the
Lord Resistance Army
Northern Uganda suffered from civil unrest since the
early 1980s. Hundreds of people were killed in the
rebellion against the Ugandan government, and an
estimated 400-thousand people were left homeless
(Global Security, 12 May, 2008). According to Doom and
Vlassenroot (1999) political violence increased in
Kampala with the 1998 and 1999 bombings of several
popular restaurants nightclubs, and other public places.
Foreign tourists, from different countries were murdered
throughout March 1999. President Yoweri Museveni used
Uganda's military to battle with the Lord's Resistance
Army. Thousands of children fell victim to the warabducted by the LRA to serve as fighters or porters, a
total breach of the UN charter. As the conflict between
the government of Uganda forces and armed insurgent
group intensified in late 1996, the government of Uganda
military encouraged rural people in affected areas to
move into protective camps (Human Rights Watch,
2002). However, the military provided only a short period
for the move and undertook little preparation for the influx
of people to the protective camps. Uganda's economy
also suffered, with billions of dollars of the government's
budget going to the military. The instability from the civil
war, and growing domestic and international pressure to
find a way to stop the fighting, apparently prompted
President Museveni to turn away from the military option
and look for a political solution.
In February 2003, Sudan agreed to let troops from
neighboring Uganda enter its territory to attack the LRA
rebels who had been trying for years to overthrow the
Ugandan government (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The
Ugandan army called on the LRA to surrender or be
defeated. Ugandan officials took this as an opportunity
they had long been waiting for to eliminate the LRA. The
agreement set the stage for a decisive blow against
rebels. The LRA was in a tight corner after its bases in
southern Sudan, just over the border from northern
Uganda, had been destroyed by Ugandan troops
following an agreement with the Sudanese government.
The rebels' main sources of food and military supplies
were now in northern Uganda, which made them much
more vulnerable to attacks by government troops. This
put pressure on the LRA which considered the option of
an agreement. By early 2003 optimism was growing that
16 years of fighting in northern Uganda may soon come
to an end. The LRA declared a cease-fire and asked to
hold talks with the government of Yoweri Museveni
(Global Security Organization, 10 January 2008). The
pledge by the LRA to cease all ambushes, abductions
and attacks was welcomed by the Uganda government. It
would appear as though Museveni may have realized
that, even with access to the rebel bases in Sudan, the
military solution he once preferred was not going to
succeed. He was under enormous public pressure to try
the path of a negotiated settlement. Meanwhile the
people of Uganda continued to be victims of rebel brutal
attacks and kidnappings.
While the UN activities aim to make peace, build peace
and maintain peace through negotiation, mediation and
arbitration, sometimes lives are lost in the process due to
violent conflicts. Outside interveners in a violent conflict
peacemaking situation are unlikely to want to sacrifice
their own troops in order to make peace. In such a
situation the costs are likely to go up unabated. By
November 2003 UN Under-Secretary General for
Humanitarian
Affairs
and
Humanitarian
Relief
Coordinator Jan Egeland stated that he considered the
humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda to be among the
worst on the planet (International Crisis Group, 2002)
Several UN agencies, including UNICEF and the Food
and Agricultural Organization, were expected to increase
their presence in northern Uganda, provided the
government was able to provide adequate security which
was not necessarily the case.
In January 2004 Ugandan Defense Minister Amama
Mbabazi announced that the government had killed 928
LRA rebels, 791 rebels were either captured by the army
or surrendered during the war, 7,299 people abducted by
the rebels were rescued or 88 army soldiers died in the
combat while 141 others were injured and four went
missing during the period (Human Rights Watch, 2004).
Within the same period rebels of the LRA attacked a
camp for internally displaced persons in war-ravaged
northern Uganda on 16 May 2004, killing scores of
people and abducting others. A group of rebels attacked
Pagak displaced people's camp in three prongs; one
attacked the camp, a second one attacked the soldiers
guarding it and the third one concentrated on the patrol
units. The group that attacked the camp set ablaze
dozens of grass-thatched huts to create confusion, then
looted food and abducted people whom they forced to
carry their loot for a distance before they killed them
along with their babies.
The involvement of the rebels in Sudan, the DRC and
Uganda
The Lord's Resistance Army operated in the north from
bases in southern Sudan. The LRA committed numerous
abuses and atrocities, including the abduction, rape,
maiming, and killing of civilians, including children in all
three countries. The LRA also congregated in the Bunia
area in eastern Congo. They linked up with the Army for
278 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) and other rebel groups
battling with forces from the Rally for Congolese
Democracy (RCD). Uganda accused Sudan of supporting
the LRA and Sudan accused Uganda of allegedly
supporting the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA),
the rebel movement that fought against the Sudanese
government. Although both governments denied the
accusations, they severed diplomatic relations with each
other in 1995. However, relations between the two
countries improved. In 1999, Sudan and Uganda signed
an agreement under which Sudan agreed to stop aiding
the LRA and Uganda to stop aiding the SPLA.
The rebel operations in Sudan, Central African
Republic, Uganda and the DRC
The LRA rebels continued attacking villages in Uganda,
south Sudan, the Garamba National Park in the eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo and south eastern Central
African Republic. Uganda, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and southern Sudan agreed to jointly fight the
Lord’s Resistance Army if the peace talks with the rebel
group collapse (Global Security Organization, 15
September, 2008). The agreement was reached in June
2008, to launch a joint operation against the rebels,
whose fighters have ravaged northern Uganda and destabilised neighbouring parts of oil-producing southern
Sudan and mineral-rich eastern DRC.
The chaotic conditions in the Central African Republic
(CAR), Eastern DRC, and Southern Sudan provide an
ideal incubator for the LRA’s predations. The CAR
continues to be destabilised by hostilities hatched in its
neighbouring countries. This chaos has been stoked by
three regional wars; the still-unresolved aftermath of the
Congolese civil war, the spill over of the conflict in Darfur
into Chad and CAR, and the North-South civil war in
Sudan, settled by the Comprehensive The Peace
Agreement of 2005, is threatened by growing tensions
between Northern and Southern Sudan and this could
result in renewed hostilities. It would appear as though
some parts of these countries supported rebel activities
to discredit their own governments in order to gain
political mileage as opposition parties or disgruntled
citizens.
Activities of the LRA in Sudan
The fragile newly emerged Government of South Sudan
(GOSS) is most likely to be destabilized by LRA. Poor
judgments, lack of leadership and incompetence coupled
with corruption have affected Goss officials to the point
that they could not read clearly the potential threats
posed by the LRA to their very survival (Human Rights
Watch, 2002). In an unpopular and controversial move to
mediate peace between the government of Uganda and
the LRA, GOSS inadvertently imported the war of
Uganda to Sudan by officially designating specific
locations for the LRA to assemble in and providing them
food, medicine, cash and free passage within South
Sudan (Human Rights Watch, 2002). On their part, the
LRA rather assemble themselves in the place of their
choice, strategically at the proximity of the borders where
they can easily cross to Uganda, Sudan, DRC and
Central African Republic. From those strategic locations,
the LRA is successfully carrying out killings, abductions,
looting and destruction of the properties within these four
countries. It would appear as though both the UN and
NGOs become helpless when they do not resources and
worse still when they cannot operate in war tone zone
area, when they know very well that people are killed and
are dying of hunger and disease.
After Uganda and Sudan agreed in 1999 to end support
of the LRA and the SPLA and to restore normal
diplomatic relations, Sudan cut aid in form of food and
other support and disassociated itself from the LRA. The
Sudan government’s cutback of aid to the LRA weakened
the rebel group but did not lead to its disintegration. To
survive, the LRA attacked and looted southern Sudanese
villages for food. The LRA moved from its bases south of
Juba to a remote area on the Sudan/Uganda border. In
this area they caused more havoc than ever to the
villagers. A few Non Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) tried with minimal resources to provide for
thousands of newly displaced civilians inside southern
Sudan, both in the garrison towns and in SPLA areas.
According to the United Nations (UN report, 2006),
thousands of people were displaced and needed aid.
However, the area was not safe to work in and the
resources were inadequate.
Despite the displacement caused by this military
activity, the government of Sudan has kept in place the
three-year flight ban it has imposed on the affected area,
preventing access to the UN and NGOs working through
the UN coordinated relief effort. The land route to
northern Uganda, through which the UN consortium
Operation Life Sudan (OLS) could access some
Sudanese border towns, such as Nimule and Labone,
also became unsafe as the LRA moved back into Uganda
(International Crisis Group, 2002). In addition, the Sudan
government imposed a ban on all flights going into
Western and Eastern Equatoria in southern Sudan from
neighboring Kenya or Uganda, putting extra pressure on
the southern Sudanese displaced inside Sudan by LRA
attacks. In such a case one wonders what the UN can do
to relieve the human suffering. The Senator in the
representative of the US Chamber Feingold, pointed out
that without expanded resources and capacity focused on
this problem, a completely new offensive runs a high risk
Charema 279
of exacerbating the region's volatility. The senator has
recommended more co-ordination between donor
agencies and asked the US government to convene a
high-level donor conference to focus on the rebuilding of
the north an idea favoured by Mr Tim Shortley, the senior
advisor to the Assistant Secretary of US State
Department for Africa, Dr Jendayi Frazer, who has been
involved with peace process. The return to violence by
the LRA will make the argument for continued dialogue
and eventual signing of the final deal more tenuous.
While both Sudan and South Sudan continued to
experience hostile activities within and outside their
borders eventually they agreed to have negotiations. To
date, both the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of
South Sudan signed an agreement reached on 27
September 2012, namely among others, security status
of nationals of the other state, border issues, trade and
other related issues.
Activities of the LRA in the Democratic Republic of
Congo
The political situation in the DRC continues to experience
hostile activities and atrocities due to emerging new rebel
leaders who break away from different political parties in
the country. According to UN (15 April, 2006) in
September 2005, the Lord's Resistance crossed into
Garamba National Park in northeastern Democratic
Republic of Congo. In January 2006, LRA fighters
displaced thousands of villagers and killed eight
peacekeepers from the UN Mission in Congo (MONUC),
an act that drew international condemnation. The attacks
came at a critical juncture in the DRC's history. The LRA
entered the DRC just months before the country's
adoption of a new constitution and first democratic
elections since independence. The eastern region of
DRC, where the LRA entered, has long been home to
several rebel groups, state human rights abuses and the
breakdown of civilian government. In fact, over 25,000
refugees from the eastern DRC currently live in Uganda
(International Crisis Group, 2002). Given the proliferation
of rebel militias, the government in Kinshasa hardly
considers a few hundred LRA fighters a security threat.
More importantly for the DRC, there are fears that the
LRA presence may provide a pretext for Uganda to once
again invade. The Ugandan military was one of five
foreign countries to send troops to the DRC during the
war from 1998 to 2003. Uganda along with other
countries, used the invasion as a front to loot the natural
resource rich eastern DRC of millions of dollars worth of
minerals and timber. In late 2005, the International Court
of Justice indicated that Uganda had to pay $10 billion in
reparations to the DRC for human rights abuses
committed and resources plundered during that period
(Global Policy Forum, 2006).
After the LRA entered DRC, Ugandan President Yoweri
Museveni threatened to invade the country in pursuit of
the rebels. This instigated hostility in Kinshasa and drew
widespread condemnation from the international
community. Following the war of words, both Kinshasa
and Kampala raced to build up troop levels on their
collective border, further heightening fears of another
cross-border conflict. The advent of the Juba peace talks
deescalated this tension, along with new willingness from
Kinshasa to cooperate and avoid conflict. Still, even as
negotiations continue, Ugandan officials have hinted that
Uganda could still invade the DRC if peace talks fail
(Global Policy Forum, 2006). Such a move would likely
undermine attempts by the DRC's newly elected
government to stabilize the volatile east Africa.
In 2004, U.S. helped establish the Tripartite plus Joint
Commission, which brings together representatives from
Uganda, the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi to discuss
regional diplomatic and security issues. Tripartite Plus
played a key role in defusing tensions in late 2005
between Uganda and DRC. Continued international
support for Tripartite Plus and other regional initiatives
will be the key to mediate arising security threats and
conflicts. In addition, regional support for peace
processes will be essential for their success and
implementation. The recent announcement that MONUC
and the Congolese military will help monitor the cessation
of hostilities is a great boost to the Juba peace process.
MONUC was an observer’s mission to report on
compliance of factions with the peace accord. However, it
faced a lot of challenges and did not have the capacity to
handle the violations of the peace accord, hence the
formation of MONUSCO with a big army whose mission
was to stabilize the situation in the Congo and to combat
the LRA cross border hostilities in the three countries in
question.
The heart of the conflict; and when does conflict
become international?
In August 2007 the Security Council stressed that
conflicts between and within nations have grown so
complex in recent years that the United Nations’ capacity
to deal with the world’s most difficult crises needs to be
enhanced. Social psychology offers four theses about the
nature of international conflicts, each of which expands
significantly on traditional views and international
relations. On one hand, conflict is driven by people's
collective fears and needs, and not solely by rational
calculations of interest. Basic needs include issues of
identity and security, and are often perceived in terms of
survival. The threat that basic needs will not be met
gives rise to existential fear. Such fear inhibits conflict
280 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
resolution. For the parties, making concessions, or even
reducing the intensity of their fighting, can seem to
endanger their very survival. Effective conflict resolutions
address both sides' basic needs, and reassure their
fears. Such resolutions must penetrate to the level of
individuals. On the other hand, international conflict is not
a purely interstate or intergovernmental phenomenon, it
is an inter-social phenomenon. International conflicts
affect societies at all levels; economic, political, cultural,
psychological and structural. Political actors need to
respond both to their international opponents, and to
various factions within their own society. Extremist
factions can block opportunities for resolution, while
moderate factions can create opportunities. Coalitions
between factions across conflict lines can foster
resolution. Many settlements that focus on the official,
political level fail to address the wider social aspects of
conflict, and so fail to fully resolve the conflict (Thakur,
1988: 105).
It is important to note that international conflicts involve
the mutual exercise of influence on many levels. They
are not simply contests of coercive power. Fisher, et al.,
(1979: 132) observe that responsiveness to the other's
needs and fears is a fairly common form of influence in
normal social relations. Use of threats and coercion can
prompt similar retaliation and escalate conflict. More
effective, positive incentives include; economic benefits,
sharing essential resources, international approval,
integration in regional or global institutions, or a general
reduction in the level of tension (Azar and Burton, 1986:
202). Effective resolution strategies need to include the
element of mutual reassurance, in the form of symbolic
gestures, acknowledgements, or other confidencebuilding
measures. A
systematic
strategy
of
responsiveness and reciprocity can transform the parties'
relationship and their definition of the conflict in beneficial
ways. It is of paramount importance to understand that
conflicts are not merely a series of actions and reactions
deployed by stable actors. International conflicts display
an interactive, escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic that
affects both the situation and the parties. Conflict causes
certain cognitive and perceptual biases, which in turn
tend to increase and perpetuate conflict, creating a
viscous cycle of escalation.
In an emergent global politics the definition of conflict
that is internationally relevant has burst through the
constraints of sovereignty (Bercovitch, 1996). It is not
surprising that ethnic conflicts that spills across borders
and secessionist movements that wish to reconfigure
existing states should be the subject of global concern.
These conflicts either threaten existing state borders or
flow over them and are logically included in established
concepts of international conflict. The case of Uganda,
Sudan and the DRC is in this category. Bloomfield and
Moulton (1977: 94) claim that what is new are the scope
and intensity of global attention to the actions of a state
against its own citizens, when these actions violate
international norms, and to the violent actions of one
group against another group even when the violence
does not spill over state borders.
Within this expanded definition of international conflict,
new types of dilemmas are emerging that present
unprecedented challenges to conflict resolution. The
shape of these new challenges is only beginning to be
defined as established institutions and new players work
to adapt and develop strategies of conflict management
and resolution. Conflict resolution here refers to efforts to
prevent or manage or mitigate destruction violence
resulting from inter-group or interstate conflict as well as
efforts to reduce underlying disagreements. The focus is
on the challenges faced by those who are seeking to
mitigate violence within the context of complex
humanitarian emergencies, for example Al-qaida in
Afghanstan, the LRA in Uganda and deteriorating case of
General Laurent Nkunda’s (CNDP) in the DRC. These
emergencies arise from violence inflicted by one group
against another within the confines of a state, from the
capture of state institutions by one group, or by the
collapse of these institutions and the failure of
governance. These kinds of problems have created
recurrent challenges for international conflict resolution in
the past and present decade.
These new challenges have developed in a context of
disengagement by the major powers from all but areas of
core interest. After the intervention in Somalia, Iraq,
Sudan, and Afghanistan, the United States as well as
most of the other big powers has generally been unwilling
to commit forces to mitigate violence and prevent
humanitarian disasters in new emerging conflicts
particularly in Africa. This is largely to the ever increasing
financial costs of such intervention, the death toll they
have to pay and the emotional erosion of long-lasting
intervention with continuous losses of life.
Conflict resolution in Uganda, Sudan and the DRC
International negotiation is a dynamic process. Outcomes
develop from patterned exchanges from negotiating
parties and their constituencies. The negotiation process
is embedded within the context of a larger conflict
between the parties (Anstey, 2006: 143). Both negotiation
and mediation aim at establishing peace between two or
more states or within a state. With the decline in
interstates conflict, the UN is likely to play a more active
role in conflicts within states. However, its role is made
difficult by some of its own regulations that do not seem
to be very clear, for example when not to meddle with the
affairs of a state when the people in that state are
suffering and when to intervene when there is a crisis
Charema 281
within a sovereign state and what is a crisis? These are
challenges that the UN has to address in its charters. No
one has the right to use the cloak of sovereignty and
violate the rights of the citizens.
In his Law of Nations Vattel wrote in 1758 that to give
help to a brave people who were defending their liberties
against an oppressor by force of arms was only the part
of justice and generosity. John Locke and other apostles
of the eighteenth century Enlightenment proclaimed the
right of any people to rebel by force against a tyrannical
regime (Brierly, 1963: 47). Many argue that the right to
seek assistance to rebel against a usurper of people’s
democratic rights is within natural law (Fisher, et al.,
1997). Some try to justify armed rebellion within the
concept of right to self-determination. But, what about the
right to rebel by force against a democratic regime? Like
John Locke many think not. Such debates
notwithstanding, after the horrors of the two World Wars
the community of Nations marked a sharp departure from
the theories of just wars and norms of international law
governing state behaviour on external interventions. Nonviolation of state sovereignty is the new norm; nonintervention in internal affairs has been the cardinal
principle of international relations. Any intervention by
one state in the internal affairs of another is inconsistent
with contemporary international law. Although in the
specific case of South Africa, during the Apartheid, the
UN General Assembly urged third states to assist the
black population in their struggle against the white
minority regime, but as a general rule, the Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States is emphatic
"No State or group of States has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State”. In any case
this does not exonerate the UN from protecting violation
of human rights, as indicated in the AU charter articles III
and IV.
Responsibility to protect human rights
The Charter of the United Nations gives the UN Security
Council the power and responsibility to take collective
action to maintain international peace and security. For
this reason, the international community usually looks to
the Security Council to authorize peacekeeping
operations. Most of these operations are established and
implemented by the United Nations itself with troops
serving under UN operational command. Protection of
human rights is also one of the main mandates of the UN.
In other cases, where direct UN involvement is not
considered appropriate or feasible, the Council
authorizes regional and other international organizations
such as the European Union (EU), the African Union
(AU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
or “coalitions of willing countries” to implement certain
peacekeeping or peace enforcement functions.
After the end of the cold war and large-scale violence
and violations of human rights due to internal strife, new
debate on humanitarian interventions started. Operation
Restore Hope in Somalia, Desert Storm to expel Iraq
from Kuwait, intervention or lack of it in Rwanda, Burundi,
Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are other examples
(Hauss, 2001: 173; UN, 2006: 2; Mitchell, 1981: 87;
International Crisis Group, 2006: 3). What is the role of
the international community when states fail and are
unable to respond to the needs if its people? What should
the international community do when people die due to
natural or man-made disasters while no functioning or
effective government exists? How effective is the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in Africa without the
support of African leaders. Is it a matter of enforcing ICC
agreed regulations or using any means to achieve
“peace” in the eyes of the International World at the
expense of the domestic citizens? Another example is the
indictment of the President of Sudan Omar al-Bashir by
the ICC, which is not supported by African leaders
because they fear it will affect the peace process in
Sudan. These questions could be raised in relation to
what is happening in Somalia, Zimbabwe, (the DRC,
Sudan and Uganda), the case in point. How does one
deal with state and or non-state actors that neither follow
rules nor are accountable to established norms? In the
post September 11 environment and the US led global
War on Terror, doctrines of Pre-emption or Regime
Change have started raising difficult questions.
High-level panels on Responsibility to Protect and
Human Security have submitted reports (Bennet, 1995).
The reports were based on the idea that sovereignty is
not a right but a responsibility with focus on preventing
among others mainly four crimes: genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
Recommendations given were that: a state has a
responsibility to protect its population from mass
atrocities; the international community has a
responsibility to assist the state to fulfill its primary
responsibility; and if the state fails to protect its citizens
from mass atrocities and peaceful measures, the
international community has the responsibility to
intervene through coercive measures such as economic
sanctions. Military intervention is considered the last
resort.
The traditional idea of national security is defined also
in terms of the security of the individual. Besides, the
1949 Rome Statute have added new dimension to
international criminal accountability for violations of
human rights and humanitarian law. Gradually the world
is moving towards universal recognition that matters of
282 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
human rights and humanitarian law may transcend the
strict bounds of national sovereignty. Responsibility to
Protect rather than Right to Intervene is the main
question. But the debate on how best to fulfil the
responsibility continues.
Article 33 of the UN Charter makes reference to a
number of means of Pacific Settlement of Disputes.
Negotiation, good offices, inquiry, mediation and
conciliation are some of the most common procedures
and practices developed over many years. It is, of
course, important to understand the significant
differences in those steps. Article 33 also mentions one
other important dimension of conflict resolution through
resort to regional agencies or arrangements. If the means
provided in Article 33 fail, Article 34 stipulates that the
Security Council (SC) may investigate any dispute to
determine whether the continuance of the dispute or
situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security.
If one was to look at Uganda, as the violence with
untold suffering of the Ugandan people nears two
decades and the parties themselves fail to come together
or actors within seem unable to bring them together,
search for external role have started and will grow. No
side in the current conflict has been seeking UN
involvement and as long as those in power are well
protected the civilian population will continue to die from
mass killings, hunger and disease. Attempts have been
and are being made to find peaceful means but
meanwhile human rights are being violated. The UN is
well aware of what is happening but because of its
unclear charters, the people of Uganda will continue on
their journey of untold suffering. Besides its devastating
internal impact, the conflict and violence in Uganda also
has some serious doctrinal dilemmas and difficult policy
problems for the international community, the UN in
particular. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has
recently issued warrants of arrest to the four of the rebel
leaders, which again is viewed as a drawback to the
negotiations.
If one was to be very critical and ask “What is the UN’s
track record in resolving internal conflicts?” Experience
shows that UN involvement may not be the panacea that
some seek. Otherwise, Somalia would not remain as it is
today. Afghanistan would not have been what it became.
Iraq and Sudan are living testimonies. Many humanitarian
operations born for short emergencies, acquire a life of
their own. Conflicts further degenerate rather than
resolve. And as far as the UN role is concerned the
situation of more questions than answers persists.
However, it must be pointed out that even if the UN was
effective and ready to intervene, in a global political
system built on the foundations of state sovereignty and
territorial integrity, accepting external role in settling
internal disputes is by no means easy for any
government. Government’s reluctance to accept a UN
role in Uganda and any other African country for that
matter could be understood in this perspective as much
as in the context of the continuing ambivalence of
powerful external actors. But, as the parties either fail to
come together to settle the difference politically or one
side prevails militarily, external facilitation will provide the
only hope.
If the negotiating teams of the rebels and the Ugandan
government came together and decided to settle their
differences through the democratic process, most
violence could end and the Ugandan people could
embark on a new course. Fear of committed atrocities
and lack of political will is the real impediment. Without
the necessary political will, it is difficult to expect how an
external actor could help resolve internal conflicts. There
are many ways to promote peace in the world but
perhaps the best way is to promote it within ourselves.
Peace is a gradual and wonderful event that occurs
because compassionate people are inspired to help
others discover the joy of peace. Helping others also has
the direct effect of increasing our personal peace and
well-being, but this is merely one of the many bonuses
that come from sharing our kindness with our fellow
human beings. Peace is probably the most important
lesson we should learn during our lives and the sooner
the better. Ugandans, Sudanese and the Congolese
need peace.
Peace Negotiations
With the ever growing humanitarian and military costs, it
became increasingly clear to the government that
something needed to be done to end the conflict. The
mediation peace initiatives carried out by civil society
organizations such as the Acholi Religious Leaders did
not hold for long with the LRA breaking loose on their
sowing terror, killing, abusing and abducting women and
children. The talks between representatives of
Museveni's government and the Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA) between November 1993 and February 1994 were
perhaps the most significant initiative by the government
to engage directly with the LRA in political negotiations to
end the war. But negotiations collapsed abruptly before a
final agreement could be reached. In July 2006, the LRA
representatives were participating in a series of peace
talks with the Ugandan government in neighboring
Southern Sudan. The LRA representatives present did
not include Joseph Kony who was believed to be hiding
in the Democratic Republic of Congo to avoid prosecution
for war crimes. Some international observers (UN, 3
April, 2006) thought a peace deal was going to be
reached in October 2006. The LRA leaders (though not
Kony) met with the government of Uganda negotiators in
Charema 283
the town of Juba in Southern Sudan. However, the talks
broke down relatively quickly as both sides violated their
predetermined conditions of the negotiation. LRA forces
moved from their designated area along the SudaneseUgandan border and the government of Uganda forces
assembled in unauthorized portions of Northern Uganda.
The talks were also at an impasse. The main discussion
was about the charges brought on Joseph Kony and four
LRA leaders by the ICC. The LRA claimed they would
sign a peace deal after the charges were dropped, while
the government of Uganda negotiators demanded that a
peace deal be in place before they discussed dropping
the charges (International Regional Information
Networks, 2 June 2006).
A key member of the LRA, peace team Dr. James
Obita, indicated that the rebel army was divided when he
charged that if Joseph Kony failed to sign a
comprehensive peace deal by February 2008 he would
be abandoned. Dr. James Obita claimed they would all
abandon him and come back home since they were tired
of war. Obita was part of the LRA’s negotiating team
touring northern Uganda consulting locals on the
accountability and reconciliation strand of the peace
agreement between the rebels and the government.
When there was no progress on the peace deal,
Uganda's army urged the DRC and United Nations (UN)
peacekeepers to attack Ugandan rebels and force the
guerrillas' elusive leader to sign a peace deal. Kinshasa
sent several hundred soldiers to a remote northern
border region to box in fighters from the LRA and stop it
attacking civilians. Two years of talks between the group
and Uganda's government collapsed in April after rebel
leader Joseph Kony failed to emerge from the Congolese
forest to sign a final peace agreement.
The involvement of the ICC
The International Criminal Court (commonly referred to
as the ICC) is a permanent tribunal to prosecute
individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and crime of aggression. (Although, it cannot until
at least 2017, exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression). It was established in July 2002. It can only
prosecute crimes committed on or after the date. The
Court’s official seat is in The Hague, Netherlands, but its
proceedings may take place anywhere. As of July 2012,
121` states are states parties to the Statute of the Court
including all South America, nearly all of Europe and
roughly half the countries in Africa. A further 32 countries
joined including Russia.
The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants
on 8 July and 27 September 2005 against Joseph Kony,
his deputy Vincent Otti, and LRA commanders Raska
Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen. The five
LRA leaders are charged with crimes against humanity
and war crimes, including murder, rape, sexual slavery,
and enlisting of children as combatants. The warrants
were filed under seal; public redacted versions were
released on 13 October 2005. These were the first
warrants issued by the ICC since it was established in
2002. The aim of the Court is to help end impunity for the
most serious crimes of concern to the international
community, when States are not willing or cannot
prosecute the crimes included within the scope of the
Court (war crimes, crimes of aggression, crimes against
humanity and genocide).
Details of the warrants were sent to the three countries
where the LRA is active; Uganda, Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The five LRA leaders
are charged with crimes against humanity and war
crimes, including murder, rape, sexual slavery, and
enlisting of children as combatants as contained in the
Articles listed (ICC, 8 July, 2005). The warrant of arrest
for Joseph Kony lists thirty-three counts on the basis of
his individual criminal responsibility (Articles 25(3)(a) and
25(3)(b) of the Statute) The warrant of arrest for Vincent
Otti lists thirty-two counts on the basis of his individual
criminal responsibility (Article 25(3)(b) of the Statute)
The warrant of arrest for Okot Odhiambo lists ten counts
on the basis of his individual criminal responsibility
(Article 25(3)(b) of the Statute) The warrant of arrest for
Dominic Ongwen lists seven counts on the basis of his
individual criminal responsibility (Article 25(3)(b) of the
Statute) The warrant of arrest for Raska Lukwiya lists four
counts on the basis of his individual criminal responsibility
(Article 25(3)(b) of the Statute). The warrants of arrest
were issued under seal by Pre-Trial Chamber II on 8 July
2005 to ensure the safety or physical or psychological
well-being of and to prevent the disclosure of the identity
or whereabouts of any victims, potential witnesses and
their families. The Chamber also issued requests for
arrest and surrender of the five LRA commanders named
in the warrants and decided that they would be
transmitted by the Registrar of the International Criminal
Court to the Government of Uganda. Pre-Trial Chamber II
decided on 13 October to unseal the arrest warrants,
noting that the overall plan in respect of the situation in
Uganda for the security of witnesses and victims in the
field has been completed and implemented and that by
the assessment and advice of the Prosecutor and the
Victims and Witness Unit the overall plans provides the
necessary and adequate protective measures for all
concerned at this stage (ICC, 14 October, 2005).
The activities of Lupanga, the leader of the Union of
Congolese Patriots (UPC) led to his arrest and was taken
to the Hague for trial. He was found guilty of having
committed the war crimes of forced recruitment of
children under the age of 15 years and using them to
participate actively in hostilities in the DRC between
284 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
September 2002 and August 2003. Lupanga was
sentenced to 14 years in prison. This case sets
precedence for forthcoming cases pending trial such as
the LRA hostilities.
The LRA leadership has long stated that they would
never surrender unless they were granted immunity from
prosecution, so the ICC order to arrest them raised
concerns that the insurgency would not have a
negotiated end (BBC News, 23 January, 2008). Is it not
beyond the effective powers of the 121 states that have
ratified the ICC to secure their arrest? Surely bin Laden
would have been arrested by now. Is Uganda able to
arrest them, or is it violating the treaty by failing to arrest
the men? Trials in absentia are not permitted because
the rebels have to account for themselves. Under the
Treaty of Rome that established the ICC, the Ugandan
government like all signatories is obliged to cooperate
fully with the Court in any matter related to the
investigation and prosecution of crimes within its
jurisdiction. In particular, Uganda as a State Party to the
ICC must genuinely cooperate in arresting and
surrendering any person charged by the Court, without
delay. Nonetheless, recent developments indicate that
the Ugandan government is not, at present, pursuing the
arrest and surrender obligation. Instead, as part of
ongoing peace talks in Juba, the Uganda government
signed an agreement with the representatives of the LRA
on February 19 2008 to establish a national court to try
those alleged to have committed 'serious crimes' during
the conflict.
The agreement between the Ugandan government and
the LRA provides for, "a special division of the High Court
of Uganda, to try individuals who are alleged to have
committed serious crimes during the conflict". They also
agreed that traditional justice and other unspecified
alternative justice mechanisms would be used. However,
to "save" Kony from the ICC without fair, credible,
independent, and impartial prosecutions (conforming to
international minimum standards and appropriate
penalties) amounts to a violation of Uganda's obligation
to cooperate with the ICC. This might appear as an
attempt to use the ICC as a political tool of the Ugandan
government, which the ICC must reject to maintain its
relevance and credibility. However, what the Ugandans
want is peace just like what happened in Kenya and what
is happening in Zimbabwe. Democracy in Africa has
become an ambiguous or vague concept, it is not
democracy in Europe or as interpreted by United Nations.
If Uganda is allowed to get away with its "special
division" of the High Court without a proper determination
of how the Ugandan judiciary, under the existing political
and legal framework in Uganda, can organise and
independently manage complex trials involving crimes
against humanity and war crimes, the ICC might be seen
as being vulnerable to other States using it to expose
rebel leaders internationally if this suits the political
interests of a State. This would undermine the
independence of the ICC as a judicial as opposed to a
political body. But the question is why not Uganda if it has
happened elsewhere and has been accepted. One can
simply say democracy in Africa is the status quo. At
present there is no evidence to suggest that the LRA
leaders are going to disarm, assemble at the agreed
assembly area and present themselves freely to the
"special division" of the Ugandan court. Just as the ICC
contributed significantly to move the LRA leaders to the
negotiating table and contributed to a focus on
accountability at the peace talks, should it maintain its
warrants for the indicted leaders? It must be noted that
Joseph Kony is unlikely to submit himself to national trials
or to the ICC as long as an alternative remains. The main
concern is that the warrants would undermine the peace
process by forcing the LRA leaders into a situation where
they would either face trail at The Hauge or continue
fighting.
CONCLUSION
The world has transformed rapidly since the end of the
Cold War. A potentially revolutionary change in world
politics is experienced and hence the redefinition of
“international conflict.” While international conflict still
includes the old-fashioned war of states attacking one
another, acting through their own armed forces or proxies
with at least one state, fighting outside its borders. The
present experience is that some internal conflicts,
(particularly in Africa) are treated as threats to
international peace and security even if two states are not
fighting. This is so where internal conflicts involve
violations of universal norms such as human rights and
democratic governance. It would appear as though the
United Nations mainly uses threats or force to prevent,
conclude, or resolve the conflicts. Military operations to
keep the peace still seem to be the favoured approach,
although NGO’s are beginning to play a meaningful role.
The logic of using the military to maintain, peace, clearly
misses the important point that peace is more than just
an absence of war, and that it is certainly not an absence
of conflict. There is a serious need to re-examine the
approach. It is profound to note that little has changed in
the constitution of international politics in the last thirtytwo years but the World Politics has moved on
remarkably. The reforms to the Security Council of the
United Nations have not yet occurred. The distinction
made between domestic and international affairs is
almost as strong as it used to be. The principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of states still holds as
strongly as ever. Although warfare is now more strongly
condemned, states still stand by as internal wars take
Charema 285
more lives than traditional inter-state wars used to. The
United Nations are pledged not to intervene in matters
which are the domestic concern of any of the members.
The conflict between the LRA and the government of
Uganda which has taken more than two decades has
caused untold suffering to the people of Uganda,
southern Sudan and the DRC. The two parties involved
have come together on several occasions but failed to
reach an agreement. There appears to be need for the
intervention of an external organ either from the African
Union (AU) or Southern African Development
Commission or United Nations. The AU is committed to
universal values and principles of democracy, good
governance, human rights and human development as
well as respect for sovereignty.
Besides its devastating internal impact, the conflict and
violence in Uganda, DRC and southern Sudan caused by
the LRA has some serious doctrinal dilemmas and
difficult policy problems for the international community,
the UN in particular. The involvement of the ICC in the
matter seems to have further dashed off people’s hopes
for the far off agreement. Lack of political will, the search
for peace and compassion for the suffering ordinary
people by both parties does not seem to bring an
agreement in the near future. While experience shows
that the UN record in resolving internal conflicts has not
yielded much fruit, it is important that they appoint a solid
team that can help resolve the conflict between the
government of Uganda and the LRA that has destabilized
southern Sudan, Uganda and the DRC. It is time to look
beyond state sovereignty and territorial integrity and save
the people of the three countries from hunger, military
aggression, rape, murder, household and natural
resource looting. The UN is encouraged to press the
Ugandan and Sudanese governments to fulfil the
conditions of their alliance and maintain pressure on the
LRA for negotiations with lasting peace solutions. Steps
need to be taken to ensure that any peace agreement
proposed for the solution of the conflict should include
enforcement measures to protect and respect human
rights, including provisions against impunity for past
crimes. The UN could also insist that all parties provide
immediate and unimpeded access for humanitarian
activities in southern Sudan, the northern part of the DRC
and in northern Uganda.
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