udall center
for studies in public policy
environmental policy working papers
Global Warming and Antarctica
Causes, Effects, and Policies
Bernard P. Herber, Ph.D.
Global Warming and Antarctica
Causes Effects, and Policies
Bernard P. Herber, Ph.D.1
Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy
The University of Arizona
Environmental Policy Working Papers
March 2012
Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of
Arizona, and Udall Center Fellow,
1991-92. Contact: bherber@
yahoo.com.
1
Support for Udall Center
Publications is provided by
the Morris K. Udall and
Stewart L. Udall Foundation.
www.udall.gov
About the Author
Bernard P. Herber is professor emeritus of economics at the University of Arizona.
His research focus has been on public economics and international public finance.
He was a Udall Center Fellow in 1991-1992. He is author of Protecting the Antarctic Commons: Problems of Economic Efficiency (Udall Center Publications, 2007).
See: http://udallcenter.arizona.edu/publications/herber.php.
Herber, Bernard P. 2012. Global Warming and Antarctica: Causes, Effects, and Policies. Tucson:
Udall Center Publications.
Cover photo (man on Antarctic ice) by Calee Allen courtesy National Science Foundation Antarctic Program.
Cover design by Chrysantha Gakopoulos and Robert Merideth.
Udall Center Publications
Robert Merideth, Editor in Chief
Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy
The University of Arizona
803 E. First St. Tucson, AZ 85719
(520) 626-4393
udallcenter.arizona.edu
Copyright © 2012 by the Arizona Board of Regents
All rights reserved
Support for Udall Center Publications is provided by the Morris K. Udall
and Stewart L. Udall Foundation.
Table of Contents
I. Global Warming and the Antarctic Commons
1
The unique role of Antarctica in the global warming scenario
Antarctica as part of the global commons
Negative externality effects on the Antarctic commons
II. Global Warming Policy under International Treaty Constraints
7
“Global” commons resources, “sub-global” government sovereignty
III. Searching
for an Efficient Global Warming Policy
10
Global and sub-global levels of policy
Global warming policy under the U.N. Climate Change Convention
Global warming policy under the Antarctic Treaty System
Enhancing the strategic role of Antarctic science
The ultimate policy challenges: Leadership and distributional issues
References
23
iii
The Antarctic Region Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/antarctica_map.htm, accessed February 22, 2012. iv
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R I
Global Warming and the
Antarctic Commons
The unique role of Antarctica in the global warming scenario
The Industrial Revolution, which began during the mid-1800s, spawned
an ancillary phenomenon consisting of an enormous growth in the
emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the global atmosphere.1
During the latter part of the twentieth century and continuing into the
present century, the global scientific community—as coordinated by the
United Nations-sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC)—has reached a definitive majority opinion that such an increase
in GHGs causes global warming accompanied by significant changes in
global climate patterns across various regions of the planet.2
In turn, computer simulations indicate that such disparate climate
changes will exert devastating long-run economic and human welfare
effects—some of which may already have begun. The perceived harmful
effects of global warming, with widespread regional differences in the
specific locations and features of such effects, include more intense heat
waves, rising sea levels, increased drought, increased flooding, increased
wildfires, disrupted agricultural production, and devastating effects on
biological diversity.
Among the “excessive” GHGs being introduced into the atmosphere, the
most significant culprit is carbon dioxide (CO2), a gas released in the
burning of the fossil fuels—coal, oil, and natural gas—for the production
1
The major greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide, methane, ozone, nitrous oxides, and chlorofluorocarbon dioxides. 2
The present paper is based upon the acceptance of this majority scientific opinion. However, acknowledgement is made of an outspoken minority opinion challenging the majority position. 1
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R of energy. Coal is the dirtiest fossil fuel, natural gas is the cleanest, and oil
is in-between, as measured by the amount of CO2 released per unit of
energy produced.3 The very presence of CO2 in the global atmosphere, of
course, is not a problem when the atmosphere is in a balanced or
equilibrium
natural
state.
However,
the
enormous
increase
in
atmospheric CO2, since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, has
created a significant disequilibrium in the natural state of CO2 in the
atmosphere that, in turn, is largely responsible for the present global
warming and related regional climate change threats.
Global CO2 emissions in 2009 amounted to just over 30,000 million tons of
CO2 (see Table 1). Yet, CO2 emissions emanating from the continent of
Antarctica amounted to less than one percent of aggregate global CO2
emissions—a sharp contrast to the magnitude of CO2 emissions that
originated on the other six continents of the planet.4 Despite the
extremely small input of CO2 from Antarctica, the negative externality
effects of global warming caused by the excess CO2 emissions exert
disproportionately larger repercussions on the natural resources and
environment of Antarctica than on any of the other continents.5
The explanation for this unique and, as it turns out, strategic role of
Antarctica in the global warming and climate change scenario is the fact
that, unlike the other continents, the environment and natural resources
of Antarctica are an integral natural component of the global commons,
inclusive of the global atmosphere and oceans.
3
The carbon dioxide (CO2) content of coal per unit of energy produced (one million British Thermal Units) is .030 tons of CO2; oil is .024 tons of CO2; and natural gas .016 tons of CO2. 4
Among individual nations, the largest CO2 emitter in 2009 was China, with 7,706.8 million tons of CO2 emissions (25.5 percent of the world total), followed by the United States, with 5,424.5 million tons of CO2 emissions (17.9 percent of the world total). In turn, these two nations were followed by India, with 5.3 percent; Russia, with 5.2 percent; and Japan, with 3.7 percent of global CO2 emissions. 5
Negative externalities are “economic costs” that escape market pricing and, as a result, tend to be oversupplied and harmful to economic welfare. 2
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R Table 1. World carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by region (2009) Region Carbon dioxide emissions (million metric tons) Percentage of total Africa 1,118.9 3.7 Antarctica ** 0.3 ** < 0.1 Asia & Oceania 13,238.3 43.7 Eurasia 2,338.3 7.7 Europe 4,307.3 14.1 Middle East 1,687.9 5.6 North America 6,410.6 21.2 South & Central America 1,211.9 4.0 World (Total) 30,313.2 100.0 ** Antarctica is included under South & Central America. Source: Energy Information Administration (2011). Thus, due to the intrinsic “global commons interface” between Antarctica
and the global atmosphere and oceans, any damage to the natural
resources and environment of Antarctica, caused by global warming,
assimilates back, in return, to the other six continents by means of this
commons linkage with the global atmosphere and oceans. In other words,
as a result of its unique and important global commons characteristics,
Antarctica assumes the role of a major player in the global warming game
via the transmission of such negative externalities of global warming
throughout the entire global community.
Antarctica as part of the global commons
Antarctica, a continent approximately twice the size of the continent of
Australia, is 98 percent ice covered and contains more than 90 percent of
the world’s ice and 70 percent of its freshwater (see map on page iv). The
role of Antarctica, as part of the global commons, is demonstrated in a
number of ways (Herber 2007, 26–29). The interaction of global natural
processes reveals the critical importance of Antarctica and the adjacent
3
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R Southern Ocean in determining planetary atmospheric and oceanic
conditions that affect global climate. A leading British scientist observes
that scientific investigation in Antarctica demonstrates “clearly and
without ambiguity the integral role of Antarctica in the natural systems of
planet Earth” and, further, notes that Antarctica acts as a major heat sink
(i.e., by “soaking up” heat from the atmosphere) in driving the global
climatic regime (Drewry 1988, 5–10).
The Antarctic ice sheet exerts a major influence on global ocean levels.
Moreover, the circumpolar current of the adjacent Southern Ocean, which
is the largest ocean current in the world, drives the circulation of global
oceans. The oceans, in turn, both influence the atmosphere and interact
with it as the integral driving forces behind global weather and climate.
In reference to the unique natural importance of Antarctica, as described
above, a recent United Nations study describes the “critical role” played
by Antarctica and the Southern Ocean in the global environmental
system, which involves “major processes of interaction between the
atmosphere, oceans, ice, and biota [that] affect the entire global system
through feedbacks, biogeochemical cycles, circulation patterns, transport
of energy and pollutants, and changes in ice mass balance” (United
Nations 2005, 10). Furthermore, the region is of immense value for the
conduct of scientific research that is essential to understanding the global
atmosphere and environment as well as their past history.
Negative externality effects on the Antarctic commons
It is useful to assess the extent of the damage caused by the negative
externality effects of global warming that have already occurred in
Antarctica. Such information has recently been provided in a study
conducted by the Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR), a
prestigious research body that is a component of the Antarctic Treaty
System (ATS)—the supranational governance body of Antarctica,
4
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R established under a series of international treaties.6 The SCAR Report
(Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research 2009), based upon the latest
evidence provided by 100 world-leading scientists from thirteen nations,
reaches the following major conclusions:7
1. The ozone hole, by changing wind patterns in Antarctica, has
shielded most of Antarctica from the effects of global warming—
to this point of time. However, this pattern of deterrence is
expected to change during the present century, as the ozone hole
continues to diminish due to the successful policies of the
Montreal
Protocol
in
greatly
reducing
the
emission
of
chlorofluorocarbon dioxides into the atmosphere.8 Importantly,
however, some parts of Antarctica have already received
significant negative effects from global warming.
2. The warming of the Southern Ocean will cause changes in the
Antarctic ecosystem.
3. Rapid increase in plant communities on the Antarctic Peninsula is
occurring due to a high rate of warming on the Western Antarctic
Peninsula—a warming rate that is among the highest rates of
temperature increase detected anywhere on earth during recent
times. This provides dramatic evidence of the regional dimension
of climate change.
4. Ice loss in parts of the Antarctic is occurring at a rapid rate.
5. There is a rapid increase in the extent of sea ice around the
Antarctic as a result of the ozone hole, a result likely to reverse as
the ozone hole diminishes [see (1) above].
6
The Antarctic Treaty System will be described in greater detail below. 7
See a summary of the report in British Antarctic Survey (2009). 8
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted in 1987; ratified in 1989. This treaty is a protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, adopted in 1985 and ratified in 1988. 5
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R 6. Palaeoclimate (ice core) studies in Antarctica demonstrate that the
current shock to the global climate is unusual (current CO2
concentration is at a high level that is unprecedented in the last
800,000 years).
7. Loss of sea ice in some parts of Antarctica is reducing the
populations of krill and penguins.
8. Antarctica is predicted to warm by 3 degrees centigrade over the
present century, as the damage to the ozone layer improves [see
(1) above].
9. Ice loss in the West Antarctic could lead to a major sea level
increase in global oceans over the remainder of the present
century, that is, a total sea level rise of up to 1.4 meters (4 feet, 6
inches) could occur by 2100.
10. Improved representation of polar processes in models is needed to
produce improved scientific knowledge and predictions in the
years ahead.
Thus, it seems clear that global warming has already begun to exert
significant negative externalities on the environment of the Antarctic
commons, with such damages expected to increase in magnitude and in
extent of coverage during the present century as the ozone hole continues
to diminish and global warming, as expected, continues to increase. In
addition, if the present significant void in regulatory policy to reduce the
emissions of CO2 into the atmosphere continues, the situation will
become even worse. Although improved global policy to mitigate CO2
emissions is not impossible during the years ahead, it does appear that
such policy will be extremely difficult to attain in a highly complex and
diversified global community of some 200 sovereign nations.
This critical decision-making scenario in the international public sector
will be considered in the next section of the paper.
6
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R II
Global Warming Policy under
International Treaty Constraints
“Global” commons resources, “sub-global” government sovereignty
The global commons—in the form of the global atmosphere and oceans
and their strategically interrelated “natural engines” in Antarctica—
comprise natural resources that are truly planetary in scope. As such,
their beneficial consumption qualities to mankind cannot be divided into
individual units of consumption. Instead, such consumption is collective
or joint in scope across the planet as a whole.
For example, a New Zealander breathing air in the South Pacific does not
preclude an American from breathing air on the North American
continent. Nor, in political terms, can the atmosphere be divided into a
specific number of units consumed by the citizens of each nation.
Nevertheless, human economic behavior, such as industrialization, can
change the natural equilibrium of these complex, global commons
resources. In the case of global warming, human activities—originating
almost exclusively on six of the seven continents—have emitted excessive
amounts of CO2 and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere,
resulting in harmful negative externalities that can lead to significant
regional climate changes and accompanying regional and global
economic and human welfare disruptions.
These negative externalities are the result of economic costs caused by
free (unlimited) access to the atmosphere, which costs escape market
pricing. As a result, an enormous oversupply of CO2 emissions, with their
accompanying unwanted global warming and climate change effects, are
present in the atmosphere.
7
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R Thus, free (unlimited) access to the atmosphere by both individuals and,
collectively, by the nations in which they reside and in which they engage
in economic activities, have caused a significant natural atmospheric
imbalance in the form of excessive greenhouse gases, especially CO2. The
fact that negative externalities escape the market system and, thus, escape
private-sector pricing, points to the need for some form of government
(public-sector) intervention to reduce CO2 emissions so as to restore the
atmosphere to its natural equilibrium state.
In light of the above, the following important point should be made: The
negative externalities, caused by global warming, possess spatial
dimensions that are global in scope, while the existing sovereign
governmental institutions that have the authority to create policies to deal
with these negative externalities, possess spatial dimensions that are subglobal in scope.9 Therefore, the existing decentralized political world of
some 200 sovereign nations creates a situation in which sovereign policymaking authority does not correspond, in geographical space, to the
planetary-wide natural phenomenon of global warming.
Accordingly, a critical geographical mismatch exists between the
comprehensive global dimensions of the global warming problem, on the
one hand, and the decentralized sub-global dimensions of the sovereign
governmental policy-making authority to deal with this problem, on the
other.
Unfortunately, the circumstances under which some 200 globally
decentralized sovereign nations are called upon to manage the economic
usage of a globally comprehensive commons resource are a recipe for
trouble—if not disaster. The primary economic culprit in this scenario is
found in the high relevance of the economic concept of free rider behavior
to the situation. For example, if Nation A, by itself, were to invest its own
9
Sovereignty may be defined as the right to exercise, within a geographical territory, the functions of a state, exclusive of any other state, and subject to no other authority. A sovereign is a supreme lawmaking authority. See Wikipedia, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignty. 8
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R resources in a CO2 mitigation policy, while the other nations simply wait
to receive the benefits of such action—while taking no corrective policy
action themselves that would equally benefit Nation A—there would be
little, or no, incentive for Nation A to initiate such an action in the first
place. In other words, policy action by one nation alone would be
counterproductive since the other nations could benefit from such action
without contributing to its cost. The likely result is that no nation will
undertake CO2-mitigation action. Since the global warming problem is
worldwide in scope, action by only one nation would not suffice as an
effective policy for a problem of such magnitude, due to such
overwhelming incentives for free-rider behavior by other nations.
Thus, being confronted by the circumstances of this free-rider dilemma,
how are all, or even a majority, of 200 sovereign nations going to act in a
unified fashion in order to attack the serious worldwide problem of
global warming? The only potentially viable avenue to address the
problem (since the world is far from ready to accept any form of
sovereign global government) is to utilize the conventional, ages-old,
decision-making approach for supranational government policies,
namely, the formation of international treaties.
Such international agreements establish international government
institutions (such as the United Nations or the World Bank) to pursue
common transnational goals. But these institutions do not possess the
ultimate sovereign authority to adopt international goals on a directly
authoritative basis. Instead, international treaties normally utilize the
unwieldy decision-making rule of consensus voting—which often
prevents definitive and effective policy action. This voting rule consists of
a “group decision-making process” that seeks the agreement of most
voting participants as well as the resolution or mitigation of minority
objections.10
10
See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_decision_making. 9
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R III
Searching for an Efficient
Global Warming Policy
Global and sub-global levels of policy
Under such constraining circumstances, the existing global treaty that is
primarily responsible for solving the global warming problem is the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
which was adopted in 1992 and ratified (entered into force) in 1994. While
the policy emphasis of this Climate Change Convention is on the
reduction of GHGs and, especially, CO2 emissions into the atmosphere,
policy directed toward adaptation to existing levels of these gases is also
undertaken. Meanwhile, at the sub-global level of government, a
coordinated group of international treaties, known as the Antarctic Treaty
System (ATS), governs the continent of Antarctica.
The foundation treaty of this supranational governance body is the
Antarctic Treaty, adopted in 1959 and ratified in 1961.11 Subsequent
additions to the Antarctic Treaty have resulted in the existing Antarctic
Treaty System. These are:
•
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of the Antarctic Fauna and
Flora (adopted in 1964),
•
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (adopted in
1972 and ratified in 1978),
•
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (adopted in 1980 and ratified in 1982), and
11
See http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm. 10
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R •
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty
(adopted in 1991 and ratified in 1998).
At the present time, 48 nations are members of the Antarctic Treaty
System, comprising more than 80 percent of the global population and
including all major industrial and developing nations. The intent of the
foundation Antarctic Treaty has designated the continent of Antarctica as
a region of political stability or peace while emphasizing scientific
research and the preservation of the Antarctic environment. Unlike the
other six continents, there are neither sovereign territories nor citizens of
residence in Antarctica.12
In a very real sense, this absence of socio-political characteristics is
consistent with Antarctica’s natural resource characteristics, which
assimilate it with the global commons. Unfortunately, any policies
introduced to address the global warming problem, whether under the
UNFCCC or the ATS framework, are constrained by the absence of
sovereignty, a void inherent in supranational government.
Global warming policy under the U.N. Climate Change Convention
The present generation of global treaties directed toward solving the
global warming problem stem from the so-called “Earth Summit” held in
Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This important meeting of world nations, which
pursued the general theme of sustainable economic growth, led to the
adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, with its ratification into international law
occurring in 1994. This treaty, in turn, spawned the important Kyoto
Protocol that was adopted in 1997, ratified in 2005, and scheduled to
expire in 2012.
12
Seven nations (Australia, Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom) have “territorial claims” in Antarctica. However, these claims, in effect, are neutralized while the Antarctic Treaty is in force. 11
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R The protocol recognizes that industrial (developed) nations are primarily
responsible for the existing high levels of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere and, thus, places a heavier, though non-mandatory, carbon
dioxide (greenhouse gas) reduction burden on these nations under the
international
legal
principle
of
common
but
differentiated
responsibilities.
In general, the CO2 mitigation policies implemented under the protocol
have been ineffective, especially in the fundamental areas of: (1) assigning
mandatory or binding emissions levels to polluting nations, and (2)
distributing emissions reduction responsibilities between “original” and
“emerging” major polluting nations.
However, some progress has been made toward establishing a
mechanism for financial assistance from wealthier developed nations to
poorer developing nations for climate policy purposes—a so-called Green
Climate Fund. Yet, despite its overall difficulties, the Kyoto Protocol does
provide an important first step, within the UNFCCC, through which
subsequent, more effective, policies can hopefully be built.
An important conference under the UNFCCC, with the goal of
establishing policies to replace the Kyoto Protocol, was held in
Copenhagen in late 2009.13 This much-publicized meeting, however,
failed to achieve the difficult compromises on major issues between the
principal polluting nations that would have been necessary for global
warming policy to be moved forward to an effective replacement for the
Kyoto Protocol (Broder 2009).
Specifically, in the midst of the contentious negotiations that took place,
the conference failed to reach agreement on the establishment of binding
emissions goals for individual nations. Moreover, little progress was
made on the critical issue of how to distribute total CO2 reduction
13
The structure of the UNFCCC calls for an annual Conference of Parties of the nations that are signatory to the treaty. The Copenhagen conference was such an annual meeting. 12
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R responsibilities between existing industrial nations (such as the United
States, the nations of the European Community, and Japan) and emerging
industrial nations (such as China and India).
Subsequent annual climate policy conferences under the UNFCCC took
place at Cancun, Mexico, in 2010 and at Durban, South Africa, in late
2011. The latter conference delayed the scheduled 2012 expiration date of
the Kyoto Protocol to 2017, or 2020, the year depending upon the pattern
of subsequent negotiations. Furthermore, it was agreed at the Durban
conference that future negotiations would include commitments to
legally binding CO2 reduction targets for individual nations.
Unfortunately, the on-going global recession and government debt
problems, as well as continuing military conflicts, could prove to be
formidable obstacles to significant progress in global warming policy
negotiations in the near future.
However, despite these formidable contemporary external obstacles, a
fundamental deterrent to successful policy formation continues to be the
inherent difficulties present in the international treaty mechanism, which,
as described above, relies upon delegated sovereignty rather than upon
direct sovereign authority to formulate and implement policy.
Under such circumstances, successful international policy often requires
an aggressive, though even-handed, political leadership by a single, or
subset, of influential nations to help navigate complex treaty negotiations
through the constraints imposed by the consensus decision-making rule.
Admittedly, circumstances leading to such aggressive, and fair,
international political leadership may be of a fortuitous nature and, thus,
not readily available when needed. Nonetheless, the attainment of
effective global warming policy most likely will require the presence of
aggressive political leadership within the “nonsovereign framework” of
supranational government.
13
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R Global warming policy under the Antarctic Treaty System
While it is true that primary global warming policy must follow a global
approach to the problem (as exemplified by the UNFCCC treaty), since
the atmosphere is a planetary-wide resource, sub-global policy may still
serve an important, secondary role.
The Antarctic Treaty System, with its 48 member nations, exemplifies a
supranational governmental body that is in a favorable position to play
such a role via its regional policies that apply to the continent of
Antarctica. Often, the focus of regional ATS policy is upon adaptation to
the effects of global warming in Antarctica that have been imported from
the rest of the world. This situation occurs because Antarctica is in a
unique position to receive the negative externalities of global warming,
on the one hand, and to return these externalities to the world as a whole,
on the other, via its inherent natural linkage to the global atmospheric
and oceanic commons.
For example, climate change effects in Antarctica caused by an increase in
global greenhouse gases has the potential of changing Antarctic ice that,
in turn, may cause further global climate change (HubPages 2011). Any
adaptation policies directed by ATS toward these flow-back negative
externalities, which policies would reduce or neutralize such negative
effects, will serve, albeit indirectly, to mitigate the global warming
problem on a global basis.
In addition, such policies may concurrently serve not only the overall
global warming goal but, also, the internal regional goal of protecting the
Antarctic environment and natural resources from human-induced effects
resulting from such economic activities as fishing, science, and tourism.
The primary environmental management policies carried out under the
Antarctic Treaty System are: (1) those that stem from the Convention for
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), and
14
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R (2) those that have their origin in the Protocol on Environmental
Protection, referred to below as the Environmental Protocol.
Under CCAMLR, one of the major management responsibilities is to
regulate the harvesting of fish in the waters of the Southern Ocean. In
addition, CCAMLR established the Scientific Committee on Antarctic
Research (SCAR)—the important organization that coordinates scientific
research activities in Antarctica.14 Meanwhile, under the Environmental
Protocol, there exists a comprehensive or umbrella environmental
protection mandate, with one of its most important areas of regulatory
jurisdiction being Antarctic tourism.
On the positive side, the regulatory performance of the Environmental
Protocol was enhanced by the inclusion of a 50-year moratorium on
Antarctic mining in the protocol itself. Moreover, the later adoption of a
liability annex that deals with liability arising from environmental
emergencies has been a positive contribution under the Environmental
Protocol, though the annex has not yet been ratified nor fully
implemented.
Meanwhile, the CCAMLR treaty, via its SCAR relationship, has
performed credibly in coordinating Antarctic scientific research. In the
meantime, the regulation of fishing under CCAMLR has experienced
moderate success; with its effectiveness being improved by the fish catch
limits that were imposed in 1991. It should be recognized, however, that
management and regulation of fishing on the global oceans and,
especially, on the high seas, remains a major problem, thus making it
more difficult for CCAMLR to implement high standard regional fish
harvesting policies.15
14
The Antarctic Treaty focused upon science as the basic (economic) activity in the Antarctic, as accompanied by political stability (peace) and protection of the environment. 15
The “high seas” are areas “outside” the 200-­‐nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) that were established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 15
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R In addition, an area of further improvement for the marine environment
of the Southern Ocean would be to increase policy emphasis on a
network of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) to help preserve the many
species of seabirds, seals, penguins, whales, and fish (such as krill and
toothfish), which are found in the Southern Ocean (Antarctic and
Southern Ocean Coalition 2011b).
Unfortunately, the regulation of tourism in Antarctica under the
Environmental Protocol has left much to be desired. At the present time,
the tourist industry is largely self-regulated, with a virtual absence of
ATS regulation, except for the requirement of environmental impact
assessments on various tourist activities.16 There are essentially no
restrictions on “where you can go, what you can do, and how many of
you can do it” (Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition 2011a).
Although tourism is a legitimate economic activity, its legitimacy is
contingent upon certain constraints that do not allow it to compromise
Antarctica’s fundamental designation as a “natural reserve, devoted to
peace and science” (Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition 2011a).
Improvement in tourism regulation should include limits on both the
types of tourist activities and their locations.
Overall, the Environmental Protocol may be viewed as a significant step
forward in efforts to protect the Antarctic environment, though
considerable room remains for more effective regulatory policy. At the
present time—twenty years after the signing of the Environmental
Protocol in 1991—the Antarctic region is only nominally protected and,
moreover, it is under increasing environmental pressures that are “not
always addressed effectively, proactively or strategically (Antarctic
Treaty System 2011, 8).
16
The International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) administers this self-­‐
regulation. 16
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R Economic industries needing further improvement include fishing and
tourism. Improvements in these, and other, regulatory areas, while
helping to maintain the internal integrity of the natural resources and
environment of the Antarctic region, can also enhance global warming
policy by helping to offset the negative externality effects of global
warming in Antarctica.
Moreover, there is a growing need for oversight of the emerging
bioprospecting industry in Antarctica (see Herber 2006).17 While the
protocol is in a position to provide an effective regulatory umbrella over
all resource-impacting economic activities in Antarctica, this valuable
mandate has not been fully realized to this point of time.
Enhancing the strategic role of Antarctic science
Although various Antarctic Treaty System policies to address the global
warming problem yield positive results, perhaps the most important role
that ATS policy can perform is to continue to support, and enhance, the
vital scientific research activities taking place in Antarctica that bear upon
the global warming phenomenon.
This research provides very useful knowledge regarding the history,
causes, and effects of global warming. The fact that Antarctica is an
integral part of the global atmospheric and oceanic commons allows it to
be a prime location for such scientific research. The Antarctic region
serves as an important indicator of global change by providing a data and
knowledge link between past, present, and future periods of time.
For example, the polar ice cap holds within it a record of past
atmospheres that date back hundreds of thousands of years. This
information allows the study of earth’s natural climate cycles against
17
This global industry involves the search for biological resources—such as animals, plants, and microorganisms—for biochemical and genetic resources of commercial value. 17
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R which the significance of recent atmospheric changes can be evaluated
(Australian Antarctic Division 2011).
The Antarctic has been described as a “pivotal part of the Earth’s climate
system and a sensitive barometer of environmental change” and as
“Earth’s most powerful natural laboratory” (British Antarctic Survey
2011). An understanding of how Antarctica is responding to current
climate change—and what the continent was like in the past—is essential
if scientists are to predict more accurately future climate change and
provide accurate information to politicians and policy makers (British
Antarctic Survey 2011).
Antarctic ice cores “reveal the clearest link between levels of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere and the Earth’s temperature” and “show that the
temperature of the climate and the levels of greenhouse gases are
intimately linked” (British Antarctic Survey 2011).
The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) is the principal
institutional mechanism within ATS for coordinating scientific research
activity—research undertaken through national programs sponsored by
treaty nations of the Antarctic Treaty System.
Meanwhile, at the global level, the primary institution responsible for
assembling and disseminating global warming and climate change
research and information is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), an agency sponsored by the United Nations. Obviously,
it is important for these two international organizations to efficiently
coordinate their respective roles in global warming research.
The ultimate policy challenges: Leadership and distributional issues
In the end, the attainment of an effective global policy solution to the
global warming problem must overcome two very large obstacles. First,
there is a critical need for aggressive leadership from one, or a few,
18
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R influential nations among the some 200 nations that comprise the global
public sector. This decentralized group of nations must ultimately
interact with each other in order to reach an effective global warming
policy outcome.
As observed above, the absence of sovereignty at the supranational level
of government relegates the supranational political decision-making
process to one dominated by international treaties, which normally use
unwieldy consensus voting. This voting rule often results in policymaking failures in the form of either ineffective policy or no policy at all.
Second, even if influential and rational leadership nations are at hand,
compromises must still be reached on the complex and difficult
distributional issues that are inherent in the composition of workable and
effective global warming policy.
Thus, international negotiations under the UNFCCC must seek
compromises that will trade off, among negotiating nations, various
distributional gains and losses in a manner acceptable to these nations
while, at the same time, achieving the goal of significantly reducing CO2
(and overall GHG) emissions into the atmosphere. In relationship to this
critical policy challenge, it should be recognized that value judgments,
not the theories of economics, underlie this important concept of
distribution. Three major distributional issues that confront global
warming policy negotiators may be identified.
First, there is the question of apportioning the responsibility (burden,
cost) for reducing CO2 emissions between: (1) existing industrial nations,
which have historically emitted substantial CO2 amounts into the
atmosphere, and (2) emerging industrial nations, which have begun
much more recently to emit substantial CO2 amounts into the
atmosphere. This important matter requires difficult intertemporal
distributional decisions.
19
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R Ultimately, such a challenging distributional compromise—based upon
value judgments—must be negotiated within an international treaty
framework in order for the world community to achieve a successful
global warming policy. It may be noted that the first significant global
effort to reach an agreement on this difficult question failed at the
UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen during 2009.
Meanwhile,
in
addition
to
this
aforementioned
intertemporal
distributional question—which looks backward in time between
presently emerging industrial nations and already established past
industrial nations—a second significant intertemporal distributional
question may be identified that visualizes a time track looking forward
rather than backward in time.
This particular distributional question is concerned with apportioning the
responsibility (burden, cost) for a reduction in global CO2 emissions
between the present generation and future generations of mankind. In
other words, should the use of scarce economic resources to solve the
global warming problem be primarily a burden of the present generation
or, instead, should the burden of responsibility for CO2 reduction be
largely postponed to future generations?
Furthermore, a third important distributional question relevant to the
sharing of responsibility for global warming policy burdens—though not
a question that directly involves intertemporal considerations—is the
question: How should CO2 reduction burdens be distributed between rich
and poor nations? This important question exhibits both fairness and
pragmatic reasons for payments from rich to poor nations as part of an
overall global warming policy format in order to achieve a CO2 reduction
goal.
The reasons behind such payments include: (1) payments from rich to
poor nations as compensation for the negative externalities of global
warming borne by poor nations, but caused primarily by rich industrial
20
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R nations, and (2) payments from rich to poor nations as a means of
deterring the growth of CO2 emissions in poor nations as they develop
industrially over time—to be accomplished via subsidies to poor nations
for investments in green technology and other environmentally friendly
policies. Negotiators at the recent UNFCCC conference in Durban made
further efforts toward the attainment of an operational Green Climate
Fund.
Accordingly, it is apparent that distributional issues are an important
component of the complex negotiations involved in the pursuit of a
successful global warming policy. However, the negotiation of global
policy decisions between sovereign nations to solve such complex
questions—within the constraints of a nonsovereign, supranational treaty
framework—is an extremely difficult challenge. Indeed, the formidable
obstacles to efficient supranational government decision making caused
by the absence of an umbrella layer of supranational political sovereignty
must somehow be overcome.
As suggested above, the best hope for an eventual favorable policy
outcome is the emergence of aggressive, but fair, leadership from a key
nation or, subset, of key nations that are aware of the complex economic
and distributional parameters of the matter at hand and, most
importantly, are motivated to move global warming policy forward in an
influential and even-handed manner.
Unfortunately, major contemporary distractions—such as the global
recession, government debt, and wars—are likely to make it more
difficult to draw worldwide attention to the importance of solving the
global warming problem, thus creating additional obstacles that would
have to be overcome by assertive leadership nations.
This paper does not undertake a detailed discussion of how specific
leadership nations might emerge, though it acknowledges that it would
likely take favorable circumstances of a fortuitous nature to help reach
21
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R such a result. Meanwhile, the following observation will be made,
namely, that all leading nations, as measured in terms of such
benchmarks as their economic importance and political influence, are
signatories to both the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, the centerpiece of global climate change policy, as well as
to the Antarctic Treaty System, the governance body that determines
regional Antarctic global warming policy. These leading, and treaty
overlapping, nations include such powerful nations as the United States,
the major nations of the European Union, China, Japan, and India.18
In other words, policy—both global and regional (Antarctica)—involves
the same group of “leading nations.” Thus, an opportunity exists for
these nations to better coordinate their UNFCCC (global) policies with
their ATS (regional) policies and, in so doing, help create an assertive
leadership momentum toward negotiating the difficult distributional
compromises necessary to attain effective global warming policy.
After all, the Antarctic Treaty System, in itself, constitutes a remarkable
example of how a supranational governmental body can find policy
success in the complex world of international treaties and consensus
voting.
18
Although the United States has signed the UNFCCC, it is the only leading nation that has not ratified it. However, in practice, the general support of the United States for the treaty has been evident. 22
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R References
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(2011a).
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Antarctic Treaty System, “The Antarctic Environmental Protocol, 19912011,” Information Paper presented at the XXXIV Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meeting, Buenos Aires: June 20-July 1, 2011
www.asoc.org
Australian Antarctic Division, “Human Impacts in Antarctica,” (2011).
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Broder, John M., “Climate Deal Reached, but Limited in Scope,” New York
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(2011).
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www.guardian.co.uk/news
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Regime,” Polar Record, 42 (221): pp. 139-146, (2006).
Herber, Bernard P., Protecting the Antarctic Commons: Problems of Economic
Efficiency, Tucson: Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy,
University of Arizona, (2007).
HubPages, “Antarctic Ice and Climate Change,” (2011).
kjscrafts.hubpages.com/hub/Antarctic-Ice-and-Climate-Change
23
G L O B A L W A R M I N G A N D A N T A R C T I C A | H E R B E R Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR), Antarctic Treaty
System, Report: Antarctic Climate Change and The Environment,
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United Nations, Question of Antarctica, Report of the Secretary-General,
A/60/222, August 2005.
24
Also by Bernard P. Herber
Protecting the Antarctic Commons: Problems of Economic Efficiency
Udall Center Publications, 2007, 73 p.
ISBN 978-1-931143-31-8
Protecting the Antarctic Commons analyzes the adequacy of existing international
governance mechanisms, specifically the Antarctic Treaty System, to direct policy
goals for the long-term sustainability of the globally strategic Antarctic commons and
natural resources. After reviewing the economy of Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty
System, Herber describes current threats to the continent's sustainability and
presents several options to help attain desired policy outcomes, particularly within
the context of emerging global economic and political trends.
http://udallcenter.arizona.edu/ucpubs/herber_2007.pdf