PLIR 8630
Statecraft and International Security
Prof. Todd S. Sechser
Fall 2014
Office Hours: Mondays, 1:30-3:00pm
Office: Gibson #282
Email: todd.sechser@virginia.edu
Website: faculty.virginia.edu/tsechser
Class Meetings: Wednesdays, 1:00–3:30pm
Seminar Room: Gibson #241
Summary
This is a seminar devoted to examining prominent research in political science about tools of
international statecraft. The course is designed specifically for graduate students intending
to write a dissertation or thesis in the field of international security; all others should see
the instructor before enrolling.
Objectives
1. Evaluate recent social science research about the use and effectiveness of instruments
of diplomacy, statecraft, and foreign policy.
2. Build a cache of potential research proposals upon which to draw when selecting a
dissertation or thesis topic.
3. Prepare for the comprehensive examination in international relations by gaining familiarity with a broad class of international security literature.
General Requirements
1. Complete the Readings. The course will succeed only if students read all assigned
readings prior to class meetings. Required books will be available at the University of
Virginia Bookstore; all other readings can be accessed via Collab. For those who wish
to follow up on specific interests later, supplementary books and articles (denoted by
+) are listed below the required readings.
2. Contribute to Class Discussion. Discussion constitutes the entirety of each seminar
meeting; students must come prepared to offer critical thoughts on each of the readings.
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3. Write Six Research Proposals. Six times during the semester, students must prepare
a one-page research proposal related to the week’s topic. (Each student may choose
four off-weeks.) Proposals should describe one puzzle raised by the readings or during
class discussions and propose a brief research plan for resolving it. Proposals must be
uploaded to Collab in pdf format not later than 24 hours before each class meeting.
4. Present A Research Proposal. In the last class session, students will briefly present one
of their six research proposals, and answer questions from the class.
5. Writing Assignment. Students must complete one of the following writing assignments:
(a) Final Exam. Students who have not taken comprehensive examinations may
choose this option. The final examination mimics the format of the department’s
exams: students will choose one essay question to answer in a two-hour period.
The use of books and notes will be prohibited.
(b) Write a Review Essay. Students who have already taken comprehensive examinations will prepare a review essay evaluating one week’s readings. Essays must
be no longer than 3,500 words and must be uploaded to Collab in pdf format not
later than 24 hours before the class in which the readings are to be discussed. A
good review essay will contain the following elements:
• Critique the theoretical argument. Essays should not just summarize
the material. What are the independent, independent, and intervening variables? Is the causal logic plausible? Are there reasons the argument might
be problematic?
• Assess the empirical evidence. Are the cases chosen appropriately? Are
the variables operationalized well? Might alternative tests be equally valid?
If the author’s data are available, can you replicate the results? How robust
(or fragile) are they?
• Discuss related literature. How does this literature compare and contrast
with other work on the subject? What are the origins of this research agenda?
How far has the literature come? Has it made progress?
• Add value. This is the most important and difficult element of the paper.
Can you suggest new hypotheses, data sources, or research strategies? Are
there alternative explanations that need to be considered? Can the research
design be improved? Suggest how we might move forward.
For a model of a nice review essay, see Jack S. Levy, “Misperception and the
Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems,” World Politics
36:1 (October 1983), pp. 76–99 (available on Collab).
Assignments and Evaluation
There are three main components to the final semester grade.
–2–
• Participation
30%
• Research Proposals and Presentation 40%
• Writing Assignment
30%
Professionalism, Ethics, and Other Policies
1. In-Class Distractions. Please remember to turn off your phones before class. Texting
during class is distracting for the instructor, those around you, and most importantly,
you.
2. Late Arrivals. Please be prompt so that class may begin and end on time.
3. Academic Integrity. Cheating and plagiarism are taken very seriously in this course.
All assignments must be solely the original work of the student. Quoting or paraphrasing another author without attribution on any written assignment is considered
plagiarism. Avoid plagiarism by using footnotes (with page numbers) whenever you
quote, paraphrase, or otherwise borrow someone else’s ideas. Citing others’ work is a
standard scholarly practice, and there is no punishment for having too many citations.
If you are unsure whether you are committing plagiarism, do not hesitate to ask the
instructor for guidance (before you submit your work). Violators risk failing the course
and being reported to the Honor Committee.
4. Group Collaboration. Colleagues are essential to one’s intellectual growth, and I urge
students to collaborate with classmates. Sharing written summaries, reading draft
papers, and commenting on others’ work are all acceptable forms of collaboration. On
the other hand, writing portions of a classmate’s paper or copying a paragraph from a
book or website without attribution are very serious violations.
5. Late Assignments. Late assignments will not be accepted for any reason. To ensure
that illness, computer failures, or other unanticipated events do not cause you to miss
an assignment deadline, it is recommended that you begin the assignments well in
advance of the deadline. Further, you should back up your work off-site using the
University’s Home Directory or Box services, Google Drive, Dropbox, or another free
cloud backup service.
Books and Readings
The following books are required and available at the University of Virginia Bookstore. All
other readings can be accessed on Collab.
• Reiter, D. and Stam, A. C. (2002). Democracies at War. Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
• Fortna, V. P. (2004b). Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
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• Pape, R. A. (1996). Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.
• Press, D. G. (2005). Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats.
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.
• Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, New Haven.
Students should also become familiar with the following book if they are not already:
• King, G., Keohane, R. O., and Verba, S. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Schedule
Readings denoted by “•” are required; those denoted by “+” are supplementary.
1. August 27: Organizational Meeting
2. September 3: When Does Deterrence Work? A Debate
• Huth, P. K. and Russett, B. (1988). Deterrence failure and crisis escalation.
International Studies Quarterly, 32(1):29–45.
• Lebow, R. N. and Stein, J. G. (1990). Deterrence: The elusive dependent variable.
World Politics, 42(3):336–369.
• Huth, P. K. and Russett, B. (1990). Testing deterrence theory: Rigor makes a
difference. World Politics, 42(4):466–501.
• Fearon, J. D. (1994b). Signaling versus the balance of power and interests: An empirical test of a crisis bargaining model. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(2):236–
269.
• Fearon, J. D. (2002). Selection effects and deterrence. International Interactions,
28(1):5–29.
+ Huth, P. K. (1988). Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. Yale University Press, New Haven.
+ Achen, C. H. and Snidal, D. (1989). Rational deterrence theory and comparative
case studies. World Politics, 41(2):143–169.
+ Jervis, R. (1989b). Rational deterrence: Theory and evidence. World Politics,
41(2):183–207.
+ George, A. L. and Smoke, R. (1989). Deterrence and foreign policy. World Politics,
41(2):170–182.
+ Huth, P. K. (1990). The extended deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 34(2):270–290.
–4–
+ Huth, P. K. (1999). Deterrence and international conflict: Empirical findings and
theoretical debates. Annual Review of Political Science, 2:25–48.
+ Signorino, C. S. and Tarar, A. (2006). A unified theory and test of extended
immediate deterrence. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3):586–605.
3. September 10: Democracies, Signals, and Credibility
• Fearon, J. D. (1994a). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3):577–592.
• Schultz, K. A. (1999). Do democratic institutions constrain or inform? Contrasting
two institutional perspectives on democracy and war. International Organization,
53(2):233–266.
• Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach. International Organization, 61(4):821–840.
• Weeks, J. L. (2008). Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve.
International Organization, 62(1):35–64.
• Snyder, J. and Borghard, E. (2011). The cost of empty threats: A penny, not a
pound. American Political Science Review, 105(3):437–456.
• Downes, A. B. and Sechser, T. S. (2012). The illusion of democratic credibility.
International Organization, 66(3):457–89.
• Potter, P. B. and Baum, M. A. (2014). Looking for audience costs in all the wrong
places: Electoral institutions, media access, and democratic constraint. Journal
of Politics, 76(1):167–81.
• Moon, C. and Souva, M. (2014). Audience costs, information, and credible commitment problems. Journal of Conflict Resolution, (forthcoming).
+ Schultz, K. A. (2001). Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge University
Press, New York.
+ Gelpi, C. and Griesdorf, M. (2001). Winners or losers? Democracies in international crisis, 1918–94. American Political Science Review, 95(3):633–47.
+ Guisinger, A. and Smith, A. (2002). Honest threats: The interaction of reputation
and political institutions in international crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
46(2):175–200.
+ Slantchev, B. L. (2006). Politicians, the media, and domestic audience costs.
International Studies Quarterly, 50(2):445–477.
+ Clare, J. (2007). Domestic audiences and strategic interests. Journal of Politics,
69(3):732–45.
+ Trager, R. F. and Vavreck, L. (2011). The political costs of crisis bargaining:
Presidential rhetoric and the role of party. American Journal of Political Science,
55(3):526–45.
+ Haynes, K. (2012). Lame ducks and coercive diplomacy: Do executive term limits
reduce the effectiveness of democratic threats? Journal of Conflict Resolution,
(forthcoming).
–5–
+ Trachtenberg, M. (2012). Audience costs: An historical analysis. Security Studies,
21(1):3–42.
+ Schultz, K. A. (2012). Why we needed audience costs and what we need now.
Security Studies, 21(3):369–75.
+ Gartzke, E. and Lupu, Y. (2012). Still looking for audience costs. Security Studies,
21(3):391–397.
+ Slantchev, B. L. (2012). Audience cost theory and its audiences. Security Studies,
21(3):376–382.
+ Levy, J. S. (2012). Coercive threats, audience costs, and case studies. Security
Studies, 21(3):383–90.
+ Weiss, J. C. (2013). Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist
protest in China. International Organization, 67(1):1–35.
4. September 17: The Utility of Air Power
• Pape, R. A. (1996). Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, N.Y, chapters 1–3 and 9.
• Reiter, D. and Horowitz, M. (2001). When does aerial bombing work? Quantitative empirical tests, 1917–1999. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(2):147–173.
• Stigler, A. L. (2002). A clear victory for air power: nato’s empty threat to invade
Kosovo. International Security, 24(4):5–38.
• Lake, D. R. (2009). The limits of coercive airpower: nato’s “victory” in Kosovo
revisited. International Security, 34(1):83–112.
• Kocher, M. A., Pepinsky, T. B., and Kalyvas, S. (2011). Aerial bombing and
counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War. American Journal of Political Science,
55(2):201–18.
• Lyall, J. (2014). Bombing to lose? Airpower and the dynamics of violence in
counterinsurgency wars. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International
Studies Association, Toronto, March 26–29.
+ Watts, B. D. (1997/1998). Ignoring reality: Problems of theory and evidence in
security studies. Security Studies, 7(12):115–71.
+ Warden, J. A. (1997/1998). Success in modern war: A response to Robert Pape’s
bombing to win. Security Studies, 7(12):172–90.
+ Pape, R. A. (1997/1998a). The Air Force strikes back: A reply to Barry Watts
and John Warden. Security Studies, 7(12):191–214.
+ Byman, D. L. and Waxman, M. C. (2000). Kosovo and the great air power debate.
International Security, 24(4):5–38.
+ Press, D. G. (2001). The myth of air power in the Persian Gulf War and the
future of warfare. International Security, 26(2):5–44.
5. September 24: Nuclear Coercion
–6–
• Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, New Haven,
chapters 1–3.
• Betts, R. K. (1987). Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C, chapters 1 and 4.
• Jervis, R. (1989a). The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the
Prospect of Armageddon. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y, chapter 1.
• Beardsley, K. and Asal, V. (2009). Winning with the bomb. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 53(2):278–301.
• Sechser, T. S. and Fuhrmann, M. (2013). Crisis bargaining and nuclear blackmail.
International Organization, 67(4):173–95.
• Kroenig, M. (2013). Nuclear superiority and the balance of resolve: Explaining
nuclear crisis outcomes. International Organization, 67(1):141–71.
• Gavin, F. J. (2014). What we talk about when we talk about nuclear weapons:
A review essay. H-Diplo/International Security Studies Forum, (2):11–36.
• Fuhrmann, M., Kroenig, M., and Sechser, T. S. (2014). The case for using statistics
to study nuclear security. H-Diplo/International Security Studies Forum, (2):37–
54.
+ Brodie, B., editor (1972). The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order.
Harcourt, Brace, New York.
+ Nitze, P. H. (1956). Atoms, strategy, and policy. Foreign Affairs, 34(2):187–198.
+ Kissinger, H. (1957). Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. Council on Foreign
Relations, New York.
+ Schelling, T. C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
+ Jervis, R. (1979). Why nuclear superiority doesn’t matter. Political Science
Quarterly, 94(4):617–33.
+ Powell, R. (1990). Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. Cambridge University Press, New York.
+ Trachtenberg, M. (1991). History and Strategy. Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
6. October 1: Are Reputations Worth Building?
• Mercer, J. (1996). Reputation and International Politics. Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, N.Y, chapters 1–2.
• Copeland, D. C. (1997). Do reputations matter? Security Studies, 7(1):33–71.
• Press, D. G. (2005). Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats.
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y, chapters 1–2 and 5.
• Sartori, A. E. (2002). The might of the pen: A reputational theory of communication in international disputes. International Organization, 56(1):121–149.
–7–
• Nalebuff, B. (1991). Rational deterrence in an imperfect world. World Politics,
43(3):313–335.
• Weisiger, A. and Yarhi-Milo, K. (2014). Revisiting reputation: How past actions
matter in international politics. International Organization, (forthcoming).
+ Walter, B. F. and Tingley, D. H. (2011). The effect of repeated play on reputation
building: An experimental approach. International Organization, 65(2):343–65.
+ Hopf, T. (1991). Soviet inferences from their victories in the periphery: Visions
of resistance or cumulating gains? In Jervis, R. and Snyder, J., editors, Dominoes
and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian
Rimland, pages 145–189. Oxford University Press, New York.
+ Hopf, T. (1995). Peripheral Visons: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign
Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
+ Huth, P. K. (1997). Reputations and deterrence: A theoretical and empirical
assessment. Security Studies, 7(1):72–99.
+ Walter, B. F. (2006). Building reputation: Why governments fight some separatists but not others. American Journal of Political Science, 50(2):313–330.
+ Gibler, D. M. (2008). The costs of reneging: Reputation and alliance formation.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(3):426–454.
+ Sechser, T. S. (2010). Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power.
International Organization, 64(4):627–60.
+ Crescenzi, M. J., Kathman, J. D., Kleinberg, K. B., and Wood, R. M. (2012).
Reliability, reputation, and alliance formation. International Studies Quarterly,
56(2):259–74.
7. October 8: Democracies and Military Effectiveness
• Reiter, D. and Stam, A. C. (2002). Democracies at War. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, chapters 1–3 and 8.
• Lake, D. A. (1992). Powerful pacifists: Democratic states and war. American
Political Science Review, 86(1):24–37.
• Desch, M. C. (2002). Democracy and victory: Why regime type hardly matters.
International Security, 27(2):5–47.
• Downes, A. B. (2009b). How smart and tough are democracies? Reassessing
theories of democratic victory in war. International Security, 33(4):9–51.
+ Choi, A. (2003). The power of democratic cooperation. International Security,
28(1):142–153.
+ Lake, D. A. (2003). Fair fights? Evaluating theories of democracy and victory.
International Security, 28(1):154–167.
+ Desch, M. C. (2003). Democracy and victory: Fair fights or food fights? International Security, 28(1):180–194.
–8–
+ Schultz, K. A. and Weingast, B. R. (2003). The democratic advantage: Institutional foundations of financial power in international competition. International
Organization, 57(1):3–42.
+ Choi, A. (2004). Democratic synergy and victory in war, 1816–1992. International
Studies Quarterly, 48(3):663–682.
+ Reiter, D. and Stam, A. C. (2009). Correspondence: Another skirmish in the
battle over democracies and war. International Security, 34(2):194–200.
+ Downes, A. B. (2009a). Correspondence: Another skirmish in the battle over
democracies and war. International Security, 34(2):200–204.
+ Henderson, E. A. and Bayer, R. (2013). Wallets, ballots, or bullets: Does wealth,
democracy, or military capabilities determine war outcomes? International Studies
Quarterly, 57(2):303–17.
8. October 15: Keeping the Peace
• Fortna, V. P. (2004b). Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of
Peace. Princeton University Press, Princeton, entire.
• Werner, S. and Yuen, A. (2005). Making and keeping peace. International Organization, 59(2):261–92.
• Walter, B. F. (1997). The critical barrier to civil war settlement. International
Organization, 51(3):335–364.
• Sambanis, N. (2000). Partition as a solution to ethnic war: An empirical critique
of the theoretical literature. World Politics, 52(4):437–483.
• Fortna, V. P. (2004a). Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war. International Studies Quarterly,
48(2):269–92.
+ Kecskemeti, P. (1958). Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat.
Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif.
+ Pillar, P. R. (1983). Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
+ Goemans, H. E. (2000). War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination
and the First World War. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
+ Ramsay, K. W. (2008). Settling it on the field: Battlefield events and war termination. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(6):850–79.
+ Stanley, E. A. (2009). Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination
and the Korean War. Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif.
+ Reiter, D. (2009). How Wars End. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
9. October 22: Economic Sanctions
• Pape, R. A. (1997). Why economic sanctions do not work. International Security,
22(2):90–136.
–9–
• Elliott, K. A. (1998). The sanctions glass: Half full or completely empty? International Security, 23(1):50–65.
• Drezner, D. W. (2000). Bargaining, enforcement, and multilateral sanctions: when
is cooperation counterproductive? International Organization, 54(1):73–102.
• Hovi, J., Huseby, R., and Sprinz, D. F. (2005). When do (imposed) economic
sanctions work? World Politics, 57(4):479–99.
• Marinov, N. (2005). Do economic sanctions destabilize country leaders? American
Journal of Political Science, 49(3):564–576.
• Wood, R. M. (2008). “A hand upon the throat of the nation”: Economic sanctions
and state repression, 1976–2001. International Studies Quarterly, 52(3):489–513.
• Escribà-Folch, A. and Wright, J. (2010). Dealing with tyranny: International
sanctions and the survival of authoritarian rulers. International Studies Quarterly,
54(2):335–359.
+ Pape, R. A. (1998b). Why economic sanctions still do not work. International
Security, 23(1):66–77.
+ Drezner, D. W. (1999). The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. Cambridge University Press, New York.
+ Kirshner, J. (2002). Economic sanctions: The state of the art. Security Studies,
11(4):160–79.
+ Lektzian, D. and Souva, M. (2007). An institutional theory of sanctions onset
and success. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(6):848–871.
+ Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N., and Krustev, V. (2009). The threat and imposition of economic sanctions, 1971–2000. Conflict Management and Peace Science,
26(1):92–110.
10. October 29: Fighting Against Non-State Actors
• Edelstein, D. (2004). Occupational hazards: Why military occupations succeed or
fail. International Security, 29(1):49–91.
• Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University
Press, New York, pp. 146–72.
• Lyall, J. (2009). Does indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? Evidence
from a natural experiment. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(3):331–62.
• Lyall, J. (2010b). Do democracies make inferior counterinsurgents? Reassessing
democracy’s impact on war outcomes and duration. International Organization,
64(1):167–92.
• Downes, A. B. and Cochran, K. M. (2010). It’s a crime, but is it a blunder? The
efficacy of targeting civilians in war. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2–5.
• Toft, M. D. and Zhukov, Y. M. (2012). Denial and punishment in the North
Caucasus: Evaluating the effectiveness of coercive counter-insurgency. Journal of
Peace Research, 49(6):785–800.
– 10 –
+ Downes, A. B. (2007). Draining the sea by filling the graves: Investigating the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence as a counterinsurgency strategy. Civil Wars,
9(4):420–44.
+ Lyall, J. and Wilson, I. (2009). Rage against the machines: Explaining outcomes
in counterinsurgency wars. International Organization, 63(1):67–106.
+ Lyall, J. (2010a). Are coethnics more effective counterinsurgents? Evidence from
the second Chechen War. American Political Science Review, 104(1):1–20.
+ Friedman, J. A. (2011). Manpower and counterinsurgency: Empirical foundations
for theory and doctrine. Journal of Strategic Studies, 20(4):556–91.
+ MacDonald, P. K. (2013). “Retribution must succeed rebellion”: The colonial
origins of counterinsurgency failure. International Organization, 67(2):253–286.
+ Getmansky, A. (2013). You can’t win if you don’t fight: The role of regime type
in counterinsurgency outbreaks and outcomes. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
57(4):709–34.
? November 5: No Class
11. November 12: Terrorism and Counterterrorism
• Kydd, A. H. and Walter, B. F. (2006). The strategies of terrorism. International
Security, 31(1):49–80.
• Pape, R. A. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. American Political
Science Review, 97(3):343–361.
• Cronin, A. K. (2006). How al-Qaida ends: The decline and demise of terrorist
groups. International Security, 31(1):7–48.
• Gould, E. D. and Klor, E. F. (2010). Does terrorism work? Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 125(4):1459–1510.
• Abrahms, M. (2012). The political effectiveness of terrorism revisited. Comparative Political Studies, 45(3):366–393.
• Johnston, P. B. (2012). Does decapitation work? Assessing the effectiveness
of leadership targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns. International Security,
36(4):47–79.
• Jordan, J. (2014). Attacking the leader, missing the mark: Why terrorist groups
survive decapitation strikes. International Security, 38(4):7–38.
+ Abrahms, M. (2006). Why terrorism does not work. International Security,
31(2):42–78.
+ Jordan, J. (2009). When heads roll: Assessing the effectiveness of leadership
decapitation. Security Studies, 18(4):719–55.
+ Price, B. C. (2012). Targeting top terrorists: How leadership decapitation contributes to counterterrorism. International Security, 36(4):9–46.
– 11 –
+ Carvin, S. (2012). The trouble with targeted killing. Security Studies, 21(3):529–
555.
12. November 19: War and the Public
• Jentleson, B. W. (1992). The pretty prudent public: Post post-Vietnam American
opinion on the use of military force. International Studies Quarterly, 36(1):49–73.
• Gelpi, C., Feaver, P., and Reifler, J. (2005). Success matters: Casualty sensitivity
and the war in Iraq. International Security, 30(3):7–46.
• Boettcher, W. A. and Cobb, M. D. (2006). Echoes of Vietnam? Casualty framing and public perceptions of success and failure in Iraq. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 50(6):831–854.
• Liberman, P. (2006). An eye for an eye: Public support for war against evildoers.
International Organization, 60(3):687–722.
• Berinsky, A. J. (2007). Assuming the costs of war: Events, elites, and American
public support for military conflict. Journal of Politics, 69(4):975–997.
• Gartner, S. S. (2008). The multiple effects of casualties on public support for war:
An experimental approach. American Political Science Review, 102(1):95–106.
• Groeling, T. and Baum, M. A. (2008). Crossing the water’s edge: Elite rhetoric,
media coverage, and the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon. Journal of Politics,
70(4):1065–1085.
+ Eichenberg, R. C. (2005). Victory has many friends: US public opinion and the
use of military force, 1981–2005. International Security, 30(1):140–177.
+ Berinsky, A. J. and Druckman, J. N. (2007). Public opinion research and support
for the Iraq war. Public Opinion Quarterly, 71(1):126–141.
+ Gelpi, C., Feaver, P. D., and Reifler, J. (2009). Paying the Human Costs of
War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts. Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
+ Berinsky, A. J. (2009). In time of war: Understanding American public opinion
from World War II to Iraq. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
+ Baum, M. A. and Groeling, T. (2010). Reality asserts itself: Public opinion on
Iraq and the elasticity of reality. International Organization, 64(3):443–479.
+ Grieco, J. M., Gelpi, C., Reifler, J., and Feaver, P. D. (2011). LetâĂŹs get a
second opinion: International institutions and american public support for war.
International Studies Quarterly, 55(2):563–583.
+ Althaus, S. L. and Coe, K. (2011). Priming patriots: Social identity processes and
the dynamics of public support for war. Public Opinion Quarterly, 75(1):65–88.
+ Althaus, S. L., Bramlett, B. H., and Gimpel, J. G. (2012). When war hits home:
The geography of military losses and support for war in time and space. Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 56(3):382–412.
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? November 26: No Class (Thanksgiving)
13. December 3: Research Presentations
• Students this week will choose one of their research proposals to present. Audience
members will play the role of a National Science Foundation grant committee
evaluating grant proposals for funding. Presentations will last 10 minutes, with
10–15 minutes of questions from the audience.
[Updated: November 13, 2014]
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