Worldwide Governance Indicators
vs. ‘Afro-Pessimism’:
Lessons from an empirical perspective on
governance in Africa countries
Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, The World Bank
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
www.govindicators.org
Background Handout for Presentation at the Center
for Global Development Seminar,
Jurys Hotel, Wash. DC, November 28th, 2007
Inputs and collaboration from Massimo Mastruzzi and staff from the World
1
Bank’s Africa region is acknowledged. Errors and views are the author’s.
Issues: Empirics inform on Fallacies vs. Realities?
Moving Away from Fallacies:
• Unmeasurability of
Governance & only rely on
objective or ‘official’ data
• ‘Afro-pessimism’ – lack of
governance changes, and
poor perfomers, or
• ‘Irrational Exuberance’ – by
focusing on growth in very
recent short term, declaring
victory prematurely
• Generalizations about the
whole African continent –
excessive averaging
• Governance a ‘Luxury Good’
Towards a new Reality:
• Governance is measured
• ‘Governance Matters’ for
development
• Understanding the variety
and contrasts across
countries in the continent
• Learning from good
performers: some
leaders, countries, and
institutions showing ‘the
art of the possible’
• Role of the ‘Demand Side’
of Governance, & of the
International Community
2
& Private Sector
The ‘Long View’– Sobering but some hope…
While Africa Stagnated, East Asia Soared
GDP per capita: Africa & East Asia, 1960-2006/7
1600
1473
1400
East Asia & Pacific
Low income
Sub-Saharan Africa
GDP per capita
1200
1000
800
605
509
600
400
200
0
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
-- Chart depicts income per capita in 2000 constant terms. In 1960, actual per capita income of East
Asia region was $141, while Sub-Saharan Africa average was $432; in 1974 it was $202 and $595,
respectively, in 1994 it was $677 and $486, and in 2006 it was $1473 for East Asia and $583 for Africa.
3
-- Source: WDI, Low-income economies are those in which 2006 GNI per capita was $905 or less (53
countries of which 33 from Sub-Saharan Africa).
WHILE ON AVERAGE DISAPPOINTING,
AFRICA’S FIVE FASTEST GROWING
ECONOMIES STACK UP WELL WITH ASIA…
10%
Africa Average
Africa top performers
Asia top performers
China
Annual GDP per capita growth, simple average
9%
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
-1%
1960's
Source: WDI, 1960-2005
1970's
1980's
1990's
2000~2005
4
Macroeconomic Management has improved
Inflation Rates, 2000-06 (in %)
26
22
OilOil-Exporting
Countries
18
14
Africa Average
Oilimporting
countries
10
6
2000
2001
Source: IMF, SSA Regional Economic Outlook.
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
5
Growth has recently picked up in a number of
countries in Africa, yet very diverse
Eq. Guinea
Angola
Chad
Sudan
Nigeria
Congo
Gabon
Mali
Tanzania
Uganda
Ghana
Lesotho
Sierra Leone
Rwanda
Namibia
Cameroon
Burkina Faso
Zambia
Senegal
South Africa
Guinea
Benin
Malawi
Seychelles
Gambia
Mauritania
-4
Per Capita Growth: 2 - 3%
22%
Per Capita Growth: 1 - 2%
13%
Kenya
Swaziland
Madagascar
Togo
Niger
Comoros
Cote d'Ivoire
Central African
Burundi
Eritrea
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Guinea-Bissau
Zimbabwe
Countries with per Capita
Growth Rate >3%
13%
% of total African Population
Mozambique
Botswana
Sao Tome
Mauritius
Cape Verde
Ethiopia
Growth in Oil
Rich Countries
28%
10%
Per Capita Growth 0 - 1%
14%
Negative Per Capita Growth
-2
0
2
4
6
GDP per capita growth, 1996-2006
8
10
6
Source: Africa’s Silk Road (2007). Authors calculations based on 2007 ADI Report.
Governance in Africa: work in progress
• Governance defined and measured
• The WGI, margins of error, and caution
• Africa’s governance performance: diversity
in levels and in trends – variance galore
• Complementing aggregate WGI with other
data sources
• Some preliminary implications
7
What Is Governance?: the traditions and institutions
by which authority in a country is exercised.
This includes:
• The process by which governments are selected
and replaced:
1.Voice and Accountability
2. Political Stability & No Violence/Terrorism
• Capacity of state to formulate and carry out good
policies and deliver services
3. Government Effectiveness
4. Regulatory Quality
• Respect of citizens and state for rules of the game
5. Rule of Law
8
6. Control of Corruption
Worldwide Governance Indicators
• Data on six dimensions of governance
covering 212 countries over 1996-2006
• Based on hundreds of underlying indicators
taken from 33 different data sources
• Aggregate and individual indicators available
interactively at www.govindicators.org,
largest governance database
• Full transparency on degree of imprecision:
taking margins of error seriously
• Unobserved Component Model (UMC) used
to aggregate individual sources
9
Why Measure Governance?
• Governance matters for:
– Development outcomes
– Effectiveness of foreign aid
• WGI are not a “scorecard” or a
“horserace”
– entry point for serious empirical analysis
• Data on governance empowers reformers
and advocates for change
– enables evidence-based policymaking
10
Whose Views Do the WGI Reflect?
• WGI capture views of tens of thousands of
stakeholders worldwide
– household and firm survey respondents
sharing their successful and failed interactions
with governments
– experts in NGOs, private and public sectors
sharing their international perspective on
governance successes and failures
• WGI do not reflect views of World Bank
– almost all data sources from outside WB
– WB allocation of IDA resources based on CPIA
11
Sources of Governance Data
• Cross-Country Surveys of Firms: Global Competitiveness
Survey, World Competitiveness Yearbook, BEEPS
• Cross-Country Surveys of Individuals: Gallup World Poll,
Global Corruption Barometer, Latinobarometro,
Afrobarometer
• Expert Assessments from Commercial Risk Rating
Agencies: Global Insight, Political Risk Services, BERI,
Economist Intelligence Unit, Merchant International
Group, IJET Travel Consultancy, Asia Risk Consultancy
• Expert Assessments from NGOs, Think Tanks: Reporters
Without Borders, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House,
Bertelsmann Foundation, Amnesty International, IREX,
Global Integrity, Binghamton University, International
Budget Project
• Expert Assessments from Governments, Multilaterals:
World Bank CPIA, EBRD, AFDB, ADB, State Department,
12
OECD, IFAD
Why Aggregate Indicators?
Basic Premise: individual data sources provide a
noisy “signal” of broader concept of
governance, e.g.:
– trust in police → RULE OF LAW
– freedom of press → VOICE & ACCOUNTABILITY
– bureaucratic quality → GOV’T EFFECTIVENESS
Benefits of Aggregation
• aggregate indicators are more informative
about broad concepts of governance – simple
intuition of averaging
• less likely to generate extreme outliers
• generate explicit margins of error for country
13
scores
Three Principles for Using Governance
Indicators
1. All indicators have measurement error
– rely on variety of data sources
– reduce noise by aggregation
2. There are no silver bullets
– subjective/perceptions vs. objective/statutory
– aggregate vs. individual indicators
– regular cross-national monitoring/research vs.
detailed country diagnostics/country policy
advice
– complements vs. substitutes
3. Links from policy actions to outcomes are complex
– “actionable” versus “action-worthy” indicators
14
4 Governance Indicators, 2006, Some Regions
100
Voice & Accountability
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Control of Corruption
Percentile Rank (0-100)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
East Asia
NICs ('T igers')
East Asia
developing
Sub-saharan Former Soviet
Africa
Union
Eastern
Europe
Latin America
Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006’, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - www.govindicators.org.
15
Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa –
Resource-Rich vs. Non Resource Rich Countries, 2006
100
Percentile Rank (0-100)
OIL RICH COUNTRIES
80
OTHER (NON-OIL RICH)
STRONG GROWTH PERFORMER (NON-OIL RICH)
60
40
20
0
Voice &
Accountability
Political Stability
/ Lack of
Violence
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule of Law
Control of
Corruption
16
Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006’, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - www.govindicators.org. Oil Rich
countries included Gabon, Congo, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Angola and Equatorial Guinea
Control of Corruption, African countries, 2006
1.8
Good Control
of Corruption
Margins
of Error
Governance
Level
B O T SWA N A
C A PE VER D E
SO U T H A F R IC A
MA U R IT IU S
N A M IB IA
R WA N D A
G HANA
ER IT R EA
T A N Z A N IA
M A D A G A SC A R
SEN EG A L
B U R K IN A F A SO
SWA Z IL A N D
ET H IO PIA
MA L I
MO Z A MB IQ U E
MA U R IT A N IA
G A MB IA
UG ANDA
MA L A WI
Z A MB IA
B EN IN
G ABO N
L IB ER IA
C A M ER O O N
G U IN EA
N IG ER
K EN YA
TO G O
CO NG O
C EN T R A L A F R . R EP.
BURUNDI
SU D A N
ANG O LA
C O T E D 'IVO IR E
CHAD
N IG ER IA
SIER R A L EO N E
High
Corruption
Z IM B A B WE
C o n g o , D em . R ep .
EQ . G U IN EA
-1.8
SO M A L IA
0
Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006’, by Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, June 2007 ,www.govindicators.org.
Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red: country is in the bottom 10th percentile rank (‘governance crisis’); Light17
Red:
between 10th and 25th percentile rank; Orange: between 25th and 50th percentile rank; Yellow, between 50th and 75th; Light Green between 75th and
90th percentile rank; and Dark Green: between 90th and 100th percentile (exemplary governance). Estimates subject to margins of error.
Control of Corruption, 2006: Africa Map
Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007
18
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light
Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th.
Government Effectiveness, 2006: Africa Map
Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007
19
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light
Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th.
Government Effectiveness, 2006: Selected Countries
20
Over-time Changes in WGI’s Voice & Accountability,
selected African Countries, 1998-06
1.5
Unit Change
1
0.5
0
-0.5
NI
GE
R
GH
SIE
AN
A
RR
A
LE
ON
E
LE
SO
TH
O
KE
GU
NY
IN
A
EA
-B
ISS
AU
MA
LI
NI
GE
RI
A
LIB
ER
IA
CO
NG
O
GA
BO
N
EQ
ET
UA
HI
TO
OP
RI
IA
AL
GU
IN
EA
TA
NZ
AN
IA
CO
TE
D'I
VO
IR
E
ZIM
BA
BW
E
ER
ITR
EA
-1
Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006’, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi,
June 2007 - www.govindicators.org. Dark and light Green reflect significant improvement at 90 and 75% confidence level,
21
respectively, and likewise regarding light and dark Red for deteriorations. By contrast, changes in Yellow (only selected
countries shown) are not highly significant statistically (once margin of error taken into account).
Governance Indicators for Ghana, 1998-2006
Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007
22
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light
Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th.
Governance Indicators for Mozambique, 1998-2006
Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007
23
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light
Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th.
Governance Indicators for Liberia, 1998-2006
24
Governance Indicators for Mali, 1998-2006
25
Governance Indicators for Zimbabwe, 1998-2006
Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007
26
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10th percentile rank; Light
Red between 10th and 25th ; Orange, between 25th and 50th ; Yellow, between 50th and 75th ; Light Green between 75th and 90th ; Dark Green above 90th.
Governance and Development
• Is governance “better than expected” given low
income levels in Africa?
– 2/3 of countries in Africa fall “above the line” in a
scatterplot of governance against per capita
income
doing relatively ok on governance?
• This scatterplot interpretation (implicitly) assumes
a strong positive effect of income on governance
– but actually most if not all of the causation is in
the other direction – better governance raises
per capita income
– Weak rationale for “income discount” for
governance challenges in poor countries
27
Rule of Law and Per Capita Income
3
WGI Rule of Law 2006
2
y = 0.63Ln(x) - 5.45
R2 = 0.58
1
CPVBWA
MUS
NAM ZAF
0
100
-1
-2
-3
GHA
LSO
GMB
MDG
MLI
SEN
MRT
MWI
TZA
STP
BFA
UGA
BEN
RWA
ZMB
ETH
1000MOZ
DJI
NER
COM
BDI
KEN
ERI
TGO
CMR
LBR GNB
SLE SDN
COG
NGA
TCD
CIVGIN
CAF
ZAR
ZWE
GAB
SWZ
10000
100000
GNQ
SOM
GDP Per Capita in 2003, USD at PPP, log scale
28
Higher Income Does Not Cause Better Governance
3
WGI Rule of Law 2006
2
y = 0.63Ln(x) - 5.45
R2 = 0.58
1
CPVBWA
NAM ZAF
0
100
-1
-2
-3
GHA
LSO
GMB
MDG
MLI
SEN
MRT
MWI
TZA
STP
BFA
UGA
BEN
RWA
MOZ
ZMB
ETH
1000
DJI
NERKEN
COM
BDI
ERI
CMR
TGO
LBR GNB
SLE SDN
COG
NGA
TCD
CIVGIN
CAF
ZAR
ZWE
SOM
MUS
GAB
SWZ
10000
100000
GNQ
Causal Effect
of Income on
Governance
GDP Per Capita in 2003, USD at PPP, log scale
29
Governance Matters: The 300% ‘Dividend’
•
Large Development Dividend of Good
Governance: a one-standard-deviation
improvement in governance (say, corruption
control) raise incomes per capita in a country
by about 300% in long-run
•
But is such a decline in corruption
unrealistically large?: NO -- One S.D. is the
difference from: Somalia → Togo or Guinea-
Bissau → Namibia or Rwanda → Botswana
or Portugal → Netherlands or Sweden
•
The impact is from governance to incomes,
and not viceversa -- higher incomes alone will
30
not automatically do
Governance Matters -- The ‘Development Dividend’
Isolating Causality: From governance to income
log(Real GDP
Per Capita)
3
Kaufmann-Kraay (2002)
2
Alcala-Ciccone (2004)
Rodrik-Subramanian-Trebbi (2004)
1
Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson (2000)
0
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Rule of Law 2004
-1
-2
-3
31
Even in the Shorter Term African countries can
benefit from improvements in Governance?
Changes in Control of Corruption & Income per
capita growth, 1998-06
Avg per capita growth rate 98-06 (%)
2
Governance Improving Countries
r = 0.41
1
0
Corruption Control Deteriorating
Corruption Control Improving 32
Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006’, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - www.govindicators.org, and World
Bank database. The Africa sample excludes 7 oil-rich countries; the correlation is somewhat lower when included.
Complementing WGI & Learning from Disaggregated Data
Firms Speak: Top Constraints to Business, EOS 2006
% firms reporting constraint among top 3:
80
Average for Sub-Saharan African Countries in EOS
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Fo
M
ar
re
ke
ig
n
t
Cu
rr
en
In
cy
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
Bu
re
Ed
re
au
uc
at
cr
ed
ac
y
W
or
kf
or
W
ce
or
k
Po
Et
l
hi
i
cy
G
cs
ov
I
ns
er
ta
nm
bi
en
l it
y
ti
ns
ta
bi
l it
y
Cr
im
e
Co
rr
up
Ta
ti o
xR
n
eg
ul
at
io
ns
Ta
xr
at
es
In
fla
tio
n
bo
r
La
Fi
na
n
cin
g
0
Source: EOS 2006. The question posed to the firm was: Select among the above 14 constraints the five most problematic factors for doing business in your33
country.
Note that the overall EOS sample covers 125 countries, and in some regions –particularly in the Middle East, Africa and the FSU, many countries are not surveyed.
Thus, regional averages need to be interpreted with caution, since typically countries not surveyed tend to rate lower in governance than those surveyed.
Unbundling Different Manifestations of Bribery,
EOS 2006
% Firm Report High Bribery (1-3)
100
High
Bribery Bribery in:
Frequency of Bribery
80
Trade Permits
Connection to Utilities
Procurement
Judiciary
60
40
20
Low
Bribery
0
Botswana
Kenya
Rwanda
South Africa
Source: EOS firm survey, WEF2006. Questions: In your industry, how commonly firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with
permits /
34
utilities / taxation / awarding of public contracts / judiciary? (common…never occurs). How commonly do firms like yours make undocumented extra payments to
lower level public servants / high ranking politicians, political parties, and senior public servants to secure business?
Responsibility of the Private Sector &
Multinationals on Anti-Corruption
(% of Firms Reporting Procurement Bribery, 2006)
70605040302010-_________________________________________________________________
Multinational
Domestic Firms in NON
Location Multinational in
operating outside
OECD Countries
of Firm: OECD, HQ in
(comparable)
another OECD
OECD, HQ in OECD
35
Source: EOS2006. Questions: When firms like yours do business with the government, how much of the contract value must they offer in additional payments
to secure the contract?”. Y-axis shows percentage of firms who admitted paying bribes. Last bar excludes small with less than 50 employees.
Complementing WGI: Country-specific, in-depth
Governance & Anti-Corruption diagnostic surveys
• A demand-driven, participatory action-oriented
process to improve governance
• Key features:
–
–
–
–
–
Three surveys: households, firms, and public officials
Questions focus both on experience and perceptions
Questions are tested and adapted to local realities
Rigorous technical requirements in implementation
Local institution implements, with advise from outside
• Outcomes: enhanced local capacity, baseline
governance data, and action plan for policy reform
• In Africa, examples of such diagnostics in Ghana,
Zambia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Madagascar,
Guinea, Nigeria, Malawi, Benin, and Burundi.
36
The power of diagnostic data and
key dimensions for analysis
1. Participatory and Transparency Tool, for all
stakeholders within the country to be involved
2. ‘Unpackage’ corruption – administrative, state
capture, bidding, theft of public resources,
purchase of licenses
3. Identify weak and strong institutions
4. Assess the costs of corruption on different
stakeholders
5. Identify key determinants of good governance
6. Input to develop concrete policy
recommendations
37
Corruption acts as regressive tax-- small firms pay more
in bribes. Diagnostic Results from Guinea & Ghana (%
of gross monthly revenue paid in bribes, reported by firms)
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
na
ha
G
G
ui
ne
a(
(2
20
00
04
0)
)
Small
Medium
Large
38
Governance Indicators, by agency
(based on responses of public officials from 20
agencies, Guinea 2004)
Audit
Enforcement of Quality of
Citizen
Wage
State
Overall
Politicization Resources Transparency
Service
Mechanisms
Rules
Rules
Voice Satisfaction
Capture Corruption
Ministère de la justice
Ministère de la Sécurité
Ministère de l’Administration et de la Décentralisation
Ministère des Finances
Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieurs et Recherche
Scientifique
Ministère de l’Urbanisme et Habitat
Ministère de la Santé Publique
Service Communal
Service Sous Préfectoral
Ministère de la Communication
Ministère de la Jeunesse et Sports
Ligue Islamique Nationale
Ministère de l’Agriculture
Ministère de l’enseignement Pré Universitaire
Ministère de la Fonction Publique
Organisation Non Gouvernementale (ONG)
Entreprise Micro – Finance
Ministère de l’Energie, Mines et Environnement
63
62
61
76
51
50
53
72
55
57
54
60
44
44
42
40
37
38
39
43
47
47
49
58
72
74
75
80
19
18
29
28
67
69
70
67
44
38
45
51
39
35
45
30
62
50
56
44
35
46
74
20
69
47
42
76
63
62
43
52
52
60
58
69
44
59
57
51
55
61
56
59
57
57
60
53
42
43
34
45
44
42
41
42
41
45
41
64
70
64
72
75
73
75
77
72
71
82
73
52
75
30
13
13
42
11
28
30
42
25
8
8
25
38
58
49
64
65
71
64
65
76
56
70
80
74
5
40
49
52
69
52
43
36
45
10
54
13
49
33
35
40
32
38
42
41
38
50
44
48
32
55
Whole Country
62
45
34
75
20
68
42
70
58
60
62
61
67
70
50
57
60
52
43
46
53
49
45
50
44
44
46
The indicators above take values between 0-100. To interpret them please keep in mind that:
-The higher the value of the governance indicator the better the quality of that dimension .
-The higher the value of the corruption index, the more severe the problem.
39
44
37
42
33
36
31
37
Concluding: Some Issues for Debate
• Governance Matters, and so does Measuring it
• Learning from considerable Country and
Institutional Variation – in Africa & other regions
• Candid & Realistic Role of Donors, Private
Sector & Multinationals
• Away from focus on symptoms and on
superficial reforms by ‘fiat’
• Towards deeper Incentive-driven reforms
• Back to basics?: Contestable Politics,
Competition, Transparency, ‘Voice’ & Free
Press; Judiciary Reforms
40
Concretely: 10 Transparency Reform Components
1. Public Disclosure of Assets & Incomes of Candidates, Public
Officials, Politicians, Legislators - & dependents
2. Public Disclosure of Political Campaign contributions by
individuals and firms, and of campaign expenditures
3. Public Disclosure of Parliamentary Votes, w/out exceptions
4. Effective Implementation of Conflict of Interest Laws,
separating business, politics, legislation, & government
5. Publicly blacklisting firms bribing in public procurement
6. Effective Implementation of Freedom of Information Law,
with easy access to all to government information
7. Fiscal/Financial transparency: EITI, budgets, ROSCs
8. E*procurement: transparency (web) and competition
9. Media Freedoms & Media Development
10. Country Diagnostic (& Scorecard) on Governance & A-C
41
Press Freedom (FRH) in Sub-Saharan Africa,
1995 vs. 2006
9
Not Free
Part Free
Free
47
% countries in 2006
44
15
% countries in 1995
Not Free
Part Free
Free
45
40
Source: 2006 Freedom House. Y axis measures percentage of countries in the region with free press (rating of 30 or below), partly
42
free (ratings between 30 and 60) and not free (rating above 60). In 1995 there were 45 countries divided into red (21), yellow (20)
and green (4). In 2006 there were 47 countries divided into red (21), yellow (19) and green (7).
FH Formal Democracies & Press Freedom, Africa, 2006
‘Free
Press’
‘Democ
racies’
‘NonDemocr
acies’
MALI, GHANA,
MAURITIUS,
SOUTH AFRICA,
CAPE VERDE, SAO
TOME & PRINCIPE,
BENIN, NAMIBIA
‘Partly Free’
‘Not Free’
BOTSWANA, KENYA
BURUNDI, LIBERIA,
MOZAMBIQUE LESOTHO ZAMBIA
SENEGAL COMOROS
GUINEA-BISSAU
MADAGASCAR MALAWI
SIERRA LEONE CENTRAL
AFRICAN REPUBLIC
NIGER SEYCHELLES
BURKINA FASO, CONGO,
TANZANIA, UGANDA,
MAURITANIA, NIGERIA
ANGOLA, GUINEA
CAMEROON, IVORY
COAST, GABON,
DJIBOUTI, CHAD,
TOGO, SWAZILAND,
ETHIOPIA,GAMBIA,
Congo DR, SUDAN,
RWANDA, SOMALIA,
EQUATORIAL GUINEA,
ZIMBABWE, ERITREA
43
Source: Freedom House (FH) 2007 - Press categories based on press freedom ratings: 0-30=free; 31-60=partly free; 61-100=not free.
Power of Data, Transparency and Citizen Oversight
Tracking Education spending in Uganda
equiv. US$ per student
3.5
3.0
Public info campaign
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
1990
1991
Intended grant
1993
1994
1995
1999
Actual grant received by primary school (means)
Source: Uganda Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
44
Nothing very new…
‘If it cannot be measured, it cannot be
controlled’
Lord Kelvin
‘Not everything that counts,
can be counted, and
not everything that can be counted,
counts’
Einstein
45
Data for Analysis and Informing Policy Advice,
Not for Precise Rankings
Any data on Governance, Institutions, and Investment
Climate are subject to a margin of error. They are not
intended for precise country rankings, but to highlight
relative strengths and weaknesses and draw analytical and
policy lessons. The data and indicators do not necessarily
reflect official views on rankings by the World Bank or its
Board of Directors. Errors are responsibility of the main
authors. This presentation draws from collaboration and
inputs from Massimo Mastruzzi as well as from staff from
the Africa region.
For access to the data and to bibliographical
references, visit www.govindicators.org 46