[NA/CONF/PAPERS/MONTANO SECURITY SECT REFORM -OCT 2013]
MEXICAN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: A BUDGETARY AND
INFRASTRUCTURE APPROACH
Sergio Montaño/Manuel Palma
Crime is the price society pays for abandoning character.
James Q. Wilson
Mexico faces a significant challenge from organised crime. Well-financed, wellarmed criminal gangs have sought to rollback governmental actions through the
use of violence and corruption. Their tactics have become increasingly brutal, as a
systematic campaign of law enforcement launched by the administration of
President Calderon has dented their illegal operations.
Violence from organised crime needs to be analysed in a wider context; Mexico
has acquired, for the time being, consistent experience and knowledge in this area.
Nevertheless, the efforts made by the Mexican government to understand how
best to fight against these criminal organisations have been both a slow and hard
process. Fortunately, since the late 90´s all states have been challenged through a
new security agenda, either through internal or external forces. Because of this,
Mexico is now an important component of the international security regime.
As a part of this regime, Mexico is now in a stronger position to exchange tactical
and operational information relating to the movement and strategic decisions of
these organisations. Furthermore, Mexico is more able to produce and generate
accurate information relating to public security. Yet this is not an automatic and
immediate achievement. Security institutions in Mexico have to submit themselves
2
to various processes of transformation to move into more effective, efficient,
equitable and transparent spaces.
Recent debate within the international community has centred on the challenge of
insecurity and conflict as a barrier to political, economic and social development. If
states are to create the conditions in which they can escape from a downward
spiral where insecurity, criminalisation and under-development are being mutually
reinforced,
socio-economic
and
security
dimensions
must
be
tackled
simultaneously. The traditional concept of security is being redefined to include not
only state stability and the security of nations but also a clear focus on the safety
and well-being of its people.
It is concerning this where Mexico’s fight against organised crime has not always
been interpreted correctly. Because of the current rate of violent deaths, the
increase in drug-related violence and, for instance, the problems of Ciudad Juarez
(by far the hardest hit city), Mexico’s security challenge can be better understood
from a governance approach.
From this perspective a dysfunctional security sector is the point of departure for
security sector reform. Security sector reform can be considered dysfunctional if it
does not provide:
1) Security to the state and its people or, even worse,
2) If it is the cause of insecurity.
At the beginning of the XXI century Mexico faced both these challenges.
Security sector reform is therefore meant to reduce security deficits, or in other
words, to reduce inefficient and ineffective provision of security, or even provision
of insecurity.
3
In this approach, security system reform, and institutional reform to support it, is an
inherently political process. Security system reform has an explicitly political
objective; to ensure that security and justice are provided in a manner consistent
with democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law. Reform
processes inevitably create winners and losers by challenging vested interests and
existing power relationships. Security reform is therefore best approached as a
governance issue and not simply as a technical activity, or even worse, the “failed
state approach”. 1
Placing SSR on the national agenda
Security reform begins in a variety of ways. In some cases the push for reform may
be a governmental priority; in others, civil society organisations may be the impetus
for change.
The literature on the politics of public policy reform is usually focussed on
overcoming obstacles to launch reform. The principal assumption is that any
government attempting radical reform, whether democratic or not, must cope with
political challenges inherent in the nature of these measures. SSR impose costs
that are immediate, reliable and often concentrated in specific groups.
Organised crime has plagued Mexico for decades, but turf wars amongst rival drug
gangs led to a notable surge in violence at the end of the 90´s. The magnitude of
criminal activity has become increasingly threatening to Mexican society.
Organised crime has become the most important political challenge. It threatens to
damage the unstable political, economic, and social systems by means of
corruption and violence. It has created a situation where there is no guarantee of
Mexico citizens´ personal safety.
1
If one considers the most commonly used variables to identify “failed states”: controlover territory;
provision of public services; existence of displaced people or refugees; civil disobedience; inability
to collect taxes; economic disarray; infant mortality and interaction with the international community,
it is difficult to see how Mexico fits this pattern.
4
Despite the considerable political risk, the Mexican government decided to launch
a security sector reform. Why did they do this? Several factors may help to answer
this question. These factors include the following:
 A major security crisis often preceded by a long period of economic
violence.
 The perception of the political elite, as well as much of the public, that less
painful security programs tried in the past had not worked.
From a pluralist perspective, the definition of challenges and the setting of policy
agendas are essentially the outcome of a competitive process between different
groups. The power of influence in the decision-making process is seen as
dispersed rather than concentrated. In the Mexican political system, even though
elections have been increasing in importance, political consensus is the product of
political negotiation rather than of voter preference. In this sense, decision-making
over public policies in Mexico is comparable to the elitist models of decisionmaking. As a consequence it is useful to take into account the domestic
institutional environment in which competitive policy is made.
Policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or when a public policy is
initiated, have a substantial influence on the policy far into the future. This political
legacy determines the policy options available at later stages and constitutes the
“path dependency” of policy developments (North, 1990). Security Sector Reform
(SSR) programmes usually involve numerous stakeholders, interests, agendas and
choices, across a wide range of possible programmatic entry points.
According to Przeworski (1991), the question over the relationship between
democracy and the implementation of a given public policy, such as SSR,
5
concerns transitional effects. Such reform, as the Colombian experience shows2,
necessarily results in a temporary fall in security and an increase in violence, so
public safety temporarily declines when the entire security system is being
transformed. This means, as shown in the following figure, that even if the postreform period means greater welfare than the situation pre-reform, a transitional
deterioration of material conditions, the valley of transition, is inevitable. The
question is whether the political regime is able to support the “valley of transition”.3
Figure 1
Security Sector Reform and the Valley of Transition
Public Security
Post-reform
Status quo
Welfare
Time 0
“Valley of transition”
Time 1
Source: Przeworski (1991: 238)
Mexico´s SSR: a summary
2
Colombia’s five decades of active armed conflict; involving various guerrilla and paramilitary
groups within a weak state and without effective state control over parts of its vast territory have
elevated the security issue to become the dominant policy problem for Colombian society.
3
According to several analysts the increase in drug-related violence (“valley of transition”) is the
direct result of the Mexican government’s policy to stamp out organised crime.
6
Reforms in Mexico’s public security may be divided into two main spheres: Law
enforcement operations and institutional structuring. The first is directly related to
common tactical operations in the Army and the Federal Police to attack organised
crime. It’s purpose has been to legitimise and empower local governments and
protect Mexican citizens as part of recovering and controlling the main public
spaces across the country.
The strategy that the Mexican government has taken towards organised crime has
resulted in the following4:
 The detention of 59,979 individuals involved in organised crime
 The seizure of 33,454 firearms, over 4.5 million rounds of ammunition, and
2,454 grenades.
 The confiscation of 15,246 vehicles, 261 boats, and 344 airplanes
 The seizure of 77 tons of cocaine, 4,145 tons of marijuana, and 584 kilos of
heroin.
 The confiscation of over $230 million USD in bulk cash
The SSR policy agenda covers three inter-related challenges facing all states:
a) The development of a clear institutional framework for the provision of security
that integrates security and developmental policy and includes all relevant actors.
Concerning institutional reforms, the congress has approved a constitutional
reform regarding public security issues summarised as follows:
4
“Mexico and the fight against drug-trafficking and organised crime: setting the record straight”.
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. México. 2010.
7
 Reforms are passed to an adversarial system based on the principles of
advertising, contradiction, concentration, immediacy, continuity and a
presumption of innocence.
 The powers of the police have been defined in the investigation and
prosecution of crimes and new mechanisms designed for the coordination of
public safety.
 The establishment of legal mechanisms in the fight against crime to ensure
the criminal due process.
b) The strengthening of security institutions’ governance
 Among the reforms, substantive stages of public safety were also included
(prevention, investigation, prosecution and social reintegration).
 The move towards a professional police force who carry out their function
through scientific, technical and modern means.
 The design of evaluation and the monitoring of trust.
 The establishment of joint action between police at different levels of
government.
 The sharing and standardisation of information on public safety raised as a
constitutional obligation of the authorities.
c) The building of capable and professional security forces who are accountable to
civil authorities.
The aforementioned reforms have established the legal foundation of the New
Institutional Model of Public Safety.
The strategy aims to accomplish three main objectives. In the short term, territorial
control is achieved to recover public spaces for the community and implement
operational intelligence to combat criminal structures. In the medium term,
8
structural change is contemplated and the operational model of the police force. In
the long term, the consolidation of public security institutions of the country under a
system
of
system capability
alignment, standardisation and
international
standardised methodology and procedures. Through seven guiding lines:
1) Aligning the capabilities of the Mexican state against crime. Seeking to involve
three levels of government in the fight against crime. Includes the coordination of
federal police corporations under a single command to avoid duplication of
functions and to allow for improved operational deployment and geographic
coverage.
2) Prevention of crime and citizen participation. Focussing on the factors which
cause crime and promoting the protection of human rights from the perspective of
the victim.
3) Institutional development. Underpinned by a reengineering process of
organisational development, specifically the professionalisation of the police.
Based on a meritocratic system to regulate recruitment, process selection,
integration and personal development.
4) The penitentiary system. Promoting policies to eradicate corruption and criminal
operation intramural, recover the original meaning of detention centres and control
instances of alleged perpetrators and sentencing, with effective surveillance.
5) Combating corruption. Monitoring of law enforcement to prevent and punish their
possible deviations, through the establishment of a Reliability Control Centre,
responsible for the recruitment, selection, evaluation and retention of police
personnel in the three levels of government to unify technical criteria, methodology
and application.
9
6) Technology infrastructure for public safety. Under the heading "Platform
Mexico", the design of a networking and telecommunications technology system to
map networks and databases related to public safety and to create uniformed
methods of action and information through two routes: a) horizontal, to connect
police stations and b) vertical, to meet local entities, through coordination
agreements with state authorities.
7) Measurement indicators established with civil society. For transparent results
and to strengthen the culture of accountability, indicators have been designed with
the participation of civic organisations in order to measure the effectiveness of the
authorities responsible for public safety.
III: A first Assessment
Because SSR is a process rather than an end point, measuring ‘success’ or
‘failure’ can be problematic. The holistic nature of SSR means that ‘success’,or at
least ‘performance’,is only likely to be visible after time. Particular reforms may be
assessed as ‘successful’, but can be undermined if other elements of the security
sector system are unchanged. Thus, a professionalised police force may be
considered an SSR success, but the implications of this for SSR as a whole may
be undermined, if, for example, the judiciary remains in the same situation.
However, these challenges do not mean that performance cannot and should not
be evaluated.
According to the OECD Handbook of SSR, the following criteria can be used to
assess the impact of the SSR process and long-term sustainability:
1. Legal frameworks
2. An integrated approach to security, justice and development
3. Budgetary processes
10
4. Developing national capacity to manage change.
1. We defined the powers of the police in the investigation and prosecution of
crimes and designed new mechanisms for the coordination of public safety.
2. The country's law enforcement agencies now have technical and functional
autonomy to investigate crimes. It laid the foundations for police
investigators, scientists and professionals. Likewise, the reform changed the
foundations of the Mexican prison system to redefine its function.
Actions have been implemented in terms of safety, both in the legal
framework and institutionally, and have resulted in profound changes,
creating a whole new model of policing.
New Model of Police Performance
Preventive
Actions
Model Unit of
Research police
COORDINADOR ESTATAL
DE LA POLICÍA FEDERAL
Federal forces of
support
COORDINACIÓN CON
AUTORIDADES
FEDERALES,
ESTATALES Y
MUNICIPALES
Regional security
Contact with
Control Centre
11
The police restructuring model is grounded on the following basic principles:

The normative aspect, including Constitution reforms, fitness for
implementing legislation, and, in short, the legal changes necessary
to ensure that the police forces of the three branches of government
assume research functions, jointly with the Ministry of Public Safety,
to combine technology, operations and logistics.

In the context of professionalisation, the development of a Police
Career system that provides certainty to members of the police and
prison security in the country. To include both those in service or
incorporated in the municipal orders, federal and state expectations,
to strengthen their development and promotion, with clear and fair
rules.

Police development through the New Police Model will seek ongoing
training for all federal police officers and training for police officers
specialising in senior management at the Academy of Public
Security. Also, providing corporate training, police expertiseand
prison security in the three levels of government.

As regards to the issue of evaluation and control of trust in the new
model, it provides for the application of strict controls of income trust,
retention and promotion of police and guards.
With this system it is possible to purge the police and security prisons of negative
elements linked to criminal organisations, or without the appropriate profile, by
applying trust screening tests and the establishment of a disciplinary system. This
12
ensures that corporation police and prison security in the country have the best
men to achieve effective results and individual recognition.
3. Budgetary Processes. The investment in public safety cannot be seen solely as
the quantity of resources assigned to equip and operate institutions. The
intensification of violence and changing security conditions has involved the
investment of resources and consequently an impact on expenditure. 5
Similarly, it is usual in this discussion to confuse ends and means. The acquisition
of public safety equipment (e.g. weapons) should not be considered an end in itself
but a means to achieve certain strategic objectives. It is therefore necessary to
take into account long-term costs, for example, maintenance and personnel.
How much additional protection means increased expenditure on public safety?
How much should a country spend on public safety? The literature suggests that
once a country has the capacity to respond to crime and organised crime the
probability of achieving planned objectives increases. Increases in these
capabilities have little additional deterrent value; an increase in security spending
public in this case would be of a marginally low value to society. In short, it is a
matter of state capacity and, of course, an efficient allocation of resources.
Between 2006 and 2009 SSP expenditure grew by 232%. This has been
earmarked to strengthen the operational capacity of the Federal Police, as well as
infrastructure and technology projects. Investment has been focussed on:
1. The creation of a federal police corporation under the New Police
Model;
5
Perhaps the clearest example of a pure public benefit is national defense and public security.
However, the level of expenditure that will be addressed in these and other public benefits (such as
health, for example) often raises heated debate (should more resources be assigned to basic
education or higher?). The theory suggests that the amount of resources assigned to a public
benefit depends on the additional benefits society would receive for a given increase in spending
(i.e. its marginal willingness to pay). Unfortunately this method of analysis is not entirely clear in
relation to public safety.
13
2. The national network interconnection, Platform Mexico;
3. The implementation of an Infrastructure Master Plan for the
deployment of the Federal Police;
4. The growth of the prison infrastructure;
5. The implementation of the New Police Model nationally through
SUBSEMUN.
SSP´s Budget 2006-2011
(millions of dollars )
2006
TOTAL
Federal Police
Federal Prisons
Plataforma México
Subsidies
Others
2007
2008
923.1
1,795.4
2,019.0
509.8
232.8
1,202.8
260.3
135.2
68.5
128.7
1,223.2
254.2
41.7
383.1
116.8
78.8
101.7
2009
3,073.4
1,724.4
699.1
96.9
362.2
190.9
2010
2011
2,608.0
2,950.9
1,818.8
503.7
45.4
97.0
143.1
1,609.1
909.6
130.5
301.7
As mentioned, the new legal framework for corporate action defines the powerof
the police in the investigation and prosecution of crimes, resulting in a significant
new power structure and demanding human nature, technical, organisational and
investment requirements.
Between 2006 and 2009 Federal Police members spend accounted for
approximately 12 thousand to 39.500 seats. In the early years, growth was
focussed on the reaction force and federal troops, while in 2009 research, scientific
and intelligence areas were strengthened through increased personnel.
Not only this increase in strength, but also extended police operations scope and
coverage, had a significant impact on police operating expenditure between 2006
and 2011, reporting an increase of almost 215.6%.
14
Thisdataisindicativethat only underthe administration of PresidentFelipeCalderon,
public security policyhas beena priorityof theMexican State.
SSP´s Budget 2001-2011
(millions of dollars)
12,446.8
14,000.0
12,000.0
10,000.0
8,000.0
6,000.0
4,000.0
2,000.0
0.0
4,972.7
2001-2006
2007-2011
To date the SSP's budget under the existing administration (2007-2011) in
comparison with the previous (2001-2006), has increased by 150% in real terms,
from 4,972.2 to 12,446.8 md. This increase must be evaluated in the context of the
restoration of original meaning of the public safety function of the State, through
infrastructure development and equipment, a function that to date is only 4 years
old, which compared to larger global corporate police structures is relatively young.
Notwithstanding this growth, the public security sector receives 2.3% of the federal
budget, while health and education receive more than 20%. It is here where we
understand the need to enhance our holistic approach to SSR.
15
Regardless of the strategies to combat organised crime, or the political party in
administration, the Government has to put in place police and prison infrastructure
and technology, as well as strengthening the police operation for the creation of a
Modern State.
Moving froman annual expenditure of923.1mdin2006 to 2,950.6 mdin2011,
resulted in:
 The formationoftheFederalPolicewith39.500personnelwithtacticaloperational capacity and a fleet of vehiclesfor their transportationbylandand
airacrossthecountry.
 The construction ofaNationalCommandCentre, connected to Plataforma
México; in addition to an area dedicated to the care of victims of crime. The
National Command Centre consists of:
Quarters
Hangar and heliport
16
Shooting stand
Armoury

17 new police stations modelled on the National Command Centre, located
throughout the country, to develop police operations. These have been
designed to promote a sense of proximity and attention to the public.
 Operating expenditure associated with developing police operatives around
the country involving fuel, food, travel, vehicle maintenance, and radio and
telephone communications, among others.
 Plataforma México, a multi communications network for voice, data, radio,
and video/image amongst the various governmental departments. This,
complemented through the use of protocols and the development of
technological products and systems, that facilitate the exchange of
substantive information in real time to strengthen police intelligence
systems.
 Infrastructure Construction and Operation of Federal Penitentiaries,
increasing inmate capacity from6,192 in 2006to16,000 at the end of2010.
It is interesting to note that, as a percentage of GDP spending, public security in
Mexico is still relatively low.
17
Expenditure as % of GDP in Public Security and Defense in OECD
Countries
Public Security
Country
2003
2004
2005
2006
Defense
2007
Reino Unido
2.4%
2.6%
2.6%
2.5%
República Checa
2.2%
2.2%
2.2%
2.2%
Uruguay
2.2%
2.1%
0.0%
Hungría
2.1%
2.1%
2.1%
2.2%
Portugal
2.1%
2.0%
2.0%
1.9%
Estados Unidos
2.0%
2.0%
2.0%
2.0%
República Eslovaca
1.9%
2.3%
2.0%
2.1%
Italia
1.9%
1.9%
1.9%
1.9%
Holanda
1.8%
1.8%
1.7%
1.8%
Chile
1.9%
1.9%
1.9%
España
1.8%
1.8%
1.8%
1.8%
Alemania
1.7%
1.7%
1.6%
1.6%
Canadá
1.7%
1.6%
1.6%
1.6%
Bélgica
1.7%
1.6%
1.7%
1.7%
Polonia
1.7%
1.6%
1.7%
1.8%
Nueva Zelanda
1.6%
1.6%
1.9%
Austria
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
Islandia
1.5%
1.5%
1.4%
1.4%
Finlandia
1.4%
1.3%
1.4%
1.3%
Japón
1.4%
1.4%
1.5%
1.4%
Irlanda
1.4%
1.4%
1.3%
1.4%
Suecia
1.4%
1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
Francia
1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
Corea de Sur
1.2%
1.2%
1.2%
1.3%
Grecia
1.1%
1.2%
1.2%
1.2%
Luxemburgo
1.1%
1.1%
1.0%
0.9%
Noruega
1.1%
1.1%
0.9%
0.9%
Dinamarca
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
México
0.1% como
0.1%
0.2% y Seguridad
0.2%
/1 Gasto Gubernamental clasificado
Orden Público
2008
2.5%
2.1%
2.6%
2.1%
2.0%
1.6%
2.1%
2.0%
1.9%
1.8%
2.0%
1.9%
1.6%
2.0%
1.5%
1.6%
1.8%
1.7%
2.0%
1.4%
1.5%
1.2%
1.4%
1.5%
1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
0.9%
0.9%
1.0%
0.3%
1.5%
2.2%
2.3%
1.8%
1.8%
1.3%
1.8%
1.3%
1.2%
1.3%
1.2%
0.9%
0.9%
1.0%
0.3%
2003
2.5%
1.9%
1.8%
1.3%
1.3%
4.0%
1.8%
1.4%
1.5%
1.4%
1.1%
1.1%
1.1%
1.2%
1.2%
1.3%
0.9%
0.0%
1.4%
1.0%
0.5%
2.0%
1.9%
2.5%
3.0%
0.3%
1.9%
1.6%
0.4%
2004
2.5%
1.4%
1.6%
1.3%
1.4%
4.2%
1.9%
1.4%
1.5%
1.3%
1.1%
1.0%
1.0%
1.1%
1.0%
1.1%
0.9%
0.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.6%
1.9%
1.9%
2.3%
2.8%
0.3%
1.8%
1.6%
0.4%
2005
2.4%
1.6%
0.0%
1.3%
1.4%
4.2%
1.6%
1.4%
1.4%
1.2%
1.1%
1.0%
1.1%
1.1%
1.1%
1.0%
0.9%
0.0%
1.6%
1.0%
0.5%
1.7%
1.9%
2.5%
2.5%
0.2%
1.6%
1.5%
0.4%
2006
2007
2.6%
1.2%
2.4%
1.2%
1.4%
1.3%
4.2%
1.7%
1.3%
1.4%
1.3%
1.1%
4.2%
1.5%
1.3%
1.4%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.2%
1.0%
1.0%
0.8%
0.1%
1.4%
0.9%
0.5%
1.7%
1.8%
2.5%
2.1%
0.2%
1.6%
1.6%
0.4%
0.9%
0.1%
1.4%
0.9%
0.5%
1.6%
1.8%
2.5%
2.3%
0.2%
1.6%
1.6%
0.5%
1.0%
1.4%
2008
2.5%
1.3%
1.3%
1.2%
2.0%
4.3%
1.5%
1.7%
1.4%
3.5%
1.2%
1.3%
1.3%
1.2%
2.0%
0.9%
1.3%
0.9%
0.6%
1.3%
2.3%
2.8%
3.6%
0.7%
1.3%
1.4%
0.5%
Source: OCDE, CEPAL , IMF and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Even with a 150% increase in the SSP´s budget in this Administration in
comparison to the previous, in 2009 Public Security spending represented only
0.4% of GDP, well below the average spent by OECD countries, which in 2008
accounted for 1.6%. When including the Ramo33, federal transfers and subsidies
to the states and municipalities to strengthen public security, the percentage rose
from 0.4% to 0.5% of GDP.
4. Develop national capacity to manage change (political conditions). Current
Mexican political arrangements create impediments to the coordination required to
sustain and advance those policy changes needed to support the SSR. As Greif
18
(2006) argues, there is an intimate relationship between belief systems and the
institutional framework. In other words, the “path dependency” of Mexico’s political
arrangement influences current decisions.
Due to the de-centralisation of political power, state and local governments need to
be involved in the process to implement SSR. In the past, an all-powerful
presidency was able, for instance, to deal with a corrupt police, the smuggling of
goods or the execution of a policy for social and political contention. Therefore,
policy-contradictions were not solved but managed through the resources of the
state. James Q. Wilson, in his classic study of the police in eight communities in
the US, argued that the social and political environment in which a police
organisation is situated has an effect on the style of policing that it adopts.6
Because of this, and the absence of sufficient regulations, the political system has
generated a true necessity for political pacts and informal agreements that imply
the President’s ability to undertake a certain level of political activism to benefit or
damage interest groups in the implementation of the SSR.
This informal system is a breeding ground for a range of mafias that represent
strong interest groups, and for the first time act without the authoritarian control of
the old regime and without the legal controls of the new one.
A comparative analysis of 59 countries conducted by Sung (2004) to investigate
the association between different levels of democracy and organised crime
activities revealed that higher perceptions of victimisation through organised crime
6
Wilson developed a taxonomy to describe three prominent styles of policing that he observed:
legalistic, service, and watchman. In legalistic-style departments, officers initiate formal contact with
citizens and structure their work according to criminal law. In service-style departments, officers
initiate informal contact with citizens and rely less on criminal law. In watchman-style departments,
officers neither initiate contact with citizens as frequently, nor rely as much on criminal law.
19
were reported in moderately democratic countries than in both authoritarian
societies and advanced democracies.
Therefore, as Rexton and Williams argue (2010), Mexican organised crime has
many similarities to the Russian situation in the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet
Union removed social and political control mechanisms which had allowed elite
exploitation of organised crime while controlling the level of violence.
The shift in the federal and local balance of power and the areas outside the
democratisation process represent primary growth opportunities for criminal groups
as they attempt to establish territorial dominance, and compete for a greater share
of the illicit market. This issue and the deficit in the rule of law unfortunately results
in an increase in violence.
As Volha Piotukh and Peter Wilson (2009) argue, a dysfunctional security sector,
deficient in terms of efficiency and / or governance, can threaten the interests of
the state and its citizens through varying means. Following this author the SSR
needs to find a balance in resources, instruments and democratic control.
20
SSR Pathologies
Resources
Instruments
Mexico´s reform
Structural-institutional
Law enforcement operations
% inversion
% personal
% infrastructure
% equipment


Technology
 Police Stations
(Plataforma
 New equipment
Mexico)
 Operational procedures
New
Legal
Framework
 Civil
Service
(SIDEPOL)
Democratic Control
 Variables
 Society Council
 Society Council
 Media
 Trust on Public
 ONG´s
Policy Evaluation
FINAL NOTE: ORGANISED CRIME, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW
Organised crime has become one of the main security concerns in democratic and
democratising societies around the world. Criminal organisations and the
democratisation process co-exist in a paradoxical tension characterised by
symbiosis and incompatibility. In this context it is important to clarify that, at the end
of the day, the challenge of organised crime affronts Mexico’s democratic process.
Organised crime corrupts government officials and weakens the support of
democratisation and market reforms. Although the short-term security threat posed
by criminal organisations is focussed on the violent challenges of local state
21
population and territory control, in the long run the erosion of the rule of law, the
distortion of local economies, and the bridging with international criminal groups
could directly threaten democratic institutions.
The democratic character of the rule of law is defined both by its form and
substance, in other words, by the extent to which the law is implemented.
Mexico needs to improve the implementation of the rule of law based upon four
elements. The first is the political and legal guarantee of both civil liberties and
property rights. The second is the existence of an efficient judicial branch to cut
transaction costs and effectively limit the predatory behaviour of authorities. The
third is legal security, so that citizens can plan their goals in the context of known
rules, certain that the authorities will not use coercive power arbitrarily against
them. The fourth is the guarantee that the authority of the rule of law will always be
enforced over other rules of the game when the latter are not in accordance.
With the progress of democratisation, organised crime becomes more effectively
controlled, as more complex liberal institutions gradually take form. As long as the
citizenry persists in its struggle for the strengthening of democratic institutions, the
grip of criminal groups on the society as a whole will be challenged and gradually
dismantled. The best weapons to fight organised crime are the key elements of a
liberal democracy.
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