United States Department of State
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs
International
Narcotics Control
Strategy Report
Volume I
Drug and Chemical
Control
March 2013
INCSR 2013 Volume 1
Country Reports
Cuba
A. Introduction
Despite its proximity to major transit routes for illegal drugs to the U.S. market, Cuba is not a
major consumer, producer, or transit point of illicit narcotics. Cuba’s intensive security presence
and bilateral interdiction efforts have effectively reduced the available supply of narcotics on the
island and prevented traffickers from establishing a foothold. The Cuban Border Guard (TGF)
maintains an active presence along Cuba’s coastal perimeter and conducts maritime
counternarcotics operations and coastal patrols. Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)
frequently attempt to avoid Cuban and U.S. government counternarcotics patrol vessels and
aircraft by skirting Cuba’s territorial waters.
Cuba’s domestic drug production and consumption remain negligible as a result of active
policing, harsh sentencing for drug offenses, and very low consumer disposable income. Cuba’s
counternarcotics efforts have prevented illegal narcotics trafficking from having a significant
impact on the island.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
In 2012, Cuba continued “Operation Hatchet,” a Ministry of Interior-led multi-agency
counternarcotics strategy that also includes the efforts of Cuba’s ministries of Armed Forces,
Justice, Public Health, Education and Culture, and the Border Guard. The operation aims to
reduce supply through vigilant coastal observation, detection and interdiction, and reduce
demand through education and legislation. The Cuban government’s extensive domestic security
apparatus and tough sentencing guidelines have kept Cuba from becoming a major drug
consuming country. The government did not publicize new counternarcotics legislation policy
initiatives or related budget increases supporting such measures in 2012.
Cuba continues to demonstrate a commitment to counternarcotics cooperation with partner
nations. The government reports having 35 bilateral agreements for counterdrug cooperation and
35 agreements with partner nations regarding judicial proceedings and extradition. Cuba
regularly participates in international counternarcotics conferences, such as the United Nations’
Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, and submits quarterly statistics on drug
interdictions and seizures to the International Narcotics Control Board.
The 1905 extradition treaty between the United States and Cuba and an extradition agreement
from 1926 remain in effect. In 2012, these agreements were not employed to hand over
fugitives. Instead, bilateral arrangements were made to have the fugitives detained and deported
from Cuba and directly placed in the custody of the receiving nation for further prosecution.
Regionally, Cuba is not party to the Caribbean Regional Maritime Agreement which opened for
signature in 2003.
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2. Supply Reduction
Major transshipment trends did not change from 2011. Through October 2012, the Government
of Cuba reported seizing a total of 2.066 metric tons (MT) of illegal narcotics, 97 percent of
which were found washed-up on Cuba’s shores, a marked decrease compared to the 9.1 MT
reported seized in 2011. Government counternarcotics forces reported disrupting 34 smuggling
operations, seizing 26.88 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and 7.37 kg of marijuana. There are no
reported seizures of synthetic drugs. Statistics on arrests or prosecutions were not made
available.
Domestic production and consumption remained very limited, and Cuba concentrated its supply
reduction efforts on preventing illegal smuggling through Cuban territorial waters, rapidly
collecting reported narcotic wash-ups, and preventing visitors and smugglers from bringing
smaller amounts of narcotics into the country. The Ministry of Armed Forces and Ministry of
Interior’s fixed and mobile radars, coupled with visual and coastal vessel reporting procedures
make up an effective network for detecting illegal incursions of territorial air and sea by
narcotics traffickers. Cuba continues to share “go-fast” vessel information with neighboring
countries, including the United States, and has had increasing success in interdicting such vessels
using independent assets and in coordination with United States and other nations’ forces. In
2012, Cuba reported 31 real-time reports of “go-fast” narcotics trafficking events to the U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG). TGF’s email and phone notifications of maritime smuggling to the USCG
have increased in timeliness, quantity and quality, and have occasionally included photographs
of suspected narcotics trafficking vessels.
Overseas arrivals continue to bring in small quantities of illegal drugs mostly for personal use,
although the extent of this problem remains unknown beyond occasional anecdotes. The
Ministry of Interior conducts thorough entry searches using x-rays and trained counternarcotics
detection canines at major airports.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
The combination of extensive policing, low incomes, low supply, and strict drug laws (involving
up to 15-year prison sentences) has resulted in very low illicit drug use in Cuba. There are
nationwide campaigns aimed at preventing drug abuse, and the quantity of existing programs for
the general population appears adequate given the very low estimated numbers of addicts. The
National Drug Commission, headed by the Minister of Justice, with representatives from the
Attorney General’s office and the National Sports Institute, remains responsible for drug abuse
prevention, rehabilitation and drug policy issues.
The Ministry of Health reports operating special drug clinics, offering services ranging from
emergency care to psychological evaluation and counseling to treat individuals with drug
dependencies. The government runs three substance abuse clinics that cater to foreigners, and
the Catholic Church runs a center to treat addiction in Havana.
The government occasionally broadcasts anti-drug messages on state run media and operates an
anonymous 24-hour helpline.
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4. Corruption
Cuba has strong policies in place against illicit production or distribution of narcotic or
psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, and laundering of proceeds from illegal drug
transactions. Cuba professes a zero tolerance for narcotics-related corruption by government
officials and reported no such corruption occurrences in 2012. As a matter of government
policy, Cuba neither encourages nor facilitates illegal activity associated with drug trafficking.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
In 2012, Cuba maintained a significant level of cooperation with U.S. counternarcotics efforts.
In Havana, the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) has a USCG Drug Interdiction Specialist to
coordinate counternarcotics efforts with Cuban law enforcement officials. The United States
does not provide narcotics-related funding or assistance to Cuba.
The USCG shares tactical information related to trafficking and responds to Cuban reporting on
vessels transiting through Cuban territorial seas suspected of smuggling, or tactical information
on drugs interdicted within Cuban territory. Cuba also shares real-time tactical information with
the Bahamas, Mexico and Jamaica. Bilateral cooperation in 2012 led to multiple at-sea
interdictions.
In 2011 the Cuban government presented the United States with a draft bilateral accord for
counternarcotics cooperation, which is still under review. Structured appropriately, such an
accord could advance the counternarcotics efforts undertaken by both countries.
D. Conclusion
Cuba continues to dedicate significant resources to prevent illegal drugs and their use from
spreading on the island, so far successfully. The technical skill of Cuba’s security services gives
Cuba a marked advantage against DTOs attempting to gain access to the island. Upgraded links
between the United States, Cuba, and regional partners, along with improved tactics, techniques,
and procedures, would likely lead to increased interdictions and disruptions of illegal trafficking.
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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK or North Korea)
Drug use may be rising within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North
Korea), according to reports from DPRK refugees and travelers to North Korea. Chinese and
South Korean press reports indicate that a substantial volume of methamphetamine continues to
be produced within DPRK territory, mainly for transshipment to China. There are also reports of
transactions between DPRK traffickers and large, organized criminal groups along the DPRKChina border, and of Chinese police enforcement targeting drugs entering China from the DPRK
by way of enhanced patrols, periodic arrests, and drug seizures. However, the Chinese
government rarely identifies the DPRK as the source of illicit drugs.
The proximity and availability of precursor chemicals in China likely contribute to the
production of methamphetamine within North Korea. Reliable information is difficult to obtain
regarding illicit activities within the DPRK territory, but drug production and other criminal
activities, such as the counterfeiting of cigarettes, appear to have continued in 2012. There is
insufficient current information, however, to confirm official DPRK state involvement in drug
trafficking. There have been no confirmed reports of large-scale drug trafficking involving
DPRK state entities since 2004. This suggests that state-sponsored drug trafficking may have
ceased or been sharply reduced, or that the DPRK regime has become more adept at concealing
state-sponsored trafficking of illicit drugs.
Despite the absence of reports of drug seizures linked directly to DPRK state institutions, the
United States cannot entirely rule out the possibility of official DPRK state involvement in the
manufacturing and trafficking of illicit drugs. A relatively large investment in precursor
chemicals is necessary to produce the volume of methamphetamine trafficked from North Korea,
and it is unclear how individual criminals could independently organize such activity within such
a tightly-controlled state. It is likely that some official corruption on both sides of the DPRKChina border facilitates drug trafficking.
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