15/11/2013 Seeking an injunc2on by a patent-­‐holder as an abuse? The reference to the Court of Jus2ce in Huawei v ZTE Alison Jones New Challenges in EU Compe22on Law and Enforcement, 13 Nov 2013 Overview The reference in Huawei v ZTE The background to the case: standard seNng, FRAND obliga2ons and na2onal injunc2on suits Should there be a role for compe22on law or can na2onal courts resolve the issues applying principles of patent law and na2onal law? Do the exis2ng categories of abuse and principles underpinning them help to create a rule to iden2fy any unlawful seeking of an injunc2on 1 15/11/2013 The ques2ons referred Essen2ally, the Landgericht Düsseldorf has asked the CJ whether, and if so when, the seeking of an injunc6on by a patent-­‐holder against a patent infringer may cons6tute an abuse of a dominant posi6on contrary to Ar2cle 102 In this case, the patent-­‐holder was a holder of a standard-­‐essen2al patent (‘SEP’) who has commi[ed to license that SEP to all third par2es on Fair, Reasonable and Non-­‐Discriminatory (‘FRAND’) terms To what extent can compe22on law (in combina2on with the FRAND commitment) constrain reliance on a patent holder’s exclusive rights and right to decide whether or not to license its rights and if so what on terms? Background to the case Standard seNng frequently procompe22ve, par2cularly by ensuring compa2bility and interoperability between products/ components within a system. But •  At SS stage: could be used as a mechanism for excluding compe2tors of compe2ng technology •  Post-­‐standardisa2on: SEP-­‐holders may be able to hold-­‐up and foreclose compe22on downstream by a refusal to licence implementers (who are locked into the standard) or by licensing them only on ‘unreasonable’ terms (SS confers addi2onal power beyond patent) •  Because numerous complementary SEPS read on a product, or component of it, there is also a risk of ‘royalty stacking’ 2 15/11/2013 Background to the case FRAND licensing commitments now commonly required from par2cipants in standard seNng • Necessary to ensure that the SS compa2ble with Art 101 • Incen2ve to standardise on best technology • Preserves incen2ve to innova2on (fair royal2es on more licences) • Ensures success of standard by precluding private profit maximising by SEP-­‐holders Background to the case FRAND commitment has not resolved problems and a number of complex ques2ons s2ll le` open. In addi2on to validity, infringement and enforceability issues, important ques2ons are: • How a FRAND royalty can be assessed; • What happens when nego2a2ons between SEP-­‐holders and implementers break down: is it jus2fiable for SEP holders to seek injunc2on against an implementer that won’t meet its royalty demands and who is infringing on the patent? EU authority on seeking an injunc2ons but not on how a FRAND rate can be determined 3 15/11/2013 A growing consensus that injunc2ons in rela2on to FRAND-­‐
encumbered SEPS should be remedy of last resort? IPCom v Nokia, Roth J: Nokia has declared itself willing to take a licence and IPCom made a FRAND declara2on – so why should an injunc2on be granted? Samsung v Apple, District Court of Hague: no grant of an injunc2on if would breach of a FRAND obliga2on and cons2tute an abuse of power or breach of pre-­‐contractual good faith. Threat of injunc2on would put improper pressure on Apple to agree to non-­‐FRAND licensing terms Samsung and Motorola: Commission: seeking of an injunc2on by a SEP-­‐holder may be abusive where sought against an implementer willing to enter a licence on FRAND terms. Seeking injunc2on will distort licensing nego2a2ons –harm consumers (dra` commitments in Samsung) US A similar approach taken by courts and compe22on agencies But different approach in Germany German law generally requires the grant of an injunc2on to a patent holder alleging that patent holder is infringed. Thus injunc2on unless: •  High degree of likelihood of invalidity of patent: but patent infringement cases held separately from, and prior to, validity claims; •  Refusal to conclude a licence will cons2tute an abuse of a dominant posi2on: but Orange-­‐Book-­‐Standard decision interpreted in way which makes it very difficult to raise such a defence. To avoid injunc2on must: •  Renounce defences to claim (e.g. that patent invalid); •  Uncondi2onally offer terms, refusal of which would be abusive; •  Render supra-­‐FRAND payments in respect of past use; •  Pay deposit for damages in escrow In prac(ce injunc(ons rarely refused: eg Motorola v Microso, and Motorola v Apple 4 15/11/2013 Huawei v ZTE Prac2ce of lower German courts out of kilter? Might the courts be in breach of obliga2ons under EU law? The fact that an injunc2on is permi[ed would not provide a defence to a finding of an abuse – conduct a[ributable to the SEP-­‐holder and not required by na2onal law Is threat of an injunc2on a mechanism for hold-­‐up or valid exercise of IPR for resolu2on of licensing nego2a2ons? One approach Another approach •  Threat of an injunc2on 2ps the balance of power in nego2a2ons towards excessive royal2es, hold-­‐up and consumer harm: •  Implementers locked-­‐in •  SEP small part of value of final product – effects of exclusion devasta2ng •  SEP-­‐holder: irrevocably waived its general right to refuse a licence, except perhaps against an implementer that has refused to pay an independently determined FRAND rate •  SEP-­‐holder commi[ed itself to seeking a reasonable royalty rate •  FRAND-­‐encumbered SEP-­‐holder should not be taken as having waived right to seek injunc2on relief and a decision to seek an injunc2on •  Injunc2on-­‐legal remedy which part and parcel of patent •  May be necessary to bring recalcitrant implementers who holding-­‐out and refusing to bargain in good faith (reverse hold-­‐up) •  Denying access to injunc2ons gives prospec2ve licensees enhanced ability and incen2ves to free-­‐ride on SEPs 5 15/11/2013 Approach One (be[er view?): • Risk of hold-­‐up (and harm to compe22on up-­‐ and downstream) high because consequence of exclusion so severe? • No damage to innova2on upstream (SEP-­‐holder planned to mone2ze IP through broad licensing on reasonable terms rather than through exclusive use) • No infringement if SEP-­‐holder can establish objec2ve jus2fica2on (no compliance with independently determined licensing terms) • Implementers cannot infringe SEPs with impunity and refuse to engage in good faith nego2a2ons: • Risk of reverse hold-­‐up low: SEP holders that can establish infringement -­‐ en2tled to FRAND royal2es for past and future use and costs where appropriate But how could abuse be characterised? Is concern that conduct might be exploita2ve or exclusionary (or both)? Concern that threat of injunc2on will allow hold-­‐up implementers: •  Unfair licensing terms: Commission not generally keen to intervene in cases where conduct purely exploita2ve; •  Discriminatory: compared to other licences? •  Exclusionary: can it be analysed in similar way as refusal to license/ construc2ve refusal to license/ misuse of indispensable patent (or new stand-­‐alone abuse as margin squeeze) -­‐ which likely to exclude compe2ng technology upstream and to eliminate compe22on on the secondary market AND development of compe22on downstream; •  Innova2on and incen2ves to invest upstream not harmed 6 15/11/2013 Denial of access to court? ITT v The principle of access to court is Promedia: a fundamental right and a general principle ensuring the rule of law •  Art 102 can only deny this right excep2onally e.g., not an a[empt to establish rights but serves to harass the opposite party and part of plan to eliminate compe22on •  But no denial of access to court? •  Art 102 a factor to be considered •  Refusal to license may cons2tute an abuse in excep2onal circumstances •  Na2onal courts: na2onal rules must comply with principles of effec2veness and equivalence (Crehan) •  Orange-­‐Book-­‐Standard – denies implementers access to court as have to waive right to challenge validity of SEPs to avoid injunc2on? If injunc2on not generally available to SEP-­‐holder Axioma2c that mechanism for swi` resolu2on of licensing disputes put in place Role for compe22on agencies? SSOs should be doing more Guidance necessary from courts in the EU – no direct precedent (but judgments in the US are emerging) 7