International
Public Policy
Review
An Analysis of Regional Perception of
the Impact of Political Clientelism on the
Process of Democratisation in Senegal: A
Julia Baxter
IPPR Volume 6 Issue 1 (July 2010)
pp 65-103
International Public Policy Review • The Department of Political science
The Rubin Building 29/30 • Tavistock Square • London • WC1 9QU
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An Analysis of Regional Perception of the
Impact of Political Clientelism on the Process of
Democratisation in Senegal: A Mixed
Julia Baxter*
Introduction
This research has concentrated its focus on the political attitudes of everyday citizens in bucolic Saint Louis, Senegal concerning the impact of political clientelism
on the process of democratisation in Senegal. Unlike dated research in which the
structural and institutional characteristics of democratic transformation were
awarded primacy, clientelism is now at the centre of most modern polity investigations. I therefore consider this paper to have great current value in the international
campaign to unlock democracy and ensure the eradication of all corrupt practices.
Senegal, although a reputable African nation with a functional democracy and a decentralised government, continues to be troubled with the persistence of political
clientelist activity at both the local and national level. The potential for traditional
and modern political culture to coexist therefore presents itself as questionable considering their seemingly contradictory logics.
Similar to a handful of other African nations, Senegal is suffering from institutional dualism. That is, sustaining an operational democratic administration in tandem with the
continued functioning of clientelist networks (Beck 1997; Foltz 1977; Brinkerhoff et al.
2002:2). These networks, defined as influential subsystems of political activity, engage
in both short term exchanges between public officials and network members and in long
term associations between societal leaders and local residents (Robinson 2003; Auyero
2001). There is no incontestable conceptualisation of clientelism and its implications have
been identified both positively and negatively. Therefore this research has attempted to
“anchor vignettes” (King et al. 2004) in order to generate findings that are consistent and
comparable. Local perception is recognised as the most effective way to do this.
*Julia Baxter recently completed her Master of Science studies in Global Governance
and Ethics at University College London. She is now working for africapractice as a
strategic communications consultant and is working alongside the African Union in a
peace initiative.
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The purpose of this research is to evaluate the existence and the effects of political clientelism and the extent to which they hinder the achievement of a full
liberal democracy in Senegal. These evaluations take form from the perceptions
of everyday citizens in Saint Louis, one of the four townships of Senegal and its
former capital. The paper continues to determine that these political attitudes
conflict with the theoretical underpinnings of theories of modernisation: modernity will not fail to eradicate inappropriate cultural norms (Lerner 1958;
Lipset 1960; Diamond at al. 1986; Almond et al. 1989; Mbuku 2000). This liberal development theory ignores the persistence of traditional norms and values; the determination of clientelism as verified in this dissertation exemplifies
the inadequacy of democratic reform as a sole catalyst for its elimination (Faton
1987: 47). Rather it is the stagnation of social change and a local political deficiency that has resulted in the resilience of clientelist networks regardless of
political modernisation (Lemarchand 1981).
This paper uses data collected by the Afrobarometer (2005, 2008) alongside
findings from current research to formulate its central hypothesis: political clientelism still exists in Senegalese society and is perceived as negatively affecting the process of democratisation. Fresh data from the site under study in
2009 is produced to test this hypothesis. Whilst an institutional approach to the
study of clientelism is often employed, it is necessary to analyse how citizens
understand its consequences in order to gain a holistic understanding of the
concept. Thus, this predominantly qualitative research renders modern Senegalese political culture as an adapted version of traditional politics whereby the
primary impetus still remains: the attainment of social honour and power, driven by patron-client relationships (Barker 1971:47). Furthermore, the findings
show these ‘corrupt’ relationships to be in a process of transformation but in
their current state perceived as negatively affecting the legitimacy of elections
and trust in politicians. In both cases the null hypothesis is rejected. Correlation
tests fail to find a statistically significant relationship between perceptions of
clientelism and citizen participation in politics. However, this paper finds that
although clientelism may not be directly constraining participation, it is not encouraging a public space in which citizens want or feel able to participate. Future public policy would do well to improve genuine political participation and
to ensure effective decentralisation of government. This in turn will decrease
the need for citizens to engage in clientelist practices and the ability for political
elites to use them.
Historical Trajectory of Political Clientelism in Senegal
The strong influence of Islam and the Muslim brotherhoods in pre-colonial African
culture combined with the introduction of liberal, democratic voting patterns by the
French in the 18th century, nurtured a political system that incorporated both behaviours into its functioning (Fatton 1987:91). Subsequently, the formation of clientelist relationships began to pervade Senegalese politics, chiefly in the mid 1970s
when multiparty politics was reintroduced and in 1981 when this was expanded to
an unlimited multi-party system (Beck 2008).
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
67
Such relationships engendered a combination of dictatorial beliefs and values alongside the democratic requirement of open debate, interdependence of actors and
power and political strategy (Coulon 1988:429). The hierarchies, social and political, were the foundation of traditional political culture. Rural Senegal was governed
by indirect rule; a samba linguer was the term assigned to the chief of the village, a
man responsible for the protection and the financial well-being of the groups living
under his authority (Ibid). Urban Senegal saw the creation of democratic institutions
that allowed the African elite to acquire positions of responsibility. This inequality
between the rural and urban community was an inherent characteristic of Senegalese society (1988:430). Since the expansion of political life, it is now the marabouts
of the Muslim brotherhoods, of which there are several, who have taken this responsibility as honourable men to supply guidance and resources to those who are lacking in them. Their autonomy from the state grants them immediate trust from their
clientele. Although Senegalese politicians are quick to speak of the separation of religion and politics in public affairs, their relationship remains interactive (Beck 2008).
The peaceful electoral transfer of power in 2000 from the Socialist Party (PS hereafter) to the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS hereafter) was the first indication that
the clientelist support that the PS had been experiencing was eroding. Furthermore
it was believed to signify that voters could no longer be bought in the traditional
clientelist fashion but rather desired a political system based on liberal norms and
values. This loss of support surprisingly occurred mostly in the rural electoral districts, including Saint Louis. However, in the last year especially, the opinion of the
PDS party in Saint Louis has become unfavourable as demonstrated in the last local
elections (March 2009) contrasted with the rising popularity of the United to Boost
Senegal Party (Appendix 1.1) to which the newly elected Mayor (March 2009) is
member. It is apparent that after nine years in office, societal members have lost
faith in Wade’s campaign promise Sopi (change) and resign to the fact that political
clientelism is ever present in the Wade administration. This prevalence of corruption is further illustrated in Senegal’s deteriorated rank in the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International 2008) .
The historical trajectory of the former French colony has therefore resulted in an entrenchment of clientelism in political and societal affairs as a guarantee of political
survival (Foltz 1977; Johnson 1971; Fatton 1986); corruption has become the rule
as opposed to the exception (Mèdard 2002). It seems contemporary political culture
in Senegal combines both neoliberal values with the traditional desire for the accretion of power coupled with the ever present concern to portray an acceptable image
to the outside (Coulon 1990:430). Clientelism continues to be the “backbone of current Senegalese political culture” (Coulon 1988:430).
These competing logics at work in the Senegalese political system make Senegal an
interesting case for investigation; it is indicated as a “model democracy in Africa” by
the World Bank and yet is one of the most discussed countries in regard to political
clientelism. Furthermore, the region of Saint Louis—the chosen case study— was
one of the key cities that the ruling party lost in the March 2009 local elections. In
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addition, the population of Saint Louis is extremely diverse: 63% rural and 37% urban (Diop 2006), therefore making it a highly representative case.
Review of the Literature
Within the existing literature, the necessity to divorce traditional and modern political culture has sparked contentious debate: in this case political clientelism and
democracy. Several recent analyses of their coexistence have produced conclusions
that are both predictable and limited. Hence in order to really contribute to current research, it is elementary that a new analysis generates conclusions from the
perspective of everyday citizens. Such research, both qualitative and quantitative in
approach, will hope
to achieve a comprehensive, contextual insight into this conceptual contention and
its implications for the functioning of national and local politics in Senegal.
Current research
Clientelism is globally prevalent, as acknowledged in the burgeoning literature that
focuses on different societies, both developed and developing. However empirical
investigations have identified it to be a more regular practice in the global South.
Stokes (2007) attributed poverty to be the root cause of this; the poor place a higher value on handouts than the rich and regard them to be of greater importance
than public policy (Despato 2007; Wantchekon 2003; Kitschelt 2000; Scott 1976).
Moreover, the familiarity of clientelist practice within the African political arena has
meant that it has become ingrained within political activity, as alluded to in the historical trajectory. Therefore in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when much of the
developing world began to experience a period of democratic transformation, it is
unsurprising that a theoretical shift occurred in clientelist literature. Literature began to identify a state’s regime type as a variable with great explanatory power for
the existence of political clientelism (Stokes 2007:7; Roniger 2004:4).
This contemporary research focused its conclusions and predictions for the future
of clientelism parallel to predictions of regime type or change; the implementation
of a functioning democracy would weaken and eventually dissolve patron-client relationships (Lemarchand 1972; Legg 1975; Scott 1977). The contradictory nature of
the two cultures could not render it possible for their mutual survival; democratic
norms: accountability, legitimacy and transparency, superior to clientelist norms:
reciprocal gift-giving, string-pulling and favouritism would displace the need for
citizens and public officials to engage in corrupt practices.
However, recent studies have falsified the above prediction. Part of its erroneous
belief was the perception of clientelism as a dated practice functional in a traditional state (Roniger 2004:4). They failed to acknowledge the cemented quality of
the ‘norm of reciprocity’ (Gouldner 1960:161) persistent in Senegalese society and
the durability of existing political culture (Robinson 1994; Schaffer 1998; Schatzberg 2001). This ‘moral norm’ states that people should help those that have helped
them. Although, its positive implementation is common in daily Senegalese, known
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
69
nationally as Teranga, political elites exploit its nature. They use this demand in the
guise of mutual aid to enforce an obligation upon voters to whom they have distributed gifts to support them (Stokes 2007). Disapproval of these corrupt exchanges
came from former President Senghor (1980:174, 224-25) when he coined them ‘la
politique politicienne’ or ‘la Senegalite’
, the national disease of Senegal (Fatton 1986:61).
The continued prevalence of ‘petty’ corruption in Senegal is further illustrated in
Blundo’s and Olivier de Sardan’s (2006) qualitative contribution to the literature on
clientelism. Their comparative field study spanning between 1999 and 2001 concluded that daily transactions between voters and public officials were consistently
pervaded by low-level corruption. Their investigation into the roots and continued
existence of such activity grants the study originality; no previous study had qualitatively produced data on corruption in Africa. The results achieved from such a
methodology showed corruption to be widespread in Senegal unlike quantitative
studies that present it to be less of a problem relative to other African states (Konold
2007). Hence, the opportunity to further use qualitative methods to extend this type
of study on low-level corruption to its impact on democratisation is central to this
paper.
Clientelist practices, in view that they are considered to be counter to the logic of
democratic reform, have been theorised to present significant obstacles for the development of Senegal (Foltz 1977; O’Brien 1975; Brinkerhoff et al 2002) tabulated
by Brinkerhoff and Goldmith in 2002 (Appendix 1.2). However, the coexistence of
political clientelism and effective democracy is highly dependent on the definition of
democracy that is employed.
The existing literature on the process of democratisation (Dahl 1971; Huntington
1991; O’Donnell 2001) and its defining conditions implies an explicit or implicit
definition of democracy. To embark on a debate involving democratisation, the term
must first be clearly defined and operationalised: any discussion that fails to do this
is left vulnerable to severe criticism. Dahl (1971), whose work on democracy is most
commonly alluded to, identified eight essential democratic institutions: (1) freedom
of association; (2) freedom of expression; (3) the right to vote; (4) alternative sources of information; (5) universal eligibility for public office; (6) the right to compete
for political support; (7) “free and fair” elections; and (8) institutions for making
government policies depend upon an electoral mandate (1971:3).
Although Senegal appears to have conformed to the above criteria, it has done so to
an extremely minimal level (Beck 2008). Upon examination of the subsystem of Senegalese politics, one can conclude that the legitimacy of Senegal’s electoral process
has evaded the country for nearly two decades (Beck 1997). Beck (1993) deduced
from her extensive research that the implementation of a genuinely free and fair
electoral process has been obstructed. This will continue as long as stubborn informal mechanisms such as local clientelist practices persist. Such exploitative activity propagates electoral deception and misuse of the rules by both political elites
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and clients. Elections do not automatically give a voter a meaningful bargaining option if the vote does not genuinely reflect the true interests of the voter (Lemarchand 1981). Purchased votes cannot be accurately interpreted and can therefore not
count toward mandate-making and policy evaluation (Stokes in Schaffer 2001:90).
Thus, the continuation of patrimonial relations will have a dampening effect on the
purpose and implementation of democratic rules and practices.
Several rival theories have recognised compatibility between clientelist activity
and the functioning of a democratic institution. As acknowledged by The Report for
the Commission of Africa in 1995, traditional, culturally defined local networks are
strengthstrengths of African society. They create a focus on local politics and consequently form a local structure which performs to provide a foundation upon which
an effectual state can be established. In areas of low democratic representation,
clientelism can act as a practical solution to represent and promote local interests
(Beck 1997; Valenzuela 1992). Furthermore, clientelism can help to improve citizen
participation in politics and integrate less educated citizens who normally might feel
intimidated by the political process. Reciprocal dyads make up for the deficiencies
created by the introduction of a foreign institution into an indigenous society (Boissevain 1974:108-146). In creating a bridge between central government and the
people (Bratton et al. 1994), the state can then effectively execute its redistributive
role (Foltz 1977:248). Clientelism aids in the adjustment of developing countries
“to postmodern conditions and civil society more than is usually expected” (Roniger
2004:355).
Although this may be the case to some extent, the bridge that is built is invariably
between societal leaders and public officials as opposed to society itself. Moreover,
an increase in political participation does not entail genuine vote casting, as already
alluded to above.
However, the expectation that African states must imitate Western democracy without regard for already existing traditional social and political structures is incongruous. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) explained how democratisation across Africa
has varied due to the neopatrimonial nature of African politics. However, their analysis focuses primarily on formal institutions omitting local, informal networks and
the social power of their leaders. Hence the concept of clientelist democracy was
introduced (O’Donnell 1994; Beck 2008): a democratic regime saturated with clientelist networks that serve as the basis of political modernisation and accountability
(Beck 2008:4). Although this subtype of democracy fulfils the minimum conditions
of democracy, it can only be accepted as a legitimate and effective paradigm if the
clientelist structure that it embraces does not impede on the quality of democracy:
for example, popular participation and even distribution of political power (Fatton
1981:92).
This clashing logic of clientelism and democracy was illustrated in Putnam’s quantitative study (1992) on the effectiveness of democracy in Italy; regions with a high
percentage of patron-client networks experienced a less effective local government.
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
71
Drawing on primary survey data coupled with six selected case studies, he argued
that clientelism restrains civic participation. In considering the importance of citizen
participation for all democratic regimes (World Bank ), one is forced to conclude that
clientelism is constraining the process of democratisation. Putnam depends on the
use of psychological variables explored in the theory of civic culture (Almond et al.
1989) for explanation of his findings. This states that democratic stability assumes
certain properties: trust in people, political competence and support for the political system, all of which clientelism obstruct (Almond et al. 1989:29). Furthermore,
there is a correlation between attitudes and political direction, and through a process of socialisation communities begin to share similar attitudes and act accordingly.
Hence, the acceptance of clientelism and dissatisfaction with government spreads
quickly through Senegalese society. Konald’s paper (2007) demonstrated that attitudes are likely to vary between intra-country regions as well as inter-country.
Reliance on a reciprocal relationship can also compel those in a vulnerable position,
socially or financially, to align themselves politically in a manner that they would
not normally desire. This entails a sacrifice of personal liberty and political subordination and subsequently a breach of the democratic condition of freedom. Often
this sacrifice of voting freedom is unobserved due to the paradox of power: “effective power is unnoticed power; power observed is power devalued…” (Huntington
1981). Occasionally it is voluntarily forfeited due to a lack of interest in public policy; often a result of socio-economic deprivation or a lack of trust in its functioning. Moreover, the regularity of clientelism preserves this exploitation of the lower
classes as they become dependent upon it (Fatton 1986:64), thus maintaining the
existing structural class inequality in Senegal.
Political clientelism has further been depicted as an obstruction to democracy (Beck
1997; Stokke 1994; Bayart 1993; Scott 1977). Its functioning supplies exclusive advantages to voters, often financial or material, which contravenes the democratic
requirement of political equality according to liberal accounts (Stockton 2003). This
discord between democracy and clientelist practice was coined ‘changing continuities’ (Beck 1997); the government must continue to develop on its journey toward
democracy whilst acquiring political support that obliges it to listen to the demands
of society. Often the two requirements engender conflicting policy choices causing
development to stagnate, resulting in a ‘paradox of development’ (Barker 1977:436).
This is a clear indication of the powerlessness of political leaders caused by the deficiency of rational organisational forms (Fatton 1987). The centralisation of government emerging under the Wade administration has created a chasm between
the state and society, thus increasing society’s tendency to act independently and
engage in clientelist networks (Barker 1977:437). They become an escape from unpopular governmental demands and grant members a voice that speaks for change
(Hirschman 1981:211).
The serious policy implications of clientelism and its violation of democratic norms
convey the necessity for analysts and policymakers to be able to accurately determine the extent to which clientelism is in existence in their environments (Sousa
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2008:12). Henceforth, stable and sustainable governance reforms require political
support from all regions of the country. This support must be inclusive of all the rural areas in which the contention between traditional and modern political culture
is most apparent. In order to reform these practices, a new technique of communication between the centre and the peripheries must be fostered (Coulon 1990); hence
the necessity to evaluate local perspective to establish a ‘bottom-up’ approach for
reform (Brinkerhoff et al. 2002:39).
Using clientelism as the independent variable in this study transforms its relationship with democratisation from a vertical to a horizontal one. It grants them equivalent explanatory power (Lemarchand 1981); the causal direction of the relationship
between clientelism and democracy is indistinct (Szeftel 1998:226). Thus, unlike
previous modernisation studies that analyse the impact of democratisation on political clientelism and the way in which it is perceived, this paper investigates the
relationship from the reverse perspective. Understanding clientelism and its perceived legitimacy within society is a step towards an improved understanding of the
state and civil society. This is the central objective of this research.
Key Questions
From the above literature, key questions and hypotheses are formulated:
1)How is perception of political clientelism affecting the process of democratisation
in Senegal?
Hypothesis 1: Perception of political clientelism is negatively affecting the process
of democratisation.
In order to obtain a comprehensive answer to the above question it is important to
allocate some time to the investigation of the following sub-question:
a) To what extent is political clientelism perceived to exist in Senegalese society?
Primarily, illustrating the extent to which political clientelism is integrated in societal activity causes the opinions of those interviewed regarding its implications
and legitimacy to hold greater value.
b) What are the dominant perceptions of political clientelism in the region?
Thus, for the purpose of fully capturing the concept of democratisation, I make the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Perception of political clientelism is perceived as negatively affecting
the legitimacy of the electoral process.
Hypothesis 3: Perception of political clientelism is perceived as negatively affecting
trust in politicians.
Hypothesis 4: Perception of political clientelism is perceived as negatively affecting
civic participation in politics.
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
73
Methodology
Variables and Definitions
Independent Variable: the perception of political clientelism
“Political clientelism is defined as a personalized
, effective and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding
unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political
ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships” (Larmarchand
et al. 1972:151-152).
Measured by: reciprocal gift-giving between politicians and individuals in society:
short term and long term, individual’s perceptions of clientelism and association to
a network.
Dependent Variable: the process of democratisation
The process of democratisation is reaching a state in which liberté, egalité and fraternité is accomplished. Citizens have effective control over policy, government is
responsible, politics is open and honest, power and participation is equal and decisions are informed and rational (Huntington 1993).
Measured by: Free and fair electoral process, trust in politicians, civic participation
in politics, and citizen perception of democracy.
Intervening variables
These are the legitimacy of the electoral process, trust in politicians and civic participation in politics. Legitimacy of the electoral process is measured by the perception of the electoral process, trust in politicians is measured by perceived level of
electoral fraud and citizen trust in politicians and civic participation is measured by
the level of contact with various political personalities, perception of citizen power
in politics, support for the political system.
Research Design
This snapshot case study incorporates methodological triangulation: both the research and analysis of existing survey data from secondary sources and the generation and analysis of new primary field data. Its findings produced from the fieldwork
carried out in Senegal are original because it is the first time that such research with
a sole focus on the single site of Saint Louis has been conducted: “variations of attitude within a country can be as important (or more so) than differences between
countries” (Nye 1967:423). It is intended to be part of a larger research programme:
to use citizen perception of the concepts under study to guide future policy recommendations for better and more transparent governance in Senegal as well as in the
future across the third world.
The intention of the research is not to generalise to national limits but to enable an
intra-country comparative analysis.
The body of the research data consists of observation, interviews, focus groups and
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survey procedures. Fieldwork was carried out from th4 July to st31 July 2009, an
intense period of investigation based also on a previous visit to Saint Louis on th10
April to th10 July 2008. Primarily this is an analysis formulated from participant
observation, focus groups and interviews with community activists, public officials
and local societal actors. In addition a regional survey based on a systematic random
sample of one hundred individuals is conducted. This is coupled with prior analysis
of national survey data from the archival database, the Afrobarometer . Using this
secondary data I examine whether intensive regional fieldwork will match and further explain the findings articulated from a national survey.
Furthermore, the Afrobarometer data clearly conveys that although there is a hesitancy to directly admit to or implicate oneself in clientelist activity, the overriding
view is that political clientelism is widespread in Senegalese society. From my twomonth stay in Saint Louis the previous year, I was very much aware of this type of
environment and felt that I had established contacts and built trusting relationships
within the community so that an in-depth inquiry would yield reliable and honest
results.
Thus, in order to achieve comparable results, I conduct a small scale survey framing
similar questions, often the same as those posed by the Afrobarometer. The sample
size of 100 is approximately four times larger than the sample size of 24 Saint Louisians utilised in the Afrobarometer survey. I predict that these quantitative procedures will produce the same or similar results as the recent 2008 national survey.
Using a local translator, the survey questions are translated into the local vernacular
language, Wolof (Appendix 1.3) as well as French (the national language, Appendix
1.4) and English (Appendix 1.5) so as not to exclude any member of the population. Moreover, engaging locals as research assistants ensures that both cultural and
social norms are correctly considered and appropriate terms are used. These interview questionnaires are conducted like formal surveys: face to face and strictly
confidential. To produce inclusive and representative results, it is important to sample in a random and systematic fashion. Hence, various locations are selected at different times of the day. Every 10th pedestrian is stopped for an interview which at
times is not entirely possible as conversational, informal interviews can sometimes
exceed the expected time allocated for each interview. However, I had the help of
three research assistants which efficiently enabled this method of sampling to be
conducted. This anthropological tool was not used to produce an actual measure of
political clientelism but is considered to be one element of the overall evaluation of
the existence and perception of clientelism in Saint Louis.
The study employs a scoring system to aggregate the data ; descriptive statistics
illustrate the observed survey results. Furthermore, a linear-by-linear association
test is run to test for a statistically significant correlation between the perception of
clientelism and the three intervening variables. A weighted variable is used in each
test to specify the frequency of cases in each cell rather than entering all individual
cases.
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
75
A focus group is established comprised of eight local community members: ministers, teachers, university students and political advisors (Appendix 1.6). This is used
as a component of a multi-method system of fieldwork and is an effective technique
to understand the dynamics and opinions of the community (Laws et al.
2003). Due to time constraints, the focus group is employed as an insightful alternative to in-depth ethnographic work and produces a quantity of contextual data that
would otherwise be unattainable. The social composition of the group is vital so as
to provide a forum in which members feel comfortable discussing sensitive topics.
The findings produced from the three weekly held sessions—which normally last
two hours and are conducted at a school in the centre of the town —use the group
as the unit of analysis and not the individuals. Holding the sessions over a period of
three weeks facilitates an awareness of community issues and important codes of
behaviour prior to the formal interviews as well as a ‘reflexive capability’ afterward
(Desai et al. 2006:156).
The interviews are semi-structured in the style of a guided conversation: “fluid rather than rigid” (Yin 2003:90, Appendix 1.7). The questions are asked in an unbiased
manner with the help of a fluent French speaker. This enables effective note-taking
without disrupting the interview (Appendix 1.8).
All of the above techniques are part of the participatory research undertaken as a
participant-observer. Residing in the town under observation with a Senegalese
host family grants the opportunity to generate data from an ‘insiders’’ perspective
in order to produce a case study that accurately portrays with greater validity the
concepts of ‘clientelism’ and ‘democratisation’ and how they are perceived; the results are more tangible than data produced simply from survey procedures (Babbie
2004).
The theoretical foundation of this research ensures that it is externally valid and employs data triangulation which aids in maintaining its construct validity. Moreover,
triangulation enables a comprehensive analysis stimulated by converging lines of
inquiry.
Data Analysis
The research uncovers an astounding convergence regarding the prevalence of political clientelist activity in Senegal. Contrary to expectation, its longevity in politics
does that produce a number of competing views in terms of its existence and the
legitimacy of its practice. However, it is apparent that political clientelism is deemed
by most as a catalyst of corruption; the political system is dominated by favouritism,
string-pulling and reciprocal gift-giving at the expense of genuine vote casting and
trust in politicians.
The first account produced from the results of my study focuses on the intricate
devices used in clientelist practices and the scale to which Saint Louisians perceive
them to exist in Senegal. The second part of the analysis describes the way in which
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Saint Louisians perceive clientelist activity and its legitimacy in society. It examines
the consistency of responses between questions posed regarding clientelist norms
and those regarding cultural norms. This provides a clear indication of the blurred
line between corruption and culture that often facilitate politicians to exploit its confusion. Post-perception
analysis, correlation tests are run against the three intervening variables.
The existence of political clientelism in Senegal
Achieving an estimate of the prevalence of clientelist activity in Senegalese society
is reliant upon the perceptions of its citizens. Its conceptual nature means that it
cannot be measured in terms of its actual existence but instead depends on reports
of direct engagement, rumours and discussions. The fieldwork therefore attempted
to capture these perceptions in order to provide such an estimate. The survey questions included in the Afrobarometer National Survey 2005 were very inclusive of the
concept of political clientelism unlike the survey of 2008. Therefore in the regional
survey that I conducted, I included many of the 2005 survey questions regarding its
existence to provide a comparative and confirming conclusion.
Figure 1.1
How often do you think politicians offer gifts to voters during electoral campaigns?
Number of Respondents
70
60
50
40
2005 National Survey (in line with sample size)
2009 Regional Survey
30
20
10
0
Never
Rarely
Often
Frequency
Always
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
77
Figure 1.1 illustrates citizen perceptions of the existence of vote-buying, enabling
a comparison between national and regional data sets (2005:2009). Both data sets
show that the majority of respondents reported that politicians always (46%:64%)
or often (40%:14%) offer gifts to voters during electoral campaigns. Moreover, astoundingly in the 2009 regional survey not one respondent indicated that politicians
never engage in this behaviour. Thus, political clientelism is perceived both nationally and regionally by the majority to suffuse all electoral processes.
Differently however when respondents were asked about their personal experience
in clientelist activity , popular answers were quite the opposite. See Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2
How often in the last Presidential Elections did a candidate or party offer something (e.g. food, gift)
in exchange for your vote?
100
90
80
70
60
2005 National Survey(in line with sample size)
2009 Regional Survey
50
40
30
20
10
0
Never
Once or twice
A few times
Often
Frequency
While 64% of respondents in the 2009 regional survey answered that politicians always offer gifts in exchange for votes (figure 1.1), 76% of respondents reported that
they themselves had never been directly offered any gifts by a politician or a party in
the 2007 presidential elections. These contrasting results could indicate a number
of things. Firstly, citizens may be less willing to directly implicate themselves in clientelist activity for fear of reprisal, thus causing the level of clientelist behaviour to
go seriously underreported. Alternatively, ordinary members of society do not have
direct contact with politicians but rather it is network representatives or religious
leaders that are offered gifts to instruct their followers to vote accordingly.
The latter suggestion aligns with the frequency findings of overall network association from the 2009 regional survey displayed in Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3
Number of Respondents
Overall Frequency of Network Association
40
35
30
25
20
2009 Regional Survey
15
10
5
0
Leader
Active Member
Member
Non-member
Refused to answer
Level ofAssociation
Only 11% of respondents claim to be network leaders therefore possibly accounting
for the low number of respondents that claim to have been directly offered vote incentives in the 2007 presidential election. An interviewee, a leader of a charitable
organisation, reported several occasions in which he had been offered an incentive
by a local political representative to gather support for the running candidate. He
believed his influence in the community to be responsible for the offer; however he
claims that on no occasion did he accept.
Furthermore, findings in one of the focus group sessions revealed:
Politicians know who to give money to: they give it to local representatives. In the rural areas most voters are illiterate so politicians approach their Marabouts to instruct
their disciples. In the last local elections, the local authorities received instructions
from ruling parties to do favours. Only sometimes do politicians give money directly
to the citizens: at times of the year maybe when support is flailing, politicians arrive
to distribute money in their local regions. They pretend that they do it because they
are sensitive to the local conditions of the poor but they are not: money-giving is an
investment in their future in politics. (Teacher, focus group member, 2009).
As a result of the social legitimacy of gift-giving, political corruption can easily adopt
this guise and become undetected therefore blurring the line between influencepeddling and illegal activity. A minister in central government from Saint Louis,
whose name or title cannot be revealed due to ethical issues, apparently is particularly notorious for this type of behaviour. The informant claimed that he lived in the
same district as the minister and would often witness queues of people, “like refugees”, form outside the politician’s house to receive envelopes full of money. When
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
79
the informant was asked if he would know where and when to get this money, he
confirmed that he would:
It is because of our continued economic struggle that people take this money. They
do not care that it is corrupt. Our government is corrupt, they talk about minor civil
liberties but we need bread, butter, housing and hospitals. When politicians do identify development as a key priority they only do so in their own towns; Idrissa Seck,
the Prime Minister, bought many infrastructures but only invested in his own city,
Thies. (ibid).
This widespread material deprivation, twinned with the dissatisfaction with
government and public policy, has increased the capacity of traditional leaders
to influence societal members. The 2008 Afrobarometer National Survey indicates that 47% of respondents think that the influence of traditional leaders
should increase compared to only 5% of respondents that believe their influence must decrease substantially. Furthermore, the survey indicates that 20%
of respondents believe that traditional leaders have a great deal of influence in
the local community, 20% think they have some influence and 19% think they
have none. In addition, 50% of respondents agree that traditional rulers should
have seats in government compared to only 34% who thought they should not.
All of the above data confirms that traditional political culture is still very much
ingrained in society and that individuals embrace it as compensation for displeasing modern political culture.
This postulated relationship between the marabouts and government is a contentious subject as they have been in competition since independence. The evolution of
democracy has meant that marabouts are not as powerful as they were in previous
times; their disciples no longer accept ndigels without question, but religion still
remains an important player in Senegalese democracy. It was suggested that marabouts no longer give money to their followers but their spiritual ability is reality.
In many informal discussions about political clientelism , informants were quick to
identify President Wade as a member of the Murids, the most powerful religious sect
in Senegal; “this in itself urges people to vote for him” (Local community member
2009).
Those who are the same, ally, it is natural, but it is not a genuine vote. Corruption is
in our blood; it is a life, our behaviour. Even ‘car rapide’ drivers (bus drivers) give the
police money to turn a blind eye to the over-filling of their vehicles. This is a small
example but this low level corruption has transpired from its acceptance in high
level arenas such as the political one. It is only the Catholic Church that voices the
problems of our electoral process because the Senegalese church is independent.
(Political advisor, focus group member 2009).
Furthermore, the entanglement of religion and politics was illustrated in the 2000
presidential elections when for the first time in Senegal’s political history two marabouts ran for the presidency.
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Most public officials when asked about the existence of political clientelism in Senegal offered expected responses: it is practiced by a minority of politicians just as it
is all over the world. A local political leader (2009) answered “Yes it still exists: not
everyone participates but there are still some politicians that do”. However, one PDS
representative gave a more interesting response:
“The PDS are not against other parties engaging in clientelist practices, as there is
not much difference between political parties. If parties don’t accept clientelism,
there is no voice to vote. It concerns a feeling of mutuality. Hence, corruption can be
both positive and negative. It is a social ability: that is, the ability to become socially
interactive with your supporters. The evolution of democracy correlates with the
evolution of social ability in Senegal” (Interviewee, PDS representative 2009)
This interviewee was alluding to the idea that clientelism has transformed in nature.
The norm of reciprocal gift-giving is still very much embedded in all daily transactions , both political and other however clientelism is now an artistic conviction as
opposed to a financial one. It has not disappeared but it has changed form; it is a far
more developed concept than it used to be. New clientelism better embraces cultural values: politicians go to baptisms, weddings and funerals, “in moments of joy and
in moments of sorrow he is there…this is a form of cultural corruption” (Ibid). This
was seconded by a fellow PDS administrator. He indicated that clientelism no longer
strictly takes a financial form but rather it is about proximity and integration within
society; “the Mayor has lots of money but he is always in Saint Louis. People vote
for him not because he has money but because he is close to society” (Prefect: July
2009). Golbert Diagne (community leader) stated that he is even better perceived
than the mayor as a port of call for resolving problems because he responds immediately. These are examples of long-term associations, a form of political clientelism
that appears to be the preferential form among society.
Thus, the extent to which political clientelism is believed still to be operating in Senegal is great: both in the form of financial, short term exchanges and long term relationship-building. Political modernity has to date failed to eradicate unsuitable cultural norms; traditional and modern political culture continue to co-exist in Senegal.
The implication that citizens positively perceive the functioning of traditional leaders indicates that social change is required to destroy this coexistence; institutional
change is inferior to the requirement of social change. Furthermore, effective decentralisation and an efficiently functioning local political institution would satisfy societal needs, thus rebuilding the trust between citizens and politicians and henceforth
the state. The influence of traditional leaders would predictably decrease; the void
in society that causes individuals to turn to them would be filled with local politics
constitutive of a vibrant civic culture.
These systems of allegiance breed corruption and reinforce the use of clientelist
practices in politics. Although political clientelism existed in President Senghor’s administration it became more important in 1974 when a multi-party political system
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
81
was introduced; competition propagates clientelism. Thus, with Wade’s popularity
ratings deteriorating and political competition increasing, it will be interesting to
see if political clientelism increases alongside his power struggle.
Perception of political clientelism
The above account denotes that the mention of political clientelism often introduces a dialogue of corruption. To explore this impression, following the style of the
Afrobarometer surveys, the regional survey depicts a number of situations that are
considered to represent different norms of clientelist behaviour: string-pulling, favouritism and illegitimate requests for money. It also used the renowned notion of
Teranga to cement a divide between what Saint Louisians consider to be an act of
Teranga and what they consider to be an example of political clientelism. In this way
the importance of question framing is conveyed but more importantly, it enables an
analysis that has tested for the confusion and overlap of cultural norms and corrupt
acts.
Figure 1.4
Perceptions of Clientelist Norms
Number of Respondents
60
50
40
String-Pulling
Illegitimate requests for money
Favouritism
30
20
10
0
Not wrong at all
Wrong but
understandable
Wrong and
punishable
Don't know
Refused to answer
Perceived Legitimacy
Figure 1.4 represents public perception of three dominant clientelist norms: stringpulling, illegitimate requests for money and favouritism. The visual analysis clearly
postulates that the majority of respondents deem clientelist practice in all its forms to
be wrong and punishable. Moreover, when ranked in order of their perceived legitimacy, unwarranted requests for money—bribes, requests for payment of a public good or
service—are believed to be the most unlawful practiced norm. 51% of Saint Louisians
reported it to be wrong and punishable and a further 14% indicated that they thought
it was wrong but understandable; this type of clientelist practice regularly pervades
the Senegalese public sector. During the period of investigation, an example of such
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behaviour was experienced whilst shadowing the work of a grassroots charity.
A British container filled with clothes and school materials for the street children
of Saint Louis had arrived in December 2008 at the port in Dakar. Normal practice
would include a stamped form for charitable exoneration of taxes by the Ministry of
Education to release the container from customs officials. However 8 months later
the container has still not been released because customs officials are demanding
60,000 CFA for its discharge. The official reason given is that they do not believe the
goods inside the container to be for the street children because they are “too new”
even though it was a charitable transfer between two registered charities. All parties
involved believe this to be a blatant example of corruption (July 2009).
Such corrupt behaviour carries grave implications for the Senegalese government.
Frequently citizens are conscious of their rights and subsequently refuse to pay the
demanded price. They then appeal through government administrative channels, as
in the case above, to have the unwarranted fee lifted. This delays all public transactions and furthermore causes government officials to preoccupy their time dealing
with these unnecessary claims rather than significant governmental issues. The paperwork produced as a result of these claims engenders a cluttered and disorganised governmental office (witnessed at the Ministry of Education, Dakar: July 2009).
Figure 1.4 also illustrates that unlike string-pulling and illegitimate requests for
money, there is almost no difference between those that believe the practice of favouritism to be wrong but understandable (27%) and those that believe it to be
wrong and punishable (29%). Furthermore, 13% do not see home town development projects to be wrong at all, the highest percentage of respondents in this category across all three scenarios.
For example, a politician invests in improving the infrastructure (water supplies,
sanitation etc.) in his local region so that people will vote for him. In Western countries this money comes from the state for the well-being of the population. The problem in Senegal is that people don’t always differentiate between the state and the
individual. Although this investment in basic infrastructure has positives for the implementation of a successful democracy, this should be made available to the whole
country. Furthermore, the population should not regard politicians solely by investments but by their ability to carry out their proposed policies. (Local community
member 2009).
The overlap of private and public expenses is a point that was made by the Prefect (2009) when asked how he thought the functioning of government could be
improved. He ascertained that the levels of transparency within government must
increase and that all communications and transactions that affect the ministerial
budget must be made public knowledge.
This negative perception of political clientelism is further confirmed upon observation of the below figure.
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
83
Figure 1.5
Number of Respondents
Overview of Perception of Clientelist Behaviour
80
70
60
50
Yes
No
Don't know
Refused to answer
40
30
20
10
0
Q17b. Do you agree
with politicians offering
gifts to voters during
electoral campaigns?
Q.20 Is it acceptable for Q22. If a womens group
politicians to give out
want money to have a
material articles in
party, is is acceptable
exchange for political
for a politician to give
support?
them money to have
one?
Q22b. Would this be
acceptable during the
electoral period?
Q23. "Teranga" is the
renowned slogan of
Senegal: is it acceptable
for politicians to give
money to people who
need it?
Recorded frequencies
Figure 1.5 shows the frequency of responses that respondents gave when asked
if they consented to the use of gifts in exchange for political support. The first two
questions were direct examples of clientelism and yielded the following results:
73%:63% of respondents reported that they do not consent to the use of incentives
compared to only 11%:17% that do. Respondents appear slightly more forgiving of
the use of gifts when they are not used as part of an electoral campaign. Interestingly
the same percentage of respondents, 11%, claimed to be network leaders as alluded
to in the above account and just over half of these alleged network leaders reported
to consent to the use of incentives. Network leaders—religious and other—are those
that were established to have the most direct contact with politicians and so would
be most likely to profit from clientelist practice.
It is interesting then that on numerous occasions, informants referred to the rules of
religion to condemn the practice of vote-buying:
Corruption is forbidden in Islam: corrupt is the man who gives, corrupt is the man
who receives. I asked one informant, ’Would you take money for your vote if it were
offered to you?’ The respondent answered after pausing for a moment, ’I think not…I
believe in God, the almighty God. I would rather die than accept. I am incorruptible’.
However, this absolute conviction against the use of vote-buying is not demonstrated when combined with cultural norms. During a previous visit in 2008, I was told
of a local politician that distributed money to a women’s group during the electoral
period in 2007. I was informed that they wanted to hold a village party and so the
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politician obliged. There was no doubt in the informant’s mind that this was a deliberate form of political clientelism even though to his knowledge the politician had
not received a guarantee of support from the women.
If he gives you something, you are obliged to give him something back. He has not
done this out of kindness but because he needs votes. The women are just as guilty
because they know this and exploit it. (Political advisor, 2009).
This scenario included in the 2009 regional survey produced a majority consensus
(55%) that concluded this type of behaviour to be wrong and perceived negatively
by the population of Saint Louis.
The predominance of an anti-clientelist attitude was however less visible when the
final question introduced the familiar concept of Teranga.
Teranga is only in Senegal but political clientelism occurs worldwide. Therefore individuals often confuse the two. Teranga is about helping people but reciprocal giftgiving is not Teranga. Whenever politicians give money, it is political clientelism.
When politicians give anything it is clientelism, even cleaning the town is an example
of clientelism. If the population is happy they will vote for that candidate. In the district of Julafen, the reconstruction of a road was not completed because the overseeing politician was not voted in. (Prefect, 2009).
Thus, from all the above findings it is evident that the majority of Saint Louisians
perceive political clientelism negatively (Appendix 1.9). Although the line between
cultural norms and corrupt practices is sometimes unclear, it is the responsibility
of politicians to maintain a positive divide between them; politicians are often perceived to use this familiar form to disguise their political strategy which results
in citizen mistrust. A negative perception of political clientelism indicates a rejection of the operating subsystems of political institutions in Senegal; the fallout of its alignment with corruption is overall majority dissatisfaction with an
apparently democratic institution (Appendix 2).
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
85
Linear-by-Linear Correlation Findings
In all cases the sample size (N of Valid Cases) is representative of all responses omitting missing data and ‘don’t know’ responses.
5.3 i) Impact of Political Clientelism on the Legitimacy of the Electoral Process
Table 1.1
Chi-Square Tests
3
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.010
Likelihood Ratio
12.090
3
.007
Linear-by-Linear
Association
9.307
1
.002
N of Valid Cases
75
Pearson Chi-Square
Value
11.442a
df
a. 4 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 1.39.
Symmetric Measures
Interval by Interval
Ordinal by Ordinal
N of Valid Cases
Pearson's R
Spearman Correlation
Value
-.355
-.355
75
Asymp.
a
Std. Error
.086
.083
b
Approx. T
-3.241
-3.249
Approx. Sig.
.002 c
.002 c
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. Based on normal approximation.
There is a statistically significant correlation between perceptions of clientelism and the extent to which elections are considered to be free and fair at
the 95% confident level with one degree of freedom (Appendix 2.1). Therefore
the null hypothesis can be rejected. Furthermore, a Pearson’s R value of -0.355
indicates that there is a moderate to strong negative relationship between the
two variables; an increase in negative perception of political clientelism entails
a decrease in perception of free and fair elections. Therefore, individuals who
perceive political clientelism negatively are more likely to consider elections to
be neither free nor fair.
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INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW
5.3ii) Impact of Political Clientelism on Trust in Politicians
Table 1.2
Chi-Square Tests
Pearson Chi-Square
Value
8.003 a
3
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.046
df
Likelihood Ratio
8.149
3
.043
Linear-by-Linear
Association
4.507
1
.034
N of Valid Cases
65
a. 6 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is .18.
Symmetric Measures
Interval by Interval
Ordinal by Ordinal
N of Valid Cases
Pearson's R
Spearman Correlation
Value
-.265
-.258
65
Asymp.
a
Std. Error
.136
.086
b
Approx. T
-2.185
-2.123
Approx. Sig.
.033 c
.038 c
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. Based on normal approximation.
There is a statistically significant correlation between perceptions of clientelism and
the level of trust held for politicians at the 95% confident level with one degree of
freedom (Appendix 2.2). Therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected. Furthermore, a Pearson’s R value of -0.265 indicates that there is a weak to moderate negative relationship between the two variables; an increase in negative perception of
political clientelism entails a decrease in trust of politicians. Therefore, individuals
who perceive political clientelism negatively are less likely to have a high level of
trust for politicians.
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
87
5.3 iii) The Impact of Political Clientelism on Citizen Participation in Politics
Table 1.3
Chi-Square Tests
Pearson Chi-Square
Value
5.840 a
3
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.120
df
Likelihood Ratio
7.763
3
.051
Linear-by-Linear
Association
1.585
1
.208
N of Valid Cases
60
a. 5 cells (62.5%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is .33.
Value
Asymp. Std.
Error(a)
Approx. T(b)
Approx. Sig.
Interval by Interval Pearson’s R
-.164
.084
-1.266
.211(c)
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation
N of Valid Cases
-.210
.082
-1.635
.107(c)
60
a Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c Based on normal approximation.
The test found there to be no statistically significant relationship between perceptions of clientelism and citizen participation in politics at the 95% confidence level
(Appendix 2.3). Therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Discussion and Implications of Correlation Findings
The above correlation findings indicate the serious implications that a negative perception of political clientelism carry for the consolidation of effective governance
in Senegal. The persistence of clientelism indicated in this paper’s initial findings
analysis enables a series of correlation statements: the existence of political clientelism in society is negatively affecting perceptions of clientelism. Perceptions of clientelism are negatively affecting democratic requirements. Therefore political
clientelism is perceived to be negatively affecting the process of democratisation in
Senegal; traditional political culture is perceived to be negatively affecting modern
political culture.
Similar to the concept of political clientelism, a measure of legitimacy of the electoral process relies on citizen perception; the extent to which elections are free and
fair. The freedom to vote is a right of citizenship that presupposes political equality.
When reciprocal gift-giving impedes on an individual’s genuine voting intentions,
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political clientelism violates the democratic condition of political equality. This paper has highlighted the prevalence of political clientelism in Senegalese society, thus
implying that a high number of individuals are voting according to their financial or
spiritual gain rather than their perception of good public policy. The 2008 Afrobarometer survey indicated that only 48% of respondents consider the electoral process to be completely free and fair compared to only 20% of respondents in the 2009
Regional Survey. See Figure 1.6.
Figure 1.6
In general, to what extent were the last presidential elections in 2007 free and fair?
Number of Respondents
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Completely free and Free and fair, but withFree and fair, but with Neither free nor fair
fair
minor problems
major problems
Don't know
Refused to answer
Extent of free and fair elections
“We cannot explain it as normal people but it is neither free nor fair” (University student, 2009). The influence of economic gain removes an individual’s autonomy to
express their genuine political preferences which entails unequally weighted votes
(O’Donnell 2007). These votes cannot count toward effective policy evaluation, violating the legitimacy of the electoral process and subsequently defeating the purpose of democratic activity.
Furthermore, negative perceptions of political clientelism are engendering a mistrusting society. A political system constructed upon a corrupt and negatively perceived foundation causes all political activity to be regarded as suspicious. The national survey allows a quick comparison of citizen trust in the President. It reveals
that there has been a significant decrease in the level of trust from 2005 (59% responded ‘a lot’) compared to 2008 (27% responded ‘a lot’). However interestingly,
64% of respondents (2008) answered ‘a lot’ when asked a question concerning their
level of trust for traditional leaders. This is further evidence to suggest that citizens
engage in these clientelist networks as a form of escapism however they are often
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
89
unknowingly exploited by the influence of their network leaders. The perceived incompetence of government and the ruling coalition party resulted in their loss of
control of the key city of Saint Louis to the Benno Siggil Senegal (United Put Right
Senegal) in the local elections on rd23 March 2009.
Additionally, during the period of fieldwork, an email was circulated listing the assets of the President. Furthermore, an informant revealed that a local minister in
Saint Louis owned ten luxury houses across the country. I was urged by members
of the focus group to include these examples in this paper; distrust of politicians
who live and work alongside economic deprivation is fueled by their inappropriate
financial statuses.
A political system subjugated by clientelism implies a lack of care and realisation
by public officials of the importance of information to citizens; more information
equals more participation. Furthermore, a local space should be utilized as a forum
to integrate locals into local governmental affairs (USAID
) and engage citizens in political discussions; “FM Teranga should air public views at
election times…not all Saint Louisians can be part of the regional counsel, thus, FM
Teranga could act as a medium. In Zinguachor and Dakar, the Mayors have there own
radio shows but not yet in the local collectives” (Deputy Governor, 2009).
Unlike the above democratic requirements, there were a significant number of questions included in the survey that tested for citizen participation. A standard measure
of political participation is voter turnout however in the case of Senegal this measure is flawed for the reason of rampant clientelist activity. Although in the last presidential election the official electoral turnout figure issued was 71.1% — Senegal’s
highest turnout figure in its electoral history—this is not necessarily representative
of genuine civic involvement. Political participation values the quality of vote rather
than quantity (Putnam 1993:93).
The 2008 national survey indicated that 41% of respondents think that their local
council was handling citizen participation very badly coupled with 58% of respondents who feel that there is nothing they can do to change or solve how government
is run. All interviewees identified the necessity to improve social and governmental
relations:
Since 2000 there have been big changes but no great reaction from the public; the
people must protest! The PDS encourage manifestations and protests: it is a healthy
society and necessary for democracy. (Deputy Governor, July 2009)
There appeared to be minimal local political activity; although Saint Louis has representatives for all governmental departments these Ministers spend most of their
time in Dakar. This was confirmed by the Minister of Demographics in Saint Louis,
who was also a member of the focus group. Modest citizen participation is further
illustrated in Figure 1.7.
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Figure 1.7
During the course of the last year, how many times did you contact each of the following
personalities to help you resolve an important problem or give you their point of view?
Number of Respondents
60
50
40
Never
Only once
Sometimes
Often
30
20
10
0
Local Government Counciller
MP
Official of a government ministry
Political Party Leader
Various Personalities
A mean of 50% of respondents never contacted any of the above political personalities over the course of the last year compared to a mean of 12% who
sometimes made contact and 14% who often did. Low citizen participation on a
daily basis implies that such a high voter turnout is grounded in other reasons:
the use of incentives. Although the quantitative test of association could not
verify this correlation, qualitative research has shown that even though clientelism may not be directly constraining participation, it is not encouraging a
public space in which citizens want or feel able to participate.
Conclusions
This paper has sought to identify the perceived impact of political clientelism
on the process of democratisation in Senegal and to evaluate the extent to which
its existence is hindering the achievement of a full liberal democracy. Not unlike other African nations, Senegal is suffering a clash of traditional and modern
political culture: a functioning democracy alongside the persistence of political
clientelism. This confirmed prevalence of such clientelist activity conflicts with
the theoretical underpinnings of modernisation theory; modern political culture has failed to eradicate inappropriate traditional norms. Furthermore, society’s negative perception of these political subsystems, defined in this paper as
both short term exchanges and long term associations, is shown to be negatively
affecting the legitimacy of the electoral process and citizen trust in politicians.
This quantitative correlation, indicated by a linear-by-linear association test,
was coupled with the findings from a period of intense qualitative fieldwork.
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
91
These findings indicated that political clientelism is perceived to be supporting the
use of corrupt practices in government and disables the implementation of a public
space whereby citizens can effectively control public policy. The chasm between the
state and society that is consequently created increases society’s tendency to look to
traditional leaders for guidance: ineffective governance produces a channel for traditional political culture to continue. Furthermore, although Senegal has undergone
decentralization, it is clear that the localities are not independent from the central
state; there is no such thing as local government. In theory there is an executive
regionale: a Prefect, a mayor and a president de conseil however ‘local government’
is a notion not a practice in the Senegalese context. Local political administrators indicated that the Senegalese government believe this is the best way to guard a unite
national, a national unity.
This suggests that real and effective decentralization partnered with local politicians
who genuinely engage citizens in public affairs would displace the influence that traditional leaders still have on their citizens. Furthermore, it is apparent that citizens
are calling for their ministers and politicians to live amongst them in their community instead of in the capital of Dakar. In this way, politicians would effectively build
trusting relationships with their supporters and would be less inclined to resort to
financial distributions in exchange for their vote. This relationship-building may or
may not still be viewed as clientelism or a political strategy by society but it would
be a legitimate form in line with the traditional norm of reciprocal gift-giving. In this
way, traditional and modern political culture can coexist corruption-free.
The impact of political clientelism on democracy is unhealthy; it is not sincere politics. “We must learn how to use politics to aid the nation…if we use clientelism, we
are not aiding the population, we are using them” (Prefect, July 2009).
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INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW
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Acknowledgements
During my research trip to Saint Louis, Senegal, I was fortunate to profit from the insightful assistance of several informants, without whom this research project would
not have been possible. It is not possible to mention everyone who has contributed,
however special mention must be given to Issa Kouyate, the president of a grassroots charity and a highly respected member of the community. I am so grateful for
his time, patience and honesty whilst acting as my cultural and linguistic interpreter
and his help with establishing my contacts and research sources.
Critical to this study was the help of Lucinda Rouse. The high standard of her French
coupled with her superior journalistic techniques provided me with invaluable insights. The financial support of my parents enabled this primary research and the
teranga (hospitality) of my host mother, Marie Camara, will not be forgotten.
Others to mention include: Moctor Diagne, Isabel Finch and of course the ongoing
support and encouragement of my dissertation supervisor Dr David Hudson.
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Appendices
Appendix 1.1
Photographs taken in the town of Saint Louis in July 2009. These illustrate the increasing support for the United to Boost Senegal Party (Bennoo) in Saint Louis.
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Appendix 1.2
Tabulated by Brinkerhoff et al. 2002
Appendix 1.3
(Wolof) TAXAWAAY SENEGAL CI ANAM YI DI NANGONTE XALAAT AK WAAYO
Numéro du Répondant …………..
Date de l’interview……………
Salamalékoum , mangui toudou Julia , bayéko ba université bou londar ci eutoum
mbotaay bouye saytou ci waloum xam xam , Téwaloumafi ben ngour raakh ci doli
gnouye woté ngour , mangui ci jangoum xalatou domou Senegal ci naka la ngourgui
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
99
tiyé réwmi . Dama beugone waxtane ci yoyou lath ak yeen , wala yit kéne kouleen
jégué Képe kou bayéko ndar amgua tcheur ci jangue bi .
Bépe xibaar bougnou dieul ci nit dananou ko dégnth ci soutoura . Képe kouci boke
dang ko féké .Dagnouy tane kéne ci yéén . Ndax lolou meuna né ?
Waxtaan wi
Tour wi :
Ngoor
/
Jiguéén
Kouci meunoul tontou , bayil nonou té dém ca laath baca tope .
NDOORTE LAATH YI
Nanou door saye tou yéneu mbir ci yaw
1. Niata at nga am ? 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80 +
2. Bane kalaama guéén di wakh ci keur gui ?
Anglais Bainouk
Français
Bassari
Portugais
Kiswahili
Wolof
Pulaar
Serer
Mandinka
Soninke
Diola
Manjack
Bambara Autre [Préciser] : ________________________ Code Postale
3. Fane la sa djang yém?
Diangoum lifanetou bou diekh
Daanay digue
Daanay kaw
Autres qualifications post-secondaires qu’universitaires (diplôme technique ou collège)
Diangue bou die khegoul si daara bou makbi
Diangue bou diekh si daara bou makbi
Wadjaloum diangue si daara bou makbi
Wakhnou sa takhawaye ci askan wi
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4.Ndax séén biir amna kouci nek njiit , kouci yeungou , wala kouci boke am déét
kouci nek njiit
kouci yeungou
wala kouci boke
Mbotayou dine
Mbotayou baykat
Mbotayou yengou yengou
Mbotayou dimbalak kom kom
déét
5. Ci waloum djo ngonté bopoum rewmi ci atoum 2007 , lan guéén ci meuneu wakh?
Woté si dioganeté you mondieyi
Daga dogou bagne woté
Mogme guoss woté koybi
Dayniou laténe woté
Jamoulo diotou woté
Demoulo bimoudji
Khamouma/ Fatélikouwouma
6. Ci at mi rombeu , gnata yoon nga diiss sa sokhla njiit yi maye beugeu liime nguir
gnou fadjal la sa sokhla , wala nga wakh ko sa khalaat?
A. Un conseiller municipal ou rural
Mouk Dong bén yoon Yan say Ay yoon you baré Khamouma
B. Ndawou tewnu
Mouk Dong bén yoon Yan say Ay yoon you baré Khamouma
C. Diewrin wala andandowam
Mouk Dong bén yoon Yan say Ay yoon you baré Khamouma
D. Un dirigeant de parti politique
Mouk Dong bén yoon Yan say Ay yoon you baré Khamouma
E. Kilifa dine
Mouk Dong bén yoon Yan say Ay yoon you baré Khamouma
F. Kilif aada
Mouk Dong bén yoon Yan say Ay yoon you baré Khamouma
G. Une autre personnalité influente ………………………………..
7. Céén guiis guiis ci baat bougni wakh DEMOCRATIE(nangoulanté)? (Choisez 3)
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
101
Dara
Yéwéékou
Ngourgui di wakhe nguir askan
Woté
Diame/ béno/ bokou dolé
Yokeuté askan/concom
Tolo dolé/ yoone
Mbolo djeum kanem
Njité
Mom sa Bope
Teteur
Liguéyou boolo
Nékine wou deugou
Khoulo/ niak dégo
Diaye sa ngor
Métite lou askan/ concom
Nékine woudoul dëug
Yoonu njiit ci askan wi/ngoornama
Ngoornama Bou Bess
Nékine wou tégou woul
Amoul benentontou
Niake kham/khamouma
8. Bane kaddou ci niéti yi ci souf moci maingok sa khalaat ?
AFFIRMATION A: Democratie mogeun bépe walou njiit
AFFIRMATION B: Ci yéén anam, ngourgou amoul democratie mëune diale
AFFIRMATION C: Kou mélni mene, nangou na bépe ngoornama
Khamouma
9. Bane kaddou ci niéti yi ci souf moci maingok sa khalaat ?
A: Danou ware taane sounauye njiit ci ay woté you léén, jaam ak dengou.
Ande ak Doolé ci / Ande ci
B: Ndakham ay woté dou nékh yeneu saye, danou wara taane yéénéén yoon nguir
tékfi ay njiit. Ande ak Doolé ci / Ande ci
Andë ak kéne
Gnak kham
10. Ci teunke ndakh mounga gnou wakh jogonté njiitou réw yi moudj yi , amna léér
léér am déét?
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Lépe jam ak méngo
Fékh ak méngo ak touti tolof
Fekh ak méngo ak ay djou beuri
Andoulak fekh ak méngo
Djapoul laath bi
Gnak kham
11. Taane njiit boula doye mofi am , wala dane lakoye sass ?
Jaxasso na lol
Jaxasso
Beene la
Tané na
Tané na boubakh
Gnak kham
12. Ci sa khalaat lignouye woowé DEMOCRATIE(nangoulanté) bane tolou waye laci
SENEGAL toleu ?
Nangoulanté gou doye
Nangoulanté gou andak tolof
Nangoulanté gou andak tolof tolof
Gnak nangoul
Gnak kham lath wi / gnak kham louye nangoul di téki
Gnak kham
13. Ci teunke , ndakh Senegal doylou nanou ci DEMOCRATIE biye daw ci rewmi ?
Ndakh:
Doylou
Ci yoonou doylou
Désséna doylou
Gnak doylou
14. Yaakaar ngéén ni yi njiit dagnou djaaye séén ngoor nguir am am? Wala dégouléén
kouci wakh
A.Njiit gui ak ay talibéém
B.Mbolom assemblée
C.Mbolom njiit kawkaw
D.Mbolom ngoornama
E.Mbolom khétou njiit
F.Alkaati
G.Njiitou limpo ak douane
H.Até kat yi
I.Njiitou wergou yaram
POLITICAL CLIENTALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATIONY
103
J.Njangalékat yi
K.Kéneu
L.Gnak kham
15. Ci tombe yi di gneuw , guéén baal gnou wakhgnou ndakh dane ko wara téré , wala
bayi mou dialeu , wala dane ko wara téré ba faw
A. Njiit bou dieule mbokam tékko ci beureup liguey bou kokou amoul xam xam
Waroul dém yoon / dafa wara dem yoon ak dégue dégue / dafa wara dém yoon ak
gnou tiyé ko yit / gnak kham
B. Njiit bouye lath faye ci liguey goumou wara déf ci néén
Waroul dém yoon / dafa wara dem yoon ak dégue dégue / dafa wara dém yoon ak
gnou tiyé ko yit / gnak kham
C. Njiit gou tokhal beureup bou liguey kaye fi ay mbokam nékeu nguir japaléléén
Waroul dém yoon / dafa wara dem yoon ak dégue dégue / dafa wara dém yoon ak
gnou tiyé ko yit / gnak kham
16. Ci woutoum Njiitou rééwmi yi rombe , ndax Njiit moussoul djééma dieunde sa
tour , wala nite kou boke ci ngour gui di léén fékhéél , nguir am séén baate ?
Moussoul égue thi kham kham gogou
Moussoul am
Ben wala gnari yoon
Yéne saaye
Ay yoon
Gnak kham
17. Ci séén xalaat , niata yoon la njiit di jokhé nékhal askan wi nguir oute ndimbeul
ay baate ?
Sa souné
Ay yoon
Dinay am
Moussoul am
Gnak kham
Ndakh nangou géén lolou ? Waw Déét
18. Naka géén guissé yoriinou askan wi ci lokho sounou njiit?
Sokhal nama
Sokhal nama touti
Sokhalouma
Khawma si dara
Gnak kham