International
Public Policy
Review
Containing China? How the United States
and its East Asian allies should deal with the
new Asian security environment
Dirk Siebels
IPPR Volume 6 Issue 1 (July 2010)
pp 40-48
International Public Policy Review • The Department of Political science
The Rubin Building 29/30 • Tavistock Square • London • WC1 9QU
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/
Containing China? How the United States and its
East Asian allies should deal with the new Asian
security environment
Dirk Siebels
The rise of China is viewed with a lot of suspicion by the United States and its East
Asian allies, especially Japan and South Korea. Analysing it from a realist perspective, they may be right to be suspicious as this theoretical approach suggests that
any state that wants to change the distribution of power in its favour is, by definition,
revisionist.
The question is whether China really is striving for global or at least regional leadership. There is no shortage in economic, political and military indicators, but the
interpretation very much depends on the standpoint of the respective analyst, and
the relationship between China and the U.S. is complicated, giving a lot of room to
misunderstandings. Because the political systems are fundamentally different, political leaders in both countries often fail to grasp how the domestic forces in the
other country work, while their counterparts think that their reasons for a decision
must be obvious as they seem absolutely clear to them (Lieberthal 1997).
In this article, I will argue that the U.S. and its alliance system should accommodate
China’s rise through integration into international organisations and multilateral
regimes, minimising mutual threat perceptions through common rules and regular
consultations. A policy to contain China would almost certainly backfire. China’s economic growth since first introducing liberal market reforms in the late 1970s has by
no means come at the expense of the U.S. or its Asian allies: ‘[t]hese are positive-sum,
not zero-sum, relationships‘ (Shambaugh 1996: 88). The economies of China and
Dirk Siebels completed his Bachelor degree at Fernuniversität Hagen in Germany, a
distance learning institution. He is now a Masters student (International Studies) at
Durham University and has been working as a freelance journalist for the past
four years, specialising in foreign and security politics.
CONTAINING CHINA
41
Japan, or China and the U.S., have become interdependent over the last two decades.
Political frictions could therefore result in serious economic repercussions on all
sides.
The US and its allies: No need for hedging
After the Second World War, the United States established bilateral ties with key countries in Asia, instead of introducing a collective security system, for a number of reasons.
Most importantly, the U.S. wanted to exert control on its partners directly rather than
through a multinational organisation. Backbone of U.S. policy in the region was the establishment of a hub-and-spoke system, providing a security umbrella and, at the same
time, creating politically reliant allies.
The U.S. signed mutual security treaties with its most important allies in the region,
Japan and South Korea, in the early days of the Cold War, creating a bulwark against the
communist threat and allowing them to flourish under this regime. Both countries were
thus able to concentrate on economic development. At the same time, the U.S. avoided
a security dilemma by making partners out of potential rivals in the region and creating incentives, especially for Japan, to keep military expenditures low. Moreover, both
Japan and South Korea came to share a number of common values with the U.S., such as
a preference for free trade, the necessity of regional peace or nuclear non-proliferation.
The post-Cold War era did not bring as much change to the region as it brought to Europe. The U.S., a traditional maritime power, still has to consider forward deployment of
its troops in East Asia as crucial to its national security. Troop withdrawal and following isolationism would be ‘the most dangerous choice‘ (Lym 2003: 168). In 1995, the
influential Nye Report underlined the importance of the existing alliances in the region,
stating that the military umbrella remains a crucial element for political and economic
relations in the region, summed up in the famous line that ‘security is like oxygen‘ (Nye
1995: 91).
East Asia, especially Japan and South Korea, has indeed seen a remarkable economic
development. Over the last two decades, however, intraregional trade relations have
become more and more important, demonstrated by the prominent example of China
surpassing the U.S. as Japan’s most important trading partner, while more than half of
all Japanese exports now go to Asian countries. Overall, this has led to an economic
situation that is dominated neither by Japan nor by the U.S., but all ‘countries in the region could reap worthwhile economic benefits from increased regionalism focused on
removal of border barriers‘ (Kharas, Krumm 2003: 13). The question now is whether
politics, and especially security politics, follow suit.
The US has supported multilateral agreements in the region and, beginning with the
Clinton administration, has tried to involve China within a framework of organisations,
most prominently supporting the country’s bid for World Trade Organisation membership. This support, however, has come rather reluctantly: ‘there has been a great deficiency in real efforts by the United States to incubate a stable regional order in East Asia‘
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(Kim, Kim 2008: 325). U.S. policy towards East Asia remains based on the assumption
that the status quo should be stabilised; ‘[i]t wants continuity more than change, and its
security and economic strategies toward the region reflect this reality‘ (Ikenberry 2008:
33). Yet a number of challenges for the U.S. position in the region can be identified:
• the promotion of economic cooperation among its allies could be seen as a containment policy by China,
• long-term economic stagnation and an ageing population could undermine Japan’s
position as a major regional power,
• a more balanced alliance with Japan (“burden-sharing“) could spark fears of Japanese military power in the region, and
• power projection has led to popular resentment towards the U.S., making it harder
for democratic leaders in Asia to defend the alliance.
Declining U.S. power in the region, however, could lead to a power vacuum. East Asia
has not yet developed a regional identity, and nationalism continues to be an important
factor in shaping policies of all countries in the region. Compared to Europe, where the
European Union was originally built around a core that slowly integrated the periphery,
such a core is missing in Asia. A number of territorial disputes remain unsolved, and
mutual perceptions in the region – especially among the major regional powers, Japan
and China – are rather negative, further complicating cooperation .
Yet there are signs that all major players are willing to overcome obstacles in order to
deal with a rising China. The tri-national summit in 2008 marked the first time that
political leaders from China, Japan and South Korea met independently of other occasions and declared to further promote tripartite cooperation. This could be interpreted
as simple bandwagoning with the rising power in the region, yet Asian leaders are first
and foremost concerned about a stable order in the region, and regionalism ‘offers a
means to stabilize security and establish an environment for peace and development‘
(Rozman 2004: 351). Especially after the 1997-98 financial crisis, Western-dominated
institutions like the International Monetary Fund lost reputation and a growing number
of multilateral Asia-only initiatives were either reinforced or launched, such as ASEAN
Plus Three and the East Asia Summit.
In the U.S., the political mainstream is ‘that trade and investment with China are critical parts of the long-term solution to the problem of a rising China‘ (Ikenberry 2008:
33), but China has ‘a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success‘ (Zoellick 2005). The threat to the United States posed by China is less
intimidating than the one posed by the former Soviet Union; ‘containment of China is
not yet required, and may not be in the future‘ (Lim 2003:169) as long as the country
does not actively seek hegemony over East Asia. Nevertheless, the relationship with a
China that is now in a ‘positive but fragile equilibrium‘ (Sutter 2010: 91) is arguably
the most important relationship with any single country in the twenty-first century
for the U.S. and should be based on the assumption that ‘the only viable policy alternative is to manage the relationship by recognizing the areas of common interest and
disagreement‘(Garrison 2007: 185).
CONTAINING CHINA
43
Understanding China: Rising, not competing
Since the country introduced liberal market reforms in the late 1970s, China has
experienced remarkable growth rates year after year. Today, the Chinese economy is set to overtake Japan’s as the second largest in the world, enabling it to
play a more prominent role on the international stage. Realists would almost certainly translate this into tension and possible conflicts between the rising and the
(relatively) declining power, but there are ambiguous signs that China is directly
challenging U.S. predominance in East Asia. While it is not actively promoting
multilateralism, it is not balancing against U.S. military power either: ‘[a]lthough
the evidence is mixed, much in China’s behaviour points to Beijing’s desire to
stabilize the region‘ (Kang 2003: 68). Meanwhile, although the realist analysis
is not yet obsolete, wars between great powers have long since become unlikely
because of mutual nuclear deterrence.
China shows characteristics of what Rosecrance calls a trading state, subordinating political and military means to trade as its strategic requirement (Rosecrance
1999:3-9). From the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders drew the
lesson ‘that national security depends more upon overall national strength, based
on a solid economy, than on military might‘ (Xinbo 1998: 127) and view internal development as a necessity in order to guarantee the survival of the regime.
Other goals, such as reunification with Taiwan, will only be pursued after the first
is accomplished. Although ‘[n]o contender to high office in Beijing can afford to
appear soft on Taiwan‘ (Lim 2003: 170), using force against the island republic
would be too costly, both in economic and political terms. Instead, China tries to
accomplish economic leverage in the long term while not seriously questioning
the status quo in the short term.
China’s defence budget has seen significant increases over the last decade, but
it still spends only a fraction of the U.S. military budget . More importantly, estimates for the percentage of GDP the country spends on its military range from 2
to 2.5%, compared to about 4% in the United States. The absolute numbers allow
China to pursue an access-denial strategy; submarines, mine-warfare capabilities, anti-air missiles and other military capabilities are able to deter US carrier
groups from operating close to the Chinese mainland, such as during a crisis over
Taiwan, but hardly allow power projection in the region, let alone worldwide. And
even if China really does commission its first aircraft carrier in the near future
(as the government has declared), it will take a lot of time for pilots and naval officers to engage in carrier operations and to develop strategies and operational
scenarios.
Naturally, the absolute increase in military spending raises concerns, prompting a
number of analysts to conclude that ‘China’s armed forces are being transformed
to project military strength beyond its borders, reflecting its long held aspirations
to become a prominent regional power‘ (Hartfiel, Job 2007: 5). Although there
may be some truth to this observation, one has to concede that:
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• China has fourteen immediate neighbours (more than any other nation) and
shares borders with three nuclear powers (Russia, India, Pakistan),
• the People’s Liberation Army is partly responsible for domestic security, and
• a number of minority issues and territorial disputes remain unsolved, but
China has rarely used force in border conflicts since 1949.
Overall, economic growth allows China to spend more money on its military in
absolute terms, but neither is it militarising its economy nor is it increasingly
using military power to solve disputes. ‘China’s rise will create many challenges
for East Asia and the world, but the use of force over territory may not be the
leading cause of regional instability‘ (Fravel 2007: 83); the diplomatic repercussions of increased military spending are most likely bigger than the actual military impact. Moreover, the country is increasingly contributing to United Nations peacekeeping missions, currently deploying about 2,000 troops – mostly
military observers, engineers and medical personnel (IISS 2009: 387-388).
To understand Chinese security policy, one also has to consider its history. Prior
to the entrance of Western powers into the region, the Chinese Empire dominated East Asia for almost two millennia. Other than Europe, where order developed from relationships among countries roughly similar in size, Asia consisted
of a number of small fringe states under Chinese hegemony. This history has
created a ‘historical consciousness [that] will linger, perpetuating an ideological system and political culture‘ (Zhang 1999: 30). From the Chinese perspective, the Western view that China may want to re-establish its hegemonic power
presupposes ‘that the country is, if not an adversary, at least an outsider‘ (Bessho 1999: 30), and the often-heard claim that China must “play by international
rules“ provokes concern as to who established these rules.
Chinese leaders identify two key concerns, namely regime survival in the internal dimension and territorial integrity in the external dimension. Although offensive measures may come into play, both are basically defensive goals, making
it possible for the U.S. and its alliance system to accommodate China without
the need for bandwagoning. Ikenberry (2008) underlines that China’s rational
choice would be to further integrate into the Western order that combines the
U.S. with its allies in both Europe and Asia and is based on:
• non-discrimination and open markets, creating incentives for rising powers
to gain profit from joining instead of establishing their own order, and
• a broad system of rules and institutions, binding participants together and
creating high costs for operating outside the system.
This analysis calls for a liberal institutionalist approach to the rise of China,
treating it ‘as a partner, then it will not become an enemy‘ (Ross 1999: 184),
therefore creating political and economic interdependencies.
CONTAINING CHINA
45
Conclusion
The circumstances in East Asia and Europe may be very different, yet ‘the former
has much to learn from the latter in terms of the role that visionary leadership can
play in overcoming domestic political opposition and shaping a common vision of
a regional community‘ (Moon, Suh 2008: 218). A rising China should not only be
regarded as a problem, it could also present an opportunity to create a stable order;
historically, a weak China has usually led to chaos and disorder in the whole region.
For the moment, the relationship between the U.S. and its allies on the one side and
China on the other is in a state of equilibrium. This is likely to continue unless the circumstances change significantly. The United States cannot and will not allow China
to re-establish its hegemonic status in East Asia, the Chinese government prioritises
economic development to guarantee regime survival. Both countries should therefore address each other as partners rather than competitors to address common
security challenges like terrorism, piracy or drug trafficking. At the same time, China
has to become more transparent. As the authors of the Quadrennial Defense Review
Report put it in 2006: ‘The outside world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations and decision-making‘, leaving its behaviour open to interpretation and secondguessing.
For the U.S. and its alliance system, the rise of China presents a new challenge. While
the Soviet Union was mostly a military and ideological contender, China is an economic rival that is only emerging as a military power. It is already integrated into
the global community and exhibits a great level of status quo behaviour. Therefore,
more effort should be put into strengthening existing multilateral institutions, and
accommodating China (and other emerging powers) within an accepted set of rules
and regulations.
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