International Public Policy Review • The Department of Political science
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A world with poverty, where too many lack not only for the basics of life, but also the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations, demeans us all. By helping build a path out of poverty, we do not just reduce suffering, but give people power over their own lives.
Development is a profoundly moral cause. (DFID 2009: p141)
After the public outcry and policy failures of the Washington Consensus period of the 1980s and 90s, (Gore 2000; Thomas 2000; Williamson 1990) policymaking dis course within multilateral development institutions and their state and civil society partners has in the 2000s moved towards the construction of a Post-Washington
Consensus based upon a wider set of social priorities.
One narrative suggests this period has seen the wholesale reform of the prior para digm, away from its harsh conditionality and market fundamentalism. This is the perspective of key governance bodies and mainstream CSOs. During his tenure as
Chief Economist of the World Bank, for example, Joseph Stiglitz argued that develop ment must be conceived of as more than the expansion of market opportunity, but as a much deeper and more wholesale ‘transformation of society’. (Stiglitz, 1998b p3) ‘Many previous development strategies have focused on pieces of this transfor mation,’ he argued, ‘but because they have failed to see the broader context, they have failed, and often miserably. Most of these have focused narrowly on economics’.
(ibid, p5.) This is the setting within which he campaigned to establish a ‘New Devel opment Strategy’, which aimed beyond GDP growth towards objectives defined in terms of living standards, health, education, poverty eradication, environmental sus tainability, political stability and the rights and empowerment of the individual and minorities; in short, the target of development would be to ‘catalyze society-wide
* Alex Kirkup, on completion of his PhD in 2009, joined the Politics Department of the
University of Sheffield. His research is in Global Political Economy, specifically social exclusion in the context of orthodox notions of globalization. His interests include citi zenship and human rights, human security, development, global trade and finance, the restructuring of production, institutions of global governance, and the present global crisis.

SECURIITIZATION, CONDITIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 31 change’. (ibid, p15) In turn, academic consensus on the East Asian Tigers, the most
(if only) successful cases of economic development of the Consensus era, identified that their economic growth was not based upon wholly free market principles, but upon the construction of strong developmental states which established significant preconditions for economic growth – macroeconomic stability, private property rights, an educated and disciplined labour force, efficient bureaucracies, police and military capacity, high savings rates – and insulated emerging industries from global competition.(Payne & Phillips 2010: p98-115, 152-8) Thus the market objectives of the Washington Consensus were superseded by the wider societal objectives of a Post-Washington Consensus, mediated through the construction of strong states willing and capable to pursue these goals.
However, an alternative perspective to this policymaking shift in the 2000s is that a Polanyi ‘double movement’ has taken place in international development. In The
Great Transformation Karl Polanyi (1957) first employed this term to describe the way in which unfettered laissez-faire capitalism in the 19th century had led to such disastrous social consequences, culminating in fascism, communism, and the 1914-
45 world crisis, that a social countermovement ‘more than the usual defensive be haviour of society faced with change’, but a reaction against the dislocations and social upheaval of unfettered capitalism ‘which attacked the fabric of society, and which would have destroyed the very organization of production that the market had called into being’ forced the incorporation of a wider citizenry into the mate rial benefits of expanding economic wealth, and thus a wider basis of legitimacy for capitalist polities. (Polanyi 1957: p130). This process rose to its height under the post-1945 era of ‘embedded liberalism’ in the US and Western Europe through the welfare state, Keynesian policies of full employment, and the institutionalization of economic and social rights. (Ruggie 1982) Although there was clearly a part for the resistance of marginalized groups to become incorporated in governance outcomes in new ways during this period, for example the role of strike-action in producing new a new social consensus around the collective bargaining power of industrial labour, the essence of the Polanyi an argument is that any such moves to incorpo rate wider social legitimacy into capitalism are best understood as concessions by owners of capital, concessions which will be rescinded when the threat of resistance has diminished and crises of accumulation create demands for increased returns on capital investment. (Polanyi 1957: ch.11) Thus the post-1970s neoliberal era of structural adjustment has been conceived by Polanyi’s followers in just these terms.
(eg. Cox 1996: ch.15)
Returning to the post-Seattle period, then, critical voices suggest that rather than moving beyond the fundamental framework and market fundamentalism of the
Washington Consensus, a double movement has occurred within the policymaking of international development organizations and their state and civil society part ners. Facing rising public criticism of enforced structural adjustment in the South and repeated crises of accumulation in the global political economy [GPE] – most spectacularly the global financial crisis of 2007 to the present – key actors have re branded their stance on development as people- and poverty-focused in an attempt

32 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW to gain wider public legitimacy for what is, in essence, exactly the same international project as that of the Washington Consensus: the expansion of the global economy and the privileging of global capital above all other social objectives. (Fine 2001) The difference here, however, is a new acceptance that economic liberalization alone is inadequate to ensure these governance objectives being fulfilled in significant sec tions of the globe, particularly through the existence of fragile or failed states which have not established the conditions for the flourishing of market- and rights-based civil society. In some cases multilateral partnerships have stepped into the breach and offered direct assistance, most prominently in the construction of ‘governance states’, which Harrison (2004) defines as states which depend upon outside funding for a substantial proportion of their budget, the everyday intervention of external
(particularly World Bank) experts and embedding and internalization of the gov ernance objectives of key multilateral funding partners. (Harrison 2004: p 5, 39-
42, ch.7) However elsewhere the result has been the ‘containment’ of problems to the GPE: the securitization of wealth-centres and key economic flows against the threats produced by poverty, marginalization, extremism, disease and climate crises.
(Duffield 2007) In pursuing these objectives, Northern governance bodies engaged in international development have faced and imposed new practices of conditionality and accountability in their relationships with each other, the private sector, civil society organizations [CSOs], and Southern states and populations. By widen ing the targets and deepening the penetration of conditionality and accountability, these bodies have established a new development framework based upon the construction of (what are perceived to be) the essential prerequisites for autonomous market-driven economic growth; or, where this is not possible, the containment of transborder security problems.
Following this alternative narrative I will examine the July 2009 DFID white paper
Building Our Common Future as a reaction to the failures of the Washington Consen sus period through this triple lens of transformations in securitization, conditionali ty, and accountability. Although presented in the language of wider social objectives, and particularly the eradication of poverty, as good and desirable in themselves, I argue that this alternative perspective brings to light important undercurrents exist ing beneath the inclusive surface discourse of this white paper. Rather than develop ment and poverty-eradication as ends in themselves, following this perspective they emerge as means for establishing and sustaining a ‘correct’ set of relations within the global economy, the only arena within which development is believed possible.
I end with a comment on a key problematic between DFID’s liberal discourse of em powerment and claims of paternalism.
Securitization
Duffield argues that in the post-Cold War era a new development-security nexus is emerging, based upon new perceptions of global interdependence, that the prob lems of underdevelopment in the South lead to its results – migration and refugees, disease, corruption, unwanted economic transactions, political instability and conflict, and extremism – crossing borders and ultimately threatening the wealth-cen tres and key flows of the GPE. (Duffield 2001: ch2) This concern is present through -

SECURIITIZATION, CONDITIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 33 out the white paper within the context of the recent crisis, as established in Douglas
Alexander’s preface: ‘There is a real risk that the progress the world has made in tackling global poverty...could be reversed, with all that means for the welfare of the poorest and most vulnerable people in the world, particularly women, and also for the well-being and security of people living in the UK’. (DFID 2009: p6) This secu ritization sets the scene for the white paper’s concern regarding poverty reduction, climate change (ibid, p14, 47ff), conflict, state fragility and a lack of state capac ity, (ibid, p15, 78, 85, 125) food insecurity (ibid, p35), vulnerability and margin alization (ibid, p63ff, 73), the lack of public services and justice mechanisms (ibid, p74ff), extremism (ibid, p83), and disease (ibid, p92), each of which are conceived as impediments to autonomous economic growth. In turn, containment is clearly labelled as an important goal. In terms of health, for example, ‘[g]ood health systems worldwide are the best response to containing and preventing diseases which, if not controlled, can cross borders as quickly as people do’ (ibid). Thus, throughout the white paper the provision of security and the construction of increased state capacity are presented as ‘investments’ in future economic growth and international sta bility towards this end. (ibid, p51, 78, 125)
The primary cause of such insecurity is presented as state failure and fragility, es pecially in terms of its relationship to violent conflict in the South. In this sense, ‘[c] onflict and weak government do not only cause poverty but also act as a brake on future growth, they force out the investment and entrepreneurship needed to help lift economies, create jobs and transform prospects for people’ (ibid, p15). This then leads to the lack of public service provision: fragile states ‘cannot or will not deliver core functions – such as security, schools or clinics – to the majority of their people...To reduce poverty effectively and allow each person to achieve their full potential, we need states that are capable, accountable and responsive and where a flourishing civil society empowers citizens to realise their rights’(ibid, p69), par ticularly with regards to the provision of basic public services (see Mosley 2001: p309). Thus whereas ‘[c]apable, accountable and responsible states are critical for development’ (DFID 2009: p18), this is contrasted especially against the persistence of conflict where the state cannot or will not establish security (ibid, ch.4). Fragile states are viewed as actively impeding this emergence of market-based growth and a dynamic rights-based civil society by not providing security, the necessary pre requisite, as a public service. Thus the white paper proposes to ‘treat security and access to justice as a basic service, on a par with health and education’(ibid, p75).
Where states themselves contribute to insecurity, either willingly or through a lack of capacity, the white paper highlights an increasing willingness to bypass the state altogether in the provision of development assistance, for example the role of the
Stabilisation Unit (formerly the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit) in directing ‘in ternational agencies’ to lead the ‘civilian effort’ in crisis situations where a bilateral sovereign presence may become problematic (ibid, p79). Among populations the key aim of securitization is the production of self-reliance and sustainability, and thus both the least possible dependence on prolonged food and fiscal aid and the least possible negative transborder flows (ibid, 38ff, 47ff, 123, 141; Duffield 2007: p 18-9).

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Conditionality
In this Post-Consensus period conditionality has been transformed from having the single objective of near-wholesale market liberalization towards wider social aims and lower visibility. Stiglitz highlights this trend as the move towards ‘more instru ments and broader goals’. ‘Making markets work’ he argues requires more than just forcing Southern governments to ‘get out of the way’; ‘it requires sound financial regulation, competition policy, and policies to facilitate the transfer of technology and to encourage transparency’, in short the conscious construction of the key pre requisites of a vibrant and functioning civil society which drives ahead economic development (Stiglitz 1998a: p1). Thus the white paper defines DFID’s role as ‘help ing to build a path out of poverty’(DFID 2009: p141), a path defined by creating de cision-making structures at various levels which direct actors in the South towards establishing the governance prerequisites for autonomous economic growth.
The white paper follows this rationale in directing conditionality towards disci plining the direct recipients (states, sub-national bodies) and mediators (multi lateral institutions, CSOs) of aid and loans towards the provision of basic safety nets, education and services for the disabled and elderly (ibid, 25), security and justice (ibid, 74ff.), gender equality (ibid, 75, 110), addressing environmental unsustainabilities (ibid, 56), and post-conflict recovery (ibid, 88). The direct objective of development aid in each of these cases is securing a sustainable and self-reliant form of development which does not impede the economic activities of others (ibid, 38ff, 47ff, 123). Additionally, a form of indirect conditionality is created by the white paper’s focus not on development in general, but on the poorest (ibid, 126, 129); thus a minimum of 50% of all new bilateral aid will be targeted at ‘fragile and conflict-affected’ states (ibid, 73). The conditions which qualify a state or population for development aid are narrowing around a tighter definition of transborder insecurities.
Additionally, the targets of conditionality are broadened beyond the state towards target populations and mediatory bodies. Central is the modification of behaviour in each case towards a particular image of market- and rights-based rationality.
For the individual and household it is to foster a new dependence upon pro-mar ket public services, and to ensure their supersession above other (for Stiglitz, ‘tra ditional’ (Stiglitz 1998b: p3)) social relations. For example, the white paper de mands a new focus on social provision through ‘programmes that provide a safety net for people – such as cash in return for work, money conditional on sending children to school or support for the disabled and elderly’ (DFID 2009: p25.).
The ultimate aim is a form of self-reliance based firmly upon a liberal framework of state-citizen relations, with the appearance of being produced domestically through empowered social-political choices rather than externally disciplined through conditionality (Duffield 2007: p18-9, 68-9). For mediatory bodies, which are viewed as having greater penetration in the South due to concerns over sov ereign interventions (DFID 2009: p104, 123), the white paper provides an ex tensive agenda of expanded conditionality: expanded funding in return for ‘good performance’ (ibid, 107). Thus, for example, in ‘making funding decisions for the

SECURIITIZATION, CONDITIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 35
World Bank, Regional Banks, European Development Fund, Global Funds and the
UN Family’, DFID will use conditionality to influence the geographical focus of their operations, their ‘speed and responsiveness’, ‘commitments to continuous improvement, value for money and reform’, ‘evidence of accountability for performance and transparency’ (ibid, 108), and increased peacekeeping effective ness (ibid, 86). CSOs must display their effectiveness in humanitarian crises to ensure continued funding (ibid, 132). Furthermore, within this new framework state-directed aid is subordinated to its ultimate ends in terms of its effect on recipient individuals, households and populations(ibid, 69-70).
Finally, conditionality is being established in a further sense by the increased will ingness of DFID to seek external private funding for its projects and partnerships.
This will place its operations under the demands of maintaining financial creditwor thiness, just as DFID itself demands creditworthiness from the states it deals with through its support for the IMF-World Bank Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF)
(ibid, 27, 100; Soederberg 2004).
Accountability
In the white paper expanded conditionality comes hand in hand with expanded means of accountability towards ensuring the effectiveness of such policy measures in its international partnerships, defined by the white paper as ensuring ‘value for money’, that ‘every pound of UK aid is spent well’ (DFID 2009: 8). This follows the increasing international adoption of target-based development objectives including the MDGs 2000, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005 and Accra Agen da for Action 2008, all of which feature importantly here (ibid, 11ff, 99, 127). The emphasis of the white paper, founded upon target- and regulation-mechanisms of liberal governance, is that successful development can be observed and produced through identifying and constructing value-added results (ibid, 109).
Following this agenda the white paper highlights a number of new oversight and supervision mechanisms DFID intends to establish or extend in its relationship with states and mediatory bodies. State recipients of aid face conditions demand ing the extension and deepening of accountability and transparency of govern ance policymaking (ibid, 73, 97). On the one hand these are direct prerequisites of liberal democratic government and a vibrant civil society; on the other they also comprise important means by which state-level policymaking can be observed and supervised by external development agencies. Thus 5% of new funding allo cations by DFID 2009: will in future be set aside for accountability schemes to link states to their citizens (bid, 128). Fragile and failed states which do not do so will also face greater scrutiny through new practices to establish a wider ‘humanitar ian evidence base’ to justify the necessity of various forms of external intervention
(ibid, 123). Another form of state accountability discussed is that produced by the establishment post-conflict justice mechanisms, externally imposed as with the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Balkans where necessary
(ibid, 82). Multilateral institutions and CSOs are to be held to account through var ious programmes such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) ‘to

36 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW improve transparency of aid flows by bringing together donors, partner countries,
[CSOs] and experts to agree common standards for sharing information about aid
(ibid, 128)’.
An important problematic is that where these wider reporting mechanisms reveal state failure, there is a clear agenda to bypass these states and direct aid towards populations directly (ibid, 54-6). However, this drive towards increased efficiency creates an important problematic between a discourse supporting the construc tion of strong states and alternative practices of partnership-building with mul tilateral organizations, CSOs, sub-national bodies and recipient individuals and communities (ibid, 9, 73, 103ff, 132). The result is that functioning yet fragile states are potentially denied the very resources which they need to develop the capacity for basic services and security which DFID demands in the first place.
Furthermore, the white paper charts the move towards wider reporting mechanisms among all bodies, both in measuring the achievement of specific development tar gets such as the MDGs and in monitoring the results of aid spending more broadly. In addition to the wider ‘humanitarian evidence base’ discussed above, the UK will pro mote new mechanisms within the G8 and European Commission to ensure national reporting on development practices and spending by donor states (ibid, 93), the continued employment of Country Governance Analyses as a framework for deeper reporting on recipient states, the Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF) is being expanded to increase the capability of CSOs in this field (ibid, 97), enhancing the role of the Climate Change and Energy Unit for reporting on environmental issues in development (ibid, 131-2), and the wider independent evaluation of all DFID activi ties and partnerships (ibid, 130). In addition, the increased surveillance of financial markets upon DFID operations, discussed above, extends towards a new account ability to private investors. This vastly expanding information-base and surveillance is leading to increased discipline upon all actors to act within expected norms. As
DFID responds to increased demands from the UK electorate and civil society, it then passes them onto its ‘partners’ through increased demands for accountability and transparency, ultimately to the benefit of its conditionality measures.
Conclusion
This critical commentary has suggested that recent developments within DFID can be best understood through a triple lens of securitization, conditionality and ac countability. As has already been highlighted, in an ‘increasingly interdependent world’, the UK national interest is bound up ever more tightly with the fate of the world’s poorest and most conflict-ridden regions. This is unproblematic and central to the contemporary understanding of globalization. My concern, however, is that whereas the white paper suggests that the UK’s increasing involvement and spend ing in the South is part of a ‘profoundly moral cause’ for which the international community is responsible and to which it is committed in common purpose, DFIDs threefold drive towards securitization, conditionality and accountability reveals in stead that the Washington Consensus has been transcended only in its a wider and more pervasive approach to addressing market failure: first, a broader understand -

SECURIITIZATION, CONDITIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 37 ing of the failure of successful integration within the liberal institutions and struc tures of the global economy; and second, an increased willingness and capacity to construct governance solutions and containment mechanisms within the South to counteract such failures.
For DFID, navigating within these transformations towards enhancing its funding role, and thus decision-making influence through conditionality, appears a crucial component of its future institutional role within an expanded framework of inter national partnerships, and DFID displays a strong capacity for innovation and ad aptation towards these ends. However the end result for states and populations in the South is that DFID’s liberal discourse of empowerment, that of giving people
‘power over their own lives’ (ibid, 141), must stand questioned by the structures of paternalism at the heart of securitization, conditionality and accountability, all of which ultimately attempt to mould behaviour towards a market- and rights-based liberal rationality. The shallow liberal empowerment promoted by this white paper is strictly regulated by the decision-making structures constructed by DFID and its funding partners which discipline actors in the South towards establishing govern ance prerequisites for autonomous economic growth. A deeper form of empower ment would be to open up the possibility for states and societies in the South to develop responses to global change which are not imposed from the outside but are constructed and chosen within those communities. For the time being, however, a pervasive and coercive paternalism will continue as long as governance bodies such as DFID use their purse-strings to direct particular development outcomes upon those who have not chosen such outcomes and processes for themselves.

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