INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW
- VOL. 5, NO. 1 - OCTOBER 2009
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1
October 2009
F RONT MATTER
ARTICLES
4
Gender and Reconciliation in Post-Conflict Societies: the Dilemmas of
responding to Large-Scale Sexual Violence
M. Melandri
ESSAYS/ NOTES
28
The Institutional Conditions for a UN Foreign Policy
Frederico Bartels Ferreira
41
Why Straussianism?
John Hickman
55
Public Ethics Case Study: The Corporate Social Responsibility of Goldman
Sachs
Jacob Kloeveroed Griffiths
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW
- VOL. 5, NO. 1 - OCTOBER 2009
THE IPPR BOOK REVIEW
69
Editorial note to The IPPR Book Review: Exploring (New) Avenues of
Information
71
Clashing on the Faultlines
Alex Braithwaite
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizaions
75
Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations
Harry Bauer
79
Foregoing Irredentism: The Power of Argument and the Rise of the Status
Quo Norm
Harald Heubaum
Markus Kornprobst, Irredentism and European Politics: Argumentation,
Compromise and Norms
85
Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the
European Union
Christine Reh
90
Two Bailout Plans for Planet Earth
Wasiq N. Khan
Jeffrey Sachs, Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet
Thomas Friedman, Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why The World Needs a Green
Revolution and How it Can Renew Our Global Future
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW
- VOL. 5, NO. 1 - OCTOBER 2009
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW
Editorial Staff, Volume 5 (2008 – 2009)
General Editors
Aleyha Ahmed, MSc International Public Policy, Sub Editor
Paul Aufiero, MSc International Public Policy, Academic Review Board Liason
Amanda Caldeira, MA Human Rights, Coordinator
Dilara Demir, MA Human Rights, Academic Review Board Liaison
Daisy Ellis, MSc International Public Policy, Copy/Styles Editor
Freddy Fallon, MSc International Public Policy Internet and Technology Coordinator
Ankita Gandhi, MSc International Public Policy, Coordinator
George Kakouris, MSc International Public Policy Submissions Editor
Ari Magnusson, MSc International Public Policy, Marketing/Promotion
Cole Martin, MSc International Public Policy, Copy/Styles Editor
Philippa McMahon, MA Human Rights, Secretary
Richard Rowland, MA Legal and Political Theory, Copy/Styles Editor
Christophe G. Singh, MSc European Public Policy, Book Review Editor
Filip Tanay, MSc European Public Policy External Communications
Una Vandra, MSc International Public Policy External Communications
Academic Review Panel
Dr. Alex Braithwaite
Dr. David Hudson
Editorial Board
Aleyha Ahmed, MSc International Public Policy
Paul Aufiero, MSc International Public Policy
Amanda Caldeira, MA Human Rights
Dilara Demir, MA Human Rights
Daisy Ellis, MSc International Public Policy
Freddy Fallon, MSc International Public Policy
Ankita Gandhi, MSc International Public Policy
George Kakouris, MSc International Public Policy
Ari Magnusson, MSc International Public Policy
Cole Martin, MSc International Public Policy
Philippa McMahon, MA Human Rights
Nina Musgrave, MSc Global Governance and Ethics
Richard Rowland, MA Legal and Political Theory
Christophe G. Singh, MSc European Public Policy
Filip Tanay, MSc European Public Policy
Natalie Tomlinson, MA Human Rights
Una Vandra, MSc International Public Policy
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INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW
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- VOL. 5, NO. 1 - OCTOBER 2009
GENDER AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES:
THE DILEMMAS OF RESPONDING TO LARGE-SCALE SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
M. Melandri
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses how a better understanding of women's wartime experiences of
sexual violence can influence the theory and practice of transitional justice. Attention is
first given to identifying the causes behind the widespread use of large-scale sexual
violence in contemporary conflicts. Second, an overview is offered of the positive
achievements of introducing a gender perspective in planning and implementing judicial
and non-judicial transitional justice mechanisms. Third, it is argued that a truly gendersensitive analysis of wartime sexual violence against women has the potential to expand
the concept and the scope of post-conflict reconciliation programmes.
Keywords: rape, post-conflict reconciliation, sexual violence, transitional justice, war
INTRODUCTION
War, women, and sexual violence against women in wartime have always existed,
but it was not until the 1990s that this issue reached the agenda of the international
community. The mass rape of women in Rwanda and Bosnia finally lifted the taboo of
wartime sexual violence, and the phenomenon started to attract worldwide attention.
Recent research has shed light on the epidemic proportion of sexual violence taking place
during contemporary conflicts. Statistics suggest that as many as 275,000 women and
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girls may have been violated during the war in Sierra Leone1, approximately 500,000
during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda2, and between 20,000 and 60,000 in BosniaHerzegovina.3
This essay will discuss how a better understanding of women‘s wartime
experiences of sexual violence can influence the theory and practice of transitional
justice. Research on this topic is needed because it has been recognized that both the legal
standards and the processes which transitional justice mechanisms draw on, have tended
to either exclude women or to operate with a gender bias.4 In many respects, the way
transitional justice programmes are designed and implemented determines how survivors
of wartime sexual violence are treated in the aftermath of conflict and the type of support
they receive from the community. It is thus imperative that the needs of women survivors
of sexual violence are properly understood, if appropriate responses are to be given.
The term ‗transitional justice‘ has been attributed a wide range of meanings, but it
should be understood here as ‗the set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise
following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at
confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law‘.5 The
term encompasses both judicial mechanisms aimed at bringing perpetrators to account
(criminal proceedings) and non-judicial mechanisms (truth commissions, vetting,
reparation programmes and security sector reforms) aimed at providing justice for victims
and promoting peace and reconciliation.
The paper argues that a broader approach to transitional justice should be adopted
to encompass women‘s experiences of conflict and duly address the specific
1
Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Witness to Truth (Freetown, 2004), pp.
86.
2
R. Baksh et al, eds., Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation (London, Commonwealth
Secretariat, 2005), pp. 22.
3
R. Seifert, ―The Second Front: The Logic of Sexual Violence in Wars‖, Women’s Studies International
Forum vol. 19, no. 1/2 (1996): pp. 35; R. Seifert, ―War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis‖, in Mass Rape:
The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ed. A. Stiglmayer (Lincoln: University of Nebraska,
2001), pp. 55.
4
See C. Bell, C. Campbell and F. Nì Aolàin, ―Justice Discourses in Transition‖, Social and Legal Studies
vol. 13, no. 3 (2004): pp. 318-19; C. Bell and C. O‘Rourke, ―Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional
Justice? An Introductory Essay‖, The International Journal of Transitional Justice vol. 1, no. 1 (2007): pp.
24-25; N. Reilly, ―Seeking Gender Justice in Post-Conflict Transitions: Towards a Transformative
Women‘s Human Rights Approach‖, International Journal of Law in Context vol. 3, no. 2 (2007): pp. 159.
5
N. Roth-Arriaza and J. Mazzacurrena, Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth
versus Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2006), pp. 2.
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consequences of wartime sexual violence perpetrated against women. In so doing, the
discussion will focus particularly on the issue of reconciliation. This issue indeed remains
largely unexplored in contemporary transitional justice discourses. To date, reconciliation
discourses have substantially failed to address ‗gender reconciliation‘.6 Some steps have
been taken for reconciliation efforts to include an understanding of how conflicts affect
different social groups, including women. Nevertheless, I will argue that this current
understanding of how reconciliation should address gender-specific violence, although an
important achievement, has yet to include fully women's concerns. Drawing on women‘s
experiences of sexual violence in wartime, I suggest that the concept and processes of
reconciliation should be re-interpreted and expanded to meet women‘s needs better.
The topic is one of relevance to the realms of both law and public policy, since the
two are closely interlinked in the area of transitional justice. However, this paper should
not be interpreted as advocating a strong approach to the 'legalisation' of transitional
justice, or to reconciliation strategies in particular. In recent decades the law has already
made very important steps in shaping justice programmes to protect better women
seeking justice after war. What needs to be broadened now is the scope and meaning of
justice itself, so as to reflect better women's experiences of conflict. Hence, the essay is
best read as a call for a reinterpretation of the boundaries of international public policies
on transitional justice; for policy in this area to proceed alongside the achievements of the
law. It is argued here that only such a combined and interdisciplinary interpretation of
justice can fully respond to the needs of women who have experienced wartime sexual
violence.
The paper is divided in three sections. Part 1 considers why sexual violence
against women, and rape in particular, is perpetrated in times of war, so as to gain a
clearer view of the social consequences of such violence, and to understand the extent to
which these consequences are not incidental but intentional. Part 2 briefly sketches out
the positive achievements of introducing a gender perspective into planning and
6
Some have acknowledged this gap, see Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),
Reconciliation after Conflict (Stockholm: IDEA, 2003), pp. 13-14; D. Pankhurst, ed., Gendered Peace:
Women’s Struggle for Post-War Justice and Reconciliation (Geneva: Routledge & UNRISD, 2007), pp. 11;
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Gender Equality: Striving for
Justice in an Unequal World (Geneva: UNRISD, 2005), pp. 233.
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implementing transitional justice projects, including international tribunals, truth
commissions and formal reparations programmes. It highlights the conceptual exclusion
of women‘s experiences in formulating the ideas of justice and reconciliation, and
explains how a truly gender-sensitive analysis of wartime sexual violence can address
these shortcomings. The final section offers concluding remarks on the inescapable link
between fully including women‘s experiences of conflict and the need to enlarge the
scope of transitional justice, and considers future trends in post-conflict reconciliation.
It must be emphasised that while the discussion will focus on the experiences of
women, its aim is to develop a gender analysis of the implications of large-scale sexual
violence committed in wartime. More specifically, the focus will be on the use of sexual
violence as a gender crime, hence perpetrated against women with a specific aim in mind:
to destroy community relations by targeting women because of their gender. It is
considered methodologically sound to limit this research to violence perpetrated against
women because of the different values and restrictions attributed by society to male and
female sexuality. For these reasons, sexual violence perpetrated against men will not
come under consideration here.7
1. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF WARTIME SEXUAL VIOLENCE
This section considers the causes and consequences of sexual violence
(particularly of rape) perpetrated during armed conflicts. It endeavours to unravel the
underlying motives behind wartime rape and what differentiates it from peacetime rape.
The closer focus on rape, among other forms of sexual violence, is explained by the
existence of a more extensive body of literature specifically on this issue. However, it
should be borne in mind that in fact there is a wide array of other abhorrent practices such
as forced impregnation, forced abortion, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery, abduction,
and forced marriage, which are widespread and often perpetrated systematically against
7
For an in-depth discussion of this issue see S. Sivakumaran, ―Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed
Conflict‖, European Journal of International Law vol. 18, no. 2 (2007).
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women during conflict.8 Why, then, is rape used in wartime, and what strategic purposes
are served by sexual violence against women during armed conflicts?
1.1 THE MOTIVATIONS FOR WARTIME RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
A survey of the literature reveals that rape and sexual violence arise from different
specific motivations in various wars, which are not necessarily linked to sexual desire.9
The reasons advanced to explain wartime rape are manifold and approach the issue from
different levels.
At the individual level, Goldstein argues that wartime rape essentially occurs
because war presents different opportunities from peacetime. He notes that rape was used
as revenge by Russian soldiers in Berlin in 1945; it stemmed from soldiers‘ frustration in
Vietnam, or it may result from the weakening of social norms and the awakening of
aggressiveness.10 Other writers have attributed soldiers‘ aggressive sexual conduct to the
‗craziness of war‘, lack of discipline, frustration, suffering and drug use.11
Critics have strongly opposed such theories which try to explain wartime rape
through an individual approach, arguing that they fail to account for the fact that many
men do not rape during war.12 From a sociological perspective, it was indeed argued that
wartime sexual attacks on women are historical and social processes carried out
8
E. Rehn and E. J. Sirleaf, Women, War and Peace: The Independent Expert’s Assessment on the Impact of
Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peacebuilding (New York: United Nations Development
Fund for Women, 2002), pp. 3.
9
See M. Alison, ―Wartime Sexual Violence: Women‘s Human Rights and Questions of Masculinity‖,
Review of International Studies vol. 33 (2007); M. Eriksson-Baaz and M. Stern, ―Making Sense of
Violence: Voices of Soldiers in the Congo (DRC)‖, Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 46, no. 1
(2008); J. S. Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa (Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 2001). Interestingly, Seifert (1996) argues that the ‗sexual urge‘ argument does not
stand up to scientific scrutiny, because wartime rape has nothing to do with the availability of willing
women or prostitutes.
10
Goldstein, pp. 362-65.
11
Eriksson-Baaz and Stern, pp. 75-76. From interviews conducted with soldiers from the Democratic
Republic of Congo Eriksson-Baaz and Stern found that the major reasons behind the violence were factors
such as hunger, suffering and frustration related to poverty and neglect (pp. 78). The authors also noticed
how the soldiers differentiate between ‗evil‘ or 'bad' rapes – where the violence is intended to humiliate the
victim and often involves mutilations or is committed against children – and 'normal rapes', where the
violence is intended to satisfy sexual desire (pp. 83).
12
See C. Snyder et al, ―On the Battleground of Women‘s Bodies: Mass Rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina‖,
Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work vol. 21, no. 2 (2006): pp. 185-6.
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collectively, which must therefore have a collective meaning.13 Looking from the rapist‘s
perspective, some authors have put forward the idea that rape, and especially gang rape
(which represents a high proportion of wartime sexual violence), serves primarily as an
act of loyalty between men, a bonding ritual which promotes group cohesion.14 On the
other hand, from the victim‘s standpoint, social interpretations of sexual violence argue
that women in war are not raped simply because they are women, but because of the
interplay of their gender and other attributes which inevitably make certain women more
vulnerable than others to sexual violence. For instance, Skjelsbaek notes that, during
ethnic conflicts, it is the particular combination of their gender and ethnic identity which
makes women ‗eligible‘ for rape15. Indeed in many cases it is the intersection of gender
and other factors, such as ethnicity, that permits warring parties to differentiate women as
theirs and others’. Women thus become targets because they belong to a specific group,
and their violation and humiliation becomes a way to humiliate the men, religion, ethnic
group, nation-state and culture they are identified with.16
In the last two decades, increasing attention has been paid to a conceptualisation
of wartime rape as a ‗weapon of war‘. In this sense, rape may be used against targeted
segments of the female population as part of a military strategy and to advance military
aims, for instance, with genocidal intent. Forced impregnation is the most blatant
example of rape as genocide. The explanation for how forced pregnancy could constitute
genocide lies with cultural attitudes to ethnicity, according to which a woman is only a
‗biological box‘, since the children will bear the father-rapist‘s ethnicity.17 In other
words, through systematic rape the perpetrators aim to create more babies belonging to
their ethnic group, and through this to alter and erase the ethnic, religious and national
13
Seifert (1996), pp. 36.
The authors highlight that this is an important factor in highly militarized societies. See Alison, pp. 77; L.
Price, ―Finding the Man in the Soldier-Rapist: Some Reflections on Comprehension and Accountability‖,
Women’s Studies International Forum vol. 24, no. 2 (2001): pp. 216.
15
See Alison, pp. 79-80; I. Skjelsbaek, ―Victim and Survivor: Narrated Social Identities of Women Who
Experienced Rape During the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina‖, Feminism & Psychology vol. 16, no. 4 (2006):
pp. 388.
16
Snyder et al, pp.193. Rejali argues that, where ethnic identities are blurred, rape can also serve as an
‗ethnomarker‘, which redefines racial and ethnic conventions. See D. Rejali, ―After Feminist Analyses of
Bosnian Violence‖, Peace Review vol. 8 (1996).
17
B. Allen quoted in Alison, pp. 86.
14
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identities of the raped women.18 In this case, rape (and subsequent pregnancy) thus serves
to transform the victim ethnically, culturally or religiously. In other cases, studies have
revealed that rape as a weapon of war has been used a means of terrorising not only the
victims, but also their families and the larger population, into leaving their homes – hence
functioning as a strategy of ethnic cleansing.19
Finally, there is evidence of rape and sexual violence being used as a weapon of
war with the specific intent of destroying the social and cultural stability of the collective
enemy, its very social fabric.20 Even more than in peacetime, in times of war women
hold families and communities together while the men are called to arms. Women‘s
physical and emotional destruction, therefore, strongly affects the group‘s social and
cultural cohesion. Hence, in some cases, sexually-violent acts carry the defined intent to
destroy the enemy by violating its social and gender-structured arrangements. This is
confirmed by the fact that sexual violence is indeed largely perpetrated in contexts where
cultures of honour and shame are deeply rooted, and where a high value is placed on
female sexuality, chastity and marital virtue. In such contexts, it is rape victims
themselves who bear the main burden of shame and stigma, rather than the rapists. The
violence has therefore long-lasting effects, not only on the victims themselves, but also
on gender relationships within the affected community.21 As we will see, this gives rise to
a number of specific consequences in the aftermath of attacks.
2.1
CONSEQUENCES OF WARTIME RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
Donna Pankhurst notes that sexual violence, especially public rape, is used
particularly successfully in strongly patriarchal societies to undermine the enemy22. The
presence of an honour/shame culture, and the emphasis many cultures place on women‘s
sexual virtue, indeed, enables the rapist to humiliate and demoralize not only the women
18
Skjelsbaek (2006), pp. 375.
Price, pp. 223, Snyder at al, pp. 190.
20
J. Phillips quoted in Rejali, pp. 367; Seifert (1996), pp. 39; Alison, pp. 18.
21
International Alert, Addressing Gender-Based Violence in Sierra Leone (London: International Alert,
2007), pp. 12; Seifert (1996), pp. 41.
22
Pankhurst, pp. 46. See also I. Skjelsbaek, ―Sexual Violence and War: Mapping Out a Complex
Relationship‖, European Journal of International Relations vol. 7, no. 2 (2001): pp. 228.
19
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themselves, but also the whole community and the men who have failed to protect ‗their‘
women.23 Speaking of the conflict in the Balkans, and in relation to the existence of an
honour/shame culture, Olijic writes:
Men suffer the shame of their failure to protect their property that includes
women, family, bloodlines, and soil. Women suffer through their duty to
endure the private stigma of shame. Their suffering is protection of men‘s
public shame. Public admission of sexual victimization means public defeat
of the honour of the men: the loss of their public, status-focused face; the
public admission of the loss of their bloodline; and the loss of their
soil/nation.24
The shaming intent behind the use of rape and sexual violence in war gives rise to
a number of important social consequences for the violated women. Non-governmental
organizations working in conflict-affected countries have consistently reported alarming
cases of women whom, because of the violence they suffered, have been stigmatised,
systematically ostracised by their communities, or even abandoned by their husbands. A
husband may indeed simply refuse to have further contact with his wife after such
violence and may abandon or ostracise her, or he may allow her to remain in the
household but humiliate her, or even take a second wife.25 Many men abandon the
woman claiming that she may have been infected by HIV/AIDS, and fearing that they in
turn will contract the virus. Although data are difficult to obtain (because sexual crimes
go largely unreported), a 2003 survey conducted by International Alert in the area of
Kivu, Eastern DRC, reports that in a sample of 492 women and girls who experienced
rape, 26% of married victims had been abandoned by their husbands.26 In addition, the
23
Skjelsbaek (2006), pp. 388.
M. Olijic quoted in Snyder et al, pp. 190.
25
Human Rights Watch, The War Within the War: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Eastern
Congo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002), pp. 64-66; Medicins Sans Frontieres, ‘I Have No Joy, No
Peace of Mind: Medical, Psychosocial, and Socio-Economic Consequences of Sexual Violence in Eastern
DRC (Amsterdam: Medicins Sans Frontieres, 2004).
26
International Alert, International Alert, Women’s Bodies as a Battleground: Sexual Violence against
Women and Girls During the War in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Kivu (1996- 2003)
(London: International Alert, 2005), pp. 42-43.
24
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divorce rate among couples where the rape resulted in pregnancy was reported to be at
36%.27 In general, the research reports that of the husbands told about such violence,
about half reacted very badly, becoming suspicious of their wives, while only a third
showed compassion and supported their wives.28
These data are alarming and paint a tragic picture of the situation of women who
have survived wartime sexual violence. Despite this, some researchers have warned
against the risk of stereotyping rape victims as being isolated, hopeless individuals.
Skjelsbaek argues that, in fact, the impact of wartime rapes in patriarchal families can be
quite different from what one might expect, and that rejection, stigmatisation and
ostracism are only one part of the picture.29
Interesting examples of the real complexities through which social stigma
operates can be found in ethnographic studies conducted on rape survivors. Mookherjee,
in her study of rape survivors and their husbands in a rural Bengali village, describes
quite effectively the complex interplay of factors affecting these families at community
level.30 In the Bangladesh war of 1971, it is estimated that as many as 200,000 women
were raped. After the war, the government of Bangladesh publicly referred to the raped
women as birangonas (‗war heroines‘), in an attempt to discourage social ostracisation.31
Despite these efforts, after the violence many of these women were still rejected by their
husbands and ended up living in camps appositely set up by the government.32 At the
same time, Mookherjee found that the women who, instead, had been ‗accepted‘ by their
husbands after rape, and even actively supported in their struggle for accountability, had
witnessed their husbands, in their turn, becoming extremely vulnerable to stigma and
verbal violence in their communities, as well as economically in their daily
negotiations.33 Essentially, this suggests that the discrimination faced by sexual violence
27
Ibid.
Ibid.
29
Skjelsbaek (2006), pp. 385-97.
30
N. Mookherjee, ―May man (honour) is Lost but I Still Have my iman (principle): Sexual Violence and
Articulations of Masculinity‖, in South Asian Masculinities: Context of Change, Sites of Continuity, ed R.
Chopra, C. Osella & F. Osella (Delhi: Unlimited, 2004).
31
See N. Mookherjee, ―"Remembering to Forget": Public Secrecy and Memory of Sexual Violence in the
Bangladesh War of 1971‖, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute vol. 12 (2006), pp. 440-41.
32
Price, pp. 37.
33
Mookherjee (2004).
28
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survivors is a complex phenomenon, and one which is articulated at many different
levels.
Summing up, the underlying rationales explaining wartime rape are many and
cannot be reduced to a single, oversimplified notion of ‗rape as a weapon of war‘.
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that a large proportion of violence is indeed
perpetrated as part of military strategy, which thus needs to be addressed and understood
as such. We have seen that rape as a weapon of war is, to some extent, perpetrated with
the intention of altering social and cultural stability, or destroingy the social fabric, by
destabilising gender and family relations. This kind of violence is what this paper
primarily addresses, as a specific typology of war rape.
To conclude, if rape and sexual violence are used as a weapon of war, they
constitute an intrinsic part of the parties‘ military strategies. Hence sexual violence is a
component of the conflict itself, and is chosen because it is the most efficient means of
reaching certain specific and strategic aims. In other words, large-scale sexual violence
may be used during conflict with the specific aim of destroying a society by destroying its
gender relations. It is an effective strategy as it is often successful in destabilising social
patterns, indeed, it creates situations where women may be ostracised, abandoned by their
husbands, or where families who support the woman can themselves be ostracised by the
community. This paper argues that this is an important point, and one which needs to be
taken into consideration in designing remedial and preventive measures for the violence.
Thus, how should the international community respond to the needs of victims of
wartime rape and, more generally, of sexual violence?
2. GENDER, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
Transitional justice has become a key pillar of the international community‘s postconflict reconstruction framework. Its processes and mechanisms are designed with the
twin aims of providing justice for the victims and making the perpetrators accountable. In
doing this, transitional justice should also encompass what Mckay defines as ‗gender
justice‘: ‗legal processes which are equitable, not privileged by and for men, and which
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distinguish the nefarious forms of injustice women experience during and after armed
conflict‘.34
With few exceptions, women today are denied justice. The majority of
perpetrators of wartime sexual violence still go unpunished – due in part to the massive
numbers of perpetrators with which no national system can cope, and so women
themselves often do not receive redress. In the last two decades, significant steps have
been taken at international level to including women‘s experiences of conflict in justice
programmes, yet some argue that their invisibility in transitional justice processes has still
not been adequately addressed.35 The following discussion centres on the present
shortcomings of transitional justice projects, and proposes a new model of reconciliation
to address fully women‘s experiences of sexual violence during armed conflicts.
2.1 GENDER AND JUSTICE
International law has led the way in including women in its efforts to respond to
massive human rights violations, and it first did so by conceptualising sexual violence as
a weapon of war. The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda have indeed made notable progress in recognizing sexual and gender-based
violence as a violation of the laws of war, not least by including rape as a crime against
humanity in their statutes.36 Although the judgements they delivered represent but a tiny
fraction of the real number of abuses, they have set important historical precedents. As a
result of their pioneering practices, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) today lists a number of provisions with respect to the prosecution of genderspecific crimes, including forced pregnancy, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilisation
and sexual slavery.37
34
S. Mckay, ―Gender Justice and Reconciliation‖, Women’s Studies International Forum vol. 23, no. 5
(2000), pp. 561.
35
S. N. Anderlini, Women Building Peace: What They Do, Why it Matters (London: Lynne Rienner, 2007),
pp. 158.
36
C. Chinkin, ―Gender-Related Crimes: A Feminist Perspective‖, in From Sovereign Impunity to
International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States, eds R. Thakur and P. Malcontent
(Tokyo, United Nations University, 2005), pp. 117.
37
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in A/Conf.138/9 (reprinted in 37 ILM (1998), 999.
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The practice of the tribunals thus marks an important contribution to the
advancement of accountability for gender crimes. Their practices have nonetheless been
beset by problems and inconsistencies. International justice has for instance been accused
of being too slow, of having inadequately supported victims and witnesses, of having
conducted inappropriate investigations and with inadequate staff training - all of which
are regarded in some quarters as having amounted to further victimisation.38
Acknowledging these shortcomings, the ICC rules of procedure have been designed to
include witness protection programmes, trained staff with expertise in trauma related to
sexual crimes, and have introduced a requirement for judges to have specific expertise on
the issue.39 In additon, under the complementarity principle, in future the ICC may have a
role in influencing the adoption of domestic laws and judicial remedies for women living
in conflict-affected countries.
These recent developments have marked the beginning of a new era of
international justice and accountability for women. However, a broader critique was
made that justice for women survivors of sexual violence should not be understood
simply in terms of criminal accountability. Indeed, while some women proactively seek
accountability, the majority prefer not to be exposed to public knowledge – often fearing
social stigma and ostracisation, as already discussed. Also, women survivors of sexual
violence are often in desperate need of healthcare and social rehabilitation programmes.
Widows, or women rejected by their husbands, are especially likely to be unable to
provide for themselves and their children, and to many, prostitution may seem the only
viable option.40 For these reasons, if gender justice requires the introduction of gender
perspectives in all dimensions of justice, it also requires a redefinition of the boundaries
of justice itself to accommodate women‘s requirements. Noleen Heyzer, former
Executive Director of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM),
argues that in many countries a focusing on restorative justice is needed, to help women
38
See Anderlini (2007), pp. 160-174; B. Noworojee, ――Your Justice is Too Slow‖: Will the ICTR Fail
Rwanda‘s Rape Victims?‖ (Geneva: UNRISD, 2005); E. Rehn and E. J. Sirleaf, pp. 93-96.
39
Reilly, pp. 161-62.
40
J. Ward and M. Marsh, ―Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in War and Its Aftermath: Realities,
Responses and Required Resources‖, paper presented to the Symposium on Sexual Violence in Conflict and
Beyond, 21-23 June 2006, Brussels, Belgium.
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move beyond their trauma and begin to reconstruct their lives. 41 The concept of
restorative justice moves beyond discourses of criminal punishment to focus on repairing
relationships.42 In post-conflict transitions, this model of justice proposes mechanisms
such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) and formal reparation
programmes, which, it is argued, are capable of delivering a broad range of possible
objectives, including national and personal reconciliation.
2.2 GENDER AND RECONCILIATION
The word ‗reconciliation‘ has many meanings and remains a highly-contested
concept. A basic definition entails the search for a shared truth, some form of justice, and
an element of forgiveness and healing43; but while some focus on the individual level,
some consider groups, while others consider society as a whole.44
Post-conflict
reconciliation can typically occur in a situation where war has ended, a settlement has
been reached, and a new regime is struggling to reconstruct society. In this context,
reconciliation is a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared
future, deeply concerned with re-building relationships between former enemies.45 Of
particular concern here are the issues raised when a gender perspective is included in
reconciliation efforts, particularly as to how this could affect the idea of whom needs to
be reconciled.
One of the most commonly employed reconciliation processes is to establish a
national TRC. TRCs provide a public forum where victims can express their grievances,
recount their memories of violence and, by so doing, seek reconciliation. Prior to 2000,
the only commissions to take gender crimes into account were those in Guatemala, Haiti
and South Africa. Since 2001, gender crimes are expressly on the agenda of TRCs –
including those in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Peru. This emerging practice has had the
41
N. Heyzer, ―Gender Justice‖, Statement to the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security by
Noleen Heyzer, Executive Director, UNIFEM, 28 October 2004.
42
Bell and O‘Rourke, pp. 40-41.
43
S. N. Anderlini, C. P. Conaway and L. Kays, ―Transitional Justice and Reconciliation‖, in Inclusive
Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action, eds Women Waging Peace (Cambridge,
MA: Women Waging Peace, 2005), pp. 3; IDEA, pp. 12.
44
Pankhurst, pp. 11.
45
IDEA, pp. 12.
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important effect of broadening the scope and methods of investigation.46 Significant
developments have indeed resulted in ensuring that the process takes into account the
needs of women traumatised by sexual violence, both at the substantial level and at the
procedural level. For example, the South Africa TRC created Special Hearings on
Women and formed an all-women panel to encourage women to speak freely about their
experiences of violence.47 In Sierra Leone, guidelines were developed on how to take
statements, and included the presence of female statement-takers, the absence of fathers
and husbands (unless explicitly requested by the victim), and training for personnel
dealing with traumatised women.48
Some relative success was achieved by TRCs in addressing women‘s experiences
of human rights violations and in acknowledging the ways in which women have
experienced conflict. According to Lederach, acknowledgement is decisive in the
reconciliation dynamic. While knowledge is important, acknowledgement is a different
social phenomenon, and a necessary one for reconciliation, as it is only through
acknowledgement that it is possible to start restoring relationships.49 Yet, the validity of
this principle in the context of sexual offences is disputed. Feminist critique has warned
against the potentially risky assumptions of a vision of reconciliation through public
acknowledgement, which may not be universally applicable. While hundreds of sexual
violence survivors have courageously come forward to recount their experiences in public
forums, in most cases women hesitate to testify because it would be considered shameful
and, typically, result in stigmatisation and even severe punishment.50
Seeking justice in an environment where women are traditionally encouraged to
‗forgive and forget‘ may indeed prove more complicated than providing fair processes for
witnesses, mainly because of the complexity inherent in the social dynamics of shame
46
See K. Askin, ―The Quest for Post-Conflict Justice‖, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law vol. 41
(2003), pp. 513; V. Nesiah, Gender and Truth Commissions Mandates (New York: International Center for
Transitional Justice, 2005); World Bank, Gender and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (Washington,
DS: World Bank, 2006).
47
Anderlini, pp. 163.
48
Ibid., pp. 172-73.
49
J. Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace, 1998), pp. 26.
50
See IDEA, pp. 56; N. Valji, Gender Justice and Reconciliation (Berlin: Friederich Ebert Stiftung, 2007),
pp. 17.
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and stigmatization. The ethnographic study conducted among rape survivors in
Bangladesh specifically illustrates this. Mookherjee found that while the public
authorities and the wider community acknowledged the heroism of the women
(birangonas) who had endured sexual violence, this was lacking in the community, and in
the villages the women who exposed their experiences were considered shameful.51 In the
villagers‘ eyes, the proper response to such taboo crimes was to remain silent, hidden and
invisible.52 Following their public acknowledgement, the women were seen as sinful,
often branded prostitutes, and subjected together with their families to scorn and blame.53
Summing up, the reconciliation process for gender-specific crimes needs to take
place without undue assumptions, or it may run the risk of doing harm instead of
restoring dignity. McKay stated that, ideally, ‗new meaning can be given to private
shame as it is transformed into political dignity when the traumatic story becomes
testimony.‘54 The above discussion warns that this may not always be the case. The issue
of shame, a paramount concern to women victims of sexual abuse, poses significant
questions as to whether including a gender perspective into reconciliation discourses
could indeed mean more than just re-adapting the current categories of reconciliation to
accommodate women‘s needs, as we shall see.
2.3 HOW GENDER COULD SHAPE THE DISCOURSE ON RECONCILIATION
Transitional justice mechanisms have been built on false demarcations between
conflict-related (political) violence – to be addressed in justice and reconciliation
processes, and post-conflict (incidental) side-effects of such violence – largely neglected
by justice and reconciliation programmes. I suggest that the case of wartime sexual
violence challenges such assumptions, precisely because of the reasons behind the use of
sexual violence as a strategy of war. When rape, sexual violence and other horrible
practices alike are chosen as the form of wartime violence which best serves the purpose
of destroying the enemy‘s social fabric by destabilizing gender and family relations, I
51
Mookherjee (2006), pp. 440-41.
Ibid.
53
Ibid. See also Noworojee, pp. 24.
54
Mckay, pp. 564.
52
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would argue that justice and reconciliation programmes, to be effective, must not ignore
the tangible, and intended, long-term social consequences of such violence and must aim
to repair damaged gender relations.
It has been said that, for women who have experienced sexual abuse,
reconciliation means:
‗Offences against them being recognized and punished, illegitimate children
being recognized as legitimate with full rights, and resources being allocated
to deal with the physical and psychological consequences. For war widows,
reconciliation would be expected to include compensation and to address
existing inheritance laws and practices that dispossess them or hinder them in
fulfilling their new obligations as family providers‘.55
This continues, noting that:
‗Establishing trustful and respectful relations between men and women, and
between particularly targeted groups of men and women, is essential for
fashioning a democratic society‘.56
Some progress has been made in recent years, partially to address these concerns.
The report of the Sierra Leone TRC sets the agenda in this regard, by endorsing important
policy recommendations on the adoption of reparation measures, and by calling, for
instance, for the government to provide free healthcare for victims of sexual violence, a
monthly pension, and skills-training programmes.57 Moreover, there is a move towards
the prevention of wife abandonment or stigmatisation with the Commission establishing
55
IDEA, pp. 13.
Ibid.
57
J. King, ―Gender and Reparations in Sierra Leone: The Wounds of War Remain Open‖, in What
Happened to the Women? Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations, eds R. Rubio-Marín (New
York: Social Sciences Research Council, 2006), pp. 22-23. The reparations programme, however, does not
provide direct government assistance for widows. See generally, Report of the Sierra Leone TRC (2004).
56
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that male spouses should also receive free medical treatment for HIV/AIDS, counselling
and psychosocial support.58
Nothing has been done though to establish better relationships between men and
women.59 Hence the key purpose of this essay is to suggest that the widespread use of
wartime rape and sexual violence calls for urgent action to remedy this situation. For
these purposes, Lederach‘s understanding of reconciliation as a locus – a space or
location – where the parties to a conflict meet, provides an interesting model. In the
specific case of sexual violence as a weapon of war, it can be argued that there are many
parties to the conflict which need to meet: the perpetrator, the woman, her husband and
family, and the community to which the woman belongs. As discussed earlier, rape and
sexual violence are not only used to humiliate the woman, but are deliberately chosen
among other forms of violence for their negative social connotations, with the purpose of
humiliating and destroying the social relationships of an entire group. Reconciliation
should therefore take into consideration all these dynamics and be understood as
providing a context for the healing process to take place at many different levels. Indeed,
reconciliation needs to take place at the individual level, between the victim and the
perpetrator; at the family level, between the victim, the family and husband; and at the
community level, between the victim and the local community which has stigmatised her.
In other words, a closer analysis of women's experiences of conflict suggests that
reconciliation should be understood as the locus where all the parties intended to be
affected by the conflict (whether directly or indirectly) meet, and where all the
dimensions of the conflict are addressed. In so doing, it is suggested that reconciliation
efforts should leave space for, and engage with, community practices. Such mechanisms
are anchored in existing values and relationships, and thus they are likely to receive
broader support60 and possibly be more effective in working towards the elimination of
the stigma attached to victims of sexual violence. Community leaders can play an
58
Ibid.
In the words of Donna Pankhurst, ―there has been virtually no discussion about ‗gender reconciliation‘.
Women are often expected to identify themselves with reconciliation and peace-building interventions [...]
Some of these interventions could be interpreted as being about reconciliation between women and men‖
(pp. 11).
60
IDEA, pp. 17; R. Shaw, ―Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra
Leone‖ (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2005).
59
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important role in promoting the social reintegration of survivors as, for instance, was
done in Burundi where community leaders themselves negotiated with husbands and
fathers to allow wives and daughters back into the household.61
It cannot be over-stressed how important it would be for reconciliation
programmes to include space for men to participate, through the community, in the
process of healing. In so doing, men themselves would have a role in promoting the
public acknowledgement of gender violence – an act which is traditionally discouraged
for women. This is an essential step to achieve reconciliation for gender crimes, and one
which is likely to rebuild more egalitarian gender structures because it should initiate a
process of re-negotiation of gender roles in which both genders can participate.
Safeguards to prevent abusive traditional practices should also be put in place, to avoid
the recurrence of abusive practices – such as reconciliation by means of asking the rapist
to marry the raped woman, or the compensatory exchange of women.
To sum up, I have argued that reconciliation efforts should include consideration
of how to eliminate the shame attached to victims of sexual violence, this might be
achieved by integrating a deeper understanding of rape as a form of conflict into the logic
of re-building relationships between the parties involved in the conflict. If rape
constitutes a form of conflict chosen with the specific intention of affecting not only the
woman but, through her, the wider community, then all these parties then must participate
in the reconciliation process. Indeed, not only should the process aim to reconcile the
rapist with the victim, but also it should aim to restore the relationships pre-existing
between the woman and her family and the woman, her family and her community. At
present, instead, the woman who decides to participate in national justice and
reconciliation programmes must deal with the perpetrators largely unsupported, leaving
her vulnerable to stigma and ostracism by her family, husband and community. It is
incumbent on the international community to find ways to respond to the needs of women
who have endured sexual violence, to offer them a third alternative to the rocky road to
public acknowledgement which is often followed by social stigmatisation, and the
socially-acceptable coping strategy of self-imposed silence.
61
See N. Zicherman, ―Addressing Sexual Violence in Burundi‖, Forced Migration Review vol. 27 (2007).
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3. CONCLUSIONS: HOW WARTIME SEXUAL VIOLENCE MAY RE-DEFINE THE
BOUNDARIES OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
The inclusion of sexual violence in the range of offences which are seen as
constituting an international crime, and grave breaches of the laws of war, has resulted in
significant developments in the substance and practice of international criminal justice.
Perpetrators have been held accountable for raping girls and women during conflicts, and
tribunals have gradually been adapting to the need to protect and support victims of
sexual violence. Although much remains to be done, women‘s experiences of conflict are
now on the international agenda and cannot be neglected by accountability mechanisms.
The formal commitment on behalf of the international community to eliminate sexual
violence in armed conflicts was expressed through Security Council Resolution 1325
(2000), and again through Resolution 1820 (2008).
This paper has highlighted that, notwithstanding the noble intents, women‘s
perspectives are not yet fully included in the discourse and practice of reconciliation
programmes. Social stigma is still the biggest obstacle to achieving gender accountability
and reconciliation - but for reconciliation to be effective and inclusive it needs to be
eliminated. To this end, reconciliation must be re-defined to include and address the
intended negative consequences on women of the use of sexual violence as a weapon of
war. Security Council resolutions provide the grounds for such reinterpretation, and thus
the international community is not only urged but also mandated to address this issue. A
key future challenge for justice and reconciliation programmes, therefore, is to develop a
more holistic understanding of how such violence impacts on women‘s lives and on
gender relations more broadly, and to promote a multi-dimensional understanding of the
harm suffered. At this stage, an analysis is essential of how patriarchal social structures
and gender discrimination interact to further victimise women in post-conflict settings.
This essay has advocated the need to understand women‘s experiences of conflict,
so as to advance an inclusive vision of gender justice and reconciliation in post-conflict
societies. I have shown how this could redefine the scope of international public policies
on transitional justice and move beyond the initial boundaries created by gender-blind
mechanisms. Further, I suggest that, in so doing, future justice and reconciliation efforts
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could be designed with a view to promoting a shift towards gender equality in social and
interpersonal relationships. Essentially, it appears that the transformative potential of
including gender analysis in transitional justice is still largely under-explored.
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THE INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS FOR A UN FOREIGN POLICY
Frederico Bartels Ferreira
ABSTRACT
This article addresses the institutional capabilities of the United Nations to develop its
own foreign policy. Basing the analysis on the works in the field of Foreign Policy
Analysis, the article deals with the apparatus necessary for the organisation to craft its
own policy. Furthermore the article draws parallels between the national institutions and
the institutions of the organisation in order to enlighten the function of the different
branches inside the United Nations. The UN Secretariat is dealt as one important
instrument for the exercise of an independent foreign policy for the institution.
Foreign Policy requires two main elements in its most simplistic definition: i) a foreign
element; and ii) a coherent aggregate of actions. In the absence of these two points there
can be neither a foreign environment nor a policy, therefore derailing what we understand
as foreign policy. During the course of this paper, bear in mind these two initial elements
seen that they ought to be clarified in the stance of the United Nations (UN), with the
goal of demonstrating the organisation‘s capacity for developing its own foreign policy.
In order to achieve this goal this paper will access the implications of adapting the current
literature of Foreign Policy Analysis to an International Organisation, followed by an
exploration of the institutions that permit the UN to develop his own foreign policy. First,
there will be an exploration of the initial concepts in Foreign Policy Analysis, followed
by an assessment of the place in which foreign policy develops comparing a country and
the UN. Further on, the paper will discuss the institutions of the UN and their
implications
for
the
construction
of
an
independent
foreign
policy.
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DEFINING DEFINITIONS
Foreign Policy is usually thought to be related to one country‘s identity and actions in the
international scenario, an assumption that is correct even tough it does not suffice the
phenomenon of foreign policy. The study of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), as
represented by Hudson,62 is entrenched between the domestic and the international levels,
as one could put forward, between International Relations and Political Science. In that
fashion, FPA is designed to access concerns of internal and external nature within a
political society. A useful definition is given by Hill as follows, ―[a] brief definition of
foreign policy can be given as follows: the sum of official external relations conducted by
an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations.‖63 The importance of this
definition for the current work is two-folded, firstly, it already opens up the possibility of
a non-state actor to be the owner of an independent foreign policy, and it also narrows
foreign policy to the official external relations, which can be easily identified. These two
elements will be explored further on for the case of the UN. At this point, it is also
important to bear in mind the definition of foreign policy of Smith, Hadfield and Dunne
as follows, ―For us, foreign policy, although usually linked to the behaviour of a state,
can apply to other actors. Thus it is perfectly possible to speak of companies, regional
governments, and non-state actors having foreign policy.‖64 This definition encompasses
the possibility of expanding the foreign policy concept and, hence, the FPA tools to nonstate actors, which is paramount to this work.
FPA started with the work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin65 which was dedicated to
exposing how the decision-making approach, as described, could contribute to the
understanding of the International Relations as a whole. It is also important to take notice
62
Hudson, V. M. ―Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International
Relations‖.Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 1, no.1 (2005): 1-30.
63
Hill, C. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. (New York: Palgrave Macmilliam, 2003) pp.3
64
Smith, S.; Hadfield, A.; Dunne, T. Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008) pp.2.
65
Snyder, R.C.; Bruck, H.W.; Sapin, B. Foreign Policy Decision-Making. 1962. Revisited by: Hudson,
V.M.; Chollet, D.H.; Goldgeier, J.M. (New York: Palgrave Macmilan, 2002).
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that Hudson66 emphasises the role of personality and of bureaucratic organisation for
foreign policy. In that fashion,
―[t]he single most important contribution of FPA to IR theory is to identify the point of
theoretical intersection between the primary determinants of state behavior: material and
ideational factors. The point of intersection is not the state, it is human decision
makers‖.67
The centrality of human decision makers, as stated, creates the importance of the
institutional arrangements, mainly because humans are constrained by these arrangements
in different social scenarios. Regarding bureaucratic organisations, Checkel68 supports the
idea that the organisation of the institution is important when considering analysis within
the foreign policy approach. Checkel69 puts forward explicitly that thinking in terms of
bureaucratic organisation and its development is correctly positioned in the center of
FPA, concurring with Halperin‘s70 claim of the proximity between bureaucratic
organisation and the development of foreign policy. Hilsman71 also supports the
importance of bureaucracy for the understanding of foreign policy, dedicating the bulk of
his work to the different interactions within departments of the US government and
among those very departments. Hill72 further shows a concern with the role that each
bureaucracy assumes in the decision-making process, taking into account elements as the
intelligence agencies in the process and imperfect information. This bureaucratic concern
is adamant to understand the situation of a UN foreign policy, seen that the UN was a
complex organisational charter that ought to be explored. All in all, bureaucratic concerns
66
Hudson, V. M. ―Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International
Relations‖.Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 1, no.1 (2005): 1-30.
67
Ibid, p.3.
68
Checkel, J. T. ―Constructivism and foreign policy‖. In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, edited by
Smith, S.; Hadfield, A.; Dunne, T., 71-80. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
69
Ibid.
70
Halperin, M. H. Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Policy. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1974).
Hilsman, R. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and
Bureaucratic Politics. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1987.
71
Hilsman, R. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and
Bureaucratic Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1987).
72
Hill, C. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. (New York: Palgrave Macmilliam, 2003)
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as deemed strong enough to shape not only the process of decision-making in foreign
policy, but also the outcome itself. Hilsman73 is a supporter of this point, considering as
well that, the post that one occupies could shape their considerations on a given issue.
Hudson74 explores five elements of FPA in her work which encompass the kind of
research in the field. These elements are: i) individual decision-makers; ii) group
decision-making; iii) culture and identity; iv) domestic politics; and v) the international
system. Each of these elements account for a different perspective on the phenomenon
and can be regarded to be complementary, mainly when one takes into account the
complexities of the reality of a decision-maker. Hudson75 points out that there have been
works that focused one any of the five aspects, nevertheless, the author points out the
importance of addressing all the elements in order to form a more complete picture.
THE LOCUS
Foreign Policy is, by no means, an isolated event that can be analysed outside of its social
context. That is even more important in the case of the UN, seen that the organisation
deals, in principle, with the whole world and ought to consider the planet as a unity. In
the case of countries and nation-states, there is little problem separating the foreigner
from the domestic, even with the current advances of globalisation, one can easily
determine which are the official relations of a given state. Considering that Hill‘s 76
definition of foreign policy only considers the sum of official external relations of an
independent actor, the globalisation does not change that countries usually have few
sources which conduct their official external relations. In this sense, national frontiers and
national bureaucracy still counts a lot towards defining the external and the domestic.
Departments of State, Ministries of Foreign Affairs and their similar represent the
obvious places to search for the official external relations of a country. FPA also
considers different sources for the formation of the official external relations of a given
73
Hilsman, R. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and
Bureaucratic Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1987).
74
Hudson, V. M. Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. (Lanham: Rowan &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2007).
75
Ibid.
76
Hill, C. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. (New York: Palgrave Macmilliam, 2003)
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country. For instance, Hilsman77 believes that one important role of a president is to be
their nation main diplomat, echoing the concept of presidential diplomacy and the
growing importance of foreign relations to the domestic scenario and the president. In
that sense, even if the characters and the post they occupy have different names, the
functions and limitations are the same across state borders. The dispersion of authority on
foreign relations, as takes place in the Unites States, in the relationship between the State
and Defense Departments and the National Security Council, does not melt away the
concentration and location of the official external relations.
The complication arises when we take into consideration an international
organisation which is open to all ‗peace-loving countries, a requirement that barely serves
as a real pre-condition for membership. In the United Nations, each country has the
responsibility to have a representative in the organisation; this representative is a part of
the official external relations of each individual country. In that regard, as Berger and
Luckmann78 would put, there is the formation of specific interaction environment in
which diplomats from different countries are in the same social context. Therefore, those
diplomats develop a common socialisation pattern which encompasses the behaviour and
choices of words that have became characteristic of the United Nations. A great example
is the language of the resolutions that emerged in the United Nations Security Council
that has specific sentences that are part of the social consensus of the organisation.
Another example is the set of rules of procedure of the UN that have spilled out to other
organisations, there is also the ocean of acronyms and abbreviations that requires even
growing lists. Further on, a former Permanent Representative of the United States, stated
that the UN is a place ‗with its own language and time zone, where ‗demand‘ means
‗ask‘, ‗strong‘ means ‗not so strong‘ and ‗severe‘ means ‗not so severe‘ and ‗urges‘
means ‗begs‘‘79. The UN developed, through time and social interaction, a large set of
idiosyncrasies which includes the different rituals of the organisation, as the procedure
for the opening of the annual session of the General Assembly, or the format of every
77
Hilsman, R. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and
Bureaucratic Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1987).
78
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of
Knowledge. (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).
79
Holbrooke apud Fasulo, L. An Insider’s Guide to the UN. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
pp.91.
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resolution of the organisation with the same typology font and spatial organisation. In
that fashion, the bearers of official external discourse of each country mould themselves
and their discourse to the international patterns represented by the UN, forming a culture
on its own. In that sense, Shawn80 explores how the unique culture and sense of
belonging of press corps of the United Nations plays a role in not properly investigating
the oil for food scandal, pointing out that press corps did not played its role in the
democratic societies of seeking accountability from politicians. Further on, Shawn81
explores how economic interests toppled the values in the case of Iraq, demonstrating
how the interaction in the organisation created a culture on its own. Gold82 on the other
hand explores how the United Nations was capable to undermine the situation of the
Israeli representation in the organisation. This example demonstrates how the interaction
among the diplomats inside the UN could form a culture that is even capable of
undermining one country. Tabor83 in his turn explores how the UN culture is out of touch
with national sovereignty and aims at the expansion of its role in the world. Those three
examples serve to cement the idea of a unique culture within the United Nations‘ walls.
This unique culture allows us to determine what would be foreign to the United
Nations community and what would be domestic. In that regard, as put forward by
Walker84, there is the discursive formation of a unique inside and a unique outside,
defined by the practises of the organisation. In that fashion, this work argues that there is
the construction of a domestic scenario for the United Nations in the figure of the
diplomats that work there and share the same discursive instruments. Whereas the foreign
of the United Nations can be thought to be the world outside the walls of the UN
buildings, the world that receives the resolutions of the organisation and where the blue
helmets deploy. In that sense, one could put forward that the United Nations has the
world adapted to its culture when in the confines of its buildings and in the same sense
80
Walker, R.B.J. Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
81
Ibid.
82
Gold, D. Tower of Babble: How the United Nations has Fueled Global Chaos. (New York: Crown
Forum, 2004).
83
Tabor, N. The Beast on the East River: The UN Threat to America’s Sovereignty and Security (Nashville:
Nelson Current, 2006).
84
Walker, R.B.J. Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
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the whole world is foreign to the organisation. This understanding is reinforced by the
common sense that portraits the organisation as an independent actor in many of the news
around the globe. Further on, one has to consider the role of a diplomat that works in the
UN inside their own government. This diplomat does represent a specific political view
inside a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the views of the United Nations and her
bureaucracy, just as the Ambassador to Sri Lanka represents the demands that this
country has towards his or her own country. In this sense, the domestic of the United
Nations can be said to reach the domestic level of every member-state. Nevertheless, the
contact between the UN domestic and a given country‘s domestic scenario is limited to
the participants of that countries mission to the UN and even the other diplomats of the
country are already in the foreign sphere of the organisation. Therefore, there is a limit of
reach in the organisation in the composition of its domestic and foreign spheres and both
spheres are in direct contact with its member-states.
INSTITUTIONALISING THE FOREIGN
The United Nations organisational chart represents the easiest form to have glimpse at the
bureaucratic complexity that is the world body.85 The important element of the
organisational chart is that each and every body that composes the United Nations System
has individual capacity to construct foreign policy. Further more, each of them represent
a part in the sum of official external relations of which Hill86 considers. One can consider
that the capacity of a UN body to affect the sum of official external relations of the
organisation as whole is equivalent to the capacity of any given ministry, with the
exception of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this fashion, every organisation within the
United Nations was the capacity of issuing documents that can be considered to be part of
the official external relations of the UN. Nevertheless, due to the very characteristics of
the United Nations, mainly regarding voting procedures within its bodies, there can be
divergent voices inside the official external relations of the organisation. For instance it is
possible that a specialised body such as the Human Rights Council, emits a resolution
85
86
United Nations Organization. The United Nations System: Principal Organs. (New York: UN,2007),
Hill, C. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. (New York: Palgrave Macmilliam, 2003)
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that is contradictory or even disregard the considerations from the United Nations
Security Council or from the Secretary-General himself. Those contradictions, as one
might call it, are not problematic to the analysis and should be treated as part of a healthy
democratic debate. Furthermore, those contradictions do exist in every country in the
form of debates among the advisors that help shaped parts of the foreign policy. It is as
common as for undersecretaries in the Department of State of the United States of
America to have disagreements amongst themselves as it is among countries. There is no
dividing difference between the debate that takes place in the General Assembly and in
the confines of a national government. One might argue that the organisation is different,
as are the procedures, but this does not disqualify the debate in the international forum as
one that seeks to build a policy for the body. The organisation of a debate does not
disqualify the process, the very process could take place in a non-democratic country and
it would still be a policy-making process. Nonetheless, the duty of harmonising the
internal voices of the United Nations, as it takes place in the government, relies in the
executive, in the case, the Office of the Secretary General and the figure of the Secretary
General, which will be addressed in due moment.
The UN Charter divides the organisation into six main bodies, namely as defined
in article 7, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social
Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat.87
From those bodies, with the exceptions of the Trusteeship Council and the International
Court of Justice, emerge countless organisations which are related to one or more of the
four bodies. One good example of this in the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change which reports to the United Nations Environment Programme, a program
under the General Assembly, and the World Meteorological Organisation, a specialised
agency under the umbrella of the Economic and Social Council. In a way, all the
organisations under the United Nations reports to one or more of the four main bodies
that compose the constellation of the organisation. The organisational chart in itself does
not account to all the bodies that exist under the brand of the UN, nonetheless it gives a
good overview of the size and complexity of the organisation‘s bureaucracy. Even with
87
United Nations Organization. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of
Justice. New York: UNDPI, 2003.
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the size and complexity, all of these bodies ought to be responsive the UN purposes and
values as stated by the UN Charter and the different directives issued by the Secretary
General since ―An Agenda for Peace‖.88 All things considered, the task of maintaining a
coherent foreign policy line for the organisation falls to the Office of the Secretary
General and the Secretary General himself.
SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL
Whether he considers himself as such or not, the Secretary General, similar to the figure
of a President, is the face of the organisation for the world and the general public.
Therefore, the role of granting coherence and unity to the foreign policy falls, in a large
part, on him and the people that work directly for him. The Secretary General has at least
15 organisations, among departments and organs, which are directly connected to his
Office, a number that is comparable to the number of ministries of a country. In that
regard, the head of the UN has at his disposal a number of tools, including a Department
of Public Information that publishes a number of documents, to guarantee that his
message will be the one to be considered the official from the organisation. Furthermore,
one can draw analogies between the organisation of the Office of the Secretary General
and the bureaucratic organisation of a country that can be helpful to elucidating how the
foreign policy apparatus would work in the UN. Three institutions demand special
attention in the organisation of the Office of the Secretary General, which are the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs
(DPA) and the Chiefs Executives Board for Cooperation (CEB).
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is analogous to a Ministry of
Defense in the sense that it is department with the duty of overseeing the military
engagements of the organisation and determining parameters for those, such as the rules
of engagement. Duties close to the one of a Ministry of Defense in the national
bureaucratic scheme. This is not a perfect analogy, but suffices in the arrangement of the
UN due to the construction of a chain of command and the preparation for military
88
United Nations An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping. (UN,
1992)
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action. The lack of proper military force is not enough to dismiss the bureaucratic
functions that the DPKO shares with a national Ministry of Defense, seen that the
bureaucratic part of the process that gives the civilian oversight required. Furthermore,
the DPKO represents in practical terms the main idea of keeping peace and international
security in the world, as stated in the UN Charter, therefore upholding the main goal of
the organisation. In this regard, the organisation puts forward that the ‗(…) UN
peacekeeping goals were primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilising
situations on the ground, so that efforts could be made at the political level to resolve the
conflict by peaceful means‘89. The Department of Political Affairs, on the other hand, is
analogous to the Department of State of the United States of America. The DPA does not
have the same authoritative capabilities of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which normally
tends to concentrate most of the foreign policy related initiatives at large within a
government, but rather the analogous capacity of conducting and guiding diplomacy
across the United Nations system, as takes place in the United States with the Department
of State. The Department itself describes its function as:
The Department of Political Affairs plays a central role in these [preventing deadly
conflicts] efforts: monitoring and assessing global political developments; advising the
U.N. Secretary-General on actions that could advance the cause of peace; providing
support and guidance to U.N. peace envoys and political missions in the field; and
serving Member States directly through electoral assistance and through the support of
DPA staff to the work of the Security Council and other U.N. bodies.90
The most interesting portion is the advisory capability of the DPA, which means that they
have access to the Secretary General, which as Hilsman (1987) would argue, is necessary
for having influence over policy.
89
90
United Nations United Nations Peacekeeping (UN, 2008)
United Nations The Department of Political Affairs. (UN, 2009a),
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The Chief Executives Board is the UN proxy of a presidential cabinet or a
national security council, despite being excluded from the organisational chart. 91 As its
function,
The Chief Executives Board (CEB) furthers coordination and cooperation on a whole
range of substantive and management issues facing United Nations system organisations.
CEB brings together on a regular basis the executive heads of the organisations of the
United Nations system, under the chairmanship of the Secretary General of the United
Nations.92
Therefore, the goal of the CEB is to achieve system-wide coherence, which can be
understood as the unity in the official external relations, guaranteeing a form of control
for the Secretary General to issue the message he deems appropriate for the organisation.
CONCLUSION
Looking beneath the forum-like structure of the United Nations reveals a dense
bureaucratic web capable of, not only, organising meetings, but also of producing foreign
policy on its own capacity. Furthermore, one has to take into consideration that the
Secretary General‘s power of agenda setting, as granted by the UN Charter, is important
for shaping the political process in the organisation. Regardless of the outcome of the
political debate, within any of the three debate-oriented bodies of the UN (General
Assembly, Security Council and Economical and Social Council), the Secretariat has the
capacity of determining goals for the organisation and by publicising them, as in the case
of ―An Agenda for Peace‖. To that extent one can say, with property, that the
organisation has the instruments to forge its own foreign policy. Whether those
capabilities are used, or if they are used properly in accordance with the UN Charter is
not in the goal of this work, the point is to highlight the institutional capabilities for
constructing an independent foreign policy. Capacities that are present strongly in the
91
92
United Nations The United Nations System: Principal Organs. (UN, 2007),
United Nations The Chief Executives Board (CEB). (UN, 2009b),
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Office of the Secretary General and ought to be observed. Furthermore, one important
aspect of the UN that differentiates it from the regular foreign policy construction of the
State-nation is the characterisation of what would be foreign and what would be
domestic. Through this work, it was exposed that the composition of the domestic
scenario on the organisation is largely confined to the walls of the organisation‘s
buildings, whereas the whole world is foreign to the organisation. The extent of the
foreign aspect for the organisation is crucial due to the fact that it allows them to navigate
in any issue they judge to be important. All in all the United Nations is not only capable
of producing its own foreign policy, considering the institutions in place, but is also able
to access a large scope of subjects, having an agenda that can encompass basically any
aspect of human life in society. Additionally, the foreign policy of the United Nations can
bring the international attention to situations that were not of concern before or catapult
those situations to the international media, as it has done with global warming, for
instance.93
REFERENCES
Berger, P. L.; and Luckmann, Thomas. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in
the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor Books, 1966.
Checkel, J. T. ―Constructivism and foreign policy‖. In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors,
Cases, edited by Smith, S.; Hadfield, A.; Dunne, T., 71-80. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008.
Fasulo, L. An Insider’s Guide to the UN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
Gold, D. Tower of Babble: How the United Nations has Fueled Global Chaos. New
York: Crown Forum, 2004.
Halperin, M. H. Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, 1974.
93
Tabor, N. The Beast on the East River: The UN Threat to America’s Sovereignty and Security. Nashville:
Nelson Current, 2006.
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Hill, C. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmilliam,
2003.
Hilsman, R. The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual
Models and Bureaucratic Politics. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1987.
Hudson, V. M. ―Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of
International Relations‖. Foreign Policy Analysis Vol.1, no.1 (2005): 1-30.
Hudson, V. M. Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Lanham:
Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2007.
Shawn, E. The U.N. Exposed: How the United Nations Sabotages America’s Security and
Fails the World. New York: Sentinel, 2006.
Smith, S., Hadfield, A., Dunne, T. Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008.
Snyder, R.C., Bruck, H.W., Sapin, B. Foreign Policy Decision-Making. 1962. Revisited
by: Hudson, V.M., Chollet, D.H., Goldgeier, J.M. New York: Palgrave Macmilan,
2002.
Tabor, N. The Beast on the East River: The UN Threat to America’s Sovereignty and
Security. Nashville: Nelson Current, 2006.
United Nations An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.
New
York:
United
Nations,
1992,
http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html (accessed 15 March 2009).
United Nations Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of
Justice. New York: UNDPI, 2003.
United Nations The United Nations System: Principal Organs. New York: United
Nations, 2007, http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart_en.pdf, (accessed 11 March
2009)
United Nations United Nations Peacekeeping New York: United Nations, 2008.
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp (accessed 15 March 2009).
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Walker, R.B.J. Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
WHY STRAUSSIANISM?
John Hickman
ABSTRACT
This article explores the explanations for Straussianism, the ‘ideology for elites’
articulated by arch-conservative political philosopher Leo Strauss. Why would ambitious
American elites ever embrace an ideology whose founder is tainted by his affiliation with
figures foreign and authoritarian? Although American academia is relatively tolerant of
heterodox ideas, American politics is not. Yet many Straussians have been appointed to
political offices responsible for public policy making. In addition to the pleasures of
textual interpretation, satisfaction in belonging to an intellectual elite, and membership in
an academic-bureaucratic mutual aid network, being a Straussian offers the individual
intellectual license to exercise the loyalty option: fervent demonstrations of loyalty to
current organisational leadership. Unlike the voice or exit options, the loyalty option
offers Straussians the opportunity to rise in the leaderships of well established but
declining organisations.
The ability of avoid or deflect responsibility for poor
performance is at a premium in such organisations.
Straussianism as political philosophy has been explained. There may be little agreement
about the value of the intellectual contributions made by University of Chicago political
philosopher Leo Strauss, but their content presents no more mystery for scholars than
they do interest for the general public. The ‗solution‘ to the problems of modernity
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offered by Strauss and epigones like Allan Bloom and Walter Berns was for intellectual
elites in the United States to reclaim the heritage of an essentialised West which they
conceived as being embodied in the classical Western canon and then work to prevent the
less responsible vulgar masses from succumbing to modernity‘s various isms:
communism, anti-Semitism, secularism and scientism. For the next generation of
Straussians the list of offensively modern ideological challenges to established
institutions grew to include, but is not limited to, multiculturalism, feminism, and
‗radical‘ environmentalism.
What has not been explained is the attraction of Straussianism for the extensive
and influential network of intellectuals identifiable as the Straussians. That attraction is
puzzling because there are other 20th century conservative political philosophers to
choose from, Michael Oakeshott for example, who are less alien to the Anglo-American
political tradition and untainted by any association with the ideas of the Nazi jurist and
political philosopher Carl Schmitt.94 Like Struass, Oakeshott offers a political philosophy
critical of empirical science, which would make him attractive to math-phobic students of
the humanities.95
This is all the more puzzling because today the most prominent
Straussians serve neither as teachers of political philosophy nor in any other capacity in
academia. Instead, many hold appointive positions in government, work as journalists or
occupy places in the peculiar liminal world of the Washington think tank.96 While the
American academy is relatively tolerant of heterodox beliefs, the world beyond its walls
is often less forgiving of commitments to ideas deemed foreign and authoritarian.
Three partial solutions to the puzzle are facially plausible. The first solution is
that the intricacies of textual interpretation – Straussianism is first and foremost a method
of reading texts – provide scholars with pleasure in the same way that some laymen are
fascinated by the intricacies of baseball statistics or bird watching. Irving Kristol, editor
of influential neo-conservative organ The Weekly Standard, describes encountering the
ideas of Leo Strauss as a conversion experience in which the student is privileged to
94
N. Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue. (New York: Routledge, 2008).
P. Franco, The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1990)
96
G. Dorren, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (New York: Routledge,
2004); S. M. Hersh, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (New York: Harper Collins,
2004); J. Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004).
95
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perceive the modern as the ‗ancients‘ would. Along with imagining that they are capable
of channeling the intellectual world of the ancient eastern Mediterranean, the student also
imbibes a heavy dose of anti-empiricism.97
Textual interpretation and disdain for
rigorous empirical analysis that shades into contempt are also features of Straussianism‘s
largely unacknowledged sibling intellectual movement: post-modernism. The flaw in this
first solution is that there are no networks of amateur baseball statisticians, bird watchers
and even post-modern deconstructionists linking government, journalism and academia.
The second solution is that some intellectuals are attracted to Straussianism
because they enjoy its self-conscious and self-defined elitism, in the same way that
Victorian British elites might take satisfaction in belonging to exclusive London
gentlemen‘s clubs like the Traveller‘s Club or East India Club, or in the same way that
cliques of ‗sneaker-heads‘ with collections of expensive limited edition tennis shoes
might take pride in their collections. Part of the satisfaction of being recognised as a
Straussian by fellow Starussians is that the vulgar masses, who ought not to be exposed to
philosophy in any event, cannot gain admission to the magic circle of the like minded.
Like the post-modernists dominant in the English departments of American universities
and colleges, the Straussians disdain communicating the core ideas of their political
philosophy to the masses, not the least because the masses would find it irrelevant,
annoying or distasteful.
That natural science and universal education are primarily
responsible for modern problems is a claim no more acceptable to the majority of
Americans than the post-modern moral relativism that everything is text. Unlike the
post-modernists, however, the Straussians are interested in what the masses think, or
more importantly, might be persuaded to think. Philosophical understanding should not
be disclosed to the masses lest it undermine the political order that makes the life of the
philosopher and philosophic inquiry possible. Instead, it could and perhaps should be
used to shape political events, if at a safe remove. The conviction that the masses must
not be instructed in the philosophic insights is of course a rather silly conceit. Even when
Strauss first began communicating his ‗dangerous truths‘ to his students, there were
already far too many competing philosophies, ideologies and theologies for any one of
them to undermine the political order by enlightening the masses. That Straussianism
97
I. Kristol, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea. (New York: The Free Press, 1995).
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was capable of doing serious damage to public trust in government as an ‗ideology of
elites‘ is both evident from the disastrous record of the second Bush administration and
something Leo Strauss failed to caution against.
The third solution is that the Straussians are members of a mutual-aid network.
Halper and Clarke note that the network of political associations emanating from the
University of Chicago in the 1970s present a framework of interrelated biographies for
many of those considered to be among the rank and file of today‘s neo-conservatives.‘98
That Straussians club together is no secret. However they do more than merely socialise.
In university philosophy and political science departments, the Straussians propagate
themselves and their creed by directing the resources of the departments they enter,
particularly when making hiring decisions, and encouraging a focus on the personalities,
methods and issues that other Straussians deem important. Such attention is good for
Straussian academic careers, especially the careers of figures who would otherwise find
the competitive work of getting published in peer reviewed journals too daunting.
Straussians appointed to high public office use their own powers of appointment and
recommendation to help the careers of fellow Straussians rise in political prominence.
Straussians working as journalists in news sources or biding their time in think tanks
engage in similar behaviors. In many respects, the Straussian network operates in much
the same manner as an ethnic niche. Opportunities for advancement are effectively
hoarded for members of the network. That so many of the leading lights among the
Straussians are identifiable as members of American white ethnic groups—Eastern
European Jews and Irish or Italian Roman Catholics—reinforces the impression that their
universalistic moralising conceals a rather ordinary parochialism and individual ambition.
The impression left is of individuals whose immigrant parents or grandparents suffered
social discrimination in pre-war America and now feel compelled to thunder their
gratitude at having been allowed into the once prohibited halls of power and privilege by
denouncing members of other, non-white ethnic minority groups who are still outside and
demanding admission without having ‗paid their dues‘. Heilbrunn, for example, notes
98
S. Halper and J. Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp. 67.
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that Cornell became an academic hotbed of Struassianism because of what some white
faculty perceived as the thuggish politics of the Afro-American Society.99
That gratitude may be tinged with a measure of guilt. Some neoconservatives are
former Trotskyists or their offspring who marched had ideologically from anti-Stalinism
to liberal anti-communism and then onward to neo-conservatism.100 As many Cold War
defectors learned, confessing one‘s guilt and asking for forgiveness offers political
opportunity. Repudiation of their former leftist political identities is an unending process
for some neoconservatives, because it serves as a vehicle to claim special authority on the
subject of political tyranny.
A fourth and more complete answer is that Straussianism is attractive to its
adherents less as a philosophy for the reflective individual than as an ideology suited to
the operation of a network of ambitious elites, whose members seek to rise within the
leaderships of well established institutions.
Straussians occur more frequently in
organisations that have reached at their zenith or that have begun to decline, rather than in
organisations are still being constructed. Their textual analysis skills make them better
suited to the climb up the hierarchies of venerable organisations than younger
organisations where innovation is more in demand. There is more to this fourth argument
but before elaborating it two challenges merit response.
The argument that Straussianism is an ‗ideology for elites‘ rather than a
philosophy may be challenged because it is not addressed to the masses, a characteristic
common to modern ideologies. The problem with that challenge is that the alternative
conclusion that it is a philosophy is even weaker. Ideologies are widely understood to
offer an analysis of present conditions, a vision of better future conditions, and a plan for
achieving such future conditions.
During the 20th century, notes Richard Ashcraft,
political philosophy became identified with abstract discussions of ‗timeless truths‘ and
‗perennial questions‘ in opposition to its deployment as political ideology, ‗as a weapon
or guide to practical action in the hands of a political group, party or class‘.101 Strauss
99
J. Heilbrunn ―The Neoconservative Journey,‖ in P. Berkowitz, ed., Varieties of Conservatism in America.
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 119
100
H. Wolford The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2008)
101
Richard Ashcraft, ―Political Theory and the Problem of Ideology.‖ The Journal of Politics. Vol. 42 no.
3. (1980), pp. 687-705, 602.
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was among those leading the condemnation of the use of political philosophy as ideology.
Yet that condemnation may be understood as an exercise in taqiya, or dissimulation in the
presence of threatening power. In fact, Straussianism is simple rather than profound and
encourages action rather than inaction, both of which are conventionally understood as
characteristics of an ideology. Familiar conservative criticisms of the Enlightenment
philosophy and of the negative social effects of modernity based on analyses of the
Western classics and the American founding texts that comprise the parochial Straussian
canon fail to make it profound. That Straussians covertly instruct one another in the art
of advancing their careers by whispering advice in the ears of more powerful elites is
hardly the withdrawal into contemplation that marks the traditional philosopher. For Leo
Strauss the public duty of the philosopher was to speak in a manner likely to, ‗move the
city according to a standard existing outside the city, known to the philosopher and
unknown to its citizens, but to do so in a way that seems in accord with the conventions
of the city‘102. In effect, the responsibility of the philosopher is to act in much the same
manner as a bureaucratic political appointee seeking to make public policy or a foreign
intelligence officer seeking to influence elite or mass opinion in a target country.
Straussianism thus offers elites in well established organisations the sanction they need to
act together in a covert and undemocratic manner to achieve their political goals.
Another likely challenge to the argument that Straussianism is an ideology for
elites is that when Straussians choose to descend from the realm of philosophy to the
realm of the political they simply become neo-conservatives. In effect, Straussianism is a
philosophy while neo-conservatism is an ideology. That counter-argument would be
stronger if prominent neo-conservatives did not reject the characterisation of neoconservatism as an ideology. Neo-conservatism, from their perspective, emerged because
like minded thinkers shared similar opinions about major public policy issues. According
to Irving Kristol, neo-conservatism is not a political movement but instead merely a
political ‗persuasion‘ recognised only post hoc.103
Just as Strauss insisted on his
distinction between philosophy and ideology, Kristol insists on his distinction because the
word ‗movement‘ suggests the sort of modernity that neo-conservatives are in the
102
N. Xenos, Cloaked in Virtue. (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 27.
I. Kristol. ―The Neoconservative Persuasion: What it was and what it is.‖ The Weekly Standard. Vol.
1008 no. 47 (August 25th, 2003).
103
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business of bemoaning. The self-described ‗godfather‘ of the ‗persuasion‘ begins his
attempt at a definition by describing its distinctly American temperament. Americans are
cheerful and optimistic, he explains, and so too is neo-conservatism. This is contrasted
with the dourness and pessimism of the Europeans and other varieties of conservatism.
Kristol thus acts as a proper Straussian ought by appealing to the citizens, ‗in accord with
the conventions of the city‘. One of those conventions is that Americans think of
themselves as an optimistic people imbued with a ‗can-do‘ spirit. Beyond the absurdity
of such essentialist reductions of American and European character, it is worth noting
that Kristol makes comparison only to Europe. Straussians are dyed in the wool Eurocentrists and as a consequence typically make comparisons only to ideas and events
across the Atlantic.
Kristol goes on to admit in his essay that neo-conservative domestic policy
preferences are essentially those of other American conservatives. They oppose
government social welfare spending, support tax cuts, endorse government censorship of
pornography, and are suspicious of the separation of church and state. With the eclipse of
the paleo-conservatives, the neo-conservative foreign policy preferences identified by
Kristol are now effectively identical to the conservative movement. Massive military
spending, uninhibited military patriotism and uncritical Zionism are all basic elements.104
This is simply a collection of policy preferences and little different from that held by
other conservatives, it is reasonable to see neo-conservatism not as an ideology but as the
public mask worn by the underlying ideology: Straussianism.
Why would Straussianism appeal to elites? The ideas of another, more pragmatic
political philosopher who embraced rather than rejected modernity, Albert O. Hirschman,
suggest an answer. In his 1970 essay Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Hirschman laid out the
possible options of those involved with large organisations that were encountering
challenges and failing to meet expectations, which is to say, nearly all large
organisations.105 Faced with poor performance, the employees and customers of firms,
the members of interest groups or political parties, and the citizens of nation-states can
104
R. Swansborough. Test by Fire: The War Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008).
105
A. O. Hirschman. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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choose to leave the organisation for an alternative, give voice to their unhappiness about
the organisation, or express more fervent loyalty to the organisation. The loyalty option
is more likely to be selected, according to Hirschman, where the entry barriers to an
organisation such as initiation rites are high.106 Penalties for exercising the voice or exit
options tend to be high. Political appointees and public intellectuals have typically paid
high prices to achieve their statuses. They must survive the rigors of competition for
places in their formal organisations and, if they are Straussians, also serve in the informal
coteries of more senior Straussians. To exercise the voice option by protesting in place or
resigning in protest would be too costly. Membership in a Straussian network results in
dependence on the network of employment and access to platforms from which to speak
if formal positions in government are lost due to alternation in the party in power, that
moment when a new administration brings with it a different cadre of political officials.
Exercising the loyalty option is also likely because it serves the ambitious in large
organisations that are performing poorly, which is a good general description of the
second Bush administration.
Consider the career of John P. Walters, a political appointee described as an
‗admirer‘ of Leo Strauss by the Economist.107 Although not trained as a physician,
biomedical researcher or law enforcement officer, Walters was appointed as the second
Bush administration‘s Director of National Drug Control Policy or ‗Drug Czar‘. His
qualifications for that position included having been appointed as chief of drug
interdiction under first Bush administration drug czar William Bennett, and of earning a
reputation for ‗talking tough‘ about crime while outside government during the Clinton
administration.
Before his stint as drug tsar, Walters was best known for having
coauthored a book with William Bennett and John J. Dilulio, Body Count: Moral Poverty
and How to Win America’s War Against Crime and Drugs, that predicted the rise of
young urban ‗superpredators‘ destined to terrorise America.108 The authors did not need
to state that these menaces to society were African-American or Hispanic because that
was implicit in the message. Decoding the charged imagery was not difficult. The
106
Ibid. pp. 92-98
―Philosophers and Kings.‖ The Economist. Vol. 367, no. 8329. (June 21st, 2003): p. 29.
108
W. Bennett, J. J. Dilulio and J. P. Walters. Body Count: Moral Poverty and How to Win America’s War
Against Crime and Drugs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) pp. 26-34.
107
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book‘s central policy recommendation was that the United States must overcome the
‗moral poverty‘ that they claimed was the cause of crime by ‗restoring‘ religion in
American life. For the authors to have noted that Americans already presented markedly
higher rates of religiosity, as measured by claimed church attendance in cross national
surveys, than the citizens of most of the other advanced industrial societies, would have
detracted from a rhetorical point pleasing to social conservatives. The anticipated waves
of superpredators failed to materialise but did not prevent Walters from being appointed
drug tsar.
As Drug Czar, Walters was unwavering in his assertion that the government was
winning the drug war. Rather than answer the criticism that the legal prohibition has
caused much of the social harm associated with drug use, he was content to insist that
drugs such as marijuana were harmful to users and that prohibition was necessary to
authorise the state to act on their behalf.109 Walters also exaggerated specific drug threats
in an effort to elicit public support for prohibition. In 2008 his office issued press
releases warning of a ‗dangerous new drug threat coming from Canada‘ that Walters
tagged as ‗Extreme Ecstasy‘.110 Rather than being a new drug, the substance actually
combined the chemically similar methamphetemine and Ecstasy. Although the press
reported the announcement, it did not spark much public concern. Walters‘ moral panic
may have failed to launch because the source of the drug was insufficiently threatening.
Successful moral panics about drugs in American history have been fueled by anxiety
about exotic racial or ethnic minorities perceived as outside the moral community.111
Canadians do not fit that description even when laboring in drug labs.
Although its anti-empiricism operates as an intellectual prophylactic to
understanding the economic, scientific and technical bases for entire realms of public
policy making, the textual interpretation skills taught by the Straussians are useful for
adherents because the management of powerful organisations in decline is one of
manipulating meaning to minimise responsibility for decisions incompetently made and
109
J. P. Walters ―No Surrender.‖ National Review. Vol. 56, no. 18 (September 27th, 2004) pp. 41-42.
Office of National Drug Control Policy Press Release ―Canadian-Made, Meth-Laced Ecstasy Being
Dumped into U.S. Illegal Drug Markets.‖ January 3rd, 2008.
111
Nachman Ben-Yehuda. ―The Sociology of Moral Panics: Toward a New Synthesis.‖ The Sociological
Quarterly Vol. 27, no. 4 (1986) pp. 495-513; D. Streatfield. Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography. (New
York: Picador, 2001) pp. 138-173.
110
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executed. There is a premium on organisational leadership that successfully avoids or
shifts blame for poor performance rather than innovating when large organisations begin
to fail. Consider the work of Douglas Feith, who was appointed the Director of Policy
Planning in the Department of Defense under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. To
explain why his office had proposed rebranding the ‗Global War on Terrorism‘ or GWOT
as the ‗Global Struggle against Violent Extremism‘ or GSAVE in early 2005, he stated
that ‗terminology is what drives people what people think about this subject…If its called
the war on terrorism, they think differently about it then if it‘s called a struggle against
violent extremism‘.112
After leaving office he defended his role in planning the
disastrous post-war occupation of Iraq during an April 8, 2008 interview on National
Public Radio.113 Asked about the criticisms of his role in the planning process levelled in
other reports, Feith countered by dismissing them as narratives, ‗that came out of the top
levels of the State Department‘. For those trained in textual interpretation, one narrative
interpretation is no better than another. When pressed to name who was responsible for
the Iraq occupation debacle, Feith attempted to escape by spreading responsibility to the
entire U.S. government:
‗I mean, I can give you a captain-of-the-ship type answer, where you say,
well, the president is in charge or the secretary of defense is in charge or
the national security advisor is in charge. I mean, ultimately, when you're
talking about political responsibility in the government, the top people are
in charge. That's - but I don't think that was what your question was. I
thought your question was where did the decision making process actually
break down? And as I said, I only saw my window‘114
Note that the Straussians begin to emerge in their neo-conservative guise as
important decision-makers only after the Cold War battles of the 1960s and 1960s had
already been waged and become dominant only after the defeat of the Soviet Union.
112
B. Graham. By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld.
(New York: Public Affairs, 2009): pp. 547-548.
113
S. Inskeep. ―Feith Regrets Not Pushing ‗Law and Order‘ in Iraq.‖ National Public Radio, Morning
Edition. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89429658 (April 8th, 2008).
114
Ibid.
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During the 1950s and 1960s, American foreign policy was in the hands of Cold War
liberal Democrats or moderate Republicans. The Straussians crop up in positions of
power during the Nixon and Ford administrations and re-appear in even larger numbers
during the Reagan administration, a moment when international communism Soviet style
had lost its appeal as a model. Nor were their other chosen ideological enemies strong
when they began to expand their influence in the 1970s. Anti-Semitism was just an ugly
memory everywhere but the Middle East and a few pockets of atavistic nationalism in
Eastern Europe. Support for Israel has been rock solid in the United States since the
Johnson administration. With these enemies vanquished, the Straussians went hunting
for domestic monsters to slay and joined the assault of the religious Right on
multiculturalism, feminism, secularism and scientism. However it was the events of
September 11th, 2001 that reinvigorated the Straussians by giving them a worthy
international ideological enemy: Islamism.
Here the comparison between Straussianism and Islamism is useful.
Peter
Demant describes Islamism as, ‗a reaction against modernity produced by modernity,
during modern times, using modern means, and irreversibly partaking of modernity‘.115
That description also fits Straussianism. Like the Islamists, Straussians see themselves
not as establishing a new order but as restoring an older and better order. If they seek a
less radical transformation of the existing order, they do so from within the engine of
modernity rather than outside it. The Straussian mission is to give conservative purpose
to the immense power over nature created by modernity. Here the analogy between the
Straussians and the Islamists crumbles. Where the Straussians seek to exercise power
over mass publics who know they benefit, and benefit handsomely, from modernity, the
Islamists seek to exercise power over mass publics who do not know they benefit, and
have not benefited handsomely, from modernity.
The obvious historical analogy to the Straussians is to the education in the
Classics among Victorian era British elites, which sought inspiration for the brutal
business of maintaining an empire from the Roman example.116 Classical education has
115
P. R. Demant Islam vs. Islamism: The Dilemma of the Muslim World (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006),
pp. 181.
116
F. Campbell ―Latin and the Elite Tradition in Education.‖ The British Journal of Sociology. Vol. 19,
no. 3 (1968) pp. 311-313.
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long been a salient feature of the amateur tradition among senior civil servants in Britain.
Latin provided not only a means for distinguishing elites from masses but some of the
Classics provided philosophic justification for government decisions recognisable as
morally repugnant to the uninitiated. This is reinforced by what Norton has described as
the distorted, positive image of British imperialism common among neo-conservatives.117
Barnett condemns the Arnoldian emphasis on the Classics and the certainties of
Evangelical Christianity in the British elite education for undermining the pragmatism
that had made Britain the greatest power of its time. The result was an elite incapable of
adapting to international challenge in the Twentieth century.
‗In an epoch that required in men the itch to develop, create and exploit,
school had fostered (especially in its prefects) a habit of routine
administration-cautious ‗responsibility‘ rather than the taking of risk.
Where continued British success and survival depended on innovation and
open-mindedness, school admired conservatism and conformism—loyalty
to what existed‘.118
Perhaps the best historical analogy is to the Neo-Confucian literati of late Qing
dynasty China.119 Like contemporary Straussians, the humanist intellectuals who ruled
the 19th century Chinese Empire were masters of textual analysis, albeit of a different
Classical canon.
Chinese intellectuals were granted authority as Mandarins by
demonstrating their mastery of the Confucian canon in competitive examinations
requiring interpretation. They too inherited rather than constructed a powerful state—
from the once dynamic Jurchen cum Manchus who established the Qing dynasty—and
made it their business to preserve the empire by protecting what they perceived as the
best in its cultural traditions and social institutions. The Neo-Confucian literati failed
China, though not their own careers however, by their inability to sponsor lasting
117
A. Norton Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2004 ) pp. 129-130.
118
C. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power. (Atlantic, NJ: Humanities Press, 1986) pp. 37.
119
M. Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 18621874 ( Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1957) pp. 69-70.
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technological industrial innovation. Like contemporary Straussians, they held empirical
science and engineering in contempt as lesser forms of intellectual endeavor unworthy of
gentlemen. Very large, very powerful organisations sometimes take a very long time to
collapse and ambitious elites may achieve professional success by climbing to the top of
decaying organisations. The Qing dynasty would survive the rebellions of the 19 th
century before finally collapsing in 1911 due to the incompetence and corruption of its
rulers and aggression by more modern foreign powers. Until the regime‘s collapse, the
loyalty option remained the most rational choice for the ambitious Chinese elites.
Straussianism has attracted ambitious American elites for precisely the same reasons.
REFERENCES
Ashcraft, R. ―Political Theory and the Problem of Ideology.‖ The Journal of Politics.
Vol. 42, no. 3. (1980): pp. 687-705.
Barnett, C. The Collapse of British Power. Atlantic, NJ: Humanities Press, 1986.
Ben-Yehuda, N. ―The Sociology of Moral Panics: Toward a New Synthesis‖ The
Sociological Quarterly. Vol. 27, no. 4 (1986): pp. 495-513.
Bennett, W., Dilulio, J.J. and Walters, J.P. Body Count: Moral Poverty and How to Win
America’s War Against Crime and Drugs. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
Campbell, F. ―Latin and the Elite Tradition in Education.‖ The British Journal of
Sociology. Vol. 19, no. 3 (1968): pp. 308-325.
Clabaugh Wright, M.
The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih
Restoration, 1862-1874. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1957.
Demant, P. R., Islam vs. Islamism: The Dilemma of the Muslim World. Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2006.
Doren, G. Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana. New York:
Routledge, 2004.
Economist, The ―Philosophers and Kings.‖ The Economist. vol. 367, no. 8329 (June 21st,
2003): pp. 29.
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Franco, P. The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1990.
Graham, B. By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of
Donald Rumsfeld. New York: Public Affairs, 2009: pp. 547-548.
Halper, S. and Clarke, J.. America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Heilbrunn, J. ―The Neoconservative Journey,‖ In Varieties of Conservatism in America,
edited by P. Berkowitz, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 105128.
Hersh, S. M., Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. New York:
Harper Collins, 2004.
Hirschman, A. O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
Inskeep, S. ―Feith Regrets Not Pushing ‗Law and Order‘ in Iraq.‖ National Public Radio,
Morning
Edition.
(April
8th,
2008).
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89429658 Accessed April
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Kristol, I. Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea. New York: The Free Press,
1995.
Kristol, I. ―The Neoconservative Persuasion: What it was and what it is.‖ TheWeekly
Standard. vol. 1008, no. 47 (August 25th, 2003).
Mann, J. The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. New York:
Viking, 2004.
Norton, A. Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2004.
Office of National Drug Control Policy Press Release: ―Canadian-Made, Meth-Laced
Ecstasy Being Dumped into U.S. Illegal Drug Markets‖ January 3 rd, 2008.
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press08/010308.htnm Accessed July 30th,
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Streatfield, D. Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography. New York: Picador, 2001.
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Swansborough, R. Test by Fire: The War Presidency of George W. Bush. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
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Xenos, N. Cloaked in Virtue. New York: Routledge, 2008.
PUBLIC ETHICS CASE STUDY: THE CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF GOLDMAN SACHS
Jacob Kloeveroed Griffiths
INTRODUCTION
In 2008 Goldman Sachs received $10bn of US taxpayer‘s money, and at the same time
the bank admitted that it had a bonus pot of $2.6bn for its executives.120 Though the
concern in this case study is not pay equity, it is important to establish whether the
employees at Goldman Sachs can legitimately claim their excessive remuneration in
these circumstances. The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether the bank has
a moral responsibility to other stakeholders, especially in the light of the burdens which
the recession is putting on the rest of society. The theoretical starting point is Friedman‘s
notion that the only responsibility of business is profit maximisation.121 This idea has
formed the basis for a free market regulation paradigm in neoclassical economics and has
indeed formed the basis of the politics that has governed globalisation since the 1980s.
This system appears to have failed in the financial sector.
120
J. Robinson, J. Treanor, ―Anger over £6.4bn bonus bonanza at four City banks‖, The Observer,
November 1st, 2009,
121
M. Friedman ―The Social Responsibility of Business to increase its Profits‖, in T.L. Beauchamp and
N.E. Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001).
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The essay will argue that the scope of Friedman‘s business ethics is too narrow. As the
impact of banks on society is so significant, the range of concerns they need to address is
wider than Friedman assumes. Firstly, it will be shown that both theoretically and
practically Friedman and the stockholder thesis does not hold, as it does not adequately
incorporate externalities and wrongly assumes perfect competition as well as conflicting
with virtue ethics. Secondly, the stakeholder thesis will be discussed. While taking a
broader approach, this alternative theory could potentially damage private property rights
and will be found to be unclear. Thirdly, an attempt will be made to incorporate both
private property rights with a wider notion of ethics. The syntheses will be made using
Kantian ethics. This will also demonstrate the limitations in Friedman‘s work, but allow
his concerns for profits to be preserved. However, before the main argument can be
advanced, Friedman‘s concequentialist position will be outlined with an argument
legitimising high remuneration based on freedom. The essay is philosophically
committed to disputing Friedman‘s position, but also examines practical economic
arrangement in society. It is an investigation into Goldman Sachs's moral responsibility,
though it must be viewed in the context of a critique of neoclassical economics in the
finance crisis of 2008 and public ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
generally.
AN OUTLINE OF FRIEDMAN’S ARGUMENT REGARDING TO REMUNERATION
Friedman‘s main argument is that business ethics is solely a relationship between
managers and owners. However, popular interpretations of Friedman suggest that his
theory is devoid of ethical considerations. These readings reflect a misconception of what
Friedman actually says.122 Although he argues the only moral obligation of managers is
profit maximisation for owners, he does not condone all behaviour that increases
financial returns. Quite explicitly, he places four restrictions on profit seeking: business
people must obey the law, follow ethical customs, commit no deception or fraud, and
engage in open and free competition.123 For Friedman, social responsibility means
122
J. Harvey, ―Smith, Friedman, and Self-Interest in Ethical Society‖, Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 10,
no. 3. (2000)
123
Ibid.
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pursuing one's interests without interfering with the legally protected freedom of others.
In Baron‘s framework of a three way approach to ethics: concequentialist, virtue and
Kantian, Friedman should be considered a concequentialist because he believes that by
limiting the responsibility of companies the consequence will be a free society124.
Though the different natures of the approaches mean they cannot automatically be
contrasted, from a virtue ethics position Friedman undermines the inner characteristic of
human morality and also from a Kantian perspective it is problematic to justify a policy
on the basis that it is morally obligatory because it produces the best outcomes, it is
principles that count.125 Paradoxically though, Friedman advocates a free society as the
highest principle, whereas in Kantian ethics there could be potential conflicting
principles, for instance if the maintaining of a free society required the killing of an
opponent of it. The principles of a free society and principle of everyone‘s freedom to
live would contradict, so Kantian ethics could be criticised because it prescribes no
concrete action to get a free society. However, the point of Kantian ethics is that it is
concerned with obligatory ends, not obligatory actions.126 On the contrary, Friedman
strongly adheres to act-consequentialism; the act of not enforcing more regulation will
result in a free society. This sentiment forms the basis for his views on business ethics
and ultimately remuneration.
His belief in freedom and the responsibility of business being to increase its profits
closely resembles, though slightly incorrectly, the interpretation of Smith‘s notion of the
invisible hand. This maintains that market participants, in pursuit of their self-interests,
unknowingly benefit society. Thus the market is a mechanism which regulates itself to
produce the best outcome. Businesses should freely do whatever improves their financial
position, even though others could be harmed.127 Thereby limited regulation of
remuneration is automatically controlled by the market. If enough customers at Goldman
Sachs object to high bonuses, an alternative would be provided and they could choose
124
M. Baron, P. Pettit, M. Slote, Three Methods if Ethics. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007)
Ibid.
126
Ibid.
127
J. Harvey, ―Smith, Friedman, and Self-Interest in Ethical Society‖, Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 10,
no. 3. (2000)
125
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another bank. Friedman is advancing that the public good is optimised through
individuals pursuing self-interest in a free market.
This raises two questions. Firstly, whether the free market does benefit everyone?
Friedman‘s answer would be utilitarian, claiming that most people will benefit. 128 The
second contestation is whether self-interest is an adequate basis for morality? For Smith
and Friedman profit maximising behaviour is not inconsistent with normal ethical
values.129 The invisible hand justifies this position. However, for Bowie, concern for
one's self-interest is the very heart of behaviour that conflicts with public ethics.130 When
self-interest is narrowly interpreted to mean selfishness that is the case. Though,
Friedman does not use the concept of self-interest in this narrow sense. For Smith the
overriding principle governing his interpretation of self-interest is justice, while for
Friedman the principle is freedom. For both writers, self-interest embodies anotherregarding aspect that requires individuals to moderate their actions when others are
adversely affected.131 It is this concept of self-interest that Friedman advocates.
As the basis for Friedman‘s morality is freedom, it allows individuals to pursue their selfinterest. He believes that a free market is the best system to effectively coordinate people
without denying them this freedom. The basic problem of social organisation, explains
Friedman, is how to coordinate the economic activities of large numbers of people. 132 He
advocates market mechanisms characterised by voluntary exchanges between
individuals. Central planning necessarily involves some degree of coercion by the state.
For Friedman regulation is inefficient and immoral, it means everyone loses as there
would be less profit in society. MacPherson rejects the argument that political freedom
requires capitalism133. However, this misses the main point i.e. the state is to be feared
128
N. Barry, The morality of Business Enterprise. (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991)
Ibid.
130
T.L. Beauchamp, N.E. Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001)
131
J. Harvey, ―Smith, Friedman, and Self-Interest in Ethical Society‖, Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 10,
no. 3. (2000)
132
M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962)
133
C. MacPherson, ―Elegant Tombstones: A Note on Friedman's Freedom‖, Canadian Journal of Political
Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 1, no. 1. (1968)
129
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because it represents a concentration of power to which there is no alternative134. The
only positive duty of the bank is to act in the best interests of shareholders. At the same
time this duty is constrained by negative duties not to cheat, injure, or lie to all
stakeholders. In this way the optimal social coordination can be achieved.
From the forgoing analysis of Friedman's view of freedom, his position on CSR can be
derived. Since actions that impose involuntary harm on others are unacceptable, the
bank‘s actions must be examined in the context of whether they are voluntary and
compatible with the freedom of those affected by their decisions. Friedman says that a
social responsibility other than to generate as much profit as possible for business owners
is a highly ―subversive doctrine‖.135 Bankers have a direct responsibility to conduct
business in accordance with their desires, which will be to make as much money as
possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society. Furthermore, they have no
moral obligation to indulge in any philanthropic activity to help other victims of the
credit crisis. They lack the expertise to find the best way to help others. So, Friedman has
both teleological and deontological reasons for advancing the thesis that bank executives
should pursue only profit, and stay away from actions that purport to promote society's
interests.136 On teleological grounds, he argues that it may not be possible for bankers to
know what constitutes society's interests. On deontological grounds, Friedman believes
that the bank‘s actions, justified as socially responsible, violate specific duties of those
pursuing the actions. For example, unless Goldman Sachs obtains the consent of those
affected, they violate the duty not to coerce others. If bank executives do not act in the
interest of their employer, then they are coercing them into financing a project that the
owners might not want. The executive would be spending someone else's money for a
general social interest. Business people who claim they have an obligation to desirable
social ends are unwittingly puppets of intellectual forces that have been undermining the
134
R. Crowley, ―A Comment on Professor Macpherson's Interpretation of Friedman's ‗Capitalism and
Freedom‘‖, Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 2, no. 2.
(1969)
135
M. Friedman, ―The Social Responsibility of Business to increase its Profits‖, in T.L. Beauchamp, N.E.
Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001), pp. 401
136
J. Harvey, ―Smith, Friedman, and Self-Interest in Ethical Society‖, Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 10,
no. 3. (2000)
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basis for a free society.137 Thus, the setting of wages is a decision for shareholders, and
any other‘s involvement is a violation of their property rights.
Friedman‘s free market view of CSR legitimates high wages if they are the result of a
free exchange. The owners of the bank have a right to decide the amount of
remuneration. The reason for this is that in a free society an executive is an employee of
the owners of the business. Distorting this relationship is damaging and immoral, because
it results in lower profits. The price setting mechanism of the free market determines the
price someone gets for their labour. Walzer argues that there are problems with allowing
markets to dictate wages because of the inequity of power within the market138. However,
arguably even from a Friedmanite position the bonuses at Goldman Sachs are not
justified. As its market value has been halved, employees appear not to have maximised
profits.139 Though, ultimately this is a decision for bank investors to evaluate.
Walzer identifies the marketplace as a sphere of justice. Within a certain sphere of justice
certain rules apply140. Similarly, Marx claimed that it was nonsensical to criticise
capitalism for being unjust because justice was itself a capitalist term.141 The mode of
production creates its own moral rules. Thus, an actor in the market knows the
mechanism and is entitled to what he gets, but that does not necessarily correspond to
any other evaluation of how significant the job is, as demonstrated by Nozick‘s
Chamberlain argument. So, in a market system, our remuneration or the price of our
labour is our desert. Walzer argues this is to misunderstand the concept of desert, indeed
timing and luck are decisive, and business is a chancy business. 142 The remuneration of
bank managers can therefore be justified by its free market context. The bonuses are
gained in a free market. As Locke argued, labour itself creates the foundation for
property rights143. So when accepting the premises of a capitalist economy, as Friedman
does, bank managers can legitimately claim their remuneration.
137
M. Friedman, ―The Social Responsibility of Business to increase its Profits‖, in T.L. Beauchamp, N.E.
Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001)
138
M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1983)
139
S. Duke, ―Goldman Sachs ready to hand out £7bn salary and bonus package‖, The Daily Mail, 30th
October, 2008.
140
M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1983)
141
K. Marx, Capital. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
142
M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1983)
143
J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government. (Indianapolis: Hacket, 1980)
61
1.
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CRITIQUE OF THE STOCKHOLDER THESIS
Friedman is defining a very limited circumstance for applying morality to business
decisions. His business ethics state that the shareholder‘s interests are superior to other
considerations. There appears to be problems with this neoclassical view. Neither the
bank‘s managers nor owners have any obligation to take responsibility for anything other
than running a profitable bank. However, banks rely on investors which are technically
everyone who holds an account with them, though some investors are more significant
than others. Goldman Sachs has also been bailed out with taxpayer funds due to their
important role. This raises problems with Friedman‘s argument. Using tax payers‘ money
seems to imply a collective ownership, though technically the state is not an owner.
Nonetheless, the system Friedman has advocated seems to have failed. There appears to
be wider accountability for firm‘s actions than just to stockholders. Friedman does not
only assume the opposite, but maintains that accountability is sustained through selfregulation in the market.144 His theory is strongly grounded in a neoclassical framework
of economic belief. Central to this are the concepts of externalities, perfect completion
and an overarching assumption of market self-regulation and, finally, arrangements
relating to the role of management. The aforementioned concepts will now be discussed.
Firstly, Friedman dismisses other parties that do not fit into his framework as
externalities. An externality says Friedman, is the effect of a transaction on a third party
who has not consented to or played any role in the carrying out of that transaction.145
Accordingly, he acknowledges that some restrictions on our freedom are necessary to
avoid other, still worse, restrictions.146 However, control of wages would not count as
such a condition. So when taxpayer‘s money is used to pay for bonuses instead of, for
instance cheaper loans, it is justified by the fact that the democratic US government
technically does not own Goldman Sachs and the bank is best suited to running itself.
Friedman distinguishes between harm caused by external effects, which he opposes, and
the personal consequences of decisions individuals make when they freely enter into
144
T.L. Beauchamp, N.E. Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001)
J. Bakan, The Corporation (London: Constable, 2004)
146
M. Friedman, ―The Social Responsibility of Business to increase its Profits‖, in T.L. Beauchamp, N.E.
Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001)
145
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risky transactions, such as the remuneration at Goldman Sachs, which he accepts as
necessary in a free society. According to Friedman, the former reduces individual
freedoms while the latter does not.147 However, the bank seems to have pursued its selfinterest so ruthlessly that its damaging effects cannot simply be disregarded as
externalities, or ―other people‘s problems‖ as Bakan puts it148. It seems that most
members of society within Friedman‘s framework cannot be considered outside his limits
of people who have a right to decide and moral worth. This becomes especially apparent
due to the asymmetry of power between individuals and large corporations. It is difficult
for them to be compensated. Today there are grounds to claim that big business is
oligopolistic. Taxpayers and others stakeholder have no real power over banks. Therefore
it seems like the neoclassical axiom of perfect competition, is incorrect. The absence of
perfect competition is a problem with regards to Friedman‘s theory because of the banks‘
power relation to external parties seems unbalanced.
Secondly, aspects relating to a corporation's legal arrangements can create problems.
Friedman makes it clear that his argument applies only to companies in which the
decision managers are not the owners of the company149, as is the case in Goldman
Sachs. Bank executives may feel they have personal obligations to, for instance their
families, consciences, religion, et cetera150. However, in these respects they are acting as
principles, not as agents. The banker is using his own money, time or energy, not that
which he is contracted to by his employers. If there are social responsibilities they
concern individuals not business. Corporations, even though claimed to be an artificial
legal person, cannot have responsibility, according to Friedman151. However,
dichotomising a person into a moral agent and an amoral professional can seem strange,
especially with regards to virtue ethics. Also, it can be contended that executives have a
conscience and it is their morality that should be applied to business. As Thompson152
147
J. Harvey, ―Smith, Friedman, and Self-Interest in Ethical Society‖, Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 10,
no. 3. (2000)
148
J. Bakan, The Corporation (London: Constable, 2004)
149
J. Harvey, ―Interest in Ethical Society‖, Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 10, no. 3. (2000)
150
M. Friedman, ―The Social Responsibility of Business to increase its Profits‖, in T.L. Beauchamp, N.E.
Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001)
151
Ibid.
152
D. Thompson, Restoring Responsibility: Ethics in Government, Business and Healthcare (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005)
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points out, there is a tendency to make individual ethics the only kind of ethics in public
life. It seems individual relations such as within families for instance which is face to
face, are different moral principles than institutional ethics which governs relations
between individuals as members of organisations and as citizens. According to Thomson
individual ethics, like the ones Friedman discusses, dominate institutional ethics. He calls
this privatisation of business ethics. One way of regenerating institutional ethics is to
treat the corporation itself as a moral equivalent of an individual, as is the case legally153.
As Friedman feels that a business has no moral conscience, it has no moral obligation
and is not a socially responsible institution. Individuals have responsibility. Though,
Thompson argues that less emphasis should be on the moral character of the individual
manager, but the structure in which he operates. Friedman‘s focus is both too
individualistic and does not appreciate the inner characteristics of human morality.
2.
CRITIQUE OF THE STAKEHOLDER THESIS
For the reasons mentioned above the stockholder thesis does not to hold and appears to
be too narrow. The bonuses at Goldman Sachs exemplify this. In the light of the financial
crisis of 2008, they are not completely using their government funds to aid society.
Alternatively, the stakeholder thesis states that business should take into account all
groups affected by a firm‘s decisions. Traditionally six stakeholders have been identified:
stockholders, employees, customers, managers, suppliers and the local community.154
These groups are also discussed in Friedman‘s theory, but their moral obligations are
something which must be derived from their view of a liberal society. As people who
have dignity and rights that must be respected, their status should be emphasised to a
greater extent,155 it seems that their interests have been unfairly subordinated.
Stakeholder theory also acknowledges the importance of profit maximising, but questions
whether the profits should go to the investors and managers instead of other groups.
However, in Thompson‘s institutional form of business ethics, he appeals to principles
153
D. Thompson, Restoring Responsibility: Ethics in Government, Business and Healthcare (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005)
154
T.L. Beauchamp, N.E. Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001)
155
J. Dienhart, E. Freeman, Business Institutions and Ethics: a text with cases and readings (London:
Oxford University Press, 2000)
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that are shared with all fellow citizens, and not just for the pursuit of profit. Thus he
proposes, in his view, a more democratic solution so that all interests of society can be
taken into account.156 Depersonalising ethics leads in Thompson‘s view to the
Friedmanite system where managers only have responsibility to maximise profits. This
neglects the nature of public ethics. It seems correct to assume that a democratic outcome
would not be such high remuneration for the bankers at Goldman Sachs. As Walzer
notes, the free market system is not founded on the one person one vote principle;
sectorial interest of a few wealthy parties seems to dictate.157 Thompson wants a balance
between profit and morality to be the aim for all business ethics that can claim to be the
ethics for all citizens. However, what sort of regulatory system he wants is unclear.
Potentially it could limit the property rights Friedman is correct in determining. In a
liberal society, taking the returns from investors would be a violation of their property
rights.
Stakeholder theory is not as developed as stockholder, so it appears vague. The rights and
responsibilities of each stakeholder are not distinct. Friedman clearly defines manager‘s
obligations. They have legal obligations to the stockholders.158 In the stakeholder thesis it
is impossible to discover the balance between profits and responsibility and the
relationship between the different stakeholders. So the thesis appears vague and could
potentially undermine property rights.
3.
BROADENING MORAL APPLICATION TO BUSINESS IN LIGHT OF THE FINANCIAL
CRISES
The financial crises illustrates that a broader approach to business ethics is required.
There appear to be problems with both stockholder and stakeholder notions of CSR. On
the one hand Friedman and his followers define a too limited scope of morality, while on
the other hand it emerges that stakeholder theory could threaten property rights and
156
D. Thompson, Restoring Responsibility: Ethics in Government, Business and Healthcare (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005)
157
Walzer, M. Spheres of Justice. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 1983
158
M. Friedman, ―The Social Responsibility of Business to increase its Profits‖, in T.L. Beauchamp, N.E.
Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001)
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actor‘s responsibility seems difficult to define. As already established, Friedman is
correct in his analysis of property rights, but at the same time he has a limited scope of
morality, but it will now be shown how Kantian ethics can present a philosophical
solution to this problem. Kant is able to include elements with regards to, firstly,
externalities and, secondly, the problems concerning the manager‘s legal and moral
obligations that Friedman and neoclassical economics neglect. Kantian ethics are not
only broader, but transcend the problems in Friedman‘s work. For Kant, CSR would not
be seen as a positive externality that results from the modern corporation‘s pursuit of
profit, but a factor which carries moral worth in itself. CSR should be undertaken for
genuine and altruistic reasons, rather than merely a cynical gussied up bid for good
favour. However, many stockholder theorists put shareholders and their returns at the
centre of business decisions, yet hold CSR as important for the modern corporation. They
would have no moral problem, for example, with the idea that ethics is good business.159
To pay managers lower wages than other companies might make it look like the
company is taking responsibility. However, if it is done purely for the sake of increased
profits it would not adhere to a higher moral principle in Kantian ethics and Thompson
would call this personalising ethics. If the aim is to strengthen the bank‘s position in the
market, the outcome is still good but would not adhere to Kantian ethics. At the same
time, it is important to clarify that Kant‘s categorical imperative has often been
misinterpreted to mean simply not to treat others as a means to an end. He actually states
one should not exclusively treat others as means to ends.160 Therefore it seems possible to
include Friedman‘s narrow business ethics into Kant‘s wide moral philosophy.
Firstly, with regard to Friedman treating stakeholders as externalities, it is possible for
managers to do the right thing motivated by both profits and virtuous moral principles.
For instance, to show restraint in order to generate profit, and to do so for the reason that
it is a right course of action in the finance crises, are both acceptable in Kant‘s theory.
Friedman would call the latter motive ―window dressing‖, bordering on fraud,161 and
Kant would reject the idea of action purely on profit maximising grounds. At the same
159
D. Thompson, Restoring Responsibility: Ethics in Government, Business and Healthcare (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005)
160
T.L. Beauchamp, N.E. Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001)
161
M. Friedman, ―The Social Responsibility of Business to increase its Profits‖, in T.L. Beauchamp, N.E.
Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001)
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time he would allow a profit-seeking mentality, as long as it was not the sole factor.
Although the motive for the action is different, there seems no contradiction in assuming
that doing the right thing, cutting bonuses, could be the same as doing the profitable
thing. Since Friedman wrote Capitalism and Freedom in 1962 there have been many
changes. The maintenance of a good corporate image is important to profitability;
therefore acts of CSR must be firmly on the agenda. It is plausible that it would be good
business for the bank to decrease bonuses and instead provide cheaper loans that would
benefit everyone. Property rights would be intact and if this was done for the sake of
helping society, it would adhere to Kantian ethics. Thus, Goldman Sachs can afford, if
their morality is so inclined, to incorporate society‘s interest into business decisions.
Secondly, regarding the dichotomy of the individual agent in Friedman‘s thesis, this can
be overcome by clarifying a common misunderstanding in Kant‘s thesis. Some think that
Kant emphasised universal obligations over particular ones. An obligation such as
keeping a promise is universal, whereas the obligation to grade students fairly is one that
falls only on teachers.162 Similarly, the managerial obligation to use the funds of an
investor to create profit is an obligation that falls only on the manager, whereas the
manager‘s obligations to for instance his local community or family are universalistic.
Thereby the bank managers theoretically should, assuming it is not contradictory,
increase profits specifically at work, but aid society generally. Though principles may
conflict in Kantian ethics, it does none the less seem possible to unite Friedman‘s main
concerns with a broader thesis in ethics. Friedman‘s goals of a free society would still
remain intact.
CONCLUSION
As the outlining argument explains, banker‘s high remuneration alone is not in itself a
problem within Friedman‘s theory because they are justified by market forces. Though,
the bankers at Goldman Sachs cannot legitimate their bonuses as their job of profit
maximisation has arguably been poor. It appears free market mechanisms have not
succeeded in the finance sector. Markets seem not to be self-regulating; therefore
Friedman‘s neoclassical assumptions emerge as incorrect. The main question can now be
162
T.L. Beauchamp, N.E. Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001)
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answered with a fair degree of certainty. Goldman Sachs has a wider social responsibility
than Friedman postulates. Firstly, Friedman‘s stockholder thesis and neoclassical
economics fails to incorporate externalities, wrongly axiomates perfect competition and
dichotomises executives‘ personalities. Secondly, the stakeholder theory does take into
account a wider range of concerns, but it was found to be vague and potentially neglects
property rights of shareholders. Thirdly, it has been demonstrated that Friedman need not
limit his scope of morality, even though his main concern is preserving shareholders
rights over their profits. This is because virtuous business has become more profitable
business since Friedman wrote his theory. Firstly, concerning externalities, Goldman
Sachs‘ wish to generate profits can be combined with moral regard for other
stakeholders. Nearly all corporate philanthropy seems to be motivated by publicity163.
That would not necessarily be a problem for Kant, as long as there are other ethical
motives. Secondly, with regards to the dichotomy of the moral agent in Friedman‘s
theory, this can be overcome by Kant‘s distinction between special and universal moral
principles. The bank could accept the intrinsic moral worth of other factors and maximise
profits. Thereby Friedman‘s limited view of CSR as purely an issue between mangers
and owner can be broadened.
REFERENCES
Baron, M., Pettit, P., Slote, M. Three Methods if Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
2007.
Bakan, J. The Corporation. London: Constable, 2004.
Barry, N. The Morality of Business Enterprise. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press,
1991.
Beauchamp, T.L., Bowie, N.E. Ethical Theory and Business. New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
2001.
163
Ibid.
68
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Crowley, R. ―A Comment on Professor Macpherson's Interpretation of Friedman's
‗Capitalism and Freedom‘‖, Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue
canadienne de science politique, Vol. 2, no. 2 (1969).
Dienhart J., Freeman, E. Business Institutions and Ethics: a text with cases and readings.
London: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Duke, S. ―Goldman Sachs ready to hand out £7bn salary and bonus package‖, The Daily
Mail,
3rd
October,
2008,
URL:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1081624/Goldman-Sachsready-hand-7BILLION-salary-bonus-package--6bn-bail-out.html Accessed 11th
January, 2009.
Friedman, M. ―The Social Responsibility of Business to increase its Profits‖, in
Beauchamp, T.L., Bowie, N.E., Ethical Theory and Business. New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 2001.
Friedman, M. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962.
Harvey, J. ―Smith, Friedman, and Self-Interest in Ethical Society‖, Business Ethics
Quarterly, Vol. 10, no. 3. (2000).
Locke, J. Second Treatise of Government. Indianapolis: Hacket, 1980.
MacPherson, C. Elegant Tombstones: A Note on Friedman's Freedom. Canadian Journal
of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 1, No. 1. 1968
Marx, K. Capital. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Thompson, D. Restoring Responsibility: Ethics in Government, Business and Healthcare
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Robinson, J. Treanor, J. ―Anger over £6.4bn bonus bonanza at four City banks‖, The
Observer,
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/dec/21/
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executive-salaries-bonuses-
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Walzer, M. Spheres of Justice. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1983.
69
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EDITORIAL NOTE TO THE IPPR BOOK REVIEW
*
EXPLORING (NEW) AVENUES OF INFORMATION
Welcome to the International Public Policy Review Book Review section. The
IPPR Book Review is a new addition to the IPPR, starting with IPPR Volume Five, Issue
One. The Editorial Board for Volume Five established the IPPR Book Review last year
to provide an additional forum within the journal to bring practitioners (and scholars) up
to speed with contemporary developments within the field of International Public Policy
(IPP). The book reviews aim to be brief and sharp assessments, or prognostications, of
topical issues within the field of IPP and should provide the reader with concise ‗take
away‘ snapshots. The reviews may also include re-appraisals of seminal texts within the
field of IPP and more broadly that of Political Science.
This first edition of the IPPR Book Review section brings together five scholars
to review six works dealing with multiple subfields of IPP, namely those of European
Public Policy, International Political Economy, International Security and (more broadly)
Theories of International Relations. As a special tribute to the late Samuel P.
Huntington164, Dr. Alex Braithwaite —Lecturer in International Relations in the
Department of Political Science at the School of Public Policy, University College
London (UCL) — revisits Huntington‘s seminal work The Clash of Civilizations and
demonstrates its enduring relevance to the field of International Security in the post 9/11
era. Dr. Harry Bauer—SIAS Fellow—discusses Richard Ned Lebow‘s recent work A
Cultural Theory of International Relations in which Lebow lays the groundwork for a
novel holistic constructivist account of world politics. In ―Foregoing Irredentism,‖ Harald
L. Heubaum—PhD candidate in International Relations in the Department of Political
Science at the School of Public Policy, UCL—assesses Irredentism in European Politics
*
I would like to thank all the reviewers in this novel section for their kind contribution. In particular, I
would like to express my sincere gratitude to Harry Bauer for kindly providing me with instrumental advice
for generating this section for the journal.
164
Dr. Samuel P. Huntington was an eminent political scientist, who passed away on December 24, 2008.
His famous works include, amongst many others, The Soldier and the State (1957), Political Order in
Changing Societies (1968) and American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (1983).
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—a recent publication by Markus Kornprobst, which focuses on why western European
states have given up their irredentist claims in favour of cooperation. Dr. Christine Reh—
Lecturer in European Politics in the Department of Political Science at the School of
Public Policy, UCL—examines Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan‘s The
Foreign Policy of the European Union and demonstrates its timely contribution to the
recently burgeoning research topic of EU External Relations — a subarea of European
Public Policy. Finally, in ―Two Bailouts for Planet Earth‖, Dr. Wasiq N. Khan—Assistant
Professor of Economics in the Economics and Finance Department at the Faculty of
Natural and Social Sciences, Franklin College Switzerland—compares and contrasts
Jeffrey Sachs‘s Common Wealth and Thomas Friedman‘s Hot, Flat and Crowded
critically evaluating two competing approaches in the realm of International Political
Economy for dealing with climate change videlicet,
(a) internationally financed
economic development programmes as a means, over the long haul, to reduce extreme
poverty by eliminating runaway population growth and thus limit our aggregate carbon
footprint versus (b) a radical paradigm shift from fossil fuels to carbon neutral-based
economies165.
The Book Review Editor would like to thank the Editorial Board for Volume Five
for entrusting him with the challenging task of setting up this novel section for the journal
and eagerly looks forward to it becoming a lasting presence in future editions.
The Book Review Editor, Volume Five
Christophe G. Singh‡
165
For additional discussions of Common Wealth and Hot, Flat and Crowded by the respective authors,
please see the following two audio lectures:
Jeffrey D Sachs, ―Common Wealth: economics for a crowded planet‖, Introduced by Professor David Held.
London School of Economics.MP3.The Old Theatre, Old Building, May 2, 2008.
http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/podcasts/publicLecturesAndEvents.htm;
Thomas L Friedman, ―Hot, Flat and Crowded‖ Introduced by Professor Eric Neumayer. London School of
Economics.MP3.The
Old
Theatre,
Old
Building,
October
14,
2008.
http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/podcasts/publicLecturesAndEvents.htm.
‡
MSc candidate in European Public Policy (Expected: November 2010) in the Department of Political
Science at the School of Public Policy, University College London. For questions or comments, please
contact: c.singh@ucl.ac.uk.
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CLASHING ON THE FAULT LINES
BOOK REVIEW
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. By Samuel P. Huntington.
London: The Free Press, Simon & Schuster, 2002. Pp. 367. £9.99 (paper); ISBN-10:
074323149x.
It is closing in on two decades since Samuel P. Huntington first published his
civilization-based theory of post-Cold War conflict. He then expanded upon this in his
1996 book. So why is it that we are now reviewing this text a further 13 years on?
Huntington passed away on Christmas Eve of 2008. At that time, many suggested that
his Clash of Civilizations hypothesis might pass, too. Very recently, Nobel Laureate
Amartya Sen identified Huntington‘s hypothesis as an example of the kind of inadequate
theories of violence that have gained widespread support and run the danger of having us
continually oversimplify our understanding of violence in society. 166 He argued that we
should choose, instead, to engage in a global debate about the multitude of complex
causes of the various forms of violence that plague our societies. Yet, just two days after
Sen‘s speech, President Barack Obama laid out an important aspect of his foreign policy
strategy in his Address to the Muslim World.167 This speech would appear, on the face of
it, to vindicate Huntington‘s simple characterization of the post-Cold War world; in
essence, Obama was acknowledging that the West is in some kind of stand off with its
Muslim counterparts.
This review is designed, therefore, to offer a brief assessment of the potential
value of Huntington‘s model of post-Cold War politics as a guide to the post-9/11
environment. At the heart of his thesis, Huntington noted that the vacuum of post-Cold
War politics would be short-lived; that the ideological battle that had defined divisions
between humankind in the years since the rise of communism and fascism in the wake of
the Great War were already being replaced by divisions along the lines that separate
166
A. Sen, ―Violence in Society‖, (University College London. Lecture, 2009 Global Citizenship Lecture
Series. June 2, 2009).
167
B. Obama, ―Address to the Muslim World‖, (University of Cairo, Egypt. Lecture, June 4, 2009).
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civilizations. In detailing the implications of this bold assertion, Huntington stated very
clearly that the most significant fault line,
runs along what are now the boundaries between Finland and Russia and
between the Baltic states and Russia, cuts through Belarus and Ukraine…,
swings westward separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and
then goes through Yugoslavia almost exactly along the line now
separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia…The peoples
to the north and west of this line are Protestant and Catholic…; they are
generally economically better off than the peoples to the east…The
peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or Muslim…; they
are generally less advanced economically; they seem much less likely to
develop stable democratic political systems. 168
Writing in the early-to-mid 1990s, it was not exactly prescient to highlight the
potential for conflict in the Balkans. However, in the years since, tensions have been
heightened there and elsewhere along this and other fault lines between civilizations.
Hostilities over territorial control of Kashmir have been recurrent; Russia has engaged
militarily with Chechen and Georgian populations in the Trans-Caucus region and feuded
with Ukraine (and indirectly, much of the rest of Europe) over energy supplies. IsraeliPalestinian violence has, rather unsurprisingly, continued to erupt but also been
accompanied by increased Western involvement in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Notably, many of the transnational conflicts that appear to be defining our twentyfirst Century experience have occurred on or very close to the fault lines between
civilizations. Yet, surprisingly little empirical research has focused upon this inherent
geography underlying the Huntingtonian hypothesis.
Initial tests of the hypothesis,
focusing upon whether or not warring countries were both neighbouring and of different
civilizations tended to return no statistically significant findings.169 Such studies were
typically undermined, however, by their minimal conceptualisation of geography. They
168
S. Huntington, ―The Clash of Civilizations?‖ Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, no. 3 (1993): 30-31.
See, e.g., B. Russett, J. Oneal, and M. Cox, ―Clash of Civilizations or Realism and Liberalism Déjà vu?‖
Journal of Peace Research Vol. 37, no. 5 (2000).
169
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would simply tend to include an interaction term of two dummy variables—one
measuring similarity or difference in civilization, a second indicating whether or not the
two parties in conflict share a land border. At no point did these studies seek to identify
where conflict had broken out.
With the recent collection and publication of data on the precise locations of
conflicts170 as well as the distribution of populations of ethnic groups, 171 now may be the
ideal time to more robustly test the validity of Huntington‘s inherently geographic fault
line hypothesis. Pending the publication of any such results, it may be difficult to offer
any credible, categorical assessment of Huntington‘s claims. It does seem, however, as if
there is reason to suspect that those that were quick to dismiss Huntington may wish to
reconsider their judgement.
Alex Braithwaite‡
REFERENCES
Braithwaite, A. ―Location, Location, Location…Identifying Conflict Hot Spots.‖
International Interactions Vol. 31, no. 4 (2005): 251-272.
Buhaug, H., and Gates, S.. ―The Geography of Civil War.‖ Journal of Peace Research
Vol. 39, no. 4 (2007): 417-433.
Cederman, L.-E., and Girardin, L.. ―Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto
Nationalist Insurgencies.‖ American Political Science Review Vol. 101, no. 1
(2007): 173-185.
170
H. Buhaug and S. Gates, ―Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies,‖
American Political Science Review Vol. 101, no. 1 (2007); A. Braithwaite, ―Location, Location,
Location…Identifying Conflict Hot Spots,‖ International Interactions Vol. 31, no. 4 (2005).
171
L-E. Cederman and L. Giradin, ―Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist
Insurgencies,‖ American Political Science Review Vol. 101, no. 1 (2007).
‡
Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Political Science at the School of Public Policy,
University College London.
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Henderson, E., and Tucker, R. ―Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations
and International Conflict.‖ International Studies Quarterly Vol. 45, no. 2 (2001):
317-338.
Huntington, S. P. ―The Clash of Civilizations?‖ Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, no. 3 (1993): 2249.
_______. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London: The
Free Press, Simon & Schuster, 2002.
Obama, B. ―Address to the Muslim World‖, University of Cairo, Egypt. Lecture. June 4,
2009.
Russett, B., Oneal, J. & Cox, M. ―Clash of Civilizations or Realism and Liberalism Deja
Vu?‖ Journal of Peace Research Vol. 37, no. 5 (2000): 583-608.
Sen, A. ――Violence in Society‖, University College London. Lecture. 2009 Global
Citizenship Lecture Series. June 2, 2009.
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BOOK REVIEW
A Cultural Theory of International Relations. By Richard Ned Lebow. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. xi+762.
£21.99 (paper); ISBN-13:
9780521691888; £60.00 (hard); ISBN-13: 9780521871365.
All books, including those in our disciplines, can be understood as invitations.
Sometimes they are warm and welcoming, sometimes they are reluctant even awkward.
In any case, books turn their readers into guests of rather special occasions. Sometimes
we witness more or less dry lectures in badly lit and badly aired lecture halls, sometimes
we find ourselves in neatly organised, slightly freakish laboratories, and sometimes—
perhaps in the best of cases—we enter into a conversation. Reading Ned Lebow's A
Cultural Theory of International Relations might still evoke another scene, somewhat
reminiscent of Giorgio Varsari's Lives and apposite to Lebow, one of the very few true
Renaissance men in International Relations (IR) these days: here we find ourselves in the
workshop of an Italian master painter in the 15th century and follow him from dusk to
dawn, while he outlines the draft sketch of a painting on a massive canvas.
Lebow's book is, in many respects, a highly ambitious and demanding enterprise.
In fact, the volume itself is part of a Herculean project, which began with Lebow's The
Tragic Vision of Politics in 2003 and is meant to find its provisional conclusion with a
third study to be published in the years to come. The overall aim of this grand endeavour
exceeds the narrow confines of IR by far; it attempts nothing less than to offer ―a new
ontology for social science‖172 and to ―'develop[ing] a new paradigm of politics and
theories nested within it.‖173 In this regard, the volume's focus on IR is just seen as a
special (intricate) case of the more genuine issue of political order, its genesis, various
forms and trajectories. The book therefore develops a framework for the study of politics
and ―derives from it a theory of international relations.‖174
172
Lebow, R.N. A Cultural Theory of International Relations Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), ix.
173
Ibid., p.28.
174
Ibid., p.505.
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While The Tragic Vision of Politics reconstructed the concepts used implicitly or
explicitly by von Clausewitz, Morgenthau and Thucydides, in order to engage with their
attempts to come to a universally valid understanding of the underlying dynamics that
govern particular social processes, A Cultural Theory applies the reverse strategy. It
transports concepts stemming from Greek antiquity (and especially from Plato, Aristotle,
and Thucydides, as well as their reception in modern Western thought) to the course of
(Western) history—from Homer to George W. Bush—on the grounds that ―these
concepts capture universal attributes of human nature that find expression in all cultures
all times, with the very important caveat that they are manifested and described in a wide
variety of ways.‖175 This approach is deliberately multidisciplinary; it draws on Lebow's
interest into antique political thinking, his expertise in social theory, political psychology
and international history.
The keystone of Lebow's framework for the analysis of politics and therefore his
theory of international relations is, with some understatement, ―a simple set of
assumptions about human motives.‖176 Drawing on his Greek sources, he identifies
universal ―human needs‖—spirit, appetite, reason and fear—all linked ―with distinct
objects or ends.‖177 These drives in turn induce distinct patterns of behaviour, like
cooperation, conflict or risk-taking, which have different implications for the way social
and political orders unfold. Moreover, the different drives translate into distinct forms of
hierarchy grounded in different concepts of justice. By applying this concept of order to
the different levels of social association—individual, state, regional and international—
Lebow links individual behaviour and different forms of social aggregation, human
drives and the normative equipment of political organisations. But even more, an element
of change is also introduced, as the hierarchies in which orders rest are vulnerable. They
can become weak and break down, when mismatches between (elite) behaviour and
principles of justice become all too big. In this way, order is conceived as a constant
achievement, change as a constant occurrence, while disorder at one level can easily
spread to other levels. With this core conception, Lebow formulates his ontology as an
implicit response to a number of seminal issues IR has grappled with in recent decades:
175
Ibid., p.41.
Ibid., p.26.
177
Ibid.
176
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the structure and agency problématique, the issue of methodological individualism, the
problem of change and the locus of norms as well as emotions in IR.
Lebow is very much aware that the human drives he identifies blend in social
reality, which naturally also applies to the associated behaviours, hierarchies and
principles of justice. In order to tease out the mechanisms that lead to order and disorder,
he describes ideal-type worlds with the respective characteristics of spirit, appetite and
reason. The main concern of his argument lies however on 'spirit' as motive for human
conduct, as for him this element has been neglected in IR's analysis. Spirit is understood
as the universal human drive for self-esteem—for honour, glory, standing—and the
'theory' of IR Lebow develops, by passing through world history, is in essence a historical
account of the impact of self-esteem during the ages.
What makes Lebow a fascinating read is perhaps most of all his inclination to
pursue unusual paths to offer surprising arguments—take the recourse to Greek
philosophy as the most obvious one—and to (implicitly) take issue with the current state
of IR. Although he positions himself within constructivism, he is not afraid to repeatedly
criticise some variants of constructivism178 and other mainstream theories. Despite a
growing trend to turn to practices and, hence, also to the micro-level of interaction as
object of research, Lebow forcefully argues for grand theorising, in order to provide focus
and inspiration for research through ―abstract and normative theories of human nature
and conduct.‖179
Certainly, a book of such proportion and complexity must provoke criticism. Let
me just highlight a very few points. The argument made is ambitious, perhaps overly
ambitious for just one book—somewhat reminiscent of Rosenau's Turbulence in World
Politics, whose title became a catchphrase, but whose sophisticated analytical framework
found hardly anyone able or willing to apply its approach. To develop a general
framework for the analysis of politics would have justified a volume on its own, and
would have offered demonstrations of this approach at different levels and areas of
politics. Lebow's starting point, his human drives, indicates an inherently foundational
perspective, yet it becomes not entirely clear how this is reconciled with the overall
178
Ibid., p.509.
Skinner, Q. ―Introduction: the return of Grand Theory,‖ in The Return of Grand Theory in the Human
Sciences, ed. Quentin Skinner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.1.
179
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constructivist outlook of the project. This brings me to the 'empirical part' of the volume.
It takes on the form of an essentially Western world history. However, it would have been
interesting to see how the universal human needs, derived from Western political thought,
fare in non-Western cultures.
Now what kind of picture could we witness emerging over the 500 odd pages of
Lebow's A Cultural Theory of International Relations? It might perhaps be fair to say that
there are still essential elements missing to the classical triptych the overall project
intends to be. So perhaps it is not really Hans Holbein we are yet confronted with, but
rather a collage by Georges Braque with some fine sand trickling down, reminding us to
have a look at the next inspirational canvas already in work.
Harry Bauer‡
REFERENCES
Lebow, R. N. A Cultural Theory of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008.
_______.
The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Rosenau, J. N. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Skinner, Q. ―Introduction: the return of Grand Theory.‖ In The Return of Grand Theory
in the Human Sciences, edited by Quentin Skinner, pp.1-20. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1985.
‡
SIAS Fellow 2009/2010. Harry Bauer recently co-edited Pragmatism in International Relations.
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FOREGOING IRREDENTISM: THE POWER OF ARGUMENT AND
THE RISE OF THE TERRITORIAL STATUS QUO NORM
BOOK REVIEW
Irredentism and European Politics: Argumentation, Compromise and Norms. By Markus
Kornprobst. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. xvi+301. £50.00 (hard);
ISBN-13: 9780521895583.
Quarrels over territory have long been a staple of relations between sovereign
states. Several of the most prominent of these so-called irredentist disputes, including
India‘s and Pakistan‘s mutual claim to Kashmir, China‘s claim to Taiwan, and Syria‘s
and Israel‘s clashes over the Golan Heights, have for many decades threatened regional
and world security. Yet irredentist conflicts are neither predestined to eventually end in
bloodshed or the exchange of territory nor are they bound to last forever. Many irredentist
conflicts may in fact be settled by the claimants foregoing their demands and accepting
existing border arrangements.
In Irredentism and European Politics, Markus Kornprobst convincingly explains
how irredentist disputes between European states have been resolved peacefully since the
end of the Second World War by casting more light on the role of argumentation and
compromise in bringing about both policy change and a deeper-lying, more fundamental
normative change. He does so by applying a novel three-stage norm selection mechanism
to two case studies: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Republic of Ireland.
The West German case spans the better part of three decades – the 1950s, 60s and early
70s – between the partition of the Third Reich at the end of the war and the wide
acceptance of the territorial status quo under the chancellorship of Willy Brandt. The
Irish pendant covers a substantially longer period, from the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty that
divided the island into its northern and southern part to eventual dispute settlement in the
late 1990s. Both country cases are analysed with great attention to detail and the author
draws on an impressive range of sources, including parliamentary debates, newspaper
editorials, opinion polls, as well as (auto-) biographies of the relevant German
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Chancellors and Irish Prime Ministers. The picture is rounded out by interviews with key
decision-makers and advocates involved in each country‘s debates on the issue.
The main question posed by Kornprobst is why European states have given up
their irredentist claims. A comprehensive survey covering irredentist disputes throughout
the world from 1946 to 2000 (from 1848 in Europe) provides a convincing puzzle from
which the question is drawn: in a divergence from its own past and the situation in other
world regions, European states have largely solved their disagreements through peaceful
recognition of the territorial status quo since the end of the Second World War. What
explains this variation in outcomes? Expanding on more traditional understandings of
irredentism that focus largely on the retrieval of ethnic kin and the land they inhabit from
other states180, the author starts by defining the phenomenon as ―a territorial claim by a
sovereign state against another sovereign state, aimed at reaching congruence between
the boundaries of the nation and the borders of the state‖181. While traditional definitions
may suit cases such as the claims made by Serbia in the 1990s, the FRG‘s claims to lands
incorporated into Poland and Russia after 1945 and the Republic of Ireland‘s continued
claim to Northern Ireland, they are unsuited to explain the FRG‘s claims to the GDR –
this having been a claim to the whole country and its inhabitants.
Irredentist disputes and their settlement cannot be properly understood,
Kornprobst alerts the reader, without taking into account three tightly intertwined
ideational factors – the episteme, identity and norms – which together form the repertoire
of commonplaces that structures public discourse. As the collection of taken-for-granted
beliefs upon which people construct the world around them, the episteme ―delineates
what is imaginable for actors.‖182 The identity narrative defines what the nation is and
how actors see it in relation to others. Later chapters provide empirical evidence that
dispute settlement in both the FRG and the Republic of Ireland was driven by advocates
who primarily drew on their respective countries‘ identity as part of the European Union,
employing the norms of peaceful resolution of conflicts and the territorial status quo.
180
See Ambrioso, T. Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics (Westport: Praeger, 2001);
Saideman, S. M. and William Ayres, R. For Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
181
Kornprobst, M. Irredentism and European Politics: Argumentation, Compromise and Norms,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 9.
182
Ibid., pp. 22.
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Championed by constructivist scholars, norms have come to play an increasingly
important role within International Relations. Analysing norm selection in two country
cases by drawing on a great variety of domestic sources spanning several decades, this
book contributes to an academic discipline that, despite a few notable exceptions, has not
yet devoted enough attention to the often-decisive influence of levels below the
international. Despite its title then, this book is not so much a study just of irredentism as
the development and testing of an innovative three-stage norm selection mechanism.
According to Kornprobst, various actors involved in the West German and Irish
irredentist debates came to select the territorial status quo norm through a process of
innovative argumentation (1st stage), persuasive argumentation (2nd stage) and
compromise (3rd stage). During the first stage, advocates of change, including prominent
intellectuals, made first attempts at reasoning in favour of the territorial status quo.
Although their efforts were at first met with staunch opposition in most quarters, these
early attempts laid the foundation for a more refined mode of argumentation, crucially
supported by revolutionary events – the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the
collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974 – which ―made advocates feel compelled
to seek a new beginning.‖183 The new situation clearly required new arguments.
Over time, drawing on historical experience, the Idea of Europe and the norm of
peaceful resolution of disputes, the advocacy coalition broadened to include major
parties, churches, interest groups and the most influential national newspapers. This no
doubt made the difference in persuading the wider public of the necessity of giving up
irredentist claims – public opinion in the FRG and the Republic of Ireland turned in
favour of this view in the late 1960s an early 1990s, respectively. In both countries, the
shift in public opinion put pressure on influential elites either unconvinced of or opposed
to foregoing irredentist claims. Wishing to get rid of the costs that come with opposing a
majority view, those actors that shared the repertoire of commonplaces settled for a
compromise resembling ―the original position of the advocates much more closely than
the recalcitrant actors‘ original stance.‖184 In West Germany, the Christian Democrats
largely abandoned their former opposition to Chancellor Brandt‘s Ostpolitik and
183
Ibid., p. 135.
Ibid., p. 223.
184
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continued to support the territorial status quo norm upon their return to power in the
1980s. In Ireland, Fianna Fáil compromised in support of the 1998 Good Friday
Agreement, recognising Northern Ireland as rightfully part of the United Kingdom. The
development of a mechanism that accounts for both genuine persuasion of the
appropriateness of an advocated idea and compromise at the bargaining table in fear of
the consequences of non-compliance is a significant advancement over existing accounts
of norm selection. Kornprobst‘s study of reasoning and argumentation is, therefore, an
important further step towards bridging the constructivist-rationalist divide.
It is not lost on the author that the small number of cases examined may lend itself
to criticism and it is useful here to compare Irredentism and European Politics to another
major work tackling irredentism published in 2008, Saideman and Ayres‘ For Kin and
Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism and War. Saideman and Ayres, both prolific
academics in the field of ethnic conflict and foreign policy, base their work on two sets of
irredentist disputes between states in Eastern Europe: one involving ―pit bulls‖ that
sought forceful resolutions to their territorial claims, as was on evidence in the violent
conflicts engulfing Serbia and Croatia in the early 1990s, and the other involving socalled ―silent dogs‖ that did not bark, such as Hungary and Romania.185 Although an
integral part of his overall research puzzle, Kornprobst alludes to these cases only in
passing, focussing his attention instead on two successful Western European examples.
While this may limit the applicability of the findings to other cases, the author does not
strive to ―resolve the research puzzle of European irredentism once and for all.‖ 186 He
instead presents the reader with two in-depth case studies testing his theoretical approach
to argumentation and norm selection. In effect, Kornprobst devotes considerably more
space to each of his cases than comparable works, resulting in a cornucopia of insights
that should appeal to social scientists as well as historians. Furthermore, Irredentism and
European Politics identifies the emergence of a worldview heavily influenced by the Idea
of Europe as an important factor steering domestic debates on the territorial status quo
while For Kin and Country emphasises the power of xenophobia in driving the dynamics
of territorial disputes between states. Each makes valid points and it seems clear that a
185
Ibid., pp. 12.
Ibid., pp. 52.
186
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comparability of cases encompassing both Eastern and Western Europe has its limits. Yet
acknowledging that certain outcomes are contingent on a variety of factors allows for
each of these works to be seen as offering complementary rather than rival explanations,
each filling existing gaps in the literature.
Finally, more attention could have been devoted to economic development and
trade in shaping the repertoire of commonplaces and helping to build the basis for a
peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. In recent years, the historical literature has
begun to shed more light on the crucial role played by trade between the two German
states in laying the foundation for the cautious policy of détente (Entspannungspolitik)
pursued by the FRG in the early 1960s, which in turn fed into Chancellor Brandt‘s new
Ostpolitik and, ultimately, the acceptance of the territorial status quo. 187 West German
industry engaged in an economic diplomacy that sought to open trade relations with the
Eastern bloc and ease political restrictions, all of which contributed to Bonn‘s
rapprochement and a greater normalisation of German-German relations188 (Rudolph,
2004). Furthermore, the West German economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) of the
1950s and 60s and the resulting increased economic and political importance of the FRG
are likely to have played a role in this outcome.
Overall, Kornprobst succeeds in exploring a much denser web of reasoning than
has been identified in the literature to date. This well-researched, lucidly written book
sheds more light on the puzzle of European irredentism while making an important
contribution to theory development in International Relations. In addition, it serves as a
rich historical account of public opinion and elite debate on matters of national identity in
both Western Germany and the Republic of Ireland. For all these reasons it should be
widely read and discussed.
Harald Heubaum‡
187
Fäßler, P.E. Durch den “Eisernen Vorhang“: Die deutsch-deutschen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 19491969
(Köln: Böhlau, 2006).
188
Rudolph, K. Wirtschaftsdiplomatie im Kalten Krieg: Die Ostpolitik der westdeutschen Großindustrie
1945-1991, (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2004).
‡
PhD candidate in International Relations in the Department of Political Science at the School of Public
Policy, University College London.
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REFERENCES
Ambrosio, T. Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. Westport: Praeger,
2001.
Fäßler, P. E. Durch den “Eisernen Vorhang“: Die deutsch-deutschen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 1949-1969. Köln: Böhlau, 2006.
Kornprobst, M. Irredentism and European Politics: Argumentation, Compromise and
Norms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Rudolph, K. Wirtschaftsdiplomatie im Kalten Krieg: Die Ostpolitik der westdeutschen
Großindustrie 1945-1991. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2004.
Saideman, S. M. and William Ayres, R. For Kin and Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism,
and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
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BOOK REVIEW
The Foreign Policy of the European Union. By Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer
MacNaughtan. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Pp. xvii+392. £ 22.99 (paper);
£65.00 (hard); ISBN-10: 1403947228 (paper); ISBN-10: 140394721X (hard).
The external relations of the European Union (EU) have become a burgeoning
topic of research and a popular subject of teaching: few European or international studies
conferences do without a roundtable or panel on Europe‘s global role; numerous research
projects and academic networks generate a steady stream of publications on the topic; and
courses on foreign policy are in high demand on European politics programmes,
undergraduate and postgraduate alike. This academic interest stands in some contrast to
the EU‘s actual global actorness—unchallenged and acknowledged in world trade; active
but less consistent when it comes to ―mixed competences‖ such as environmental policy;
criticised and contested with regard to crisis management and conflict resolution.
Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan‘s The Foreign Policy of the
European Union was published in the European Union Series at Palgrave in 2008—
almost a decade after the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force and with it a number of
far-reaching institutional changes to Europe‘s Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP). The year 2008 also saw much activity in EU external relations—the launch of a
military bridging operation in Tschad; the preparation of a rule of law mission in Kosovo;
the breakdown of the Geneva ministerial meeting under the Doha trade round; agreement
on a climate and energy package that not only committed the Union to cut its greenhouse
gas emissions to at least 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, but pledged to increase the cut
to 30% should other industrialised countries agree to do the same. In their book,
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan cover the entire breadth of these activities: it is their
declared aim to look at EU foreign policy beyond the narrow confines of CFSP and
defence, and to assess how such policy can ―shape and influence structures and long-term
processes‖ worldwide.189
189
Keukeleire, S. and MacNaughtan, J. The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Houndmills: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008) p. 4.
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On a market already rich in textbooks, research monographs and edited volumes
on the subject, The Foreign Policy of the European Union fills a niche in between theorydriven research monographs, such as Michael E. Smith‘s institutionalist account of
foreign policy cooperation in Europe190 and more basic introductions to the topic, such as
Karen Smith‘s European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World
191
; it covers wider
substantive ground than Simon Nuttall‘s excellent and comprehensive historical overview
European Foreign Policy192 or Jolyon Howorth‘s single-issue study Security and Defence
Policy in the European Union
193
; and it offers a welcome break from the dominant
analytical focus on Europe‘s identity as a global actor—be it ―civilian‖, ―military‖ or
―normative‖—as developed prominently in Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler‘s The
European Union as a Global Actor.194
In their volume Keukeleire and MacNaughtan pursue two objectives: first, ―to
provide an overview and analysis of EU foreign policy‖, and, second, ―to reappraise the
nature of EU foreign policy and foreign policy more generally‖ 195. The latter objective
builds on their distinction between conventional foreign policy with its (alleged) focus on
―states, military security, crises and conflicts‖, and structural foreign policy, which
―conducted over the long-term seeks to influence or shape sustainable political, legal,
socio-economic, security and mental structures.‖196 The authors develop their approach
against the backdrop of a post-Cold War and globalising international context (chapter 1),
as well as the historic development of EU foreign policy cooperation from the Marshall
Plan to the Lisbon Treaty (chapter 2). They subsequently introduce Europe‘s ―foreign
policy apparatus‖197 in a systematic, detailed and accessible way: chapter 3 discusses the
complex network of intergovernmental, supranational and bureaucratic actors behind EU
foreign policy-making; chapter 4 turns from actors to processes, covering both de jure
competences and decision-procedures and de facto policy-practices; while chapter 5
190
Smith, M.E. Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation Perspectives
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
191
Smith, K.E. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity, 2008).
192
Nuttall, S. European Foreign Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
193
Howorth, J. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2007).
194
Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. The European Union as a Global Actor (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).
195
Keukeleire, S. and MacNaughtan, J. The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Houndmills: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008), p.3.
196
Ibid., p. 25.
197
Ibid., p. 329.
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looks at the interplay between European and national foreign policies in both a bottom-up
and a top-down perspective—a commendable exercise, given the much-discussed
problem of vertical ―consistency‖ or ―coherence‖ in CFSP. The six remaining substantive
chapters can be divided into two parts: chapters 6 to 9 are devoted to policies; chapters 10
and 11 cover issues of international cooperation. The first set covers ―traditional
ground‖—CFSP (chapter 6) and European Security and Defence Policy (chapter 7); yet,
true to the book‘s aim of broadening our understanding of foreign policy they also
introduce external policies located in the first pillar, including trade, development and the
promotion of human rights (chapter 8) as well as internal policies with an external
dimension, such as justice and home affairs or environmental policy (chapter 9).
Following the discussion of three types of inter-regional cooperation—with potential
member states; with neighbourhood countries; with Africa—in chapter 10, the
penultimate chapter discusses cooperation with other ―global ‗structural powers‘‖ 198 such
as the US, China and Russia as well as the EU‘s embeddedness in multilateral
institutions. Chapter 12 concludes the book; unfortunately, it chooses to link the
argument back to theories of European integration and International Relations more
generally instead of focusing on the author‘s potential contribution to foreign policy
analysis.
Throughout, the volume covers traditional textbook material in a systematic and
accessible way; it also discusses less well-known aspects of EU foreign policy, such as
the Council of Ministers‘ substructure and the European Commission‘s diverse
Directorate-Generates199; the systematic cooperation between member states200; the
external dimension of health and demography policies201; or the EU‘s approach to
international financial institutions202 and its relationship to ―Islamism‖.203 Hence,
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan certainly reach their first goal—their volume offers a
comprehensive well-structured overview and analysis of EU foreign policy. The
unusually broad approach taken, the wealth of information provided, the topical examples
198
Ibid., p. 298.
Ibid., p. 73.
200
Ibid., p.159.
201
Ibid., p. 249.
202
Ibid., p. 307.
203
Ibid., p. 322.
199
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and up-to-date facts given in the text and additional tables as well as the further readings
and sources suggested on the companion website make the book an accessible and
readable resource for anyone researching, teaching and studying EU external relations.
More scepticism is, however, in order when it comes to the authors‘ second
goal—to reappraise the nature of EU foreign policy beyond conventional wisdom.
Indeed, the book‘s twofold ―conceptual backbone‖
204
—the distinction between
conventional foreign policy and structural foreign policy,205and the definition of EU
foreign policy as ―multipillar and multilevel, operating within a complex multilocational
web of interlocking actors and processes‖
206
—appeals for two reasons: it allows us to
study foreign policy as an instance of multilevel governance, and it facilitates a
potentially more fine-grained assessment of the EU‘s performance than its usual broadbrushed condemnation (or praise) as (in)coherent or (in)effective. Yet, the framework
suffers from a combination of overload and under-specification. First, the framework is
overloaded because the authors identify no less than six research themes: the tensions
between Atlanticists and Europeanists, between civilian and military power, between
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, and between external and internal
objectives; the EU‘s ambition to shape regional, national and global structures; and the
EU‘s struggle with power.207 These themes have not only been somewhat exhausted in
the existing literature; their amalgamation also leaves the reader puzzling over what it is
that the authors, ultimately, want to explain: the nature and trajectory of EU foreign
policy? The way foreign policy decisions are reached? The distinction between the EU‘s
short-term and long-term policy-goals and the reasons for reaching these goals? The
Union‘s structural influence? The book touches upon all of these questions, yet it answers
none of them in systematic depth. Second, the framework is underspecified, because the
authors fail to translate their definition of structural foreign policy into an analytical
framework, and because they do not engage with the established literature on foreign
policy analysis—conventional or not. According to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan foreign
policy differs from external relations; the latter is about ―maintaining relations with
204
Ibid., p. 34.
Ibid., p. 25.
206
Ibid., p. 34.
207
Ibid., p. 8.
205
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external actors‖, the former ―is directed at the external environment with the objective of
influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to
pursue interests, values and goals.‖208 If this is, indeed, the case then the reader would
have expected a set of analytical tools that help her a) to identify such interests, values
and goals; b) to assess whether the external environment and actors within it have
changed; and c) to identify the scope conditions under which such change is likely.
Chapter 10, which contrasts the use of conventional foreign policy and structural foreign
policy in inter-regional cooperation, is a step in this direction. Overall, however, Stephan
Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan neither equip us with sufficient analytical tools,
nor do they give us a systematic empirical account of how the EU identifies its objectives
of structural influence, how its policies correspond to these objectives, and how structures
world-wide have (or have not) changed in response to Europe‘s policy intervention.
As it stands, The Foreign Policy of the European Union convinces as a rich,
informative and in-depth account of EU foreign policy across its thematic board; yet it
will disappoint those readers who do, indeed, expect a systematic reappraisal of this
foreign policy as ―structural.‖
Christine Reh‡
REFERENCES
Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. The European Union as a Global Actor. Abingdon:
Routledge, 2006.
Howorth, J. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. Houndmills: Palgrave,
2007.
Keukeleire, S. and MacNaughtan, J. The Foreign Policy of the European Union.
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Nuttall, S. European Foreign Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
208
Ibid., p. 19.
‡
Lecturer in European Politics in the Department of Political Science at the School of Public Policy,
University College London.
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Smith, K.E. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Cambridge: Polity,
2008.
Smith, M. E. Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of
Cooperation Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
TWO BAILOUT PLANS FOR PLANET EARTH
BOOK REVIEW
Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet. By Jeffrey Sachs. London: Penguin,
2008. Pp. xi+386. £9.99 (paper); ISBN-978: 0141026152.
Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why The World Needs a Green Revolution and How it Can
Renew Our Global Future. By Thomas Friedman. London: Allen Lane, Penguin Group,
2008. Pp. 444. £20 (hard); ISBN-978:1846141294.
Jeffrey Sachs, the Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is the
world‘s most active fire-fighting economist. Having, over the last twenty years, taken on
the liberalization of planned economies in the former Soviet bloc as well as the stubborn
problem of hyper-inflation in Latin America, Sachs has more recently, in The End of
Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time209, set his sights on designing multi-year,
multinational, and multibillion dollar projects to eradicate extreme poverty, control
malaria, and stimulate a four-fold increase agricultural productivity in Africa. His current
work, Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet210, aims no lower; Sachs now
has a plan and budget to simultaneously mitigate global climate change, control
population growth, protect biodiversity, reduce extreme poverty, and forestall serious
world water shortages. For someone who was once best known for advocating market
209
210
Sachs, J. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin, 2005).
Sachs, J. Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet (London: Penguin, 2008).
91
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based solutions to government failures in centrally planned economies and is still
associated with the term ‗shock therapy,‘ Sachs‘ recent work may represent a shift in
thinking emblematic of the times we live in; large portions of his recent books, The End
of Poverty and Common Wealth, are devoted to explaining why free markets have failed
to safeguard common resources, are inadequate at providing public goods, and will not
kick start development in regions caught in poverty ‗traps.‘
Sachs‘ proposals to head off a five-way-gathering global catastrophe are
persuasive and his plan is methodical, but all require a massive shift in government
spending priorities, a large increase foreign aid, and the creation of several new
international organizations that would expedite critical initiatives. Using a broad range of
quantitative data from geography, demography, economics, and ecology, Sachs clearly
describes what threatens the world and what it will cost to mitigate and, in many
instances, eliminate these threats. Those expecting a pessimistic rumination on inevitable
catastrophe will instead find a hopeful book that carefully tallies the costs of positive
interventions and compares these to the costs of inaction.
Sachs argues that once the prevalence of extreme poverty is reduced, runaway
population growth will cease which will, in turn, mitigate biodiversity loss, reduce fresh
water scarcity, limit carbon emissions, and ease global warming. Much will depend,
however, on the willingness of rich nations to spend at least 0.7 per cent of their gross
domestic products on foreign aid as well as on the research and development of new
technologies to generate clean energy from renewable sources, produce food in
environmentally sustainable systems, and preserve fresh water supplies.211
In short,
solutions are available, but only if humankind were to fully absorb the urgency of the
crisis, be willing to cooperate, and to give generously.
Sachs believes strongly in setting concrete goals in international development
endeavors and using these goals to monitor progress. Well known for supporting the
United Nation‘s Millennium Development Goals, Sachs, in Common Wealth, lays out a
detailed budget for seven specific priorities. To fund climate change mitigation, so that
increases in the global average temperature do not exceed two degrees centigrade by
2050, Sachs proposes that rich donor nations spend 1 per cent of their combined GDP or
211
Ibid., pp. 245, 310.
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approximately $350 billion per year while poor countries spend approximately $125
billion per year for an indefinite period into the future on efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.212 To help poor countries better adapt to the negative side effects of a warming
globe, Sachs estimates that $70 billion per year from rich countries will be needed for the
foreseeable future. The bill for the conservation of biodiversity would come to $35 billion
per year. Interventions to combat desertification would also cost rich nations $35 billion
per year – again for an indefinite period. The same price tag of $35 billion is the annual
outlay needed to support efforts at stabilizing global population growth so that total world
population peaks in 2050 at 7.8 billion and the world population growth rate falls to zero
by 2050. The costs of research and development needed to create a new generation of
sustainable technologies for energy generation will require an annual outlay of $70
billion, again for an indefinite period of time. Assistance for poor countries to ensure the
achievement of the Millennium Development goals by 2015 and the eradication of
extreme poverty by 2050 will require an annual outlay of $245 billion for the next five to
forty years. In total, the costs of keeping the world from being destroyed would be about
$840 billion per year for an indefinite period into the future. Sachs believes that much of
this can be met by redirecting available funds from military budgets, bilateral aid
programs, and a broad array of other expendable revenue sinks. The United States, for
example, currently spends approximately $1.6 billion per day or $572 billion per year on
defense (more than the rest of the world combined and twenty times the world average
per capita military expenditure).213
Sachs argues that military budgets, agricultural
subsidies, and various other programs in rich nations could be pared down or eliminated
and the revenue easily redirected to areas where the social rate of return is much higher.
He notes that one crucial intervention proven to drastically reduce malaria, the provision
of anti-malarial bed net protection to every sleeping site in Africa, would cost as little as a
one-time outlay of $1.5 billion while yearly Africa suffers from at least $12 billion in lost
economic output directly due to malaria – in short, for every dollar spent on bed-nets,
approximately $8 could be recouped in the form of increased labour productivity, reduced
212
Ibid., p. 310.
Ibid., p. 274.
213
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spending on health care, and this could easily be achieved through a reduction in the
bloated spending on sectors such as defense and agriculture in rich nations.
Sachs has been criticized for his faith in the ability of aid from rich to poor
countries to solve such a wide range of deeply entrenched social problems. William
Easterly, among others, has claimed that trillions of dollars have been spent since the
Second World War on aid from rich to poor countries and he notes that the level of aid
per capita is negatively correlated with economic growth and social development.
Easterly and others have also argued that foreign aid fosters dependency in poor countries
and this undermines precisely those social institutions that might enable poor countries to
do more to help themselves.214 Sachs pre-empts these criticisms by describing several
past triumphs of foreign assistance programs including India‘s Green Revolution, the
eradication of small pox, polio, and the success of the Global Fund for Tuberculosis,
Malaria, and HIV/AIDS.
A weakness in Sachs‘s proposals is that no specific timeline is proposed. While it
may be possible to convince rich nations to donate 2.4 percent of their yearly output to
fund critical initiatives aimed at saving all terrestrial life, a plan such as Sachs‘s becomes
a much tougher sell when the anticipated funding would be needed for an indefinite
period of time. The problem of donor-fatigue needs to be considered in light of the fact
that development grants to poor countries were once described as sunset programs that
would expire once specific targets for economic growth and social development had been
achieved. Instead development programs and many development bureaucracies have
grown in size over time and, in the worst instances, fostered long-term dependency.
Sachs‘s proposals would be more convincing if he were to explain how his plan would
avoid repeating the mistakes of past foreign aid initiatives.
Thomas Friedman, the three time Pulitzer Prize winner and foreign affairs
columnist for the New York Times, is best known for writing popular books on American
foreign policy, the Middle East, globalization, and environmental affairs. To his fans, he
is distinguished by an uncanny ability to present complex political-economic ideas in an
214
Doubts regarding the efficacy of foreign aid programs can be found in Easterly, W. The Elusive Quest for
Growth (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002), Weaver, C. Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty
of Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), and Svensson, J. ―Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking,‖
Journal of International Economics Vol. 51 (August 2000): pp. 381-40.
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engaging, accessible, and conversational way. Though he was an early and fervent
proponent of invading Iraq and has been described, by critics, as an apologist for the
worst excesses of globalization and free markets, he is a hugely influential maker of
American public opinion. In his most recent book, Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why The
World Needs a Green Revolution and How it Can Renew Our Global Future215, Friedman
passionately argues for immediate action to prevent a global climatic apocalypse.
Friedman‘s intended audience is American and to them he argues that the United States‘
world leadership position, badly eroded in the post 9/11 era, could be recovered if
Americans were to spearhead a ‗green revolution‘ to convert their fossil fueled based
economy into one that relied on renewable sources of energy which would in turn reduce
carbon emissions, mitigate climate change, protect biodiversity, and bolster American
economic competitiveness – all the while restoring the United States‘ moral prestige and
spearheading a global movement dedicated to sustainable and ecologically sound
development. Friedman‘s proposals for change have a very different slant from Sachs‘s
and, at times, appear to be diametrically opposed to Sachs‘s emphasis on top-down forms
of international cooperation. Friedman is extremely skeptical of the capacity of massive
governmental or intergovernmental spending programs to generate the necessary changes
and innovations to bring about sustainable forms of economic growth.216 A revolution in
how energy is generated and used would require very context-specific adjustments such
as taxes on carbon intensive production or consumption, price floors on fossil fuels, and
careful attention, at all points, to local political alignments to ensure that what was
proposed would work in tandem with local interests.217
Friedman does not discuss water scarcity or extreme poverty.
He is almost
entirely focused on the threat of climate change. Unlike Sachs, he makes no attempt to
link extreme poverty, runaway population growth, and water scarcity with global
warming. Instead, Friedman argues that the primary cause of global warming is the fossilfuel-intensive economic growth paradigm.218 Hot, Flat, and Crowded goes a lot further
than Sachs‘ Common Wealth in actually describing the manner in which a sustainable215
Friedman, T.L. Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why the World Needs a Green Revolution and How It Can
Renew Our Global Future. London: Allen Lane, Penguin Group, 2008.
216
Ibid., pp. 244, 246.
217
Ibid., p. 336.
218
Ibid., p. 32.
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carbon neutral economy would function, where the savings and efficiencies would be
greatest, and what types of new technologies and public policies would be needed to
convert our current economic system into one that was cleaner and greener. Friedman,
like Sachs, does not think free markets can do much to protect common resources or
provide public goods, but rather than correcting this by creating new United Nations
agencies with massive budgets, Friedman favours country specific corrections that
involve some spending and a lot of market tweaking – a carbon tax, subsides and tax
credits directed to producers of solar, geo thermal, and wind based power equipment and
some strategy to counteract the lobbying of interest groups ranging from oil companies to
coal and auto producers.219
In comparison to Sachs, Friedman is more sceptical and worried about the
prospects for mitigating global climate change and, to his credit, he provides more detail
describing the technological and political obstacles that would have to be overcome
before mitigation were achieved; the result is a portrait of a difficult and complex
challenge that will require great sacrifice and global perseverance to overcome. Sachs‘
tone is much more hopeful -- he does not dwell on the obstacles to affecting positive
change, but focuses on the affordability of the solution; implicit in this point of view is
the idea that if goals are clear and budgetary commitments are met, then what remains is
not necessarily a painful and costly adjustment, but a steady advance to a better world
based on the self-evident merits of the cause.
Wasiq N. Khan‡
REFERENCES
Easterly, W. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and
Misadventures in the Tropics. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002.
219
Ibid., pp. 17, 245.
‡
Assistant Professor of Economics and Finance in the Economics and Finance Department at the Faculty of
Natural and Social Sciences, Franklin College Switzerland.
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Friedman, T. Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why The World Needs a Green Revolution and
How it Can Renew Our Global Future.. London: Allen Lane, Penguin Group,
2008.
Sachs, J. Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet. London: Penguin, 2008.
Svensson, J. ―Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking,‖ Journal of International Economics 51
(August 2000): 381-402.
Weaver, C. Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008.