THE POWER-SHARING EXPERIENCE IN
NORTHERN IRELAND AND SRI LANKA
Ayesha Zuhair
ABSTRACT
This article seeks to identify the lessons that can be learnt by Sri Lankan policymakers
from the experience of power-sharing in Northern Ireland since the establishment of the
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive as part of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. By
comparing the power-sharing mechanisms created by both the Northern Irish and Sri
Lankan governments in recent years, the author argues that the institutional devices
created under the Belfast Agreement are paving the way for the successful
transformation of a deep-seated conflict in Northern Ireland because of their adherence
to the principles of consociationalist theory. In contrast, the Sri Lankan government
have not been able to achieve their intended goals primarily because the essence and
spirit of power-sharing have been largely ignored by the country’s policymakers.
Consequently, the author argues that Sri Lankan policymakers should put forward an
alternative choice based on the Draft Constitution of 1997 as a solution to the current
shortcomings in governance—one which incorporates elements of consociationalism
and federalism, creating a consensual decision-making process and genuine autonomy
for ethnic groups over issues directly relevant to themselves.
Keywords: Conflict Resolution; Consociationalism; Northern Ireland; Sri Lanka
INTRODUCTION
As the armed conflict in Sri Lanka snakes its way into its twenty-fifth year, the All Party
Representative Committee tasked by the Government of Sri Lanka to formulate powersharing proposals is due to visit Northern Ireland to learn from the much acclaimed
power-sharing arrangement there. Among the key questions the Sri Lankan delegation
will seek answers for are: (a) what institutional factors lead to the successful process of
conflict transformation in Northern Ireland, and (b) what policy lessons can Sri Lanka
draw from Northern Ireland?
In this paper, I examine the pertinent experiences of these two deeply divided
democratic societies, and present answers to the above-mentioned questions by
considering the themes of consociationalism – of which power-sharing is a key
component. In presenting my argument, I evaluate the key institution created by the
Belfast Agreement of 1998, namely the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive, as
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW
well as two efforts at power-sharing in Sri Lanka through the establishment of
Provincial Councils under the Indo-Lanka Peace Accords of 1987 and the proposed
Draft Constitution of 1997.
I argue that one of the primary reasons for the failure of power-sharing efforts in Sri
Lanka is because principles of consociationalism have not been adequately invoked.
Although not all the favourable conditions for full-blown consociationalism to work
holds true for Sri Lanka, its key principles of executive power-sharing and group
autonomy can still be used to mitigate ethnic violence and restore stability. Addressing
the genuine aspirations of marginalised ethnic groups, and giving them adequate power
to determine their destinies by incorporating important elements of consociationalism
would help charter ethnic relations in Sri Lanka toward more placid waters.
Why Consociationalism?
Leaving aside the Northern Irish experience, one needs to answer preliminarily why
consociational approaches have the potential of managing identity driven conflicts.
Consociationalism is widely regarded as a viable solution for stabilising societies that
are divided along ethnic, religious or sectarian lines. As Lijphart,1 the foremost
consociational theorist, avers “...consociational democracy is not only the most optimal
form of democracy for deeply divided societies but also, for the most deeply divided
countries, the only feasible solution.”
A consociation is “an association of communities”2 and it is generally the result of
bargains between leaders of conflicting ethnic or religious groups. According to
McGarry and O’Leary,3, consociational theory “is one of the most influential theories in
comparative political science. Its key contention is that divided territories, be they
regions or states, with historically antagonistic ethnically, religiously, or linguistically
divided peoples, are effectively, prudently, and sometimes optimally governed
according to consociational principles.”
This approach, however, has been criticised for its centrifugal tendencies. As Horowitz
suggests,4 consociational practice – in contrast to consociational theory – has provided
groups with explicit recognition and made their representatives the bearers of group
A. Lijphart, “The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy,” in A. Reynolds, ed., The Architecture of Democracy:
Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
2 B. O’Leary,“The Belfast Agreement and the British-Irish Agreement: Consociation, Confederal Institutions, a
Federacy, and a Peace Process,” in A. Reynolds, ed., The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict
Management, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 295.
3 J. McGarry and B. O’Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), p.1.
4 D. Horowitz, “Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement: The Sources of an Unlikely Constitutional Consensus,”
British Journal of Political Science 32, (2002): 193-220.
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guarantees. In addition, scholars like Chandra5 point out that the politicisation of ethnic
differences is considered a major threat to democratic stability, and this concern is not
completely unfounded.
But for those working within the consociational prism, ethnic cleavages are an
inescapable reality, and therefore it is only prudent to design the system of government
and public policy to deal with that reality6. Moreover, consociational mechanisms can
facilitate cooperation and compromise among political elites in states that have deep
ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic cleavages by maximising the number of winners
in the system – thereby promoting peaceful coexistence.7
As Vivien Hart8 aptly reminds us, “The issues of recent conflicts are concerned with the
recognition of identities as well as with provisions for the legitimate exercise of power.”
What becomes crucial to bear in mind is that ethnic violence is the result of (real or
perceived) historical injustices and marginalisation of communities. It is the group
identity that acts as the mobilising trigger, not individual identity.
In reality, traditional majoritarian democracies propel a winner-takes-all system and
ethnic minorities are usually excluded from political power. As a result, conflicts
involving minorities are easily channelled into extra-parliamentary and violent forms.
Although certain liberal thinkers such as Horowitz9 and Barry10 reject the idea of giving
ethnic groups a permanent political identity or constitutional status, it is becoming
increasingly clear that minority rights cannot be subsumed under the category of
human rights11. Where friction is fuelled by decades of mistrust and violence is used as
a vehicle to attain group goals, it is practically inconceivable to address those
grievances without politically recognising groups.
Hence, the risk of furthering ethnic consciousness is a less costly alternative to
continued armed hostilities. Indeed, “attempting to erase ethnic cleavages will not
simply make them go away. Rather, successful state structures must acknowledge and
address their divided house dilemmas.”12. And as the case of Northern Ireland would
attest, consociational structures are capable of fostering cross-community cooperation.
Equally, it is probable that in the long-run if institutional guarantees are able to make
K. Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India, (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2004).
6 J. Uyangoda, “Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Imagination and Democratic Alternatives for Sri Lanka,” Futures 37, no 9
(2005): 973.
7 P. Norris, “Ballots Not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems, and
Democratization,” in A. Reynolds, ed., The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management,
and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 207.
8 V. Hart, “Constitution-making and the Transformation of Conflict,” Peace and Change 26, no. 2 (2001): 153-176.
9 D. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
10 B.Barry, Culture and Equality, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
11 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
12 S. Stroschein, “What Belgium Can Teach Bosnia: The Uses of Autonomy in ‘Divided House’ States,” Journal on
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 3, (2003).
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groups - minority groups in particular - feel less insecure about their societal status,
centrifugal tendencies will give way to the more desirable centripetal forces.
Theoretical Aspects of Consociationalism
The two primary characteristics of consociationalism as propounded by Lijphart13,
namely, (1) sharing of executive power, and (2) group autonomy, have been accepted
broadly as the key ingredients for successful democracy in divided societies. To
strengthen power-sharing and group autonomy, Lijphart14 recommends two additional
ingredients: (3) proportionality and (4) mutual veto. Some attention will be paid in this
paper to the two supplementary elements of consociationalism but greater emphasis
will be placed on the primary elements.
Lijphart also goes on to list as many as fourteen different favourable conditions, but
only four of them are present in all the overviews15. These four are variations of:
distinct lines of cleavage among segments of the community, a balance of power among
the sub-groups, external threats to a country’s existence and small size, since small states
are usually more manageable than large ones16.
Power-sharing
The central theme in power-sharing is that two or more ethnic groups jointly rule the
common polity and make decisions by consensus. In such a set-up, all groups are
ensured access to political power on the basis of informal or formal rules17. As
Lijphart18 puts it, “power-sharing means the participation of the representatives of all
significant groups in political decision-making, especially at the executive level.” To
elaborate, power-sharing encompasses:
“constitutional norms calling for the inclusion of minority parties and
major ethnic and religious groups in the legislature, government, and
administrative positions of the country, as well as to the laws or
constitutional arrangements providing for territorial or functional
decentralisation or electoral systems.”19
Group Autonomy
Autonomy or ‘self-rule’ is defined as “the granting of internal self-government to a
region or group of persons, thus recognising a partial independence from the influence
Lijphart (2002), p. 38
Ibid.
15 M. Bogaards,“The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review,” European Journal of Political
Research 33, no. 4 (1998): 475-496.
16 Ibid, p. 478
17 U. Schnekener, “Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict
Regulation,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 2 (2002): 203.
18 Lijphart (2002), p. 39
19 D. Rothchild, “Settlement Terms and Postagreement Stability,” in S.J. Stedman, Rothchild, D. and Cousens, E. M.,
eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2002), p.121.
13
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of national or central government.”20 As defined by Lijphart, “...group autonomy means
that these groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas
of education and culture.”21. Gurr22, on the basis of a global empirical study, confirms
that autonomy agreements can be an effective means for managing regional conflicts.
He concludes that there is nothing inherently destabilising about autonomy as alleged
by critics.
Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka
A plethora of geographical, cultural, and economic factors set Sri Lanka apart from
Northern Ireland. Her strategic location in the Indian Ocean, population of 20.1
million,23 65,610 square kilometres of land mass24 are but a few of the many respects in
which Sri Lanka differs from Northern Ireland, a constituent country of her former
colonial ruler. Comparatively, Sri Lanka’s population is more than 10 times the size of
Northern Ireland, and is five times larger in land area25.
Despite differences, there are many parallels between the two situations which make a
comparative study meaningful. Politically, they are electoral democracies which have
witnessed extreme polarisation leading to violent, identity-driven conflict. Both
conflicts have their roots in socio-economic discrimination based on ethnic, religious
and historical differences. Crucially, in both situations, the monopoly of power in the
hands of one group formed the basis of the conflict.
The conflict in Northern Ireland is between the Unionists or Loyalists, comprised
mainly of the Protestant majority who have sought to preserve the union with Great
Britain, and the Nationalists or Republicans, comprised mainly of the Catholic minority
who have traditionally wanted to unify the island of Ireland. For much of the twentieth
century, the Catholics accounted for one third of the total population26, and they
currently represent 43.76 percent27. After the British Government’s partitioning of the
six counties of the North - which had built-in Protestant majorities - from the rest of
Ireland in 1921, tensions between the two groups grew intense.
H.J. Heintze, “On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy” in M. Suksi, ed., Autonomy: Applications and Implication,
(Cambridge: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 7.
21 A. Lijphart, “Multiethnic Democracy” in S. M. Lipset, et al., eds., The Encyclopedia of Democracy, (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, 1995), p.856.
22 T.R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 1993), pp. 300-301.
23 United Nations Population Fund (2007) “World Population Datasheet: Sri Lanka” Population Reference Bureau,
http://www.prb.org/Countries/srilanka.asp
24 Encyclopaedia Britannica (2007) “Sri Lanka,” World Data, http://www.britannica.com/nations/Sri-Lanka.
25 K. Howells, British Foreign Office Minister, “Statement on Sri Lanka”, House of Commons Hansard Debates, 02
May, 2007, Column 1551, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
26 J. Darby, “Conflict in Northern Ireland: A Background Essay,” in S. Dunn, ed., Facets of the Conflict in Northern
Ireland, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p.19.
27 Northern Ireland Office UK (2007) “The Agreement,” http://www.nio.gov.uk/theagreement.
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Since then, a number of factors including political and economic discrimination against
the Catholics (denied by some Unionists even today), the population balance between
the two religious communities, the launch of the Civil Rights Movement by the
Catholics, and the rise of a violent campaign against British rule lead to the ‘Troubles’
which commenced in 1960 and led to some of the most horrific events in Irish history.28
In Sri Lanka, political disagreements between the Sinhala-speaking, largely Buddhist
majority and the Tamil-speaking, largely Hindu minority surfaced after the island
gained independence from British-colonial rule in 1948. According to the last islandwide census conducted in 1981, Sinhalese made-up 74 percent of the population while
Tamils accounted for 18 percent.29 During the post-independence era, the Sinhalese
who resented what they saw as British-favouritism towards the Tamils during their
rule, disenfranchised Tamil migrants who had been brought by the colonial rulers to
work in the tea and rubber plantations, made Sinhala the sole official language of the
country, and promulgated a new Constitution which accorded Buddhism the foremost
position among the country’s religions.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), whose key goal is to establish a separate
state for Tamils in the North-East, was born in this context. Following the LTTE’s
ambush of thirteen soldiers in the North of the country in 1983, ethnic pogroms
targeting the Tamils in the country’s South resulted in the deaths of at least 1,000
Tamils and caused severe destruction of their property.30 It was this episode which
sparked the civil conflict that has claimed as many as 70,000 lives and displaced
200,000 persons.31
Northern Ireland has been able to successfully design a political and constitutional
agreement for power-sharing. Although it took eight years for its full implementation,
the Northern Irish Agreement is laying the foundation for a more inclusive and stable
society. Sri Lanka, however, has so far merely unsuccessfully flirted with the concept of
power-sharing and a political arrangement to contend with the country’s ethnic
divisions appears to be a distant dream. These factors make a comparison worthwhile
and it is the Northern Irish success that ignites a curiosity as to whether Sri Lanka’s
solutions also lie in consociational approaches.
Evaluating Northern Ireland’s Power-sharing Arrangement
The Northern Ireland Act of 1998 established a single-chamber Assembly and Executive
with full legislative powers and executive competence for economic development,
education, health and social services, agriculture, environment and finance. While a
Darby, pp. 18-23
Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka (1981) “Census of Population and Housing,”
http://www.statistics.gov.lk.
30 International Crisis Group (2008) “Conflict History: Sri Lanka,” http://www.crisisgroup.org
31 Ibid.
28
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substantial degree of autonomy was devolved to Northern Ireland, Westminster
continues to retain control of policy areas such as defence, taxation, immigration and
the monarchy.
What makes Northern Ireland a consociational democracy is (a) its permanent grand
coalition vis-á-vis the power-sharing Assembly and Executive; (b) the considerable
degree of autonomy particularly in the areas of education and culture enjoyed by the
two main ethno-national groups32; (c) the extensive use of evidence of proportional
representation; and (d) the introduction of the principle of mutual consent.
All the main parties in Northern Ireland are – in effect – members of a permanent
coalition government where decisions are taken on a joint basis. The cross-community
executive power-sharing is manifested in the election of First Minister and Deputy First
Minister on a joint ticket by the Assembly, with the mandate of presiding over the grand
coalition of the ten-member executive Council of Ministers. To facilitate crosscommunity decision-making, elected members are required to declare themselves
‘nationalist’, ‘unionist’ or ‘other’. The concept of group autonomy can be seen in the
explicit recognition of the political identities of unionists, nationalists, and others as
well the decision to leave alone the existing forms of the equally-funded Catholic and
Protestant schools.
Norms of proportionality are evident in the electoral system used to elect the
Assembly33; the procedure used to determine the composition of the Cabinet; the
procedure used to allocate assembly members to Committees with powers of oversight
and legislative initiative34; and the existing and additional legislative provisions to
ensure fair and representative employment, throughout the public sector, and including
the police service.35 To strengthen the power-sharing mechanism, a powerful minority
veto has been imposed in order to ensure that decisions on issues of concern to both
communities are taken only with broad consent of representatives of the two
communities. This refers to the doctrine of parallel consent: a majority of unionist and
loyalist representatives have to vote in favour of the proposed legislation. This requires
a weighted majority where 60 percent of all members have to vote, including at least 40
percent of each of the delegations.
What the above implies is that a cross-community consensus is required for agreement
on issues related to both communities. So evidently, the agreement is abundant with
A degree of cultural autonomy in education and language has existed even prior to 1998. For example, Catholic
schools have been subsidised by the British Government to the same level as Protestant schools since 1992.
33 The system used in Northern Ireland is called the Single Transferable Vote. Every voter has only one vote, but they
can ask for it to be transferred from one candidate to another to make sure it is not wasted. This is done by numbering
the candidates 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and so on instead of just putting an “X” against one of them - Electoral Office for Northern
Ireland (2006), PR/STV Voting System, http://www.eoni.org.uk.
34 Northern Ireland uses the D’Hondt system, also known as the highest average method. Under this system, seats are
won singly and successively on the basis of the highest average – Northern Ireland Assembly (2007), Allocation of
seats in the Assembly Executive and Chairs and Deputy Chairs of Committees, http://www.niassembly.gov.uk.
35 O’Leary, p. 55.
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group guarantees as propounded by consociational theorists. It also becomes apparent
that the arrangement has been designed to ensure that politicians engage in a
continuing balancing process on issues of concern. In this context, McGarry and
O’Leary’s36 assertion becomes centrally valid: “What makes consociations feasible and
work is joint consent across the significant communities, with the emphasis on
jointness.”
Furthermore, Northern Ireland features the conditions that are favourable for
consociational structures to work: distinct lines of cleavage (sharp divisions between
the two main communities, balance of power (Protestants who comprise much of the
unionist population at 53.24 percent, and Catholics who make-up most of the
nationalist population at 43.76 percent), external threats (scare tactic whereby Great
Britain and Ireland threatened Northern Ireland with partition), and small size (5,456
square miles).
Due to the mutually acceptable political arrangement currently in place, Northern
Ireland is overcoming its volatile past and emerging as a stable society. Some of the
figures speak volumes about the progress made: 102 cross-border roads closed by the
army during the Troubles have reopened; 32 security bases have been closed; and
3,500 troops have left since the peace process began bringing troop levels to the lowest
level since 1970.37 Among the many economic dividends are the creation of 31,000 new
jobs since the signing of the Belfast Agreement and the present unemployment level of
3.8 percent, a historically low level.38
Consociational theory was first applied to Northern Ireland by Lijphart himself in 1975.
Although consociational thinking was implicit in the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973,
Lijphart was unconvinced about the prospects for consociational democracy and the
key problem in his view was the absence of support for it among Protestants. Northern
Ireland had a majority that was “capable of exercising hegemonic power” and was
normatively attracted to the Westminster majoritarian tradition of democracy.
Democracy by consensus was deemed unacceptable. Sri Lanka, today, is where
Northern Ireland was then.
The Sri Lankan Power-Sharing Experience
In the last few decades, the Sri Lankan government has tried several approaches to
resolve the ethnic conflict but these measures were either too little or too late. The most
salient among the string of unsuccessful efforts are the establishment of the Provincial
Councils and the proposed Draft Constitution of 1997.
McGarry, J. and O’Leary, p. 15.
R.N. Haass,“The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Remarks to the National Committee on American Foreign
Policy”, US Department of State, New York, 07 January, 2002.
38 Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, Northern Ireland (2007) “Unemployment in Northern Ireland
Remains Low,” Statistics and Economics Research Branch, 14 November, http://www.detini.gov.uk.
36
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Evaluating the 13th Amendment to the Constitution
The 13th Amendment enacted on 14 November 1987 sought to devolve power to the
regions and provided for the establishment of Provincial Councils with legislative
powers and the appointment of a Governor with executive powers for the respective
provinces. It created three lists; the first contained powers that were retained by the
central government (reserved list); the second listed the powers devolved to the
provinces, and the third detailed shared powers between the government and
provinces (concurrent list).
Members to the respective regional bodies are elected under the proportional
representation electoral system, introduced by the Second Republican Constitution of
1978.39 The imprecise division of power between the centre and peripheries and the
latter’s inability to exercise exclusive competence or jurisdiction in any policy area are
some of the significant shortcomings of the 13th Amendment. Authority in two crucial
spheres – land settlement and maintenance of law and order – was left entirely to the
prerogative of the central government, with serious implications for Tamil security in
the North-East. The Councils also had no independent fiscal powers – it could neither
borrow nor tax – and was completely dependent on finances from central government.
Thus, it is no surprise that despite the 13th Amendment, Sri Lanka remains a heavily
centralised state with no real autonomy ceded to the Tamils. As Edrisinha40 notes,
“Continued centralisation was strikingly symbolised by the conspicuous strength of the
executive presidency, although in some areas, such as health and education, devolved
powers could be reclaimed by simple ministerial directive”. Edrisinha41 also points out
that the greatest obstacle to practical devolution was the first phrase of the Reserved
List which provided for ‘National Policy on all Subjects and Functions’ to be determined
by Parliament; this totally undermined powers apparently devolved to the provinces. As
the conflict escalation patterns have shown, the experiment with devolution vis-á-vis
the 13th Amendment to the Constitution has been wholly inadequate.
Evaluating the proposed Draft Constitution of 1997
In many ways, the Draft Constitution presented by the People’s Alliance Government on
03 August 1997, represented a huge leap forward for power-sharing in Sri Lanka. The
full constitutional reforms presented to Parliament in October offered substantial
concessions on representational, juridical, and financial matters and envisaged a
sweeping restructuring of the existing system, introduced by the 13th Amendment.
39The
proportional representation system was introduced with the new constitution so that a change to the
constitution could be prevented, by rendering it virtually impossible for any one party to muster a two-thirds
majority.
40 R. Edrisinha, “Trying times: constitutional attempts to resolve armed conflicts in Sri Lanka,” Conciliation Resources,
London, August, 1998.
41 Ibid.
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The powers of the centre and the regions were to be reconstituted, with greater
autonomy granted to new “regional councils”. The existing list of concurrent powers
was to be abolished and most powers on this list were to be transferred to the proposed
regional councils. The draft also proposed to curb the excessive concentration of power
vested in the executive presidency and distribute greater autonomy to the peripheries.
However, there were no guarantees of equality as propounded by consociational
theorists to reflect the plural nature of the country. In fact, the proposed draft very
explicitly accorded Buddhism, the religion of the majority of the Sinhalese population,
the “foremost place”. In addition, the draft did not require that recruitment to the public
service and the police service should reflect ethnic diversity. In mixed ethnic regions,
the lack of clarity can indeed be dangerous42.
But more centrally, a direct voice for the regional representatives in the central
institutions was not provided for, although a considerable devolution of financial and
administrative power was proposed. The essence of power-sharing where the common
polity is jointly ruled was thus totally overlooked.
The Need for Consociational Thought
Throughout the early years of independence, Sri Lanka invited international admiration
because of the leading position it commanded in Asia not just in terms of economic
prosperity, but also for the peaceful co-existence of its diverse ethnic communities.
However, the relative stability of the 1950s and 1960s was soon replaced by growing
hostilities between the two principal ethnic communities. This has been correctly
attributed to the shift to the increasing centralisation of power and the denial of
autonomy to the Tamil-dominated provinces under the growing influence of Sinhala
Buddhist nationalism43. The classic majoritarian system handed over by the British was
rapidly defined by the Sinhalese political elite in terms of dominance by an ethnic,
linguistic and religious majority – the Sinhalese Buddhists.
The cosmetic transfer of administrative power through the 13th Amendment proved
unsatisfactory not just to the Tamil rebels waging a guerrilla-style war, but also to the
more moderate Tamil political leaders. Even the most radical constitutional reforms
proposed by the Sri Lankan Government in 1997 which featured regional devolution of
power as its centre-piece, did not transcend the majoritarian-style of governance, one of
the root causes of the conflict. Where Lijphart’s favourable conditions for an elite
commitment to cooperate are concerned, Sri Lanka does not meet all the required
criteria. Although there are distinct cleavages and the country is relatively small in size,
M. Chadda,“Between Consociationalism and Control: Sri Lanka,” in U. Schneckener and Wolff, S., eds., Managing
and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa, and Asia, (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004), p.100.
43 Chadda, p.98
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there are no external threats to unite the main communities and is there the balance of
power requirement is absent for the Sinhalese make-up 74 percent of the population
while the Tamils account for only 18 percent of Sri Lanka’s population of 20 million. But
as Lijphart himself concedes, these conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient:
“even when all of the conditions are unfavourable, consociationalism, though perhaps
difficult, should not be considered impossible.”44
Conclusion
Based on a comparative analysis, I have argued that the power-sharing devices
established under the Belfast Agreement of 1998 is paving the way for the successful
transformation of a deep-seated conflict in Northern Ireland, and is creating a
considerably more stable society. Contrastingly, the various mechanisms designed to
mitigate conflict in Sri Lanka have not able to achieve their intended goals. This is
largely because the essence and spirit of power-sharing have been largely ignored by
the country’s policymakers.
As ethnic frictions in Northern Ireland are sedated by consociational prescriptions,
hostilities continue to escalate in Sri Lanka despite the many attempts to formulate a
mutually acceptable power-sharing formula. What Northern Ireland shows is that even
in seemingly intractable civil conflicts, it is possible to create a break-through in
negotiations if the parties are willing to rethink the framework for a settlement. In the
Sri Lanka case, the principles of consociationalism and asymmetry may be necessary
innovations of this kind.
Thus, Northern Ireland teaches Sri Lanka that consociationalism, despite its alleged
deficiencies, is a viable method of resolving conflict in deeply divided societies.
Consociational democracies feature a consensual decision-making process at the
central level on issues of joint concern, and genuine autonomy for ethnic groups to
decide on matters of particular relevance to them. To promote stability, Sri Lankan
policymakers should put forward an alternative choice based on the Draft Constitution
of 1997, preferably a system which has elements of consociationalism and federalism.
Elements of consociationalism are necessary for settlement: consociational mechanisms
don’t always polarise ethnic communities further as critics have alleged and can – and
indeed does – promote cross-community cooperation as I have argued. When faced with
a past of oppressive majority rule, simple plurality is not feasible. The reality is that in
the face of few alternatives, consociationalism has become a prudent pathway for
regions plagued with a history of communal differences.
44
A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, (New Haven: Yale, 1977), p.54.
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