26
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
THE CHALLENGE OF CHINA: TESTING TIMES
FOR NEW LABOUR’S ‘ETHICAL’ DIMENSION
A CASE STUDY OF THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON
CHINA
Kayte Rath ‡
A BSTRACT 1
The inclusion, in 1997, of an ‘ethical’ dimension to foreign policy by New
Labour has been a heavy burden for the UK Government to bear. This can
be seen most clearly in the negotiations surrounding the proposal to lift
the EU arms embargo on China, which has been in place since the events
in Tianan men Square in 1989 on a policy stance aligned to protect
international human rights. The discussion within the UK sidelined this
element of the debate, using manipulation of human rights discourse to
support its pro-lift position. The minimal element that the discourse of
human rights played can be best understood by considering two other
factors. First, the rise of China as an econo mic power has provided an
incentive for the EU to deliver a symbolic gesture, in the form of the
embargo lift, to attempt to socialise China into the international global
economy and its implicit mannerisms. This is underpinned by a long-term,
strategic econo mic engagement with the country and the pursuit of global
stability. Second, the overt advocacy of France and Germany in support
of the proposal meant that the UK could not take up a stance against this.
However, the UK’s relationship with the US restricted its ability to take a
‡
M.Sc. (Public Policy), School of Public Policy, University College London;
Contact with questions/comments: kayterath@hotmail.com.
1
The author would like to extend special thanks to Thom Rath and Jack Straw.
Further thanks to all interviewees, Charles-Henry Courtois, Tamzin Robertson, Moms,
Pops and Sis. Xie xie.
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strong stance and it sought to balance its two competing diplomatic
relationships. The passing of an anti-secession law by the Chinese
government led to a critical change in the embargo discussions. Human
rights were then used as a way for the EU to avoid political
embarrassment, but keep the embargo lift on the agenda for the future.
Overall, the case study shows the ease with which human rights discourse
can be manipulated to serve the interests of different groups. Thus, a
nuanced realist framework is the most illuminating in this case and
although international normative pressure can exert itself, such as with the
embargo’s original imposition, this remains the exception rather than the
rule.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The pursuit, by New Labour, of a foreign policy with an ‘ethical
dimension’ is one that has plagued the government’s foreign relations
since it came to power in 1997. Ever since the then Foreign Secretary,
Robin Cook outlined his vision of British foreign policy as one that
“would put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy”2 giving them
“a new priority,” 3 New Labour has consistently struggled to make this
policy ideal into a concrete reality. The move towards an ethical practice
was meant to rejuvenate British foreign policy so that Britain, once more,
could become an important player in the international community.
Instead, it has proven to be a heavy burden to bear, with the traditional
cartels of national interest, geopolitics and economic prowess continuing
to dominate.
The well-documented rise of China’s prominence onto the
international scene has raised questions about the kinds of pitfalls involved
in juggling ethical considerations with more traditional foreign policy
concerns in a starker contrast than ever before. The burgeoning Chinese
economy and the opportunities for investment and trade are juxtaposed
against the authoritarian regime and the widespread human rights
violations it perpetuates. China is a “particularly difficult case”4 and
presents a dilemma for the EU, USA and the rest of the world, in how they
can benefit from a strong economic relationship with the country, while at
the same time being politically wary about China’s policies and actions.
2
Robin Cook quoted in T. Dunne and N.J. Wheeler, Moral Brittania? Evaluating
the Ethical Dimension in Labour’s Foreign Policy (London: The Foreign Policy Centre,
2004).
3
R. Cook, “Human Rights: Making the Difference” Speech given by Robin Cook to
Amnesty International Human Rights Festival, October 16, 1998.
4
Peter Hain MP quoted in New Statesman, “The New Statesman Interview”, April 3,
2000.
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IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
This broad ranging struggle is encapsulated in the ongoing negotiations
surrounding the lifting of the European Union’s arms embargo policy
towards China. Originally put in place on human rights grounds in 1989
following the incidents in Tiananmen Square, the policy has risen to the
European agenda and has been the subject of fierce debate since 2003. In
an analysis of the UK’s role and position on this policy, this paper seeks
to illuminate current trends in UK policy towards China and demonstrate
how much of the once publicised ‘ethical dimension’ really remains rooted
in New Labour’s agenda. This will be achieved through an analysis of the
role human rights considerations have played in the formation of the
UK’s position on this issue.
The move by Labour to an ‘ethical’ foreign policy can be seen as part
of a wider shift in the foreign policies of Western governments in taking a
more normative stance in their international relations, offering
alternative motives for action other than the narrow concerns of national
interest that have traditionally characterised foreign policy formation.5
Although realism6 has dominated the field of international relations
theory, normative international relations theories have gained increasing
attention, 7 demonstrating the mirroring of Labour’s shift towards a more
normative approach in academic discourse. However, as Brown notes,
realism itself does not lack an ethical dimension, it just sees moral priority
as lying in serving the interests of the members of its own state above the
interests of members of other states.8
Similar to Brown, Frost 9 notes that all foreign policy statements and
actions have ethical meaning and implication so the idea of an ethical
versus a non-ethical foreign policy is something of a false dichotomy. For
him, the importance rests with the interplay between normative and selfinterested concerns, with realism positing a more modest, circumscribed
ethical element than the publicly trumpeted ‘ethical’ stances of New
5
M. Light & K. Smith (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
6
Theory of international relations, which predicts that due to the anarchic nature of
the international system states will always work in their own self-interest to secure their
own interests to maintain or increase their position on the international stage. See
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979).
7
C. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. (Princeton NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1979); Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative
Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992); M. Frost, Ethics in
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); M. Hoffman,
“ N ormative International Theory: Approaches and Issues in Groom”, In Contemporary
International Relations: A Guide to Theory ed. A. R J. and M. Light. London: Pinter
Publishers, 1994).
8
Chris Brown, “Ethics, Interests and Foreign Policy” In Ethics and Foreign Policy
ed. M. Light & K. Smith, 15-32 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
9
M. Frost, Putting the World to Rights: Britain's Ethical Foreign Policy Cambridge
Review of International Affairs 12 (1999).
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Labour. Committed realists, such as Carr10 would point to such moral
discourse as only a guise for other narrow national interests or argue for
the potential for moral discourse to play an instrumental role in
comprising the power of the state to act. 11 As Chandler12 points out, an
ethical dimension to foreign policy is one that suits Western governments,
such as Britain, since it provides a mission statement and increased
legitimacy to their domestic audience. On these accounts, any discussions
around lifting the embargo would focus their concerns solely on national
interest.
These arguments deny the role of international socialisation and norm
dynamics, however, which have played a role in allowing norms, such as
human rights, a greater degree of acceptance in foreign policymaking.
Finnemore 13 stresses this and the way norms can shape and regulate the
behaviour of states. Realist explanations fail to take into account essential
features of politics like emotional appeal to a political goal or the grounds
for moral judgement. The original imposition of the arms embargo could
be seen as just such an instance, motivated purely on the grounds of moral
judgement and motivation derived from international norms, bolstered by
a large-scale, intensely vocal mobilisation of global civil society.
However, if normative explanations proved true in all cases, Labour’s
reputation of sticking to its ethical commitments would be more positive
than it currently is. Although some have been broadly favourable to the
Government, 14 the involvement of the ‘ethical dimension’ seems to have
declined over time. Dunne and Wheeler, for instance moved from
concluding in 1998 that there “has been a marked shift in the content and
conduct of British foreign policy” to two years later supporting the
conclusion that there is an “increasing discrepancy between the moral
rhetoric of the Blair Government and its subsequent practices.”15 More
10
E.H. Carr pointed to the role of the British Harmony of Interests in convincing
others, including those victims of British imperialism, that their interests were the same as
Britain’s in E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study
of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1964).
11
Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy 2 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).
12
D. Chandler, “Rhetoric Without Responsibility: The Attraction of ‘Ethical’
Foreign Policy” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5, no. 3 (2003):
295-316.
13
Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (New York:
Cornell University Press, 1996).
14
R. Little and M. Wickham-Jones (eds.), New Labour’s Foreign Policy: A New
Moral Crusade? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); R. Cook, “Putting
Principle into Practice: The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy” Cambridge Review
of International Affairs 15, no. 1 (2002): 45-51.
15
T. Dunne and N. Wheeler, “Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for
British Foreign Policy” International Affairs 72, no. 1 (1998): 850; T. Dunne and N.J.
Wheeler, “Blair’s Britain: A Force for Good in the World?” in Ethics and Foreign Policy
ed. M. Light & K. Smith, 168 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
30
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
recently, they have shown further disappointment arguing that Blair’s
decision to go to war with Iraq has irreversibly damaged the reputation of
the ethical foreign policy and it is in sore need of revival. 16 Similarly,
Abrahmsen and Williams 17 show that although the introduction of an
‘ethical dimension’ into British foreign policy has raised the UK’s profile
in the international arena, the policy is intrinsically problematic. The
tension between New Labour’s internationalism and the more traditional
realist concerns of national interest are all too apparent, as are the
contradictions involved with committing to both political and economic
liberalism. Furthermore, as Williams18 discusses, the jettisoning of the
term ‘ethical’ in Labour’s election manifesto for 2001 demonstrates how
the explicit use of the term proved too much of a burden to bear by
providing benchmarks that highlighted the administration’s failings, more
than achievements in a positive light.
Consequently, there is a sense of failure around the policy, even
amongst Labour’s own MPs, 19 yet this is too simplistic a reaction. As
previously stated, realism is not without its ethical components and
international norms have had their role to play. However, this case shows
that with a lack of robust civil society pressure or large scale, emotive
media events, there may be a tendency to regress into narrower realist
(though not necessarily unethical) concerns of national interest. Realist
assumptions in generally prove useful however; the fact that there has not
been a complete removal of content associated with ‘ethics’ from the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) may suggest that a more
nuanced account of realism is needed. This is one that acknowledges not
only the ethical dimension of traditional diplomacy itself, but also of the
possible influence of international civil society in creating constituencies
for newer broader definitions of ethics in foreign policy, although these
may remain the exception rather than the rule.
As stated, despite the seeming decline of Labour’s ethical stance, an
examination of FCO policy, mission statements, speeches and press
releases reveals the element still alive and kicking. 20 It is hard to avoid the
discourse of human rights. The FCO has published annual human rights
16
T. Dunne and N.J. Wheeler, Moral Brittania? Evaluating the Ethical Dimension
in Labour’s Foreign Policy (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004).
17
R. Abrahmsen and P. Williams, “Ethics and Foreign Policy: The Antinomies of
New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ in Sub-Saharan Africa” Political Studies 49 (2001): 249-264.
18
P. Williams, “The Rise and Fall of the ‘Ethical Dimension’: Presentation and
Practice in New Labour’s Foreign Policy” Cambridge Review of International Affairs
15, no. 1 (2002);.See also The Guardian, “Labour Drops ‘Ethical Tag’,” September 4,
2000.
19
T. Kingham, “Wanted: Ethics in Foreign Policy” Socialist Campaign Group
News 164 (2001).
20
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website, FCO, www.fco.gov.uk, (accessed 12 th
September 2005).
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reports since 1998, has a specific department dedicated to human rights
concerns, democracy and governance (HRDGG), and maintains human
rights concerns among its key priorities.21 The ‘ethical’ element is still
overtly present and still jostling for position within the FCO’s varied and
competing foreign policy considerations. As stated before, China
represents a considerable challenge on this front as to how the UK can
marry its desires to see economic advancement, regional and global
stability while committing itself to the improvement towards better
human rights and democratic structure in China. These are more often
than not conflicting interests, which form part of a wider debate on the
management of China’s rising prominence.
How to deal with the increasing importance of China is perhaps one
of the most prominent elements of post-Cold War international relations.
Throughout history, countries have risen up and fallen down the ladder of
supremacy and there is no magic formula for dealing with a rising power. 22
How you deal with a rising power will also reflect one’s own position
within the spectrum. However, the case of China is seen as presenting a
plethora of difficulties based not only on its unprecedented economic
growth, but also its political regime and its potential to develop global
influence rivaling that of the USA, perhaps attaining superpower status.23
Different strategies have been developed to try and deal with China.
These have ranged from strict advocates of containment 24 and the use
balance of power principles and tactics to different forms of engagement
intended to integrate China into international society. 25 The policy of
containment however, is now largely defunct with most governments
agreeing that some form of engagement is the best policy for dealing with
21
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website, “UK Priorities,” FCO,
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Pa
ge&cid=1007029393465, (accessed 12 th September 2005).
22
R. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory” In
Engaging China: The management of an emerging power ed. A.I. Johnston and R.S Ross
(London: Routledge, 1999).
23
D. Shambaugh (ed.), Greater China: The Next Superpower? (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995); S. Kim, “China as a Great” Current History Sept. (1997): 246251; A. Goldstein, “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival” International
Security 22, no. 3 (1997): 36-73.
24
A. Waldron, “Deterring China” Commentary 100, no. 4 (1995); G. Rachman,
Containing China in Washington Quarterly 19, no. 1 (1996): 129-140; G. Segal,
“East Asia and the containment of China” International Security 20, no. 4 (1996):
107-135.
25
D. Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating
Beijing’s Responses” International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 180-209; J. Shimm,
Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations Press, 1996).
32
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
China, 26 although what form this takes will vary. Shambaugh argues that
although “the insular and defensive character of Chinese politics and
nationalism suggests that China will be reluctant and difficult to engage and
to integrate into the existing international order,”27 the international
community must try in order to protect international order and economic
stability.
For those such as Shimm, 28 this policy of engagement means
attempting to develop a constructive way to react to the rise of China.
This will involve increasing economic integration and the pursuit of
security engagement to reduce the risks posed by China’s military
expansion. Pursuit of these aims will lead China into the international
fold. Enmeshing China into global regimes will help direct its action in a
more cooperative manner. 29 As demonstrated by Ross, success has already
been seen in this area. He argues that the US has been fairly successful in
engaging with China by managing to pursue short-term, as well as longterm aims. In the short-term it has gained access to valuable Chinese
markets and in the long-term it has facilitated engagement of China in
multilateral institutions.30
However, policies of engagement have focused mainly on economic
and security integration, with Shimm placing ‘respect for basic human
rights’ at the bottom of his ten principles of conditional engagement. 31
The assumption is that economic liberalization will lead to an
improvement in human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The effect
of China’s ‘opening up’ policy has so far been positive in this area. For
example, it has led to the allowance of more media freedom. This was
initially aimed at reducing financial losses, but the freeing of public
discourse has been an indirect result. 32 However, the effect is diffuse and
protracted, and as Nathan argues, “Economic engagement is a
26
Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing ’s
Responses.” e.g. the EU, Australia, Japan, ASEAN, Canada and the US.
27
Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing ’s
Responses,” 209.
28
Shimm.
29
S. Kim, “China and the United Nations in Economy” In China Joins the World:
Progress and Prospects ed. E & M. Oksenberg, 43-89 (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations Press, 1999).
30
The US was instrumental in getting China into the CTBT (the Preparatory
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty), the Nuclear Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Zangger Committee (Committee looking at the
interpretation of article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT) (see R.S. Ross, “Engagement in US
China Policy in Johnston” In Engaging China: The management of an emerging power
ed. A.I. Johnston and R.S. Ross (London: Routledge, 1999).
31
Shimm, 8.
32
1994).
M. Pei, From Reform to Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
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complement to, not a substitute for, human rights policy.” 33 There are
areas where economic integration may harm rights, such as labour
conditions and areas where it may make no difference at all, such as the
high death rates evidenced in Chinese orphanages. Contrary to Shimm,
Nathan holds that China must be held to a level of human rights conduct
concurrent with its emerging importance and this justifies urgent and
sustained attention to China’s human rights record by the West.
The necessary attention to human rights Nathan calls for, however,
will frequently come into conflict with the economic pursuits of countries
in China. As noted by Breslin, 34 the UK’s pursuit of commercial contracts
in China is in danger of overriding any remaining ethical element of
foreign policy the UK has. Presumably, following similar logic to Shimm,
the improvement in human rights is set to follow on from this. However,
as Nathan points out, it is only when the West has taken a strong stance
on human rights in China has it been able to successfully support China’s
internal evolution. 35
Furthermore, the UK’s reputation for improving human rights in
China has been poor. New Labour’s “much heralded diplomacy of human
rights produced little in the way of discernible achievements in China,” 36
focusing more on not wishing to ‘rock the boat’ and endanger commercial
ties. At the EU level, policies toward China are sometimes just as confused
with those not always contributing towards the objectives of a more stable,
democratic China, and often failing to bring about the intended result of
making China a more stable global partner. 37
It is against this backdrop that the lifting of the EU arms embargo on
China emerges. As Labour begins its third term in government, takes on
the EU presidency and begins charm offensives towards China in the form
of various diplomatic visits, an assessment of how human rights
considerations are impacting British foreign policy now is an important
test not only for Blair’s government, but for the promotion of universal
principles in general. A study of relations with China, through the lens of
the arms embargo, is a perfect opportunity to examine the extent to
which human rights considerations really are given credence in UK foreign
33
A. Nathan, “China and the International Human Rights Regimes in Economy” in
China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects ed. E. and M. Oksenberg, 136-160 (New
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999).
34
S. Breslin, “Beyond Diplomacy: UK Relations with China since 1997”
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 6, no. 3 (2004): 409-425.
35
Nathan, 159.
Dunne and Wheeler, 182.
37
K. Barysch, C. Grant and M. Leonard, “Embracing the Dragon: The EU’s
partnership with China” (London: Centre for European Reform, 2005).
36
34
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policy, and how Britain is fostering relations with this rapidly expanding
nation.
This paper will first give a brief background to the arms embargo and
the debate surrounding it. This will be followed by a discussion of the role
accorded to human rights in the formulation of the UK’s position, arguing
that the role was so minimal as to virtually be non-existent. The
remainder of the paper will seek to explain why this was the case and
conclude that the UK hides behind its bilateral human rights dialogues with
China to justify its avoidance of human rights in broader policy
discussions. In addition, it has failed to acknowledge the potential leverage
available from the embargo and the symbolic significance of lifting the
embargo without human rights concessions by China. It will also conclude
that on this issue, the UK’s commitments to and pressures from its
relationships with the EU and the USA prevented it from making a strong
stance on the arms embargo, demonstrating that its pledge to an ethical
stance falls well below the priority accorded to sustaining its diplomatic
ties.
2.
B ACKGROUND TO THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON C HINA 38
The embargo under discussion was put in place on 27 June 1989 in
response to the crackdown by the Chinese authorities on students
protesting for democracy in Beijing’s central square. The EU responded
during the Madrid European Council by putting an embargo in place on
arms sales and military cooperation. 39 China has long been calling for the
embargo to be lifted, perhaps most ardently in China’s EU Policy Paper in
October 2003. The first of its kind, this paper calls explicitly for an end
to the embargo stating “The EU should lift its ban on arms sales to China
at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation
on defence industry and technologies.”40 This prompted discussion within
the EU, and China found a truly prominent advocate within the union, in
the form of France. France pushed the issue to the EU agenda for
discussion, with German Chancellor Schroeder quickly adding his voice to
that of the French president Chirac.
38
A copy of the original Declaration On China, containing the arms embargo appears
in Appendix 1.
39
European Parliament, “European Parliaments Fact sheet 6.3.10: China”, European
Parliament, http://www.europarl.eu.int/facts/6_3_10_en.htm, (accessed September 12,
2005).
40
Department of European Affairs, “China’s EU Policy Paper”, Dept. of European
Affairs, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xos/dqzzywt/t27708.htm, (accessed
September 5, 2003).
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Since then, the embargo has undergone various negotiations, being
referred to the GAERC and COREPER. 41 Proponents of the embargo lift
have argued that the embargo is no longer relevant in today’s
international society, and therefore the EU should be working towards a
more positive engagement with China by moving away from multilateral
stigmatisation. Those against a decision in lifting the embargo have argued
how such a decision could destabilise the tense situation between Taiwan
and China42 and how China’s human rights records does not deserve the
kind of reward the embargo lift would represent.
The embargo was due to be lifted in June 2005, but this deadline was
dropped following the passing of an anti-secession law against Taiwan by
China, which was said to change the political atmosphere of the
discussions surrounding a policy reversal. It remains in place at the present
time. Although the EU remains committed to lifting the embargo at some
point, it is uncertain as to when this will occur.
What is certain however, is that during the UK’s presidency of the
EU, the topic is almost sure not to arise. The UK’s position on the issue
has been characterised by non-commitment and a sense of “muddling
through in the middle of the pack.” 43 Although it is keen to stress that the
proposal to lift the embargo is “still under review and is still an ongoing
negotiation,” 44 the UK has come out publicly in favour of the lift, with
Jack Straw claiming that he “supported the proposal from President
Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder that we should review the EU China arms
embargo because, on the face of it, it had run its course.”45 This pro-lift
position will be investigated in the rest of the paper.
41
General Affairs and External Relations Council and the Permanent Representatives
Committee respectively.
42
The territory of Taiwan possesses an ambiguous diplomatic status. The PRC seeks
the total reunification of the territory of Taiwan as part of its ‘one China’ policy. However,
the present Taiwanese administration views Taiwan as an independent sovereign state.
This tension has the potential to escalate into military confrontation, which could involve
the USA under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.
43
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005
(please note, all transcripts are available from the author.
44
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 3, July 28, 2005.
45
Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade Industry
Committees (Quadripartite Committee). “Strategic Export Controls: HMG’s Annual
Report for 2003, Licensing and Parliamentary Scrutiny” (London: HMSO, 2005).
36
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IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
“H UMAN RIGHTS HAVE BEEN A VERY SMALL PART OF THIS WHOLE
46
DISCUSSION ” : THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS IN
SHAPING THE UK’S POSITION
Given that Mr. Straw thought the embargo had ‘run its course,’ it
becomes necessary to examine why the UK Government under the
leadership Tony Blair took this stance. As previously mentioned, this
paper focuses on the role of human rights in policymaking as a test for the
Government’s explicit commitments to human rights. Consequently, we
shall begin with a discussion of the role human rights plays in the
considerations regarding the UK’s pro-lift position.
A commitment to human rights forms one of the sets of priorities the
FCO has in pursuing its foreign policy and is said to be “integral to the
Government's wider foreign policy and security agenda.”47 However, the
extent to which these considerations have played in the UK’s position on
the EU arms embargo is not as transparent as its mission statement would
indicate. Given that the embargo was originally put in place on human
rights grounds, one might imagine that considerations of human rights also
played a crucial role in the proposals for lifting the embargo. However,
most of the evidence points to the contrary. As one source indicates
“there hasn’t been a real attempt to push China to make human rights
concessions as a quid pro quo for lifting the embargo.”48 The view that
emerges is one of human rights as a “general foreign policy concern,” 49
which needs to be addressed not substantively in itself, but because of
public perception or its instrumental uses. The Government puts little
effort into ensuring human rights are taken seriously and the lack of
clarification over what constitutes human rights means there is
considerable room for interpretation, manipulation and manoeuvre, which
the Government has used to the full in relation to this case.
In the wider public sphere however, the subject of human rights has
been raised on numerous occasions in respect of this policy: in Parliament,
in the press and by NGO groups. NGOs have consistently raised concerns
over the issue of human rights. Amnesty International urged the EU to
consider carefully the message it would send out about human rights if the
embargo were to be raised,50 whilst Human Rights Watch warned that to
lift the embargo without sufficient pressure on the Chinese “would be a
major setback for human rights in China and the EU’s reputation as a
46
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website. “Speech of FCO minister, Ian
Pearson” (21st July), http://www.fco.gov.uk, (accessed September 12, 2005).
48
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
49
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005.
50
Amnesty International, EU Press Office Release, April 14 (Brussels: Amnesty
International, 2004).
47
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serious advocate for human rights.”51 In addition, some organisations took
part in extensive lobbying of the UK and EU to promote further this
aspect of the situation. 52
In the press, human rights considerations were also featured, albeit
alongside the issues of regional stability involving Taiwan and the reaction
from the US. Comment pieces in national newspapers warned of trading
the embargo away lightly without due consideration of the human rights
element: the “EU does not have to give away the embargo for free,” 53
suggesting concessions on human rights regarding the release of
Tiananmen prisoners or ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights as an appropriate gesture by the Chinese. This is
echoed by David Shambaugh in the International Herald Tribune who also
cites China’s numerous human rights failings as a significant contributing
factor to making the lift unacceptable.54
In Parliament, the subject has been raised both within the House of
Commons and the House of Lords. As Tom Harris MP pointed out, since
1989, “China's human rights record has barely improved in any discernible
way.”55 Similarly, several Early Day Motions (EDM) by MPs from across
the parties make explicit reference to the human rights arguments
surrounding the debate and raise concerns about the lifting of the embargo
without taking these sufficiently into account. 56 As Greg Pope notes, “the
lifting of the EU arms embargo is not warranted by China's appalling
human rights record.”57 In addition to this, the Foreign Affairs Committee
(FAC) Human Rights Report 2005 concludes that “the raising of the EU
arms embargo on China would send the wrong signal at this time, in the
absence of strong undertakings from the Chinese government to address
human rights issues.”58
The acknowledgement of a human rights element to the debate by
those involved in parliament, the media and NGOs is clear. However, the
widespread vocalisation of these concerns was certainly less than that
51
Human Rights Watch, “Open Letter to Tony Blair, Prime Minister:
Recommendations for the upcoming E.U.-China Summit”, http://www.hrw.org.uk
(accessed August 30, 2005).
52
Alison Reynolds, interview with author, August 16, 2005.
53
The Guardian, “The Lure of Beijing,” May 25, 2005.
54
The International Herald Tribune, “EU To Put Brakes on Lifting the EU Arms
Embargo to China”, April 13, 2005.
55
Hansard Reporting, “Tom Harris MP, Column 156-157” (London: TSO, January
25, 2005), www.parliament.uk.
56
H. Cohen, Early Day Motion 986: EU Arms Embargo on China (London: TSO,
2004); S. Doughty, Early Day Motion 630: Arms Embargo on China (London: TSO,
2005); all EDMs available at www.parliament.uk.
57
G. Pope, Early Day Motion 891: Arms Embargo in China No. 2 (London: TSO,
2005).
58
Foreign Affairs Committee, Human Rights Report 2005. (London: HMSO, 2005),
7, 36.
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garnered in 1989, owing to the lack of a specific, high profile, emotive
media event. This is not to deny that there were no other concerns to be
expressed if the embargo were to be lifted.59 Crucially though, human
rights concerns, while acknowledged by all as at least minimally relevant
to the public debate, were given very different discursive and political
priority by different groups. For the FAC, Greg Pope and the 31 MPs that
signed his motion, human rights concerns were enough in themselves for
the embargo to remain. For others, it was enough to raise grave concerns
and call for a compulsory review of the embargo before a decision on its
lifting should be made.60 Yet for the Government, these concerns featured
little in the formation of their position on the issue and the possibility of
a review, indicated by Straw, has never been fully substantiated: “There has
never been a review in the sense of ‘let’s see what having the embargo
there has achieved. Let’s see whether we should maintain it or even
strengthen it.’ Instead, it has been more about ‘shall we lift it?’ and if so
‘how can we mitigate the impact?’ When you see a review being spoken
of, that’s rubbish.”61 This suggests that Government considerations were
purely instrumental and totally divorced from the original objectives of
the embargo; it also seems to suggest that the lift was seen as inevitable
and therefore the Government concentrated on the effect of the decision
itself, rather than whether to lift it or not.
To the extent that the Government did take account of the human
rights element it can be seen more as an exercise in damage control. It did
offer responses to the human rights concerns discussed by arguing firstly,
that it believed China had improved its human rights record since 1989
and secondly, following on from the first point, that it did not belong in
the same category as other states under embargoes.
A standard response to the human rights argument within this debate,
from the Government was that “the human rights situation in China has
eased” and is “significantly better than it was 15 or 16 years ago.”62 Bill
Rammel MP demonstrates this position in a speech given on China in
Westminster Hall: “Human rights and individual freedoms, particularly on
the economic and social side, have undoubtedly increased greatly in the
59
Increased arms sales to China and the potential for this to cause regional
instability; potential to destabilise China’s relationship with Taiwan and the potential
for damage to UK transatlantic relations were all concerns that were openly expressed by
MPs, Peers, the media and NGOs alike.
60
M. Ancram, Early Day Motion 1004: Arms Embargo on China (no.2) (London:
TSO, 2005).
61
Interview with source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
62
Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade Industry
Committees (Quadripartite Committee), Oral evidence given by Jack Straw, Q114 on
January 12, 2005.
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past 10 years.”63 The Chinese would also point to the amount of people
they have pulled out of poverty since 1989 and indicate these as advances
in social, economic and development rights; a position the Government is
willing to accept. 64 However, by emphasising economic and social rights
they seem to be moving the parameters away from the original abuses that
caused the embargo’s imposition. These were abuses of civil and political
freedoms surrounding issues of freedom of expression. In this area, the
Chinese Government can hardly point to any improvement, as is discussed
below. The invocation of social and economic rights raises questions about
the trade off between different kinds of rights and which ones take
priority. It also indicates the ease with which the discourse of human rights
can be manipulated and broken down to serve the interests of different
groups. Since there are no clear criteria as to which rights rank higher or
lower in priority, there is no way to significantly judge a country’s record
with any consistency. If the British Government agrees with the Chinese
on the significance of economic and social rights in this instance, then
they would seem to be indicating the lesser importance of civil and
political rights, yet arguably, since the embargo relates specifically to the
Tiananmen incident and the abuse of rights there, the Government’s
arguments are not addressing the key reasons for the embargo’s
imposition, making their stance largely irrelevant. Moreover, without
consistent criteria for assessing how much better or worse things have
gotten, it is hard for this discourse to have any real practical meaning,
either for governments or civil society.
This leads to perhaps one of the most striking aspects of the debate in
the UK, which is how the events of Tiananmen Square, having been
absolutely central to justifying and motivating the original embargo, are
frequently elided or pushed to the margins in government statements and
policy considerations. With Tiananmen and civil rights restored to its
central discursive position, the argument for retaining the embargo on
human rights ground flows easily. Not only are political dissidents
imprisoned after the events still in jail, but during the run up to the
fifteenth anniversary of the crackdown the Chinese Government showed
that little had really changed in their approach, either to the event itself
or to the issues surrounding freedom of expression that it represents. The
government “still forbids any public commemoration of the event. Police
harass and detain those dedicated to securing rehabilitation of victims,
payment of compensation, or reconsideration of the official verdict.” 65
63
Hansard Reporting, “Bill Rammell MP, Column 337W pt 24” (London: TSO,
March 16, 2005), www.parliament.uk.
64
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005
65
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2005 (New York: Human Rights Watch,
2005), 1.
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Even the installation of a new leadership 66 in 2003 did not bring about a
significant turn around in the official Chinese view of events, with the
attitude of the Chinese administration remaining unapologetic. The new
government still refuses a review of the events, and the impunity
surrounding 1989 is ongoing, with no signal that this will change.67
Returning to the Government’s claim about the ‘easing’ of the human
rights situation in China, even if one was to concede that the events of
Tiananmen Square were no longer relevant, a big concession admittedly,
these claims of an ‘easing’ are not as well evidenced as the Government
would like to imply. The evidence to condemn China’s human rights
record is readily available and can even be found within the FCO, the very
department that is attempting to argue its improvement. The FCO’s own
Hu man Rights Report 2005 still lists China in the ‘Major Countries of
Concern’ section, with the UK continuing to have “serious concerns about
basic human rights in China.” 68 They are not alone. International NGO
groups have frequently and consistently condemned China’s human rights
record. Amnesty International, although seeming to agree to some extent
with the UK Government’s assessment that the human rights situation has
improved, stresses that whilst “there was progress towards reform in some
areas, this failed to have a significant impact on serious and widespread
human rights violations perpetuated across the country.” 69 It is not just
these ‘usual suspects’ that hold this concern. The US Department of
State’s 2004 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices details the
countless failings in China’s human rights record of recent times claiming
that “China’s cooperation and progress on human rights during 2004 was
disappointing. China failed to fulfil many of the commitments it made at
66
The pairing of Hu Jintao, President and Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister
The Guardian, “Tiananmen Review Rejected,” June 7, 2005.
68
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights Report 2005 (London: HMSO,
2005), 40.
69
Amnesty International, Undermining Global Security: The EU’s Arms Exports
2004 (London: Amnesty International, 2004). Areas of improvement included: new
regulations aimed at preventing torture in police custody; an amendment to the
Constitution in March stated “the state respects and protects human rights”; progress was
also made on China’s AIDS/HIV epidemic with a new law to strengthen AIDS prevention
and stop discrimination against those infected; China also continued to engage in human
rights dialogues with other countries and allowed the UN Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention to visit. However, the government still arbitrarily detained peaceful activists
and advocates of reform; freedom of expression continued to be curtailed; violence against
women was widespread as a result of the family planning policy; imprisonment and
detainment of political activists was still widespread; repression and detention of the
Falun Gong movement and other unofficial religious groups continued; the death penalty
continued to be used extensively and arbitrarily; torture continued in a wide variety of
state institutions; there was forcible deportation of North-Korean Asylum seekers; harsh
repression on the Uighur minority in Xinjiang continued to be justified by the ‘war on
terror’; Freedom of religion, expression and association continued in Tibet with arbitrary
arrests and trials.
67
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the 2002 US-China Human Rights Dialogue.”70 Thus, the US seems to be
in disagreement with the UK as to the level of human rights progress that
has actually been obtained within China. This provokes questions as to the
evidence and criteria each government uses. Either they both work from
identical criteria but disagree on evidence or they have the same evidence
but a totally different understanding of what is an acceptable ‘easing’ of
conditions. If human rights were really a central consideration, one would
expect the UK Government to make its criteria clear; it has failed to do so
and has further complicated the issue by invoking social and economic
rights. Again, there is a lack of clarity, which seems to indicate a probable
lack of seriousness on the part of the Government.
A further line of argument the Government has used with the
intention of justifying the removal of the arms embargo, was that China
did not deserve to be in the same category as other states such as Burma
and Zimbabwe, which are subject to similar arms embargoes. Jack Straw
intimated that he had “long understood China’s argument, which is that to
lump them in with, say, Burma and Zimbabwe is not appropriate and I do
not think it is.”71 This seems to imply that although China is a human
rights abuser, it is not as big an abuser as the likes of Burma and Zimbabwe
and does not deserve to be castigated in this manner. Given the previous
discussion over the confusion of the ranking of rights and which ones
figure highest, it is hard to then understand the Foreign Secretary’s implied
view that China is less of a human rights abuser than Burma or Zimbabwe.
As far as the Government has shown, it has no explicit criteria in making
this judgment, nor does the Foreign Secretary give any further explanation
as to why exactly China no longer deserves to be in the same group as
these two. Again, there is lack of clarity and of consistency showing an
overall lack of seriousness in considering the issue of human rights in
China.
Aside from these arguments relating to the embargo, sources close to
the Government were keen to point to the bilateral human rights dialogues
that exist between China and the UK and stress these as the appropriate
means of tackling human rights issues with China. 72 This is further
70
US Department of State, Introduction at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41586.htm: The report criticises China’s
record on arresting and detaining political activists, as well as those freely discussing
ideas on the Internet, those attending house churches, lawyers acting on behalf of
dissidents and the disposed, workers protesting their rights, journalists and intellectuals.
It is also critical of continued abuses in prisons, the crackdown on the Falun Gong and
states that the Constitution amendment to include protection of human rights, remains
unclear as to what extent the Government plans to implement this.
71
Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade Industry
Committees (Quadripartite Committee), Oral evidence given by Jack Straw.
72
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005;
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 3, July 28, 2005.
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IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
supported by various parliamentary questions raised on China’s human
rights record, which sees ex-FCO minister, Bill Rammell consistently
pointing to the dialogue as the correct means of raising such issues with
China. 73 Together with the FCO, 74 these sources also have pointed to
projects that the UK had undertaken in China. 75 It is argued that these
dialogues and programs show the UK’s commitment to human rights in
China and are said to be more effective than the embargo at making a
difference to the situation in the country.
However, Dunne and Wheeler 76 showed these dialogues have in reality
born little fruit. Instead, the Chinese have used the dialogue as an end in
itself, avoiding further scrutiny of the human rights situation and
threatening withdrawal from the talks should the UK bring robust
pressure.77 Yet, despite the failings of these dialogues, the UK has refused
to acknowledge the opportunity to use the embargo as a tool of leverage
over China on human rights. As Alison Reynolds of Free Tibet argues, UK
policy towards China on human rights has “for too long been channelled
into a very specific programme, which is the bilateral human rights
dialogues.”78 Her point is that the UK should be pursuing its human rights
agenda with China through a variety of means and valuing a diverse
approach. The UK Government has failed to acknowledge that the “EU
arms embargo is a fantastically powerful means of leverage.”79 The
Chinese have applied considerable diplomatic pressure in trying to get the
embargo lifted: “Their lobbying was very forceful with no real hint that
they felt they needed to do anything in return.” 80 Such vigorous lobbying
indicates the importance the Chinese have attached to the lifting of the
embargo. With this kind of desire the EU could have used the embargo as a
tool with which to secure certain concessions on the basis of human rights.
This is something that the UK has seemingly ignored, rather content on
shifting the focus to the dialogues and programmes it pursues, without
acknowledging the human rights dimension of the debate or realising the
73
Hansard Reporting, ”Bill Rammell MP, Column 1549W pt24” (London: TSO,
November 16, 2004); Hansard Reporting, “Bill Rammell MP, Column 1651W pt26”
(London: TSO, 12 February, 2004); Hansard Reporting, “Bill Rammell MP, Column
337W pt 24” (London: TSO, March 16, 2005); Hansard Reporting, “Bill Rammell MP,
Column 971W pt16” (London: TSO, February 28, 2005). All available at
www.parliament.uk.
74
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
75
These include: promoting judicial justice by reforming criminal trial procedure;
reforming the death penalty review system; standardising the death penalty through
sentencing guidelines; police and human rights and enhancing human rights in prisons.
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 44).
76
Dunne and Wheeler, “Blair’s Britain: A Force for Good in the World?”
77
Foreign Affairs Committee, Tenth Report: People’s Republic of China.
78
Alison Reynolds, interview.
79
Alison Reynolds, interview.
80
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005.
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power they might have over China in this circumstance. It demonstrates,
along with the previous evidence, a lack of willingness to allow human
rights to play a significant role in policy discussion, preferring instead to
keep it boxed away in specific dialogues, which have a questionable
reputation for success. Again, a human rights profile is maintained but the
reality is that they are frequently sidelined in broader policy discussions
and the ineffective bilateral dialogues may suit the interests of the UK as
much as China, in that they project an image that cares about human
rights, but this is backed by little substance.
A closer institutional analysis of the role of the Human Rights,
Democracy and Governance Group (HRDGG) in the policy formulation
process confirms this general impression. It is true that the HRDGG was
consulted on the issue,81 yet the extent and nature of this consultation
remains unclear due to restrictions imposed because of the current
undecided nature of the policy and its ongoing sensitivity. One source
close to the Government asserted that there were “three pillars”82 within
the FCO that were involved with the discussion of the arms embargo.
These were the Counter Proliferation Department, the East Asia Group
and the EU Department (External). The HRDGG was not mentioned as a
major player within the policy process. Furthermore, the main forum for
public discussion on this issue was the Quadripartite Committee, whose
remit is to deal with strategic export controls. Those giving evidence to
the Quadripartite Committee 83 on this topic along with Jack Straw were
Edward Oakden, Director of Defence and Strategic Threats, and David
Landsman, Head of the Counter-Proliferation Department. This indicates
that these departments were considered by the Government to be the most
important players involved. The extent to which the embargo was
discussed in any other forum seems to have been minimal.
Furthermore, former Amnesty International Campaigns Manager for
Arms and Trade, Robert Parker suggests that the role of the HRDGG
within the FCO is severely limited with respect to arms exports licensing.
Based on his own investigations, he found that although the HRDGG was
the agency responsible for raising human rights concerns in the FCO “it
was unclear whether concerns raised by the HRPD (now the HRDGG)
would always be circulated to the DTI 84 , or whether their concerns were
sometimes taken out of the final collective FCO response if the decision
to support the licence application had been made. They don’t have the
power to actually veto applications on human rights grounds, and it was
81
HRDGG (pers. comm.)
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
83
Committee made up of the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and
Trade Industry Committees.
84
Department of Trade and Industry, the department responsible for all final decision
on export applications.
82
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unclear to what extent they ‘have the ear’ of the Foreign Secretary over
and above other FCO departments such as the Counter Proliferation
Department.” 85 Considering the previous evidence on those who were
involved, the HRDGG seems to have played an equally shadowy role in
this arms licensing debate than in previous ones.
Overall, human rights have played into this policy formulation only
in the most confusing, contradictory, endlessly mutable, and flexible
manner. This is perhaps inevitable given that all the evidence points to
government indifference or at the most, negligible interest towards the
human rights concerns originally behind the embargo. There is also
evidence of the absence of basic, clear, commensurate criteria across
departments, governments and NGOs on human rights standards providing
proper means of assessment, comparison and debate. There is a great deal
of room for different interpretations and stances, all apparently equally
loyal to ‘human rights’. Lastly, the Government’s bilateral human rights
dialogues with China have provided a veil to hide behind, with the
Government doing little to incorporate these concerns in wider debates.
The rest of the paper will examine further the first point raised above,
namely the Government’s indifference to human rights on this policy and
focusing on two main factors, and seek to explain why human rights
concerns, in this instance were not valued by the UK Government and
what other considerations were viewed as more important.
4.
THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE “ BIG SYMBOLIC PRIZE”86 : THE ROLE
OF THE GROWING C HINESE ECONOMY IN SHAPING THE UK’S
POSITION
Although it can be argued convincingly that China’s human rights
record has not changed significantly since 1989, other extremely
important factors in the country’s strategic importance to other states
have. It’s not new to note the amazing rise of China as an economic
power. China is the world’s fastest growing economy and as the most
populous country on the planet, it increasingly tantalizes the national
interests of other states by offering a potentially enormous market for
European trade and by having the ability to effect world markets.
Secondly, and flowing on from the previous point, China’s foreign policy
has consequently become more important. As it begins to have a greater
influence on the international market, it becomes more important to
other international actors and demands greater attention. As Sutter notes
“China’s present international significance rests heavily on its rapidly
85
86
Robert Parker, written interview, received August 16, 2005.
Interview conducted with a source close to the government 2, July 26, 2005.
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growing economy and its increasing integration with the world
economy.”87
Having already seen that one of the FCO’s priorities relates to the
promotion of human rights, a glance at another priority may hold the key
to why human rights was accorded so little attention. The UK pledges, as a
foreign policy priority, the “promotion of economic interests in an open
and expanding global economy.” 88 With such a rapidly expanding
economy, China can hardly be left out of the UK’s calculations when
considering the potential future of the global economy in benefiting
British interests. The importance to the UK of a profitable trade
relationship with China is further supported by the FAC in stating that
“the heart of the Government’s new China policy has been a focus on
promoting the United Kingdom’s commercial interests.” 89
So, can the decision by the UK to support the lifting of the arms
embargo be seen as an attempt by the UK to pursue this particular foreign
policy priority with China? Although there is some room for debate in this
area, the majority of the evidence seems to suggest that the role of
economic motivation itself was not key. Firstly, the incentive for
increased arms trade with China was not present, and secondly, the
incentives towards less direct, commercial benefits were not obvious, thus,
not making them a key factor on their own. However, the increasing
importance of China as an international actor due to its expanding
economy was a key driver, making the decision to lift the embargo one of
political symbolic value rather than material and commercial one.
In respect to the arms trade, the removal of the embargo is not expected
to open up any major new markets for the UK. The EU’s Code of
Conduct, 90 which already regulates and assesses the granting of license for
arms exports against a series of criteria, is expected to maintain a similar
level of control over the market as the embargo. This is debatable and is
contested by NGOs.91 They argue that the existence of the Code means
that there is in place a regulatory mechanism on the arms trade, which is
seen to prevent, to a degree, the granting of export licenses. In turn this
87
R. Sutter, “Why Does China Matter?” Washington Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2004): 76.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website, “UK Priorities.”
89
Foreign Affairs Committee, Tenth Report: People’s Republic of China, paragraph
88
109.
90
Introduced in 1998, the Code of Conduct defines a list of criteria and operative
provision that must be met by all EU member states when exporting arms. Within this
Criterion 2 takes into account human rights, referring to the non-export of arms to
countries where the export may be used for internal repression. Criterion 4 takes into
consideration issues of regional peace, security and stability.
91
For a full exploration of the Code’s failings see: Saferworld, Taking Control
(London: Saferworld, 2004); Amnesty International, Undermining Global Security: The
EU’s Arms Exports 2004; Oxfam, Lock, Stock and Barrel (Oxford: Oxfam, 2004).
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means that a motivation by the UK, based solely on the chance of
increased arms sales would be implausible. Brinley Salzmann, Director of
exports for the Defence Manufacturers Association sees little aspiration
from EU member states to capitalise on the embargo’s removal, confirms
this.92
In regards to the UK, an increase in arms sales, related specifically to
the embargo lift, is almost certainly sure not to arise for two reasons.
Firstly, due to the nature of the UK license application procedure as it
stands, and secondly, due to the relationship that the UK defence industry
has with the USA. Salzmann claims that he “can be perfectly certain that
a lifting of the embargo won’t result in any additional defence sales to
China,” 93 due particularly to the nature of the UK licensing procedure as it
already stands. He describes this as a “very strict and robust assessment
criteria for China.” 94 Secondly, because of the UK’s close transatlantic ties
with the USA and the USA’s relationship with Taiwan, any attempt by the
UK defence industry to sell weapons to the Chinese could potentially
rebound in a reactionary loss of sales from the US market or US
sanctions. 95 At the present time, in relation to the arms industry “the
Americans are our biggest off shore supplier. They are our second biggest
export customers in the world and they are our biggest collaborative
partners.”96 American business relations, for the UK arms industry, are too
important to be jeopardised by US retaliation over sales to China. BAE
Systems demonstrated as much when they claimed they would not sell
arms to China if the embargo were to be lifted, for fear of endangering
their extensive American interests.97
Although the embargo lift might seem like a potential opening for
arms sales, this is not the case. In terms of a potential market for arms,
China is even less attractive to the UK than it is to other EU member
states given its already strong licensing procedure and the close business
links with the American arms industry. If it is not going to cause a direct
positive economic impact on the UK defense industry, the question then
92
Brinley Salzmann, interview with author, July 21, 2005.
Brinley Salzmann.
94
Brinley Salzmann.
95
The Guardian, “Europe Risks Sanctions Over China Arms Sales”, March 3, 2005; J.
Tkacik, “The East Asia Security Act: A Step Towards Consensus Against Arms Sales To
China,” (The Heritage Foundation, 2005). Details the East Asia Security Act, which was
recently defeated in Congress. The EASA mandates that any person, firm, or country that
provides military arms, equipment, or technology to China or dual-use items to the
Chinese military, security forces, police, or other repressive agencies face heightened
scrutiny of its arms relationship with China and, if warranted, be denied access to U.S.
weapons technology.
96
Brinley Salzmann.
97
The Times, “British Arms Firm Will Spurn China If Embargo Ends”, February 22,
2005.
93
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arises concerning other less direct commercial benefits that might occur
from the embargo lift and whether these had any impact upon the
consideration of the UK government in choosing to support the lifting of
the embargo.
In favour of this proposition are assessments based on past Chinese
attitudes to sanctions imposed against them and diplomatic or political
moves by other states, which do not fit with the Chinese government’s
aims. Past actions might imply that the Chinese, upon lifting the embargo,
would reward those member states in the EU who had been proponents of
the lift and punish those states that had been against it. Evidence relating
to Chinese actions concerning commercial ties would seem to indicate that
the government does work, to some extent, on such a ‘tit-for-tat’ basis.
For example, the US imposed trade sanctions on China after it had
transferred military equipment to Pakistan. In response, Chinese aviation
authorities switched to buying from the US company Boeing to the
European Airbus. Additionally, upon selling jets to Taiwan, France suffered
short-term economic harm in relation to its interests in China. 98
Consequently, it could be inferred that being seen to support the
embargo lift might cause similar results. The importance of good political
and bilateral ties with China to the advancement of commercial interests
in the country is key. When the president of China visited the UK in 1999
“major commercial contracts worth a total of 2 billion were signed”99 and
as Lord Powell, Chair of the China Britain Business Council argues, “A
good bilateral relationship at the political level is very important for doing
business in China—and probably more important in the case of China than
most other countries, simply because the role of the state and the
government is so big.”100 However, despite this kind of evidence, in
relation to the embargo, the advancement of commercial economic
interests by the UK has not been the “main driver,” 101 although it has
probably had some effect on the policy making process.
From sources close to the Government and those outside it, the
picture that emerges is one where, although long-term economic interests
were considered and are generally considered with regards to China, in
respect to the embargo policy, it was not the main driving force behind
their decision to support a lift. This was primarily due to the intangible
nature of any derived benefits. The sources indicated that there were no
particular references by the Chinese of specific or even more general
commercial areas that might benefit. Moreover, as one source argued,
even though “the French had been pushing for it very clearly - as is seen
98
Breslin, 421.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website. “FCO Strategy” (accessed September
12, 2005).
100
Oral evidence to Foreign Affairs Committee.
101
Bill Olner, interview with author, July 18, 2005.
99
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by the Chinese to have been pushing for it very clearly - it wasn’t
altogether clear that they would repay the bilateral incentives for doing
so.” The economic incentive is “an argument you could advance but the
evidence doesn’t seem to back it up.”102 The benefits of lifting the
embargo for the UK would, in terms of trade and improved relations be
long-term and fairly imperceptible103 and consideration of this factor
would have to be balanced against the detrimental effect that lifting of the
embargo might have in UK/US commercial ties.
Overall, China’s rise in terms of economics has been considered as
part of the formulation of the position of the UK on the embargo lift but
did not form a major component and can probably best be thought of as an
ongoing long-term strategic engagement with China in commercial terms.
In that sense, it fits with the wider move towards economic engagement
and the UK priority as it relates to the global economy. However, there
was a further incentive at work, closely connected with the economic rise
of China, but more concerned with its role on the wider international
scene than with its economic potential and more concerned with social
engagement of China than economic engagement.
The desire to bring China into the international community and
provide a symbolic gesture that would make the Chinese government feel
more included and respected in the international community can perhaps
be seen as the fundamental driver in the formulation of the UK’s
position. 104 This is underpinned by the theory, espoused by Wang and
Deng,105 that including China more in international society will help it to
be more shaped by the multilateral institutions it belongs to and become a
responsible and constructive player within the international community:
“International enmeshment facilitates China’s social learning in terms of
the values, norms and principles, and rules of the international system.”
This approach was summarised by the FAC when they concluded that the
UK should attempt to encourage and support China’s closer integration
into the international system, in all fields, as a friendly and responsible
partner. 106 In this context, the embargo can be seen as a perfect
opportunity in accomplishing this objective. “Th ere are lots of global
challenges where we need China on the same side. You do not help that
process - in fact you actively hinder it - if you have them somewhere as a
pariah, as some way stigmatising them and an arms embargo is a good way
102
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005.
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
104
Bill Olner, interview; Interview conducted with a source close to the Government
1, July 11, 2005; Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 2, July 26,
2005; Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 3, July 28, 2005;
Brinley Salzmann, interview; Roy Isbister, interview with author, July 27, 2005.
105
F. Wang and Y. Deng, In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World
(Lanham, MD: Brown & Littlefield, 1999).
106
Foreign Affairs Committee.
103
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of doing that.” 107 By lifting the embargo, “you’ve given the Chinese a big
symbolic prize and they know it’s a prize and you know it’s a prize.”108
This would then have the hoped effect of moving forward some kind of
social and political engagement with China and help in other areas such as
global warming or being more responsible members of the Security
Council. In one source’s estimate this was “the only driver for doing it.” 109
The Government is “not interested in making statements for the sake
of it.” 110 Their agreement to support the symbolic gesture in favour of
China by lifting the embargo is backed up by the perceived benefits it may
accrue in terms of China’s increased socialisation into the international
community, long-term stability and institutionalisation. However, the
opposing effect of this positive symbolic gesture is the negative one sent
out in respect of human rights. Without any significant progress on human
rights in China, the symbolic reward of the embargo lift sends out a
damaging message about the extent to which human rights are considered
and the importance attached to them. Yet the UK has chosen to ignore
this element demonstrating that making a purely symbolic stand on human
rights is not a policy option. Human rights in themselves are not enough
to motivate states to act and this supports a more realist approach, where
national interests must be satisfied. In this case, this is through the
perceived long-term, geopolitical benefits to the UK.
However, this attempt at socialisation is something of a contradictory
response. In attempting to socialise China into international norms by
violating one of the founding ones, namely human rights, one can hardly
hope to successfully achieve their respect for international standards.
Rather it would send out a message that “either you think that human
rights in China are ok or you don’t really care about them.” 111 The
Government has already shown that it is not of the opinion that China’s
human rights are ‘ok’. This leaves the latter response and such a signal can
hardly hope to achieve respect for human rights from the Chinese if they
see this norm disregarded by those who purport to uphold it.
Consequently, whether these attempts to integrate China will be
successful remains to be seen however, the embargo policy can be seen as
part of this wider attempt to engage with China and bring it into the
international fold. It would produce no tangible short-term economic
benefits, only long-term intangible ones, but may produce concessions in
other vital areas in terms of international cooperation. Unfortunately, the
UK failed to see the negative side of this symbolic gesture in terms of the
value of human rights and the contradictory nature of the message it was
107
Interview conducted
Interview conducted
109
Interview conducted
110
Interview conducted
111
Interview conducted
108
with
with
with
with
with
a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
a source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005.
a source close to the Government 1, July 11 2005.
a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
a source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005.
50
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
sending out, which could undermine the socialisation they are attempting
to achieve. The long-term economic incentive to advance UK commercial
interests in China was present to some degree in the policy formulation,
but this was a minimal factor compared to the political symbolism of the
embargo lift.
5.
“THE GREAT EUROPEAN POWER PISSING CONTEST” 112 VERSUS “THE
113
EIGHT HUNDRED POUND GORILLA IN THE ROOM” : THE ROLE OF
THE EU AND THE USA IN SHAPING THE UK’S POSITION
Britain’s diplomatic ties with the rest of the world also feature within
FCO strategy and it emphasises the need for the FCO to work with others
in order to meet the priorities that they’ve set out: “No country can
tackle these issues alone,” 114 yet they also stress that “our most important
partnerships will be within the EU and with the United States.”115 As Hill
argues, “New Labour has sought to be friends with almost everyone.” 116 It
has built a strong relationship with the EU, whilst maintaining a close
relationship with the White House. It has also adopted the role of a bridge
between the two actors 117 leading to “a vast range of commitments, even
when times are serene.” 118 When times are not ‘serene’, such as with the
embargo debate, the range of commitments required to both actors can
restrict the UK’s to the point where it is unable to take its own stance on
the issue. It found itself “caught between two stalls in quite a classic
way,”119 with little room for manoeuvre.
Given that the arms embargo is an EU policy, the role of the
institution in shaping UK policy is crucial. The positions that other
member states took on the issue greatly affected the way that the UK was
able to precede with its own agenda. The issue first arose at the EU
European Council Summit on 18 December 2003 where France and
Germany proposed the lifting of the embargo. France began the initial talk
and “was keen to show that it was China’s best friend in Europe.” 120
Germany also lent their voice in support of the lift, with Schroeder
coming out strongly in support. This overt support of the lift from the
112
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
Roy Isbister, interview.
114
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website, “FCO Strategy.”
115
Foreign and Commonwealth Website, “FCO Strategy.”
116
C. Hill, “Foreign Policy” in The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997-2001,
ed. A. Seldon, 348 (London: Little, Brown and Company, 2001), 348.
117
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July, 11 2005;
Interview conducted with source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005; Bill Olner,
interview.
118
Hill, 348.
119
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
120
Interview conducted with a source close to the government 1, July 11, 2005.
113
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UK’s European great power rivals left the UK in a difficult position in
forming their own take on the arms embargo issue.
Once these two countries had come out in favour of the lift, the UK
had little option than to agree with them. The nature of the UK’s position
within the EU meant that they were under a lot of pressure not to go
against the two other major powers and risk isolation in Europe. 121 The
prominent advocacy of the other two states also meant that any attemp t
to take a different position would run the risk of the UK being seen as
anti-China. If they had sought to take a strong stance against the embargo
this is the perception that would have come across particularly to the
Chinese who might, as discussed earlier, have punished the UK in the form
of a withdrawal from economic cooperation and damaged their bilateral
relationship. According to one source, the UK was motivated by a desire
not to be caught out: “If France was going to lead the show and you want
to stand in the way of that, then you can’t help but be seen as extremely
anti-China. I think that’s just the way European politics works.”122 The
UK “wanted to stay in the pack.” 123 This meant agreeing with the two
other member states.
On a leadership level of analysis, membership of the EU also exerted
its pressure. Tony Blair would not have wanted to take a position on the
embargo that was against that of his French and German equivalents: “It
would not have been acceptable to the Prime Minister or the Government
to take a much more backward position on lifting the embargo in
leadership terms against Chirac and Schroeder.”124 Presumably, this is due
to keeping up a certain political image within the EU and not letting
either of the other two prominent member state leaders overtake him in
importance or profile. The eyes of Number 10 were firmly on the process
within the FCO and were watching it “particularly closely.” 125 This
attention was further heightened by the approach of the UK’s ascendancy
to the presidency of the EU. As one MP argues, “the policy has been
decided not on the basis of our national interest, but on the short-term
tactical interest of the Prime Minister at the beginning of the EU
presidency. The obsession with regaining popularity among European
leaders seems to take precedence over any other considerations.”126
121
Interview conducted a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005; Interview
conducted with a source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005; Interview conducted
with a source close to the Government 3, July 28, 2005.
122
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
123
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
124
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
125
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005.
126
Hansard Reporting, “Dr Liam Fox MP, Column 164 pt4” (London: TSO, May 18,
2005), www.parliament.uk.
52
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At the European level, the UK’s hands were tied by the prominent
positions of its major counterparts in Europe. Both on UK level and a
leadership level, it would not have been possible for the UK to make any
kind of strong stance on the embargo for fear of being isolated in Europe
and of being punished by the Chinese. However, the UK’s hands were also
tied from another angle by its relationship with the US.
Arguably the most powerful state on the planet, the USA has played a
progressively increasing role of importance within the discussions
surrounding the embargo. Given that the policy is an EU one and bears no
direct relation to the US, the involvement of the state could have been
thought to be minimal. However, it appears that the USA may have been
the single strongest factor in determining how the UK reacted towards the
proposals to lift the arms embargo.
For some, the pressure that the USA exerted during the discussions
around the policy is the main reason why the embargo is still in place. Roy
Isbister of Saferworld believes that “if it weren’t for the US the embargo
would have been lifted. Ultimately, that’s what has so far delayed any
lifting”127 and there is convincing evidence to support this claim. When
listing the factors involved with the issue of the embargo, one source close
to the government cited America first 128 detailing how “you have to take
American concerns quite seriously…that was a significant factor.”129 Bill
Olner MP, who stresses that “you can’t forget that the USA plays a big
role in this as well”, further supports this.130 Furthermore, at present
concern over America’s response to the embargo lift is at the point where
no further progress can be made without some kind of change in the US’s
stance: “We do want to lift the embargo, but we can’t do it with the
Americans in the way they are, because their retaliation would be
horrible.”131
The reason that the US is such a significant factor, as already
discussed, is because of its relationship with Taiwan. If the arms embargo
were to be lifted, the US would fear an increased sale of arms and European
military technology to China. This demonstrates a lack of trust in the
EU’s system of arms export control, the Code of Conduct, a point that
Salzmann confirms: “They don’t understand how robust or export control
policies and procedures are over here.”132 Consequently, any proposed
lifting of the embargo, if not handled properly, could sour the relations
between the EU and the US: “There could be an EU/US dispute of almost
127
Roy Isbister, interview.
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005.
129
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005.
130
Bill Olner, interview.
131
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
132
Brinley Salzmann, interview.
128
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the order of magnitude of Iraq. That is what people in Washington have
indicated.”133 This would hit the UK hardest given their closer ties with
the US not only on a commercial basis, as discussed earlier, but also given
their closer diplomatic and political relations between the two countries.
What is evident is that there is a difference between the way the US views
China and the way the EU does. The Americans are much more concerned
about military advances, and this can be ascribed to their relationship with
Taiwan. However, it can also be ascribed to balance of power concerns
over China’s strengthening economy and increasing modernisation. These
concerns are all too valid according to Mearsheimer. 134 As stated earlier,
China has the potential to rival the US’s powerful position internationally
thus, the US’s anti-lift position may best fit with the containment theories
of the mid 1990s in attempting to block the country’s rise. This contrasts
greatly with the EU’s pursuit of enmeshment and integration discussed
earlier, suggesting that the two actors are operating on different agendas
with regards to China. However, in the real world of diplomatic pressure
these two agendas have clashed and forced the presentation of the policy
to undergo fundamental changes.
In relation to the UK, the significance of US pressure was how it
forced the UK to act within Europe. In the EU Council conclusions of
December 2004, the EU concludes that as a result of lifting the embargo
there must be no quantitative or qualitative increase in arms sales.135 This
clause is an attempt to placate America’s fears that any embargo lift will
cause arms sales to rocket. Although keen to stress that the decision on
this matter, as with all matters in the EU is a decision by the twenty-five
member states collectively, 136 the UK engineered the inclusion of the
clause, since it served its vested interest in keeping the USA at bay. 137 The
escalation of the situation in the Straits into a military conflict is not
something that any country wants to see, but with the EU lacking a
fundamental tie to the situation, its interests in this area are of less
concern. Thus, the clause can best be seen as an effort by the UK to pacify
US fears.
Further evidence of the importance of the US in shaping the UK’s
position was shown when the Chinese passed an anti-secession law against
Taiwan, which in the event of Taiwan claiming any form of independence
133
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2001), 337.
135
European Council, “Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions 16/17
December,” http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83 201.pdf (accessed
September 12, 2005), conclusion 57.
136
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 3, July 28, 2005.
137
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
134
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from mainland China, would allow the use of “non-peaceful means and
other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial
integrity.” 138 This blatant reference to the use of force against Taiwan
happened at a sensitive time for the arms embargo discussions and changed
the terms of the debate entirely: “by passing that legislation and that law
the Chinese were actually doing something quite provocative at a quite
stupid time” 139 and the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw admitted that the law
had created “a difficult political environment” for the embargo to be
lifted.140 Here was proof of violent intentions and gave concrete evidence
for the US to back up their concerns about military action. It also gave the
UK an excellent excuse for lowering the ratchet of the debate and easing
the pressure that the role of a bridge between the US and the EU and been
putting upon them: “The anti secession law was good for us. It allowed us
to point to an objective factor out there.” 141 The UK could bow to US
pressure without being overtly seen to be doing so and persuade the rest of
the EU that there was no longer consensus on the issue therefore, it should
be dropped from the agenda.
However, the interesting point to note here is that whilst human
rights had been at the background of the debate within the UK and the EU,
after the passing of the anti-secession law they began to come to the
forefront and an expression of conditionality on human rights grounds for
the lifting of the embargo began to surface. In April 2005, a French
diplomat, when asked if this was the case said, “this link is indeed
beginning to emerge.”142 In May of this year “representatives of the
European Union decided to delay a move to lift the arms embargo against
China, citing human rights”143 and referring specifically to four areas of
concern. 144 In parallel to the EU, Alison Reynolds notes that the first
time the UK Government really began to take the human rights argument
seriously was in April 2005, after the anti-secession law. When Jack Straw
gave evidence to the Quadripartite Committee in January 2005, the
138
Government of the People’s Republic of China, “The Anti Secession Law adopted
at the Third Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress,” (March 14, 2005), Article
8.
139
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 2, July 26, 2005.
140
BBC News 2005, “EU may delay China arms move, 22nd March,” BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4371361.stm (retrieved 31st August 2005),
quoting Jack Straw.
141
Interview conducted with a source close to the Government 1, July 11, 2005.
142
The International Herald Tribune, “EU To Put Brakes on Lifting the EU Arms
Embargo to China,” April 13, 2005 (quoting an anonymous French diplomat)
143
Amnesty International, “People’s Republic of China Briefing on EU Concerns
Regarding Human Rights in China” (London: Amnesty International, September 2, 2005).
144
1. The need for China to release prisoners still held in connection with the events
in Tiananmen Square in 1989 2. The need for the ratification of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights by China 3. The need for reform of China’s ‘re-education
through labour’ system 4. The need to ease media censorship.
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argument for human rights was barely considered at all.145 However, after
the anti-secession law and the climate had changed, human rights began to
be used as a way to back out, with credibility, of the June 2005 deadline for
the lift. This again suggests that human rights alone are not enough to
change the consideration of the UK, but in the face of other external
factors they can be used (and abused) to support a quick reversal in policy
decisions.
The human rights argument had always been present, but the UK had
chosen not to use it to its full force or make any pronounced stance in
relation to it. It was only after the change in the dynamics of the debate,
from the anti-secession law that saw the human rights argument drafted in
to avoid openly admitting the law had created a change of such magnitude.
The Chinese would not repeal the law and so the law itself could not be
cited as an explicit reason for the embargo not being lifted. This would
prevent lifting it in the future. Moreover, explicitly accepting the US’s
anti-lift position would indicate a weakness on the part of the EU in
forming their own foreign policy; a particularly sensitive area given the
ongoing development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
This would be an undesirable outcome for member states and weaken their
position as an effective multilateral body, capable of pursuing their own
goals. Consequently, putting human rights conditionality on China gave
China something they could legitimately work towards and continue
negotiating around, leaving the door open for the embargo to be lifted in
the future, whilst also serving to avoid the EU looking like the US’s
puppet. Human rights were not adopted for their own sake but because, at
this particular conjuncture, they served the EU’s diplomatic and PR needs
in relation to China, the US, the public and its own self-image quite
efficiently.
Overall, the positions of France and Germany directly affected the
way the UK responded to the proposal to lift the embargo and the
political dynamic in the EU meant the UK had little choice but to agree.
The US’s relationship with Taiwan and its concerns over China’s growing
power meant that its involvement in the arms embargo negotiations was
also key and for the UK it was particularly important. They had to
carefully consider their economic and diplomatic ties with both entities
and attempt to bridge the gap between two actors following very different
agendas. Furthermore, the US’s concerns about Taiwan and balance of
power politics directly shaped the way the EU proceeded with the policy
to lift the embargo and this was exemplified by the anti-secession law. The
inclusion of human rights conditionality on the embargo lift after the antisecession law shows once more the use of human rights in an instrumental
145
Alison Reynolds, interview with author, August 16, 2005.
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IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
manner intended to keep the embargo lift on the agenda, avoiding
embarrassment for the EU.
6.
C ONCLUSION
In summary, human rights were of minimal importance to the UK
concerning this policy. The Government showed little regard for these
considerations over and above its need to produce public perception of
inclusion of this element and their use as an instrumental tool. It
manipulated the discourse by invoking different sets of rights, without
providing clear criteria by which to assess its claims. In addition, by
consistently pointing to its bilateral human rights dialogues and
programmes in China it sought to box off its human rights commitments
in respect to China, missing opportunities to exert pressure and failing to
draw a consistent picture of its human rights commitments. Linking this
to its stated ‘ethical’ foreign policy goal, it is hard to see how the UK, in
this instance, managed to maintain any such commitment.
The Government’s indifference to human rights in this instance can
be best explained by two other major factors, which were deemed of more
importance. Firstly, China’s rise necessitates increased international
cooperation and this led to a desire by the EU to give a symbolic gesture,
in the form of the embargo lift, to remove stigmatisation and facilitate its
socialisation. However, this long-term institutional approach should not be
collapsed into suggesting that norms, such as human rights are important
in any simple fashion. States may seek to enmesh China into the
international community and its norms, but this may centre more on
promoting general geo-political and financial stability than causing any
great change in China’s domestic human rights situation. Improvement in
this area may come in the long-term from this kind of approach, as
normative theories argue. However, in this case a sufficiently nuanced
realist framework is far more illuminating for understanding the actions of
the UK.
Secondly, since the UK assumes a bridging role between the EU and
the USA it found itself trapped by its commitments to both and by the
different approaches to China the two actors have. Consequently, the UK
was prevented from making any forthright or strong stance on the issue.
Pressure from the US did drive the UK to act in Europe indicating that the
right level of pressure will force it do so and to do so successfully. Human
rights pressure however, did not serve any instrumental ends for the UK
and so it sought no concessions from China on this front.
The EU is now seeking conditionality, on human rights grounds, but
this is only after the commotion surrounding the passing of the antisecession law and the UK was not instrumental in bringing this point to
bear. This pertinently shows how human rights discourse can become a
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useful resource at the disposal of the West in dealing with rising Asian
powers, which can come into play at specific conjunctures where it is
diplomatically and discursively useful to do so. However, it rarely seems to
ascend beyond this fundamental instrumentality. This is not to say human
rights are always and everywhere irrelevant. This arms embargo is hard to
envisage in the first instance without the human rights norms of global
civil society, but the vociferousness and volubility of civil society on these
issues, in this case, is transient and the geopolitical and economic interests
of the states involved, much less so.
Overall, it seems that despite the Government’s explicit human rights
commitments and the explicit human rights element in this policy debate,
the UK failed to act or assert itself on this basis. The UK is content to
keep human rights isolated into particular arenas, like its bilateral human
rights dialogues with China and refuses to let them significantly shape
wider policy debates, preferring to stick to narrower (though not
necessarily unethical) concerns relating to its interests in geopolitical and
economic stability. In specific relation to China, this seems to suggest that
the UK holds its commercial and political ties with China above its wish to
see the human rights situation improved. The lifting of the EU arms
embargo to China was a perfect opportunity to make a stance on the
internationalist principles of human rights. However, both the UK and the
EU succeeded only in showing how little importance they accord human
rights over and above its instrumental uses. In relation to China, this
bolsters the Chinese opinion that they need do little on human rights and
that their economy and rising profile will win them friends in high places,
regardless of the abuses they perpetuate.
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APPENDIX 1
Copy of the original declaration of the EU arms embargo to China
Presidency Conclusions
European Council
Madrid, 26 and 27 June 1989
Declaration on China
The European Council, recalling the Declaration of the Twelve of June 6,
strongly condemns the brutal repression taking place in China. It expresses
its dismay at the pursuit of executions in spite of all the appeals of the
international community. It solemnly requests the Chinese authorities to
stop the executions and to put an end to the repressive actions against
those who legitimately claim their democratic rights.
The European Council requests the Chinese authorities to respect human
rights and to take into account the hopes for freedom and democracy
deeply felt by the population. It underlines that this is an essential element
for the pursuit of the policy of reforms and openness that has been
supported by the European Community and its Member States.
The Twelve are aware that the recent events have caused great anxiety in
Hong Kong.
In the present circumstances, the European Council thinks it necessary to
adopt the following measures:
•
raising of the issue of human rights in China in the appropriate
international for a; asking for admittance of independent observers
to attend the trials and to visit prisons,
•
interruption by the Member States of the Community of military
cooperation and an embargo on trade in arms with China,
•
suspension of bilateral ministerial and high level contacts,
•
postponement by the Community and its Member States of new
cooperation projects,
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•
reduction of programmes of cultural, scientific and technical
cooperation to only those activities that might maintain a
meaning in the present circumstances,
•
prolongation by the Member States of visas to the Chinese
students who wish it.
Taking into account the climate of uncertainty created in the economic
field by the present policy of the Chinese authorities, the European
Council advocates the postponement of the examination of new requests
for credit insurance and the postponement of the examination of new
credits of the World Bank.