Article Title:
Participation-Based Budgeting: Defining and Achieving Normative Democratic Values in Public
Budgeting Processes
Contact information:
Doralyn Rossmann (Primary Contact)
Collection Development Librarian & Assistant Professor
Montana State University Libraries
P.O. Box 173320
Bozeman, MT 59717
E-mail: doralyn@montana.edu
Elizabeth Shanahan
Montana State University
Department of Political Science
Wilson Hall, 2-142
Bozeman, MT 59717
E-mail: shanahan@montana.edu
Bio Statement
Doralyn Rossmann is assistant professor and Collection Development Librarian in the Libraries
at Montana State University. Her research and teaching focus on public budgeting, bibliographic
control, distributed leadership, and organizational dynamics.
Email: doralyn@montana.edu.
Elizabeth A. Shanahan is an assistant professor of political science at Montana State University.
Her research interests center on policy conflict and the role that public officials, media, interest
groups, and citizens have in developing political narratives to influence policy outcome.
E-mail: shanahan@montana.edu.
Title
Participation-Based Budgeting: Defining and Achieving Normative Democratic Values in Public
Budgeting Processes
Abstract
Achieving public participation is often a goal for public budgeting entities and yet in practice is
difficult to accomplish. This study’s purpose centers on three questions: how do public
representatives interpret and define their democratic responsibilities; what are their insights
regarding opportunities and barriers in participation-based budgeting; to what extent are these
goals met? To address these questions, this research employs a case study of a public university
budgeting committee; interviews of committee members were conducted; analyses result in a
conceptual map of a participation-based budgeting process. Findings reveal that respondents 1)
define their mission structurally and procedurally, 2) identify a need ethical behavior and
leadership, and 3) recognize that democratic values such as participation and efficiency come
into tension with one another. Being open and inclusive comes in the form of the citizen—public
administrator dialectic, and it also requires intellectual, ethical and practical engagement with
competing democratic values.
Keywords
citizen participation, democratic values, public budgeting, qualitative research
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Introduction
Many public administration and budgeting scholars (e.g., Box 1998; Denhardt and
Denhardt 2007; Ebdon and Franklin 2006; Stivers 1990) advocate that decision making in public
administration should be a process of delivering democracy by authentically engaging the public.
While theories and models abound for what constitutes the continuum of successful citizen
participation (e.g., Franklin and Ebdon 2007; King, Feltey, and Susel 1998), actualizing this
democratic norm is difficult even for the trained, reflective practitioner of public administration.
Implementing theoretical ideals in praxis harbors challenges when citizens are included late or in
a surface manner (Yang and Callahan 2007), when democratic values come into tension with one
another (Stone 2002), and when decisions require technical expertise, such as in public
budgeting (Beckett and King 2002). As Ebdon and Franklin (2006) correctly identify, struggles
in delivering democracy in budgeting decision making through citizen participation has been a
constant struggle since the 1900s, with little connection between theory and practice.
Given the calls from scholars and students alike to both build theory and offer practical
solutions, we seek to address how democratic values are actualized and to what extent they are
achieved in practice through a case study of a public university budgeting committee. This case
study moves beyond the repetitive normative prescriptions to an empirical qualitative analysis of
a budgeting system that was intentionally built on the principles of openness and inclusiveness.
The budgeting committee was newly constituted by the university president with an overt,
documented democratic charge of being “open to and inclusive of the entire campus community”
(University Budgeting Committee Charge 2009). While the list of democratic values is long,
openness and inclusiveness are certainly among them. This case serves as an excellent one to
explore the process of how public servants make budgetary recommendations centered on
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technical information and democratic values. The results of this case study also offer an
opportunity to reflect on how we teach public administration students in that murky space
between normative political theory and praxis.
In contrast to other budgetary reform models such as zero-based budgeting, programbased budgeting, and performance-based budgeting, we call such citizen involvement in the
budgeting process “participation-based budgeting.” This model reflects public budgeting with a
democratic orientation of openness and inclusiveness. As such, we seek to address three research
questions. First, how do public representatives from various backgrounds interpret and define
their democratic responsibilities, particularly in regard to openness and inclusiveness? Second,
what are their insights regarding opportunities and barriers of accomplishing participation-based
budgeting? Finally, to what extent do these public representatives believe they meet these goals?
We begin by exploring the normative definitions of openness and inclusiveness in both
the broad public administration literature and that of public budgeting. We then describe our case
study, detail the methodology, discuss our results, explore the implications for public budgeting
processes that are explicitly centered on democratic values, and outline the implications of these
findings in the teaching of public administration students.
Openness and Inclusiveness
Openness and inclusiveness are two democratic values espoused to be key components of
a legitimate, democratic government (Denhardt and Denhardt 2007; Piotrowski and Rosenbloom
2002). Both values have historic roots in our founding and in the Constitution, and they have
been subject to scholarly study in public administration. These two values are also addressed in
the budgeting literature. Following is a review of the historic context, current public
administration literature, and recent public budgeting scholarship for each democratic value.
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Openness
Three definitions of openness emerge in the literature: lack of secrecy, access to
information, and transparency of the process.
At the founding, openness of government was considered a necessity against the
aggrandizement of power (Moynihan 1998). Yet the irony of the closed-door nature of the
Constitutional Convention is not lost (e.g., Beard 1913; Dye and Zeigler 2003). Was the
deliberative process of the founding of the Constitution sheltered from the public for efficiency
in a time of crisis or for elite parochial gain? While it is not the purpose here to detail this debate,
the point is that openness has run headlong into secrecy for security or efficiency sake, even at
the early stages of our nation’s founding. Over time, for example, we have agreed that executive
privilege is necessary; however, the extent that executive communiqués are kept classified is
hotly debated among constitutional and presidential scholars today (e.g., Rozell 2002).
Openness is also defined as access to information for citizens. “A popular Government,
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to
be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives” (Madison
1819, 103). The history of federal information legislation reveals the recurring struggle between
security and openness through access to information: the Espionage Act of 1917 criminalized the
sharing of national defense information with foreign governments (Jost 2006); Wilson’s 1918
Fourteen Points to Congress speech in which he asserted that “open covenants of peace, openly
arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but
diplomacy shall always proceed frankly and in the public view” (Moynihan 1998, 84); the
Federal Register Act of 1935 that mandated publication of executive branch materials such as
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agency regulations (Jost 2006); the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 that put procedures in
place to provide accountability of agencies through citizen participation in the rule-making
process (Birkland, 2005); the Freedom of Information Act in 1966 which allows anyone to
request records held by a federal agency (Jost 2006); the Presidential Records Act of 1978; and
the creation of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO 2006). Thus, historically, access
to information has tilted more toward openness than secrecy; interestingly, as technology makes
access easier, the expectations of information dissemination are higher among citizens (Bertot et
al. 2009).
The third aspect of openness is transparency of the process of governmental decision
making. How decisions are made and how issues are discussed in deliberation should be open to
public scrutiny (Bunting 2004). Public administration scholars often refer to transparency in
tandem with governmental accountability. A legitimate democratic government is accountable to
it citizenry through transparency (Florini 2004). Rules usually comprise transparency; sunshine
laws at local, state and federal levels mandate transparency through means such as open meeting
laws, and public access to representatives. Rules, however, do not necessarily translate into the
spirit of openness to which they aspire; in many cases, it is up to the specific organization to
decide to communicate well to the public (Fairbanks, Plowman, and Rawlins 2007).
Rubin (2006) also describes the variability in transparency in budgeting, depending on
the ethical nature of the executive. Similarly, Franklin and Ebdon (2007, 91) assert that
disclosing public budgeting information to the public is a way “to enhance trust through
increased transparency.” An additional definition of openness in the public budgeting literature is
that of understandability. Because of the complexity of budgets, there is a general resignation
that while this information is available as a public consumption document, it is not necessarily
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understandable (Beckett and King 2002; Robbins and Simonsen 2002). Possible inequities are
created for the citizen who may lack of knowledge of budget complexities; “budgetary processes
tend to remain closed because of the belief that citizens do not have the knowledge and expertise
needed to make the complex and technical decisions involved in allocating public funds”
(Beckett and King 2002, 465). Thus, among public budgeting scholars, there is a clear call that to
be truly open, the budgets must also be understandable.
Inclusiveness
Two definitions dominate the democratic ideal of inclusiveness in the literature:
representation and participation.
Representation is based on the question of how to include or represent the values of
constituencies. Normative questions arise over how representation is achieved. The differing
representational structures of the House and Senate reflect two different ways of achieving
equity in the form of representation: population and geography. This debate continues today in
bureaucratic groups with members who are to represent a certain aspect of the population. The
theory of representative bureaucracy is centered on studies of how representation in public
agencies affects or shapes policy outcome (Meier and Crotty 2006; Wilkins and Williams 2008).
Studies informed by the theory of representative bureaucracy explore how the public interest is
achieved through the inclusive nature of representation in public administration.
Citizen participation, a second definition of inclusiveness, has a deep literature (e.g.,
Barber 1984; Denhardt and Denhardt 2007; Pateman 1970). While the common theme is that a
legitimate democratic government is based on the efficacy of citizen participation, other scholars
focus on barriers to effective public participation, such as citizen discouragement and apathy
(King, Feltey, and Susel 1998), cynical citizens (Berman 1997), a decline in social
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connectedness (Putnam 2000), and technical information (King, Feltey, and Susel 1998). Such
studies focus on both portals: the structural avenues for participation and the level and quality of
engagement on the part of the public.
Similarly, some public budgeting scholars (Beckett and King 2002) advocate that
inclusiveness is achieved through active participation in budgeting processes, such as community
visioning, citizen university models, panels and focus groups, open house informational
discussions, opinion survey responses, and listening-based public meetings. However, one of the
greatest barriers identified to such participation is the experience of and perception by citizens
that budgeting processes are closed, controlled atmospheres which are elite dominated (Beckett
and King 2002; Orosz 2002). Orosz (2002) proposes an authentic participation-based approach
to budgeting, whereby citizens are invited to participate early in a process which is “listening
based” (434). Similarly, Mikesell (2003, 24) notes that while finance in a representative
democracy may not be easy, governments have a responsibility to have budget systems that are
responsive to the public and, in particular, minority positions. Another aspect of active citizen
participation is providing education for citizens on budgeting complexities, as was done through
the publication It’s Your Business: Local & State Finance, distributed by the National Municipal
League following a financial crisis in New York City (Ecker-Racz 1976). Thus, public budgeting
scholars write about both opportunities for and barriers to achieving inclusiveness.
In sum, the literature regarding openness and inclusiveness identifies normative
definitions that address both structural or mechanical avenues (e.g., open meeting laws; posting
information for the public, and having representatives) as well as procedural channels (e.g.,
deciding what information to disclose and to whom, and on what basis is representation decided).
The goal is resoundingly the same: to achieve a legitimate democratic process. In this study, we
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seek to explore the extent to which such theoretical definitions of openness and inclusiveness are
reflected by our street-level bureaucrats as well as to assess the degree to which the goal of
participation-based budgeting is achieved.
The Case
In 2001, a university president took a dramatic step to change the budget decision making
process from a centralized one involving a few top-administrators who met in unpublicized,
administrative conference room meetings to a decentralized one within a larger, representative
body of the campus and community. The goal of this new committee is to help the university
“identify specific, institutional priorities through our long range plan; develop strategic initiatives
to achieve those priorities; guide all budget decisions with our priorities and strategies; regularly
assess the success of our plans, strategies, and budget decisions; and develop the university's
general operating budget each year” (University Budgeting Committee Charge 2009).
Importantly, the university president clearly articulated two values that should guide this new
committee’s budgetary processes. “I expect this process to be open to, and inclusive of, the entire
campus community” [italics added for emphasis] (University Budgeting Committee Charge
2009). The committee’s new charge embodies the orientation that others scholars (Ebdon and
Franklin 2006; Franklin and Ebdon 2007; Orosz 2002) refer to as citizen participation in public
budgeting and that we call participation-based budgeting.
The composition of the committee reflects the university president’s desire to flatten the
decision making hierarchy. The committee is chaired by the provost and vice-chaired by the vice
president of administration and finance. Voting membership of the committee includes
administrators (deans and vice presidents) and those representing constituent groups (faculty
senate, professional council, staff senate, the associated students of the university, and a citizen
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representative from the community). The purpose of this study is to understand how committee
members comprehend their democratic mission of participation-based budgeting, how they
assess their accomplishments toward this goal, and what factors contribute to or inhibit success.
Methodology
A qualitative research strategy with a case study design is utilized to apprehend
committee members’ meanings and assessment of the participation-based budgeting mission.
Our methodology consists of individual semi-structured interviews, with six open-ended
questions. Of the 25 current and former committee members, all were asked to participate; 24
agreed to be interviewed, with the remaining member being one of the researchers (who, thus,
was not interviewed). All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of
interviewees are replaced with ‘respondent.’ The interviews ranged from 20 to 75 minutes. They
were digitally recorded and transcribed. Using NVivo8, we independently open-coded the
interviews into nodes or concepts. Based on Strauss and Corbin (1998), we worked together to
identify how these concepts clustered into properties and, in turn, into larger constructs or
categories. Our analysis resulted in a conceptual map (see figure 1) of the group’s definitions of
openness and inclusiveness and assessment of its efficacy and responsibilities of achieving these
goals. Because this participation-based model is so strongly representative in its design, we also
analyzed the data according to the criterion of position held within the university, to determine if
properties had higher levels of responses from one particular group.
Attempts were made to assure high levels of reliability and validity or ‘trustworthiness’
(Guba and Lincoln 1994) in this study. First, the concepts, properties, and categories have
moderate to high levels of internal consistency between coders. The two coders initially agreed
on concepts (nodes) an average of 78 percent, properties 94 percent and categories 100 percent
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of the time; after much discussion, each node, property, and category were reconciled. Second,
results of the study underwent informal member-checking with the university president and with
a committee member who is using a preliminary report of this study for university accreditation
purposes. While these results may not be generalizable to other public agencies given the unique
nature of this committee, this member-checking affirmed there is a high level of congruence
between the theories in the literature and our observations in this case study.
Results and Discussion
Using inductive analyses of the data, a conceptual map emerges (see figure 1) revealing
how this public budgeting committee defines and assesses its participation-based budgeting
mission of being open and inclusive. Four categories arose from the interview data: “definition”
of open and inclusive, assessments of the “efficacy” of their democratic process in action,
reflections on the import of “ethical behavior,” and how “outside influences” can encourage or
discourage democratic processes. Each of these categories has various properties that represent
different aspects of the larger construct. Below, each category and accompanying properties are
discussed in detail. In turn, there is a discussion of how these categories and properties are
addressed differently by those who hold varying positions in the university.
[Figure 1 here]
Definition of “Open and Inclusive of Entire Campus Community”
The first substantive question asked of the 24 respondents was “What do you understand
the phrase ‘open to and inclusive of the entire campus community’ to mean for the university
budgeting committee?” The purpose of this open-ended question is to apprehend committee
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members’ language that describes their normative understandings of the committee’s mission
statement. What emerges from the interviews are two properties of definition: representation of
the campus and community and the ability to participate. Interestingly, committee members
answered this definitional question with two properties which suggest that the structure of the
committee is a reflection of its democratic mission. In other words, the definition of open and
inclusive was exclusively a description of how the mechanics of the committee meet the
objective of being open and inclusive.
The property representation of the campus and community, with 31 references, means
that the committee is populated with representatives who serve the interests of various
constituencies on campus and the broader community. This familiar concept is the basis for a
liberal democracy, with decisions being made by a representative body for the whole of the polis.
As one respondent said, “So, through representation, everyone has some input, and some voice in
how budgets are developed, how money is allocated and sometimes withdrawn from other
initiatives” (University Budgeting Committee (UBC) Interviews 2007). This structural definition
is understood as leveraging legitimacy to the process and to the representatives themselves.
The property ability to participate is the other aspect of the group’s definition of openness
and inclusiveness, with 32 references. Importantly, this definitional property refers to the ability
to participate, not amount or quality of participation itself. For example, many respondents
commented as a matter-of-fact that the press has access to their meetings: “We have one person
from the newspaper who comes” (UBC Interviews 2007). The comments that reflect on the
affect of the press are coded in a different category. Some respondents identified that campus
employees also have the right to attend and participate in the meetings, and that this ability to
access meetings is what makes the process transparent: “anyone from campus would be free to
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come” and “people can participate if they want to” (UBC Interviews 2007). Finally, a few
commented on the fact that as a public institution, we are legally bound to obey the State’s open
meeting law. Dispersed throughout this property is descriptive language such as a “mechanism”
or a “system and structure” that reflects the structural nature of ability to participate.
In sum, both representation of the campus and community and ability to participate form
the structural foundation of the democratic mission for this public budgeting committee. Without
these components, the committee would be hard-pressed to actualize a democratic mission. Thus,
to be open and inclusive, the group needs to have a representative composition and provide the
ability to participate in meetings. However, in closing the dialectic, do these properties ensure
openness and inclusiveness? This question is answered by interviewees when they address how
the committee has or has not met its aim of openness and inclusiveness.
Efficacy of Openness and Inclusiveness in Achieving Democracy
While having certain structural aspects in place gives the committee its democratic form,
interviewees reflected on both structural and procedural aspects that serve as barriers or conduits
for achieving the democratic ideals of openness and inclusiveness. Based on responses to the
question, “How has the committee met or not met the aim of openness and inclusiveness,” this
category is entitled “Efficacy of Openness and Inclusiveness in Achieving Democracy” which
includes seven properties that emerge from the data. Interestingly, while each of these properties
describes the efficacy of how the structural forms of representation and participation actually
achieve the democratic mission of being open and inclusive, each of these properties also reflect
a struggle with tensions between various combinations of public administration objectives and
democratic values: efficiency, effectiveness, security, inclusiveness, and transparency.
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One property in this category is that of low participation from the public (32 references).
Assessments of the access of the campus and public to the committee meetings reveal that
participation, while structurally available, is procedurally very low or nonexistent. This property
deals mainly with ideas as to why there are low levels of participation, not what the effects are
on public budgeting processes and decisions. Four reasons are cited to explain low participation.
1. Many references to lack of participation attribute it to simple contentment with feeling
represented and that the process is transparent (13 references). “Get the job done and get
going. That’s what people want us to do. Folks are interested in the teaching aspect of
campus, not the budget process. …No one wants to serve on another committee, so
they’re glad for us to do it” (UBC Interviews 2007). This aspect of low participation
reflects the idea of a constituency whose apathy is due to high levels of trust.
2. A general lack of awareness of the committee —amongst students, faculty, and staff—is
another oft-cited reason attributed to low levels of participation (nine references). “I bet if
you went out and asked 100 people, most of them wouldn’t even know what the
committee was” (UBC Interviews 2007). Thus, while participation is available, it is not
sought after due to simple lack of knowledge of institutional functioning.
3. There are also comments about how the room in which these meetings take place is a
barrier to participation (seven references). Two dimensions arise: the room is not big
enough (“the size of the room does not encourage people to attend freely”) and the
meetings take place in [University] Hall, where the administrative power resides. “I think
most people, to be honest, …would be very intimidated to walk into that room” (UBC
Interviews 2007). Neither assessment has undertones of conspiracy, but, rather,
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engenders reflections that perhaps a change in venue might be appropriate because the
current environment encourages non-participation in its design.
4. A few respondents refer to the fact that the committee’s deliberations are about a small
amount of discretionary dollars (three references). “Most of the money we have
committed. …If we had more discretionary dollars, there likely be more involvement and
debate” (UBC Interviews 2007). Lack of participation is, then, a result of an assessment
of the power of the committee via the actual dollar amounts in question.
Contentment, lack of awareness, characteristics of the physical meeting room, and importance of
the business at hand are all reasons identified by the interviewees as to why there are low levels
of public participation. These findings mirror the challenges of engaging public participation in
budgeting processes (see Beckett and King 2002). Committee members struggle with their
feelings that the public perceives the budgeting process being inaccessible or unknowable.
A second property that addresses efficacy is entitled closed doors are sometimes
necessary (11 references). While inclusiveness and transparency are valued through the
representational and public participatory functions, some expressed a need to be able to have a
kind of executive privilege, whereby ideas can be freely discussed without fear of being taken
out of context or misunderstood. As one respondent says,
In practice, it's likely that some comments are probably deferred if people don't feel
comfortable speaking them in the presence of everybody present. That's possibly not a
good thing. That would be one of the arguments in early stages of deliberation for having
closed doors. I don't think that really necessarily detracts from the transparency issue. I
believe that there have to be elements of confidentiality to it. If you can't have the
discussion, you're not doing the best job for the budget. My opponents would say
‘everybody has to hear what everybody has to say.’ But, we all know in practice that isn't
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what really happens. It doesn't mean you're trying to hoodwink anybody. You just need to
be able to make the discussion happen (UBC Interviews 2007).
This property confronts the disconnect between the democratic ideal of openness and
inclusiveness with the practical—the desire for a safe place to engage in deliberation. The
tension between being transparent and being effective and secure through closed-door
discussions is a theme in this property, one that highlights important questions for the public
administration literature. Should achieving democratic principles of transparency and
inclusiveness be more nuanced? Are closed door sessions ever appropriate for public entities? If
there is a public and private face to public discussions, why? In the literature, secrecy is
addressed in regard to maintaining the security of a government and the people whom it serves.
In this study, though, secrecy and closed doors are advocated for their enabling of the committee
to meet its representational qualities more effectively because of the benefits of deliberations not
taken out of context by a public who may not have all the information or historical/contextual
knowledge of comments.
A third property in this category is called time constraints (16 references). These
comments reflect two sets of tensions. One set is between the public administration objective of
efficiency and the democratic ideal of inclusiveness through participation. “Not that you want a
public forum because, again, of the conflict between the things we need to talk about and
needing to get through the agenda” (UBC Interviews 2007). Having outside participation makes
the process slow, thus flying in the face of efficiency. Another tension is the struggle that arises
over being effective as a group. “Whenever things need to be done quickly, this isn’t the process
that is going to work” (UBC Interviews 2007). The length of the agenda and the time allotted for
meetings means that sometimes decisions are made in a hurried fashion, thus having an impact
on the effectiveness of representation.
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A fourth property, called group is too big (17 references) reveals the tension between the
public administration objectives of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy with that of the
democratic ideal of inclusiveness through representation. While there is an acknowledgement of
the importance of the structural system of representation, there is also a complaint over how such
a large group is inefficient and not as effective. “And, I think, in many ways it is difficult for a
group of that size and that diverse of its representation to talk about specific budget issues”
(UBC Interviews 2007). While representation is critical to being open and inclusive, being open
and inclusive can also be a barrier to efficiency and effectiveness.
On the flip side of group too big is another property called not equal representation (18
references) that discusses how the structural aspect of representation is not equitable given how
the committee’s representation is weighted in favor of the academic or administrative sectors of
the committee, as opposed to students or classified employees. One interviewee out it this way:
“But I do wonder sometimes about the allocation of the members. There’s only one professional,
only one classified, yet there are three from faculty senate. Of course it’s going to be heavily
weighted in terms of administrators, but it seems then the academic side of the house is
prevalent. Also, there’s only one student. I’m not sure how the distribution came to be worked
out” (UBC Interviews 2007). The comments in this property suggest that the committee is not as
effective as it could be, because biased decisions are begotten out of a group not equally
representing constituencies. This is similar to Stone’s description (2002) of how equity can be
understood in different ways.
A sixth property is called information constraints (19 references). It comprises of
reflections of the committee’s efficacy. The responses indicate how budgetary information is
handled has led to some levels of ineffectiveness. There are three reasons respondents cited.
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1. In committee meetings, members are told that the information discussed is confidential
and not to be brought out to the campus community (seven references). “We’ve been told
we can’t share the amounts discussed in the committee with anyone outside of the
committee. A truly open process would share that information, but it would probably
make more trouble that it would solve to do so” (UBC Interviews 2007). Being asked to
keep information confidential runs counter to members’ representative function, banks on
low participation, and has elements of the tensions created by secrecy in public
administration, as is reflected in the literature (e.g, Moynihan 1998; Roberts, 2006).
2. Other comments reflect the idea that there is not enough detailed budgetary information
provided to have an engaging deliberation. Often times the information is provided at the
time of the meeting, leaving little time for contemplation of the information, despite the
need to make a decision in that meeting (six references). “We don’t get the info until we
walk in the door. You pass out those spreadsheets, and you just get them when you get
there. It’s hard to do any analysis of the data, and you’re trying to listen to someone talk
at the same time. The spreadsheet data is so aggregated, it’s usually at the institutional
level and not programmatic” (UBC Interviews 2007). Efforts to be efficient by providing
summative budgetary information have an impact on the committee’s ability to be
effective. This sentiment reflects the tension between the values of efficiency of process
and liberty of committee members to communicate with their constituents.
3. Having to catch up on commonly held institutional lingo and budgetary processes proves
frustrating for some (six references). “I never was transitioned into the committee and its
purpose. I never really had an orientation…I pieced it together by asking the
administration questions” (UBC Interviews 2007). Understanding institutional culture is
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critical to effectiveness. Committee members need to be fully informed about the
language and terminology of the committee and the budgeting process to be effective
participants, as is discussed by Rubin (2006).
How information is handled procedurally (held confidential) and structurally (budgetary detail
and institutional parlance) affects openness and inclusiveness. Tensions between theory and
practice of effectiveness and efficiency emerge in this property.
The final property of this category is called rubber stamping decisions (17 references).
This en vivo code represents the idea that some feel that, despite the structural constructs of
representation and participation, the decisions made really are foregone conclusions. “I think that
if there is just repeat business . . . it just undermines the process if it’s just a rubber stamp. Let’s
just make it a shorter meeting because the outcome is predetermined” (UBC Interviews 2007).
Another respondent notes, “Most of the decisions have been made before they come to the
committee . . . They come to the committee as recommendations and the committee validates
with some decisions” (UBC Interviews 2007). This property reveals some level of questioning of
the legitimacy of the committee’s work.
Now let us return to the original question. The university budget committee is open and
inclusive through its representative composition and ability for the public to participate in
meetings; however, in closing the dialectic, do these properties ensure openness and
inclusiveness? When discussing if and how the committee is achieving the participation-based
budgeting aim of being open and inclusive, many reflect on how either being open and inclusive
are, at times, barriers to effectiveness (closed doors are sometimes necessary) and efficiency
(group too big). Others reflect on how the actual structures—representation and ability to
participate—are not adequately achieved (not equal representation and low participation from
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public). Different limitations (time constraints and information constraints) are identified as
procedural and structural barriers to effectiveness. Finally, there is a disconnect between being
open and inclusive and legitimacy of decision making (rubber stamping).
Ethical Behavior
A third category, “Ethical Behavior” (71 references), arose from the interviews when
asked “How has the committee met or not met the aim of openness and inclusiveness?”
Throughout the interviews, respondents interject ideas regarding the ethical behavior at three
points in the dialectic: the public, the individual committee members, and the committee as a
whole. Four properties emerge that comprise this category: need for public to participate, need
for members to communicate back to constituents, need for members to leave their hats at the
door, and need for the committee to get information out to public. This category represents an
important addition to the conceptual map, because this category emerges as a clear and critical
aspect of achieving openness and inclusiveness more clearly than is in the literature.
Democratic processes are more robust and legitimate when a broader audience
participates. The property need for public to participate (15 references) suggests that there is an
onus on the public to actually “grab the opportunity” to show up. “[T]he success of openness and
inclusive depends in part on the community. How willing are they to take the time to speak to
members of the committee, all of whom are known? How willing are they, potentially, to request
that accommodation be made for them to attend meetings” (UBC Interviews 2007). A dimension
of this property is a feeling of frustration that the public demonizes the committee and forms
opinions without having collected information. As one interviewee says: “There will be a
contingent who will say ‘they’re not open and I can’t do anything about it, so I’m not going to do
anything about it.’ There will be those people who will complain but won’t do anything about it.
19
They will say, ‘You should do this and you should do that’ but they won’t go to any of the
meetings and listen. They’ll grab onto the rumor that something bad is happening and spread it
around, but not actually take the time to go find out what’s really happening” (UBC Interviews
2007). When the public does not participate, but still forms public opinion, then distrust and
perceptions of government as the “other” are created. In this regard, the onus of the public to
participate is to ground criticisms not in rumor but in fact. Thus, the reach of ethics in democratic
processes goes beyond the public entity charged with a specific public duty. Ethical
responsibilities permeate the whole political system; the ability to participate is a structural
venue, a right for citizens. Participating is not a just a right, but it is also a responsibility.
Similarly, another property that engenders individual responsibility to make democracy
happen is need for members to communicate back to constituents (24 references). “There’s a
large onus on the representatives on the committee to be properly communicating, to fully
understand what’s happening, and properly communicating what’s going on before there’s a big
uproar” (UBC Interviews 2007). While there is consensus that giving good and timely
information to constituents is crucial to a committee member’s ethical responsibilities, the
evaluation of how well this responsibility is being carried out and why it may not be being
carried out is mixed. Some acknowledge that individual members are, indeed, reporting back:
“Anytime we’ve had a committee meeting, I report back and I put something out of what’s been
going on” (UBC Interviews 2007). Others describe concern that individual members are not
following through with their responsibility: “I think the times that it [being open and inclusive]
has not been successful as potentially it could have been was again, when individual committee
members may not have been as diligent about communicating outside the room as they might
have been” (UBC Interviews 2007). Still others describe an inability to communicate back—at
20
all or in a timely fashion—because the information in the meeting has been determined to be
confidential. “Part of the way that the committee is not open…is that although we’ve got a
representative structure there and they do delve, as a group, into a lot of planning and strategic
direction questions, very often that information in its detail is held confidential within the group
so that, in some processes, there is not an opportunity for the representatives there to go back and
fully inform their constituencies” (UBC Interviews 2007). The ability of individual committee
members to communicate back to constituents is articulated as a critical role in achieving
openness and inclusiveness.
A third property identified by interviewees that addresses ethical responsibilities is titled
a need for members to leave their hats at the door (24 references). This idea suggests the
importance of members leaving their parochial interests behind to both understand and serve the
broader university public interest. “As easy as it is to fall into the trap of thinking of our own
little domains—what college do you belong to, are you professional or faculty—thinking of it in
those contexts, it’s difficult to leave that hat at the door, but it’s important that we do” (UBC
Interviews 2007). From another respondent: “When we walk through the door to the committee,
we are to look at the larger campus community” (UBC Interviews 2007). These comments
reflect the classic tension found in the literature between self-interests and public interests, and it
requires a reflective practitioner to achieve an ethical balance between constituent representation
and broader campus interests.
The final property identified as ethical behavior moves the focus from the individual
committee member to the group as a whole, that of need for the committee to get information out
to the public (eight references). Information includes meeting announcements, minutes,
summative information, and issues with which the committee is dealing. There are no reasons
21
identified for not disseminating information, but there are observations that there are easy
technological fixes to this issue, i.e., the Web. Thus, achieving openness and inclusiveness
includes public education in a broad sense as well.
Outside Influences
One last category that arose from the interview data is that of “Outside Influences” (54
references). Each of the three properties identified are discussed in how they either positively or
negatively impact being open and inclusive.
One property that is consistently framed as having a positive effect is that of leadership
(17 references). All of the leadership references identify the university president as committed to
the shared governance. “The first step, the major factor in creating this successful, open process
was the president making that decision, empowering the committee to that extent and trusting the
committee” (UBC Interviews 2007). Additionally, the president gave instructions about “leaving
your luggage at the door,” thus guiding both the individuals and the committee as to expectations
of ethical behavior that would, in turn, build trust.
A second property in this category is that of the presence of the press (25 references).
The theme here is that the presence of the press means that the meetings are open, but that when
the press is there, openness of discussion is curtailed by an unwillingness to have frank
discussions for fear of getting out in front of the process. “There is a problematic piece to its
open nature. Clearly, the meetings are very different when we have the press there versus when
we don’t have the press there—they are much more productive when we feel comfortable in not
having to worry about what kind of public image we are going to put out. I think that some of the
difficult conversations having to simultaneously worry about how we’re communicating
everything that we’re doing can really stifle the conversation” (UBC Interviews 2007). There is
22
an implied ethical responsibility for the press to responsibly report the discussion versus
sensationalize for profit.
A third property of outside influences is that of state-level oversight entities (12
references). Such entities include the board of regents, the commissioner of higher education,
and the state legislature. “There are sometimes when the board of regents give us instructions on
how to do things that they don't want discussed in front of the press or in front of the whole
campus and we have to remind them that that's still our process. The committee has been less
successful in being open and inclusive when it has had very short notice of very dramatic
changes in the way the commissioner's office or the board of regents expect a budget to be
developed” (UBC Interviews 2007). While the university’s goal may be to be open to and
inclusive of the entire campus community, external parties may have different priorities which
are in conflict with these values. This property is an example of one organizational culture
embedded within a larger organizational culture and how changes occur therein.
In sum, outside influences are just that—influences on all three categories identified by
the interviewers. The leadership, the press, and high-level administrative organizations both
positively and negatively have an impact on the definition of open and inclusive, the committee’s
efficacy in operationalizing these values, and the ethical behavior of those involved. Thus, in this
case, the dialectic relationship between the university community and the committee is not
insulated, but, rather, situated in proximity to other dialectic relationships, i.e., state entities and
legislative demands, the press and the readership.
[Table 1 here]
23
Results by Position in the University
Thus far, these results reflect the committee’s responses in the aggregate; however, are
there any properties which receive stronger emphasis by those with a particular position in the
university? In table 1, results are presented for number of responses for each property by position
held in the university (Vice Presidents, Deans, and Constituent Group). Deciding upon a standard
of what constitutes a ‘stronger emphasis’ was difficult, because unlike t-tests or Chi-squares,
there is no standard in qualitative research to determine difference. Because there are three
subgroups in the trait ‘position in the university,’ we decided that if 50 percent or more of the
comments were held by one subgroup, we would look closely at their responses. Using this
standard, differences in emphasis on particular properties by position in the university do arise.
The Constituent Group consists of those who represent specific constituencies on campus
and the community-at-large. This group has four properties across two categories in which their
responses represent half or more of the comments in that property. The first two properties with
higher levels of responses from the Constituent Group reside in the efficacy category and are
properties which identify challenges to achieving openness and inclusiveness. The first one is
that of not equal representation (50 percent); these results make sense, given that they comprise
only 25 percent of the participants and Deans and Vice Presidents comprise of the remaining 75
percent. Those in this position at the university also have higher concentrations of comments
regarding information constraints (53 percent). Since the primary purpose of the Constituent
Group member is to represent a part of the campus community, it is understandable why having
information tagged as confidential may be put them in an awkward position. Additionally, being
given summary data is frustrating while trying to work toward understanding budgetary
processes and lingo. Finally, two properties within the ethics category arise: need for members to
24
communicate back to constituents (54 percent) and need for committee to get information out to
the public (50 percent). Both of these ethical responsibilities reflect the primary purpose of the
Constituent Group. These results demonstrate how this group harbors a nuanced understanding
of their responsibilities. In tandem, they highlight both their individual responsibility in
communicating back to constituents as well as the ethical responsibility of the committee as a
whole to disseminate budgetary processes and decisions to the community at-large.
There are five properties across three categories which contain half or more responses
from the Deans. The first property is in the definition category, that of representation (52
percent). By virtue of their positions, the Deans are both representatives and executives. They
understand deeply the import of being a legitimate voice for a large body of constituents. The
Deans have three properties in the category of “Efficacy,” in which their responses are strikingly
high. The first property is that of time constraints (62 percent). It makes sense that the Deans feel
the crunch of time constraints, given the fullness of their respective plates of running their
colleges or units. They also identify frustration with group too big (65 percent); while
representation is important, they also feel the tug of their executive roles and hence the
inefficiency of having such a large group making budgetary decisions. The Deans have very high
concentrations of responses regarding rubber stamping (88 percent). The feeling that decisions
had already been made by a select few is a large source of frustration for some Deans. Finally,
the Deans identify the presence of the press (56 percent) as having a stifling effect on robust
dialogue. These results indicate the heightened sense of tension between democratic values,
efficiency and legitimacy.
The Vice-Presidents have only one property in which they hold half or more of the
responses. In the outside influences category, 50 percent of the responses relating to state-level
25
oversight come from the Vice Presidents. As the conduit for information from these state-level
entities, it is the upper administration who directly receives the outside pressures and demands in
the budgetary processes from various state entities.
Also of import are the six properties that have no great differences in the distribution of
responses, despite position in the university. Participation and low participation reveal that all
members of the committee share the import of the ability and practice of public participation.
Responses regarding closed doors are necessary reveal a consensus for the need for some
executive privilege to freely discuss ideas without fear of being misquoted out of context.
Interestingly, all three groups articulated the ethical responsibility of the public to participate as
well as the committee members’ ethical responsibility to leave their hats at the door and think
broadly about the broader campus’ public interest. Across all committee members, an
understanding exists that running a democracy is a dialectic relationship, not unidirectional.
Finally, all see leadership as key to achieving democratic values in public service. It is through
the leadership that both procedural and ethical expectations are set.
Conclusion
Let us return to the three research questions. First, how do public representatives define
their democratic responsibilities? As reflected in the literature, the committee members do define
their participation-based budgeting mission both structurally (representative structure of the
campus community and opportunities for others to participate) and procedurally (ethical
behavior of individuals members of the committee, the public at large, the committee as an
organic whole). Both facets are interdependent in conceptualizing openness and inclusiveness.
What makes this case study different from municipal, county or state budgeting processes is its
intentionally representative structure. Yet, instead of being a niche case, it is exemplary. As with
26
the university president, public administrators could take a constitutive role in achieving the ends
of participation-based processes by inviting people to the table in a role that carries with it ethical
obligations and responsibilities. Instead of simply providing the ability for citizens to engage,
appointing representation from community constituents necessarily engages people in the dialog
and, hence, in democracy.
Second, what are the insights regarding opportunities and barriers of accomplishing the
goal of participatory-based budgeting? The committee members’ responses seem paradoxical in
nature. For example, democratic organizations are not necessarily organic; it takes leadership to
flatten the organizational structure and make conscious ethical responsibilities as individuals and
as the committee as a whole. In another example, the structural need for transparency to achieve
the democratic goals means that the press is present and yet the presence of the press inhibits the
procedural need for robust discussion. Or, while representation is a cornerstone to participationbased budgeting, the group being so large has an affect on the efficiency of the group.
In turn, when assessing the extent to which the committee is successful at achieving the
participation-based budgeting mission, what emerges is not an answer, but, rather, a situation.
The respondents’ focus is on their internal struggles with the enormity of tensions between their
theoretical definitions and praxis. Similar to what other scholars have identified as tensions
(Franklin and Ebdon 2007; Stone 2002), the respondents desire representation, participation, and
leadership to achieve democratic values, and yet they quietly express a need for privacy or
security for brainstorming ideas to run their full course and for a more efficient process. As we
stated at the outset, delivering democracy is difficult. But most theorizing about citizen
participation remains prescriptive and ignores these tensions. The data lead to a simple question:
what do we do about these tensions?
27
Stivers (2008) insightfully asserts that there is no need to reconcile democratic politics
and scientific efficiency (i.e., politics-administration dichotomy), but, rather “keep the tension
between the two alive, because it is at the intersection between them that public administration
comes into its own” (56). Similarly, Cook (1996) suggests putting an “and” versus an “or”
between these value tensions. Perhaps the reason why there is a frustrating disconnect between
participation theory and practice is that both as a society and in our classrooms, we try to
artificially resolve or avoid these tensions. What our case study reveals is that much of the work
in public governance exists in that space of tension between democratic values with magnetizing
forces pulling in opposing directions. Since Minnowbrook, public administration scholars have
brought democratic values to the heart of public administration. It is now time to go further and
work towards working and making decisions at the intersection of competing democratic values.
How do practitioners do their work in this disequilibrium? How do we teach in this
disquieting space? Being in the tension instead of resolving it by choosing one side or saying that
the dichotomy is false requires a willingness to be uncomfortable. We suggest that wrestling with
such practical situations and intellectual arguments reside not only in a course on ethics or
foundations of public administration, but, rather, in every public administration course. The more
exposure students have to being uncomfortable in these tensions, the better. In this case study,
the committee tends not to struggle with the complexities of the budget as much as the tensions
found in making the budgeting process democratic. While the committee members express
discomfort with this tension, we assert that it is a natural element in democracy to embrace. With
its participation-based budgeting approach, the committee is delivering democracy. Being open
and inclusive comes in the form of the citizen—public administrator dialectic, but it also resides
in the intellectual, ethical, and practical engagement with competing democratic values.
28
Figure 1. Conceptual map
DEFINITION OF “OPEN AND INCLUSIVE”
(63 references total)

OUTSIDE
INFLUENCES
(54 references
total)




Representation of campus and
community (31 references)
Ability to participate (32 references)
Leadership
(17
references)
Presence of
the press (25
references)
State-level
oversight (12
references)
EFFICACY OF OPENNESS
AND INCLUSIVENESS IN
ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY
(130 references total)



ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
(71 references total)





Need for public to participate
(15 references)
Need for members to
communicate back to
constituents (24)
Need for members to leave
their hats at the door (24)
Need for Committee to get
information out to public
(8 references)



29
Low participation from
public (32 references)
Closed doors are
sometimes necessary (11
references)
Time constraints (16
references)
Group is too big (17
references)
Not equal representation
leads to biased decisions
(18 references)
Information constraints
(19 references)
Rubber stamping decisions
(17 references)
Table 1. Responses by property and position within the university
Position within the university
Constituent Group
Deans
Vice Presidents
(n = 6)
(n = 11)
% (n)
% (n)
% (n)
Representation (31)
19 % ( 6)
52 % (16)
29 % ( 9)
Participation (32)
15 % ( 5)
41 % (13)
44 % (14)
Low participation (32)
22 % ( 7)
37 % (12)
41 % (13)
Closed doors necessary (11)
45 % ( 5)
45 % ( 5)
10 % ( 1)
Time constraints (16)
19 % ( 3)
62 % (10)
19 % ( 3)
Group too big (17)
29 % ( 5)
65 % (11)
6 % ( 1)
Not equal representation (18)
50 % ( 9)
44 % ( 8)
6 % ( 1)
Information constraints (19)
53 % (10)
42 % ( 8)
5 % ( 1)
Rubber stamping (17)
12 % ( 2)
88 % (15)
0 % ( 0)
27 % ( 4)
40 % ( 6)
33 % ( 5)
54 % (13)
29 % ( 7)
17 % ( 4)
33 % ( 8)
29 % ( 7)
38 % ( 9)
50 % ( 4)
12 % ( 1)
38 % ( 3)
Leadership (17)
47 % ( 8)
24 % ( 4)
29 % ( 5)
Presence of the press (25)
20 % ( 5)
56 % (14)
24 % ( 6)
State-level oversight (12)
8 % ( 1)
42 % ( 5)
50 % ( 6)
Properties by category (n)
(n = 7)
Definition (63)
Efficacy (130)
Ethics (71)
Need for public to participate (15)
Need for members to communicate
back to constituents (24)
Need for members to leave their
hats at the door (24)
Need for committee to get information
out to the public (8)
Outside influences (54)
Source: University budget committee interviews 2007
NOTE: One person may have offered more than one response; we ensured that the responses were not mere
repetitions of the same idea by carefully reading each quote in its context.
30
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