Human Nature and Moral Responsibility
Cameron Davis
Johns Hopkins University
International Undergraduate Philosophy Conference
Montana State University, Bozeman
September 6-7, 2013
Preamble
Holding others responsible for and responding resentfully to their wrongdoings are nearly
universal practices. Few philosophers and social activists have ever adopted the idea that one
should, seemingly against his nature as a human being, seek to completely abandon his “negative
reactive attitudes”, as P.F. Strawson coined them in Freedom and Resentment. The notion that
one should suspend all negative reactive attitudes such as anger and resentment is based on the
idea of determinism: that all events, choices, and actions are causally determined and cannot
happen in any other way—every event is predestined and must occur as part of an immutable
sequence of events. Strawson does not refer to a specific type of determinism, but perhaps an
explanation of the reasoning behind the main conception of determinism will be helpful.
The main conception of determinism, physical determinism, is based on the important
premise that all events are physical events, and even mental events such as thoughts and
decisions are simply physical events or the results of physical events in the brain. If all events are
physical events or the results thereof, then all events are causally constrained to be as they are—
they could not be otherwise—because they are simply parts of a sequence of events operating
under universal, invariable physical laws such as energy, mass, etc. Our mental events, which
according to physical determinism are physical events, are no different—each thought and
decision is not a result of someone’s free will but rather is one neural event (such as a pattern of
neurofiring) in a sequence of neural interactions. Many understandably hold that if determinism
is true, humans have no free will and are simply characters in a prewritten story of causally
related physical events. While there is a sect of determinists known as “compatibilist
determinists,” who believe that determinism and free will are compatible, for the sake of
simplicity, in this essay, the terms “determinism” and “determinist” will refer to a conception of
determinism that is incompatible with free will.
In today’s society, where free will pervades the worldview and determinism is widely
considered a high-flown philosophical fantasy, negative reactive attitudes are expressed in the
vast majority of cases in which a moral actor commits a wrongdoing—but not all. If an agent
harms another only accidentally and does not express ill will, or if a sociopath or someone with a
neurological abnormality has no meaningful control over his behavior, he is often met with
forgiveness rather than anger or disapprobation. Even in our free-will dominated society, many
still find reasonable justification for suspending negative reactive attitudes some of the time, but
if determinism is true, it seems no one is ever responsible for his behavior. If determinism is true,
one’s will is causally determined, simply a product of the interactions between the physical
events that preceded it and the physical laws operating on those physical events, and one has no
meaningful control over it. No one chooses in any meaningful sense to have their will but simply
receives it as a causally determined inevitability. Strawson, in agreement with most determinists,
asserts that if determinism is true, the rational practice is to suspend all negative reactive
attitudes, since it is nonsensical and unfair to hold others responsible for actions they have no
control over. However, he argues that despite the rationality of abandoning these attitudes,
humans should not attempt such a feat, as it is surely so antithetical to human nature as to
be impossible.
Freedom and Resentment has gained significant popularity as one of the most influential
philosophical papers of the late 20th century. Strawson’s idea is intuitively appealing because it
accords with societal norms. Negative reactive attitudes such as anger and resentment toward
wrongdoing are so common and so widely accepted as justified that these attitudes seem to be
insuppressible parts of human nature. In this paper, however, I will argue that this is not
necessarily the case; humans can control and suspend their negative reactive attitudes in the
appropriate cases, including in the case that determinism is true. In arguing that humans are
capable of suspending all of their reactive attitudes based on belief in determinism, I will show
that Strawson inadvertently substantiates my claim.
Strawson’s argument is self-defeating. He admits that under certain circumstances, one
might understand why an actor committed a wrongdoing and consequently suspend reactive
attitudes, taking an “objective” view. One of these exempting circumstances, according to
Strawson, is “derangement” or “perversion.” By this very admission, Strawson undermines his
own argument that humans could not suspend negative reactive attitudes based on belief in
determinism. He does so by establishing that humans can control their reactive attitudes by
reasoning about whether the actor is responsible for his will. I propose that if people can reason
that a moral agent committed a wrongdoing because he was “deranged” or “perverted” and can
consequently suspend negative reactive attitudes, as Strawson admits, they should be able to
perform a similar suspension by reasoning that a moral agent committed a wrongdoing simply
because his ill will and behavior were causally determined. This paper has three main sections.
In the first, I will reconstruct Strawson’s argument. In the second, I will elucidate its logical
incoherency. In the third section, I will examine Strawson’s resources to counter and then refute
these possible counterarguments.
Section I: Reconstructing Strawson’s Argument
First, I will reconstruct Strawson’s argument in more detail. Determinism, i.e. an
incompatibilist conception that rejects free will, is an extremely controversial theory with little
support even from the philosophical community, but if it is true, it might render nonsensical and
unfair society’s ubiquitous practice of holding people responsible for their actions. If
determinism is true, one has no control over his actions or will, so how can one be held
responsible for them? Strawson took a unique approach to addressing the implications of
determinism on moral responsibility. He argued that reactive attitudes such as anger and
resentment toward someone who manifests an ill will are rooted in human nature. Contrary to the
common conception of moral responsibility, Strawson believes that these attitudes are prior to
and constitutive of moral responsibility. People do not react angrily or resentfully to ill will
because they hold people morally responsible. Rather, Strawson believes, moral responsibility—
the holding of others responsible—results naturally from people’s insuppressible psychological
tendencies to react angrily and resentfully toward ill will, so the truth of determinism is irrelevant
to the issue of moral responsibility.
Strawson then admits that people refrain from reacting in such a way in some cases of
exemption, and it is with this admission that such exemptions are commonly made that Strawson
undermines his argument. He presents two main types of exempting cases. The first type is what
I will call “exemptions by circumstance.” Sometimes a person may do something that would
naturally cause another anger, such as shove him, but not out of ill will—not with desire to harm.
Imagine a case in which the person had to shove another in order to reach and rescue a dying
loved one or a case in which the shove was done by accident—perhaps one’s shoe came untied,
he tripped, and the shove was a byproduct of his accidental fall. Strawson explains that in these
cases one may suspend reactive attitudes by reasoning that the other person did not display ill
will. While these cases are interesting and perhaps they could play some role in clarifying the
incoherency in Strawson’s argument, cases of the second type are much more elucidating.
I will describe the second type of exempting cases as “exemption by inapplicability.”
Unlike the previous type, the wrongdoer intends to harm, expressing the ill will that Strawson
believes is essential to eliciting negative reactive attitudes; however, people generally can
suspend the attitudes, Strawson admits. He does not explain why, though. He simply admits to
this general ability to suspend attitudes toward certain types of people. Strawson’s examples
include children and, what I will focus on, a “deranged” or “systematically perverted” person.
People tend to refrain from holding morally responsible actors of certain circumstances—e.g.
those with neurological defects or sometimes those that have suffered exceptionally hardening
pasts—when they find the actors’ behavior can be explained by their “unfortunate formative
circumstances,” in Strawson’s words. While discussing a murderer, one tends to react with
anger, disgust, and vicarious resentment. On the other hand, Strawson postulates that if one
knows a murderer to be a victim of a neurological disorder that has rendered him unable to
empathize or uncontrollably violent and malicious, one tends not to react with anger or vicarious
resentment, but rather to take an “objective attitude”: to see that person as a subject of policy,
someone who must be pacified, softened, and possibly controlled. Herein Strawson’s admission
undermines his own argument.
Section II: Identifying the Logical Incoherency
Strawson’s examples clearly illustrate that humans have the capacity to reason about the
reactive attitudes they should and should not have. He himself has proven that they are not the
insuppressible emotions that he describes them to be. To see the inconsistency more closely, we
must answer the questions Strawson tellingly fails to: What unites the cases of “exemption by
inapplicability,” and why can we suspend negative reactive attitudes for deranged, perverted, or
neurologically abnormal people? The answer, which I hope the reader will find intuitively
appealing, is that one tends to reason the neurologically abnormal or deranged actor is not
responsible for his ill will. This interpretation makes sense in light of how society tends to think
about these types of people. Neurologically abnormal people who commit atrocities are often
thought of as unable to control their intentions and behaviors—i.e. their wills. Similarly, the
“deranged” or “perverted” are often considered to have wills shaped into depravity by their
“unfortunate formative circumstances.” In both cases, I believe most would agree with the
proposition that they are able to suspend reactive attitudes toward these actors because they find
the actors are not responsible for their wills and thus not responsible for their ill will.
If this answer is correct, Strawson’s argument seems to fall apart. If one can suspend
attitudes on account of a deranged or neurologically abnormal person’s not being responsible for
his ill will, why can’t one do the same for all given a belief in determinism? In a deterministic
world, no one is ever responsible for his ill will. Perhaps Strawson is right that there is
something natural in feeling anger and resentment toward those with ill will, but since humans
are capable of taking the unemotional, rational, “objective” stance toward deranged or perverted
people, perhaps what is human nature and maybe even insuppressible is the tendency to react
with anger and resentment only when one believes the actor is truly responsible for his ill
will. If determinism is true and humans lack free will, no one is responsible for his ill will,
and as Gandhi and Albert Einstein espoused, it makes sense to desire and demand fair treatment
but not to react angrily, resentfully, and certainly not vengefully toward one’s mere annoyances
or even oppressors.
Section III: Examining A Possible Reply
Strawson could reply by arguing that humans lack the willpower or endurance to suspend
all negative reactive attitudes. They can do so in rare, extreme cases, but it is in their nature to
express at least some negative reactive attitudes toward their plights and the injustices in the
world. This argument faces some major problems. First, it seems wrong on a very basic level.
When humans realize that wrongdoers are out of control of their actions, they do not seem to
expend some of a putatively finite store of willpower in suspending negative reactive attitudes.
Generally, it is not a struggle to suspend negative reactive attitudes toward a person who is
known to have been born neurologically abnormal. Consider a person with Tourette’s syndrome
who might unwillingly shout profanity during a sacred ceremony. One somewhat easily suspends
his negative reactive attitudes. It does not require depletion of willpower; it simply requires a
realization that the actor is not in control of his actions or that the actor does not have an ill will,
so there is no reason to be mad or resentful toward him. If willpower to suspend negative
reactive attitudes is not limited, and suspension simply requires a realization that one is out of
control of his actions, then suspension of these attitudes toward all based on determinism seems
entirely possible. The second major problem with this argument now directly follows from the
example of a man with Tourette’s. Suspension of negative reactive attitudes would not deprive
humanity of all negative emotional reactions, which seem to serve a cathartic role in helping
people to cope with plights and injustices. The negative emotional reactions would simply
change. Instead of feeling angry and resentful toward an actor one finds deserving of
disapprobation, repugnance and vengeance, one might feel sad, disappointed, or frustrated by
simply unfortunate events. This is probably how most would react to the aforementioned case of
a person with Tourette’s shouting profanity during a sacred ceremony. Finally, since Gandhi,
Albert Einstein, and presumably many determinists have been able to suspend negative reactive
attitudes on a broad scale, this argument is empirically denied as well.
Strawson’s mistake is understandable. Practices of reacting resentfully and holding others
responsible for their actions are so nearly universal that, prima facie, such practices seem to be
human nature. However, Strawson’s argument may be limited by its shortsightedness. Strawson
believed negative reactive attitudes are insuppressible and part of human nature simply because
they are so common, but perhaps they are only so common because the existence of free will and
responsibility for one’s actions are so widely and wholeheartedly accepted as truth, so engrained
in society’s worldview. Given that people can indeed think rationally about whether it makes
sense to have negative reactive attitudes toward a “deranged” or “perverted” person, it is likely
that widespread belief in determinism would produce a society of people who take the
“objective” stance toward all unfortunate circumstances around them. Strawson seems to have
been limited by his shortsightedness. It does not seem that humans in general can abandon
negative reactive attitudes toward everyone now, as most people scoff at such a notion, but with
a widespread belief that everyone’s actions are entirely out of his or her control, subject to the
forces of determinism, a near universal suspension of these attitudes should be considered
possible. That is, in a world where a belief in free will is not so pervasive and engrained,
suspension of reactive attitudes may be much more natural.
Recent Empirical Inquiry
Strawson, if he were alive today, might believe he has gained some support from
evolutionary moral psychology. The idea that moral condemnation and moral emotions such as
anger and resentment are rooted in human evolutionary history has recently gained significant
empirical support. Some evolutionary psychologists have proposed theories of “indirect
reciprocity”, which state that the human brain’s pleasure centers may adaptively reward certain
moral behaviors because others notice such moral behaviors and are willing to form cooperative
and mutually beneficial relationships. Similarly, some evolutionary psychologists have argued
that the brain may be programmed to condemn and react angrily and resentfully toward immoral
behaviors because such reactions also broadcast a benevolent disposition and willingness to form
cooperative, mutually beneficial relationships. If negative reactive attitudes are rooted in human
evolution, they may indeed be part of human nature, as Strawson believed.
However, there are two main problems with the jump from these recent findings to the
conclusion that Strawson was right that humans could not suspend all reactive attitudes based on
a belief in determinism. First, even if negative reactive attitudes are evolutionary mechanisms,
they are not necessarily insuppressible. Just because something is some way in its natural state
does not mean that it has to be so. Secondly, negative reactive attitudes clearly are not
insuppressible. The exempting cases that Strawson provides show that to be the case. If one
believes that a moral actor is not responsible for his ill will because he is neurologically
abnormal, one can overcome his evolutionary tendency to react with anger and resentment, and
similarly, with a belief in determinism, he should be able to overcome this evolutionary tendency
for negative reactive attitudes toward people in a deterministic world who are not any more
responsible for their ill wills than they are for the chain of causally related physical events that
surround and affect them.
Summary
Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment is an extremely influential work on determinism
and moral responsibility. His idea that, even if determinism is true, suspension of negative
reactive attitudes for all is so antithetical to human nature as to be impossible is a unique take on
the issue. However, Strawson’s argument exhibits a major logical inconsistency that undermines
his entire argument. He willingly admits that people can suspend their negative reactive attitudes
if, with rational consideration, they find good reason to. With this admission, he incites the
reader to ask why this same sort of rational consideration and consequent suspension of attitudes
and responsibility is not possible with regard to all human action. Even if people are
evolutionarily designed to react angrily or resentfully toward ill will, since they can suspend their
negative reactive attitudes toward deranged or neurologically abnormal people who cannot
control their wills, they should be able to do the same toward everyone given they believe in
determinism, for anyone in a deterministic world has even less control over his will than a
deranged, neurologically abnormal person in a world with free will. These attitudes may seem
natural and insuppressible simply because the idea of free will is so engrained in society’s
worldview, but if the common man saw the world as a determinist does, perhaps anger and
resentment would become the unnatural reactions.
Strawson’s greatest mistake was setting for himself an unattainable burden of proof—one
that he failed to come close to meeting. Freedom and Resentment was meant to end the debate
between the “optimists” and the “pessimists”. The optimists believe that even if no one has free
will, society should continue to hold people morally responsible to regulate behavior. Pessimists,
on the other hand, believe that holding others morally responsible despite their lacking free will
is unfair and unjust. Strawson believed his paper ended this debate because it showed it doesn’t
matter whether it’s right or wrong to hold morally responsible people without free will—we
can’t help but do it. To meet this burden—to end the debate between the optimists and the
pessimists—Strawson needed to prove that no one could ever suspend negative reactive attitudes
given a belief in determinism. Even if you believe not everyone could suspend attitudes in every
case, it should be clear—in light of the logical inconsistency and cases like Gandhi and
Einstein—that at least some people could do it some of the time. Given this, the debate between
the optimists and pessimists remains valuable. In a world without free will, is it better to uphold
moral responsibility in the name of behavioral regulation or to abandon it in the name of
fairness? Strawson set out to end this debate, but it remains just as important for the philosophy
community to confront as ever.
REFERENCES
Alcock, John. Animal Behavior. 9th ed. Sinauer Associates, Inc., 2009. Print.
Strawson, Peter. "Freedom and Resentment." Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. (1963): n.
page. Web. 1 Jun. 2013.