Bringing the Constitution Online: The Struggle over Egypt’s New Constitution
Tofigh Maboudi (tm1325a@american.edu)
American University, School of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
Ghazal P. Nadi (gp4917a@american.edu)
American University, School of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
PRELIMINARY DRAFT
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Introduction
Participatory constitution making is increasingly accepted as a democratic norm allowing
citizens to engage in the creation of their constitution and their future. However participation is
not without challenges and we argue that participatory constitution making is not effective
without elite consensus. We use empirical evidence from an unprecedented data base of online
feedback on the Egyptian Constitution and show that the likelihood of constitutional changes as a
function of online participatory process decreases significantly following non-Islamist elite
boycotts of the Constituent Assembly.
The literature on constitution making suggests that participatory constitution making is the ideal
form as well as an emerging norm in the international law1. Popular participation is argued to
give legitimacy to the constitution through the inclusiveness of citizens and the information that
is spread about the provisions of the constitution (Elster 1993, Moehler 2006, Bannon 2007). We
argue that participatory constitution making alone cannot guarantee the legitimacy of a
constitution if there is no prior consensus among political elites. Existing studies on constitution
making emphasize the importance of participation as a democratic experience which gives
legitimacy to the constitution that should be respected by the citizens and the elites alike (Hart
2003, Widner 2008). Although there are different cases of constitutions which did not have a
participatory process but still enjoy legitimacy including the Japanese constitution of 1946 and
the DRC constitution of 2005; there are also cases of highly participatory drafting process such
as in Kenya 2005, where participation did not result in the production of a legitimate constitution
and citizens voted down the proposed draft.
1
. "Lessons Learned from Constitution Making: Processes with Broad Based Public Participation." Democracy
Reporting International, February 2012.
2
The constitution making process in Egypt appears to have been participatory in all stages of the
process, from the election of the constitutional Assembly, and the deliberation process to the
ratification in referendum. However the referendum turnout was low and the citizens of Cairo the
heart of the revolution mainly refused to vote in the referendum and eventually the Constitution
was rejected in Cairo. Furthermore, the country is still unstable and the non-Islamist groups
demand basic changes to the Constitution and postponing all elections. We argue the challenges
to the legitimacy of the Constitution in Egypt are results of the fact that despite popular
participation in the drafting process, there was no agreement among elites over the fundamental
issues and the key components of the Constitution and the system of government.
To support our argument we conduct statistical analysis using data from online feedback on the
Egyptian Constitution. In order to highlight the participatory constitution making process, the
Egyptian Constituent Assembly launched an official website for people to review the proposed
drafts of the Constitution and express their opinion on them. We use the data from this
exceptional mechanism of participatory constitution drafting2to examine whether changes in the
proposed drafts of the Constitution correlate with online feedback of those drafts or other factors
such as inter-elite dynamics were also influential on the outcome. The statistical analysis
demonstrates that the likelihood of change in the content of the Constitution drafts decreases
significantly as the citizen approval of those drafts increases. However, we also find that
following the boycott of the Constituent Assembly by prominent liberal and non-Islamist figures,
the predicted probability of draft change as a function of online feedback decreases significantly.
In other words, regardless of approval or disapproval by citizens, the predicted probability of
draft change as a function of online feedback is significantly lower after the boycotts. This
2
. Only Iceland in 2011 has used crowdsourcing for constitutional amendments.
3
finding challenges the view that through participation citizens’ views are accounted for in the
constitution and supports our argument that citizen participation should be accompanied with
elite consensus.
This paper proceeds by identifying the key features, findings and propositions of the relevant
literature. Then we outline the theoretical framework of the study and review the process of
constitution making in Egypt. Following the review of the constitution making process in Egypt,
we proceed to the empirical analysis, the data and results. Finally we present our discussion and
we conclude by emphasizing the importance of participatory constitution making accompanied
by elite consensus.
Literature and Theory
Constitutions are born under various circumstances, in post-conflict situations and at the times of
transitions. The actors involved in the process of constitution making also differ. A constitution
can be decreed by the ruler or can be created by constitutional assemblies elected by the people
or appointed by the ruler (Carey 2009).
The Arab Spring opened a path for the emergence of new constitutions as well as amendments to
previous ones in the MENA region. New constitutions have been written or are in the process of
being written in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. Also there were constitutional amendments
in Morocco and Jordan. Considering the history of authoritarianism in the region, the focus of
politicians and leaders is to provide legitimacy to new or old regimes through constitutional
changes and participatory constitution making is among the ways this can be fulfilled.
Widner (2008) divides the process of constitution making in five different stages including
drafting, consultation, deliberation, adoption, and ratification. This classification is useful,
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however underestimates the importance of prior negotiations and bargains among elites and
those who are in charge of the actual drafting of the constitution. Banting and Simeon (1985) add
this additional stage to their categorization, arguing the process starts even before drafting, with
an additional stage of “idea generating” which essentially means a period before preparing the
text where ideas and interests are laid out. Eisenstadt and LeVan (2013) fold the process into the
three stages of drafting, deliberation and ratification.
Scholars in general agree that public participation and deliberation are important elements of a
democratic process of constitution making (Elster 1993, Bannon 2007, Elkins et al 2009).
According to Wessels (2001) constitution is the ultimate law of a nation and the foundation of
public life. It therefore determines the relation between the rulers and the ruled. That is why the
participation of the civil society and the entire population is necessary throughout the process of
constitution making. As such, the “nuts and bolts” of a constitution do not matter as much when
skilled politicians and officials are in charge and the affairs of the state run smoothly. However a
constitution which is not perceived legitimate and is not respected by the people will turn out to
be a huge problem at the times of crisis. This is when constitution becomes irrelevant and
conflict will spread within a polity.
Hart (2003, P.4) also suggests that “a claim of necessity for participation is based on the belief
that without the general sense of “ownership” that comes from sharing authorship, today’s public
will not understand, respect, support, and live within the constraints of constitutional
government.”
According to Elster (1993) the concern over legitimacy is the main issue underlying the process
of constitution making. First, there is the “upstream legitimacy” which concerns the Constituent
Assembly. The latter can enjoy legitimacy only if it has come to being through a legitimate
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manner. Second is the “process legitimacy” which concerns the internal decision making
procedure of the assembly. For instance if a constitution is perceived to be a mere inter-elite
agreement rather than an agreement on common good, it would lack legitimacy. Third is the
“downstream legitimacy” and concerns the participation of people in ratifying the constitution
through referendum.
Widner (2008) argues that the process of constitution making has a direct effect on the actions of
politicians after the promulgation of the constitution and its enforcement. As such if the citizens
are involved in the process of the constitution making, they would be more informed of the rules
and accepted behavior under the new constitution and therefore they can better monitor
politicians and officials and punish those who cross the law accepted line. Consequently when
politicians are aware that their transgressions can be monitored, they will be more likely to
abstain from deviation predicting popular resistance.
One of the most important aspects of the deliberative democracy are inclusion and political
equality and according to Banks (2008) politically equal actors who engage in deliberation over
political matters in a threat and domination free environment can achieve consensus. The
inclusion norm guarantees that a variety of interests, opinions and ideas are raised and the best
choices will be achieved through compromise. Further, the political equality norm allows all
those groups who are affected to be included in the decision making and that all participants are
free to pronounce their opinions without fear.
Although the consensus among scholars is rooted in both “normative” and “legal” foundations
(Banks 2008), there are those who criticize a participatory perspective to constitution making and
suggest that constitution making is an elite affair (Elkins et al 2009) which should be kept from
the debates of ordinary democratic politics (Moehler 2006). Prior to spread of participatory
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constitution making, the task of drafting a constitution was restricted to politicians and legal
experts. As such the content of the constitution was important for evaluation of its democratic
values rather than the process by which it came to life (Moehler 2006).
Critics of participatory constitution making mention both time and resource costliness of the
procedure (Bannon 2007) and the fact that when negotiations are public, representatives and
political leaders find it difficult to bargain and make concessions. Some also argue that
participatory constitution making is likely to “foster conflict, polarize public attitudes and
diminish constitutional support” (Moehler 2006, p.280).
Others criticize the fact that participation does not necessarily entail democracy and a stronger
civil society. Eisenstdat and LeVan (2012) argue that despite the assertions that participatory
constitution making would empower the people and would allow them to provide checks on the
politicians after the constitution is enforced, it is in fact the post-promulgation participation
which would determine the levels of democracy or authoritarianism in a country.
The works cited above demonstrate that there is an overwhelming amount of studies which
promote participatory constitution making. Although this assertion has its own critics the general
trend in academia and even international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights3 is the use of participatory methods in at least one of the phases of constitution
making and ideally in all of them. The proponents of participatory constitution making however
underestimate the fact that without elite consensus over the shape of the constitution, legitimacy
cannot be guaranteed and elites can mobilize their popular base even after a general referendum.
As Brown (2011) suggests the best practice with constitution writing is that where all significant
3
. "Lessons Learned from Constitution Making: Processes with Broad Based Public Participation." Democracy
Reporting International, February 2012.
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political forces are included, citizens participate at all phases and that the constitution includes a
public element.
There are many examples of how a participatory constitutional process without elite pacting
turns to be unsuccessful and where pacted constitutions can actually enjoy legitimacy in the eye
of the public. The Columbian Constitution of 1950 is the example of a pacted constitution which
was put to referendum and passed with a wide margin and saved the country from a long civil
war (Garcia-Guadilla and Hurtado 2000). However, the Nicaraguan constitution making under
the Sandinista is an example of highly participatory constitution drafting where elites did not
agree over the nature of the state and the constitutional principles (Benomar 2004). These
examples reinforce the fact that participatory constitution making is a democratic ideal which
should be pursued but without elite consensus the values attributed to participation cannot be
achieved.
In Egypt the constitution making process appears to have been participatory with people being
consulted all the way to the referendum. However the referendum turnout was low with only
31.62 percent of the eligible voters participating in the referendum and in Cairo the heart of the
movement for freedom, 56.93 percent voted down the constitution.4 Furthermore to this day after
more than three months after the referendum the opposition is mobilized and demands systematic
amendments to the constitution; while the Supreme Constitutional Court has postponed all
elections until reforms are made to electoral laws5.
In the light of the events in Egypt, we argue that participatory constitution making has true
meaning and can ensure legitimacy of a constitution only when the representatives of different
4
5
. Stamboliyska, Rayna. (December 25, 2012). Egypt’s Constitutional Referendum Results, Jadaliyya.
. "Egypt Court Suspends Parliamentary Elections." Ahram Online, 6 March 2013.
8
views within the society are included in the drafting process and that there is a consensus among
all elites over the general structure and content of the final draft. If certain groups, for instance
the Muslim Brotherhood fill the majority of seats within a constitutional assembly and dominate
the process (Brown 2012c, Rutherford 2012) without making genuine commitment to
compromising with other elites who are representatives of different groups in the society, the
constitution would not be a product of inputs from the whole society rather the machination of
those in the majority. This can undermine the legitimacy of the constitution among people and
question the importance of people’s participation as a legitimizing mechanism and as a path to
constitutionalism and participatory politics.
Elkins et al (2009, p.7) argue that “higher levels of participation are presumed to function like
supermajority rules, restricting the adoption of undesirable institutions and protecting
prospective minorities in the democratic processes that are established. Participation thus
legitimates and constrains, substituting process for consent to make effective government
possible.” This assertion is true, however only when views’ of people’s representatives are
accounted for rather than buried under the majority vote of only one or two groups within the
constitutional assembly. Participation is important however it is difficult to account for its impact
on the content of the constitution. It is through the elites and representatives which we can gauge
the amount of consideration for people’s views. People do not write the constitution rather they
are consulted and it is up to the constitutional assembly to implement their feedbacks and views
in the text.
Hart (2003) argues that although participatory constitution making is ideal, the fact that
constitutions are made by elites and are essentially about distribution of power should not be
clouded by idealistic accounts of public involvement. In both South Africa and Rwanda where a
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considerable involvement of people were sought, the first stages of constitution making were
initiated by elites and with their prior agreements on key issues of interest to all parties involved.
For instance in the case of South Africa, although elite negotiations were public, often times
when disagreement and deadlock arose, the problems were resolved in secret meetings.
Another issue which affects the values of participatory constitution making is the fact that a
domination of constituent assembly by certain groups can marginalize minority groups (Landau
2012) if there is no elite consensus and members of constituent assembly do not achieve a
compromise over the structure and essential content of the constitution. This issue is more salient
in countries like Egypt where there are few well established political parties, and where pluralist
political participation is allowed following a vacuum of political participation. In these
circumstances the more well established and organized parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood
are able to win a higher number of seats and to dominate the other fledgling parties (Carey and
Reynolds 2011).
There are several instances where elite pacting prior to drafting the constitution have resulted in
coherent, inclusive and stable constitutions. The case of South Africa is the ultimate case of
successful participatory constitution making cited by advocates of participatory constitution
making. However what is underestimated is the fact that the success of the South African case
was mainly due to elite agreements (Brown 2011) prior to constitution making. Hart (2003)
argues the post-apartheid constitution in South Africa was a success based upon the democratic
norms and the process of constitution making starting even earlier than the actual draft with
private and public negotiations between the adversaries on the process of the constitution making
and on the actual content of the draft. Interestingly, there was also a negotiated agreement
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between the elites on the main principles of the constitution. And after that people’s opinions
were sought.
Therefore it is plausible to argue that participatory constitution making should accompany elite
consensus. Without an elite pact it is difficult to assume the constitution was an inclusive product
since it is possible that decisions were made by majority vote rather than political compromise.
The case of Egypt demonstrates the challenges of a constitution which despite its participatory
process does not enjoy popular legitimacy and has generated political crisis (Brown 2012b) in
the country and after months since the referendum, parts of the population demand extensive
amendments to it to guarantee minority rights.
Participatory Constitution Making in Egypt
In this section we will review the process of the constitution making in Egypt and the critical
events that affected the process, and then we will focus on the participation phase and the various
mechanisms which were used to generate a participatory process. Finally we will give a short
account of the inter-elite struggles, the non-Islamist elite boycotts and the polarization of the
Constituent Assembly Members.
Process
In January 2012 the first democratically elected House of Representatives in Egypt began its
duties including electing the 100 member Constituent Assembly. The first Constituent Assembly
which enjoyed democratic legitimacy (Brown 2012a) however was dissolved on April 10 2012
by the Egypt's Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) only after one month into its life, due to law
suits and complaints from liberal and non-Islamists groups stating that the Constituent Assembly
11
did not represent the diversity of the Egyptian society.6 The second Constituent Assembly
however was elected only after the Supreme Military Council threatened to impose its own
Assembly if the different political parties involved did not reach an agreement on the allocation
of seats to different groups. Finally on June 7, 2012 an agreement was reached between
representatives of 22 parties and the military.7 In the new constitutional Assembly 39 members
were elected from the sitting House of Representatives dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood’s
Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafist Nur Party. Six seats were allocated to judges and nine
to law experts and one seat each for armed forces, police and justice ministry. Thirteen seats
were given to unions and five to al-Azhar University and four to Coptic Orthodox Church of
Egypt and the remaining twenty one from public figures.8
The agreement on the making of the Constituent Assembly came only seven days prior to the
dissolution of the democratically elected but Islamist dominated House of Representatives. The
dissolution by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) came after a court ruling
decided that the parliamentary elections were unconstitutional.9 It was under these threatening
circumstances that on June 26 2012 the first session of the Constituent Assembly convened to
begin the process of drafting by choosing the subcommittees and internal administrative issues.
This meeting took place under the shadow of the threat of dissolution by the military and the
Administrative Court. The latter postponed its decision on the Assembly’s constitutionality until
September 4. Another threat hovered over the Constituent Assembly after the military added a
6
. "Egypt Court Suspends Constitutional Assembly." BBC NEWS Middle East, April 10 2012.
. "Egypt Parties End Deadlock over Constitutional Panel." BBC NEWS Middle East, June 8 2012.
8
. Ibid.
9
. "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Denounces Parliament Ban." BBC NEWS Middle East June 16 2012.
7
12
new article to the provisional constitution on June 17, giving it power to dissolve the Constituent
Assembly if it “encounters obstacles that prevent it completing its work” (Article 60B).10
The process of the drafting as such continued with the Administrative Court postponing its
verdict to October 23. On October 23 the Administrative Court announced its ruling and referred
the law suit against the Constituent Assembly to the Supreme Constitutional Court. This decision
came as a relief to the Islamist members of the Assembly since it gave them time to finish the
drafting process. The Supreme Constitutional Court would examine the case in 45 days which
was ample time for the Assembly to finish the drafting and to put the draft to referendum and
consequently avoid the threat of dissolution by the Supreme Constitutional Court.11 This decision
of the Administrative Court provoked satisfaction among the Islamist but was criticized by nonIslamist groups. Ahmad Said head of the liberal Free Egyptians Party accused the Muslim
Brotherhood of using the situation "to confuse the political scene in order to earn more time until
it can pass a constitution that doesn't represent the Egyptian people."12
Despite the growing number of withdrawals from non-Islamist members of the Assembly, the
Assembly accelerated the pace of reviewing and voting on the articles in order to finish drafting
before the Supreme Constitutional Court’s sessions. At last on November 29 the last meeting of
the Assembly was held and after a 19 hour session the Sharia based draft was voted on and
approved with only 85 members being present and liberals as well as Christian members being
absent.13 In the meantime on December 3 the judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court
announced they would not oversee the referendum in protest to President Morsi’s actions and
10
. Rashwan, Nada Hussein. "Egypt's Constituent Assembly Convenes Tuesday with Future Still in Doubt." Ahram
Online, June 27 2012.
11
. Ibrahim, Ekram. "Administrative Court Non-Decision Gives Assembly Ample Time to Finish Constitution." Ahram
Online, October 23 2012.
12
. Ekram 2012.
13
. "Islamist Constitution Spurs Controversy in Egypt as Protests Grow."Russia Today, November 30 2012.
13
protests by Islamists allied to the president.14 Despite the judges’ refusal to oversee the
referendum the Constitution was put to referendum on December 15 and passed with 63.96
percent vote.
Participation
The participatory process in the constitutional drafting in Egypt began with the election of the
House of Representatives’ members who then elected the first Constituent Assembly from within
themselves. Following the dissolution of the first Assembly, although the second Assembly was
not directly elected by people, 39 members were elected from the House members elected by
citizens. The first phase of constitution making in Egypt was not fully participatory, however
indirectly people elected a portion of the members.
The second phase of the drafting process, the deliberation however was fully participatory. The
Constituent Assembly was made up of five committees including the “The Basic Principles of
the State & the Egyptian Society Committee”, “The Rights, Freedoms, and Public Duties
Committee”, “Regime and Public Authority Committee”, “Regulatory and Independent Bodies
Committee”, and “Drafting and Research Committee”.15 The Drafting and Research Committee
was assigned with the task of receiving suggestions and views from the people and experts.
According to Justice Hossam Ghariani, Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, the various
committees toured different governorates in the country and listened to people’s views. These
consultation meetings consisted of 160 sessions in all provinces.16 By December 4, the Assembly
had received 35000 proposals from the population consisting of one or several articles or even
full constitutions. Furthermore beginning August 11 the different drafts were put online and
14
. "Egypt’s Judges Refuse to Oversee Referendum." France 24, December 3 2012.
. Egypt Constituent Assembly’s Official Website.
16
. "Hossam Ghariani: Constituent Assembly and New Constitution Statistics Speak for Themselves." Ikhwan Web,
December 4 2012.
15
14
people were able to comment on the drafts or show their support or disapproval by voting on
each article. All the meetings of the Assembly including all the 408 committee sessions which
amounted to 1622 hours were broadcast through media outlets.17
After the first draft of the constitution was issued on October 10, the Constituent Assembly
launched the “Know Your Constitution” campaign to encourage community dialogue and to
provide a channel for the citizens to familiarize themselves with the constitution.18 Among the
programs of the campaign were television and radio programs explaining the content of the
constitution. Furthermore public consultation meetings were held with massive public attendance
to received suggestions and views on the first draft.19 Also 95 information centers were
established nationwide in order to provide information to the citizens.20
Among other activities of the Campaign were special panels held to discuss for example why
political and civil groups reject the constitution. This panel discussed “the articles that caused a
dispute among civil powers”.21
Beside the official campaign by the Assembly, the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party
launched a campaign, “With the constitution the wheel of production will spin”, encouraging
people to participate in the referendum. As part of this campaign a website was launched to
encourage discussion, questions and suggestions about the new Constitution.22
The campaigns however were not limited to the Assembly and the Brotherhood, rather the
opposition and non-Islamist groups protesting the constitution began awareness campaigns
17
. Ikhwan Web, 2012
. "Constituent Assembly Announces First Draft of New Constitution." October 10 2012.
19
. "Constituent Assembly to Launch Constitution Awareness Campaign on Wednesday with Le100,000 Budget."
Ahram Online, October 7 2012.
20
. "Awareness Campaign to Familiarize People with Coming Constitution."Egypt Independent, August 28 2012.
21
. El-Behairy, Nouran."Fjp Launches Referendum Campaign."Daily News Egypt, December 9 2012.
22
. El-Behairy, 2012.
18
15
educating people about the content of the constitution and the reasons why they should reject it.
For instance the 6 April Youth Movement, launched the “Protect Your Constitution” campaign
explaining the issues of disagreement in the Constitution and why Youth Movement was
rejecting the Constitution and accusing the Brotherhood of attempting to direct the people by
hiding certain articles from the people.23 Other groups such as former members of the nowdefunct National Democratic Party launched a similar campaign educating people about the
“dangerous” articles of the Constitution and why they should reject it.24
Withdrawals
With the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party dominating the chairs of all
committees, already in the first rounds of meetings in mid-July six members of the Constituent
Assembly from the Egyptian Bloc parties resigned. They cited their concern over the Islamist
monopolization and the lack of representation for women, young people and Coptic Christians.25
There were long discussions over the election of replacement members with former Arab League
Secretary General Amr Moussa suggesting the new members include Coptic Christians and nonIslamists to increase the diversity of the Assembly however this was rejected by the Assembly’s
chairman stating replacement should be from the same political groupings as the withdrawals.26
The wave of withdrawals by non-Islamist members of the Assembly continued with the highly
publicized resignation of human rights and Nubian rights activist Manal El-Teiby. El-Teiby who
advocated freedom of religion and rights for all citizens announced a smear campaign by the
23
. El-Behairy, 2012.
. "NDP Offshoots Campaign against Egypt's Constitution." Ahram Online, October 7 2012.
25
. "Political Forces Sign on Elbaradei Call for Constituent Assembly Boycott." Ahram Online, September 29 2012.
26
. Enein, Ahmed Aboul. "Constituent Assembly Reports Progress in Committees." Daily News Egypt, July 24 2012.
24
16
Islamist members of the Assembly as the main reason for her resignation.27 In September a
number of political figures from various liberal and non-Islamist groups including the Egyptian
Democratic Party, the Socialist Popular Alliance, the Free Egyptian Party, the pro-democracy
Kefaya Movement, the Egyptian Socialist Party, signed a statement by Nasserist Hamdeen
Sabbahi and reform campaigner Mohamed El-Baradei to boycott the Assembly for its
incompetency. The statement announced the Assembly suffers from "the absence of a basic
understanding of things that concern the Egyptian citizen, such as basic freedom, economic and
social rights".28Withdrawals increased in mid-November with the members of the Coptic
Orthodox Church resigning from the Assembly, stating “the constitution ... in its current form
does not meet the desired national consensus and does not reflect the pluralistic identity of
Egypt, [which has been] entrenched across generations.”29 Other prominent non-Islamist
members including Ahmed Maher from April 6 Youth Movement, former Arab League chief
Amr Moussa and liberal politician Ayman Nour withdrew from the Assembly after their
demands were not met in the Assembly.30 Further the farmers and journalists syndicates joined
the withdrawal camp because of the same reasons.31
The wave of withdrawals and protest campaigns against the Constituent Assembly and the draft
Constitution continued and the protests and demonstrations have continued well after the
referendum and the promulgation of the Constitution. Demonstrators and political leaders
demand systematic amendments to the Constitution to reflect the diversity of the society.
According to Magdi Sherif, head of the centrist Guardians of the Revolution Party “the
27
. Enein, Ahmed Aboul. "Human Rights Activist Manal El-Teiby Withdraws from Constituent Assembly." Daily
News Egypt, August 16 2012.
28
. "Political Forces Sign on Elbaradei Call for Constituent Assembly Boycott." Ahram Online, September 29 2012.
29
. "Egyptian Churches Withdraw from Constituent Assembly." Egypt Independent, November 17 2012.
30
. "Revolutionary Youth Group Leader Quits Constituent Assembly." Ahram Online, November 18 2012.
31
. "Journalists, Farmers Syndicates Withdraw from Egypt's Constituent Assembly." Ahram Online, November 20
2012.
17
amendment of the new constitution is one of the primary demands of the people and parties
taking part in anniversary rallies”.32
In Cairo and Alexandria headquarters and offices of Muslim Brotherhood have been the targets
of constant attacks from demonstrators who demand a cessation of violence against
demonstrators, amendment of the Constitution and formation of an inclusive and diverse
cabinet.33
Data and Procedure
On August 12, 2012, the Constituent Assembly publicized the first drafts of few proposed
Articles by putting them online for public review. People were able to sign in the official website
of the Constituent Assembly34 using their Facebook, Twitter, Gmail, or Yahoomail accounts, to
comment on the drafts and express their preference by giving thumbs-ups or -downs to the
proposed drafts or to other comments. More drafts were added in the following days and by
September 17 the first draft of most articles were put online for public consulting. By December
1, when the last modifications were made to the articles, a total of 803 drafts for 236 articles
were suggested by the Assembly, resulting in an average of 3.4 drafts per article. The range of
drafts per article varies from 1 draft in some articles to for instance 8 drafts in article 35 of the
approved Constitution.
Most of the changes the articles received were not substantive and included wording and syntax
changes, moving a section from one article to another, and merging articles. Some changes,
however, were substantive in terms of targeting inclusiveness, contestation, division of power,
32
. Morrow, Adam, and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani."New Revolution against New Constitution."Inter Press Service,
January 27 2012.
33
. Michael, Maggie. "Thousands Protest at Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Offices." The Boston Globe, March 22
2012.
34
www.sharek.dostour.eg
18
and civil liberties and social rights. These changes differ in terms of direction (i.e. negative or
positive). The question raised here is whether the changes made to the drafts of articles came as a
result of people’s feedback or those changes depended on other factors including inter-elites
interactions.
To examine whether there is any significant correlation between the public online feedback as
well as elite boycotts and the changes made to the drafts of each article, we ran two random
coefficient multi-level models, namely binary logit and multinomial logit. The dependent
variables of this study are change (whether the draft was changed substantively) and the direction
of change (whether the change, if any, was positive or negative). For the former outcome (i.e.
change) we used a multi-level binary logit model and for the latter outcome (i.e. direction of
change) we used a hierarchical multinomial logit model. The independent variables are
proportion of positive (if contributors express their approval of the proposed draft) to negative
feedback (if they express their disapproval of the draft), and non-Islamist elites’ boycott of the
Constituent Assembly (whether the proposed Article was drafted before or after the boycotts).
We take the proportion of thumbs-ups to thumbs-downs of the previous draft as the proportion of
positive to negative feedback35.
In terms of the first outcome (i.e. likelihood of change), if the changes made to a draft were
because of the public feedback, then higher proportion of positive to negative feedback of the
previous draft is expected to correlate with lower likelihood of change in that draft and,
similarly, lower proportion of positive to negative feedback of the previous draft is expected to
correlate with higher likelihood of change in that draft. For example, the proportion of thumbs-
35
All the data on the number of thumbs-ups and thumbs-downs were retrieved on December 1, 2012 when the last
changes—mostly wording changes—were made to the drafted constitution.
19
ups to thumbs-downs of draft 1 of article 1 should be negatively correlated with changes in draft
2 of article 1.
In terms of the second outcome (i.e. direction of change), since high proportion of positive to
negative feedback indicates high popularity of the proposed drafts, we expect that higher
proportion of positive to negative feedback of the previous draft to be correlated with lower
likelihood of both positive and negative change in that draft, and vice versa.
Finally, if changes made to the proposed draft came as a result of elite-based political game, then
boycotts should correlate with lower likelihood of change in the proposed drafts. Considering the
direction of change, we expect that boycotts should also correlate with lower likelihood of
positive change and higher likelihood of negative change in the proposed drafts.
Since its formation, the Constituent Assembly faced several withdrawals and boycotts. We only
considered those withdrawals and boycotts that dated after the online publication of first drafts
on August 11, 2012, and did not consider, for example, the members’ withdrawals in mid-July
that year. We identified September 29, 2012 as the starting point for organized boycotts and
members’ withdrawals. On that date, a number of prominent political figures and movements
including, Hamdeen Sabbahi and Mohamed El-Baradei, issued a statement calling for the
boycott, urging Assembly members affiliated to national forces to withdraw in disapproval of
Assembly’s formation. Prior to that date the withdrawals were not organized and only few
members acted individually and resigned from their duty in the Assembly. We also marked that
date as the starting point of organized boycotts because the clash between Islamists and nonIslamist members of the Constituent Assembly started around that time. As Ahmed Maher36 told
us in an interview, “Toward the end of September and early October the Islamists began ignoring
36
Liberal member of the Egyptian Constituent Assembly, and co-founder of April 6 Youth Movement
20
the suggestions of other members, which made [non-Islamist] members to start boycotting [the
Assembly] in order to put pressure on them.” The dummy variable to account for the boycott was
coded 0 for Articles drafted before September 29 and 1 for those drafted after that date.
To control for other events that may have impacted the process of constitution drafting, we added
a dummy variable for the date37 the Administrative Court announced its ruling to refer the law
suit against the Constituent Assembly to the Supreme Constitutional Court(SCC). Only few
weeks after this ruling, the largest wave of withdrawals hit the Assembly with more than 30
members resigning in protest. It is largely argued38 that after the Supreme Constitutional Court’s
decision to review the lawsuit against the Constituent Assembly, the Islamist-dominated
Assembly hastened the process of constitution drafting and approved the Constitution before the
legal deadline for SCC to announce its verdict on the constitutionality of the Assembly. To
control for these events, we included a control variable for the date the lawsuit against the
Assembly was referred to SCC.
Thus, the six hypotheses raised in this study are:
H1: Higher proportion of positive to negative feedback correlates with lower likelihood of
change in the proposed drafts.
H2: Higher proportion of positive to negative feedback correlates with lower likelihood of
negative change in the proposed drafts.
H3: Higher proportion of positive to negative feedback correlates with lower likelihood of
positive change in the proposed drafts.
37
October 23, 2012.
For instance see Jailan Zayan (November 28, 2012).
38
21
H4: Non-Islamist Elites’ Boycotts correlates with lower likelihood of change in the proposed
drafts.
H5: Non-Islamist Elites’ Boycotts correlates with lower likelihood of positive change in the
proposed drafts.
H6: Non-Islamist Elites’ Boycotts correlates with higher likelihood of negative change in the
proposed drafts.
Coding Process
In order to determine whether proposed drafts have substantively changed from previous
versions, we first categorized the potential changes in four aspects of contestation, inclusion,
division of power, and civil liberties and social rights. These four categories are among the most
cited components of democracy in the literature. Robert Dahl, for instance, identifies
contestation and inclusiveness as the two pillars of polyarchy (Dahl 1971). Although, Dahl’s
definition of democracy is not perfect and there are many criticisms of it, it is a good starting
point for defining the most-accepted elements of democracy. Coppedge (2012), for example,
generally agrees with Dahl, but adds division of power, and scope of democratic authority to the
list. Or Przeworski (2010) adds equality and liberty to Dahl’s contestation and inclusiveness.
Przeworski (2010, p. 12) defines democracy as a form of self-governance based on equality,
participation (inclusiveness), representation (contestation), and liberty. It seems that these few
aspects are widely accepted, among scholars, as the significant ingredients of democracy. Each
of these aspects itself includes several criteria. For instance, civil liberties and social rights
include equal rights for women and minorities, freedom of expression, etc. Totally, we identified
22
17 criteria corresponding to the four categories mentioned above39. To measure the first
outcome, i.e. likelihood of change, any change in these elements is coded 1 as opposed to no
change which is coded 0.
We also used the same criteria to measure the second outcome, that is, whether those changes
were negative or positive. To determine the “direction” of changes, we created three categories
of “no change”40, “negative change”, and “positive change”. In this categorization, 1 is assigned
for “no change”, 2 for “negative changes”, and 3 for “positive changes” in the proposed drafts.
We defined a negative change as any change in a draft of an Article that in comparison with the
previous draft of the same Article undermines one or some of the 17 criteria mentioned above
directly or indirectly. Similarly, we defined positive change as any change in a draft of an Article
that, compared to the previous draft of the same Article, enhances one or some of the 17 criteria
identified in our coding in a direct or indirect way. To distinguish between direct and indirect
changes that undermine or enhance our criteria, we provide an example from our data. Draft 1 of
Article 43 articulates that “Freedom of belief is inevitable and the State shall guarantee the
freedom to establish places of worship for the divine religions, as regulated by law, if it does not
contradict the public order”. Draft 2 of the same Article adds “freedom to practice religious rites”
to the first draft. Based on our coding, this change directly enhances freedom of belief and
religion. The third draft of this Article omits the final section, “if it does not contradict the public
order”. Based on our coding, this change is positive for indirectly enhancing the freedom of
belief and religion. The omitted section could have been used by the Islamists or the government
to limit the freedom of belief on the ground that practice to those beliefs contradicts the public
39
For a list of these criteria see Appendix I.
“No change” was used as the baseline comparison group in the Multinomial logit model we ran to estimate the
likelihood of the direction of change as a function of citizen feedback and elite boycotts.
40
23
order. The elimination of this section reduces the power of the Islamists or the government to
limit the freedom of religion, and, therefore, indirectly enhances the freedom of belief and
religion criteria.
Measurement and Results
To test the significance of the correlation between the public online feedback and the likelihood
of change in the proposed drafts of each Article, we ran two multi-level models: one model to
estimate the impact of feedback and elite boycotts on change in drafts (1=change, 0=no change),
and another model to estimate the impact of feedback and elite boycotts on the direction of
change in drafts (1=no change, 2=negative change, 3=positive change).
To estimate the impact of citizen feedback as well as elite boycotts on the likelihood of draft
change (hypotheses 1 and 4), we ran a random coefficient binary logit model. Our data is
hierarchical in the sense that every few drafts are clustered within one Article and at the same
time every few drafts from various Articles were published for public feedback periodically. To
consider this hierarchical nature of the observations, we ran a random coefficient logit model
with dates of drafts’ online publication identified as the clusters41. Drafts of Articles were
proposed and published online for public review at 21 time intervals. Each time few proposed
drafts from few Articles were published online.
We were specifically interested in the time factor to account for the specific events that erupted
throughout the process of constitution drafting. The Constituent Assembly faced several
41
Structurally every few drafts belong to an Article which at the first glance makes drafts nested within Articles as
more logical hierarchical structure for the data. However because of two reasons we decided to identify drafts
nested within dates of publication as the hierarchical structure of our data. First, each time a cluster of drafts from
only some of the Articles were publicized for online review which. Second, several Articles have only one draft.
These two factors make dates of publication a more appropriate cluster than Articles. Finally, and most
importantly, we were more interested in accounting for the time factor because of the significance of the events
that affected the process of Constitution making.
24
challenges including members’ withdrawal, prominent figures’ boycotts, and court appeals to
suspend the Assembly. To account for the time factor, we treated our data as hierarchical with
individual drafts clustered within date of publication. Therefore, the dummy variable of the nonIslamists boycotts is the level-2 independent variable and the proportion of positive to negative
feedbacks is the level-1 independent variable that we estimated in our two models.
We also ran a random coefficient multinomial logit model with dates of publication identified as
clusters, to test for the impact of citizen feedback and elite boycotts on the direction of changes
in the drafts of proposed articles. Since we were specifically interested in estimating the
likelihood of positive and negative change in the proposed drafts, in this model we identified “no
change” as the baseline comparison group. Table 1 summarizes the results for the two models we
ran42.
As the results for the binary logit model show, both proportion of positive to negative feedback
(the proportion of thumbs-up to thumbs-down) and elite boycotts have a negative effect on the
likelihood of draft change, which confirms our prediction. This effect is significant at
conventional level. Similarly, the results for the multinomial logit model show that both
proportion of positive to negative feedback and elite boycotts have a negative effect on the
likelihood of negative and positive change in the proposed drafts. All these effects are also
significant at conventional level. The results, however, shows that our control variable is not
significant in all the models we estimated.
42
To control for time factor, we also ran the same models with dummy variables for the date of publication (the
cluster in this study) included, and the results showed no substantive change in the significance or the direction of
the coefficients.
25
Table 1.Predicted Probability of Draft Change as a Function of Feedback and Boycotts
Independent Variables
Random Effects
Binary Logit†
Change
Proportion of Positive
to Negative Feedback
-2.387***
(0.669)
-3.402***
(1.017)
-1.944**
(0.787)
Boycotts
-1.591***
(0.428)
-2.232***
(0.800)
-1.323***
(0.487)
SCC†††
0.0925
(0.387)
0.173
(0.780)
0.0663
(0.432)
Constant
1.453**
(0.634)
1.389
(0.936)
0.571
(0.748)
Observations (N)
Clusters (J)
Random Effects
Multinomial Logit††
Negative
Positive
Change
Change
601
601
16
16
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
601
16
†
“Change” is coded 0 and “No Change” is 1.
“No Change” is used as the baseline comparison group.
†††
SCC is a dummy variable included to control for the date the lawsuit against the Constituent Assembly was
referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court.
††
What is striking in the results is the significantly negative effect of boycott on the likelihood of
draft change. For both the binary logit and multinomial logit models the direction of this impact
was negative indicating that most of the substantive changes, whether negative or positive, were
made before the boycott. We expected that boycotts should have negative impact on the
likelihood of positive changes and positive impact of negative changes. The results, however,
showed that the direction is the same for both outcomes with boycotts negatively impacting any
direction of change. We argue that this can be explained by the fact that it was the Islamists who
wrote those drafts in the first place and after the boycotts they were less likely to change those
drafts, whether in positive or negative way.
26
The results also indicate a negatively significant impact of the proportion of positive to negative
feedback on the likelihood of draft change. For both the binary logit and multinomial logit
models the direction of this impact was also negative indicating that as the proportion of positive
to negative feedback increases, the likelihood of substantive changes, whether negative or
positive, decreases. This was quite expected because higher proportion of positive to negative
feedback indicates higher popularity of the proposed drafts among the population which makes
changing those drafts a risky decision.
In our analysis we also considered the cross-level interaction to estimate the interaction between
proportion of positive to negative feedback and non-Islamist elite boycotts. While we found that
both proportion of positive to negative feedback and non-Islamist elite boycotts have negative
impact on the predicted probability of change in the proposed drafts, estimation of the interaction
between the two independent variables could provide us with more evidence of how elite
boycotts can affect the impact of citizen feedback on draft changes. Figure 1 shows the impact of
non-Islamists’ boycotts on predicted probability of draft change as a function of citizen feedback.
0
Predicted Probability of Draft Change
.2
.4
.6
.8
Figure 1. Impact of Boycotts on Predicted Probability of Draft Change as a Function of Feedback
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Proportion of Positive to Negative Feedback
Before Boycotts
27
After Boycotts
1
As Figure 1 shows the non-Islamist elite boycott significantly decreases the predicted probability
of draft change as a function of citizen feedback. In other words, the predicted probability of
draft change as a function of citizen feedback is much lower after the boycotts. In the above
graph, the area between the red and the blue lines is, in fact, the impact of elite boycotts on
effectiveness of citizen feedback. By effectiveness of feedback, we mean whether citizen
feedback has significant impact on changes made to drafts. For example, as the figure shows, for
a feedback proportion of .1 (very high internet disapproval) the predicted probability of draft
change is as low as .4 after the boycotts in comparison to .76 before the boycotts. This indicates
that after the non-Islamists’ boycotts the impact of citizen feedback on the probability of draft
change drops significantly, which is an evidence for our argument that citizen participation
without elite consensus is less effective than when it is accompanied with elite consensus.
To confirm our finding that it is the boycotts—rather than other events—that has significant
impact on the probability of draft change as a function of citizen feedback, we also report a
similar graph for the control variable (i.e. the Supreme Constitutional Court’s decision to review
the lawsuit against the Constituent Assembly). Figure 2 shows the impact of the Supreme
Constitutional Court’s (SCC) decision on the predicted probability of draft change as a function of
feedback.
28
Figure 2. Impact of Supreme Constitutional Court’s (SCC) Decision on Predicted Probability of
.3
Predicted Probability of Draft Change
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
Draft Change as a Function of Feedback
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Proportion of Positive to Negative Feedback
BeforeSCC
After SCC
1
As this figure shows, the SCC’s decision does not have any significant impact on the predicted
probability of draft change as a function of feedback. It only increases this probability slightly. For
instance, for a feedback proportion of .1 (very high internet disapproval) the predicted
probability of draft change is .77 after the SCC’s decision in comparison to .75 before the SCC’s
decision. This, again, confirms that elite division, which started sometime around the boycotts
has more impact on probability of draft change as a function of citizen feedback in comparison to
the impact of other events.
The results we find indicate few points which need to be explored. First, both proportion of
positive to negative feedback and elite boycotts have negative impact on the likelihood of change
as well as the direction of change, whether positive or negative. These impacts are significant at
conventional level in both multi-level models that we used. We also found that the non-Islamists’
boycott significantly decreases the predicted probability of draft change as a function of citizen
feedback. This means that regardless of high citizens’ approval or disapproval the predicted
29
probability of draft change as a function of citizen feedback is much lower after the boycotts.
This finding challenges the effectiveness of the participatory process of constitution making in
Egypt.
Discussion
The empirical evidence presented above supports our argument that citizen participation without
elite consensus is not effective. The analysis from above demonstrates the importance of
boycotts in affecting the changes made to the draft Constitution which was put online. Prior to
the mass boycotts which systematically started since September 29, the changes made to the
draft Constitution were consistent with the online feedback from citizens. In other words if an
article received positive online feedback from citizens less changes were made to it and if an
article received negative online feedback from citizens more changes were made to it. However
following the increase in boycotts proposed by prominent non-Islamist figures, such as ElBaradei the changes made to the draft Constitution online become insignificant. In other words,
the likelihood of draft change as a function of people’s feedback dropped significantly following
the boycotts. These results are consistent with our argument that participatory constitution
making alone cannot be used to account for citizens’ views and in order to achieve this goal, elite
consensus is required as well.
We suggest that challenges to the legitimacy of the Constitution in Egypt are result of the fact
that despite popular participation in the drafting process, there was no agreement among elites
over the fundamental issues and the key components of the Constitution and the system of
government. We do not question the importance of participatory constitution making, however
we argue citizen participation is most effective when it is accompanied by elite consensus. When
representatives of people from various social and political groupings are included in the
30
constituent assembly and they reach agreements over fundamental structure of the constitution, it
is more likely that citizen views would be implemented in the constitution. This is because
citizens’ representatives are present to convey people’s demands and to bargain for their being
reflected in the constitution. However in cases such as Egypt where one political group
dominated the assembly, it is difficult to make citizen participation effective since the voice of
one dominant group wins over the rest of ideologies and citizen participation turns to a mere
showcase.
There is no doubt that participatory constitution making is a democratic ideal which should be
pursued, however it is difficult to assess the extent of effectiveness of citizen participation.
Despite extensive literature on the merits of participatory constitution making there is little
empirical evidence as to whether citizen participation actually influences the constitution’s
content. There are many studies emphasizing the importance of thousands of propositions
received from citizens in South Africa, Brazil and Kenya; however there is little evidence as to
the implementation of those propositions. The case of Iceland might be the most important
example of effectiveness of public participation. In 2011 the Iceland Constitutional Council used
crowdsourcing to engage citizens in deliberation process of the constitutional amendment. The
draft Constitution was put online and citizens could suggest amendment recommendations to the
draft.43 Among the articles which were added to the Constitution the public ownership of
Iceland’s natural resources, and an article on information rights are the most notable ones.44
The case of Iceland is among the few cases where it is evident the public participation was
effective and the citizens’ views were implemented in the constitution. The data in this study
allows measuring the effectiveness of public participation through one of the channels provided
43
44
. Kok, Alexander. "Icelandic Constitutional Council 2011." Participedia, August 31, 2011.
. Kok, 2011.
31
by Egypt’s Constituent Assembly. The data in this study is by no means a representative sample;
however we attempted to study public participation through the online users. As was mentioned
earlier, the Egyptian Constituent Assembly was transparent during the deliberation process
(Brown 2012c) and used several mechanisms for including the public in the deliberation process
and the online crowdsourcing was only one of the many other channels where the draft
Constitution was put to debate for the public.
Despite the biasness of the data toward a particular portion of the Egyptian citizens, it is the only
viable channel for assessing the effectiveness of citizen participation and the results show that at
least the online crowdsourcing was only effective as long as the elites were included in the
deliberation. As soon as the withdrawals and boycotts increased the Constituent Assembly
neglects the online feedback provided by the people.
Some may suggest that the decrease in changes in the constitution could be a result of time
pressure the Assembly faced. It was mentioned earlier that the Assembly was under pressure to
finish drafting the Constitution and put it for popular ratification prior to the Supreme
Constitutional Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the Assembly. Our analysis however
shows that time pressure was not a defining factor in determining changes to the draft
Constitution. If it was in fact the time pressure which resulted in drop of changes to proposed
articles, the drop in changes should be visible in the last month of the drafting process. However
our data shows that in fact the boycotts which started in September, almost three month prior to
ratification were the cutting point for the changes made to the Constitution. As was discussed
earlier we suggest the presence of non-Islamist elites and politicians in the Assembly worked as
leverage over the Islamists members of the Assembly to implement the views of the citizens and
their proposals. However following the boycotts this leverage was removed and the Islamist
32
dominated Assembly did not face any pressure to include citizen proposals and therefore the
participatory process was undermined after elite boycotts of the Assembly.
This process demonstrates the importance of both citizen participation and elite consensus. In
South Africa, the most apparent successful case of participatory constitution making, the whole
process of constitution making began through an elite pact (Hart 2002, Landau 2012). Although
elite pacts are criticized for their undemocratic nature (Encarnación 2005) , there is evidence as
in South Africa or Spain that elite pacts can indeed channel democratization where all political
actors and social groupings are included.
The case of Egypt is another example which reinforces the importance of elite consensus in
paving the route to democracy and reinforcing the role assigned to citizens. Citizen participation
in constitution making should be accompanied by elite consensus in order to achieve the highest
degree of inclusion. Furthermore, presence of political leaders representing different political and
social groupings functions as a force holding elites in check. This is particularly important in
places such as Egypt where the Constituent Assembly was imbalanced due to the domination of
one majority, meaning the Islamist groups.
The empirical analysis provided in this study is only a small step in the attempt to understand the
extent to which citizen proposals are accounted for in the Constitution. Despite the limited base
of the data, the results are consistent with the reality of circumstances in Egypt and can explain
the contestation of the Constitution even after its ratification and the ongoing popular
mobilization demanding radical amendments to the Constitution.
In sum, the case of Egypt and the process of constitution making in that country provides
evidence that participation by itself cannot be a good measure of accounting for popular views. A
highly participatory deliberation process in Egypt led to low turnout in the ratification process
33
and an ongoing constitutional contestation. This undermines the emphasis on participatory
constitution making and opens up for various questions. Further research can evaluate popular
and elite views on the effectiveness of citizen participation.
Conclusion
Participatory constitution making has become an international norm and has been highly
emphasized in academia and international law including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. The importance of participation is in the legitimacy of the product and sense of
ownership which is transferred to citizens implying that they are directly involved in the making
of their laws. Furthermore, participation provides the means for practicing democratic norms of
inclusion and civic engagement. These mechanisms together pave the way for a legitimate and
stable polity and facilitate the emergence of democratic norms and institutions.
The case of Egypt demonstrates the fact that participation on itself cannot fulfill any of the tasks
it is assigned to fulfill. Similar to the 2005 Kenyan Constitution which was voted down in
referendum despite a highly participatory process, the Egyptian Constitution does not enjoy a
universal legitimacy and months into its promulgation, sections of the society are still mobilized
and demand its amendment. This study argues that citizen participation without elite consensus
cannot be effective and generate the ideal results expected from a legitimate constitution. The
empirical evidence from online feedback on the draft constitution demonstrates that citizen views
and comments affected change in the constitution but only prior to mass elite boycotts in
September 2012. This implies that citizen participation cannot be effective and even cannot be
accounted for if there is no elite consensus. Elite bargains and pacts are needed to guarantee
representation of all social and political groupings and to prevent the usurpation of power in the
hand of certain groups.
34
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Appendix I. Criteria Used for Coding Changes in the Proposed Drafts
Criterion
Category
Source
The right to vote for almost all adult citizens
The eligibility of almost all adult citizens to run for public
Inclusiveness
office
The right for public leaders to compete for votes
Free and fair election
Freedom to form and join political parties and other
Adopted from
organizations
Dahl (1971)
Contestation
Freedom to express political views
Existence and protection of diverse sources of information
about politics
Dependence of government policies on votes and other
expressions of preference
Autonomy of the judiciary from the Executive
Autonomy of the House of Representatives from the
Executive
Adopted from
Autonomy of the Shura Council from the Executive
Balance of Power
Coppedge (2012)
Autonomy of Governorates from the Executive
Autonomy of Local Administration from the Executive
Freedom of expression
Freedom of belief and religion
Adopted from
Equal rights for religious, ethnic, and other minorities
Equal rights for women
39
Freedom and Rights
Przeworski (2010)