6 th    International  Conference  on  Intercultural  Pragmatics  and
Communication
University  of  Malta  Valletta  Campus,  30  May  –  1  June  2014
Plenary  talk  abstract
C AN   I NTERCULTURAL   P RAGMATICS   B RING  SOME  NEW   I NSIGHT  INTO   P RAGMATIC   T HEORIES ?
I STVAN  K ECSKES ,  S TATE  U NIVERSITY   OF  N EW  Y ORK ,  A LBANY
This  paper  argues  that  intercultural  pragmatics  may  direct  attention  to  issues  and  phenomena   that   are   taken   for   granted   in   Gricean   pragmatics.   What   standard   pragmatics   assumes   about   how   things   work   in   communication   depends   on   there   being   commonalities,   conventions,   standards   and   norms   between   speaker-­‐hearers.   This,   however,   may   not   be   exactly   so   in   intercultural   communication.   Commonalities,   conventions,   common   beliefs,   norms,   shared   knowledge   create   a   core   common   ground   on   which   intention   and   cooperation-­‐based   pragmatics   is   built.   (Of   course,   there   are   plenty   of   varieties   within   those   commonalities.)
However,  when  this  core  common  ground  appears  to  be  limited  as  is  the  case  in  intercultural   communication   interlocutors   cannot   take   them   for   granted,   rather   they   need   to   co-­‐construct   them,   at   least   temporarily.   So   what   is   happening   here   is   that   there   appears   to   be   a   shift   in   emphasis   from   the   communal   to   the   individual.   It   is   not   that   the   individual   becomes   more   important   than   the   societal.   Rather,   interlocutors   in   intercultural   interactions   function   more   like  core  common  ground  creators  rather  than  just  common  ground  seekers  and  activators  as   is  the  case  in  L1  communication.
As  a  result  the  socio-­‐cognitive  approach  (SCA)  argues  that  Grice  was  right  when  he  tied   cooperation   to   the   speaker-­‐hearer’s   rationality.   However,   egocentrism   has   to   be   added   to   speaker-­‐hearer’s   rationality.   We   human   beings   are   just   as   egocentric   (as   individuals)   as   cooperative   (as   social   beings).   “Egocentrism”   in   the   SCA   refers   to   attention-­‐bias   that   is   the   result  of  prior  experience  of  individuals.  It  means  that  interlocutors  activate  and  bring  up  the   most  salient  information  to  the  needed  attentional  level  in  the  construction  (by  the  speaker)   and  comprehension  (by  the  hearer)  of  the  communication.  So  there  is  nothing  negative  about   egocentrism  if  the  term  is  used  in  this  sense.
Integrating  the  pragmatic  view  of  cooperation  and  the  cognitive  view  of  egocentrism  the
SCA   emphasizes   that   both   cooperation   and   egocentrism   are   manifested   in   all   phases   of   communication,   albeit   in   varying   degree.   We   cooperate   by   generating   and   formulating   intention   that   is   relevant   to   the   given   actual   situational   context.   At   the   same   time   our   egocentrism   means   that   we   activate   the   most   salient   information   to   our   attention   in   the   construction  (speaker)  and  comprehension  (hearer)  of  utterances.  The  interplay  of  these  two   phenomena  drives  interaction  and  generates  meaning.