Proceedings of 10th Global Business and Social Science Research Conference
23 -24 June 2014, Radisson Blu Hotel, Beijing, China, ISBN: 978-1-922069-55-9
Thailand In 2030: The Impact of Globalization on Bangkok’s
Future
Davis Florick1
Globalization has been a significant driver in Thailand’s domestic politics in
recent decades. As one of the original “Asian Tigers,” Bangkok experienced
significant economic growth during much of the second half of the twentieth
century. The growing income disparity between northern and southern
Thailand has led to a decade long response of on-again-off-again political
subsidies to the largely agricultural north. Despite ongoing north-south
tension, the economic prospects for Thailand are vast.
Its strong
agricultural sector, proximity to China’s rapidly developing Yunnan province,
and potential access to markets and physical capital across much of
Southeast Asia affords Bangkok a valued position in the region’s future.
From these assets, three trends will emerge to make Thailand a more
powerful regional force. First, investments in land-based transportation will
make it a regional hub for the movement of goods and services. Second, its
diversified economy is strong enough to withstand future economic
downturns in Southeast Asia. Third, Thailand’s powerful transformation into
an even greater regional, economic giant, with growing political influence,
will increase Bangkok’s importance to both Beijing and Washington. The
increased influence Thailand will exert in 2030 in comparison to 2013 will be
evolutionary.
JEL Codes: F51, F59, and F62
1. Introduction
Bangkok has long been a seat of power and influence in Southeast Asia. At various times
in its history the Thais have dominated many of their neighbors. In the second half of the
twentieth century, Thailand withstood the spread of communism and emerged as one of the
four “Asian Tigers.” Only with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis did the torrid pace of
economic growth ebb. Despite the downturn, however, in the last decade the national
government has been at pains to ensure improved standards of living across the country,
particularly in the agrarian north as “two-fifths of Thais work in agriculture, most of them as
rice farmers” („Thailand‟s Economy: The Rice Mountain‟ 2013, para. 3). At times this
approach has cost the incumbent President their job. Regardless, economic and political
developments, both domestically and abroad, are setting the stage for future growth.
The framework being laid down now will lead to a transformed Thailand in 2030. Four
major trends are beginning to emerge now that will guide Bangkok‟s evolution well into the
future. First, investments in land-based transportation will make it a regional hub for the
movement of goods and services. As the economies around Thailand continue to grow, it
will make the state a regional north-south and east-west hub for commerce. Second, its
diversified economy is strong enough to withstand future economic downturns in Southeast
*
Mr. Davis Florick, Asian World Center, Creighton University, United States, Email: davisflorick@creighton.edu
Disclaimer Statement
The views expressed in, and pertaining to this document, are solely those of the author and may not reflect those of
the official policy or position of the United States Strategic Command, Department of Defense, United States
Government, or Creighton University.
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Proceedings of 10th Global Business and Social Science Research Conference
23 -24 June 2014, Radisson Blu Hotel, Beijing, China, ISBN: 978-1-922069-55-9
Asia. From its agricultural underpinnings in the north to its high technology assets in
Bangkok, Thais are well-positioned to withstand future ebbs and flows in both regional and
international economics. Third, Bangkok‟s national government will have greatly improved
in terms of both its credibility and legitimacy. A more qualified and transparent national
government will shift the focus away from regional domestic politics and promote greater
stability. Fourth, Thailand‟s powerful transformation into an even greater regional,
economic giant, with growing political influence, will increase Bangkok‟s importance to both
Beijing and Washington. Its interconnectivity with the rest of Southeast Asia makes
Thailand an important regional asset both in terms of its potential influence in dialogue and
its strategic values. The economic growth of both Thailand and the region will garner the
state significant political potency in the decades to come.
2. Literature Review
It is important to identify some of Thailand‟s major long-term characteristics in order to help
frame some of the issues and concepts that underpin its place in the region. Among
Southeast Asian peoples, the Thais have long been one of the most formidable in the
region. They were close enough to China to reap the rewards of trade, but too far away for
China to threaten militarily. Likewise, they enjoyed a good trade relationship with the Indian
subcontinent, but terrain and geopolitics barred Thailand from being threatened from the
west. While at one time parts of what we know as Thailand today were under the control of
the Khmer Empire, the Thais established a series of relatively autonomous states starting
in the thirteenth century. Their ability to manage the regional relationships would serve
them well as the British and French, in particular, began colonizing the region. Bangkok
would have the distinction of remaining the only Southeast Asian state to retain its
autonomy. In the twentieth century Thailand would become an increasingly relevant asset
in larger geopolitical dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region.
In the last one hundred years, Bangkok has found itself embroiled in multiple conflicts
dealing with much larger, major world powers. During World War Two (WWII) Japan
invaded Thailand in its effort to reach India. After Tokyo‟s defeat Bangkok aligned itself
with Washington. The spread of communism into Southeast Asia heightened Thailand‟s
value in the eyes of policy-makers in the United States (US). While fighting alongside US
forces in the region, Bangkok undertook an ambitious series of domestic policies,
particularly in the states agrarian north. “Government spending on agriculture increased
fifteenfold between 1960 and 2008” (Walker 2012, p. 139). These activities were meant to
improve the standard of living in the region in an order to reduce the appeal of communism.
The fight against communism was helped by two events in the early 1970‟s. First,
Thailand‟s military dictatorship was overthrown in 1973. The democratic institutions that
existed in the country, coupled with the lack of a strong communist movement, made it
possible for Thailand to flourish as a democracy. Second, improved relations between the
People‟s Republic of China (PRC) and the US reduced foreign support for communist
movements in the region. These factors combined to further economic growth. It was not
until the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 that Thailand‟s economy began to lag. Into this
environment the Shinawatra family emerged as the voice for financial equality across the
nation.
In the last decade five regimes have held power in Thailand. Thaksin Shinawatra was
elected to the Presidency in 2001 and reelected in 2005. “Mr. Thaksin‟s social policies,
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Proceedings of 10th Global Business and Social Science Research Conference
23 -24 June 2014, Radisson Blu Hotel, Beijing, China, ISBN: 978-1-922069-55-9
dismissed as mere populism by his opponents, helped people [predominately in the north]
to escape poverty” („Political Crisis in Thailand: You go Your Way, I‟ll Go Mine‟ 2014, para.
3). His welfare programs supporting the agricultural sector and the resulting populist image
concerned the military, which has historically been drawn from the central portions of the
country. Not surprisingly its views have been predominately more aligned with the urban
population around Bangkok. A coup would replace Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra. Interestingly,
rather than retaining power the military returned to a democratic vote; but when the elected
government proved to be greatly aligned with the Shinawatra family, a second coup
ensued. Once again though, the military attempted to return power to the public through
another round of democratic elections. In the most recent third attempt at presidential
elections Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin‟s sister, won the presidency. Interestingly though,
“the dividing line in Thai politics is geographic as well as social and economic” („Thailand‟s
Election: A Symbolic Exercise‟ 2014, para. 6). While she has faced domestic opposition
from southern Thais, much like her brother, she has proven to be able to weather the
storm.
More importantly though, even in the aftermath of multiple coups the general consensus in
Thailand is that democracy is still important. “Despite the personal hatreds, there is a
surprising amount of common ground. Crucially, both camps agree on the need for
constitutional reform. Thailand is overcentralised and bureaucratic. It allows constant
meddling by the king‟s courtiers” („Thailand‟s Political Crisis: A Way Out‟ 2014, para. 8).
The value much of the nation places on democracy and the reforms both parties agree on
should not go unnoticed, even in the midst of recent political upheaval.
Politically, Thailand today is gripped in the midst of another challenge to the presidency.
“On April 2nd the constitutional court agreed to hear a case against Ms. Yingluck regarding
her removal of a national security adviser, Thawil Pliensree, in 2011. The case is currently
looking like the most plausible route by which the government could be toppled. The
charge against her is essentially nepotism” („Thailand‟s Political Crisis: Uneasy Lies the
Head‟ 2014, para. 3). Family and friends of the Shinawatra‟s have managed to acquire
high-placed government positions in recent years. Given the way with which Ms.
Shinawatra‟s brother was ousted from power, the need for security at the top should not
come as a great surprise. However, “if she were found guilty, then Ms. Yingluck‟s
opponents could invoke Section 7 of the constitution, under which the king can appoint a
„neutral‟ prime minister. A recent poll suggests that 48% of Thais think a neutral prime
minister is the best way out of the mess; 23% think the next prime minister should come
from another election” („Thailand‟s Political Crisis: Uneasy Lies the Head‟ 2014, para. 6).
While the court has recently found Ms. Shinawatra guilty, there is no clear way forwards
regarding her tenure. Time will tell whether the court‟s finding will actually lead to the
President‟s demise.
While the Shinawatra‟s have been roundly criticized for some of their domestic policies,
they have done a great deal to improve Thailand‟s economic vibrancy. In the agrarian
north analyses over the last decade have found “particularly strong support expressed for
Thaksin‟s local economic development initiatives, especially the so-called SML (SmallMedium-Large) program” (Watson 2012, p. 167). For instance, in one town “the SML grant
funded the construction of a village rice mill, which offered cheaper rates than the privately
owned village mills. The rapid pace of Thaksin‟s financial assistance was a key point of
contrast with previous governments” (Watson 2012, p. 169). These sorts of locally-focused
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Proceedings of 10th Global Business and Social Science Research Conference
23 -24 June 2014, Radisson Blu Hotel, Beijing, China, ISBN: 978-1-922069-55-9
projects, and others, have done a tremendous amount of good work in improving the lives
of many Thais.
Most recently, Thailand and the PRC came together to develop a rail line from Yunnan
province to Bangkok. Just as important, Thailand has invested heavily in building roads
from Bangkok to Myanmar along the Andaman Sea. Access to the Indian Ocean from the
western side, rather than on the eastern side through the Gulf of Thailand will reduce the
risks and costs associated with the Straits of Malacca. Furthermore, as cargo ships
become larger the deeper waters along the Andaman Sea are far more valuable than in the
shallower waters in the Gulf of Thailand. “The big idea is to spend 2 trillion baht ($64
billion) by 2020 towards upgrading the country‟s creaking infrastructure. Another 3 trillion
baht will come due as interest on the loans, accumulating over the next 50 years. It aims to
fulfil a favourite dream of Thailand‟s political class: To make the country the keystone of
mainland South-East Asia” („Infrastructure Spending in Thailand: Fast Train Coming‟ 2013,
para. 3). All this combined increases the volume of trade through Thailand, which will bring
more investment and business opportunities to the state.
As discussed previously, globalization has increased Thailand‟s strategic significance.
This, in part can explain how, despite political problems “but, miraculously it seemed, at
least Thailand‟s economy has come through it all pretty well. Many other countries‟ would
have collapsed under the deadweight of political squabbling and myopia” („Business in
Thailand: Another Fine Mess‟ 2013, para. 2). Bangkok‟s ability to control movement from
the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea makes it a significant asset in the region. Both
the PRC and US have gone to great lengths to improve relations with Thailand. China has
been able to leverage its cultural ties, particularly to the Shinawatra family, to curry
influence. Simultaneously, Washington‟s traditional relationship with Bangkok and Thai
fears regarding Chinese expansionist policies have helped the US position. While it
remains to be determined which way the regime in Bangkok might lean, their value is clear.
3. The Methodology and Model
Drawing on historical trends as well as similar scenarios in other states a number of key
trends can be identified. By identifying long-term indicators that are likely to lead to
success Thailand‟s future outlook can be projected. The four attributes previously listed:
development as a regional trade center, economic diversification, political restructuring, and
revitalized foreign policy outlook are all likely to contribute to significant success over the
long-term. Drawing from other states and their experiences the direction(s) Thailand is
likely to take becomes clearer. Identifying trends that bridge across states is an
appropriate qualitative methodology for projecting future success.
4. The Findings
Having discussed where the Thais have come from and where they are now, it is time to
discuss where they are headed. Bangkok‟s geographical location as a conduit for trade
across the Asia-Pacific region offers the potential for both economic and political strength.
As a regional hub for trade Thailand will not only thrive, but will be able to reinvest in
human and physical capital projects to enable further growth. Its increasing economic
diversity will make it more structurally resilient when future economic downturns occur.
Thailand‟s structural fortitude will make the state‟s political infrastructure much stronger and
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Proceedings of 10th Global Business and Social Science Research Conference
23 -24 June 2014, Radisson Blu Hotel, Beijing, China, ISBN: 978-1-922069-55-9
usher in a golden age of bureaucratic stability. Bangkok‟s strategic value will make it the
preeminent state in Southeast Asia. While states such as Myanmar and Vietnam hold
promise, Thailand‟s significance as an east-west conduit will make it increasingly valuable
as partnerships between Asia and Africa-Europe strengthen. Taken as a whole, 2030 will
be a banner year and symbolize a turning point from where Thailand was twenty or three
years previously.
As a major north-south thoroughfare the relationship between Thailand-China will only
deepen. As Beijing‟s economic engine raises labor costs on its seaboard, industrial firms
have been moving inland. Already places like Yunnan province, in southwestern China,
are seeing considerable economic growth as a result of businesses moving away from the
coasts. Unfortunately, with new industrial centers further away from major ports the costs
of transportation will continue to increase. To get goods to market in Africa-Europe the
Chinese will need to find new, cheaper alternatives to traditional port cities such as
Shenzhen and Shanghai. Ergo, a Thailand-China railroad from Kunming to Bangkok. This
railroad, already in planning stages today, will allow the Chinese to avoid shipping costs
from traversing around Southeast Asia. Once completed Thailand will reap the rewards of
being one of the major transportation centers for China‟s industries in its interior.
Likewise, by 2030 a new transportation route will exist between Myanmar and Thailand.
This east-west rail and automotive line will link Bangkok with an even more valuable
harbor. The decision-calculus motivating Thailand to pay for this project is based on two
major factors. First, the water depth in and around Bangkok is sufficient for today‟s cargo
vessels, but as these behemoths of the sea continue to increase in size the water depth in
the area will become a major issue. Fortunately, on the western side of the Malay
Peninsula the water is far deeper. This will prove to be a lucrative option for large trading
companies looking to move goods to Africa-Europe. Second, congestion through the
Straits of Malacca is a growing concern for many of the states in the region. The Thais
could alleviate them of this problem by bypassing the straits entirely. Even China may view
this development as a potential strategic boon. “Beijing wants to be able to counter any
attempt by India or the US to control the sea lanes that bring it oil from the Middle East.
Eighty per cent of such imports come through the Malacca Straits” (Fenby 2012, p. 203).
By 2030 this east-west trade route will prove cost-efficient enough to entice Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam to develop and/or improve upon rail lines to Thailand. Indeed, “China
plans to sink $6.2 billion into a passenger and freight railway that will run from Kunming to
Vientiane, tunneling through 196km of mountains to get there” („Infrastructure Spending in
Thailand: Fast Train Coming‟ 2013, para. 12). The pieces are coming together to make
Thailand a major hub for Southeast Asia transit. This development in Bangkok‟s economic
fortunes will fundamentally alter its economic position in the region.
Over the long-term Thailand‟s economy will significantly benefit from the increased revenue
generated from its newfound trade epicenter. In particular, tariffs from goods being brought
into the country, revenue from sales to people moving goods, and other goods and services
needed to augment the market will improve Thailand‟s outlook. With this new wealth
Bangkok can reinvest in both human and physical capital. Over the next fifteen years these
investments will lay the groundwork for a more vibrant and resilient economy. By 2030 a
vicious cycle will form allowing Thais to reap the rewards of trade, invest in themselves,
offer better goods and services, attract more consumers, and so on. The duplicative effect
of this economic growth will make Thailand an extremely powerful economic force in
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Proceedings of 10th Global Business and Social Science Research Conference
23 -24 June 2014, Radisson Blu Hotel, Beijing, China, ISBN: 978-1-922069-55-9
Southeast Asia. The transformation will grant the government a broader range of domestic
policy options to further diversify the state‟s economy.
Thailand‟s increased revenue from its role as a major trade center will help support further
diversification across the Thai economy. In the agrarian north farmers will receive
government subsidies to purchase technologies that serve as force multipliers.
Agribusiness interests in the region will also continue to work with local to bring their goods
to market across Southeast Asia. Improved technology will allow families to send more of
their children to the regional cities for better education and job opportunities. Not unlike
China in recent decades, this internal migration will offer a low-cost labor supply to firms
always seeking to reduce the bottom-line. In some cases this may in fact prove to be a
more lucrative option than labor forces in China or Vietnam for instance, particularly when
considering its closer proximity to the Africa-Europe region. Given the improvements in the
transportation sector, both manufacturing firms and agricultural interests in Thailand‟s north
will find themselves in a far stronger position vis-a-vie their neighbors/competitors.
Further to the south, in and around Bangkok, high technology firms and service sectors will
reap the rewards of success elsewhere. Government investment in human and physical
capital will develop generations better able to grasp the demands and rigors of the twentyfirst world. They will be able in a better position than their parents or grandparents to
leverage the same sorts of technologies and opportunities of first-world competitors. In the
high-technology fields this will give Thailand an advantage against its competition.
Particularly, when it comes to developing systems to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of other sectors of the economy, Bangkok will be well-positioned to utilize
home-grown talent. Likewise, younger generations of Thais in 2030 will have been imbued
with a better set of business and managerial skills, for all the reasons previously discussed,
to establish their own business ventures. The influx of trade and the human traffic brought
to the region will require a service industry capable of meeting the demands of foreign and
domestic clients. Providing luxury services will make Bangkok and the area around it an
even more inviting place for tourists and firms with location options. Taken as a whole, the
more southern reaches of Thailand will be well-positioned to leverage the changes the
region experiences.
Increased revenue will also allow the state to invest more heavily in public works projects.
Coupled with the aforementioned investments designed more so to help private business,
targeting public works programs will help many of the service sector fields. For instance,
areas like tourism, already vital to the economy, would be bolstered by holistic
improvements to the state („Business in Thailand: Another Fine Mess‟ 2013, para. 4):
Tourism is vital to the national economy. In [2012] the country pulled in about 22m
visitors. Overall, the tourism-and-travel sector contributed about $28 billion to
Thailand‟s economy, which would make it worth 7.3% of GDP for 2012, according to
the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC). Including tourism-and-travel‟s
indirect impact on the economy would make the sector‟s value rise to $64.3 billion,
or 16.7% of GDP. The sector employs about 2m people directly, and far more
indirectly.
Investing in public works programs will make Thailand a far more attractive tourist
destination. In so doing, Bangkok will be able to attract even greater levels of revenue from
across the globe.
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Proceedings of 10th Global Business and Social Science Research Conference
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The transformation and diversification of the economy will greatly alter the state‟s fortunes
moving forward. During the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis Thailand suffered just as much, if
not more so, than many of the other states in the Asia-Pacific region. As it was beholden to
market forces in elsewhere it could not withstand downturns in places like Japan, South
Korea, or Indonesia. If a similar downturn were to occur in 2030 though, the Thais‟
industrial centers, agricultural sector, and even its high-tech firms could all still sell to the
Africa-Europe region, South Asia, and the Middle East. While the service sector might be
disproportionately affected, it would not be as crippling a blow as 1997. In the event of a
similar financial crisis Bangkok would actually be in a position to create opportunity in the
midst of chaos. Through a whole-of-nation approach, both public and private sectors could
offer loans to their counterparts across the region and therefore build greater
dependencies. For some more specialized activities Thailand could even offer joint
ventures to encourage foreign reliance on their capabilities. The fundamental restructuring
of the Thai economy, driven in part by foreign trade, will make the state far more resilient in
the event of future regional destabilization.
Economic development will allow the state to invest in and strengthen the policies,
procedures, and mechanisms surrounding the government. By investing in human capital
Thailand can develop a more skilled and lawful bureaucracy. This in turn will help avoid
some of the ongoing issues with political corruption. Also, improvements in the educational
system across the state will strengthen general awareness and understanding of domestic
politics. Consequently, some of the populist policies and fear mongering, which have
dominated the last decade of Thai domestic politics will greatly diminish. By investing in
Bangkok‟s political infrastructure the nation‟s stability will greatly improve.
By 2030 the US strategic shift towards the Asia-Pacific region will have evolved
dramatically. Africa and South America will always be the scenes of small disturbances in
the international system from time to time. The more significant policy challenges for
Washington will always emerge from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and
East Asia. Ripples and tertiary challenges generated from these broader issues may occur
in places such as the Caucasus and Central Asia, but world politics are driven by China,
Russia, and the United States. Into this environment Thailand emerges as a potential focal
point for future activities. This is by no means a suggestion that the world in 2030 will be
on the verge of another world war, but rather that strategic interests from South Asia to
East Asia will meet on the Malay Peninsula. Thai policy-makers will be able to leverage
this situation to court the two most dominant states of the time: the PRC and US.
Bangkok will find itself in a unique position. Both Beijing and Washington will court it in an
attempt to secure their respective equities in Southeast Asia. This effort by both parties will
allow Thailand to extract the best possible deals. Based on its economic role in the region
it will be able to keep both powers at arm‟s length. While China might try to influence
Thailand with its rail connection, the Thais‟ east-west rail system will help offset any
potential damage China could cause by limiting trade. Likewise, Bangkok will not gravitate
too far to Washington, simply because doing so might adversely impact its trade with
Beijing. In many ways Thailand will benefit from both parties‟ desire to maintain a foothold
in Southeast Asia.
Economically Thailand will be able to leverage this opportunity to their advantage by
working on trade agreements and other mechanisms with both the PRC and the US to its
advantage. Pro-Bangkok trade agreements will enable it to send products abroad without
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Proceedings of 10th Global Business and Social Science Research Conference
23 -24 June 2014, Radisson Blu Hotel, Beijing, China, ISBN: 978-1-922069-55-9
some of the tariff or quota restrictions other countries face. Furthermore, its position in the
region will allow it to establish protectionist policies at home to prevent foreign business
threats from crowding out its own consumers. Also, much like China, the influx of new
capital will be put towards reinvestment at home, but also investment abroad. Buying US
treasury bonds and other assets will make it easier for Thailand to control its own economy
and reduce the risk of inflation and unemployment. As Bangkok‟s value in the region
increases it will be able to establish more advantageous economic policies with its foreign
partners.
Just as important as its economy, Thailand will be in a far better position to improve its
military. In recent years fears have grown that “China, flush with cash, is developing
bilateral military relationships with Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries, even at
America‟s expense” (Kaplan 2012, p. 234). However, this presumes that Bangkok will
remain loyal to Beijing, even if a better deal with Washington is not available. Strategic
upgrades will be necessary to guarantee the continued flow of goods and services through
the country. While it is highly unlikely that Thailand faces external threats, the nation‟s
armed forces will be a vital component in the fight against Muslim fundamentalists in the
nation‟s south. “The case of separatist insurgents in Southern Thailand can historically be
traced back for nearly half a century. But the latest outburst of violence as indicated by
government reports started in 2001” (Kraisoraphong 2012, para. 17). Fortunately, “the
degree and scope of violence have been confined within the three Southern provinces –
Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani” (Kraisoraphong 2012, para. 21). Preventing terrorism on the
Malay Peninsula will be crucial towards ensuring the viability and stability of the east-west
rail line linking Bangkok with Myanmar. Conducting counter-terrorism operations and other
similar actions in the region is a role the military is best-suited for. Yet to avoid some of the
complications and potential problems these activities usually entail the government could
use material and technical support from both China and the US. For Washington and
Beijing this is an opportunity to improve cooperation in the hopes of pushing the other out.
However, Thailand will be able to use both states as patrons in its attempts to ensure its
territorial legitimacy.
5. Summary and Conclusion
In 2030 globalization and the growth of the Asia-Pacific region will help bring Thailand to an
elevated position in the international system. As a major trade center the state will be in a
unique position to bring Asian products to markets in the Africa-Europe region much faster
than was previously possible. The influx of revenue and people this will entail will allow
Bangkok to invest in human and physical capital. Focusing on reinvesting in Thailand will
make it a more diverse, and therefore stable economy moving forward. Improving the living
standards will have the added benefit of strengthening domestic political processes. The
sort of populist policies that have handicapped Thailand‟s recent past can, in part, be
overcome with a more politically astute and active population. All of these developments
taken as a whole have the chance to make Bangkok a far more attractive partner for both
China and the US. Over the long-term, attracting support from those two powers will
enable Thailand to take on other policies that may not have been possible otherwise. Into
this new world Bangkok is moving.
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References
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„Infrastructure Spending in Thailand: Fast Train Coming‟ 2013 The Economist, para. 3
and 12.
Kaplan, R. 2012, The revenge of geography, Random House, New York.
Kraisoraphong, K. 2012, „Thailand and the Responsibility to Protect‟, The Pacific
Review, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 1-25.
„Political Crisis in Thailand: You go Your Way, I‟ll Go Mine‟ 2014, The Economist, para.
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„Thailand‟s Economy: The Rice Mountain‟ 2013, The Economist, para. 3.
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„Thailand's Political Crisis: A Way Out‟ 2014, The Economist, p.1.
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Walker, A. 2012, Thailand's political peasants, University of Wisconsin Press,
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