Adrian Borbély & Julien Ohana, The Impact of the Negotiator’s... Dimensions, in Negotiation Desk Reference (Christopher Honeyman & Andrea

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Adrian Borbély & Julien Ohana, The Impact of the Negotiator’s Mindset in Three
Dimensions, in Negotiation Desk Reference (Christopher Honeyman & Andrea
Schneider eds., forthcoming).
Draft – Please do not quote or cite without permission.
Beyond skills, such as preparing and strategizing, questioning and listening,
dealing with different cultures, etc., how do we explain how negotiations unfold? Some
of us use a process approach, detailing different steps that one needs to follow (not
necessarily in a linear manner). This approach is controversial: some consider it
oversimplifies what happens in the real world of negotiations; yet, others, like us, claim it
should not be completely ignored, as it offers negotiators a roadmap – granted, simplistic
– to better understand the path they engage in.
This chapter does not aim to offer a process approach, but will rely on one to pool
together two ideas that we are transmitting to our students during their training, in order
to help them grasp how negotiation functions. First, and often contrary to their original
belief, negotiation is not only about what is being negotiated (substance) but also about
who negotiates (people) and how to do so (process). The three-dimension model is
useful, as it helps students put into perspective the substance of their negotiation and
integrate the two other elements in their negotiation preparation, practice and analysis.
Second, we do not portray the distributive and integrative models as elements drawn from
the context, but as two possible mindsets that negotiators may hold, which will impact
their behavior on each of the three dimensions. These two ideas taken together enable us
to isolate and classify a series of behaviors frequently observed at the negotiation table.
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The Three Dimensions of Negotiation
Whether explicitly or not, negotiation teaching manuals often introduce negotiation as a
combination of three dimensions: the relationship, process, and substance aspects (e.g.
Mnookin, Peppet and Tulumello 2000). This categorization aims to remind students that
negotiation should not be approached exclusively from the substance angle, that is, a
focus solely on resolving the problem at hand. From preparation on, negotiators are
encouraged not to hasten towards their arguments, counter-arguments and possible
solutions, but to include two additional elements into their thought process: whom am I
negotiating with, and how should we proceed? After all, negotiation is an interpersonal
communication process; it is therefore essential to study the different legs of the voyage,
from departure to arrival, as well as existing or potential relations between its
participants. We must specify what these dimensions entail.
The substance dimension concerns the object of the negotiation, the roots of the
issue (the contract to be established, or the conflict to be resolved), and all the elements
that allow us to assess it. The object of the negotiation is defined by the parties
themselves, sometimes through another, strategic negotiation. It is composed partly of
what parties request (positions) but also of the parties’ history, needs, values,
preoccupations and worries (interests), as well as what has caused the situation (origins).
On the substance dimension, people need to think about a field of possible solutions that
takes into account their constraints, especially their alternatives to a negotiated agreement
(Fisher and Ury, 1981).
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The relationship dimension focuses on the choice of partners in a negotiation,
what we know about them and their position in their organization (expertise, autonomy,
authority, etc.), what connects or divides us (shared history and/or past disputes), as well
as the affective aspects of our ties (trust [Lewicki], emotions and identity). Relationship
aspects can also reveal possible coalitions for participants, at the table but also beyond
the table, with un-invited stakeholders (people interested in the outcome or with the
capacity to block its implementation, though neither present nor represented at the
negotiation). [Wade, Tribe]
The process dimension covers the elements that structure the negotiation; it goes
beyond just the “shape of the table” and ground rules. One may approach this architecture
through the prism of the “6P’s” (Lempereur, Colson and Pekar 2010): The Project
(reason and purpose of the meeting); Planning (agenda and timing); People (roles and
representation); Procedures (rules for communication, adjournment, etc.); Place
(logistical aspects); and Product (type of deliverables and commitment).
Negotiators need to understand the three dimensions, first, to recognize that all
three are negotiable. During a negotiation, in addition to negotiating on the substance,
people share the responsibility to create an efficient, adaptive process and to manage a
relationship-friendly atmosphere – provided that it fits with their objectives, of course. In
themselves, these elements may lead to more-or-less visible preliminary negotiations.
Second, negotiators must distinguish these three dimensions in order to adapt their
behavior at the table. Indeed, does the other party’s action call for a response on the
substance (a counter-argument, or a counter-offer)? Or would it, on the contrary, be wiser
to respond through a relationship gesture (e.g. improve relationships through an informal
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meeting), or a process one (for example, a reminder of the rules or the purpose of the
meeting)? The three dimensions should therefore be used as the trunk of the decision tree
before people take any action in a negotiation.
Articulating the Three Dimensions
The three dimensions are linked and interdependent; they should therefore not be
distinguished for purposes of taking them apart, but to clarify how they add to one
another. While the relationship dimension can function autonomously (people can be
connected without going into a formal negotiation process), the other two cannot. The
process dimension necessarily relies on the relationship, as there can be no process
without interconnected parties (even if they are bound by an unproductive relationship.)
Likewise, the substance dimension relies on the other two: we cannot discuss a matter
without a process (however informal), nor without a relationship among the parties
(however bad). It is therefore just as important to distinguish the roots of the different
elements of the negotiation (particularly the parties’ actions) as it is to acknowledge the
entanglement of the negotiation’s constituent dimensions.
We therefore propose a principle of addition of the three dimensions. The
following diagram illustrates this principle throughout a negotiation session.
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We designed this graph to suggest that it makes sense not only to segment
(vertically), but also to sequence (horizontally) the three dimensions. Even if this may not
be palpable in a simple negotiation, it could turn out to be fundamental for more complex
situations. Indeed, the previous diagram shows that the negotiation curve goes through
five main stages of negotiation:
Relationship  Process  Substance  Process  Relationship
It is worth emphasizing that sequencing does not imply linearity, quite the
opposite: negotiators may often have to go back and forth between substance, process and
relationship. In practice, the curve may look like a rollercoaster, going up and down
between the different dimensions, depending on the evolution of the discussion on the
different points at hand. (It may also feel that way to the participants.) In other words,
negotiation is not about aligning the stages into a unique path, but rather about navigating
them in a way that makes searching for an agreement as efficient as possible.
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Our approach enables us to show apprentice negotiators how to start their
negotiation. Often, at the beginning, they may feel frustrated, as they are impatient to
start working on the substance and building their agreement. We tell them it would be
unwise to bypass what we consider to be two mandatory stages. First, addressing the
relationship issues upstream helps create a favorable working environment. Then,
discussing process serves to set the rules and logistics for communication; these elements
may themselves be subject to a negotiation (Fisher and Ury 1981). Beyond the immediate
effects this may have on the conversation on the substance, negotiators who neglect these
early stages deprive themselves of a safety net in case the situation becomes difficult.
When discussions become tense, particularly when approaching a stalemate, negotiators
must be able to lean back on their early work on the rules of the game (reiterating them if
necessary), or the strength of their relationships through, for example, a friendly break.
Downstream, when closing a negotiation session, spending time on the process
will serve to set the conditions for decision-making and the implementation of the
agreement. So many negotiators fail to secure these elements and see good substantive
deals fail in their implementation phase! Finishing with a relationship touch will
strengthen and maintain the negotiators’ relationship for future negotiations. In other
words, at the end, when a partial or full agreement is reached, negotiators must be able to
capitalize on their relationship for future exchanges, which may in itself help
implementation. [Wade & Honeyman, Lasting Agreement]
Adding the three dimensions could therefore serve as a framework for teaching a
simple conception of a negotiation process, keeping in mind that negotiators will need to
adapt it to suit their own practice. Again, this should not be presented as a cooking recipe,
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in which steps need to be followed in order; rather, as a map, with many different paths to
explore.
Negotiation as a Mindset Question
Negotiation theories distinguish between two approaches or even two categories of
negotiations: integrative and distributive. This distinction is particularly well explained
by Roy Lewicki and his colleagues (2014). On the one hand, the principle of distributive
negotiation is to divide a fixed and limited set of resources between parties with
diametrically opposed objectives. For example, in a commercial negotiation, the buyer
will aim for a low price, while the seller aims for a high price. Based on the
presupposition that one’s gain is another’s loss, negotiation is seen as a confrontation
where parties exchange offers and counteroffers, trying to convince their counterpart of
the strength of their position. In such a setting, negotiators may be tempted to use tactics
that are more or less aggressive, even ethically questionable.
Integrative negotiation, on the other hand, brings negotiators to acknowledge the
value that may be created through a cleverly constructed agreement that takes into
account multiple dimensions, on which the parties’ objectives may not necessarily be
incompatible. Even if they were totally incompatible, it recognizes that agreeing to
disagree, as it preserves the relationship, is preferable to a rupture in communication. As
one party’s gain is not necessarily the other’s loss, negotiators face a common problem,
and can generate additional resources through “creative cooperation” (Halifa and
Cantournet 2011).
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Distributive negotiation generally focuses on a single variable (usually money)
and is founded on extrinsic interests (the carrot and the stick). Conversely, integrative
negotiation requires multiplying the dimensions of the discussion; it often puts more
focus on extrinsic motors (motivations and meaning) in order to generate “win-win”
discussions among parties.
Some may perceive a negotiation setting as either integrative or distributive. In
this case, buying a second-hand car, or a piece of real estate, would be purely distributive
negotiations, as these settings focus mostly on price, with little-to-no long-term or
relationship aspects. Some see all negotiations as an alternation between distributive and
integrative phases. Negotiators would therefore have to switch strategies, depending on
how the negotiation unfolds, i.e. whether they are in a value creation or distribution
phase.
We prefer to define the “distributive-integrative” distinction according to how
negotiators perceive and approach the negotiation, in other words through the
negotiators’ mindset. By “mindset” we mean the lens, or in other words the set of
assumptions, through which negotiators define a negotiation situation (Pinkley and
Northcraft 1995). This allows acknowledging that any negotiation situation can have both
distributive and integrative aspects: it will become either distributive or integrative
according to how its participants choose to deal with it. This is particularly visible in
dispute resolution: some see the dispute as purely distributive, a view often supported by
the judicial system (and legal counsels), who function based on one party defeating the
other one based on conviction of their legal merits (and/or a purely distributive, financial
negotiation). Conversely, others will approach the same situation in an integrative
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manner, once purged from its emotional elements and freed from its purely legal frame;
with or without the help of a neutral, such as a mediator, they will be able to turn the
dispute into a setting for integrative bargaining, or even positive resolution.
The actual context of the negotiation therefore becomes secondary to the way
negotiators will choose to act at the table. We consider the negotiation to be integrative
when a negotiator sees the other party as a partner with whom he must build a common
solution. We consider the negotiation to be distributive when the negotiator sees the other
party as an adversary that he must defeat. Note that when one assumes this and acts
accordingly, this may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In other words, the negotiator’s
mindset is integral to whether he sees the other party’s satisfaction as positively or
negatively correlated with his own satisfaction.
The Impact of the Negotiator’s Mindset on the Three Dimensions
In terms of behavior, we propose to analyze the difference between the two mindsets
through the lens of the three dimensions. We illustrate this below as three behavioral
continua represented by “rev counters” (tachometers, to those classically-trained in
technology), each representing one of the three dimensions in negotiation. This
“continuum” approach facilitates illustrating how the negotiator’s initial mindset will
fluctuate according to how the negotiation progresses and to the tactical choices made by
the parties. Whether a negotiator will act in one way or another does not simply depend
on the “dosage” of the choices, but also on their sequencing. Each negotiator finds their
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balance by navigating from one extreme to the other (or, in the rev counters, from left to
right).
The first rev counter represents the substance dimension. It allows identifying two
behavioral continua: the integrative negotiator’s behavior goes from pure cooperation to
pure competition, whereas the distributive one goes from competition to manipulation.
Along the negotiation, behaviors will vary between the two “extremes” that represent
pure cooperation and manipulation. Integrative negotiation is thus not defined as
cooperation, but as a mix of cooperation and competition. But that takes us only halfway
around the rev counter. Manipulation should be defined as feigned cooperation; you
make the other party believe that you are cooperating when in fact you are only serving
your own interests. And this takes up the remainder of the meter’s range. The idea here is
to integrate, by enriching it, the concept of mixed motive, offered for the first time by
Thomas Schelling (1960) and so often presented as an essential tension for any
negotiation situation.
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The second rev counter, representing the relationship dimension, shows the
integrative negotiator’s behavior ranging between empathy and assertiveness, that is,
alternating listening to the other and expressing oneself. The distributive negotiator will,
on the other hand, work between assertiveness and coercion: he does not listen sincerely
to the other parties, but tries to persuade them, even threatens if necessary. While the
integrative negotiator’s focus will be centered on all the actors, and therefore their
interpersonal relations, the distributive’s focus will only be on himself and his interests.
Whereas the former sees the relationship as a balanced playing field on which to grow the
agreement, the latter will consider the relationship only as a source of personal gain. For
such a negotiator, listening is used mostly to find a way through which he can impose his
viewpoint, or destabilize the other party (directive, distracted, or impassive listening,
etc.). Another way to look at this is to consider the question of information exchange:
whereas the integrative negotiator will share information for the common good, the
distributive one will try to skew the exchange in his favor.
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The third rev counter, representing the process dimension, shows how the
integrative negotiator’s behavior toward the negotiation process is split between paying
attention to external interests and needs (that is, in relation to the other parties) and
internal (paying attention to the people, organizations and interests he is specifically there
to defend at the table). This conception of process is oriented toward having principals
get heavily involved, using negotiators as spokespersons; the preferred process is
therefore designed for efficiency for both parties. Distributive negotiators, by contrast,
are likely to place themselves on the upper half of the scale, i.e. between an “internal”
focus and unfair tactics. This means they will resort to processual ways to put pressure on
the other party, in order to unilaterally gain more, and faster, on the substance. Where the
integrative negotiator will work to create a link between his own mandate and that of the
other party, the distributive negotiator will use the process to try to enforce his influence
on the other party.
A diagnostic tool
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Without going into too sophisticated a process approach to negotiation, it is therefore
possible to alert negotiators about how one’s mindset may impact their behaviors on each
of the three dimensions of negotiation (Relationship – Process – Substance). First, this
implies that the negotiator’s mindset does not impact just the substance dimension; the
way a negotiator looks at the process and the relationship dimensions is also colored by
her assumptions about negotiation. One’s distributive tendency may appear visible in any
of the dimensions.
Although the three counters may move in parallel with one another, this may not
necessarily be the case; hence, how the other negotiator behaves in terms of substance
may hide a different mindset on the other dimensions. A negotiator may act in an
integrative manner on the relationship dimension, thus giving the impression he will be
integrative on the substance… to better hide a distributive stance. Another negotiator may
build a very distributive process, serving his interests only, and then act collaboratively
on the substance; this is sometimes the case with purchasing centers, when they opt to (or
are forced to) try and protect their weakest suppliers from their own aggressive pricing
policies.For more experienced professionals, such a tool serves not only to understand the
behavior of our counterparts but also as a useful self-diagnosis tool – to assess our own
behavior at the negotiation table. By looking at evidence of distributive behavior on each
of the dimensions, one may be able to anticipate non-collaborative actions by the other
party. Also, one may be able to self-diagnose oneself by looking at hints of behaviors on
each of the dimensions. Am I considering manipulating the other party through
communication? Or am I skewing the process to better serve my own interests? Also, the
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most integrative-oriented negotiator may sometimes let slip a manipulative action that
could have some pervert impact on the negotiation process.
The rev counter metaphor presents another asset: it indicates that when
negotiation becomes tense or complex, a negotiator who feels under pressure, or simply
emotional, may “rev up”, and therefore abandon integrative behaviors for more
distributive ones. This may be done consciously by particularly reflective negotiators, or
unconsciously by the greater number. Such a shift can be observed, through different
forms, in one, two or three of the dimensions of the negotiation at a time.
Conclusion
Three dimensions, two mindsets, six possibilities. Our approach first enables looking at
negotiation as a process, with stages that need to be aligned (not necessarily linearly) by
surfing on the three dimensions of negotiation. Furthermore, defining negotiation as a
matter of mindset basically means that any negotiation may be distributive or integrative,
depending on one’s approach to the situation. What this chapter does not say is how to
change the other negotiator’s mindset; for this, we invite readers to refer to the notions of
“negotiation jujitsu” and “changing the game” offered by Fisher and Ury (1981).
Finally, the three dimensions may serve as a diagnostic tool, both for ourselves
and for the other party: by looking for traces of distributive behavior on each of the
dimensions, a perceptive negotiator may be able to anticipate distributive moves, whether
they come from himself or the other party.
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References
Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York NY: Basic Books.
Caillé, A., and J.E. Grésy. 2014. La Révolution du Don. Paris: Seuil.
Fisher, R. and W. Ury. 1981. Getting to Yes. New York NY: Penguin Books
Halifa, Y. and G. Cantournet. 2011. Le Syndrome du Lapin dans la Lumière des Phares.
Saint-Julien-en-Genevois : Jouvence.
Lempereur, A., A. Colson and M. Pekar. 2010. The First Move: A Negotiator’s
Companion. London: Wiley.
Lewicki, R., D. Saunders and B. Barry. 2014. Negotiation. Columbus OH: McGraw-Hill
Education.
Mnookin, R., S. Peppett and A. Tulumello. 2000. Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create
Value in Deals and Disputes. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Pinkley R. L. and G. B. Northcraft. 1994. Conflict frames of reference: implications for
dispute processes and outcomes. Academy of Management Journal, 37, 193–205.
Schelling, T. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
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