Foreign Policy Analysis (2013) 9, 203–222
Simple vs. Complex Learning Revisited:
Israeli Prime Ministers and the Question of
a Palestinian State
GUY ZIV
American University
When does a decision-maker’s shift on a major policy issue represent a
genuine reassessment in his or her beliefs as opposed to tactical maneuvering? This article provides a framework to improve our confidence
that a policy shift represents “complex learning,” which entails the adoption of new goals, rather than “simple learning,” which refers to a
change in means but not goals. Challenging the conventional wisdom
on learning, it argues that decision makers who alter their foreign policies incrementally are more likely to have had a fundamental rethinking
of their underlying assumptions on a core issue than those who exhibit
sudden shifts in their foreign policy decisions absent a traumatic event.
The public declarations of Israel’s three most recent premiers—Ariel
Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Benjamin Netanyahu—in support of the
establishment of a Palestinian state are used to illustrate the utility of
this framework. Whereas Sharon and Olmert underwent complex learning, Netanyahu’s swift change appears to represent merely a tactical
response to pressure from the United States.
For more than 25 years, scholars have used learning theory to explain major
changes in international politics. This approach has been applied to such disparate areas as shifts in US and Soviet foreign policy (Nye 1987; Breslauer and
Tetlock 1991; Bennett 1999), states’ decision concerning entering alliances when
faced with international instability (Reiter 1996), the growth in numbers and
influence of international organizations, such as UN peacekeeping operations
(Haas 1990; Howard 2008), and regional integration (Eising 2002; Bomberg
2007; Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and Padgett 2007; and Zito and Schout
2009). Since the publication of Lloyd Etheridge’s (1985) Can Governments Learn?
learning theorists have largely selected the state, organization, or region as their
unit of analysis; comparatively, few studies have focused on the learning processes of the decision makers themselves. This is unfortunate given the critical
impact of decision makers on state and organizational behavior. To help
improve our understanding of dramatic foreign policy reorientations, this paper
builds on recent scholarship that seeks to return to the individual level of analysis in the study of foreign policy learning (Malici and Malici 2005; Malici 2008;
Renshon 2008).
Author’s Note: The author thanks Aaron Boesenecker, Mohammed M. Hafez, Jeffrey W. Knopf, Shoon Murray,
Jonathan Pearl, and Shibley Telhami for their helpful suggestions. The author is also grateful to the editors and
anonymous reviewers at Foreign Policy Analysis for their constructive comments. Earlier versions of this article were
presented at the 2010 annual meeting of the International Studies Association in New Orleans, Louisiana, and a
co-written paper with Brent E. Sasley at the 2010 annual meeting of the Association for Israel Studies in Toronto,
Ontario.
Ziv, Guy. (2012) Simple vs. Complex Learning Revisited: Israeli Prime Ministers and the Question of a Palestinian State. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00180.x
© 2012 International Studies Association
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Understanding whether announcements of major policy shifts are the manifestation of instrumental logic or the result of a genuine change in beliefs is important because leaders who voice a change in their belief concerning a given issue
merely because it is politically expedient to do so may not be truly committed to
altering the status quo if their rhetoric results solely from political expediency.
Conversely, those leaders who have undergone a true change in their beliefs are
more likely to promote their new beliefs both within their inner circles and
externally. Given the difficulties associated with altering the status quo, a decision-maker’s deep commitment to his or her beliefs is necessary for altering it.
Most studies on learning focus on the impact of “formative events,” such as
wars or periods of economic calamity, which induce learning, that is, learning
triggered by substantial discrepant information arriving within a short period of
time (Goldsmith 2005:11). This paper examines the oft-neglected longitudinal
approach of learning. It is argued that decision makers who alter their foreign
policies gradually are more likely to have had a fundamental rethinking of their
underlying assumptions on a core issue than those who exhibit sudden shifts in
their foreign policy decisions absent a formative event. A decision-maker’s position on a particular issue that has changed incrementally provides a greater
degree of certainty that this change is not merely tactical—as opposed to an
abrupt change precipitated, for example, by heavy political pressure on the actor
to change course.
The past two decades of Israeli government policy toward the establishment of
a Palestinian state offer several good cases with which to illustrate the usefulness
of the longitudinal approach for understanding the nature of the learning
undergone by a decision maker. Israeli policy toward a Palestinian state has
changed dramatically since the Oslo peace process of the 1990s. Indeed, every
prime minister since Ehud Barak has officially endorsed Palestinian statehood,
reversing decades of government policy.1 This paper examines the policy reversals on this highly charged issue by Israel’s three most recent prime ministers—
Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Benjamin Netanyahu—to assess the extent of
their commitment to this new policy. In contrast to former Prime Ministers
Barak and Peres, whose backing of a Palestinian state might be more easily
understood in the context of their long-time affiliation with the left-of-center
Labor Party, Sharon, Olmert and Netanyahu each spent the bulk of his political
career in the right-wing Likud party, which has always firmly opposed such a
state. If learning takes place against the backdrop of preexisting beliefs, it is less
surprising that a Labor premier would endorse Palestinian statehood given
Labor’s traditional support for territorial compromise than that a Likud premier
would do so given Likud’s traditional hard-line positions on territorial compromise. The three cases chosen here are thus particularly powerful ones for illustrating whether each of these prime ministers has undergone “complex
learning”—that is, the adoption of new goals—or “simple learning,” which refers
to a change only in means, not in goals. To assess whether Sharon, Olmert, and
Netanyahu have exhibited complex or simple learning, I examine biographies of
the premiers, journalistic accounts, and public statements made by each decision
maker both before and after his endorsement of a Palestinian state. I also interview former senior aides to these premiers. In addition, I examine the specific
1
Barak served as prime minister from July 1999 to March 2001. Former Prime Minister Shimon Peres publicly
expressed his support for a Palestinian state prior to Barak, but he did so in 1997, after he was no longer in power.
A caveat is in order here: it should not be assumed that every prime minister who has embraced a Palestinian state
shares precisely the same understanding of what the contours of such a state would entail; their individual definitional differences are beyond the scope of this article. It is assumed here that the common denominator among
those who have accepted the eventuality of a Palestinian state is the shared vision of a return to most of Israel’s
pre-1967 borders as part of a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the outcome of which would be
two sovereign states—Israel and Palestine—living side by side.
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actions the prime ministers took prior to, and following, their momentous decisions. The data collected reveal not only when the shift occurred but also
whether it was a sudden shift or an incremental one, the domestic and international context in which the policy shift was announced, and the extent to which
each decision maker promoted the new policy following its announcement in
his public statements.
Sharon and Olmert, both of whom underwent a gradual evolution of their
position on the issue of a Palestinian state, are shown to have experienced complex learning, as evidenced by the absence of coercive pressure prior to their
announced policy changes, the rationalizations they used in explaining them,
and specific actions they took in support of their new policies. Both of them
appear to have genuinely reassessed their prior beliefs as they came to accept
the necessity of a Palestinian state. By contrast, Netanyahu’s reversal on the issue
of a Palestinian state occurred rather suddenly, and it came on the heels of
heavy pressure by US President Barack Obama to change course. A tentative conclusion concerning Netanyahu is that his shift appears to have been a tactical
maneuver given that he has not yet demonstrated a reassessment of his core
beliefs.
Assessing Complex Learning
In studying policy change, learning models have been proposed as alternatives to
what Jack Levy calls “structural adjustment models” like neorealism, which assume
that the decision maker will rationally and efficiently adjust to changing structural
incentives (Levy 1994:298). As Levy notes, “People interpret historical experience
through the lens of their own analytical assumptions and worldviews…The different frames that people apply generally result in variations in learning across individuals in the same situation” (Levy 1994:283). In foreign policy decision-making,
it is important, therefore, not to neglect the actor behind the decision. Writes
Malici: “It is ultimately leaders who make decisions and implement them…Their
subjective representations of themselves and their enemies, how these representations change or are reified and the strategies they consider to be appropriate over
time are crucial considerations for a satisfactory account of international interactions” (Malici 2008:132). As Larson (1991) demonstrates, the shift toward détente
in US-Soviet relations during the 1970s can best be explained by focusing on two
individuals: Nixon and Kissinger. She shows how Kissinger’s complex belief system, coupled with Nixon’s lack of enduring beliefs, enabled the strategic shift
from confrontation to negotiation. Stein (1994) does not focus on belief systems,
but she, too, demonstrates that an adequate explanation of the changes in Soviet
foreign policy that took place in the mid-1980s ought to account for Gorbachev’s
inductive trial-and-error learning that enabled him to develop a new approach
toward the ill-structured Soviet security problem.
Yet cognitive psychologists posit that people do not readily revise their beliefs
(George 1969; Jervis 1976; Suedfeld and Rank 1976; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977;
Conover and Feldman 1984; Tetlock 1985; Lau and Sears 1986; Little and Smith
1988; Vertzberger 1990). According to theories of cognitive consistency, people
have a tendency to accept information that is consistent with their prior beliefs,
rather than information that challenges those beliefs. A person’s belief system
plays a critical role in enabling him or her to cope with potentially overwhelming
environmental uncertainty. However, there are inherent limits to the amount of
flexibility anyone can afford in the face of this uncertainty. Cognitive consistency
theories posit that people are thus highly unlikely to change their beliefs in light
of discrepant information. Whereas rational choice theorists would posit that
people update their beliefs based on new information, cognitive consistency theorists would expect leaders to discount systematically new information or use
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those elements that correspond with their preexisting beliefs and thus resist
change in their fundamental beliefs (Jervis 1976; Little and Smith 1988; Stein
2002:293). Leaders may be particularly disinclined to change their beliefs given
that it is difficult to explain such a change to the public, which is rarely fully
aware of the informational basis of the currently held beliefs nor is the public
necessarily aware of new information the leader may have come across. Thus, to
protect their credibility with the public, leaders may choose to avoid information
that challenges their beliefs (Vertzberger 1990:122, 137–8).
Yet, recent studies in cognitive psychology have challenged some of the
assumptions of the cognitive consistency model. A number of studies employing
the operational code framework have disputed the notion that people’s core
beliefs are especially resistant to change, finding, in fact, significant changes in
the fundamental beliefs of such disparate leaders as President George W. Bush
(Renshon 2008), President Jimmy Carter (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998),
and Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres (Crichlow 1998).2
Operational code analyses have posed an even greater challenge to the cognitive
consistency model’s assumption that people’s beliefs are internally consistent. In
contrast to Jervis’s claim that once change comes, “it will come in large batches”
and that “several elements will change almost simultaneously,” recent studies
show that changes in core beliefs do not necessarily cause all of one’s beliefs to
change (Jervis 1976:170; Renshon 2008:830–831, 840).
Other researchers have looked into certain personality traits that may help to
explain why some leaders are more likely to change their beliefs in light of new
information than are others. Several recent studies looking into decision-makers’
cognitive structure (as opposed to the content of their beliefs) have found that
leaders who are relatively cognitively open and complex are more likely to
change their beliefs in the face of discrepant information than those who are
deemed cognitively closed and simple (Stein 1994; Aronoff 2001; Farnham 2001;
Ziv 2008, 2011). Discourse analysis of these decision-makers’ own words in memoirs, press conferences, speeches, and published interviews, as well as testimony
from associates of these leaders, elaborates upon the extent to which the decision maker is receptive to new information he or she comes across (cognitive
openness) and also the number and combination of dimensions the decisionmaker applies to people and situations (cognitive complexity). These studies
find that the more a decision maker is open and complex, the higher the likelihood that he or she will revise his or her beliefs when confronted with new
information.
A significant challenge confronting scholars who examine changes in decisionmakers’ beliefs is determining whether learning has indeed taken place. Nye’s
(1987) distinction between “simple learning” and “complex learning” offers a
useful framework in this regard. The former refers to new information the actor
uses to alter means, but not ends. Similarly, Haas (1991) distinguishes simple
learning, which he calls “adaptation,” from genuine learning. Complex learning,
by contrast (the only real learning, for Haas), involves the alteration of one’s
causal beliefs that lead, in turn, to the adoption of new goals.
Whether a decision maker has undergone simple or complex learning is
important because it is a strong indicator of his or her level of commitment to a
newly announced policy. Charles Hermann distinguishes among four graduated
levels of change: adjustment changes, program changes (a change in means),
2
The operational code, a concept developed by Nathan Leites in 1951 and revised by George (1969), is
designed to provide the researcher with a picture of a leader’s belief system by investigating the decision-maker’s
philosophical beliefs about the nature of the political universe (e.g., conflictual or harmonious) with his or her set
of instrumental beliefs (e.g., how best to deal with enemies). Applied over time, operational code analysis makes it
possible to trace changes in that belief system (Bennett 1999; Malici and Malici 2005; Malici 2008).
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problem/goal changes (a change in ends), and international orientation
changes, which involve multiple simultaneous policy changes because of a basic
shift in an actor’s entire orientation toward world affairs (Hermann 1990:5–6).
According to Tetlock (1991), most learning takes place at the tactical level
(Nye’s “simple learning,” or, in Hermann’s typology, “adjustment” or “program
changes”) following recurring failures to reach adequate solutions to foreign policy problems. In such cases, however, genuine learning cannot be said to have
taken place, because the supposed adoption of “new” policies will, in all likelihood, fail to meet the expectations set up by the announcement of a new direction. In cases involving peace diplomacy, failed learning can lead to widespread
disillusionment with the leadership and with the process in general. As Knopf
notes, “the reason for attaching special importance to learning that involves the
adoption of new causal understandings or redefinition of goals is clearly an
expectation that this will generally lead actors to embrace policies that favor
peace and cooperation” (Knopf 2003:190). If Tetlock is correct, though, this
expectation will be dashed in the majority of cases of foreign policy learning.
How can we assess whether a decision maker has undergone simple or complex learning so as to help us ascertain whether this decision maker will be fully
committed to pursuing a newly stated policy? The conventional wisdom is that
complex learning tends to be brought about by dramatic events, such as crises,
which may trigger a change in a decision-maker’s belief system (Nye 1987:398;
Bennett 1999:84–85). Recent studies have explored, for example, the impact of
the Korean War on Mao Zedong’s more hostile and confrontational worldview
(Feng 2005) and that of 9/11 on George W. Bush’s more negative and bellicose
worldview (Renshon 2008). The literature on learning downplays, however, the
possibility that complex learning can also occur incrementally. In one recent
work, for instance, Goldsmith (2005), who focuses on observational (as opposed
to experiential) learning based on “formative events,” asks: “Under what conditions might observational learning be likely in the absence of a formative event
of major failure?” He then suggests in his conclusion that future research might
focus on incremental learning as well (Goldsmith 2005:113). This alternative
path of incremental learning is explored here.
Focusing solely on learning based on formative events erroneously assumes that
belief change necessarily follows a war, a major crisis, or some other traumatic
event. Yet, learning can also occur in an evolutionary manner. One’s belief change
over an extended period of time has likely come about as a result of a trickling of
information that challenges the logic of a prior belief. Such incremental change
may herald a change in ends given the amount of time that has elapsed, enabling
the decision maker to reassess his or her beliefs. By contrast, a decision to change
course that is made in a sudden manner may be merely a tactical maneuver, particularly if it is precipitated by significant political or diplomatic pressure.
Time can be seen as a facilitator of an actor’s evolving views. Interaction with
information flows over time can contradict one’s earlier beliefs, leading actors to
better internalize this information and, in turn, reassess his or her beliefs. When
a decision maker exhibits an abrupt change in major policy preferences, the
shift may be made in the presence of heavy pressure, which often is exerted on
one or more parties in an atmosphere of crisis. In such an atmosphere, “diplomatic time,” which runs faster than normal time, can compel an actor to make a
decision more quickly than usual (Allan 1983:23; Telhami 1990:152). Such a
change may be merely tactical, though, particularly if the crisis falls short of a
traumatic event, such as a war, a major tragedy involving a high death toll, an
economic calamity, etc. While a new policy might be proclaimed by the decision
maker in light of diplomatic or political pressure, its chances of being fully carried out are slim in the absence of complex learning on the part of the decision
maker.
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Israeli Prime Ministers and the Learning of a Palestinian State
Examining Israeli prime ministers over time provides us with strong cases for
illustrating the salience of the incremental approach to learning. Israeli policy
toward a Palestinian state has changed dramatically since the late-1990s. Barak
was the first sitting prime minister to publicly endorse a “Palestinian state” in
2000. Each of his successors has done likewise; however, some have accepted the
notion of a Palestinian state sooner than others, and some appear to have
embraced it more fully than others. A close examination of this phenomenon
reveals that there has been considerable variation in the leaders’ responses to
changes and continuities in the environment, as manifested by the timing of
their pronouncements in support of a Palestinian state and their levels of commitment to the two-state solution. Understanding the underlying reasons for
their changed rhetoric can shed light on whether these prime ministers have
undergone complex or simple learning.
In this section, I explore Israeli decision-makers’ evolutionary acceptance of a
Palestinian state. First, I look at changing attitudes—both at the societal and at
the elite levels—toward a Palestinian state since Israel began occupying the West
Bank and Gaza Strip as a consequence of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. I then
look at the processes leading each of the three most recent Israeli premiers—
Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Benjamin Netanyahu—to endorse the idea of a
Palestinian state. The cases of Sharon and Olmert illustrate complex learning
that has taken place incrementally. Although as a sitting prime minister, it may
be too early to draw a definitive conclusion about Netanyahu, this case appears
to be illustrative of simple learning. Netanyahu, too, has endorsed the two-state
solution but the evidence to date belies the notion that he has embraced it as a
new goal.
A Sea Change in Israeli Policy Toward a Palestinian State
From 1967 to the late-1990s, there was a broad Israeli consensus in opposition to
a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.3 When the agreements were
signed, support for a state among the general public hovered around thirty-five
percent, surpassing the fifty-percent mark only in 1999 (Arian 2003:12). Prior to
Oslo, no mainstream politician seriously contemplated the notion of an independent Palestinian entity alongside Israel. Golda Meir, the Labor Party leader who
served as Prime Minister from 1969 to 1974, did not even recognize the existence of a Palestinian nation (Tessler 1994:444). The prevailing view in Labor
was to establish some sort of confederation with Jordan, which was seen as a
more legitimate partner than the Palestinians, since it was led by King Hussein,
a moderate, Western-oriented leader familiar to Israelis. Yitzhak Rabin, who succeeded Meir as Prime Minister, stressed that “Israel’s policy is that the Palestinian issue has to be solved in the context of a peace treaty with Jordan. We don’t
see any room to have a third state between Israel and Jordan” (BBC Television
1975). Peres, Rabin’s long-time rival in the Labor Party, was an early supporter
of the “Jordanian option.” Warned Peres, “If a Palestinian state should emerge,
there is no doubt that it would be filled with modern Soviet weaponry or weapons from Libyan arsenals” (Davar 1975).
The right-wing Herut (a precursor to Likud) party, which until 1977 was the
chief opposition party, opposed not just a Palestinian state but also any arrangement—including a confederation with Jordan—that entailed territorial compromise in the West Bank and Gaza. As its long-time leader Menachem Begin
3
As a consequence of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel conquered the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, the Sinai peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria.
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pointed out, “the difference between the parties is not on a Palestinian state…
The difference is that the Labor Party says we should be ready to give back part
of Judea and Samaria [the West Bank]. Likud is not ready to do so” (Halevy
1977).
Opposition to a Palestinian state did not diminish with the Likud’s rise to
power in the May 1977 national elections and Labor’s move to the opposition.
“There is no force on earth which will compel us to agree to the establishment
of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza,” insisted Begin (Claiborne
1979). By the early 1990s, however, some of the more dovish Labor Party politicians began to publicly call for what only the far left had long advocated: a Palestinian state (Yudelman 1991).
In the wake of the Oslo peace process between Israel and the PLO in the mid1990s, Labor’s leaders came to terms with the eventuality of a Palestinian state,
although they were cautious, at first, in expressing their support publicly. Not so
the leaders of Likud, who continued their outright rejection of this solution to
the conflict.
Beginning with Prime Minister Barak’s public acceptance of a future Palestinian state, every subsequent prime minister has followed suit. Not all, however,
appear to have truly reconciled themselves to the “two-state” solution to the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Later, I trace the steps that Netanyahu and his two
most recent predecessors—Olmert and Sharon—took to arrive at that conclusion
and, in so doing, I illustrate Netanyahu’s simple learning in contrast to Sharon’s
and Olmert’s complex learning.
Ariel Sharon
As late as January 1992, Ariel Sharon, a general-turned-politician who spent most
of his political career promoting the construction of settlements in the West Bank,
held the view that Jordan was Palestine (Haberman 1992). In his autobiography,
which was first published in 1989, Sharon wrote that “a Palestinian state has
existed since 1922, when Great Britain split off 78 percent of Palestine to create
Transjordan” (Sharon 2001:545). He argued that “concern for our own survival
does not permit the establishment of a second Palestinian state on the West Bank”
(Sharon 2001:553). He outright rejected the Oslo peace accord of 1993, arguing
that Arafat still intended to destroy Israel, and he urged Prime Minister Rabin to
annex significant portions of the West Bank (Hefez and Bloom: 304).
In the late-1990s, Sharon began to show greater flexibility toward the Palestinians. While maintaining his support for Jewish settlements, many of which he
had played a role in building, he dropped his Jordan-is-Palestine rhetoric. A
clear indication that Sharon was undergoing a complex learning process on the
Palestinian issue occurred when he made headlines in November 1997, declaring
that “a Palestinian state in the Palestinian [National] Authority [PNA] areas is a
fait accompli even if Israel objects to this definition.” Predicted Sharon: “The day
is not too far off when the Palestinians will declare an independent state” (Yedioth Ahronoth 1997). When asked a year later, as Foreign Minister in Benjamin
Netanyahu’s first government, if he still believed that the process would end in a
Palestinian state, Sharon expressed his concern that such a state “could sign a
treaty with Iraq or Iran” and warned that “every effort must be made to ensure
that there is no unilateral decision”; significantly, however, he did not rule out a
negotiated two-state solution (Israel’s Sharon Says 1998). Sharon also lent his
support that year to the Wye River agreement, which resulted in the transfer of
additional land to the Palestinian Authority. Defending his stance before the Likud Central Committee, he acknowledged that “there are risks in any arrangement and agreement” and declared Israel’s desire for peace (Voice of Israel
1998).
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Following his ascent to the premiership in February 2001, Sharon continued
his steady shift to the center of the political map. That September, Prime Minister
Sharon declared at a teachers’ conference in Latrun, a place of biblical and oncestrategic importance located just west of Jerusalem, that “the state of Israel wants
to give the Palestinians what nobody had given them before: the possibility to
establish a state” (Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)’s 2001). Although two of Sharon’s predecessors, Peres and Barak, had already declared their support for a
Palestinian state, Sharon’s statement came as a surprise. After all, he had defeated
Barak in a landslide victory as part of a backlash against Barak’s failed approach
toward the peace process, which had collapsed during his premiership. The second Intifada broke out in September 2000, precipitated by Sharon’s controversial
visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem. The mood in Israel had
shifted to the right as the left all but disappeared from the political map. Moreover, President George W. Bush, Sharon’s old friend, had all but ignored the
Israeli–Palestinian issue following 9/11, focusing mainly on the war on terror.
Nevertheless, although Sharon’s declared support for a Palestinian state was his
own initiative, forced on him neither by international nor domestic political
forces, he undoubtedly was aware of polls indicating that, by 2001, a majority of
Israelis favored the creation of a Palestinian state (Lavie 2001; Arian 2003). Just as
the general public’s attitudes toward such a state had begun to evolve in the
1990s, so did Sharon come to favor the eventual establishment of a Palestinian
state. Sharon’s evolution on this issue is not unprecedented: Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin also had undergone a change in his beliefs regarding the Palestinians
that mirrored that of Israeli society (Barnett 1999). In the late 1980s and early
1990s, events such as the end of the Cold War and the first Palestinian Intifada
had a palpable impact on a significant number of Israelis’ conception of their conflict with the Palestinians, prompting a shift in their attitudes toward negotiations
with the PLO over the future of the occupied territories. Similarly, in the late
1990s and early 2000s, developments such as the demographic changes that
appeared to threaten the future of Israel as a Jewish state, coupled with the second
Intifada, contributed to the public’s fears about holding on indefinitely to the
occupied territories and, by extension, denying the Palestinians their own state.
Sharon shared these growing concerns, as is evidenced by his changing rhetoric
on the conflict in general and on the issue of Palestinian statehood in particular.
Sharon’s acceptance of a Palestinian state was formalized when, on May 25,
2003, he and his government approved the Road Map for Peace, as proposed by
the so-called “Quartet”—the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the
United Nations. The second phase of the Road Map called for the establishment
of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders. As Sharon’s biographer has noted, with the acceptance of the Road Map by the Israeli government,
“for the first time in parliamentary history, the Jewish state had consented, after
due process, to the principle of the establishment of a Palestinian state” (Dan
2006:220).
Following the adoption of the Road Map, Sharon began preparing the hawkish segment of the Israeli public—his natural constituents on the right—for the
eventuality of a Palestinian state. Despite a flurry of criticism from many of his
traditional supporters, Sharon not only defended his decision to approve the
Road Map, but he also began to use the politically loaded term “occupation.”
“Holding 3.5 million Palestinians under occupation is a terrible thing for Israel,
for the Palestinians, and for the Israeli economy,” he argued (Walla News 2003).
Sharon reiterated his support for Palestinian statehood in a statement he delivered after the Aqaba Summit on June 4, 2003. Declared Sharon:
Israel, like others, has lent its strong support for President Bush’s vision,
expressed on June 24, 2002, of two states—Israel and a Palestinian state—living
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side by side in peace and security…It is in Israel’s interest not to govern the
Palestinians but for the Palestinians to govern themselves in their own state. A
democratic Palestinian state fully at peace with Israel will promote the long-term
security and well-being of Israel as a Jewish state (Israel Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) 2003).
In an unprecedented move, the Sharon government adopted, in June 2004, a
plan to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and from four settlements in
the West Bank—a plan carried out the following summer and which cost him
much support among his traditional constituency. That December, Sharon used
the Herzliya Conference, a forum often used by Israeli leaders to announce
major new policy initiatives or defend existing ones, to promote “a two-state
vision” that would involve “great concessions on both sides.” Warned Sharon:
“The alternative of one nation, where one rules over another, would be a horrible disaster for both peoples” (PMO’s 2004). When traveling abroad, he also
emphasized his support for a Palestinian state—speaking, for example, of “the
establishment of an independent Palestinian state” at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit in August 2005, and saying that the Palestinians were “entitled to freedom
and to a national, sovereign existence in a state of their own” in his speech at
the United Nations General Assembly (PMO’s 2005a,b).
In November 2005, Sharon set off a political earthquake in Israel by bolting
the Likud and forming a new centrist party, “Kadima,” whose platform called for
achieving “two states for two nations.” Until he suffered a massive stroke that has
left him incapacitated since January 2006, Sharon had a set response to questions about his change of heart: “When you take on the role of prime minister,
you see things you don’t see from the opposition benches,” he would say (Dan
2006: 239). As prime minister, he realized he had to act with far greater responsibility than as an opposition politician or even a cabinet minister. These responsibilities included maintaining a strong relationship with the United States,
Israel’s most important ally. Sharon noted that his decision to accept the Road
Map stemmed, in part, from “the desire to support the Bush administration in
its difficult struggle to create peace and democracy in the Middle East…” (Plett
2003; Dan 2006:218). Yet, significantly, by the time the Road Map was unveiled,
Sharon had already come to terms with the need to part with territories that
would be marked for a future Palestinian state. Whether Sharon would have
overseen its establishment had his second term not been cut short is impossible
to know, but it is clear that his gradual move to the political center was facilitated by his acceptance of the political realities that compelled him to reevaluate
his earlier goal of annexing the West Bank and Gaza.
In short, Sharon had exhibited complex learning over time that led him to
reverse his beliefs concerning a Palestinian state. His acceptance of such a state
was the culmination of a gradual shift in his attitude toward the conflict with the
Palestinians that began in the late-1990s, prior to his premiership or even assuming the leadership of the Likud party. He certainly must have been aware of the
Israeli public’s own growing acceptance of a Palestinian state, although his
declared support for such a state was done in the absence of significant domestic
pressure. Certainly, the notion of a Palestinian state remained highly unpopular
among his constituents on the right. He was undoubtedly attuned to expectations
by the Bush administration and the Quartet to accept and implement Israel’s
responsibilities as stipulated in the Road Map. However, the international pressure he faced was far from consistent, particularly from President Bush, who was
preoccupied with the war on terror and, later, Iraq. Moreover, Sharon already
had publicly endorsed a Palestinian state in addressing his nation at Latrun, many
months prior to the introduction of the Road Map. Over time, Sharon had
become convinced of the necessity and inevitability of a Palestinian state.
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Ehud Olmert
In many ways, the process leading up to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s acceptance of a Palestinian state was similar to that of his predecessor: both were
hawkish Likud politicians who, for much of their lives, had opposed statehood for the Palestinians; both began to moderate their attitudes toward the
Palestinians in the late 1990s; and both bolted Likud in 2005 to form the
Kadima party, whose central purpose was to work toward a two-state solution
to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Olmert’s change was perhaps even more
profound than Sharon’s turnabout on this issue given that he was widely
perceived as more of an ideologue, having been born into a prominent rightwing family whose father was a Member of Knesset representing Herut—the
Likud party’s predecessor—and that he himself had grown up in the movement’s Betar Youth Organization. As a young Knesset Member representing
the Likud party, Olmert rejected any notion of territorial compromise. He
even opposed the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt despite the
fact that they were negotiated by his own party leader, then-Prime Minister
Menachem Begin. In an op-ed he penned in 1982, Olmert insisted that “no
territorial compromise can satisfy the Arab countries’ minimum demands and,
at the same time, meet Israel’s security needs.” Rejecting a future Palestinian
state, he argued that what was needed was “a different kind of compromise
based not on a partition of land but on a division of administrative functions
between Israel and Jordan” (Olmert 1982). After the first Intifada broke
out, he warned that if there were to be a Palestinian state, the Intifada would
be started in Israel by a small minority of Arabs disloyal to Israel (Dunsky
1989).
In 1993, Olmert defeated long-time Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek. Following
his victory, Olmert said that he “had a big fear that Jerusalem was going to
become a province of a Palestinian state” had Kollek been reelected (The Times
1993). Throughout most of his decade-long tenure as Jerusalem’s mayor, Olmert
maintained his hard-line stance. When two hawkish members of the Knesset law
committee began to draft legislation aimed at undermining possible future
efforts by the Rabin government to make compromises with the Palestinians over
Jerusalem, Olmert urged them to further strengthen the two bills under debate
to ensure that the eastern part of the city could not serve as the capital of any
future Palestinian state (Izenberg 1994). He fervently opposed the 1993 IsraeliPLO accord, seeing it as “a coverup” for an eventual Palestinian state (Hepburn
1993).
Despite his rejection of the Oslo process, Olmert began a slow but steady shift
to the political center in the late 1990s. Significantly, he came to terms with the
prospect of territorial compromise—even in Jerusalem. After publicly criticizing
Barak for offering too many concessions to the Palestinians, Barak revealed that
Olmert had shared far-reaching proposals with him prior to the ill-fated Camp
David Summit. According to Barak, “The practical significance of his [Olmert’s]
proposals was the partition of Jerusalem” (BBC News 2001).
In January 2003, Olmert was elected to the Knesset and, one month later, he
became Deputy Prime Minister and was widely seen as the Prime Minister’s alter
ego, launching trial balloons on Sharon’s behalf—such as when he proposed
relinquishing the Gaza Strip, much of the West Bank, and parts of East Jerusalem for a future Palestinian state (Matza 2003). Like Sharon, Olmert must have
been cognizant of polls showing that the majority of the public was prepared to
support a Palestinian state. As noted earlier, however, while the public’s growing
acceptance of a Palestinian state may have had an impact on Sharon’s and
Olmert’s position on this issue, the government in fact faced little pressure from
the public; the Sharon government was reelected by a wide margin in 2003.
G UY Z IV
213
Sharon’s and Olmert’s views can be seen as mirroring the trend of growing public support for a Palestinian state—in contrast to many of their colleagues in Likud, who remained steadfast in their opposition to it.
In November 2005, facing vehement opposition from the Likud rank-and-file
to the government’s unilateral disengagement plan, Olmert followed Sharon in
bolting Likud and joining the centrist Kadima party in an effort to work toward
a solution to the conflict. Upon Olmert’s replacement of Sharon as Acting Prime
Minister (and, later, Prime Minister), it did not come as a surprise when he
turned the two-state solution into the centerpiece of his government’s policy
agenda. At the annual Herzliya Conference, Olmert clearly spelled out his
unequivocal support for a Palestinian state:
The existence of two nations, one Jewish and one Palestinian, is the full solution
to the national aspirations and problems of each of the peoples…The choice
between allowing Jews to live in all parts of the land of Israel and living in a state
with a Jewish majority mandates giving up parts of the land of Israel…We will not
be able to continue ruling over the territories in which the majority of the Palestinian population lives (Myre 2006).
Like his predecessor, Olmert had come a long way to arrive at this point. It is
doubtful that either he or Sharon would have risked publicly endorsing a Palestinian state had the majority of the Israeli public continued to oppose it,
although their relatively strong mandate would have enabled them to continue
with the status quo. The Olmert government was prodded by the Bush administration to pursue peace with the Palestinians, but it was not heavily pressured to
take far-reaching steps to do so (Cohen 2007; Sofer 2007). Olmert himself had
come to realize the futility of the status quo and the need for a two-state solution, and, as a former aide of his confirms, he did so years before he became
prime minister (Shariv 2011). For Olmert, the dream of a “Greater Israel,” which
would have entailed annexing the occupied territories, was no longer realistic;
“that [viewpoint] was a mistake,” he had concluded (Wolf 2008). He took pains
to emphasize that the demographic issue could no longer be ignored. “The
Government, any government, must tell the truth, and this truth, unfortunately,
will obligate us to rip away many portions of the homeland – in Judea, Samaria,
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights” (MFA 2008). He warned ominously that if the
two-state solution was to collapse and Israel was left facing “a South African-style
struggle for equal voting rights,” then “the State of Israel is finished” because
Israel would cease to be a democracy and would thus become isolated internationally (Ravid et al. 2007). Olmert has gone as far as to credit the Oslo agreements he once had so fervently opposed with bringing about “the beginning of
a process of sobering up among the Israeli public and the forming of a more
realistic and balanced world view regarding the steps Israel must take in its
contacts with the Palestinians” (Mazori et al. 2005).
Indeed, Olmert had undergone a process of complex learning with regard to
the Palestinian issue. Demographic realities, coupled with his gradual acceptance
of the Oslo accords of the 1990s, had led to a fundamental change in his attitude toward the Palestinian issue. According to numerous accounts, his learning
was aided by his family. Olmert’s wife, Aliza, an artist, and their four children
have always been far more dovish than him and had reportedly made considerable effort to moderate his views over the years (Alon 2006; Berger 2006;
Erlanger 2006).
Olmert reportedly met with his Palestinian counterpart, President Mahmoud
Abbas, thirty-six times in the course of almost two years, from December 2006 to
mid-September 2008. “We were very close, more than ever in the past,” Olmert
has since stated, “to complete an agreement on principles that would have led to
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Simple vs. Complex Learning Revisited
the end of the conflict between us and the Palestinians”—an account corroborated by Abbas (Avishai 2011). According to the Palestine Papers that were published in the Al-Jazeera news channel, Olmert offered the Palestinians 93.5% of
the West Bank, in addition to passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
(Eldar 2011).
Olmert’s peace efforts were overshadowed by the two wars his government initiated with Lebanon and Hamas-ruled Gaza, as well as by the corruption allegations that ultimately led to his resignation and early elections in February 2009.
Notwithstanding these major distractions, he underwent a genuine political
transformation beginning in the late-1990s. Olmert showed himself to be a complex learner. Political realities—in particular, the Oslo peace accords—led him,
over time, to revise his fundamental assumptions, thereby pursuing a very different goal concerning the future of the occupied territories than that he had
sought when he first entered politics.
Benjamin Netanyahu
Olmert’s successor, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, was the last holdout
among Israel’s mainstream leaders in expressing support for a Palestinian state.
In contrast to his predecessors, however, Netanyahu does not appear to have
undergone complex learning on this issue, although this conclusion must
remain tentative given that he is a sitting prime minister. Despite his declared
support for Palestinian statehood, his rhetoric has changed little and his policies
have remained largely the same since assuming office.
A lifelong hawk, Netanyahu was raised in an ideologically right-wing family.4
As leader of the Likud opposition in the 1990s, he was a fierce critic of the
peace process with the PLO, arguing that “the Oslo concept is what failed”
(Honig 1996). Until recently, he was an outspoken opponent of a Palestinian
state. “Such a state,” he has written, “would nullify the whole value of the buffer
area on Israel’s eastern front” (Netanyahu 1993: 288). Rather than “a third independent state in what was once Palestine,” he once wrote, it is Jordan that “is a
two-state solution to resolve a conflict between two peoples” (Netanyahu
1993:329–331, 351). In his prime ministerial debate with then-Prime Minister
Shimon Peres, Netanyahu asked, rhetorically, “why does he want to establish a
Palestinian state and place our security in Arafat’s hands?” (Yudelman and
Itim 1996). As prime minister from 1996 until 1999, he agreed to carry out
Israel’s territorial commitments under the Oslo accords by overseeing withdrawals from the West Bank city of Hebron and additional West Bank territory under
the Wye River Memorandum. He did so, however, with much reluctance and
under significant pressure from the Clinton administration (Ross 2004: 387–
393). At the same time, he did not waver in his rejection of a Palestinian state
(Shavit 2006).5
Netanyahu did not soften his approach toward this issue following his first
stint as prime minister. At an August 2002 forum of the Likud Central Committee, he proposed a resolution to restate the party’s opposition to the creation of
a Palestinian state. He cautioned that a Palestinian state “could turn into a fortress of terror” against Israel. Fifty-nine percent of the 2,600 voting members
voted in favor of Netanyahu’s proposal, dealing a political defeat for Prime
Minister Sharon, who had opposed this proposal (CNN 2002).
4
His father was Benzion Netanyahu, a noted right-wing Zionist historian, who recently passed away.
A recently released video from 2001 shows Netanyahu—who reportedly did not know he was being recorded—
claiming that “America is something that can be moved easily” and that “Palestinians want to throw us into the sea”
(Levy 2010).
5
G UY Z IV
215
After being elected prime minister for a second time, in February 2009,
Netanyahu continued to oppose Palestinian statehood. He tried, in vein, to woo
Kadima Chairwoman Tzippi Livni to join his Likud-led coalition. The negotiations failed largely because of Netanyahu’s refusal to incorporate the two-state
solution—a central plank in Kadima’s platform—into the new government’s
guidelines. It was four months later, on June 14th, when Netanyahu stated his
support for a Palestinian state for the first time. In a historic speech at Bar-Ilan
University, Netanyahu joined the ranks of his predecessors in endorsing a Palestinian state:
In my vision of peace, in this small land of ours two peoples will live freely, sideby-side, as good neighbors with mutual respect. Each will have its own flag, its
own anthem, its own government. Neither will threaten the security or survival of
the other…If we receive this guarantee regarding demilitarization and Israel’s
security needs, and if the Palestinians recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish
people, then we will be ready in a future peace agreement to reach a solution
where a demilitarized Palestinian state exists alongside the Jewish state (MFA
2009).
A month later, Netanyahu went a step further when he uttered the phrase
“two state solution,” stating that “for the first time, we have arrived at a national
consensus on the term ‘two state solution’” (Zilberman 2009). In contrast to
Sharon and Olmert, Netanyahu’s shift occurred nearly a decade later and, unlike
his predecessors, his shift was sudden.
Had Netanyahu “learned” that a Palestinian state was preferable to the continued occupation of the West Bank? Based on the extant evidence, what seems to
have led him to back the two-state solution was neither a perceived demographic
threat to Israel nor the moral implications of continued domination of another
nation. Rather, Netanyahu appears to have been all but compelled to endorse
the two-state solution by US President Barack Obama’s relentless pressure on
him to do so. In their first meeting as their nations’ leaders, their difference on
this issue was highlighted by Netanyahu’s deliberate avoidance of Obama’s references to the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel (Wilson 2009).
Several weeks later, President Obama reiterated this message in his Cairo
speech:
The only resolution is for the aspirations of both sides to be met through two
states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in peace and security. That is in
Israel’s interest, Palestine’s interest, America’s interest, and the world’s interest.
And that is why I intend to personally pursue this outcome with all the patience
and dedication that the task requires… (USA Today 2009).
In the wake of Obama’s forceful declarations in support of the two-state solution, Netanyahu’s continued obstinacy on this issue threatened to harm
US–Israel relations. The media in both countries devoted considerable space to
the growing rift between the two countries that stemmed largely from this ongoing disagreement (Mozgovaya, Ravid and Mualem 2009; Richter and Parsons
2009). Israel’s outgoing ambassador to the United States, Sallai Meridor, said
that Netanyahu’s failure to declare support for a two-state solution was causing
“significant” damage to Israel. “There is, in my opinion, significant political and
moral damage in [Netanyahu] not saying: ‘At the end of the road, I’m ready for
a Palestinian state’” (Haaretz 2009).
Netanyahu has long had a reputation of responding to pressure. According to
long-time US Mideast negotiator Dennis Ross, Netanyahu would often “come up
with ideas simply to get himself out of a jam” (Ross 2004:337). Ross also notes that
Netanyahu once confided to him that “a leader can never afford to give up ‘his
216
Simple vs. Complex Learning Revisited
tribe’—those who are fiercely loyal to him, who identify with him because of his
shared roots, long-standing ties, and emotional connections” (Ross 2004: 492).
Although Netanyahu’s tribe of loyalists may have been his constituents on the
right, who remained opposed to a Palestinian state, it was not lost on him that
the public at large had been at odds with his position on this issue. One poll
taken a month before Netanyahu’s announced policy shift showed that fifty-eight
percent of Israel’s Jewish public backed the “two states for two peoples” solution
to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Ynet News 2009). He understood that, while
shifting his public stance on this issue might cost him support from the right, it
would be a popular move overall. Indeed, Netanyahu’s approval rating jumped
from twenty-eight percent in May to forty-four percent in June, following his
expressed support for a Palestinian state (CBC News 2009).
Netanyahu’s Bar-Ilan speech must be seen, therefore, as a tactical response to
pressure from the White House and, to a lesser extent, from public opinion at
home, rather than a fundamental change in Netanyahu’s thinking on this issue.
Indeed, a former senior aide to Netanyahu, Aviv Bushinsky, dismisses the notion
that his former boss has truly abandoned his opposition to a Palestinian state
(Bushinsky 2011). As one Israeli columnist put it, “Netanyahu’s speech was
meant for one pair of ears—the most prominent and famous pair in the world:
the ears of Barack Obama” (Barnea 2009).
Netanyahu’s statements and actions since his Bar-Ilan declaration call into
question his commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state. His initial
refusal to freeze all settlement construction in the occupied territories, an early
demand by the Obama administration, led to further tension between the US
and Israel. When the Israeli prime minister visited the White House in March
2010, he was denied a photograph appearance with Obama—an unusual rebuke
from a US administration. Netanyahu eventually agreed to a ten-month, partial
construction freeze; however, he refused to renew it—a key demand of President
Mahmoud Abbas to continue the peace talks. Indeed, the talks ended in September 2010, following the resumption of construction in the West Bank.
Netanyahu refused to resume negotiations from the point at which they were
left off by his predecessor, laying out strict demands regarding the future establishment of a Palestinian state: it would need to be demilitarized; it would need
to receive international recognition of the demilitarization arrangements; and,
in an unprecedented demand by an Israeli government, Palestinians would need
to accept Israel as a Jewish state (Mozgovaya 2009). Unlike his predecessors, who
used the annual Herzliya Conference to promote their vision for a two-state solution to the conflict, which would invariably entail big concessions on Israel’s
end, Netanyahu’s brief mention of the peace process at the February 2010 conference put the ball squarely in the Palestinian court by calling on the Palestinian leadership to build up the Palestinian economy and Palestinian institutions,
and to enter into direct talks with Israel. He did not elaborate on his vision nor
did he spell out any steps his government would be willing to take to promote
the two state solution (MFA 2010). Netanyahu skipped the 2011 Herzliya
Conference altogether. In his visit to the White House on July 6, 2010, he failed
to publicly mention a two-state solution (New York Times Editorial 2010).
The popular revolts that have engulfed parts of the Arab world since January
2011 have led Netanyahu to back away from his earlier statements regarding working toward the Obama administration’s objective of a final-status agreement
within a year. “We cannot simply say, ‘We are signing a peace agreement,’ close
our eyes and say ‘We did it’ because we do not know with any clarity that the
peace will be honored,” Netanyahu said following the ouster of Tunisia’s longtime president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (AP 2011). He also has declared that
Israel would retain a military presence in the West Bank’s Jordan Valley under any
future peace deal—a stipulation that Palestinians reject outright (Estrin 2011).
G UY Z IV
217
Before heading to Washington in May 2011, Netanyahu publicly rebuffed President Obama’s call for a future Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and
land swaps. “The viability of a Palestinian state cannot come at the expense of
Israel’s existence,” he declared, sparking renewed tension with the Obama
administration (Mualem and News Agencies 2011). More tellingly, Netanyahu
revealed his skepticism about the two-state solution when he told an Israeli journalist that the conflict was “insoluble” and that “until Abu Mazen [PA President
Mahmoud Abbas] recognizes Israel as a Jewish state, there will be no way to
reach an agreement” (Keret 2011). His admission prompted the newspaper
Haaretz to publish an editorial blasting him for “dooming Israel to live eternally
by the sword” by declaring the conflict insoluble (Haaretz 2011).
Thus, Netanyahu’s earlier policy reversal on a Palestinian state appears to have
been a strictly tactical move, spurred by heavy pressure from President Obama.
In light of the crisis atmosphere between the two leaders over Netanyahu’s obstinacy on the diplomatic front, the Israeli leader needed to make a decision in
“diplomatic time.” Failing to publicly endorse a Palestinian state would have
risked severely harming US–Israel relations. Given the discrepancy between
Netanyahu’s stance on a Palestinian state and that of the majority of the Israeli
public, he may have also wanted to shore up his low public approval rating.
Netanyahu’s belated endorsement of a two-state solution, the sudden manner in
which he did so, and his tepid, conditional support for a Palestinian state, calls
into question what Netanyahu has really learned about this issue. While it is conceivable that Netanyahu’s change is a change not just in means, but also ends,
his public pronouncements and actions since his June 2009 declaration belie the
notion that he has changed his beliefs.
Discussion and Conclusion
These cases highlight, first, the importance of incorporating the oft-neglected
individual level of analysis in studies of learning and foreign policy. A decision
by a government to change course will unlikely be pursued seriously if the
chief decision maker has not fully embraced it. The beliefs of Israel’s leaders
are highly salient with regard to Israeli policy toward the establishment of a
Palestinian state. Although the two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was formally approved by the Sharon government in May 2003, Prime
Minister Netanyahu, who publicly endorsed it only in June 2009, does not
appear to have fully accepted the idea of an independent Palestinian state
existing alongside Israel. Whereas Sharon and Olmert took concrete steps to
promote their new policy—for example, by highlighting what they perceived
to be the dangers of continued occupation—Netanyahu has conveyed mixed
messages, and taken measures that are widely regarded as obstacles to the
establishment of a future Palestinian state. Without Netanyahu’s full backing
for a Palestinian state, the emergence of such a state during his tenure in
office is highly unlikely.
These cases shed light on the usefulness of the temporal dimension to help
distinguish between complex and simple learning. In contrast to the conventional argument that complex learning tends to occur in a dramatic manner,
particularly following a formative event, the cases of Sharon and Olmert serve to
illustrate that incremental learning is an important alternative path by which
learning can occur. The timing of one’s policy reversal—both, in terms of the
context in which this decision has been made and in terms of steps the decisionmaker has taken to reach that decision—reveals a lot about whether the policy
shift was a result of a reevaluation of one’s goals or whether it was a merely tactical consideration (a change in means rather than goals). The road taken
by Sharon and Olmert in their acceptance of the eventual establishment of a
218
Simple vs. Complex Learning Revisited
Palestinian state was a long one; each, in his own way, mirroring the larger trend
in Israeli society, went through an incremental process that led him to accept a
Palestinian state. Netanyahu, on the other hand, accepted it much later than the
others, and he did so rather suddenly. His announced policy shift was not
accompanied by a discernable reassessment of his long-held beliefs. In contrast
to his predecessors, who, once having reached their decision, accepted the concept of establishing a Palestinian state as a necessity and justified it by referring
regularly to morality, demographic needs, and international expectations, Netanyahu has not gone to any great lengths to promote the goal he now claims he
supports. It appears that his new position, in essence, was thrust upon him by
President Obama.
In the absence of significant domestic or international pressure, it is unlikely
that the decision maker who has not undergone complex learning will act on his
or her own to change a particular policy. By identifying whether, and to what
extent other decision makers have undergone learning, we can get a better idea
of whether their announced policy shifts are a manifestation of changed ends or
simply means, a distinction that could make the difference between announcing
a new policy and pursuing it.
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