Cognition In The Wild Hutchins, Distributed Cognition, and Cognitive Systems Kenny Skagerlund 2015-09-29 Ramifications? ”The central claim of distributed cognition is so radical that it may well reorganize the whole of cognitive science” --Latour (1996) ”Some of what has been done in cognitive science must now be undone so that these things can be brought into the cognitive picture” --Hutchins (1995) Todays lecture at a glance Recap of distributed cognition Some central tenets revisited Hutchins pioneering work ”Cognition In The Wild” Why traditional cognitive science is fundamentally flawed The role of culture ”How a cockpit remembers its speeds” Cognitive science in sociotechnical systems The cockpit as a thinking thing Distributed Cognition Cognition extends beyond the individual Interactions between people, resources and material Looks for cognitive processes wherever they occur Functional relationships between elements are key (as-if’s) Not every process in the brain is cognitive Distributed Cognition is not a certain kind of cognition A perspective on all cognition To understand memory, we have to understand how memory is used in interaction with the world Distributed Cognition Object of study: Wherever cognitive processes can be found The brain and the neural activity (even our brain is ”distributed”) One individual – brain and body Among several individuals – social cognition and external resources …it’s not where cognitive activity takes place that defines cognition Cognition is still transformations of representations But where are we to draw the boundary? Depends on the question asked and the functional role of elements Distributed Cognition Distributed Cognition Three kinds of distributed cognitive processes: Cognitive processes distributed across a social group Cognitive processes between internal and external representations E.g. Communication and problem-solving between friends E.g. Epistemic actions Cognitive processes may be distributed through time E.g. Cultural processes and history Hutchins and Distributed Cognition Cognitive Ethnography Aboard US Navy ships Aboardcommerical airliners and cockpits Became a book – ”Cognition In The Wild” The role of culture and why traditional CogSci is mistaken How a cockpit remembers its speeds Serve as foundation for Distributed Cognition Cognition In The Wild Traditional cognitive science is fundamentally flawed Traditional characteristics of CogSci (Gardner, 1985) Representations Computers Marginalization of emotions, context, culture and history Interdisciplinary approach Roots in classical philosophy The flaws of traditional CogSci So why is the traditional view flawed? Cognitive processes consists of the manipulation of mental symbols (PSS hypothesis) ”The computer was made in the image of the human” (Simon & Kaplan, 1989) Binary digits as on/off switches resemble neuronal activity (McCulloch & Pitts) Universal Turing machines and formal logic Programmable using formal rules ”Intelligent” behavior – capture human cognition The PSS hypothesis – initial success appealing The flaws of traditional CogSci Origin of PSS due to Turing Self-conscious introspection Mathematician doing math – computations Apply rule to problem Compute Write down on paper Look at result Next step/rule Interaction with symbols doing computation Manual manipulation of symbols Cognitive properties of ”human+pen+notebook” is not the same as properties of the ”human” alone. The system has computational properties that the human does not Turing mistook the properties of the system as symbols in the head The PSS = The entire symbol manipulating system! The computation is not done in the head alone The flaws of traditional CogSci The PSS is the entire system The individual is just one ”component” Searle’s Chinese room = PSS The human is not the symbol cruncher and does not understand semantics But the room as a system does The room is a cognitive sociotechnical system! The result? The PSS tells us nothing about the pure psychological processes of the human – the person is dissolved We have been studying sociocultural systems – but know nothing about the processes and the interactions within the system The flaws of traditional CogSci AI and cognitive psychology: Lost embodiment, emotions, culture etc. The computer was not a model of human cognition Computer (PSS) is a model of a cognitive system The flaws of traditional CogSci So now CogSci has tried to shoehorn and conceptualize humans as computers! We have lost the fine-grained cognitive activity of what really goes on Symbols were outside the head – sensorimotor activity responsible for interaction Gardner (1985) describes the deemphasis of emotion, culture and context It’s too hard to model To get the program started and then add them later It’s hard, even impossible – they are by definition removed as cognitive processes Some consequences Strict boundary between perception, action and cognition ”Cognition” Artificial boundary between inner/outer processes ”When one commits to the notion that all intelligence is inside the inside/outside boundary, one is forced to cram inside everything that is required to produce the observed behaviors” Some consequences Turing thought this was the PSS: Transformation of symbolic representations in the head PSS according to Hutchins: Transformation of symbolic representations in a sociotechnical system Some consequences If the PSS is a sociotechnical system and… …Cognitive Science removed emotion, culture and context.. …how can we now add them again? We can’t. The interactions giving rise to tranformation of symbols have been lost. The human has been lost, and therefore there is nothing to add. Cognitive processes has been ”Lost in Translation” Thus… ”Some of what has been done in cognitive science must now be undone so that these things can be brought into the cognitive picture” --Hutchins (1995) So what has been lost? The role of Culture What is culture? ”…whatever it is one must know in order to behave appropriately in any of the roles assumed to any member of a society.” --Goodenough (1957) ”Culture is not a collection of things, whether tangible or abstract. Rather, it is a process. It is a human cognitive process that takes place both inside and outside the minds of people. It is the process in which our everyday cultural practices are enacted. (…) a major component of culture is a cognitive process (…) and cognition is a cultural process.” --Hutchins (1995) So what has been lost? The role of Culture Cultural artifacts (things) are residua of cognitive processes ”Culture is an adaptive process that accumulates partial solutions to frequently encountered problems” --Hutchins (1995) By marginalizing culture, we have lost alot of cognitive activity and processes inherent in culture Culture and cognition Understanding culture is understanding cognition We have to capture the interactions between the self, others and artifacts, that got lost using the old view of PSS/cognition To understand cognition we have to study cultural practices in everyday activities and problem-solving situations. Hutchins empirical cases Cognition In The Wild (1995) Cognitive Ethnography Studying navigation aboard a U.S. Navy vessel Focus on navigation and labor division between crew members and their interaction Cognition in the wild Computational properties and representations are shared and transformed between several individuals and artifacts. Cognition in the wild Calculate position through triangulation Measure bearing to 3 landmarks Line of position: smaller fix triangle – greater accuracy Anticipate appropriate landmarks in future states Calculation and anticipation: Several multimodal representations Distinct cognitive properties Cognition in the wild Calculate position Situated seeing of the chart – look at the map and estimate appropriate upcoming landmarks. Visual imagination on map Enacting line of position with finger motions above map Augmentation through gesture for communication and own thinking Motor/visual/proprioceptive representations Integrate line of position with finger motions on/near the surface of the chart. Communication and distributed ”reasoning” with crew. Placing charting tool on chart. Stable visual representation to system Then drawing on the map itself with pen. Plotting. Cognition in the wild Increasing tangibility of representation From communication to reasoning using visual, motor and proprioceptive feedback. The last part – plotting – is the only formal task. The result of several cognitive processes using cultural processes – communication and embodied gestures. Actions are trains of thought This is the transformation of symbols and representations – the PSS! Cognition in the wild How a cockpit remembers its speed Later work by Hutchins aboard a commerical airliner How a cockpit remembers its speeds Since the PSS is a sociotechnical system… ”The classical cognitive science approach can be applied with little modification to a unit of analysis that is larger than a person” --Hutchins (1995) Hutchins focuses on representations Transformations of representations across media Cockpit as sociotechnical unit Two pilots (PF & PNF) Instruments and levers Manuals, protocols and instructions for computations Memory card (speed card) Visual memory support (speed bugs) Some technical background Wings of airplanes have different configuration depending on speed Aerodynamics The configuration is handled by ”flaps” and ”slats” Some technical background Low speed (landing/take-off) requires one configuration to maintain lift High-speed configurated wings cannot maintain lift during low speeds Too low speed (given weight/configuration) can cause stall (sudden drop in altitude and control) Crucial to remember certain speeds Minimal maneuvering speed Plane weight and wing configuration Landing speed Tradeoff between different speeds High speeds are safe because of good control and stability in air but dangerous on ground Low speed is good for length of landing, but require enough speed to lift again for safety. The interplay between speed, configuration and weight is cruical! The key to this is in the speed card Landing procedure PNF prepare landing data Compute projected landing weight Select the appropriate speed card Place in visible, appropriate place in cockpit Apply speed bugs on correct locations on the speed indicator to match with card Representations in cockpit Representations in cockpit Striped indicator – Max speed Black indicator – current speed Salmon bug – speed to be communicated Representations in cockpit Speed bugs – minimum speed with different angle/configuration of slats/flaps Safety to ensure ”lift” Landing procedure 7000 ft lower velocity change wing configuration Cross-check on both pilots indicators and verbally reports At 1000 ft change again for max flap At 500 ft coordinate landing sequence PNF verbally announces velocity and deviations Cognitive representations in cockpit Speed card Verbal representation of speed from PNF Long-term memory – durable Weight and speed Flap settings Spatially located in between both pilots, once opened, keep open – distribution across social space The visual working-memory/attention of PF is high Auditory resources instead Speed bugs Malleable memory – working memory Prospective memory (when at speed X adjust config) Cognitive representations in cockpit Large handles are visually perceptible in cockpit Easy to get visual feedback Analogue, large inputs Motor memory and representation Fuel indicator Sensory information Cockpit as distributed cognitive system Safe and reliable Redundancy in information display Workload is distributed among components Crosschecking and different sensory modalities Two pilots with different assignments Arefacts as information resources and memory Transformation of cognitive work From computation to perception From memory to perception Cockpit as a distributed cognitive system ”Speed bugs do not help pilots remember speeds; rather, they are part of the process by which the cockpit remembers speeds.” --Hutchins (1995) Cognitive systems We are not always aware of how representations and resources are exploited From cognition to perception ”Cognition flows wherever costs are lower” (Kirsh) Hard to predict how artefacts and tools are going to be used Sometimes dangerous to make big changes in volatile settings Cognitive systems Hutchins showed how cognitive systems can be analyzed using traditional notions of cognitive processing (The PSS as sociotechnical systems) The correct application But with a systems view… …who bears responsibility? … ”the human factor” Some consequences Studying hard puzzles in laboratory settings Artificial, controlled challenges where solutions are unimportant to the individual We should focus on open-ended problems in natural settings ”Intelligent use of Space” – ”Epistemic Actions” They tell us about real cognitive activities and processes Cognition in the lab vs. the wild Lab Uncommon Isolated Problem defined by experimenter Novel situations Performed once ”in captivity” Real world Common Ecological context Problem defined by the self Familiar situations Performed often ”in the wild” Cognition Complementary approaches to understand cognitive processes: From brain to sociotechnical systems Study domain in the wild ”It is not possible to discover these regularities of the domain without understanding the details of the domain, but the regularities of the domain are not about the domain specific details, they are about the nature of human cognition in human activity.” --Hutchins (1995) Distributed cognition as framework for design 1) Observe 2) Theorize How do these components enhance performance? How can they be better? Perceptual aspects? Working-memory aspects? Propagation of representations? 3) Design Identify functional components and features of structures Sketch and implement 4) Observe/measure Investigate if the new design solution works Measure performance Cognitive systems and extended cognition Some concerns… … Where should we draw the boundary of cognition? …Persistence of cognitive systems …Coupling vs. constitution What enables a process and what is part of it? …Mental representations? Organism vs. transient coupling with artefacts Difference between perception and introception? … Who bears responsibility in case of accidents in cogn. systems?