Should Multi-National Corporations Based in the
United States be Held Liable in This Country
for Their Extra-Territorial Toxic Torts?
Professor Skillern
Spring 1986
Independent Research
Carid~ce L. Caperton
00001
Should Multi-National Corporations Based in the
United States be Held Liable in This Country
for Their Extra-Territorial Toxic Torts?
In the past two decades, devastating environmental
disasters have emerged from the pages of science fiction
and into reality.
Spurred on by innovations in tech-
nology and science, such calamities are becoming more
and more commonplace and their locales span the globe,
from Love Canal, New York, to Bhopal, India.
As with
the Bhopal incident, these environmental nightmares
often involve multi-national corporations, thus complieating matters even more.
The atrocity which occurred
in Bhopal, India, will be scrutinized closely in arriving at the conclusion that, indeed, multi-national corporations based in the United States should be held
liable in this country for their extra-territorial toxic
torts.
Around midnight on December 2, 1984, a toxic
methyl isocynate gas escaped from Union Carbide's
pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Praden, India, killing
two thousand persons and injuring two hundred thousand
more.
1
The massive litigation which has ensued since
the Bhopal incident epitomizes why multi-national corporations based in the United States should be liable
in this country for their extra-territorial toxic torts.
1
2
torts.
However, it is important to note that the type
of toxic tort seen in the Bhopal incident was quite
unique and distinguishable from the types of toxic
torts which are usually observed in the chemical industry.
The Bhopal disaster was different in that it occurred
at a specific time, on a specific date, with immediate
and identifiable repercussions.
More often than not,
environmental harms manifested in the form of toxic waste
pollution are discrete, liability-concealing incidents
whose effects may not be known for years.
2
For this
reason, the legal theories employed in redressing these
harms must be chosen with care; more often than not,
however, traditional tort law will be used.
argued,
3
It has been
though, that traditional tort law may be diffi-
cult to apply to injuries caused by toxic tort pollution,
for reasons to be discussed shortly.
Because of this difficulty, the possibility of redressing toxic environmental harms via statutory means
comes to mind.
The quality of our environment is becoming
an increasingly important concern for most Americans,
and this concern is reflected in the multitudinous environmental statutes and regulations implemented in
recent years. 4
Thus, the possibility of remedying toxic
environmental injuries by way of American environmental
000fl3
3
statutes and regulations is yet another reason why multinational corporations based in the United States should
be held liable in this country for their extra-territorial
toxic torts.
American statutory remedies may be feasible solutions to liability because, as indicated, traditional tort
law may be difficult to apply to injuries caused by toxic
tort pollution.
Harm caused by improperly disposed or
released toxic wastes appear particularly ill-suited to
tort recovery for numerous reasons.
For one, this type
of pollution does not usually injure few, specifically
identifiable persons.
5
Additionally, traditional tort
law application necessitates statutes of limitations, or
legislative decisions that certain claims should be valid
for only a limited time.
6
Generally speaking, statutes
of limitations for tort actions begin to run at the time
•
one I s tort1ous
act occurs. 7
However, within the context of a so-called "toxic
tort," often the injury is caused by the leaking of toxic
substances from disposal sites.
It may take years for
contaminants to migrate out of disposal sites,
8
and many
of the injuries associated with toxic chemicals have long
latency periods. 9
.
1 statutes o f 1'1m1.
Thus, convent1ona
tations appear to be ill-suited for toxic tort litigation.
For this reason, some states in this country have altered
4
the date at which a toxic tort cause of action accrues
and from which the statute of limitations runs.
For in-
stance, a cause of action may accrue only when a victim
discovers both his injury and its potential relation to
a toxic contaminant exposure.
10
Different versions of
this discovery rule abound from state to state. 11
Furthermore, if a great deal of time has passed
since the date of disposal of a toxic substance and
subsequent injury, imposing liability on waste generators
and disposers for past actions may be neither fair nor
efficient, if doing so requires judges to hold defendants
to today's knowledge and standards rather than to the
technological competence prevalent at the time of disposal.
12
This is yet another reason for turning to
statutory remedies offered by the American legal system
when dealing with toxic environmental harms.
Another problem with applying traditional tort law
to toxic tort litigation is found in the requirement
that a definite, causal linkage be found between the toxic
13
. .
s ub stance an d 1nJury.
This connection is often hard
to prove when toxic harm to the environment has occurred.
Statistics are often used to show such a connection, and,
due to the flexible and interpretative nature of statistical
findings, a court or jury may be apprehensive of imposing
5
. b 1'1'1ty wh en on 1 y s t a t.1s t.1ca 1 ev1dence
.
. offered. 14
1 1a
1s
Something more concrete is desirable.
The difficulty in
proving causal connections is yet another reason why
statutory relief found in American regulations, rather
than traditional tort law, might be employed in redressing
toxic environmental injuries.
Furthermore, waste generators, haulers, and disposers
may be insolvent by the time the tort action is brought,
or a large number of aggregated claims may exceed the
assets of the defendent, forcing it into bankruptcy and
.
. f f s. 15
.
f u 11 recovery f or t h e p 1 a1nt1
prec 1 u d 1ng
. .
11 y,
Add 1t1ona
identifying potential defendants may be a difficult
obstacle to overcome.
For example, waste generators may
be hard to locate if they contracted with a waste disposer
instead of disposing of the wastes on their own; 16 waste
generators are often abundant in number, 17 and lackadasical
recordkeeping of disposers may lead plaintiffs on fruitless searches. 18
Again, these are all problems encountered
in applying traditional tort law to environmental toxic
torts; hopefully, statutory relief, such as that found in
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) ,
19
will alleviate these
difficulties and provide yet another reason for making
multi-national corporations liable in this country for their
6
extra-territorial toxic torts.
Clearly, given the two major characteristics of toxic
waste injuries which differentiate them from ordinary
torts, that is, the time lag between the tortious act
and injury and the difficulty in proving causation, it
appears that perhaps United States environmental regulations rather than traditional tort law should be
res o:tted to ..
Our national environmental laws are wide and very
encompassing.
We have laws dealing with clean air,
toxic substances, pesticides, and hazardous wastes. 20
The Environmental Protection Agency sets uniform standards,
and financial responsibility arrangements and compulsory
insurance funds exist to remedy certain environmental
disasters.
21
Those who violate environmental laws may
face criminal charges.
22
The attorney general, or the
EPA, or a private citizen may be able to sue to obtain
compliance; governments and private parties may be able
to sue for reimbursement of cleanup costs, response
costs, or harms to natural resources.
23
However, these
federal regulations fail to provide a means whereby the
.
.
~nJure
d
.
part~es
. d amages. 24
can o b ta~n
Although it might be argued that private rights of
action for damages might possibly be implied in environmental legislation, this notion was done away with in
OOOf-7
7
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clarnmers
Ass'n.
25
Thus, it appears that remedies for damages caused
by environmental disasters, such as toxic torts, will
have to be found in the common law, despite the facts
that the common law is wrought with troubles in this
context.
Of course, if "American" law is imposed upon
multi-national corporations, in fact it would be the
law of some state which would actually be applied.
is true in light of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee.
This
26
Thus, in considering whether a multi-national corporation
should be liable in the United States for its extraterritorial toxic torts, the common law of the state in
which litigation would likely take place should be
scrutinized.
The selection of a favorable forum is of paramount
importance when determining where litigation concerning
a multi-national corporation's toxic torts should take
place.
Quite often, a plaintiff's forum choice will be
granted; however, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert
29
set forth
numerous private and public factors to be weighed by a
court in determining whether to overcome the presumption
against disturbing a plaintiff's forum choice.
28
This
case established the doctrine of forum non conveniens
which means, essentially, that a district court may dismiss
8
a case more appropriately held elsewhere. 29
This doctrine
is applicable where an alternative forum is a court in a
.
30
f ore1gn country.
The next significant Supreme Court case which focused
on choice of forums was Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. 31
Here, the Supreme Court narrowed application of the
Gilbert analysis to litigation involving injured foreign
nationals and American defendants.
Reyno indicated that
a district court must first determine whether an adequate
alternative forum exists.
Inadequacy could be shown by
the inability of the alternative forum to exercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendant or if its remedy
was so unsatisfactory that it was no remedy at a11.
32
Remedies may be insufficient when the foreign forum lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, or when there is some
.
.
.
t.1a 1'1 t y. 33
quest1on
o f 1ts
1rnpar
Reyno also indicated that a court may properly
consider the financial barriers to pursuit of the
plaintiff's claim in their horne forums.
34
Other factors
for the court to scrutinize include: the relative ease of
access to sources of proof; the possibility of viewing the
premises where the accident occurred; the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing witnesses; and the availability of
.
35
compulsory process for unw1'11'1ng w1tnesses.
After balancing all these ennurnerated private
interests, and if they are not dispositive, the court
9
may balance the public interest factors in considering
.
.
a f arum non conven1ens mot1on.
36
Public interest
factors will weigh against dismissal if a sufficient
nexus with the chosen forum to justify the use of its
judicial time and resources can be found. 37
In this
context the court will examine: the connection between
the forum and the parties or the site of the accident or
challenged conduct;
38
interest in dispute;
law.
39
the local or general regulatory
and the need to apply foreign
40
The final public interest factor to be weighed by
the district court, the need to apply foreign law, is
extremely significant.
In a diversity action, the type
of action which would probably be involved when dealing
with extra-territorial torts of multi-national corporations,
a federal court must apply the choice-of-law rules of
the state in which the court sits.
41
Different states
adhere to different choice-of-law doctrines.
For instance,
some follow the traditional lex loci delecti approach,
which will apply the law of the place of the wrong in
tort cases. 42
Several states apply the substantive law
of the state with the most significant relationship to
or relevant contacts with the occurrence of the tort and
.
43
th e part1es.
Finally, states which have adopted the
governmental interest analysis approach will apply the
t(lfllO
10
substantive law of the state with the greatest interest
in resolving the rights and liabilities of the parties. 44
Thus, the analysis set out in Gilbert and Reyno, in
connection with choice-of-law questions, will be critical
in determining whether a suit filed in the United States
against a multi-national corporation for its extraterritorial torts will remain intact or be dismissed to
an alternative, foreign forum.
This determination is
committed to the trial judge's discretion, 45 and appellate
.
rev~ew
.
~s
. d • 46
accor d'~ng 1 y 1'~m~te
Even if the doctrine of forum non conveniens and
choice-of-law rules indicate that litigation should take
place in a forum other than the United States, other
considerations exist which may make the American legal
system more attractive than a foreign one.
For instance,
when a federal court in the United States dismisses a
case on the basis of forum non conveniens, it ordinarily
conditions that dismissal on the defendant's undertaking
to submit to the
.
.
.
jur~sd~ct~on
of t he f
.
ore~gn
tr~'b una 1
.
47
However, the transnational tort plaintiff who has lost
his access to the United States forum usually either
gives up altogether or manages to settle the case for
a very small fraction of its value.
48
Reasons why a plaintiff might decide not to pursue
his complaint if the lawsuit is relegated to an alternative,
11
foreign forum are exemplified in an examination of the
Bhopal disaster.
For instance, the Indian legal system
is plagued with many troubles.
Access to Indian courts
requires the prepayment of substantial filing fees. 49
Additionally, other drawbacks to the Indian legal system
include the absence of contingency attorney's fees,
exorbitant ad valorem court fees, a congested court
system, the lack of investigative and fact-developing
solicitors, and low standards of accountability applicable to the government and private employers.
50
Undoubtedly these imperfections were taken into
consideration by the Government of India before it decided
to file a class action on behalf of the Bhopal victims in
federal court in the Southern District of New York.
51
Of course, it goes without saying that these considerations
will also be examined by the American court system in
determining whether to grant Union Carbide's forum non
conveniens motion.
Due to inherent differences in the legal systems of
different countries, forum shopping will undoubtedly take
place when multi-national corporations are faced with
law suits concerning their extra-territorial toxic torts.
Such a practice is inevitable when multi-national parties
are involved, as plaintiffs will be inclined to file suit
in the location most advantageous to them.
This tendency
12
to forum shop was arguably seen in the Bhopal incident,
where, as mentioned the Government of India filed suit
in the Southern District of New York against union
Carbide in the form of a class action on behalf of the
. .
d
~n]ure
I n d.~an
.
1 s.
nat~ona
52
Most likely, the Indian
Government only took these steps after meticulously
scrutinizing the situation at hand and determined that
the United States could offer the most beneficial forum.
Such international forum shopping is not as much of
a concern as that which occurs between states.
Public
policy mandates uniformity and consistency within the
American legal system; blatant forum shopping between
various states definitely disrupts this equilibrium.
In
deciding whether multi-national corporations based here
in the United States should be liable in this country
for their extra-territorial toxic torts, the question is
not merely whether America or another country offers a
more feasible forum.
Often, the dilemma centers on which
American state would provide the most agreeable forum
for the plaintiff.
To illustrate, American states with contacts relevant
to the Bhopal litigation are New York (state of incorporation of Union Carbide), Connecticut (locus of general
corporate decision-making) , and West Virginia (site where
decisions relating to the design and operation of the
13
Bhopal plant were allegedly formulated) . 53
Thus, the
stage is set for forum shopping not only between this
country and India, but also between New
and West Virginia as well.
Yor~
Connecticut,
This inherent forum shopping
which occurs between states is perhaps one reason why
multi-national corporations based in the United States
should not be liable in this country for their extraterritorial toxic torts.
On the other hand, however, holding multi-national
corporations liable in this country for their extraterritorial toxic torts might be advantageous because of
the three principal theories of liability which have
been applied in this country against such multi-national
corporations.
These theories are:
a) the traditional
"piercing the corporate veil"; b) a concept of worldwide
financial responsibility for multi-nationals, regardless
of corporate forms; and c) a multi-national's "duty to
manage
responsibly,~·
derived perhaps from evolving
.
.
1 co d es. 54
mu 1 tlnatlona
The "piercing the veil" concept may be invoked when
the owner of the offending corporation previously ignored
or abused the corporate form and thus should be treated
as if the limited liability shield had never been erected.
55
The imposition of a worldwide financial responsibility
upon multi-nationals is another approach to direct
00014
14
liability.
This theory is based upon the notion that
the policies which underlie limited liability for corporations should not be seen in the case of multi-national
companies, especially those investing in emerging nations
lacking well-developed regulatory infrastructures. 56
The
rationale for this theory is founded in equity; it hardly
seems fair for multi-national corporations to reap the
benefits of overseas operations, such as cheap labor and
favorable exchange rates, and yet escape liability for
the torts they commit abroad.
To illustrate, this
equitable concept was recently approved in Container Corp.
of America v. Franchise Tax Board,
57
where California
applied a "unitary" treatment to the income of a multi-
.
1 • 58
nat1ona
Also, in Argentina,in the early 1970's
Campania Swift went into bankruptcy and was unable to
meet the financial obligations to Argentinian creditors.
However, Swift's Bahamian parent, Deltec, was held
59
.
.
responsible for those ob 1 1gat1ons.
Of course, any adoption of worldwide financial
responsibility would have serious ramifications in the
area of international investments.
If a developing
nation adopted worldwide financial responsibility as a
legal concept, a strong incentive for investment to be
geared to other countries might develop.
00015
60
15
Imposing worldwide financial responsibility upon
multi-nationals might prove even more beneficial if done
in conjunction with the imposition of a theory of multinational management responsibility.
Multi-national man-
agement responsibility is, quite simply, a legal duty
upon multi-nationals to manage their subsidiaries,
particularly those in emerging countries, in accordance
with some standard of responsible international investment
and management.
61
Responsibility for training and super-
vising local management and providing regularly updated
technology would be of utmost importance. 62
Finally, a theory of strict liability, as set forth
in the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher,
adhered to.
63
might be
That is, where a defendant exercises a
measure of control over a hazard, and the hazard escapes,
with resultant damage to the plaintiff, there is liability
without a need to show fault.
64
Arguably, this doctrine
could be applied to a parent company based in the United
States, as well as a foreign subsidiary; of course,
application of strict liability would depend on whether
litigation was taking place in federal or state courts,
and, if the controversy was being resolved in state
courts, what the laws of that particular state were.
Another means of forcing a United States parent
company to be responsible for its subsidiaries' toxic
Ctlflt6
16
torts could be a lawsuit by the subsidiary against the
parent company, based on breaches of express and implied
warranties in the technology licensing agreement between
65
paren t an d s ub s1'd'1ary.
s uc h
an agreement, if not
explicit, could be implied from ordinary commercial usage, 66
and would logically extend to personal injuries suffered
by third parties.
In summary, it is true that in considering whether
multi-national corporations based in the United States
should be liable in this country for their extra-territorial
toxic torts, it is important to keep in mind the burdensome difficulties which will be encountered when applying
traditional tort law to toxic tort litigation.
However,
given the fact that federal environmental statutes afford
no relief concerning damages to injured private parties,
traditional tort law will have to be applied, and its
inherent problems will simply have to be dealt and
contended with.
Problematic application of traditional
tort law is not an excuse for a United States based, multinational corporate defendant to escape liability.
Next, in any situation involving injured foreign
plaintiffs and a domestic defendant, the Gilbert and Reyno
cases mandate a thorough weighing of relevant private and
public interests along with a complete investigation of
choice-of-law rules.
Although this process is oriented
17
towards the selection of the most appropriate and objective forum for all concerned, some forum shopping is more
than likely to occur; however, this is yet another inherent problem which must be contended with.
The
possibility of forum shopping from state to state is one
basis for advocating foreign liability for multi-national
corporations based here who have committed extra-territorial
toxic torts; however, it can also be argued that the
possibility of forum shopping should not preclude the
bringing of toxic tort litigation within this country,
if a balancing of all Gilbert and Reyno factors indicate
that a United States court will indeed be the most proper
forum.
Another reason for making multi-national corporations
liable in this country is the shortcomings and obstacles
encountered in foreign legal systems.
As noted, the Indian
legal system is besieged with problems, making American
courts appear to be more favorable forums.
67
Of course,
assuming that all foreign legal systems are inferior to
ours would be an extremely presumptious postulation; however, the advantages of the American legal system will
undoubtedly be considered when deciding on the locus of
litigation concerning the liability of American based,
multi-national corporations who have co~~itted extraterritorial toxic torts.
00018
18
As indicated, our legal system may hold multinational corporations accountable on several theories of
liability; piercing the corporate veil; worldwide financial
responsibility; duty to manage responsibility, and strict
liability.
Although these theories may make American
courts more enticing, it should be noted that these
enumerated possibilities of parent company liability
might be construed as running contrary to the freeenterprise concept of incorporating to limit risk and
increase profits.
However, environmental disasters
involving toxic torts are extremely unique and extremely
devastating.
A trend has developed in the American
conscience in the last several years; environmental
protection seems to be moving to the forefront of American
sentiments,
68
and perhaps it should be up to everyone,
particularly American industry and its foreign tributaries
to maintain, if not enhance, the worldwide environmental
status quo.
In conclusion, it is evident that many factors point
to the finding that multi-national corporations based in
the United States should be held liable in this country
for their extra-territorial torts.
American based corpora-
tions should not be allowed to benefit from their foreign
subsidiaries without being answerable for the toxic torts
committed by these corporate branches, and, perhaps more
00019
19
often than not, restitution for these wrongdoings should
be achieved by using American, rather than foreign, legal
systems.
...
00020
20
Endnotes
(1).
Diamond, The Bhopal Disaster: How it Happened, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
(2).
Duce, In Searth of Adequate Compensation for Toxic
Waste Injuries: Who and How to Sue, 12 Pepperdine
L. Rev. 609 (1985).
( 3) .
Id at 610.
(4).
Dhavan, For Whom? And for What? Reflections on the
Legal Aftermath of Bhopal, 20 Tex.
(1985).
Int'l L.J. 309
See also The Clean Air Act, 42
u.s.c.
§
7401-7642 (1982); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982); Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7
u.s.c.
§§
136-136y (1982); and Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), 42
u.s.c.
§§ 6922-6987 (1982),
as amended by 1984 Amendments.
(5).
Strand, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort
Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic
Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 Stan. L. Rev.
578 (1985).
(6).
Id. at 580.
(7).
Id.
(8).
Id.
(9).
Environmental Causes of Cancer: Hearings Before the
Subcornrn. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 180 (1976).
21
(10).
Superfund 301 (E) Study Group, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Wastes Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies: Report
To Congress in Compliance with § 301 (E) of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-510) pt. 2, 19-53
(Cornrn. Print 1982).
(11).
Id.
(12).
Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Products
Liability, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 919 (1981).
(13).
Strand, at 583.
(14).
Id at 584. See also Castrilli, Problems of Proof and
Credibility Issues in Relation to Expert Evidence in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 Queen's L.J. 76 (1984),
which states that hazardous substance issues can
often be characterized as situations in which there
is some evidence of a risk pf damage, but the likelihood of the risk culminating in damage cannot be
demonstrated with objective certainty.
It is largely
or entirely speculative.
(15).
Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A.J. 139, 141 (1981).
(16).
Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts:
A Phantom Remedy, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 859 (1981).
(17).
Strand at 587.
(18).
Id.
22
{19).
Comprehensive Environmental Response, compensation,
and Liability Act, 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
{20).
Note, supra note 4.
{21).
Dhavan at 310. See also TSCA, 15 u.s.c.
§§
2601-2629;
FIFRA, 7 U.S.C §§ 136-136y; Comprehensive Environmental Response, C0mpensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C.
§§
9601-9657 {1982); and the Price-Anderson
Act, 42 U.S. C. § 7 413 (c) .
( 22) .
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (d); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C
§
7401-7642 (1982).
( 2 3) •
Dhavan at 310.
( 2 4) •
I d.
( 25) •
453 u.s. 1 (1981).
{26) .
451 u.s. 304 (1981).
( 2 7) •
330 u.s. 501 (1947).
( 2 8) •
I d.
( 29) .
I d.
( 30) •
Wright, Law of Federal Courts, 44, at 260 (4th ed.
19 83) •
{31).
454 u.s. 235 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 928
(1982).
(32).
Id at 254.
(33).
Id.
( 34) .
Id at 256.
(35).
Gilbert, 330 u.s. at 508.
23
( 36) •
Pain v. United Technologies, 637 F. 2d 775, 785
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert denied, 454
u.s.
1128 (1981).
( 3 7) •
Pain, 637 F. 2d at 791.
( 3 8) •
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
( 39) •
Reyno, 454
( 40) .
I d.
( 41) .
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mgf., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
( 42) .
See generally Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of
u.s.
at 260.
Law in the Courts, 34 Mercer L. Rev. 521 (1983),
giving a description of choice-of-law doctrine
followed in fifty states.
( 43) .
Kay at 556.
( 44) •
Id.
( 45) .
Reyno at 235. See also Gilvert at 501.
( 46) .
I d.
( 4 7) •
Robertson, Introduction to the Bhopal Symposium, 20
Tex Int'l L.J. 279 (1985).
( 4 8) •
Id.
( 49) .
Id.
(50) .
See generally, Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why so Little
has Happened in India after the Bhopal Tragedy, 20 Tex.
Int' 1 L. J. 2 7 3 ( 19 85) .
(51) .
Lewis, Carbide is Sued by India in Gas Disaster, N.Y.
Times, April 9, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
(52) .
I d.
24
(53).
Costagliola, Jurisdiction and Conflicts of Law - the
Bhopal Litigation, 26 Harv. L.J. 644 (1985).
(54).
Westbrook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and
the Prospects for an International Settlement, 20
Tex. Int'l L.J. 322 (1985).
(55) .
Id.
{56) .
Id. at 324.
{57) •
10 3 S • Ct . 2 9 3 3 {19 8 3 ) .
(58) •
Id. at 2940.
{59) .
Westbrook at 325.
{60) •
Id.
( 61) .
Id. at 326.
{ 6 2) •
Id.
{ 6 3) •
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
{ 6 4) •
Id.
{65) •
Westbrook at 328.
{ 66) •
Id.
( 6 7) •
Note, supra note 50.
{ 6 8) •
Tucker, Environmentalism: the Newest Toryism, 6
Pol'y Rev. 141 (1980).