SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INVESTING:
THE SOUTH AFRICA DILEMMA
Fred Garcia
Professor Cummins
May 2, 1986
Independent Research
()fl?~1
1
Introduction
The duties of a trustee have traditionally been
dictated by purely economic considerations.
The trustee,
whether he is the decisionrnaker for a private trust, public
or private pension fund, or a University endowment fund,
will always be required to follow some variation of the
"prudent man" rule.
Recently, there has been a growing
concern about the social consequences of investment decisions by trustees of trust funds.
One of the most contro-
versial issues today concerning social investing is the
investment in companies which do business in South Africa.
Invest.~ents
which support South Africa's "apartheid" policy
have been protested by universities, states, and investors
as repugnant to social and moral considerations.
The
central question to be discussed in this paper is whether
-·---
trustees in making investment decisions based solely on
-------
moral and political beliefs violate any fiduciary responsi-
____ The
bilities to their beneficiaries .
.................
first part of this
-·------
paper will discuss the political, social, and economic
environment in South Africa.
The second part will outline
America's economic presence in South Africa
of disinvestment from that country.
an~~~effect
,_ '-- ...
Finally, part three of
this paper will analyze the legal issues of social investing
in South Africa.
')
2
1.
Political, Social, and Economic Environment of
South Africa
A.
Political Setting
Apartheid, which literally translated means "separate-
ness," is a system that enables a small white minority to
maintain political, social, and economic control of the
black majority in South Africa and, consequently, to
maintain its own·wealth, power, and prestige. 1
The South
African government is sometimes characterized as oligarchic
or authoritarian, but according to Freedom House (a New
York-based hu:r.an rights organization), it is "a parliamentary democracy in which over 80 percent of the people have
been excluded from participation in the national political
process because of race."
2
From the ascendancy of the pro-
apartheid National Party in 1948 until 1983, only whites
could vote and only whites could run for parliament.
B.
3
The People of South Africa
The Republic of South Africa is about two and a half
times the size of Texas, and its 25 million people come from
many racial and ethnic groups.
million.
4
Blacks number about 17
There are 4.5 million whites
{l,.)~.c
~b
are descendants
of original Dutch and French Huguenot settlers.
"Coloreds"
number 2.6 million and are persons of mixed-race ancestry.
The 806,000 Asians are almost all descendants of Indian
3
workers who were brought into South Africa in the late
nineteenth century to work on sugar plantations.s
C.
Economic Climate
The inflow of foreign capital into South Africa has
been important in every stage of the country's economic
growth.
This is especially true with the opening of new and
vital sectors of the economy, which could never have been
launched without the capital and expertise of overseas
investors.
6
Foreign trade and investment constitute a major
~ l·111"1
portion ( (Y}tl"
of South Africa's economy, importing and exporting
account~
for more than half of its gross domestic product.
As of
1979, foreign investment in the economy was $26.3 billion,
or 20 percent of the value of its industrial capacity.
7
Of
this amount, 80 percent was held by five countries--Britain,
West Germany, France, Switzerland, and the United States.
2.
A.
8
American Presence
Direct Investment
United States' fixed investments in South Africa were
$2.6 billion in 1982. 9
Approximately 6,000 U.S. companies
do business in South Africa.
The U.S. Federal Reserve has
reported that as of December 31, 1982, U.S. financial
institutions had outstanding loans to South African
,..•~J t•)
f""l'')
,4!
4
borrowers totaling over $3.6 billion. 10
U.S. investors were
estimated in 1982 to hold $8 billion worth of shares in
South African mines, making the total
u.s.
financial
involvement in South Africa over $14 billion. 11
Because the South African government is involved in all
elements of society, any capital infusions that bolster the
South African economy necessarily serve to strengthen the
forces that maintain apartheid.
12
Thus, through investment
and business ties with South Africa, U.S. corporations
support apartheid.
Many corporations play a direct role in
support of the apartheid system by providing goods, knowhow, or high-level technology in strategic sectors of the
economy. 13
American firms are concentrated in oil, motor vehicle,
and computer technology.
In the late 1970s, U.S. firms
represented 43 percent of the petroleum market, 23 percent
of the auto sales, and 70 percent of the computer business
in South Africa.
B.
14
The Clark Report and The Sullivan Principles
The Clark Report, a Congressional study of U.S.
+~r
corporate interest$in South Africa,
states~as
of 1978
u.s.
corporations have made no impact in eliminating apartheid.
The report concluded that:
00?~7
5
Collec~ively, U.S. corporations operating in
S~uth Afr~ca.have made no significant impact on
e~ther relax~ng apartheid or in establishing
company policies which would offer a limited but
nevertheless important model of multinational
responsibility. Rather, the net effect of
American investment has been to strengthen the
economic and military self-sufficiency of South
African apartheid regime, undermining the fundamental goals and objectives of u.s. foreign
policy.IS
John H. Chettle, director of the North & South American
South African Foundation, has challenged the report's
conclusion on several points. 16
The major point being that
U.S. companies "have indeed contributed significantly toward
relaxation of apartheid in South Africa, by instituting
changes in their operations which run counter to the rigid
concepts of apartheid, and by stimulating a dynamic growth
in the South African economy which is incompatible with
aparth e~'d . 17
In the mid-1970s, Reverend Leon Sullivan, a member of
the Board of Directors for General Motors, formulated a
Statement of Principles for U.S. corporate behavior in South
Africa.
The code became known as the Sullivan Principles,
and it required its signatories to follow six general
policies.
They are:
Principle 1 - Nonsegregation of the Races in
All Eating, Comfort, Locker Rooms, and Work
Facilities;
Principle 2 - Equal and Fair Employment Practices
for All Employees;
6
Principle 3 - Equal Pay for All Employees Doing
Equal or Comparable Work for the Same Period of
Time;
Pri~c~ple 4 - Initiation and Development of
Tra1n1ng Programs that Will Prepare Blacks 1
Coloreds, and Asians in Substantial Number for
Supervisory, Administrative, Clerical and
Technical Jobs;
'
Principle 5 - Increasing the Number of Blacks,
Coloreds, and Asians in Management and Supervisory
Positions;
Principle 6 - Improving the Quality of Employee's
Lives Outside the Work Environment in Such Areas
as Housing, Transportation, Schooling, Recreation,
and Health Facilities.l8
The Principles are based on the strategy of mobilizing
the influence of U.S. multinational companies to contribute
to peaceful change in South Africa. 19
Sulllvan asserts that
"[+] his change must include the elimination of apartheid
and the equal participation of blacks and non-whites in the
social, economic, and political processes of that nation,
without compromise of the freedom and rights of any
persons."
20
The Principles have become the standard by.which social
1$
responsJLbilitX for businesses in South Africa are measured.
_
\A.t\V!-
There has... been measurable improvements in the treatment of
.
.
. 1 es. 21
blacks since the implementat1on
o f t h e Pr1nc1p
It is
Sullivan's hope that the Principles will help improve the
quality of life, bring justice to unliberated people, and
.
build a peaceful free South Af r1ca
f
or everyone.
22
7
C.
The Investment - Disinvestment Debate
Many people believe that social and political change is
necessary to achieve peace, order, and justice in South
Africa.
One author has stated that two basic ways in which
political change could come about are by evolution or by
revolution.
23
"Evolution," which is the preferred course
most Western countries, is the "constructive engagement"
with South Africa.
24
------~----~------
Advocates who support this position
would invest in and help develop South Africa socially and
economically to end apartheid.
Revolution is the complete
overthrow of the South African regime and is the course of
...
action preferred by some political and religious organizations in the West and South Africa.
25
Proponents of this
view demand radical political change, beginning with
immediate control of the government in Pretoria by the black
majority. 26
They demand the isolation of South Africa from
the rest of the world and call for economic sanctions
.
.
27
aga1.nst 1.t.
1.
Current Divestments
As of 1980, there were some 2,000 local, state,
regional, and national organizations across the United
28
States committed to some type of divestment movement.
In
1978 and 1979 alone, they were able to compel United States
. 1'1.0n 1.n
. s t oc k · 29
universities to divest $50 m1.l
These
8
organizations have also succeeded in getting nearly all
major U.S. banks to stop lending money to the south African
government.
30
In a recent count, six states, 24 cities, and 40
universities, at considerable cost to the beneficiaries,
have liquidated pension-fund holdings of over $1.5 billion
in the securities of companies that do business in South
Africa.
31
According to a recent count by Pensions &
Investments Age, 51 institutional investors have divested
$735 million from their portfolios in companies doing
business in South Africa.
2.
32
Effect of Total U.S. Disinvestment
A U.S. State Department assessment of the South African
economy's dependence on multinational corporations for high
technology concluded that lack of access to foreign technol.
ogy could cripple South Af r1ca.
33
As previously noted, U.S.
firms supply 70 percent of South Africa's computer needs and
play an important role in suppling South Africa in this
field.
However, surveys indicate that most U.S. companies
in South Africa generate with a minimum of U.S. personnel
.
• 34
and in many cases are run by South Afr1cans.
Moreover,
many European companies are not notably inferior in technological competence and present strong competition.
~
/
9
Davis, Cason, and Hovey contend that the united states
is South Africa's largest trading partner, its second
largest investor, and a supplier of one-third of its
international credit demands.
It would be economically
wounded by any significant cutoff of u.s. trade or investment flows. 35
Professor Lansing has stated that because Great Britain
and West Germany are South Africa's most important trading
partners and because of the inability of apartheid opponents
to muster coordinated international trade and investment
sanctions, any embargo or divestment of business by the
United States would have little effect on the South African
economy.
36
Sincere has shared the view of Lansing and has
stated that "it is unlikely that U.S. disinvestment would
have the profound effect its advocates have claimed, since
U.S. direct investment in South Africa represents about 20
percent of total foreign investment and only 4 percent of
the total capital invested in the South African economy."
John Chettle, in his article, has stated that the
introduction of sanctions against South Africa would have
some impact.
It is clear that total u.s. divestment would be a
political blow to South Africa; that it would
reduce somewhat the rate of growth of the South
African economy; that it would reduce South .
African access to u.s. technology and manager1al
expertise· that it would probably cause hesitation
on the ca~ital market and thus cause South Africa
37
10
~ifficulties in raising capital abroad; and that
~t would cause black unemployment, although, given
the s~ortag7 of skills, probably not much white.
Yet, ~ts ch~ef effect would be punitive rather
than decisive.38
'
tl.t1
rJl
t.f ("' p/
~f·.Jcl'-~
It appears that the effect of U.s. disinvestment on
South Africa will depend on who you ask.
"
Undoubtedly, some
change in South Africa will occur as the result of
b~ .y/.~
~jf~
u.s.
Att~ ~/ IJ
divestment, but the extent and consequence of it are
i\
i>
d~
On September 9, 1985, President Reagan issued an
Executive Order to prohibit certain transactions with South
This was issued to deal with the threat to U.S.
foreign policy and economy from the government of South
Africa.
•
)·
1~.,J" )-
Presidential Sanctions Against South Africa
Africa. 39
~
fl~
uncertain.
D.
c,f
J'
II
The President claimed that "the policy and practice
of apartheid are repugnant to the moral and political values
of democratic and free societies and run counter to United
States policies to promote democratic governments throughout
the world and respect f or h uman
. ht s ...• .. 40
r~g
The major
sanctions against South Africa include (1) the making or
approval of bank loans to the South African Government;
(2)
the export of computers and related goods and technology to
certain government agencies;
(3) all nuclear exports to
South Africa; and (4) the import into the United States of
{)f)?!\1
,..JJ
11
arms, ammunition, or military vehicles produced in south
Africa. 41
On October 1, 1985, President Reagan issued another
Executive Order which prohibited the importation into the
United States of South African Krugerrands. 42
In a letter
to Congress, the President noted that these measures are
directed at apartheid and the South African Government, and
not against the people of that country or its economy. 43
3.
Legal Issues
.
.
'' 4 4 may take on d 1. f f erent
. 1 1nvest1ng
Th e t erm '' soc1a
7
forms.
Here, we will treat "socially dictated investment
policies" as those "investment practices and policies which
either (1) permit the sacrifice of safety, return, diversification, or marketability; or (2) are undertaken to serve
some objective that cannot be related to the interests
of ... beneficiaries in their capacity as such."
A.
45
Prudent Investor Rule at Common Law
Another problem in dealing with U.S. companies disin-
vesting from south Africa is the legal duties of trustees in
managing the portfolios consisting of these divesting
companies' stock.
The traditional standard of care required
of trustees is set out in the landmark case of Harvard
12
College v. Amory
46
in 1830.
That court stated the standard
as follows:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest
is, t~at he condu~ts himself faithfully and
'
exerc~ses sound d~scretion.
He is to observe how
men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence
manage their own affairs, not in regard to
s~eculation, but in regard to permanent disposi~~on of his funds, considering the probable
~ncome, as well as the safety of the capital
invested.47
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines a trustee's
investment obligations at common law as follows:
[i]n making investments of trust funds the trustee
is under a duty to the beneficiary ..• to make such
investments and only such investments as a prudent
man would make of his own property having in view
the preservation of the estate and the amount and
regularity of the income to be derived .... 48
The United States
announce d
.
th~s
c
~ourt
of
~~
Appeals~Second
Circuit
49
. .
. Estate o f Car 1 ton v. c ornrn~ss~oner.
rule ~n
That court stated that "a trustee is obliged not only to
attempt to employ profitably the corpus but must also take
care t o preserve ~•t . 50
This rule has been interpreted by
Ravikoff and Curzan to require a fiduciary to promote two
objectives:
attainment of an adequate return and preserva-
tion of trust corpus.
51
Their interpretation has been attacked by Professor
Langbein and Judge Posner as a misapplication of the commonlaw prudent man rule.
The term "adequate" return is their
13
own invention and implies a standard less than "optimal" or
"max;mum"
and •;t ~s
· wh o 11 y w1t
· h out authority. 52
•
B.
Duty of Loyalty
Another duty of a fiduciary in managing trust funds for
beneficiaries is the duty of loyalty.
Restatement (Second)
of Trusts states "the trustee is under a duty to the
beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest
of the beneficiary." 53
The Official Conunent to the Restate-
ment warns against investing for the benefit of any third
party.
It states "the trustee is under a duty to the
beneficiary in administering the trust not to be guided by
the interest of any third person."
In Blakenship v. Boyle
55
54
, a 1971 case, the duty of
loyalty was applied to social investing of pension funds.
The court endorsed the view that trustees may not pursue
nontraditional objectives to the detriment of traditional
investment goals.
The trustees of a union pension fund who
were officials of the United Mineworkers Union deposited the
fund's assets into an interest-free account at a bank owned
by the union.
The bank used these funds to buy controlling
shares in electric utility companies.
The bank then
required the utility companies to buy union-mined coal.
The
court held that this practice violated the rule of prudent
investing.
The court stated that:
14
[~]he ~ntimate relationship between the union's
f1~a~c1a~ and organizing activities and the
ut1l1ty 1nvestment activities of the trustees
demonstrates that the Fund was acting primarily
for the collateral benefit of the union and the
regulatory.o~e:ators in making most of its utility
stock acqu1s1t1ons.
These activities present a
clear case of self dealing ... and constituted a
breach of trust.56
In Withers v. Teachers' Retirement system 57 , the
trustees of the Teachers' Retirement Fund purchased unmarketable and highly speculative bonds of the City of New York
as part of a plan that prevented the city from going
bankrupt.
The court found that the trustees' major concern
was to prevent the depletion of the assets of the System by
protecting what was, according to the information available
to them, the major and indispensable source of the System's
funding--the City of New York.
58
The court distinguished
Blankenship by stating that the trustees pursued policies to
enhance the position of the union and the welfare of its
members.
On the other hand, the trustees of the Teachers'
Fund gave consideration to the interest of the City of New
York solely in its capacity as the major and indispensable
contributor of monies to the pension system.
59
The court
concluded that "neither the protection of the jobs of the
City's teachers nor the general public welfare were factors
which motivated the trustees in their investment decisions."60
The court stated that the trustees "aid to the
City was simply a means--the only means in their
15
assessment--to the legitimate end of preventing the exhaustion of the assets of the TRS in the interest of all of the
beneficiaries."
61
Because the trust fund would be seriously
harmed if the city were to go bankrupt, the court held that
the investment was proper.
C.
Economics of Social Investing
Proponents of modern portfolio theory 62 contend that
social investing will bring about higher risk and underdiversification, lower return, and increased management and
brokerage costs.
They state that a portfolio constructed in
accordance with social principles will be less diversified
than a portfolio constructed in accordance with the optimal
strategy of portfolio design.
63
A study by Wilshire
Associates identified 229 South Africa-connected companies
with market capitalization adding up to more than a third of
the entire equity markets' value.
64
Wilshire also found
that avoiding all stocks with South Africa ties would shrink
drastically the universe of stocks from which an investor
could choose.
65
Social investing
will~fect
the return of an invest-
ment portfolio because it excludes many successful companies
and includes many less successful companies.
66
Also, the
administrative costs of a social-investment portfolio will
be higher, and the net expected return therefore lower than
()fl~
16
the administrative costs of a portfolio constructed in
accordance with the principles of modern finance theory.6 7
D.
Legality of Social Investing
One commentator has stated that it is possible for
"university trustees to divest all holdings which the
trustees consider inconsistent with the university's social
responsibility while still remaining within the traditional
fiduciary standards of care of economic benefit or
prudence. 68
Ravikoff and Curzan contend that the trustees' principal obligation under the prudent man standard will be to
obtain an adequate return and protest the trust corpus.
69
However, they assert that there is ample reason to believe
that courts will ultimately give trustees considerable
freedom to foster nontraditional goals at the expense of
return and corpus safety.
70
Professor Langbein and Judge Posner conclude that "the
duty of loyalty, the prudent-man rule, and cognate doctrines, which govern both pension funds and trust investment
71
.
.
.
.
generally, forbid soc1al
1nvest1ng
1n
1' t s curren t f orm. "
They contend that sacrificing the beneficiary's financial
well-being for any social cause violates fiduciary duties.
17
In the light of the foregoing, it appears that there is
disagreement among trust experts of the duties of trustees
in divesting stockholdings in companies doing business in
South Africa.
The moral and humanitarian decisions that a
trustee will make on this issue will have a far-reaching and
permanent effect on society.
law, it
.....-----.
Under the current state of the
seems that the requirement of loyalty to trust
beneficiaries and the requirement of prudent investing
dictates that a trustee may not consider the moral and
social goals of social investing in lieu
~
fudiciary duties.
~
~
~
~
/CA.-l.~:e.-
cl~
~C/~
18
Endnotes
1.
Davis, Cason & Hovey, Economic Disengagement and South
Africa:
The Effectiveness and Feasibility of
Implementing Sanction? ang__Q_;iyes..tmen.tJ 15 Law
&
Pol'y
in Int'l Bus. 529, 532 (1983).
This separation of the races takes two forms.
apartheid in simple segregation, similar to that
existed in much of the United States prior to the
rights movement of the 1960s.
Separate develop-
t
ment, sometimes called "grand apartheid
is a '!!Mieh--
more complex and controversial concept.
Under it, the
Pretoria government intends to separate black South
Africans from the Republic of South Africa and grant
them citizenship in independent states drawn along
traditionally recognized tribal or national boundaries.
R. Sincere, The Politics of Sentiment 4-5 (1984).
2.
R. Sincere, The Politics of Sentiment 4 (1984).
3.
Id.
See also Chettle, The Law and Policy of
Div~stment
of South African Stock, 15 Law & -~?1_~_¥ -~~ -=:~t__' l ~U$:.
445, 448-461
(1983)
(for a further background on the
South African Government and its laws).
4.
Id. at 3.
5.
Id.
6.
B. Roger~ White Wealth and Black Poverty 93 (1976).
7.
R. Sincere supra note 2, at 6.
19
8.
Id.
9.
Chettle, The Law and Policy of Divestment of south
African Stock, 15 Law & Pol'y in Int~~~ 445, 461
(1983).
10.
Davis, Cason & Hovey supra note 1, at 546.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Staff of the_ ~e-~ate Co~·- -~n _Foreign Rel~tic:>ns, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess.,
u.s.
Corporate
-
Inte~~~
South
- ---------· - - - -
-
Africa 9 (Comm. Print 1978); See B. Rogers supra note
6, at 125-47 (an analysis of
u.s.
corporate involvement
in the major industries of auto, heavy engineering,
electronics and computers, petroleum, mining, chemicals, rubbers, pharmaceuticals, photography and
banking).
15.
Id. at 13.
16.
Chettle supra note 9, at 464.
17.
Id.
18.
R. Sincere supra note 2, at 109 (appendix B).
19.
Sullivan, Agents for Change:
The Mobilization of
Mul tinationa:LS9Jnp_a_p;i.~.s_.J:.I].._J~Q_\lth_hfric_C!., 15 Law & ~~1 '¥:
in Int'l Bus. 427 (1983).
2 0.
Id.
21.
Id. at 432-33.
20
22.
Id. at 444.
23.
R. Sincere supra note 2, at 11.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.
Those who favor revolutionary change are likely to
favor disinvestment as a tactic.
utJ~
~&ci~"~
~~
uf1.p)-'
disinvestment believe that (1) South Africa is the
worst violation of human rights in today's world;
u tv.fi ,, •
,~·
l
J0../I.VO
( 2)
the volume of U.S. investment in South Africa is
considerable;
heid regime;
(3) U.S. investment supports the apart(4) external pressure can induce political
change; and therefore ( 5) withdrawing
~·~~will
~J~
Most supporters of
u.s.
investment
bring about positive change in South Africa.
Conversely, most opponents of disinvestment
believe :
(1) South Africa, with a limited, democratic
,/ 'rJ--
government capable of peaceful change, has a potential
79ff~:~
for great justice;
ttJIJ tl
+~~·
(2) the volume of U.S. investment
there is relatively insignificant;
(3) U.S. investment
does, however, support constructive change;
(4)
external pressure seldom brings about desired domestic
policy changes; and therefore (5) withdrawing U.S.
investment will have no positive effect but will be
likely to affect the South African economy adversely
21
and set back prospects for constructive change.
R.
-
Sincere supra note 2, at 12.
28.
Lansing, The Divestment of United states comp~nie~~~
60 Neb. L. Rev. 304, 321
(1981).
2 9.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Bleiberg, Anti-Apartheid or Anti-Ca.pi,talist?, Barron's,
July 1, 1985, at 9.
32.
Tell, The Apartheid
Facto~,
Barron's, Aug. 19, 1985, at
18.
33.
Davis, Cason & Hovey supra note 1, at 556.
34.
Chettle supra note 9, at 463.
35.
Davis, Cason & Hovey supra note 1, at 555.
36.
Lansing supra note 28, at 323-24.
37.
R. Sincere supra note 2, at 97.
38.
Chettle, supra note 9, at 484-85.
39.
Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985)
4 0.
Id.
41.
Id. at 36,861-62.
42.
Exec. Order No. 12,535, 50 Fed. Reg. 40,325 (1985).
~!.~
J1
7
•,'~
I
ll
~
4 3.
H. Doc. No. 114, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
4 4.
A policy of social investing may be designed to benefit
ru-. ~
(1985).
({,/,
C#/J:j_
(Jvo; rl.J. ..
the participants incidentally by improving the community in which they live, or it may be designed to
22
ameliorate some regional, national, or even international problem.
A social investment program may
involve a selfless sacrifice of the participants'
interests in order to aid some other less fortunate
segment of society, or it may be part of a calculated
strategy to enhance the political and economic strength
of the participants.
Hutchinson & Cole, Legal
Social and Political Goals, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1340,
1344 (1980).
45.
Id. at 1346.
46 .
2 6 Mass .
47.
Chettle supra note 9, at 504 (citing Harvard College v.
( 9 Pick . ) 4 4 6 ( 18 3 0 ) .
Amory, 26 Mass.
48.
(9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830)).
1 Restatement
(Se.concll_p~r~ §227 (1959)
- ---------. ---
[herein-
'
after cited as Restatement].
49.
298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962).
50.
Id. at 418.
51.
Ravikoff & Curzan, Social Responsibili!Y_in~ves~~~n~
Policy and_~~~--~r;-~~e!]!-~~~!l.Y.'!:.l~, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 518
(1980).
52.
Langbein
&
Posner, ~o~~~! ___I?_V~:?ti?~---~~d__ T~~- La~-~
Trusts, 79 Mich. L. Rev~ 72, 103 (1980) ·
53.
Restatem.en~ supra note 48, at §170(1).
54.
Id. at Comment q.
23
55.
329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971).
56.
Id. at 1106.
57.
447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'9@ mem. 595 F.2d
1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
58.
Id. at 1252.
59.
Id. at 1256.
6 0.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
See Langbein & Posner supra note 52, at 77-96 (for a
brief background on modern portfolio theory and the
economics of social investing).
63.
Id. at 85.
64.
Tell supra note 32, at 20.
65.
Id.
66.
Langbein & Posner supra note 52, at 92.
67.
Id. at 85.
68.
Note, 'Qn_iv~:r;_si~J!1V~~t.ments _:with a South __Africa.n.
Connection:
Possible?, 11
~ §. -~!='-~4-~_!lt.... Divestiture
-.
N.Y.U.J. Int'l L.
69.
Ravikoff
70.
Id.
71.
Langbein
&
-
Pol.
- . -- ....... 543, 579 (1979).
-
&
Cur zan supra note 51, at 546.
&
Posner suEr a note 52, at 76.