PLEASE NOTE this is a sample reading list for the 2015-16 academic year – precise seminar content
may change from year to year.
Weekly Seminar Schedule:
Week 1. Introduction to the PPE Module: Methodology

Discussion of organisation, themes and structure of the module

The methodology of economics and politics

How do the disciplines of politics and economics approach public choice/political economy?
Ben Lockwood's lecture
Wyn Grant's lecture
Core Reading
J Moses and T Knutsen, Ways of Knowing Palgrave-Macmillan 2007, esp. Ch. 1, 2 8 (Chapter 1 is
available here)
Further Reading
K.Arrow, "Methodological individualism and social knowledge" The American Economic Review,
1994, 84, 1-9
M. Blaug, The Methodology of Economics, Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. , 1992, Chapters 1
and 15
D Coen, W Grant, G Wilson (eds) Oxford Handbook of Business and Government, introduction
ESRC Benchmarking Review of Politics and International Relations in the UK: ESRC
M.Friedman, ";The Methodology of Positive Economics";, Essays in Positive Economics, 1953
Marion Fourcade, Economists and Societies: Discipline and ProfessionPrinceton University Press,
2009. There is a summary of the book here: Times Higher
W Grant, The Development of a Discipline: the History of the Political Studies Association, WileyBlackwell (2010)
W Grant, ‘An Analytical Framework for a Political Economy of Football’, British Politics (2007) 2 (1),
69-90
G.Hodgson, ";Behind methodological individualism";, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1986, 10,
211-224
N Phillips (ed), Globalizing International Political Economy, especially Chs. 1-4, Palgrave-Macmillan
2005.
Vivien Schmidt's article on discursive and other institutionalisms: Schmidt
R Sil and P J Katzenstein, Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World
Politics, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010.
G Stoker, 'Blockages on the Road to Relevance: Why has Political Science failed to
deliver?'', European Political Science, 9 (1) (2010), S72-S84
R.Thaler and C.Sunstein, Nudge, Caravan Books, 2008, Chapters 1-5
Week 2: Voters and Elections – Wyn Grant

An assessment of Hay’s critique of public choice

The Downs model of the median voter
Lecture
Core Reading
C Hay, Why We Hate Politics, esp. pp. 95-122.
Further Reading
C Hay, M Lister and D Marsh (eds) The State: Theories and Issues, chapter by A Hindmoor on ‘Public
Choice’
A Hindmoor, Rational Choice, chapter on ‘Anthony Downs and the Spatial Theory of Party
Competition’
The British Journal of Politics an International Relations, 7 (3) (2005) A. Hindmoor, ‘Reading Downs:
New Labour and An Economic Theory of Democracy’, 402-17
Journal of Elections, Public Opinions and Parties, 18(4) (2008) D. Sanders et al., ‘The Endogeneity of
Preferences in Spatial Models: Evidence from the 2005 British Election Study’, 413-431
The 2015 election seen in Downsian terms: Who is closest to the centre ground?
Wyn Grant takes a look at Labour's 2015 election prospects in Downsian terms: Labour strategy
Week 3: Voters and Elections – Ben Lockwood

The “paradox of voting”

The Downsian model of electoral competition

The Citizen-Candidate model of electoral competition

Evidence from close elections
Lecture
Core Reading
K.Shepsle and M.Bonchek, Analysing Politics, Norton and Company, chapters 2,4,5
Further Reading
"Rational Choice and Turnout", John H. Aldrich, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 1
(Feb., 1993), pp. 246-278
"Voter turnout at the British General Election of 1992: Rational choice, social standing or political
efficacy?" C Pattie and R Johnston, European Journal of Political Research 33, 263–283, 1998
"Explaining voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research", Benny Geys, Electoral Studies 25
(2006) 637-663
Grofman, B. (2004), "Downs and two-party convergence" Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 7, 25-46.
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (1997). An economic model of representative democracy. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 85-114.
Osborne, M. J., & Slivinski, A. (1996). A model of political competition with citizen-candidates. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65-96.
"Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House", D.Lee, E.Moretti, and M.Butler,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2004
"Do Political parties Matter? Evidence from US Cities", F. Ferreira and J. Gyourko, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, February 2009
Gerber, E. R., & Hopkins, D. J. (2011). When mayors matter: estimating the impact of mayoral
partisanship on city policy. American Journal of Political Science, 55(2), 326-339.
Week 4. Public Goods – Wyn Grant

The dilemma of public choice

The Tragedy of the Commons

The approach of Elinor Ostrom

The challenge of climate change?
Wyn Grant's lecture
Core Reading
Inge Kaul et al, ‘Why Do Global Public Goods Matter Today?’, Executive Summary, Providing Global
Public Goods: Managing Globalization,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. (Available as an E book
in the library)
Maurizio Carbone, “Supporting or Resisting Global Public Goods? The Policy Dimension of a
Contested Concept”,Global Governance, 13(1) 2007.
Elinor Ostrom, Governing The Commons, Cambridge University Press, 1990, especially Chapter 1.
Scanned copy of that chapter here: Ostrom
Elinor Ostrom, 'A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action', American
Political Science Review, Volume 92, 1, March 1998, 1-22.
N Bermeo et al, 'Beyond the Tragedy of the Commons', Perspectives on Politics, Volume 8, Number
2, July 2010, 569-594
Chapter by Wyn Grant from forthcoming edited book on climate change Hull.doc
Political Studies 62(3), October 2014, A Maltais, 'Failing International Climate Politics and the
Fairness of Going First', 618-33.
Elinor Ostrom, 'A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change', World Development Report
paper Ostrom paper
Further Reading
P.B. Anand, ‘Financing the provision of Global Public Goods’, Discussion Paper 2002/110,
WIDER:http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/dps/dps2002/dp2002-110.pdf and also in The
World Economy, Volume 27, Number 2, February 2004 , pp. 215-237
Alfred Binger, ‘Global Public Goods and potential mechanisms for financing
availability’:http://www.un.org/esa/policy/devplan/al_binger.pdf
Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods 2ndedn.;
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996
Peter Drahos, 'The Regulation of Public Goods', in Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman (eds.),
International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual
Property Regime Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Christopher D. Gerrard, Marco Ferroni and Ashoka Mody (eds.), Global Public Policies and Programs:
Implications for Financing and Evaluation. Proceedings from a World Bank Workshop, Washington
DC: The World Bank.
Inge Kaul et al, Global Public Goods, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Ravi Kanbur, ‘International Public Goods’, conference paper for the CSGR 5th Annual conference on
Globalisation, Growth and (In)Equality, 18th March 2002 http://www.csgr.org
Ravi Kanbur , Kevin M. Morrison and Todd Sandler, The Future of Development Assistance: Common
Pools and International Public Goods, Overseas Development Council Essay No. 25, Johns Hopkins
Press, 1999.
Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman, ‘The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and
Privatization of Global Public Goods’, Journal of International Economic Law, 7(2) 2004: 279-320
Related Websites
Global public goods Network (gpgNet): http://www.gpgNet.net
International Taskforce on global public goods: http://www.gpgtaskforce.org/bazment.aspx
UNIDO Project on International Public Goods for Economic
Development: http://www.unido.org/en/doc/40778
63rd Congress of International Institute of Public
Finance: http://www.iipf2007.com/iipf/delegatecontent.cfm?siteid=918
Week 5. Public Goods – Ben Lockwood

Public goods and common property resources; a review

Private provision of public goods

State provision of public goods

Collective provision of public goods

Global public goods and the design of international treaties
Lecture
Core Reading
Elinor Ostrom, Governing The Commons, Cambridge University Press, 1990, especially Chapters 1,
3,6.
Further Reading
Dean Karlan & John A. List, 2007. "Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a LargeScale Natural Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol.
97(5), pages 1774-1793, December
S. Barratt, Environment and Statecraft, Oxford University Press, Chapters 3,6,15
Barratt, J and Stavins, "Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change
Agreements",International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 3, 329-376,
2003
J.Black and De Meza, D. "Creating a Good Atmosphere: Minimum Participation for Tackling the
'Greenhouse Effect"Economica, 60, 281-93
J. Zelmer, "Linear Public Goods Experiments: A Meta-Analysis", Experimental Economics, 6:299–310
(2003)
Further information about the Kyoto Protocol available
at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php)
Week 7. Interest Groups - Wyn Grant

What is the importance of Olson’s Logic of Collective Action?

Olson’s theory does not explain ‘altruistic’ groups. How can we explain an apparent increase
in their numbers?
Lecture
Core Reading
A Hindmoor, ‘Rational Choice’, chapter on ‘M Olson and the Logic of Collective Action’
Further Reading
M Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (2ndedition)
G Jordan and W Maloney, Democracy and Interest Groups, Ch. 2 (on Olson), Ch. 4 (on altruistic
groups)
Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 58 (2), 2005, W Grant, ‘Pressure Groups: a Politics of Collective
Consumption?’, 366-379
Political Studies, Vol. 52 (3) (2004), G Jordan and D Halpin. ‘Olson Triumphant? Recruitment
Strategies and the Growth of a Small Business Organisation’, 431-449
W Grant, Pressure Groups and British Politics, 43-8 (Olson)
R Baggott (et al), Speaking for Patients and Carers: Health Consumer Groups and the Policy Process
N Crowson et al. (eds) NGOs in Contemporary Britain (altruistic groups)
Week 8. Interest Groups – Ben Lockwood

Special Interest Groups - An Introduction

Olson's Theory of Groups and Organisations

Special interest Groups: Some Empirical Evidence

More Recent Theories of Interest Groups: Rent-Seeking vs. Informational Lobbying

Lecture
Core Reading
M.Olson, The Theory of Collective Action, Chapters 2 and 6
G.Grossman and E.Helpman, Special Interest Politics, MIT Press, Chapters 1.1, 4.1, 7.1, 8.1
Further Reading
Potters and Sloof(1996)
Jones and Keiser(1987)
Langbein(1986)
Week 9. Institutionalism - Wyn Grant

What are the distinctions between rational choice, historical and social constructivist
institutionalisms?

What is ‘path dependency’?
Lecture
Core Reading
Peter A Hall and Rosemary Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political
Studies, 44(5) 1996
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B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science, 2005. chapters 3, 4 &; 5
V Lowndes and M Roberts, Why Institutions Matter
Further Reading
Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth
Century, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Ellis Krauss and R J Pekakanen, The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP: Political Party Organizations as
Historical Institutions, Cornell University Press, 2011.
W Streeck and K Thelen (eds), Beyond Continuity Oxford University Press, 2011.
V Schmidt, 'Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive
institutionalism as the fourth "new institutionalism"', European Political Science Review, 2(1), 2010
V Schmidt, 'Discursive instututionalism: the explanatory power of ideas and discourse', Annual
Review of Political Science, 11 (2008), 303-26.
F Paniza and P. Miorelli, 'Taking Discourse Seriously: Discursive Institutionalism and Post-structuralist
Discourse Theory', Political Studies (2013), 301-18
John L. Campbell, "Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy,"Theory and
Society, Vol. 27, No. 3 (June) 1998:
Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991
P. Hall, ‘Path Dependence’ in G. King et al. (eds) The Future of Political Science, 246-8..
J March and Johan. P. Olsen. “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political
Life”,American Political Science Review, 78(3) 1984
J. G. March &; J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, Free Press 1989
Douglas North and Barry Weingast, ‘Introduction: Institutional Analysis and Economic History’, The
Journal of Economic History, (2000), 60 : 414-41
P. Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics’, American Political
Science Review, 94 (2000), 251-67
P. Pierson, Politics in Time: History Institutions and ~Social Analysis, Princeton University Press 2004.
Related Web-sites
The Ronald Coase Institute: http://www.coase.org/newinstitutionaleconomics.htm
Week 10 - Institutionalism – Ben Lockwood

Institutional Change, Path-Dependency: Definitions

Path Dependency: Theory

Path Dependency: Empirical Evidence

Greif’s Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change

Institutional Changes as Precommitment: Acemoglu and Robinson
Lecture
Core Reading
A.Greif, Instutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, especially chapter 6
D.Acemoglu and J.Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, esp. Ch 5
Further Reading
S.Becker Empire paper
S.Becker Weber paper
Jeff Sachs paper
D.Acemoglu and J.Robinson institutions and growth paper
R.Sugden, "Spontaneous Order", the Journal of Economic Perspectives", 1989, 3, 85-97
K.A.Shepsle, "Rational Choice Institutionalism", in the Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions
Questions for the Seminars, Week 2

What is the naturalist methodology of social science? To what extent does research in
economics and politics follow its prescriptions?

What is the rational choice postulate? What role does it play in economics?

What do we mean by methodological individualism? Does its use represent one significant
difference between the study of economics and politics?

How do economics and politics differ in the way in which they treat institutions?
Questions for the Seminars, Week 3

How far do you agree with Hay's critique of public choice? What 'solutions' might there be
to the problems that Hay identifies?

Does a theory like that advanced by Downs make it easier for politicians to manipulate
voters or does it make them more responsive to their concerns?

Are the assumptions made in the median voter theorem too unrealistic?
Questions for the Seminars, Week 4

Can the public choice approach explain individual voting behaviour?

Explain how policy convergence can occur in the Downsian theory, and when it might not
occur.

In what ways, if any does the citizen-candidate theory of electoral competition improve on
the Downsian theory?

To what extent do we observe policy convergence in practice?
Questions for the Seminars, Week 5

Is the Tragedy of the Commons still relevant?

Does Elinor Ostrom offer a credible alternative analysis and set of prescriptions to the
Tragedy of the Commons?

Can her approach be scaled up to cope with the challenge of climate change?
Questions for the Seminars, Week 7

Compare and contrast the private, state, and collective modes of provision of public goods.
Give examples of each.

How can public choice theory help inform the deisgn of workable international treaties?
Questions for the Seminars, Week 8

What are the main insights to be derived from Olson's Logic of Collective Action

What are the main incentives that encourage individuals to participate in cause groups or
social movements?

What is the role of the state in relation to interest groups?
Questions for the Seminars, Week 9

Do you find Olson's Logic of Collective Action to be a convincing explaniation of why
special interest groups form? If not, why not?

Distinguish between the rent-seeking and informational roles of special interest groups.
Which do you think is more important in practice? Should interest groups be encourgaged
or discouraged?
Questions for the Seminars, Week 10

What is meant by path-dependence? What evidence is there that it occurs?

Explain how Greif's theory of institutional reinforcement can acount for institutional
change

How can the extension of the franchise help elites precommit to redistribution? Do you find
this a convincing explaination for the spread of democracy?