“A source of danger to the stock of
this country”
The Pirbright laboratory and the
history of foot and mouth disease
research in Britain
Dr Abigail Woods
Centre for the History of Science, Technology
and Medicine
Imperial College London
FMD, 2007
8 outbreaks in Surrey, August-September
Origins: the Pirbright site
• Defective drains + contractors vehicles blamed
• Criticism of Defra’s dual role as regulator and
customer
Led to media questioning
of the risks and benefits
of work at Pirbright
• ‘Vaccines may prevent an epidemic.
They may also have caused this outbreak’
(Economist 9/8/07)
• ‘How safe is biosafe?’ (Telegraph, 14/8/07)
• ‘Science proved to be a threat as well as a
protection’ (Guardian, 13/0/07)
What’s new?
• This risk / benefit discourse has a long
history.
– Since the 19th century, fears about virus
escape have structured attitudes to and the
practice of FMD research in Britain.
– FMD escaped before, in 1960.
• What lessons can history provide?
Origins
• 1839: FMD appeared in Britain, became
endemic.
• 1869 / 1878: acts passed to control it.
• 1878-1883:
experiments at the
Brown Institution and
the RVC, sponsored
by Royal Agricultural
Society
Interest fades
• 1886 endemic FMD eliminated: only
occasional invasions for the next 25 yrs.
• No further research
– Vets not interested – job done!
• But many advances in Germany and
France
The 1910s
• 1911: 25 outbreaks
– Worst situation for 25 yrs
– Committee appointed to enquire
• Witnesses asked about
research: extremely cautious
• Committee recommends
research abroad.
• 1914: Research committee heads to India,
no progress
• 1920: Departmental Committee directs
work by JA Arkwright on HMS Dahlia: no
progress
Epidemics, 1922-24
• 2 devastating
epidemics
• 7 months / 9 months
• 1,140 / 2,691
outbreaks
• 56,000 / 300,000 culls
• Cheshire particularly
hard hit
The battle for research
• Mounting criticisms of the slaughter policy
• Calls for research into an alternative control
method
• Campaign led by members of the medical
profession
• Stockman furious!
• Argued that research was:
– Dangerous
• virus might escape from lab
– Harmful to trade
• threatened Britain’s ‘FMD-free’ status
– Irrelevant
• already know how to control FMD
• experiments are ‘going on before our eyes, in nature.’
• Stockman was overruled.
• Minister of Agriculture appointed the FMD
Research Committee (FMDRC), 2/24.
• Research began at various sites.
• Pirbright field station opened 1925.
FMD research: the early years
• Stockman lost the battle…but his (MAF’s)
views of research shaped the way it was
pursued.
– No independent FMD research allowed
– MAF to oversee the FMDRC
– All research (from 1933) at Pirbright
– MAF vet stationed at Pirbright to monitor
‘biosecurity’
Disease security at Pirbright
• Ongoing upgrading of
facilities, including:
– Enclosed animal
accommodation,
bathing, lab, hostel for
workers (1927)
– Laundry (1930s)
• Isolation unit
(c1950, 1970,
1998)
• Sewage / effluent treatment plant
(mid-1950s).
• Air filtration (c1960)
Breaches
• Much accidental (mechanical) transfer of
virus within the compound
• 1946 and 1958: outbreaks within 3 miles
of Pirbright.
• 1958 internal leaks: raises awareness of
aerosol route.
• 1960: 2 internal leaks; 1 external leak
1960: escape to infect farm near Guildford
• Cover-up considered – and rejected.
• Press comment, not criticism
Who was responsible?
• MAF’s close control had slipped in previous decade:
– ARC in charge from ’51 (though CVO still on governing
body)
– MAF vet withdrawn ’53.
– Significant expansion of Institute
• Claimed governing body / ARC responsible. ARC denied
• Ultimately agreed:
– ARC responsible for internal leaks
– MAFF responsible for external leaks
Internal investigation:
• Couldn’t discover route
• ‘In view of the many
hazards and the high
infective power of the virus,
it will never be possible to
guarantee absolute security
at all times’
• 2 firms of auctioneers sued (unsuccessfully) for
damages
Action:
• Biosecurity improved
(though internal virus leaks
in ’67 and 70)
• Vaccine R&D handed to
industry, 1961.
• Conditions of work shaped
by biosecurity demands
Post-1960
• Rothschild report (1971):
– Funds shifted from ARC to MAFF
– Customer-contractor principle of research
• 1980s: Pirbright threatened – but survived. Control
passed to AFRC (1984) and BBSRC (1993)
• Wellcome sold out to Rhone Merieux (1990) which
became Merial (1997)
• Responsibility for biosecurity passed from MAFF to
Defra (2001)
Lessons from history
• Why the Pirbright facility exists
• What Merial is doing there
• Defra’s dual role as customer and regulator
• The ongoing fight to contain the virus
– And how that priority has shaped the governance and
practice of research
• How reactions to viral escape have changed