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Constructing Peace in the Taiwan
Strait: a constructivist analysis of the
changing dynamics of identities and
nationalisms
Yitan Li
Published online: 27 Jun 2013.
To cite this article: Yitan Li (2014) Constructing Peace in the Taiwan Strait: a constructivist analysis
of the changing dynamics of identities and nationalisms, Journal of Contemporary China, 23:85,
119-142, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2013.809985
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Journal of Contemporary China, 2014
Vol. 23, No. 85, 119–142, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.809985
Constructing Peace in the Taiwan
Strait: a constructivist analysis of the
changing dynamics of identities and
nationalisms
Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 09:05 13 May 2014
YITAN LI*
Economic integration in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly stronger recently.
Economic integration should have led to stronger political convergence. Why hasn’t it
occurred? I argue that democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in
China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences
have formed two different identities. People in Taiwan are increasingly thinking of themselves
as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has
also altered the political identity of mainland Chinese. Such change could force Beijing to
accommodate citizens’ demand to act more toughly towards Taipei. Further political
integration is still possible, but it would require another norm change, perhaps already in the
making.
Early in 2012, Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) President, Ma Ying-jeou, won a second
term of presidency with a comfortable margin over the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) challenger, Tsai Ing-wen. It has been 16 years since Taiwan’s first direct
presidential election in 1996, signifying Taiwan’s continued consolidation of
democracy; while China continues its ‘soft authoritarianism’ governance.1 Since Ma
took office in 2008, economic ties across the Taiwan Strait have strengthened
significantly. Not long ago, there were serious concerns and debates2 regarding
* Yitan Li, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Seattle University. His research focuses on
international relations, foreign policy analysis, international conflict and security, international political economy,
comparative politics, and Chinese and East Asian politics. He has published recently in Asian Affairs, Canadian
Journal of Political Science, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies Perspectives, Journal of East Asian
Studies, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics and Political Research Quarterly. He is currently serving on the Editorial
Board of Foreign Policy Analysis. He would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.
He would also like to thank Seattle University for providing release time through the Junior Faculty Development
Grant. The author can be reached by email at liy@seattleu.edu
1. Francis Fukuyama, ‘Asia’s soft-authoritarian alternative’, New Perspectives Quarterly 9, (1992), pp. 60–61;
Denny Roy, ‘Singapore, China, and the “soft authoritarian” challenge’, Asian Survey 34, (1994), pp. 231–242.
2. For example, a special issue was dedicated to Taiwan’s identity change and its influence on cross-Strait
relations in Asian Affairs 44(4), (2004).
q 2013 Taylor & Francis
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YITAN LI
whether there had been a ‘lack of “spillover” from economic integration and social
communications into the realms of national security and identity’ in the Taiwan
Strait.3 The concern was particularly apparent during the eight-year DPP rule. In spite
of the strong economic integration over the last three decades, the potential for a
conflict between Taiwan and the mainland remains. Most notable is the fact that the
idea of unification for the two sides has not materialized. As a recent Economist
article points out, although China has been trying to win the hearts and minds of
Taiwanese by creating an increasingly stronger economic interdependence across the
Taiwan Strait, the cunning plan does not seem to be working in terms of bringing
closer the day when Taiwan embraces the motherland.4 Economic integration should
have led to stronger political convergence.5 Why hasn’t this occurred yet?
This paper argues that the issue of nationalism and identity needs to be taken into
serious consideration as an alternative approach to explain cross-Strait relations.
Realism and liberalism can only go so far in accounting for what has been observed.
Constructivism, which investigates what norms and interests are, may be able to
help.6 Constructivists argue that norms and ideas shape interests; and, in turn,
interests shape the actions of individuals and nation states.7 Furthermore, norms and
ideas can change people’s perception about nationalism and identity;8 therefore, they
are crucial in explaining actors’ behaviors.
Moreover, nationalism and identity are ultimately correlated with regime type. The
two different political systems in Taiwan and China have a significant impact on the
formation of social experiences. Different social experiences have subsequently
influenced the change of respective nationalisms and identities. Nationalism, social
identity creation or re-creation and regime type will have important implications for
the future of cross-Strait relations. Finally, strong economic integration might not
have caused a spillover into a visible political integration; however, the process has
helped to construct a new norm. The new norm is that conflict should be avoided,
perhaps through the preservation of the status quo for now. The best way to maintain
such a status quo may be through economic means. In the short term, further
3. Cal Clark, ‘Economic integration between China and Taiwan: no spillover into the identity and security
realms’, in Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo and Alexander C. Tan, eds, Identity and Changes in East Asian Conflicts: The
Cases of China, Taiwan, and the Koreas (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. 71.
4. ‘Taiwan’s commonsense consensus: economic integration with China is not doing what China hoped and the
opposition feared’, The Economist, (24 February 2011), available at: http://www.economist.com/node/18229208/
print on (accessed 31 July 2011).
5. The notion of ‘political convergence’ can be very hard to define. Especially when it is placed in a historical
context, significant political improvements between the two sides have most definitely occurred. These include the
general political trend between the two sides since 1949, particularly prevalent since Ma Ying-jeou took office in
2008. Political relations can be characterized as moving from ‘tensions’ to ‘détente’. While there is no question that
the overall political dynamics in the Taiwan Strait have improved, for the purpose of this paper, ‘political
convergence’ more narrowly refers to a clear roadmap collectively developed by Beijing and Taipei towards an
eventual unification. This is an important question to examine. As will become apparent later, there are signs from
Taiwan of a new Taiwanese identity emerging. This new identity has prevented economic convergence from spilling
over into more political convergence.
6. Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
7. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
8. Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Norms, identity, and culture in national
security’, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
120
CONSTRUCTING PEACE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
economic integration may not directly lead to swift unification; however, the new
norm will definitely help to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait.
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Strong integration, but no spillover
Current cross-Strait relations can be characterized as ‘strong integration, but no
spillover’. Recent integrations between Taiwan and China are primarily in the areas
of ‘low politics’, particularly economic, cultural and societal integrations.
Functionalists argue that cooperation in one area could ‘spillover’ into other
areas.9 Liberalists also favor economic integration as a means to reduce the potential
for future conflict.10 Analysts suggest that Beijing believes that ‘increasing economic
integration will go along with, or eventually lead to, a growing political bridge
between the two sides and, eventually political integration’.11 Clark refers to
Beijing’s strategy as ‘peace by pieces’.12 By all accounts, economic and social
interactions between China and Taiwan have been getting closer by the day since
cross-Strait interactions first began in the late 1980s.
Economic interactions
Economic interactions are the most significant among all the areas of integration in
the Taiwan Strait. Trade and investment are the two main economic activities. The
ROC’s Mainland Affairs Council’s (MAC) data show that Taiwan’s share of exports
to China has steadily increased from 1.4% in 1984 to 29.66% in 2011. Taiwan’s share
of imports has also increased from 0.58% in 1984 to 15.52% for the same year (see
Table 1). Both exports to and imports from China have increased more than 20-fold.
Taiwanese investments have poured into China as well. Table 2 shows that by
August 2011, Taiwan had approved 39,292 cases of investment projects, in the
amount of US$107,742 million, into the mainland. ‘The mainland has already
become Taiwan’s largest export market and investment site . . . ’ and ‘Taiwan
became the mainland’s third-largest import market, just following Japan and the
European Union’.13 Economic ties between China and Taiwan have become stronger
over the years.
In addition to the close geographical proximity, Taiwan’s outpouring of trade and
investment into the mainland has also been backed by ‘facilitating conditions’ in
China. Coinciding with Taiwan’s rapid economic growth and export-oriented
economic policies, ‘China had just decided to emphasize precisely the industries that
Taiwan was being forced to shed, creating a perfect economic complementarity
. . . ’.14 Moreover, China gave ‘preferential treatment15 to Taiwanese business9. David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975).
10. Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1980).
11. Weixing Hu, ‘The political–economic paradox and Beijing’s strategic options’, in Edward Friedman, ed.,
China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 33.
12. Clark, ‘Economic integration between China and Taiwan’.
13. Hu, ‘The political–economic paradox and Beijing’s strategic options’, pp. 22–24.
14. Clark, ‘Economic integration between China and Taiwan’, pp. 73–74.
15. Preferential treatment was intentionally granted to Chinese compatriots from Taiwan for political reasons.
121
YITAN LI
Table 1. The share of cross-Straits trade in Taiwan. Total foreign trade estimates by Mainland Affairs
Council, ROC (unit: %)
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Year
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011 (January – August)
Export share
Import share
Total trade share
1.40
3.21
2.04
2.28
3.70
5.03
6.54
9.79
12.84
16.28
16.99
17.15
17.63
18.08
17.62
17.22
16.46
20.27
23.30
25.43
26.83
28.36
28.27
30.11
28.94
30.49
30.89
29.66
0.58
0.58
0.60
0.83
0.96
1.12
1.40
0.46
1.03
1.31
2.17
2.97
2.97
3.41
3.91
4.07
4.43
5.47
7.04
8.61
9.95
11.00
12.23
12.77
13.06
14.01
14.30
15.52
1.06
2.17
1.49
1.71
2.47
3.31
4.23
5.57
7.31
9.19
9.93
10.36
10.79
11.03
11.00
11.00
10.67
13.45
15.89
17.70
18.72
20.04
20.65
21.95
21.24
22.88
22.96
22.87
Sources: 1. Hong Kong Customs Statistics; 2. ROC Customs Statistics. Available at: http://www.mac.
gov.tw/public/Attachment/112309192670.pdf.
people’. The cross-Strait ‘cultural affinity’ also makes it much easier for Taiwanese
businessmen to do business on the mainland.16
Clark refers to the economic integration of China and Taiwan as a ‘commodity
chain’ through which the two economies are not ‘just exchanging goods and services
but have developed a functionally linked economy that has integrated into the global
division-of-labor’.17 For instance, many computer companies in Taiwan often
‘export’ finished high-tech components to the mainland for final assembly. Such a
global implication has been famously portrayed by Thomas Friedman as the Dell
theory of conflict prevention as part of what he describes as a ‘supply-chaining’.18
16. Clark, ‘Economic integration between China and Taiwan’, p. 74.
17. Ibid., p. 78.
18. Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Picador,
2007).
122
CONSTRUCTING PEACE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Table 2. Taiwan investment in mainland China (unit: US$ million, %)
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Approved by Ministry of Economic
Affairs, ROC
Official data from mainland China
Period
Cases
Amount
Average
amount
Projects
Contracted
amount
Average
amount
Realized
amount
Realization
ratio
1993*
1994
1995
1996
1997*
1998*
1999
2000
2001
2002*
2003*
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011**
Total
9,329
934
490
383
8,725
1,284
488
840
1,186
3,116
3,875
2,004
1,297
1,090
996
643
590
914
607
39,292
3,168.41
962.21
1,092.71
1,229.24
4,334.31
2,034.62
1,252.78
2,607.14
2,784.15
6,723.06
7,698.78
6,940.66
6,006.95
7,642.34
9,970.55
10,691.39
7,142.59
14,617.87
10,421.36
107,742
0.34
1.03
2.23
3.21
0.5
1.58
2.57
3.1
2.35
2.16
1.99
3.46
4.63
7.01
10.01
16.63
12.11
15.99
17.17
–
10,948
6,247
4,847
3,184
3,014
2,970
2,499
3,108
4,214
4,853
4,495
4,002
3,907
3,752
3,299
2,360
2,555
3,072
1,716
84,849
9,964.87
5,394.88
5,849.07
5,141.00
2,814.49
2,981.68
3,374.44
4,041.89
6,914.19
6,740.84
8,557.87
9,305.94
10,358.25
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.91
0.86
1.21
1.61
0.93
1
1.35
1.3
1.64
1.39
1.9
2.33
2.65
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
3,138.59
3,391.04
3,161.55
3,474.84
3,289.39
2,915.21
2,598.70
2,296.28
2,979.94
3,970.64
3,377.24
3,117.49
2,151.71
2,135.83
1,774.37
1,898.68
1,880.55
2,475.74
1,425.07
53,441
31.5
62.86
54.05
67.59
116.87
97.77
77.01
56.81
43.1
58.9
39.46
33.5
20.77
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Notes: * Includes the number of the registration of previously unregistered investments.
** Data for 2011 for January to August.
Sources: 1. Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC; 2. Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation, PRC. Available at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/
11230919443.pdf.
Perhaps the single biggest economic move for the mainland and Taiwan since Ma
Ying-jeou took office has been the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement (ECFA) in June 2010. This comprehensive preferential trade agreement
between the two sides is aimed at reducing tariffs and commercial barriers and further
strengthening economic ties.
Economic interactions in the Taiwan Strait have been ‘asymmetrical’ for several
reasons; and such asymmetry should not be viewed as China’s intentional strategy to
generate trade and investment surplus to weaken Taiwan’s economy. First, Taiwan
has traditionally adopted an export-oriented trade strategy due to its comparative
advantage in labor resources. Second, the mainland has a huge market, so the
exporting of goods and services to China became virtually inevitable. Third, it was
the Taiwanese government that imposed restrictions on what Taiwanese people and
businesses could do regarding trade and investment in China. For example, the DPP
administration made it difficult for companies to transfer investment funds to China,
through a law that capped a Taiwanese company’s mainland-bound investment at
123
YITAN LI
40% of its net worth. Also, as the mainland continues to gain confidence in its
economic growth, China has become a much stronger economic magnet to Taiwan.
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Social interactions
In addition to stronger economic ties, social interactions in the Taiwan Strait have
also increased significantly. Since Taiwan first allowed its residents to visit the
mainland in 1987, cross-Strait visits have skyrocketed. Table 3 shows that, by the end
of 2010, a total of 61,048,742 Taiwanese residents had visited the mainland.
Considering Taiwan’s total population of 23,000,000, this is the equivalent of saying
that every Taiwanese has visited the mainland almost three times. Cross-Strait visits
are again asymmetrical. In the past, more Taiwanese visited the mainland than
Chinese to Taiwan. However, by the end of 2010, a total of 4,778,449 mainlanders
had visited Taiwan. The largest growth rate ever (roughly 269%) was seen in 2009.
This is mainly because Taiwan opened its door to mainland tourists.
As many urban Chinese continue to do well economically, their ‘spending power’
is rising. During Taiwan’s economic downturn in recent years, some advocates have
lobbied the Taiwanese government to allow more mainlanders to come to visit the
island, hoping that their visits could inject much needed cash into Taiwan’s slow
Table 3. Cross-Strait visits
Taiwan visitors to the mainland
Mainland visitors to Taiwan
Year
Persons
Year-to-year
growth (%)
Accumulation
Persons
Year-to-year
growth (%)
Accumulation
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
1,526,969
1,390,215
1,532,309
1,733,897
2,117,576
2,174,602
2,584,648
3,108,643
3,441,961
3,660,565
2,731,897
3,685,250
4,109,187
4,413,470
4,627,881
4,385,591
4,484,100
5,140,600
–
28.96
10.22
13.16
22.13
2.69
18.86
20.27
10.72
6.35
225.37
34.9
11.5
7.4
4.86
25.24
2.24
14.64
5,726,350
7,116,565
8,648,874
10,382,771
12,500,347
14,674,949
17,259,597
20,368,240
23,810,201
27,470,766
30,202,663
33,887,913
37,997,100
42,410,570
47,038,451
51,424,042
55,905,142
61,048,742
18,445
23,654
42,295
56,545
73,848
90,387
106,254
116,311
133,988
154,770
134,811
138,561
172,982
243,185
320,169
288,511
1,064,999
1,580,099
39.98
28.24
78.81
33.69
30.6
22.4
17.55
9.47
15.2
15.51
212.9
3.36
24.14
40.58
31.66
29.89
269.14
48.37
37,080
60,734
103,029
159,574
233,422
323,809
430,063
546,374
680,362
835,132
969,943
1,108,504
1,281,486
1,524,671
1,844,840
2,133,351
3,198,350
4,778,449
Sources: China Monthly Statistics and China Travel Yearbook, PRC. Available at: http://www.mac.gov.
tw/big5/statistic/em/182/19.pdf. National Immigration Agency, Ministry of the Interior of
Taiwan, ROC. Available at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/171915311630.pdf,
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/171915312939.pdf.
124
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CONSTRUCTING PEACE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
economy. At the same time, mainlanders are now not only more willing to spend
money but also more capable of doing so. Taiwan is certainly one of the most
attractive and convenient places for them to do so.
Cross-Strait communications have also increased. Table 4 shows that
communication in the form of postal letters remains an active form of contact.
However, the total number of letters across the Taiwan Strait decreased from 17
million in 1995 to 8 million in 2010. This could be due to the increased use of
telephone, fax and emails. Table 5 shows that the number, and length, of phone calls
from both directions increased dramatically over the last decades. Nevertheless, there
has been a notable trend of decreasing level of telephone communications in terms of
both the number of calls and length of calls. This could be due to the increase in
alternative communication methods such as Skype and other Internet-based voice
providers.
Cultural and educational exchanges have also been enhanced since the late 1980s.
Many policy makers from both China and Taiwan believed that cultural and
educational exchanges between the younger generations of mainlanders and
Taiwanese would help draw the two sides closer in the future. According to MAC’s
Chinese Development Fund, Taiwan-sponsored cross-Strait cultural activities
increased from 18 cases in 1992 to 607 cases in 2009, while MAC co-sponsored
cultural activities had increased from six in 1992 to 2,787 by the end of 2009 (see
Figures 1 and 2). By the end of 2009, MAC had co-funded 836 out of 1,544
applications to send scholars to China (see Figure 3). In addition to exchanging
Table 4. Cross-Strait letters
Letters to Mainland China
Letters to Taiwan
Year
Total letters
Growth rate (%)
Total letters
Growth rate (%)
Total
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
6,714,489
6,532,580
6,018,077
5,751,680
5,031,834
5,409,559
5,004,283
9,224,488
10,268,325
9,280,017
9,398,239
5,985,106
5,263,948
4,638,916
3,814,799
3,518,056
22.51
22.71
27.88
24.43
212.52
7.51
27.49
84.33
11.32
29.62
1.27
236.32
212.05
211.87
217.77
27.78
10,943,909
11,510,345
10,283,669
8,930,255
8,492,073
8,577,556
7,626,377
7,045,970
7,698,078
6,907,013
6,769,875
6,501,617
6,331,197
5,562,110
4,949,798
4,813,194
210.48
5.18
210.66
18
24.91
1.01
211.09
27.61
9.26
210.28
21.99
23.96
22.62
212.15
211.01
22.76
17,658,398
18,042,925
16,301,746
14,681,935
13,523,907
13,987,115
12,630,660
16,270,458
17,966,403
16,187,030
16,168,114
12,486,723
11,595,145
10,201,026
8,764,597
8,331,250
Source: Department of Statistics, MOTC, ROC. Available at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/
182/17.pdf; http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/112710335889.pdf; http://www.mac.
gov.tw/public/Attachment/171915305069.pdf.
125
YITAN LI
Table 5. Cross-Strait telephone calls
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Calls to Taiwan
Calls to Mainland China
Year
Calls
Minutes
Average
time per call
Calls
Minutes
Average
time per call
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
36,286,354
42,956,178
56,652,934
69,203,243
82,295,197
95,048,691
114,970,716
169,332,270
185,782,187
228,595,500
298,044,463
358,902,498
282,248,004
234,701,523
221,953,162
204,625,818
102,222,867
115,162,620
151,719,608
180,643,371
214,145,259
241,113,377
321,953,043
473,223,614
523,941,755
645,109,422
790,814,715
875,980,140
784,836,551
714,055,458
576,594,289
552,919,921
2.8
2.7
2.7
2.6
2.6
2.5
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.7
2.4
2.8
3.0
2.6
2.7
41,519,318
53,541,006
69,077,688
79,951,814
96,033,222
111,604,019
154,668,202
213,866,226
250,073,756
289,035,219
318,610,184
350,297,538
352,274,657
371,859,974
369,005,987
403,616,104
133,795,616
168,739,603
198,068,887
236,140,690
286,033,653
342,987,929
509,835,107
758,784,078
987,261,966
1,286,702,911
1,369,443,937
1,505,975,668
1,566,245,351
1,538,542,237
1,423,249,660
1,496,326,500
3.2
3.2
2.9
3.0
3.0
3.1
3.3
3.5
3.9
4.5
4.3
4.3
4.4
4.1
3.9
3.7
Source: National Communication Commission, ROC. Available at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/
statistic/em/182/18.pdf; http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/17191531270.pdf.
scholars, MAC also funded 1,063 graduate students to study in China by the end of
2009 (see Figure 4).
As a result of the intensive economic and cultural integration, an estimated
500,000 ROC citizens live for most of the year in Shanghai. That means that roughly
Figure 1. MAC (Chinese Development Fund) sponsored cultural activities.
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, available at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/0114959471.pdf
126
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CONSTRUCTING PEACE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Figure 2. MAC (Chinese Development Fund) co-sponsored cultural activities.
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, available at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/01149593071.pdf.
Figure 3. MAC (Chinese Development Fund) co-sponsored scholar exchanges.
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, available at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/0114100271.pdf.
2% of Taiwan’s total population lives in the city of Shanghai alone at any given time.
Lynch also reports increased number of cross-Strait marriages in the past decade.19
Evidently, economic integration has ‘spilled over’ into social integration and vice
versa.
19. Daniel C. Lynch, Rising China and Asian Democratization: Socialization to ‘Global Culture’ in the Political
Transformations of Thailand, China, and Taiwan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); also see Chen
Qimao, ‘The Taiwan Straits situation since Ma came to office and conditions for cross-Straits political negotiations: a
view from Shanghai’, Journal of Contemporary China 20(68), (2011), pp. 153 –160.
127
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YITAN LI
Figure 4. MAC (Chinese Development Fund) co-sponsored graduate-student exchanges.
Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, available at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/01141003171.pdf.
Occasionally increased tensions
There is no doubt that intensive and extensive economic and social integrations have
occurred; and Taiwan has become more dependent on the mainland as a result.
Conventional wisdom suggests that economic and social interdependence or
dependence reduces the probability of potential military conflict and hostility.
Looking at the reality in the Taiwan Strait, however, ‘the burgeoning economic
integration between Taiwan and China was accompanied by rising, not diminishing,
political hostility and security threats’.20 Examples of increased hostility are not hard
to find. In 1995 and 1996 Beijing authorized military exercises in the waters near
Taiwan. Since the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan missile crises, Beijing has learned that
over-threatening strategy could backfire.21 Since then, China has not conducted any
military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in close proximity to Taiwan. However,
Beijing has kept its hundreds, if not thousands, of missiles deployed along China’s
southern coast as part of a broader deterrence strategy. The Taiwan Strait is now one
of the most dangerous conflict regions in the world. Beijing’s recent launch of its first
aircraft carrier is believed to be, at least partially, for the purpose of deterring Taiwan
independence.
After the pro-independence DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian was elected president
in 2000, tensions in the Taiwan Strait remained high for eight years. The ‘1992
Consensus’ was largely abandoned by Chen. Over the years, the mainland has
gradually relaxed its Taiwan policy from insisting on asking Taiwan to first accept the
‘one China’ policy to asking Taiwan to accept the ‘1992 Consensus’ before any
negotiation can take place. Beijing refused to talk to Taipei’s pro-independence
20. Clark, ‘Economic integration between China and Taiwan’, p. 80; Weixing Hu, ‘Explaining change and
stability in cross-Strait relations: a punctuated equilibrium model’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(78), (2012),
pp. 933 –953.
21. Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
128
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CONSTRUCTING PEACE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
government. At the international level, Beijing has continued its efforts to further
isolate Taipei, for example, effectively lobbying the international community to keep
Taiwan out of any international organizations that would require statehood.22
Presently, only 23 small countries maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Since Ma Ying-jeou took over, there has been no visible escalation of military
tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Both sides have compromised somewhat. For example,
while maintaining its existing 23 diplomatic allies, Taiwan no longer pursues
recognition by new states; meanwhile China no longer tries to pressure the 23 Taiwan
allies to switch recognition. However, Taiwan and China are not any closer to a
noticeable unification. Both Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou relied heavily on the
mainland’s burgeoning economy; however, analysts have argued that the
increasingly strong integration in both economic and social areas have not spilled
over into closer political ties or a decreased level of potential conflict.23 It is
particularly notable that since the pro-status quo24 KMT regained power, significant
economic and social integration has occurred. Nevertheless, political integration is
nowhere near and the unification question does not seem to be on Taiwan’s agenda.
The relationship between Beijing and Taipei can be characterized as ‘a paradoxical
combination of closer economic convergence and greater political divergence’.25 The
lack of ‘spillover’ can no longer be explained by the impressive economic and social
integrations in the Taiwan Strait.
The inadequacy of liberalism and realism
To summarize the observations above from a theoretical perspective, neither
liberalism nor realism is fully adequate in explaining the strong economic – social
convergence and the political divergence in the Taiwan Strait. Although the crossStrait relations are not the usual state-to-state relations, both theoretical frameworks
could still be useful to conceptualize the case in the general context of international
relations. From a liberal perspective, strong integrations in the economic and social
areas should have led to more visible political integration, especially with regard to a
more clearly charted roadmap toward political unification. What Kant referred to as
the ‘spirit of commerce’26 has definitely been prevalent in the Taiwan Strait;
however, such a spirit has not replaced the ‘vicious circle’ of fear and mistrust with a
‘virtuous circle’27 of mutual political cooperation.
22. Chien-min Chao and Chih-Chia Hsu, ‘China isolates Taiwan’, in Friedman, ed., China’s Rise, Taiwan’s
Dilemmas and International Peace; Dennis V. Hickey, ‘The high cost of excluding Taiwan from the WHO’, in
Friedman, ed., China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace.
23. Clark, ‘Economic integration between China and Taiwan’; Daniel C. Lynch, ‘Taiwan adapts to the network
society’, in Friedman, ed., China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace; Hans Stockton, ‘Taiwan: political
and national security of becoming “Taiwanese”’, in Horowitz et al., eds, Identity and Changes in East Asian Conflicts.
24. Traditionally, the KMT is considered as a pro-unification party, but calling the Ma administration a prounification administration can be very controversial. Therefore, I use the term pro-status quo instead.
25. Hu, ‘The political–economic paradox and Beijing’s strategic options’, p. 34.
26. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939).
27. Bruce Russett and John O’Neal, Triangulating Peace (New York: Norton, 2001); Qiang Xin, ‘Beyond power
politics: institution-building and mainland China’s Taiwan policy transition’, Journal of Contemporary China 19(65),
(2010), pp. 525 –539.
129
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YITAN LI
From a realist perspective, Beijing and Taiwan would have interacted with each
other in a different manner. First, we would not have expected the two sides to
become so economically and socially interdependent to begin with. Particularly from
an offensive realist perspective, China would have denied a lot of the economic and
social benefits it has given to Taiwan.28 Second, the continued rise of China should
have given Taiwan a major incentive to balance against China. This could happen
perhaps through a more explicit alliance building with the US in the region.29
The reality in the Taiwan Strait suggests that the two sides want to be, and have
been, on a course of economic and social integration, but political unification has not
occurred. The somewhat unique and strange ‘frenemy’ suggests an intervening factor
that deserves closer examination. The rest of the paper examines issues of
nationalism and identity change, from a constructivist perspective, to further explain
the relations in the Taiwan Strait.
Nationalism and identity change
Leaders in Beijing effectively waited out the eight years of the pro-independence
DPP president, Chen Shui-bian. He was replaced by the pro-status quo KMT
president, Ma Ying-Jeou, who won a landslide victory in 2008. Ma is largely believed
to be a more pro-mainland leader, who has advocated for improving relations with
China. Aspects of that shift in policies include returning to the ‘1992 Consensus’,
allowing more mainland visitors to visit Taiwan, starting direct flights between
Taiwan and the mainland, and further facilitating trade with and investments in
China, just to name a few. Perhaps the most significant achievement so far has been
the signing of the ECFA and the winning of the 2012 re-election after advocating for
improved ties with the mainland.
Beijing, however, might be in for a surprise. On 20 May 2008, in his presidential
inaugural address, Ma specifically called for a ‘principle of no unification, no
independence and no use of force’ and the upholding of Taiwan’s democracy as the
guiding principle to deal with the mainland. After winning the 2012 re-election, he
smartly promised Taiwanese voters, while not provoking the mainland, by saying that
he would defend ‘the sovereignty of the Republic of China’, ‘the security of Taiwan’
and ‘the dignity of the Taiwanese people’. He appears to be inclined not to push for
any immediate change in the status quo, including unification with the mainland.
So why hasn’t unification occurred, even under a pro-mainland president?
Evidence suggests that traditional realist and liberalist schools have failed to explain
the combination of economic convergence and political divergence, as they ‘do not
take sufficient account of actor identity construction and the subsequent effect of that
construction on state interests’30. I argue that nationalism and identity change in both
Taiwan and China over the decades have fundamentally altered the dynamics of
cross-Strait relations. Cross-Strait relations may continue to improve. However, the
28. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).
29. Stephen M. Walt, ‘Alliance formation and the balance of world power’, International Security 9, (1985),
pp. 3 –43.
30. Hu, ‘The political–economic paradox and Beijing’s strategic options’, p. 34.
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CONSTRUCTING PEACE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
traditional unification vs. independence framework has become increasingly more
challenging. In the following sections, I will discuss the respective changes of
nationalism and social – political identity in both Taiwan and China and the
implications of these changes with regard to the future of China– Taiwan relations.
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Nationalism and identity change in Taiwan
For decades in the past, the Taiwan issue had been an issue of national sovereignty.
The PRC has always argued that there is only one China—the PRC—and that Taiwan
is part of China. The issue of Taiwan is an issue of eventual national unification,
which was not properly resolved after the end of the Chinese Civil War. Both
Presidents Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo of the KMT also believed that
there was only one China—the ROC—and both Taiwan and the mainland were part
of the ROC. As time went by, changes gradually occurred to how best to define the
Taiwan issue. However, for the most part, the issue was still centered around the
sovereignty question. So, based on these assumptions, on the China side,
‘the problem is how to bring Taiwan back into the Chinese nation. On the Taiwan
side, the problem is how best to maintain comfortable economic and political
trajectories without being swallowed up or bombed by China’.31
Recent changes in Taiwan have shown that the Taiwan issue has increasingly
become an issue of identity: ‘Han ethnic identity, Chinese national identity, and the
relationship of both of these identities to the new Taiwanese identity forged in the
1990s’.32 As will become apparent later on, Han ethnic identity is directly associated
with the identity of the Chinese nation. How both Han Taiwanese and non-Han
Taiwanese view the new Taiwanese identity has become the central issue in defining
the relationship between China and Taiwan.
Moreover, embedded in the issue of identity is the issue of nationalism. Brown
further argues that it is a misunderstanding to view ethnic and national identities as
based on ‘antiquity’; instead she argues that ‘identity is formed and solidified on the
basis of common social experience, including economic and political experience’;
and ‘identities must be negotiated; . . . identity formation in individuals and groups
derives from their interaction with the social and cultural context in which they
live’.33 As a result, when common social experiences change, identities change too.
Changes of social experiences in both China and Taiwan in the past several decades
have altered the two entities’ respective social and national identities. The traditional
unification/independence dichotomy has created problems for both Taiwan and the
mainland.
31. Melissa Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?: The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).
32. Ibid., p. 1.
33. Ibid., pp. 2– 13. Also see Charles F. Keyes, ‘The dialectics of ethnic change’, in C. F. Keyes, ed., Ethnic
Change (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1981); G. Carter Bentley, ‘Ethnicity and practice’,
Comparative Studies in Society and History 29, (1987), pp. 24–25; Brackette Williams, ‘A class act: anthropology
and the race to nation across ethnic terrain’, Annual Review of Anthropology 18, (1989), pp. 401 –444; Stevan Harrell,
Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1995); Mellissa
J. Brown, Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan (Berkeley, CA: Institute for East Asian Studies, University of
California, 1996).
131
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YITAN LI
Wakabayashi identifies three national identity changes in Taiwan.34 The first
occurred when Taiwan was annexed by Japan after the first Sino– Japanese War in
1895. Prior to 1895, ‘people in Taiwan did not think of themselves as a unified
group’.35 However, after the Japanese occupation, Japanese culture was forced upon
the Taiwanese, and the ‘imminent arrival of Japanese troops [be]came the first
indication of a pan-Taiwanese identity, and identity limited to Han’ and an identity
centered on the resistance to Japanese occupation and the formation of a strong
nationalism.36 Both local Taiwanese and mainland immigrants became unified
against the external Japanese threat.
The second change occurred when Taiwan was ‘gloriously returned’ to the ROC in
1945.37 The ROC invoked a ‘Chinese nation’, promoting the Han culture as the
dominant group and culture.38 The process was especially intensified after the KMT
lost the civil war to the CCP and decided to move the Nationalist government to
Taiwan. Many Taiwanese assumed they were simply ‘Chinese’ again. On the day
before 28 February 1947, a local cigarette vendor was brutally beaten by the
Nationalist police as they tried to confiscate her allegedly smuggled cigarettes. The
incident sparked an island-wide uprising. In the next few weeks, the KMT executed
thousands of Taiwanese.39 This eventually led the Nationalist government to declare
martial law. The ‘2.28 Incident’ marked the beginning of the second identity change
in Taiwan. It became the ‘historical genesis of a broad Taiwanese nationalism as we
see it today’. As a result, ‘a considerable number of Taiwanese came to see “China”
as “outside” . . . “they”, the mainlanders, became the “Chinese”; we the Taiwanese
became a different community of people from these “Chinese”’.40
Recent democratization has started perhaps the third national identity change in
Taiwan. The end of the martial law in 1987 and permission from the government
allowing dangwai (opposition parties) to exist are largely considered as the beginning
of Taiwan’s democratization. As a result, ‘Taiwanese nationalism has assumed
considerable prominence, and a cultural uniqueness has been gaining strength’.41
Taiwan’s democratization has been a gradual process. Among the most significant
changes are the 1996 presidential election, in which Lee Teng-hui of the KMT
became the first directly elected ROC president; the 2000 election, in which, for the
first time in Chinese history, an opposition party leader, Chen Shui-bian, of the DPP
became the president; the 2008 presidential election in which the KMT candidate Ma
Ying-jeou took back the presidency after eight years of DPP rule; and Ma’s success in
winning a second term in 2012.
Popular elections have also changed low-level politics. For example, the
government in Taiwan has implemented mayoral-level and county-level elections.
34. Masahiro Wakabayashi, ‘Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others”’, in Friedman, ed., China’s
Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace, pp. 6–15.
35. Mao-kuei Chang, ‘On the origins and transformation of Taiwanese national identity’, China Perspectives 28,
(2000), pp. 51 –70.
36. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 8.
37. Ibid.
38. Wakabayashi, ‘Taiwanese nationalism and the “unforgettable others”’.
39. The estimates range from 8,000 to 22,000. See Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 252, endnote 10.
40. Ibid., pp. 11– 12.
41. Ibid., p. 3.
132
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CONSTRUCTING PEACE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
The government is increasingly more accountable to the public for both domestic and
international policies. Stockton refers to these changes as a transition from the
traditional ‘one-level’ game exclusively played at the elite level to a ‘multilevel’
game involving a combined effort of political elites, popular ballots and state
bureaucracy.42
In recent years, particularly the DPP government has been promoting a series of
‘de-Sinification’ processes. Taiwanese writers and critics have stimulated a discourse
of Xiangtu Wenxue (native literature). Taipei added the word ‘Taiwan’ onto the
jacket of the ROC passport. The government has also changed the name of ‘China’
Post to ‘Taiwan’ Post. Changes have been made in the education system as well to
promote the unique cultural and historical characteristics of Taiwan, emphasizing the
differences between Chinese and Taiwanese. For instance, in schools, local dialects
are encouraged rather than Mandarin Chinese. The pinyin system, a phonetic system
commonly used in the mainland and in the international community (such as libraries
overseas) to transliterate Chinese characters into Western phonetic systems, has been
demoted. Instead, the government has emphasized the importance of using the old
Tongyong Pinyin system which is only used in Taiwan. The ultimate goal of the
‘de-Sinification’ process is to ‘Taiwanize’ Taiwan by emphasizing the uniqueness of
the Taiwanese identity. Dan Lynch refers to all these as a ‘self-conscious nationbuilding project’.43
Perhaps most importantly, both the people and the government in Taiwan have
argued that an immediate reunification with the mainland under China’s terms would
certainly mean ‘the erosion of many hard-won political liberties’.44 Taiwan’s recent
democratization has created a new ‘common social experience’. It is this common
social experience that has altered the national and social identity of the Taiwanese.
The new identity has also called for the continued safeguard of Taiwan’s
democratization. Cal Clark asserts that:
Taiwan’s democratization, therefore, was widely expected to unleash Taiwanese
nationalism on two interlinked but distinct issues: (1) reject of the Mainlander-dominated
political regime; and (2) growing hostility toward and the absolute rejection of China’s
claim to sovereignty over Taiwan . . . .45
Democracy in Taiwan has become a defining issue that marks the political and social
difference between Taiwan and the mainland.
Such a change in identity caused by Taiwan’s democratization is very significant.
Figure 5 shows that the percentage of people who consider themselves Taiwanese
increased from 17.6% in 1992 to 54.2% in 2011, while the percentage that consider
themselves as Chinese dropped from 25.5% to 4.1%, respectively. More people in
Taiwan now consider themselves as having a different social and political identity
42. Stockton, ‘Taiwan’.
43. Daniel C. Lynch, ‘Taiwan’s self-conscious nation-building project’, Asian Survey 44, (2004), p. 513; S. Philip
Hsu, ‘Between identity quest and risk aversion: lessons from the Chen Shui-bian presidency for maintaining crossStrait stability’, Journal of Contemporary China 19(66), (2010), pp. 693–717.
44. Stockton, ‘Taiwan’, p. 59; Dongtao Qi, ‘Divergent popular support for the DPP and the Taiwan independence
movement, 2000–2012’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(78), (2012), pp. 973–991.
45. Clark, ‘Economic integration between China and Taiwan’, p. 83.
133
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YITAN LI
Figure 5. Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of Taiwanese, 1992– 2011.
Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, available at: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/
english/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm.
than the Chinese. This evidence reveals that Taiwanese increasingly believe they
belong to a separate ‘nation’ that is fundamentally different from China. Once this
social and political identity change is solidified, economic integration can hardly
dismantle this new identity.
Regarding the future status of Taiwan as shown in Figure 6, among all the surveyed
options, ‘unification as soon as possible’ has the lowest support rate (1.4% as of June
2011) and ‘maintain status quo, decide at later date’ has the highest support rate
(33.3%). Generally speaking, most people in Taiwan favor some form of status quo
and wish to shelve the Taiwan issue for the future.
One could argue that the recent ‘Taiwanization’ is largely due to Chen Shui-bian’s
orchestrated ‘de-Sinification’ efforts. However, a closer examination of these
changes suggests that they are due to the recent identity change in Taiwan. After all,
even the current pro-status quo president Ma Ying-jeou knows that an immediate
move to unification would mean nothing but a political suicide mission for the KMT
and himself. Popular democracy has taken hold in Taiwan. Political elites must listen
to public opinion and try to answer what its people want. Some would even go so far
as to say ‘the longer that Taiwan remains a democracy, the less actual social basis
there is for a reunification’, assuming the mainland maintains its current regime
structure.46 One must admit however that Taiwan’s economic dependence on the
mainland is a critical part of this process of identity creation for Taiwan. Although
protecting Taiwan’s hard-earned democracy is important, economic stability seems
to be the most important issue for Taiwanese voters right now. This is clearly shown
in the 2012 election and the welcoming signs from the voters for warmer cross-Strait
relations under KMT’s Ma. Emerson Niou argues that Taiwanese voters’ preferences
46. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 245.
134
CONSTRUCTING PEACE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Changes in the Unification - Independence Stances of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys
by Election Study Center NCCU ( 1994 ~ 2011.06 )
Maintain status quo, decide at later date
Independence as soon as possible
Maintain status quo, move toward unification
Maintain status quo, move toward independence
Unification as soon as possible
Maintain status quo indefinitely
Non response
45
40
38.5
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35.9
P
e
r
c
e
t
a
g
e
36.5
36.2
37.3
38.7
36.8
35.2
35
35.8
30.5
30
30.3
30.9
29.5
26.3
25
20.5
20
15.6
19.4
15.6
20.9
19.5
18.6
15.3
17.3
16.3
15.4
11.5
9.8
18.7
18.8
15.9
15.2
15.9
11.5
9.5
19.2
17.4
17.3
14.5
11.6
13.6
15.7
16.4
13.3 15.0 13.8
10.5
12.4
8.0
4.4
94
5.7
3.5
4.1
2.3
2.5
95
96
3.2
5.7
2.1
3.1
2.0
97
98
99
18.4
12.5
11.9
15.2
11.0
10.6
00
2.8
4.4
4.3
1.8
3.7
2.5
01
02
03
16.0
14.2
13.8
13.7
12.3
8.5
12.1
7.9
10.0
15.0
16.2
17.4
11.4
9.4
7.8
6.1
5.6
1.8
2.0
05
06
1.5
04
26.8
19.9
6.2
4.7
2.2
14.5
25.4
21.5
19.9
18.0
17.5
8.1
3.1
0
26.2
24.8
15
5
35.9
33.3
30.5
10
35.1
8.7
7.1
8.5
9.0
8.7
8.1
6.2
6.6
5.8
6.1
5.8
1.4
1.9
1.5
1.3
1.2
07
08
09
10
6
.0
11 Year
Figure 6. Changes in the unification – independence stances of Taiwanese.
Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, available at: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/
english/modules/tinyd2/content/tonduID.htm.
can be influenced.47 Therefore, how elites utilize identity re-creation to influence
voters’ preferences becomes an important political matter.
Nationalism and identity change in China
An old Chinese expression goes, ‘one hand alone cannot clap’. The increased
economic convergence and the continued political divergence in the Taiwan Strait
are due to recent changes regarding nationalism and identity in China as well. The
continued rise of Chinese nationalism could push Taiwan further away from potential
reunification. However, as China’s economic and political confidence continues to
increase in the region, the leadership in Beijing may become less concerned about
Taiwan breaking away unilaterally. But the leadership must prepare for any potential
rise of popular demand for acting tough on Taiwan.
The ever-growing economic and social interactions between China and Taiwan
suggest China’s interest in further integrating Taiwan into a ‘greater China’ system
has not diminished. Moody asserts that ‘China’s more enduring interests in Taiwan
need to be explained in constructivist terms, particularly, of course, contemporary
nationalism. For China’s ruling elite, the incorporation of Taiwan is part of what
constitutes Chinese national identity’.48 It is reasonable to assume that most Chinese
would be willing to sacrifice economic interests in order to preserve the unity of the
Chinese nation.49 Therefore, China’s behavior towards Taiwan cannot be explained
solely through economic terms.
47. Emerson Niou, ‘Understanding Taiwan independence and its policy implications’, Asian Survey 44, (2004),
p. 555.
48. Peter R. Moody Jr, ‘The evolution of China’s national interest: implications for Taiwan’, in Horowitz et al.,
eds, Identity and Changes in East Asian Conflicts, p. 41.
49. Shirk, China.
135
YITAN LI
The mainland’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan is based on both historical and
cultural grounds. Brown identifies several assumptions about Han ethnic and Chinese
national identities that are often used by mainland Chinese to argue the case of
Taiwan. Mainlanders often assume that:
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First, Han ethnic identity is linked to Chinese national identity. Second, Chinese national
identity is linked to Han culture. Third, Chinese national identity has a clear border, and a
person or group is located on one side of it or the other; that is, a person or a group is
definitively Chinese or not Chinese, Han or non-Han.50
The Chinese do acknowledge that the Chinese nation is multiethnic, but a Confucian
hierarchical order exists everywhere.51 The result is that the Chinese view the Han as
the ‘Big Brother’, leading non-Han little brothers and sisters and offering guidance to
them.52 The non-Han little brothers and sisters should naturally respect the ‘Big
Brother’ and pledge allegiance to him.
Based on these assumptions, Chinese national identity is linked to Han ethnic
identity. If Taiwanese, Han (the Big Brother) or non-Han (little brothers and sisters
who have supposedly pledged allegiance to the Han Big Brother) are ‘culturally
Han they should be part of the nation of China’.53 Recall an early discussion about
the preferential treatment (usually more favorable trade and investment policies)
the mainland gives Taiwanese businessmen and investors. The preferential
treatment is arguably intentional (for both political and symbolic reasons) because
the mainland considers Taiwanese as family; therefore, they are socially in-group,
in sharp contrast to other out-group foreigners, such as American or French
businessmen.
This Chinese in-group and Han-centric national identity has been strengthened
recently by the ever-stronger Chinese nationalism for two main reasons. First, the
modern history of China is a history of humiliation by foreign invasions.54
Nationalism is both the result and the means to strengthen national unity at times of
crises. To many Chinese (not only mainland Chinese but also Chinese in a greater
sense including Chinese overseas), one proxy to conceptualize and measure
‘nationalism’ is the government’s ability to retain the country’s territorial integrity.
The 1919 May Fourth Movement was precisely an upsurge of Chinese nationalism
triggered by the unfair treatment of China through the Treaty of Versailles over the
transferring of German concessions in Shandong Province to Japan rather than
returning them to China, among other things. Political elites who end up giving up
territories are often labeled as ‘national traitors’, who bring ‘national humiliation’ to
the people and nation. Such political repercussion would be tremendous.
For example, Li Hongzhang, a well known diplomat in the late Qing Empire,
became the symbol of traitors because of his role in signing the Treaty of
Shimonoseki which ceded the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan and the Pescadores
50. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 22.
51. Lynch, ‘Taiwan adapts to the network society’.
52. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?
53. Ibid., pp. 23– 24.
54. Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2005).
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Islands to Japan. Shirk argues that one of the reasons Jiang Zemin played ‘tough’ with
Taiwan during the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan missile crises was that he did not want
history to view him as a traitor who had lost Taiwan.55 All political elites will try to
avoid such a situation at all costs.
Second, China’s recent lightening-speed economic development has triggered the
West’s growing fear of China’s rise. The Western articulation of the ‘China threat’
has created internal cohesiveness among the Chinese. Nationalism is one way, if not
the only way, to defend Chinese unity. It is a matter of not only the survival of the
country, but also the survival of the CCP regime.56
Three events show how strongly Chinese nationalism has grown recently. The
NATO-led bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 1999 and the anti-China protests
during the Olympic torch relay in 2008 demonstrate the growing level of nationalism
in a general sense. The Anti-Secession Law in 2005 demonstrates the growing
nationalism on cross-Strait relations in particular. All three cases show that the
increasingly stronger nationalism in China is no longer solely fanned by the
government. Instead, all cases, in one way or another, are Beijing’s frantic reactions
to the rising popular nationalism as well. This recent rise of Chinese nationalism is a
part of China’s new identity.
Suisheng Zhao asserts that there are three forms of nationalism, namely
nativism, anti-traditionalism and pragmatism.57 Nativism and anti-traditionalism
are two opposing extremes, calling for Chinese tradition/self-reliance and
the adoption of foreign culture and models, respectively. Pragmatism serves as
the middle option, which sees the lack of modernization as the cause of
China’s weakness and calls for the adoption of whatever solutions that might
work for China. China has adopted a pragmatic nationalism in dealing with
Taiwan.58
NATO-led bombing of the Chinese Embassy, 1999. On 7 May 1999, during the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Operation Allied Force, an
American B-2 bomber dropped precision guided missiles on several targets in
Belgrade, hitting the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. The air strike killed three
Chinese journalists and injured 20 others. Both NATO and the US blamed the error
on an outdated map. The bombing immediately sparked outrage across China:
‘Protests erupted in over two dozen Chinese major cities. The American consul’s
residence in Chengdu was firebombed’.59 University students took to the streets in
major cities to demonstrate.
The Chinese government immediately argued that the bombing of the Chinese
embassy had to be ‘deliberate’ and severely condemned the ‘barbaric attack and a
55. Shirk, China; Christopher Hughes, ‘Reclassifying Chinese nationalism: the geopolitik turn’, Journal of
Contemporary China 20(71), (2011), pp. 601–620.
56. Ibid.
57. Suisheng Zhao, ‘Chinese nationalism and its international orientations’, Political Science Quarterly 115,
(2000), pp. 1–33; Suisheng Zhao, ‘Conflict prevention across the Taiwan Strait and the making of China’s AntiSecession Law’, Asian Perspective 30, (2006), pp. 79–94; Suisheng Zhao, ‘Foreign policy implications of Chinese
nationalism revisited: the strident turn’, Journal of Contemporary China 22(82), (2013), pp. 535–553.
58. Zhao, ‘Conflict prevention across the Taiwan Strait’.
59. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 14.
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gross violation of Chinese sovereignty’.60 President Jiang Zemin, having been under
tremendous pressure and criticism within the CCP for being too weak and soft in
handling China’s foreign policy and relations with Taiwan, refused to take calls from
President Bill Clinton during the initial days of the crisis.61 The incident was not
resolved until President Clinton made repeated apologies to the Chinese people.
Most analysts argue that the nationalist protests were fanned by the Chinese
government—a traditional top-down approach. For instance, the government silently
signaled a green light for students to go onto the streets and even in some cases
bussed students to protest sites.62 Beijing also did not report President Clinton’s
public apology in the state controlled media, fanning the flames of nationalism and
allowing more public protests against NATO and the US in particular.
However, the analysis by Peter Gries suggests that the 1999 Embassy Bombing
protests were actually ‘an overwhelmingly bottom-up phenomenon; the Party had its
hands full simply responding to the demands of popular nationalists’.63 Unlike in
most previous cases of public demonstration, where the government would normally
use repressive means to control the public, the public reaction to the Chinese
Embassy Bombing was overwhelming. Beijing feared that ‘water can support a boat,
but it can also flip it’.64 Gries believes that the protests were not fanned by the Beijing
government, because Chinese overseas in the US and Europe, for example, also put
up major demonstrations outside China.
Gries suggests that Beijing’s shift from the traditional suppression to co-optation
or even accommodation indicate the emergence of a new popular nationalism in
China.65 Since then, the CCP has struggled to keep up with popular nationalist
demands. In order to maintain its legitimacy, both the CCP and the government must
take popular demands seriously.
The anti-China protests during the Olympic torch relay, 2008. The Chinese
welcomed the year of 2008 with great enthusiasm as Beijing would soon host the
long-awaited Summer Olympic Games. Unexpectedly, on 15 March 2008, on the
occasion of the 49th anniversary of the 1959 anti-Chinese Tibetan uprising, Tibetan
monks took to the streets of Lhasa and put up the largest protests in Tibet in two
decades against Chinese rule. Protestors set Han shops, businesses and government
office buildings on fire. Fatalities occurred to both Tibetans and Han Chinese. Beijing
sent troops into the region to restore order and meanwhile banned international
journalists from traveling to the region.
60. Erik Eckholm, ‘Crisis in the Balkans: Beijing; China assails “gross violation of sovereignty”’, The New York
Times, (8 May 1999), available at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res ¼ 9A0CE3DB163FF93BA
35756C0A96F958260 (accessed 1 January 2012).
61. Shirk, China.
62. Ibid.
63. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 128. Also see Wenfang Tang and Benjamin Darr, ‘Chinese nationalism
and its political and social origins’, Journal of Contemporary China 21, (2012), pp. 811– 826; Yanqi Tong and
Shaohua Lei, ‘War of position and microblogging in China’, Journal of Contemporary China 22(77), (2013), pp.
292–311.
64. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 129.
65. Ibid.
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Less than ten days later, on 24 March 2008, the Beijing Olympic Committee took
over the Olympic torch in the Panathenaikon Stadium at Olympia, Greece. Tibetan
supporters interrupted the ceremony. From Greece and throughout the entire torch
relay route outside China, Tibetan supporters tried on numerous occasions to
interrupt the relay.
Chinese worldwide are outraged by the Tibetan protestors. Han Chinese, in
particular, have always perceived Beijing’s Tibet policy as a favorable economic
liberation of the region. Tibetans, however, have accused the Beijing government of
conducting ‘cultural genocide’. The world immediately saw a major surge of Chinese
nationalism. Domestically, people demonstrated across the country in various forms.
Internet bloggers voiced strong opposition to the anti-Chinese Tibetans. Many
Chinese expressed the belief that France did not handle the security of the torch relay
well. People across China boycotted the French supermarket chain Carrefour, causing
many stores to shut down temporarily and forcing the Carrefour CEO, Jose-Luis
Duran, to publicly deny any support for the Dalai Lama by his company and express
support for the Beijing Olympic Games.66
Outside of China, Chinese students and residents overseas formed massive rallies
along the torch relay route to show support for the Beijing Olympic Games and
dissatisfaction with the anti-China Tibetan protestors. Chinese demonstrators also
formed anti-CNN rallies in Los Angeles, Atlanta and Chicago to demand CNN
commentator Jack Cafferty apologize for his remarks referring to Chinese as a ‘bunch
of goons and thugs’.
The games became a symbol of national pride and unity—a sign of strong Chinese
nationalism. The popular demonstrations and demands of the Chinese citizens caused
fear among China’s political elites. They had to walk a fine line between not ruining
the Olympic Games and accommodating citizens’ popular demands. As the power of
the central government in Beijing becomes more decentralized, China no longer has
the kind of charismatic strong leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, who
could suppress the public. Today’s political elites have been forced to listen to the
voices of the people in order to ensure the party-state’s legitimacy of survival.
The Anti-Secession Law, 2005. While the previous two cases show the growing
level of nationalism in a general context, the passing of the Anti-Secession Law in
2005 shows the impact of growing nationalism on cross-Strait relations in particular.
Like in the first two cases, Beijing has been increasingly paying more attention to
public opinion regarding Taiwan due to the growing popular nationalism.
After Chen Shui-bian’s surprising win in 2000 (and re-election win in 2004), the
DPP took a series of measures, if not to officially move toward Taiwan independence,
at least to push the envelope of Taiwan independence. Examples include the
referendum measures and institutional measures to Taiwanize Taiwan as discussed
earlier in the paper. Perhaps the biggest frustration on China’s part was the lack of a
clear sense of direction regarding the future of cross-Strait relations. Jiang Zemin had
66. Jose-Luis Duran, ‘Carrefour CEO denies backing Dalai Lama’, Forbes, (4 April 2008), available at: http://
www.forbes.com/2008/04/19/carrefour-china-duran-face-markets-cx_pm_0419autofacescan01.html (accessed 1
January 2012).
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already been criticized by party hardliners for being too soft on Taiwan. National
unity has always been a touchstone for elite legitimacy. As Chen continued his push
for the envelope, there was a growing demand, both top-down and bottom-up, for
tougher actions to curb any potential Taiwan independence.
As a result, the National People’s Congress adopted the Anti-Secession Law on 14
March 2005. Although analysis shows that the adoption of the law has not changed
cross-Strait balance in any fundamental way,67 the adoption does signal that rising
Chinese nationalism is a reason for the creation of such a law. For example, Zhao’s
analysis suggests that both state-led nationalism and popular nationalism were
reasons behind the adoption of such a law. The preservation of national unity,
including reunification with Taiwan, is an uncompromising goal under all
circumstances. From the state’s perspective, nationalism (preventing Taiwan
secession) is a ‘means for legitimating CCP rule’; and from the populist’s
perspective, ‘for the Chinese people to judge the performance of the state’.68
Especially for the Chinese citizens, ‘if Chinese leaders cannot deliver on their
nationalist promise, they are vulnerable to nationalistic criticism’; and in fact they
have been criticized for being too ‘soft’ toward Taiwan’s independence movement.69
So this case suggests the passing of the Anti-Secession Law had a two pronged effect.
It was an exhibition of a top-down nationalist sentiment to Taiwan that independence
would not be acceptable. It was also Beijing’s effort to placate the bottom-up popular
nationalist demand to act more toughly on Taiwan independence.
Popular nationalism has continued to be on the rise since the passing of the AntiSecession Law. Anti-independence discussion forums are not hard to find on Chinese
blogging websites, such as Sina Weibo. It must be noted however that pragmatic
Chinese leaders have not let cross-Strait policies be ‘dictated by emotional nationalist
rhetoric on the streets’ so far.70 However, there is no guarantee for the same in the
future as China moves toward a more disaggregated power structure at the elite level,
especially during times of power transitions and uncertainty; and as Chinese popular
nationalism continues to rise.
Implications and conclusions
Several implications and conclusions can be drawn from the analysis above.
The conventional wisdom that economic interdependence at the low politics level
may lead to further integration at the high politics level may not explain the lack of
political integration in the Taiwan Strait. Nationalism and identity change must be
taken into consideration.
The issue of Taiwan can no longer be solely viewed through the prism of national
sovereignty and economic interests alone. From Taiwan’s perspective, evidence
shows that ‘sociopolitical experience between Taiwan and China’ has formed a ‘very
real [and different] national identity for the people of Taiwan’; and ‘people in Taiwan
67.
68.
69.
70.
140
Zhao, ‘Conflict prevention across the Taiwan Strait’.
Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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CONSTRUCTING PEACE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
act—collectively and individually—on the basis of this identity’.71 This shift in
national and social identities could be crucial, as they cannot be easily reversed back
through further economic integration. The difficulty partially lies in Taiwan’s regime
change. Taiwan’s recent democratization has not only made the potential solution of
the Taiwan issue (unification with the mainland) increasingly more ‘outside of the
control of the mainland leadership’, but also ‘outside the control of the individual
leaders on Taiwan . . . ’.72 As Taiwan continues to democratize, ‘We [the Taiwanese]
are not obliged to take any advice from China’;73 and the Taiwanese are ‘very
unlikely to identify with an authoritarian regime’.74
However, Taiwanese are prudent and rational. Their economic well-being is a
crucial part of their identity formation. Both voters and politicians in Taiwan may see
themselves as uniquely Taiwanese, but sacrificing their economic prosperity for this
unique identity is unlikely. Dependence on the mainland, preservation of peace and
stability may have become part of the new norm in the Taiwan Strait.
What is more important, and even more surprising, is what the changes of
nationalism and identity in China have done to the cross-Strait relations. Chinese
nationalism can be characterized as increasingly stronger. One could argue that
Chinese nationalism has largely been fanned by the CCP and government to ensure
their legitimacy from a top-down approach. Evidence shows that Chinese nationalism
has gradually become the product of a more popular-nationalist, bottom-up approach.
Shirk has argued that the issue of Taiwan is essentially ‘a question of regime
survival’; and no regime in the mainland could survive the loss of Taiwan.75
If Taiwan was let go, then Tibet, Xinjinag and maybe even Inner Mongolia would
follow suit too. With Ma winning the re-election and the shifting norm towards the
preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan independence seems
to be unlikely. But how much longer can Beijing wait to see some concrete steps
towards political unification remains an interesting match to watch.
One must note that over time Chinese ‘popular nationalists gradually shifted from
supporting the CCP to making demands of it’.76 In spite of the fact that China is still a
single party authoritarian regime, the CCP may be losing ground to an increasingly
powerful popular nationalism. The party-state must now listen to its citizens. This has
been enhanced by more widespread free access to information, such as the Internet
and Weibo, and relatively more collective decision-making processes at the top level.
This grand strategy of being tough on defending territorial unity has been
confirmed by Taylor Fravel’s analysis of China’s regime insecurity and territorial
disputes. Taylor Fravel argues that among three kinds of territorial disputes, China
has been able to either comprise or maintain the status quo on ‘frontier disputes’ and
‘offshore island dispute’, but to stand tough on ‘homeland disputes’, namely the issue
71. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 241.
72. Moody, ‘The evolution of China’s national interest’, pp. 41–42.
73. Erik Eckholm, ‘As Taiwan votes in close 3-way race today, a weak government is the likeliest outcome’, The New
York Times, (18 March 2000), available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/18/world/taiwan-votes-close-3-way-racetoday-weak-government-likeliest-outcome.html?pagewanted ¼ all&src ¼ pm (accessed 1 January 2012).
74. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?, p. 245.
75. Shirk, China.
76. Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 129.
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of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.77 Issues involving homeland disputes are issues
of regime survival. By all means, China cannot afford to let Taiwan become
independent without putting up a fight first, but now both Beijing and Taiwan may be
realizing that this option may never have to be used as China continues to gain
confidence and dominance regionally and globally.
However, the changing dynamics of identities and nationalisms in Taiwan and
China is still an evolutionary process. Identities and nationalisms have changed in the
past. The good news from a constructivist perspective is that they can change again in
the future. As a matter of fact, it is perhaps being changed as we speak. The future of
the Taiwan Strait requires another norm change that’s already in the making. That is
both sides must realize that interdependence, conflict avoidance, and the preservation
of peace and stability are in the best interests of everyone on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait, as well as for everyone in the region and the world.
77. M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Regime insecurity and international cooperation: explaining China’s compromises in
territorial disputes’, International Security 30, (2005), pp. 46 –83.
142