AHumanRighttoDemocracy?
FabiennePeter1
UniversityofWarwick
PenultimatedraftofmychapterinPhilosophicalFoundationsofHumanRights,editedbyRowan
Cruft,S.MatthewLiao,andMassimoRenzo.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2015.
1. Introduction
Thereissomethingcounterintuitiveaboutimposingdemocracyonpeoples.Intherecentdebatein
politicalandlegalphilosophy,manyhavearguedagainstthehumanrighttodemocracy,oftenon
groundsofitsconflictwithanotherright,therighttoself-determination(e.g.Cohen2006;Lister
2012;Reidy2012).Thethoughtisthatthehumanrighttoself-determination,whichallowspeoples
tochoosetheirownconstitutionanddevelopment,wouldbeunderminedbythehumanrightto
democracy,whichrequiresaspecificconstitutionandthusrestrictsdevelopmentalchoices.
ThomasChristiano,inhiscontributiontothisvolume,challengesthislineofthought.Hearguesthat,
properlyunderstood,therighttoself-determinationpresupposestherighttodemocracy.
Christiano’sargumentreversestheorderofprioritybetweenthetworights.Heaimstoshowthat
therighttodemocracyhaspriorityovertherighttoself-determination.Buthealsowantstoargue
thataffirmingthepriorityofdemocracyneednotimplyreservingtherighttoself-determinationto
democraticpeoples.Theinnovativecoreofhispaperconsistsinhisproposalforhowtherightto
1
IgreatlybenefittedfromaseriesofworkshopsonhumanrightsthatRowanCruftandothersorganizedatthe
UniversityofStirling.I’malsoverygratefulforcommentsI’vereceivedfromTomChristianoandMassimo
Renzo.
1
democracycanbemadecompatiblewiththerighttoself-determinationevenforpeoplesthatare
notdemocratic.
Christiano’sargumentinvolvesthefollowingmainsteps.Hefirstdefendsthehumanrightto
democracy,bothoninstrumentalandonintrinsicgrounds.Hethenmovesontotherighttoselfdeterminationandoffersaninterpretationofthisrightasgroundedintheprotectionofthesame
interestsastherighttodemocracy.Thisstepaimstoestablishthatthereisnonecessaryconflict
betweenthetworights.2Thefinalstepoftheargumentcoversthecaseoftherighttoselfdeterminationofundemocraticstates.Christianohandlesthisthroughtheintroductionofapower
towaivetherighttodemocracy.Hewrites:“itmakessensetothinkthatthereisapowertowaive
one’srighttodemocracybecausethispowercanbegroundedinthesameinterestsinasserting
controloverone’spoliticalworldthattheclaimrighttodemocracyisgroundedin”(msp.22).While
therighttoself-determinationisthuscontingentontherighttodemocracy,sincetherightto
democracy,likemanyotherrights,isonethatcanbewaived,self-determinationispossibleevenfor
certainnon-democraticstates.
Christiano’sargumentforthepriorityofdemocracyisintertwinedwithaninterest-based,moral
conceptionofhumanrights.Onthisinterpretation,thecaseforthehumanrighttodemocracyrests
onthemoralgoodsthatdemocracyprotects.Andthecaseforthecompatibilitybetweenthehuman
righttodemocracyandthehumanrighttoself-determinationrests,similarly,onthefactthatthe
tworightsprotectthesamemoralgoods.Boththerighttodemocracyandtherighttoselfdeterminationaredefendedasminimalrequirementsofjustice.
Thosewhorejectthehumanrighttodemocracytendtorejectthesufficiencyofsuchjustice-based
argumentsforestablishingahumanright.Theytendtoarguethathumanrightsareandshouldbe
distinctfrommoralrightsbasedonjustice–becauseofwhathumanrightsareand/orbecauseof
2
Gould(2006)andAltmanandWellman(2009)havealsoofferedinterpretationsoftherighttoself-
determinationasrequiringdemocracy.
2
howhumanrightsarejustified.Theydon’tdenythatthereisaconnectionbetweenjusticeand
democracyforsomesocieties.Buttheydenythatthisconnectionissufficienttounderpinthe
humanrighttodemocracy.
Therearetwomainwaysinwhichthecasecanbemade.3Thefirstfocusesonthenatureofhuman
rights.Itstressesthefunctionalroleofhumanrights,forexamplewithregardtothejustificationof
third-partyinterventionsortheexclusionfromtheinternationalcommunity.Thesecondfocuseson
thejustificationofhumanrightsandappealstonon-parochialnormativefoundationsforhuman
rights.InJohnRawls’treatmentofhumanrights,aswellasinsomeotherapproaches,thetwo
aspectsarenotsharplydistinguishedbutarejointlyinvokedinsupportofapoliticalconceptionof
humanrightsthatcanunderpininternationallegitimacy.
Inthiscomment,Ishallsidewiththosewhorejectthejustice-basedcaseforthehumanrightto
democracy,focusingonthejustificatorychallengethathumanrightsface.4Mysympathiesarewith
thepoliticalconceptionofhumanrights.Ithinkitisamistaketothinkabouthumanrightsin
straightforwardlymoralterms,asdiscoveredrightsthatexplicatecertainuniversalmoralfacts.This
strikesmeasempiricallyandhistoricallyinadequate.Italsoobscuresthesignificanceofthe
achievementofcontemporaryhumanrightspractice,namelythatthepracticehascreateda
standardforinternationalpoliticallegitimacy.Humanrightsapplytonational,internationaland
globalpolitics.Thisstandardisnotsetinstone,ofcourse:humanrightsareaworkinprogressand
assuchsubjecttobothnegativecriticism–focusingonproblemsofthecurrentsetofstandards–
andpositivecriticism–proposalsforwhatshouldbeincluded.Butwhiletheachievementmaybe
fragile,thisdoesnotlessenthenormativesignificanceofthepoliticalproject,itseemstome.Vice
versa,theattempttoovercomethisfragilitybyprovidingmoralfoundationstothisprojectrisks
beingtooparochialtobesuccessful.
3
I’musingTasioulas’s(2009)helpfuldistinctionhere.
4
ItisbasedonideasthatI’vedevelopedmorefullyinPeter(2013a).
3
IthinkChristiano’sargumentforthehumanrighttodemocracyfailsbecauseitdoesn’tsufficiently
addressthejustificatorychallenge.Mycommentdoesn’tfocusontheconflictbetweendemocracy
andself-determination,however.IthinkChristianoisrighttoquestionthepriorityoftherightto
self-determination.Instead,Ishallcontrastthejustice-basedargumentforahumanrightto
democracywithalegitimacy-basedargumentforahumanrighttopoliticalparticipation–I
understandtherighttopoliticalparticipationinaweakersensethantherighttodemocracy.ButI
willdiscusstheimplicationsofthisrighttopoliticalparticipationforself-determinationinthefinal
section.5
2. TwoConceptionsofHumanRights
Christianoprovidesamoraldefenseofthehumanrighttodemocracy.Thedefenserestsontwo
claims:(i)thathumanrightsarebestinterpretedasminimalnormsofjusticeand(ii)thatminimal
justicerequiresdemocracy.Letmediscusstheminturn,startingwiththeconceptionofhuman
rights.
ThenormativecommitmentatthecoreofChristiano’smoraldefenceofthehumanrightto
democracyisthateachperson’sinterestsdeserveequalconsideration.Thisnormativecommitment
explainsboththesignificanceofhumanrightsandthevalueofdemocracy.AdaptingaMillian
thought,humanrightsaremoralrightsgroundedintheprotectionofimportantindividualinterests.
Amoralrighttoxisahumanrightwhentheinterestsaresuchthatthereis“astrongmoral
justificationforanystatetorespect,protect,andpromotealegalorconventionalrighttoxinall
persons”(ms3).Notallmoralrightswillpassthistestandsonotallmoralrightsarenecessarily
humanrights.
5
IshallfollowChristianobyfocusingonlyonpoliticalparticipationinthedomesticcontext.InPeter(2013a)
I’vecommentedonthepossibilityofbroadeningtherighttopoliticalparticipationintheinternationaland
globalcontext.
4
Thisconceptionofhumanrightsfollowstheorthodoxpattern.Theorthodoxconceptioncontrasts
withapoliticalconceptionofhumanrightswithregardtoboththenatureofhumanrightsandthe
justificationofrights.Ontheorthodoxconception,humanrightsaremoralrightsthatallhuman
beingshavequasalientfeaturesoftheirhumanity.Salientfeaturesmayrelatetofundamental
interests(e.g.Raz1986)orbasicaspectsofhumanagency(e.g.Griffin2008).Onthepolitical
conception,humanrightsareasetofspecialrightsthathavetheiroriginsinsalientfeaturesof
contemporaryhumanrightspractice(Beitz2009).Differentconceptionsidentifydifferentfeatures
ofthispracticeassalient.6
Withregardtothequestionofwhatjustifieshumanrights,defendersoftheorthodoxconception
typicallymaintainthatordinarymoralreasoningisnecessaryandsufficienttoestablishwhatshould
countasahumanright.Defendersofthepoliticalconception,bycontrast,typicallymaintainthat
humanrightsarebasedonpoliticalnormsandestablishedbysomeformofpublicreasonorpublic
reasoning.
Thereareimportantobjectionstotheorthodoxconceptionofhumanrights.Oneconcernsthe
justificationofhumanrights.Ifhumanrightsaretofunctionasastandardofinternationalpolitical
legitimacy,theyneedanon-parochialjustification.Theobjectionagainsttheorthodoxconceptionis
thatordinarymoralreasoningproducesdisagreementandassuchcannotjustifyhumanrights.
6
Notethatinadditiontothesepureformsofthetraditionalandthepoliticalconceptionofhumanrights,
somewritershaverecentlyproposedmixedconceptions.JosephRaz(2007,2010)is,Ithink,bestunderstood
asdefendingamixedconception.Heacceptsthepoliticalconceptionwithregardtothefirstdimension–with
regardtothequestionofwhathumanrightsare.Buthecombinesthiswiththeviewthatwhatjustifieshuman
rightsisordinarymoralreasoning.RainerForst(2010)isdrawntotheoppositemove:hedefineshumanrights
onthebasisofsalientfeaturesofhumanagency,butanswersthequestionofhowtheyarejustifiedby
invokinganaccountofpublicreasoning.
5
Idon’tthinkChristianohasagoodanswertothisobjection.Hemayclaimthatwhilemoral
disagreementisindeedcommon,itwillbelesscommonwithregardtotheminimalrequirementsof
justiceonwhichhisaccountofthehumanrighttodemocracyrests.Thatmayormaynotbeso;it’s
anempiricalquestion.Butmypointisthatwhendisagreementsdooccurabouthowsocietiesshould
beorganized,theorthodoxaccountdoesn’thaveastrategytoconfrontthem.Instead,itmerely
assertsoneblueprintforhowsocietyshouldbeorganized.
WhenRawlsoriginallycameupwiththeideaofapoliticalconceptionofjusticeforthedomestic
caseofliberaldemocracies,heproposedtocircumventcontroversiesaboutthemoralityofjustice
bydevelopingaconceptionofjusticebasedonfundamentalpoliticalvaluesembodiedindemocracy
(Rawls1993).Thethoughtwasthatwhilewemightdisagreeaboutthegood,wecanagreethatwe
liveinademocracyandthatademocracyisbasedoncertainvalues.Defendersofapolitical
conceptionofhumanrightsaredrawntothesamethought:whilewearelikelytodisagreeabout
whatmakesalifegowellandwhatpeopleneedtomaketheirlivesgowell,wecanagree–and
that’stheachievementofthecontemporaryhumanrightspractice–thatthereissuchathingasa
humanrightspracticeandthatthispracticeisassociatedwithcertainpoliticalnormsandvalues.
Referencetosalientfeaturesofthecontemporarypracticeoffersawayofsettlingdisagreements
thatarelikelytoariseabouthumanneedsandinterests.
Asecondimportantobjectiontotheorthodoxconceptionisthatithasthewrongaccountofwhat
humanrightsare.Thisobjectioncomesinseveralversions.Onefocusesontheaccountof
universalitythattheorthodoxconceptiongivesriseto.Withregardtobasichumanrightsatleast,
theorthodoxconceptionappearstobecommittedtoatimelessnessabouthumanrightsthat
doesn’tsitwellwithhumanrightspractices.Humanrightsarenottimeless,butthatdoesn’tmean
thattheyarenotuniversal.AsRaz(2010:41)hasconvincinglyargued,humanrightsarebest
understoodascommittedtosynchronicuniversality–asrightsallhumanbeingsalivetodayhave.
Thepoliticalconceptioncaneasilyaccommodatesynchronicuniversality.
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Withregardtothehumanrighttodemocracy,Ithinkthatitisnotplausibletoclaimtimeless
universality.Democracyisapoliticalinstitution–or,moreaccurately,afamilyofsetsofpolitical
institutions–thathasevolvedovertimeand,whoknows,thatmayfurtherevolveinthefutureor
evendisappearcompletely.Soifthereistobeahumanrighttodemocracyatall,itcanonlybea
rightthatisrelativetospecifichistoricalcircumstances.Butoncethispointisaccepted,thequestion
whethertherelevanthistoricalcircumstancescurrentlyobtaininternationallyisonceagainwide
open.Themoralcaseforahumanrighttodemocracythusdoesn’tseemtoachievethatmuch.
Arelatedversionoftheobjectionstatesthathumanrightsareasetofexplicitlypoliticalnormsthat
onlymakesenseincertaininstitutionalcontexts(Beitz2009).Humanrightsgettheirdistinctive
contentnotfromessentialfeaturesofhumanityassuch,butfrominstitutionalizedrelations
betweenindividualsandtheirgovernmentsandotherpoliticalagents.Thepoliticalconceptionof
humanrightsisbetterequippedtocapturethisaspectofhumanrightspracticethanthetraditional
conception.Manyhavearguedthatthisobjectionfails,however,astheorthodoxconceptionof
humanrightscanincorporatetheinstitutionalspecificityofhumanrights(e.g.LiaoandEtinson
2012).Indeed,aswesaw,Christiano’sversionoftheorthodoxconceptionalsoemphasizestherole
oftheinternationalcommunityandofinternationallawforhumanrights.
Still,therelationshipbetweenhumanrightsandtheinstitutionalcontextthatChristianopostulates
restsonasetoffundamentalintereststhatheidentifiesasessentialfeaturesofhumanitytowhicha
conceptionofjusticeresponds.Assuch,Christianooffersaparticularmoralinterpretationofthe
politicalprojectthathumanrightsstandfor.ButIdon’tthinkthatamoralinterpretationbest
furthersthehumanrightsproject;it’stoodivisive.Thisgetsmebacktotheproblemofjustifying
humanrights.Thepoliticalconceptionofhumanrightscandealwiththespecificallypoliticalproject
thathumanrightsaremoredirectlyandalreadyfactorsinthejustificatoryproblem.
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3. Justice,Legitimacy,andtheHumanRighttoDemocracy
IsitpossibleforChristianotoarguethatbecauseofthespecialwayinwhichhisapproach
emphasizesthelinkbetweenjusticeanddemocracy,theobjectionfromdisagreementandthe
problemofjustifyinghumanrightsaretakenintoaccount?Idon’tthinkhecanandthat’sbecauseI
don’tthinkhisargumentforthehumanrighttodemocracyworks.
Christianodefendsdemocracyonbothinstrumentalandintrinsicgrounds.Theinstrumental
argument,morefullydevelopedinChristiano(2011),isbasedontheempiricalclaimthat
democraciesbetterprotectarangeofhumanrightsthannon-democracies.Therearesome
questionsaboutthisargument(Lister2012;Reidy2012).Oneiswhetherthecorrelationisactually
withdemocracyorwhetheritisinsteadwithobservanceoftheruleoflaw.Ifthecorrelationiswith
democracy,anotherquestioniswhetherdemocracyisstrictlynecessaryfortheprotectionofthe
otherhumanrightsormerelyoftenassociatedwithit.Rawls,forexample,capturedthepossibilityof
peoplesthatarenon-democraticyetnothumanrightsviolating,throughhiscategoryof“decent
societies”(1999:4).Ishallleavetheseworriesabouttheinstrumentaldefenceofdemocracytothe
side.
Theintrinsicargumentisbasedondemocracy’segalitarianismandisdevelopedmorefullyinthe
ConstitutionofEquality.Itstartsfromthenormativecommitmentthateachperson’sinterests
matterequally.Accordingtothis“egalitarian”argument,democracyisdistinctivebecauseitisthe
onlypoliticalregimethatpubliclyaffirmsequality.HereiswhatChristianohastosayinsupportof
therelationshipbetweendemocracyandjusticeunderstoodasthepublicaffirmationofequality:
“Thefundamentalargumentfordemocracyatthedomesticlevelisthatitisnecessarytothe
publicrealizationoftheequaladvancementoftheinterestsofthemembersofsociety.
Personshavefundamentalpoliticalinterestsinshapingthesocietytheylivein.Theyhave
interestsincorrectingforthecognitivebiasesofothersindetermininghowtoshapethe
society.Theyhaveinterestsinbeingathomeintheworldtheylive.Andtheyhaveinterests
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inbeingrecognizedandaffirmedasequals.Againstthebackgroundofconflictofinterest,
disagreement,cognitivebiasandfallibilityonhowbesttoorganizesociety,theonlypublic
wayofrealizingtheequalityofpersonsinasocietyistogiveeachanequalsayinhowto
shapesociety”(ms.9).
Thedemandfordemocracyissupportedbythreeconsiderations,situatedinacontextoffourmain
factsaboutourjudgmentsabouthowtheworldshouldbeorganized.Thefourfactsare:(i)conflict
ofinterest,(ii)cognitivebias,(iii)fallibility,and,presumablyasaconsequenceofthefirstthree,(iv)
extensivedisagreement.Theconsiderationssupportingdemocracyare(i)theinterestincorrecting
thecognitivebiasofothers,(ii)theinterestinbeingathomeintheworld,and(iii)theinteresttobe
recognizedandrespected.Themainideaunitingthemisthatthereisvalueintheconnection
betweenpeople’sjudgmentsabouthowtheworldshouldbeorganizedandhowtheworldis
actuallyorganized.Andonlydemocracycandelivertherightkindofconnectionbetweenthetwo,
Christianoargues:
“theonlypublicwaytorealizeequalityistoensurethatpersonshaveequalopportunitiesto
shapethesocietyinaccordancewiththeirjudgments.Thisisnottosaythattheother
substantiveformsofequalityarenotimportantbutitistosaythattheycannotachievethe
publicrealizationofequalityunderthenormalcircumstancesofpoliticalsocietiesifthe
democraticrealizationisnotpresent.Democracyisindispensableforthis”(msp.10).
Iwanttoasktwomainquestionsaboutthisintrinsicargument.First,istheintrinsicargumentagood
argumentfordemocracy?And,second,doesitsupportahumanrighttodemocracy?
IamverymuchinsympathywithChristiano’scharacterizationofthebackgroundconditionsthat
shapepoliticaldecisionsandtheevaluationofpoliticalinstitutions.Ialsothinkhe’srightto
emphasizethesignificanceofpoliticalparticipationassuchandnotjustitsoutcomes.ButI’mnot
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convincedbyhisjustice-basedargumentforwhypoliticalparticipationissignificantandasaresult
I’mnotconvincedbyhisargumentfordemocracy.
Asothershavealsopointedout(e.g.Estlund2009),Christiano’sargumentfordemocracyfacesan
epistemicchallenge.Thechallengeis:whyassumethatdemocracyperformsbetterthanalternative
politicalregimesinsecuringthe“publicrealizationoftheequaladvancementoftheinterestsofthe
membersofsociety”?Or,toputthesamepointslightlydifferently,whatisthelinkbetweenequality
asaconstraintonthedecision-makingprocedureandequalityasaconstraintontheresults?Aswe
saw,Christiano’s“egalitarian”argumentaimstoshowthatgiventhebackgroundconditionsof
politics,onlydemocracycansecure(i)theinterestincorrectingthecognitivebiasofothers,(ii)the
interestinbeingathomeintheworld,and(iii)theinteresttoberecognizedandrespected.
But,surely,evenifweacceptChristiano’smoraltheory,it’stoostrongtoclaimweeachvalueour
ownpoliticalparticipationinordertosecuretheseinterests.Imayhaveaninterestthatthe
cognitivebiasofothersiscorrected–bymeorbysomeoneelse.Ifsomeoneelseisabletocorrect
others’cognitivebiasesonmybehalf,thatmustbesufficient.Similarly,Imayhaveaninterestin
seeingaconnectionbetweenmyjudgmentabouthowtheworldshouldbeorganizedandhowthe
worldisorganized.Butthatdoesn’timplythatInecessarilyhaveaninterestinexpressingmy
judgment.Finally,theinteresttoberecognizedandrespectedneedalsonothaveitsprime
expressionthroughpoliticalparticipation–itmaybepossibleformetoberecognizedandrespected
inotherwaysthataremoreimportant.Ifwegranttheselimitationsonthemoralvalueofthe
collectivedecision-makingprocedure,however,thenthenecessarylinktodemocracyislost.Itthen
becomespossiblethatnon-democraticdecision-makingproceduresarebettersuitedthan
democracytoachieveacertaindesirableoutcome.
Toarguefordemocracy,Ithinkitisnecessarytocombineanargumentforpoliticalequalitywithan
epistemicargument.Onewaytodothatisbyfocusingonhowdemocracyperformsandby
defendingitongroundsofitspotentialtoachievejustoutcomes.DavidEstlund(2008)hasadopted
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thisepistemicinstrumentalistapproach,butIdon’tthinkthatitissuccessfuleither.Instead,Ithink
democracyisbestdefendedongroundsoftheproceduralepistemicvaluesthatitembodies,values
thatbecomesignificantincircumstanceswhereacollectivecannotestablishwhatthecorrect
decisionwouldbe(Peter2008;2013b).
Whiletheepistemicinstrumentalistoption,ifitweresuccessful,wouldretainthelinkbetween
justiceanddemocracy,theepistemicproceduralistalternativethatIfavourdistinguishesmore
sharplybetweenthelegitimacyofdemocraticdecision-makingandthejusticeofitsoutcomes.The
ideaisnotthatdemocracyislegitimatebecauseittendstoproducejustoutcomes.Itis,rather,that
legitimacyisanormativeconceptinitsownright,significantincircumstanceswheremore
comprehensivemoralassessmentsfail–becauseofvaluepluralism,forexample.ThereasonwhyI
favourtheepistemicproceduralistapproachisbecauseIthinkthatdemocracyhasitsnaturalspace
insituationswherethereisnoaccesstoaprivilegedpositionfromwhichtomakevalidassertions
aboutwhichdecisionshouldbemadeandwheredemocraticproceduresarethemselves
epistemicallyvaluable.Whenitispossibletomakevalidfactualormoralclaimsabouthowsociety
shouldbeorganized,thereislessscopefordemocracy.
Thisepistemicargumentunderminesthejustice-basedcasefordemocracyevenforthedomestic
contextofliberaldemocracies.Meanwhile,manysocietiesdonotcurrentlyhavepoliticalinstitutions
thatresembleademocracy.Whataretheimplicationsofalegitimacy-basedargumentforahuman
righttodemocracyforthosesocieties?Idon’tthinkthatthereisaclearlegitimacy-basedcasefora
humanrighttodemocracy.Ishallfocusontheidealitself,leavingasideproblemsthatwouldarise
withimplementingaparticularsetofdemocraticinstitutions(Beitz2009).
Canpoliticalinstitutionsthatarenotfullydemocratic–whateverexactlythatissupposedtomean–
producelegitimatedecisions?Thedominantviewindemocratictheoryanddemocratization
researchhasbeenthatpoliticalinstitutionsthatarenotfullydemocraticareseenasdeficientandin
needofcorrectionindirectionoffulldemocracy.Therecentliteratureondemocratization(e.g.,
11
Carothers2002)challengesthisso-calledtransitionalparadigm,however.Basedonresearchonnew
formsofpoliticalparticipationbothinWesternliberaldemocraciesandincountrieswithother
politicalregimes,analternativeparadigmindemocratizationresearchisemergingthatfocuseson
thepossibilityofastablecoexistenceofelementsfromdifferentregimetypes–democraticand
authoritarian–andexaminesthediversityofchannelsofpoliticalparticipationbeyondtraditional
democraticelectoralpolitics(e.g.,Norris2002).Thetransitionalparadigmsuggestsafalsedualism
betweenpoliticallylegitimatedemocraciesandillegitimatenon-democracies.Thedualismisfalse
becauseitobscuresthemanywaysinwhichevenestablishedliberaldemocraciescontain
authoritarianelementsand,viceversa,howtherecanbemultipleformsofpoliticalparticipation
beyondthosenarrowlyassociatedwithahumanrighttodemocracy.Ifthetransitionalparadigmis
rejectedinfavourofamorepluralistmodelofpoliticalregimes,however,thelegitimacy-basedcase
forahumanrighttodemocracycrumbles.
Thissaid,Ifinditveryplausiblethatsomepoliticalparticipationmustbepossibleinlightofthe
backgroundconditionsofpoliticsthatChristianolists:cognitivebias,fallibility,conflictofinterest,
anddisagreement.NothinginwhatIhavesaidsofar,however,forcesmetodenythatthereisa
righttopoliticalparticipationasrecognizedbytheUniversalDeclarationandtheCovenantonCivil
andPoliticalRights.Andthatisbecausetherighttopoliticalparticipation,whileitisfrequently
interpretedasarighttodemocracy,canbeinterpretedinweakerterms.HenrySteiner(1988)
arguesthathumanrightsconventionsencouragefull-fledgeddemocraticparticipationasa
programmaticideal,buttheydonotrequireit.7Therighttopoliticalparticipationhastwoparts:an
“electionclause”anda“takepart”clause(Steiner1988:86).Thetakepartclauseistoovagueto
requireanyparticularpoliticalsystemandwouldbesatisfiedbyarighttoparticipateindeliberative
politicalprocesses.Theelectionsclauseismorespecific,butit,too,canbesatisfiedbypolitical
7
SeealsoLister(2012)forarecentargumentinfavouroftreatingdemocracyasanaspirationalideal,butnot
asahumanright.
12
systemsotherthandemocraticself-governmentasmodelled,say,onmodernWesterndemocracies.
Bothclausescanthusbeinterpretedinwaysthatdonotrequiredemocracy.Therighttopolitical
participation,understoodinthisway,neitherpresupposesdemocraticinstitutionsnordoesit
demandthattheybeimposedwheretheyareabsent.
4. PoliticalParticipationandSelf-determination
InthisfinalpartofmycommentIwanttoreturntomystarting-point,therelationshipbetweena
righttodemocracyandarighttoself-determination.TheCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights
recognizesbotharighttoself-determination(article1)andarighttopoliticalparticipation(article
25).Theofficialcommentonarticle25explicitlyaddressestherelationshiptoarticle1and
emphasizesthatthetworightsarenotintension.Itexplainsthatwhiletherighttoselfdeterminationisarightofpeoples,therighttopoliticalparticipationisarightofindividuals.The
righttopoliticalparticipation,asmentioned,istherightofindividualstotakepartinpoliticalaffairs,
includinginsomeformofelections.Accordingtotherighttoself-determination,peoplesshouldbe
freetochoosetheirconstitutionandtheir“economic,social,andculturaldevelopment”.Thisarticle
alsoformulatesanobligationonallpeoplestofosterandrespecttheself-determinationofother
peoples.
Topointtothedistinctionbetweenarightofindividualsandarightofpeoplesdoesn’tseem
sufficienttoruleoutconflict,however.Itisentirelypossiblethataparticularrightofpeopleshas
implicationsthatareintensionwithsomerightsofindividualsand,viceversa,thatrightsof
individualshaveimplicationsforthedecision-makingofpeoples.IthusthinkthatChristianoisright
toprobedeeper.Asmentioned,hispaperattemptstodispelconflictbyde-prioritisingtherightto
self-determinationandprovidinganaccountoftherighttoself-determinationthatrestsontheright
todemocracy.AccordingtoChristiano,thereisnorighttoself-determinationthatiscompatiblewith
thedenialoftherighttodemocracy.Self-determination,properlyunderstood,justistheexpression
ofthecollectiveexerciseoftherighttodemocracyor,asanaddedtwist,ofthecollectivewaiver–
13
notdenial–oftherighttodemocracy.Therighttoself-determinationprotectsboththecollective
exerciseoftherighttodemocracyandthecollectivewaiverofthisright.
Whilethissolutionisveryelegant,I’mnotconvincedbyitsnormativeappeal.AndthatisbecauseI
don’tbelievethatthemoralcaseforahumanrighttodemocracyissuccessful.AsI’vearguedinthe
previoussection,Ithinkweshouldpursuealegitimacy-basedapproachandthatthisapproachcan
onlysupportahumanrighttopoliticalparticipation,notarighttodemocracy.Butifthereisnocase
forahumanrighttodemocracy,thentheinterpretationoftherighttoself-determinationasbased
ontherighttodemocracyalsofails.Andifwerejectthatinterpretation,thenthetensionresurfaces:
whiletherighttodemocracyimpliesthataparticularconstitutionshouldbeimposedonpeoples,
therighttoself-determinationimpliesgreaterchoiceinthisregard.
Still,IthinkChristianoisrightthatweshouldquestionthepriorityofanunqualifiedrighttoselfdetermination.Isitpossibletoendorsethepriorityoftherighttopoliticalparticipationand
reconcileitwiththerighttoself-determination?Ithinkthisispossible,alongthelinesofwhatthe
commentonarticle25suggests.Iftherighttopoliticalparticipationisinterpretedinaweakersense
thantherighttodemocracy,itdoesnotpresupposeablue-printforhowsocietyshouldbe
organized.Assuch,itcan,moreplausiblythantherighttodemocracy,beinterpretedin
individualisticterms,asarighttobeheardinprocessesofpublicreasoning.Beyondthat,itleavesit
topeoplestodeterminewhatsetofinstitutionstheywanttoadopt.
Isthatproposalunappealingbecauseitistooundemanding?Idon’tthinkso.Note,first,thathuman
rightsdon’tfullydeterminepoliticallegitimacy–additionaldomesticconstraintswouldapply.In
addition,thehumanrighttopoliticalparticipationisonlyoneelement,albeitanimportantone,of
theminimalrequirementsoflegitimacy.But,morepositively,thereisasenseinwhichahumanright
topoliticalparticipationintheweaksenseismoreempoweringthanthehumanrighttodemocracy,
preciselybecauseitdoesnotpresupposeanyparticularsetofinstitutions.Itputsthechoiceof
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politicalinstitutionsmoredirectlyinpeople'shandsthanaversionofthisrightthatisconstrainedby
aparticularmoralblueprint.
5. References
Altman,AndrewandChristopherHealthWellman.2009.ALiberalTheoryofInternationalJustice.
Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
Beitz,Charles.2009.TheIdeaofHumanRights.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
Carothers,Thomas.2002.“TheEndoftheTransitionParadigm.”JournalofDemocracy13(1):5-21
Christiano,Thomas.2008.TheConstitutionofEquality.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
Christiano,Thomas.2011.“AnInstrumentalArgumentforaHumanRighttoDemocracy.”Philosophy
&PublicAffairs39(2):142–176.
Christiano,Thomas.2013.“Self-DeterminationandtheHumanRighttoDemocracy.”MS.
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