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Contents
Secondary sources
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Curriculum for Excellence ideas
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Assessment is for Learning ideas
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Website links
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Teaching plan
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Extended essay
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Secondary sources
Issue 1: Worsening relations with England
J D Mackie, on the immediate cause of the Revolution of 1688 –9 following
James VII and II’s policy of appointing Roman Catholics to high office, from
A History of Scotland, pp242–3:
The birth of a Prince of Wales in June convinced England that James’s policy
would survive his death, and the arrest of the ‘Seven Bishops’ stirred into
activity resentment already awakened by the promotion of Roman Catholics
to power and office. Before long William of Ora nge received an invitation
from English magnates, both Whig and Tory, to which, after some
negotiation, he replied that he would come to ensure that all pressing
questions of Church and State should be settled by a free Parliament.
A I Macinnes, on the Claim of Right, from Union and Empire: The Making
of the United Kingdom in 1707, p87:
Of greater constitutional significance was the unshackling of Court control
over the Scottish Estates at the Revolution, which was also marked by a
secular addition to the country’s burgeoning written constitutions. Without
recourse to the religious imperatives of covenanting, the Claim of Right,
issued by the Convention in April 1689, stressed the fundamental, contractual
nature of the Scottish state by deposing James VII rather than following the
English fiction of abdication.
Michael Lynch, on the Glencoe Massacre and its place in the context of
government attempts to control the Highlands, from Scotland: A New History,
p307:
The product of a moderate Highland policy wh ich went badly wrong, the
Glencoe massacre was an accurate mirror of the divisions and different lines
of communications which existed within William’s government and had
indeed permeated every Stewart government throughout the century... The
effects of the massacre were complicated but to contemporaries seemed more
clear-cut than they really were: the government had lost control of the
Highlands; the always fragile balance between an understanding with the
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chiefs implying their acceptance of the regime a nd a government presence to
enforce it was never more brittle than in the two decades after 1692.
Christopher A Whatley, on the key issues affecting Scotland in the years
after the Revolution of 1688–9 and their link to eventual union, from The
Scots and the Union, p139:
Four factors in the 1690s tipped Scotland over the edge of an economic abyss
that was to have profound political consequences for the nation’s history.
They were, first, a series of harvest failures – King William’s ‘Ill Years’;
second, the deleterious effects of the Nine Years War, particularly the loss of
the French market; third, the erection of protective tariffs by countries
overseas which blocked the export of certain Scottish goods; and, finally,
what would become the disaster of Darien, Scotland’s extraordinarily
ambitious scheme to establish a trading colony in south America that would
form a commercial bridge between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. As it
happened, the outcome – eventually – was incorporating union, but the
decade of crisis might equally have produced a very different result.
J D Mackie, on the difficulties between William and the Scottish Parliament
in addition to disagreement over the Committee of the Articles, from A
History of Scotland, p254:
Confronted by a Parliament becoming more independent and more
representative, William relied upon the expedient of offering posts and
gratifications to nobles and burgesses, but his relations with Scotland
remained uneasy. Apart from the causes of friction already mention ed, there
was a permanent underlying cause of difference in the matter of foreign
policy. William from 1689 to 1697 was at war with France, and France was
Scotland’s old ally. Scottish money was spent, and Scottish lives were lost –
the Cameronians, for example, suffered dreadfully at Steenkirk (1692) – in a
quarrel which was repugnant to Scottish sentiment and which injured an old established Scottish trade. The ill-will between the two governments came to
a head with the failure of the ‘Darien Scheme’.
Paul Henderson Scott, on King William’s role in English efforts to deny
foreign investment in the Company of Scotland, from The Union of 1707:
Why and How, pp16–7:
William gave assent to the Act as King of Scots, but as King of England he
did all he could to frustrate it. English trading interests and the English
Parliament saw the proposals for a Company of Scotland as a potential rival
to the English East India Company. On 17th December 1695 the Lords and
Commons presented an address to the King protestin g against ‘the great
prejudice, inconvenience and mischief’ that would result to English trade
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from the Scottish Act. William replied: ‘I have been ill -served in Scotland,
but hope some remedies may be found to prevent the inconveniences which
may arise from this Act’. Under the Act establishing the Company 50 per cent
of the share holding was reserved to Scottish residents, and 50 per cent was
available to English investors. The English share was oversubscribed within a
few days, but was all withdrawn when royal displeasure was made known.
English diplomatic influence in Europe discouraged continental investment.
The English Company and English Ambassador to Spain virtually encouraged
a Spanish attack on the Scottish settlement.
Christopher A Whatley, on William’s reluctance to win the hearts and
minds of Scotland despite there existing a willingness in Scotland to support
him, from The Scots and the Union, p140:
Attempts by Scottish ministers throughout William’s reign to persuade him to
visit Scotland, however, fell on deaf ears. Jacobite conspiracies south of the
border were endemic prior to 1696, when a plot to assassinate the king was
uncovered. This, followed in 1697 by the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick in
which Louis XIV agreed to withdraw succour from William’s enemies, and
the arrival of what was received as a blessed peace, did much to revive
support from the king.
Douglas Watt, on the Scots who invested in the Company of Scotland , from
The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of Na tions, p47:
At the heart of the history of the Company of Scotland was a group of
individuals who never travelled to Darien, who never felt the heat of the
Central American jungle or smelled the stench of death in the huts of
Caledonia, and as a result have not featured highly in the accounts of
historians. These were the men and women who, in very large numbers for
the period, became shareholders in the Company and provided the money to
fund the venture. They spent the years from 1696 to 1707 on an emotio nal
rollercoaster between ecstasy and despair, waiting expectantly for each crumb
of news. An examination of who they were, and why they were willing in
such numbers to invest in a joint-stock company in 1696, is of central
importance not just to the history of the Company but also to explaining the
passage of the Treaty of Union through the Scottish parliament in 1707.
A I Macinnes, on problems facing William in Scotland in 1700, from Union
and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707 , p89:
By this juncture, William was facing more formidable opposition from within
Scotland. A Country interest had emerged as a confederated opposition, intent
on using Darien as a means not of attacking the king directly but of removing
the dominance of the Court and English ministries over Scottish affairs.
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William, 4th Duke of Hamilton, a sympathiser with the exiled Stuarts, was
suspected of involvement, but not directly implicated, in the failed plot to
assassinate William of Orange at the outset of 1696. He led this incipient
political party, having returned to public life during the Darien crisis.
Although Hamilton was ambitious for office he was financially vulnerable.
Paul Henderson Scott, on English influence over Scottish affairs even before
Union, from The Union of 1707: Why and How, p22:
The domination of England was not confined to foreign policy, but extended
also to a large measure of intervention in the internal affairs of Scotland. The
appointment of officers of state, that is the ministers of the S cottish
Government, and all other senior appointments, were made nominally by the
monarch, but again on the advice of the English Government. Money raised
by taxation in Scotland was transferred to London and controlled by the
English Treasury. The ministers of the Scottish Government were not only
appointed, but were paid by London, and were instructed nominally by the
monarch, but again in practice by English ministers. The Scottish Parliament
could debate as it please and pass Acts as it wished, but agai n they required
royal assent from London. It is therefore not surprising that English
Governments had become accustomed to treating Scotland as a dependency
under their control.
Michael Fry, on the ‘Seven Ill Years’, from The Union: England, Scotland
and the Treaty of 1707, p17:
It was through acts not just of man but also of God that Scotland suffered
affliction. Lying at the climactic limits of primitive agriculture, she had often
gone hungry. But the famine of the 1690s went beyond anything known or
remembered. The whole nation seemed to fall back to a lower stage of
development. The economy ground to a halt as merchants exported coin to
buy grain from abroad. The people reverted to barter. The state struggled to
function without the taxes it could not collect. Highland bands debouched in
quest of sustenance on the Lowlands. The Jacobites spoke of ‘King William’s
seven ill years’. That term drew an analogy between him and the wicked
Pharaoh of the Bible to suggest a divine judgement on the Scots for the sin of
dethroning James VII and II.
Douglas Watt, on immediate reaction within the East India Company to the
founding of the Company of Scotland in 1695 , from The Price of Scotland:
Darien, Union and the Wealth of Nations, pp38–9:
On 4 December the directors resolved that one or more ships should be fitted
out for the East Indies and sail for Scotland as soon as possible. Plans were
also to be put in place for a Scottish capital raising. On the same day the East
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India Company appointed a committee to dr aw up for the House of Lords a
list of reasons why the Scottish act of parliament was detrimental to the trade
of England. Panic spread through the English company as rumours circulated
that several of their own directors and shareholders had subscribed to the
‘Scotch Act’. It was declared that those who invested would be excluded from
the court and directors were forced to swear an oath that they had not done
so.
Paul Henderson Scott, on how the place of the Darien disaster in events
leading to Union, from The Union of 1707: Why and How, p20:
It has been said that the Darien episode made a Union with England more
likely or even that it led directly to it. One effect was certainly to weaken the
bargaining strength of Scotland and reduce her capacity to res ist. On the other
hand, it made any form of amicable arrangement less likely by increasing the
Scottish distrust of England.
Michael Fry, on the appointment by Queen Anne and responsibilities of
Godolphin, from The Union: England, Scotland and the Treaty of 1707, p34:
Anne had so far played next to no part in politics and remained almost
unknown outside a circle of ministers. But she set off resolutely enough and
dismissed the Whig Ministers she inherited. She replaced them with Tories or
men sympathetic to Tories, notably Sidney Godolphin, among the greatest
fiscal experts of the day. The range of qualities in Godolphin made him in
essence the queen’s most senior civil servant, brilliant if testy, with the
experience and capacity to run the government’s f inances, patronage,
domestic policy and relations with Scotland (the rest of his time was his own;
he liked nothing so much as a flutter on the horses). He had as little
knowledge as most Englishmen of the Scots, though he knew what he wanted:
a stable Scotland. But stability was not something Scotland offered.
Douglas Watt, on the effect of the Darien disaster on Scottish politicians’
feelings towards England, from The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the
Wealth of Nations, p175:
Anti-English sentiment was intensified by debates in the English Houses of
Parliament in January and February [1700] on the issue of Darien, and a
Union proposal by William. The English Tories killed off the attempt to
reconstitute the relationship between the two kingdoms wi th bitter attacks on
the Scots. Sir Edward Seymour, an old Tory member of the Commons,
famously stated that Scotland ‘was a beggar, and whoever married a beggar
could only expect a louse for a portion’. The English parliament complained
about another pamphlet, An Enquiry into the Causes of the Miscarriage of the
Scots Colony at Darien, which was condemned as a ‘false, scandalous, and
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traitorous libel’ and ordered to be burnt. George Horne thought the nations
might be ‘dasht against one another like two pi tchers’. There was a fear in
government circles of a coup and Marchmont was keeping a careful eye on
the loyalty of army officers’.
A I Macinnes, on the significance of Scottish legislation in 1703, from Union
and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707, p259:
There were two key Acts restricting the prerogative powers of the monarchy.
The first was the Act anent Peace and War which laid claim not so much to an
independent foreign policy as to a binding commitment on Queen Anne’s
successor, if the common monarchy continued, to gain consent from the
Scottish Estates before any war could be declared... In the case of the Act of
Security, however, the presumption was made that the common monarchy
would not continue unless, prior to the death of Queen Anne, ‘there be
conditions of government settled and enacted’ which recognised: the honour
and sovereignty of the separate crown and kingdom; the freedom, frequency
and power of parliaments; and that the religion, liberty and trade of the nation
should not be subject to English or any foreign interference.
Paul Henderson Scott, on Andrew Fletcher’s ‘Twelve Limitations’ proposed
during the debate leading to the Act of Security in 1703, from The Union of
1707: Why and How, p27:
Fletcher proposed a series of ‘Limitations’ on royal powers which would have
transferred them entirely to Parliament. The monarch would be obliged to
sanction all laws passed by parliament and would not have power to make
peace or war or conclude treaties. ‘All places and offices, bot h civil and
military and all pensions shall ever after be given by parliament’. To provide
Scotland with a force to defend itself, ‘all fencible men of the nation, betwixt
sixty and sixteen’ would be armed. Any king who broke any of these
conditions would be declared to have forfeited the Crown.
A I Macinnes, on the political tactics of the Jacobites in the years leading to
1707, from Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707 ,
pp249–50:
By the accession of Queen Anne, Jacobite plotting ha d an increasingly
Scottish focus, partly on account of the claimed facility of Scottish Jacobites
to raise the Highland clans and partly as a reflection on the increasing
unpopularity of William of Orange in Scotland. Plots consistently featured
Hamilton, and other politicians, deemed not amenable to the direction of the
English ministry, who came to be associated with the Duke in the Country
party in 1698. In turn, their purported clandestine association with the French
during the War of the Spanish Succession served as justification for the
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English ministry to countenance armed intervention in Scotland from 1703, as
the latter struggled to come to terms with the legislative war instigated by the
Scottish Estates’ refusal to accept the Hanoverian Successi on. However, the
Scottish Jacobites and their associates within the Country party preferred to
exhaust parliamentary means to oppose union rather than commit to an armed
rising, a position sustained until the Union came into operation in May 1707.
Paul Henderson Scott, on those who faced the greatest threat from the
Aliens Act of 1705, from The Union of 1707: Why and How, p37:
The threats in the English Aliens act were aimed particularly at the lords.
Many of them had a financial interest through their ho ldings of land and
exporters of the agricultural products now threatened with embargo. Also,
since the Union of the Crowns several lords had acquired estates in England
through marriage which were at risk from the threat to ban the inheritance of
property.
Issue 2: Arguments for and against union with England
Christopher A Whatley, on the importance of trade to the argument for
Union, from The Scots and the Union, p96:
In the second half of the seventeenth century a new consideration began to
come to the fore: trade. The prospect of untrammelled Scottish involvement
in the Atlantic trade appealed to Scottish merchants whose activities from
1660 were restricted – but not blocked – by the English navigation acts which
had reduced Scots to the status of foreigners. This, allied to the growing
dependence of the Scots on English markets, aroused enthusiasm for a ‘union
of trade’, particularly among the mercantile communities on the west coast;
in Glasgow there were hopes that William’s appointment as King migh t be
accompanied by such an arrangement. The appeal of free trade however was
by no means confined to those on the Atlantic seaboard, although there are
historians who suspect that politicians simply used this to cloak their real
reasons for supporting union – that is, to strengthen the monarchy.
Karen Bowie, on the political, religious and economic benefits which
supporters of Union hoped for, from T M Devine, Scotland and the Union:
1707–2007, p41:
New research has made it clear that parliamentary votes for the Treaty of
Union rested on a core commitment to the Revolution of 1688 –9 and a desire
to secure Scotland from a return of the Catholic Stuarts ousted in the
Revolution. Many also wished to retain the Presbyterian Church, which had
been re-established in the Revolution settlement with the removal of the
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Stuarts and the Episcopalian Church. Lastly, some hope that the Union
treaty’s economic concessions, including free trade with England and its
colonies, would allow the Scottish economy to recover f rom a deep recession
dating from the 1690s. The evidence of the public debates on union suggests
that this parliamentary support for the treaty reflected opinions held by a
wider, though still limited, constituency.
Christopher A Whatley, on arguments against union based on English
ulterior motives, from The Scots and the Union, p175:
There were those who wanted to resist any moves towards union, interpreting
English interest in this as a means of diverting the attention of Scots from
Darien and their rights there, and a device ‘to make us greater slaves than the
Irish’; ‘all true patriots’ were urged to shun Sir James Ogilvy, Viscount
Seafield, who had been appointed as an emissary by the court and sent north
in January 1700, apparently with £12,000 to distribute and ‘buy us all over
like a pack of beggarly dishonourable Rogues and Villains’. At this stage,
even though attacks on those men who had obtained high office were often
informed as much by jealousy as any genuine doubts their detractors could
have about their patriotism, such reservations did have some substance.
J D Mackie, on the steps taken to discuss union immediately after the
accession of Queen Anne, from A History of Scotland, pp257–8:
In May 1702 she gave her assent to the Act of the Engl ish Parliament
empowering her to appoint Commissioners and in June recommended Union
to the Scottish Parliament which reassembled on the ninth of that month. In
that parliament the opponents of union with England suffered a reverse of
their own making. Hamilton, complaining that parliament had not met,
according to an Act of 1696, within twenty days after the king’s death,
protested that its sitting was illegal and then dramatically walked out with
fifty-seven of his supporters. His action was popular in th e streets, but in the
House it left control to the Court interest which passed a series of Acts
confirming the Revolution Settlement to win Presbyterian support and asked
the Queen to appoint Commissioners to negotiate with those of England. In
November Commissioners from both sides met at Whitehall but, though they
agreed on general principles, they differed on economic details and, in
February 1703, adjourned without reaching a conclusion.
Christopher A Whatley, on the growing case for Incorporating Unio n even
in Scotland, from The Scots and the Union, p217:
Even before the final vote on the Act of Security it had become evident that
in court circles in England, the preference was for an incorporating union.
Incorporation was not a novel idea in Scotland though, and there had been
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fairly strong support for a negotiated union of this kind up to the end of 1702.
Nor was the union option without its supporters in 1704. Lockhart was
irritated that there were so many.
Douglas Watt, on the points of discussion between Scots and English
commissioners in 1702 and 1703, from The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union
and the Wealth of Nations, p224:
The negotiations of 1702/3 reached agreement on a number of points: free
trade between the two kingdoms and the English plantations, a commitment
to the same level of taxes on imports and exports and the abolition of the
Navigation Acts. An area of difficulty remained the debts England had
accumulated since the Revolution and whether Scotland should have to pay a
proportion of them after Union. By 28 January 1703 there was agreement that
neither kingdom should be burdened with debts contracted before the Union,
that no duties or taxes levied in Scotland should be applied to paying English
debts, and that there should be time allowed for the Scots to reap the benefit
of free trade before equal taxation was introduced. Negotiations continued but
reached deadlock over the issue of the Company of Scotland.
Michael Lynch, on the new composition of the Scottish Parliament after
1703 and the effect of this on the arguments for and against Union, from
Scotland: A New History, p311:
In 1703 an event of great significance took place – or so it seemed at the
time. An election produced a new map of Scottish politics, in which both the
Court and Country party were the losers; the Jacobites (who now
masqueraded under the name of Cavaliers) made significant gains, and a
‘New party’, under the leadership of Tweeddale, broke up the old cohesion of
the Countrymen. Union, the failed product of the two old parliaments, now
seemed further away than ever for in England the Whigs had been driven
from office. This was the Scottish parliament which in the course of 1703
wrested control of the House from the court, passed the Act of Security – a
specific riposte to the act of Settlement – by a clear majority of fifty-nine
votes in August, and in the Act anent Peace and War took decisive steps to
prevent Scotland again being dragged into a foreign war by Anne’s successor.
Paul Henderson Scott, on the Scots Commissioners conceding to the English
Commissioners over the notion of Incorporating Union, from Andrew
Fletcher and the Treaty of Union, p153:
The immediate collapse of the Scottish position was to be expected from a
group of negotiators hand-picked as supporters of the Court, with the single
exception of Lockhart. As the passage from Clerk’s Memoirs shows, the
Scottish Commissioners had decided in advance that the so -called ‘federal’
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approach was ‘ridiculous and impracticable’ and that the only U nion which
could survive was one that was ‘incorporating and perpetual’. Incorporation
would be perpetual because the Scots would have surrendered any means of
establishing and asserting an independent point of view. The Scottish
Commissioners had made a gesture by opening with a proposal which would
have preserved the Scottish Parliament because they knew that it ‘was most
favoured by the people of Scotland’; but it was no more than a gesture and an
excuse with which they could later use to justify their s urrender. They wanted
to be able to argue that they had at least tried.
J D Mackie, on the popular shows objections to union made in 1706, from A
History of Scotland, p262:
When the draft Treaty was presented to the Scottish Parliament in October
1706, and its terms became public, it was met with a howl of execration
throughout the land which was, no doubt, fomented by the Jacobites, but
which also represented a feeling that Scotland had been sold to the English.
In Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dumfries, there was mob violence and, as debates
in parliament continued, petitions came in from about a third of the shires, a
quarter of the royal burghs, and from some presbyteries and parishes who
feared that the Kirk was in danger.
Michael Fry, on the unsuccessful union negotiations which took place in
1702, from The Union: England, Scotland and the Treaty of 1707 , p41:
After the opening speeches the two sides sank into a morass of argument
about trade. At least they at once identified a central issue. Right through the
coming negotiations – in both this first, abortive round and in the later,
successful one – the English evinced not the slightest interest in any of the
Scots’ alternatives to an incorporating Union (or Union of Parliaments):
limitations on the Crown, a federal system and so on. None could from
England’s point of view answer the purpose of the exercise, which was to
dismantle any rival political authority in Scotland or indeed any possibility of
it. So all attempts at compromise over the absolute supre macy of the
Parliament at Westminster were to the English wholly immaterial, mere
quibbling irritants.
Michael Lynch, on the proportion of Scottish MPs to be created in the new
proposed British Parliament, from Scotland: A New History, p312:
The allocation of forty-five seats in the Commons on a basis of thirty to the
shires and fifteen to the burghs caused numerous protests, but protest turned
into outrage when the ministry revealed that the first members in the new
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parliament would be returned not by means of a fresh election but by
nomination – in effect as clients of the ministry itself.
Christopher A Whatley, on the arguments put forward in various addresses
from burghs to Parliament that union would dishonour Scotland’s traditional
independence, from The Scots and the Union, p282:
The defence of Scotland’s honour and independent sovereignty, as embodied
in its Parliament and the ‘fundamental laws and constitution of this
Kingdom’, was paramount and based on a near -universal belief that this had
been ‘valiantly maintained by our worthy ancestors, for more than the space
of Two Thousand years’ – and which should be ‘transmitted to succeeding
generations’. It was partly because the crown was the symbolic artefact by
which this continuity was maintained that its retention in Scotland was so
important an issue. Some talked of the sacrifice of blood and of former
patriots – ‘greater people than we’, ‘their memory extinct’; the parishioners
of Larbert, Dunipace and Denny condemned incorporation as a ‘dread ful act
of ingratitude to God’ and ‘a most unaccountable act of injustice to ourselves
and posterity’, a sentiment that was shared if anything with greater fervour in
Cambusnethan. The inhabitants of the parishes of Bothwell and Kilbride went
even further, echoing the Declaration of Arbroath in their undertaking to
‘venture with all our lives and all that is dear to us’, to defend Scottish
liberties and the Reformation for which their forefathers had ‘wrestled’.
Issue 3: Passing of the Act of Union
Douglas Watt, on the eventual financial aid given to Company of Scotland
investors by the English government, from The Price of Scotland: Darien,
Union and the Wealth of Nations, p220:
As part of negotiations over an Incorporating Union between Scottish and
English commissioners in 1706, a very large lump sum of money emerged
called the Equivalent, which was to be paid to certain Scots on achievement
of Union. Most of it was earmarked for the shareholders of the Company of
Scotland and was an unusual departure in corporate history; a shareholder
bail-out with cash provided by a foreign government. Not only were the
investors to receive all the cash they had paid to the Company but also,
amazingly, interest payments of 5 per cent per annum, as if their money had
been invested in some bank deposit or gilt -edged government bond, rather
than a company that had lost every penny of its capital. This was an
extraordinarily handsome return for the shareholders – a bail-out of 142
pence in the pound – and was a truly incredible result for the directors, who
had squandered the capital of the company and now, as major shareholders,
were to be generously rewarded for their mismanagement.
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A I Macinnes, on the early days of the Squadrone Volante, from Union and
Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707, p264:
This grouping, never more than thirty from all three estates, which was to
form the New Party, later the Squadrone Volante, under the nominal
leadership of the Marquis of Tweeddale, were not simply disgruntled Dari en
investors opportunely seeking office to recoup their losses, and held together
by political expediency. They were a tight -knit band drawn mainly from
Lothian and the Borders, with ties of kinship reinforcing local association.
With limited support from the lesser burghs, they represented landed
enterprise rather than overseas trade in their commercial commitments.
Michael Fry, on the ‘Mother Caledonia’ speech made by Belhaven on the
opening day of the Treaty of Union debate, from The Union: England,
Scotland and the Treaty of 1707, p261:
Belhaven answered with a speech which has been held up as a masterpiece,
though more to the taste of his own age than of ours. It built up its effect by
striking tableaux of a future Scotland: ‘I think I see a free and independent
kingdom delivering up that which all the world hath been fighting for since
the days of Nimrod…’. Proceeding to religion, Belhaven went on: ‘I think I
see a national Church, founded upon a rock, secured by a Claim of Right…’.
Turning to address his peers, he said, ‘I think I see the noble and honourable
peerage of Scotland now divested of their followers and vassalages and put
upon such an equal foot with their vassals that I think I see a petty English
exciseman receive more homage and respect than what was paid formerly…’.
He depicted in turn a degradation of barons and burghs, judges and gentry,
soldiers and sailors, tradesmen and farmers, before rising to a plangent
climax: ‘But above all, my lord, I think I see our ancient mother Caledonia,
like Caesar sitting in the midst of our senate, ruefully looking round her,
covering herself with the royal garment, attending the final blow and
breathing out her last with et tu quoque mi fili.’… Belhaven then burst out
‘Good God! Is this an entire surrender?’. He asked for time to shed a silent
tear. After a pause, while the house chatted through his stagey gesture, he
resumed in a less emotional tone, arguing that it was folly to agree to the
Union before discussing all the articles and moving that the house should
begin with the fourth, on free trade.
Christopher A Whatley, on how the Act of Security for the Church helped
the case for union, from The Scots and the Union, p306–7:
By passing the separate act to secure the Church of Scotland as by law
established after the union, the court hoped to take at least some of the steam
out of the extra-parliamentary opposition. Government politicians both north
and south of the border reckoned that such a step was crucial if the union was
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to succeed in Scotland. Although Stair was convinced that ‘from this day
forwards [12 November] the ferment will abate’, it was not enough for
Belhaven – now leading a protest in Parliament against the English
sacramental test – nor for those Presbyterians who were unwilling to reach
any accommodation with England. But the act served its purpose.
Paul Henderson Scott, on the Squadrone Volante’s hold on the balance of
power during the period before and during the debate, from The Union of
1707: Why and How, p59:
Seafield was particularly pleased by the recruitment of the Squadrone
Volante, the group including Roxburgh, Tweeddale, Rothes, Baillie of
Jerviswoode and others who had previously supported Hamilton and Fletcher.
There is a hint in one of Mar’s letters that they had b een won over by a
promise that they would be involved in the distribution of the Equivalent, a
promise that was not kept. For months the group in their letters agonised over
the situation, but as early as 15th December 1705 Roxburgh wrote to Baillie:
‘If Union fails, war will never be avoided; and for my part the more I think of
the Union, the more I like it, seeing no security anywhere else’. He had made
the same point about the danger of war on 26th December 1704: ‘I am
thoroughly convinced that if we do not go into the Succession, or a Union,
very soon, Conquest will certainly be, upon the first Peace’. By this he
evidently meant as soon as the English armies were free from war in Europe.
Douglas Watt, on the importance of the Equivalent to the passing o f the Act
of Union, from The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of
Nations, p231:
The identity of those who were to benefit from the Equivalent was vital and
influenced support for the treaty in the Scottish parliament. The order of
payment was a matter of some debate and was not finalised until 25 March
1707 by the ‘Act concerning the Publick Debts’. This provided a detailed
breakdown of the beneficiaries: firstly those who lost out from the recoinage;
secondly, and most significantly, £232,884 5s 2/3d for the shareholders and
creditors of the Company; thirdly a subsidy of £2,000 per annum for seven
years to the wool industry; fourthly an unspecified amount to the
commissioners who had negotiated Union; and finally the military and civil
lists (the public debts of Scotland). What was important, however, for
securing the passage of the treaty, was expectation rather than payment.
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Christopher A Whatley, on the importance of the Squadrone Volante to the
government’s victory in the debate on the Act of Union, from The Scots and
the Union, p298:
For an absolute majority in a Parliament in which 227 men sat, the court
required at least 115 votes to be comfortable. Ministers however could only
muster around one hundred, the confederated opposition a dozen or so fewer.
This comprised the Hamilton-led Country party, the hard-core of which was
provided by Fletcher’s fifteen or perhaps constitutional reformers – persistent
and tenacious critics of the court – some nineteen Jacobites, and a group of
resolutely anti-union nobles at the head of which was the earl of Errol. With
around twenty-five squadrone MPs, however, the government could carry the
union, and it did. Squadrone votes proved critical in securing approval for
several of the articles which, had they been defeated, would have brought the
union process to a shuddering halt.
Paul Henderson Scott, on the role of the Duke of Hamilton during the debate
period, from The Union of 1707: Why and How, p41:
It seems almost incredible that anyone would be capable for two sessions of
Parliament to appear both as the passionate advocate of the cause of
independence and also as the man who undermined it on four decisive
occasions. Perhaps he was torn between his convictions and self -interest.
Apart from the implied threat to his English estates, he had other personal
interests. If Scotland decided on a separate succession he had a claim to the
throne because of his Stewart ancestry. If not, his interest lay in preserving
good relations with Queen Anne. In this he seems to have succeeded. After
the Union, he was given a British peerage as Duke of Brandon in September
1710, and in 1712 Queen Anne appointed him as Ambassador to France and
gave him the Order of the Garter. He was killed in a duel in London in the
same year.
Michael Fry, on the end of the Treaty of Union debate, from The Union:
England, Scotland and the Treaty of 1707, p290:
The battle had been lost and won. On January 16, the Treaty of Union and
Act of Security for the Kirk were ratified in tandem as the Scottish Act of
Union by 110 votes to 67. Since the first major division in November, the
government’s tally had held steady, while the opposition’s hand had shrunk.
It was probably Hamilton that commented: ‘And so the darkest day in
Scotland’s history has finally arrived. The point of no return has been
reached, and nothing is left to us of Scotland’s sovereignty, nor her honour or
dignity or name.’ Lockhart could not bring himself even to be there.
Queensberry touched the Act with the sceptre straight after the vote.
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Michael Lynch, on whether the passing of the Act of Union was part of a
historical process, from Scotland: A New History, p316:
The only hint of a broader British identity of interests in 1689 had come from
the Scottish parliament which suggested a ‘union of parliaments and trade’.
The point to realise is that the Scots had offered some such union in 1606 and
1641; 1689 would be the last time they did so. The constitutional safeguards
demanded of William in 1689–90 were framed as the Scottish solution to
what was perceived as a distinctly Scottish problem and, as a result, the two
countries were set on different political courses throughout the 1690s, which
mean that they were probably further apart in 1700 than at any point since
1660. The Union of 1707 completed the regal union of 1603 only in a very
limited sense. The most determined unionists in both 1603 and 1707, it is
true, were the monarchs themselves, but the amalgamation of the two
imperial crowns in 1707 was a reflection of how much monarchy itself had
changed over the course of the century. The Union of 1603 had been
grounded on the royal prerogative; the Treaty of 1706 –7 made no mention of
the prerogative. Constitutionally, very little was amalgamated in 1707, for the
Treaty had scarcely anything to say about the governing of Scotland. That
amalgamation would take place; but as part of the creeping frontier unionism
set in train after 1707; by May 1708 the hidden agenda had already claimed
the scalp of the Scottish privy council.
J D Mackie, on what Scotland obtained from the Act of Union, from A
History of Scotland, p263:
The Act of Union was a remarkable achievement. It made two countries one
and yet, by deliberately preserving the Church, the Law, the Judicial System,
and some of the characteristics of the smaller kingdom, it ensured that
Scotland should preserve the definite nationality which she had won for
herself and had preserved for so long. It realised some of the desires of both
countries. To England it gave security, in the face of French hostility, for the
Hanoverian succession and for the constitutional settlement of the
Revolution; to Scotland it gave a guarantee of her Revolution Settlement in
Church and State, and an opportunity for economic development which was
sorely needed.
A I Macinnes, on the major factors contributing to the success of English
efforts to secure Union in 1707, from Union and Empire: The Making of the
United Kingdom in 1707, p264:
The making of the United Kingdom in 1707 was the product of power, control
and negotiation. England had the military power to coerce and the fiscal
power to persuade. The English ministry was intent on controlling through
political incorporation what had become a rogue state in terms of commercial
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exchange. Likewise Queen Anne was intent on terminating what she
conceived to be the rogue behaviour of the Scottish Estates in seeking to limit
the prerogative powers of the crown. In return for union, Scottish manpower,
enterprise and ultimately Scottish intellectual endeavour were harnessed in
the service of Empire. The Union gave Scotland free access to the largest
commercial market then on offer. The unrestricted movement of capital and
skilled labour within that market stimulated and fructified native
entrepreneurship both domestically and imperially.
Paul Henderson Scott, on why the Act of Union was passed, from The Union
of 1707: Why and How, p84:
The English Government behaved like skilful but ruthless confidence
tricksters and many Scottish Members of Parli ament give the impression that
they were too naïve to see through the deception. On the other hand, the
Addresses from the public at large show that there was a widespread
understanding of the situation. Probably Clerk was right. Supporters of the
Union in the Scottish parliament were probably more understanding and
sophisticated than they appeared. What was on offer was preferable to an
invasion and its consequences. So why not opt for the lesser evil?
Issue 4: Effects of Union to 1740
Michael Fry, on the immediate reaction of merchants to the Act of Union,
from The Union: England, Scotland and the Treaty of 1707 , p305:
Not only the noblemen and lairds of Scotland felt unhappy at the
consequences of the Union. So, for example, did the merchants who had
hoped to do well out of it. And they did do well right at the outset, or rather
during the gap between the parliamentary passage of the Union early in 1707
and its entry into force on May1. During those few months they made a quick
killing from a rush of imports – wine, tobacco and other luxuries on which
Scottish tariffs were low, all to be re-exported to England once her higher
tariffs had been erected right round the new United Kingdom. Politicians at
Westminster felt furious but had no remedy. They soon got their own back.
Paul Henderson Scott, on how Queensberry was greeted in Scotland and
England after the Act of Union had been passed, from The Union of 1707:
Why and How, p66:
There was the same contrast between the two countries in their reactions
when the Treaty came into force. Queensberry had been stoned by the crowd
in Edinburgh; but, when his work as Commissioner was complete, he made a
triumphal progress through England to London in April 1707. Clerk, who
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accompanied him, says that in all the English cities he passed through, he was
received ‘with great pomp and solemnity; and the joyful acclamations of all
the people’.
Christopher A Whatley, on calls for repeal of the Act of Union, from The
Scots and the Union, p325:
We can begin to understand why, in the first two or three post-union decades,
a substantial body of opinion in Scotland was of the view that the union
should be repealed; for the first seven or eight years after 1707 this pressure
was intense, both in the country and – less so – among Scotland’s
Westminster representatives, the forty-five MPs and the sixteen
representative peers. But in Scotland the demand that the union be broken
was given a sharper edge by the Jacobites, whom it reinvigorated after the
collapse in morale that had caused them to drift away from Edinburgh at the
beginning of 1707. The disappearance of the Scottish Parliament and with it
the links protestors outside had had with the Country party within, had left a
vacant space within the body politic in Scotland, which the Jacobites had
begun to fill even prior to 1 May 1707, when they had called for Louis XIV
to seize the moment and land French forces in Scotland. The opportunity to
position themselves at the head of the popular opposition there was to the
union they grasped eagerly, supported by a welter of publications that now
celebrated the once-defiled house of Stuart, and emphasised its legitimacy.
Douglas Watt, on the historical significance of the Equivalent in the context
of Scotland’s relationship with England since the Union, from The Price of
Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of Nations , pxvii:
On 5 August 1707 a dozen wagons carrying a large quantity of money arrived
in Edinburgh guarded by 120 Scots dragoons. A mob was waiting to hurl
abuse as they trundled up to the castle to deposit their load and, on the way
back to down, to pelt them with stones. This was how the infamous
‘Equivalent’ was welcomed to Scotland; the huge lump sum paid to the Scots
by the English government as part of the Treaty of Union of 1707; a bribe,
bonanza or bail-out depending on your point of view. The stoning of those
who delivered the Equivalent reflected the acrimonious divisions within the
Scottish body politic, and is perhaps symbolic of the way in which Scots have
viewed the Union ever since; repelled by their surrender of their national
sovereignty, but at the same time willing to take the cash and opportunities it
offers.
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Michael Lynch, on the much-debated economic effects of Union, from
Scotland: A New History, p323:
The first years of Union brought new taxes but no new concessions, and it
exposed vulnerable industries such as paper -making and woollen cloth
manufacture to the chill wind of English competition. In 1711 new duties
were imposed on exported linen and salt, in 1713 came the first extension of
duties on malt, and in 1715 printed linens were also subjected to duty. The
real effects of these measures could be and have been debated at length – the
linen industry was forced into a shake -out of its practices and quality control
which by the 1740s was beginning to yield worthwhile results; the decline in
export of salt and an increasing reliance on domestic demand were both
patterns which had begun before 1707.
J D Mackie, on the possibility of disunion and the attempted repeal of the
Act of Union after the constitutional and ecclesiastical grievances during the
period 1707–13, from A History of Scotland, p268:
The outcome of these accumulated grievances was the introduction of a
motion in the House of Lords (1713) to rescind the Act of Union; this was
supported by all the Scottish members, Whigs and Tories alike, and it was
defeated in the Lords only narrowly and by the votes of proxies. It has been
doubted if the Scots meant to force the issue; anyhow the necessity
disappeared. On the death of Anne (1 August 1714), the Whigs, amongst
whom Argyll was conspicuous, acted with resolution. To the surprise of the
Jacobites, George I ascended the throne ‘amid acclamation’ and with the
establishment of a mainly Whig ministry the danger to the ‘Revolution
Settlement’ seemed to fade away. But it did not disappear altogether.
Discontent in Scotland was both wide and deep and, in both England and
Scotland alike, there was still the instinctive feeling that as long as th e
‘legitimate’ monarch was extant there was no hope of permanent peace. For
three decades it seemed possible that the exiled dynasty might return.
Christopher A Whatley, on opposition to the malt tax, from The Scots and
the Union, p345:
The pinnacle of post-union disorder was the rioting that greeted yet another
proposal, in 1725, to raise the malt tax in Scotland. Walpole, effectively
prime minister, had been under pressure from English MPs hostile to the
Scots to raise more revenue from Scotland – £20,000 is what the treasury
wanted. Linked was a proposal to remove the bounty on grain exports. There
was an explosive, two-stage reaction. The first was a flurry of letters,
petitions and pamphleteering, directed against the removal of the bounty as
an intolerable infringement of the union principle of equity between the two
nations, and reiterating the Scots’ inability to pay the malt tax... The second
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phase of protest, a wave of riots, [commenced] in Hamilton on 23 June, the
day collection of the new tax was to commence; these then spread to
Glasgow, scene of the infamous Shawfield Riot, during which the house of
the city’s MP, Daniel Campbell, was broken into and ravaged by a mob.
Alexander Murdoch, on the problems facing the Walpole administration in
Scotland, from T M Devine, Scotland and the Union: 1707–2007, p83:
Nor did the Union experience serious problems only from Jacobite rebellion
and subsequent British military intervention. During the long period of peace
from post-1716 to 1739 presided over by Sir Robert Walpole as first minister
to both George I and George II at Westminster, governing Scotland became
increasingly more, rather than less, problematic. It has been suggested that
this was due at least in part to Walpole’s inclination to trust to the Duke of
Argyll to preserve order in Scotland through the enormous extent of his
property, power and consequent influence there. He embarked on this policy
after major Scottish resistance to tax collection reached something like open
rebellion in 1725 with the so-called Shawfield riots in Glasgow and related
disturbances in Edinburgh.
T C Smout, on the relationship between the clan Campbell and the ultimate
failures of Jacobite risings after 1707, from A History of the Scottish People,
1560–1830, p206:
From the point of view of London, the main problem after the Union was the
Jacobites, whose strongholds in the hills beyond the Tay might yet have
proved the Achilles heel of the whole British Protestant establishment. The
civil war of 1689, the two major Highland risings in 1715 and 1745, and two
other abortive attempts in 1708 and 1719, seemed to show their fears were
justified. On the other hand, neither the English ministry nor the Pretenders
ever understood the extent to which the rebellions were pr ovoked not by
loyalty to the Stewart cause but by hatred of the great clan Campbell, whose
steady aggrandisement at the expense of smaller, weaker and less politically
minded clans was a cardinal objective of Government policy: after all, the
political managers of Scotland from 1725 to 1761 were successive Dukes of
Argyll, and the idea of using this clan to hold down and civilise its
neighbours had been part of royal policy since the days of James VI. This was
the reason why the rebellions in 1715 and 1745 produced so brilliant an
explosion in the north and so little effect in the south: Lowlanders had no
special reason to hate the Campbells or to love the Stewarts, and they were
certainly not inclined to rise spontaneously against the Westminster
government at the beck of a Catholic prince.
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J D Mackie, on the attempted rising of 1708, from A History of Scotland,
pp269–70:
Anxious to avenge Marlborough’s victories and aware that Scotland was ill defended, Louis XIV launched in March 1708 a powerful fleet c onveying
6,000 men, and graced by the presence of [the Old Pretender]. This was
destined for the Firth of Forth, but bad weather, faulty navigation, a marked
lack of enthusiasm amongst the French soldiers and sailors, and the arrival of
English ships prevented the invaders from making any landing. Yet in
England and Scotland alike, it was felt that a very real danger had been
averted by fortune alone.
T C Smout, on the rise of improvers in the 18th century and the inclination
of landowners to recruit English farm managers, from A History of the
Scottish People, 1560–1830, p274:
Some [landowners] were more generous than Cockburn, and financed the
division of the runrig, the running up of enclosure walls and hedges and the
building of new steadings from their own pocket: others financed them
indirectly by reductions of rent for a period of five or ten years after
enclosure. Nor did landowners leave the tenants once the layout of the farms
had been changed: a trickle of skilled Englishmen arrived throughout th e
century at the invitation of the nobility and gentry to manage their own farms
and to teach the sons of local farmers better ways; the landowner himself
continued to pour out upon his dependents a stream of gratuitous advice.
J G Pittendrigh, on the reality behind the ‘payment’ of the Equivalent, from
Paul Henderson Scott, The Union of 1707: Why and How, p76:
As a footnote to history the Equivalent Debentures were eventually redeemed
in 1850. From an English point of view they had effectively received a 143
years interest-free loan from the Scots of £248,000. At the end of the day
England had purchased control over Scotland, its people, mineral rights,
fishing and other natural assets for cash payments of only £150,000, equal to
3 shillings for every man, woman and child in Scotland at the time. At the
same time they had also eliminated potential competition from the Scottish
African and Indian Company. With this modest sum they had pulled off a
tremendous coup for which it would be hard to find a histori cal parallel. In
exchange the Scots received the equivalent of an 8% share in the ‘British’
decision-making process, the legal right to trade with the American colonies
(which they had been doing in any event ‘illegally’) and the right of access to
English markets (as, of course, the English also had to the Scots). And the
Scots took on the obligation of contributing manpower and money to the
many wars entered into by the Anglo-British state, including against France,
The Netherlands and other countries that Scotland formerly never had any
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quarrel with. They also took on a share of England’s debts whilst the English
were absolved from any further obligation towards settling Scottish debts.
Michael Lynch, on the work of General Wade as part of the governme nt’s
attempts to control the Highlands between 1715 and 1745, from Scotland: A
New History, p332:
It was on this basis that General George Wade, an Anglo -Irish soldier with a
nose for ferreting out Jacobite sympathisers, was appointed commander in
Scotland in 1725. Between 1726 and 1737 Wade organised the building of
over 250 miles of military roads deep into the western and central Highlands.
In 1725 there were only four isolated government garrisons – at Inverlochy,
Ruthven near Kingussie, Berbera in Glenelg and at Killiechiumen, later to
become Fort Augustus. Wade’s road system was designed to create a cordon
sanitaire along the line of the Great Glen, reinforced by a naval galley on
Loch Ness. It was the Cromwellian system of the 1650s writ large, with
arteries linking it to the south, including a road from Perth via Dunkeld to
Inverness.
T C Smout, on disorder in Edinburgh, the role of ‘caddies’ during mob
incidents, and those involved in the Porteous Riots, from A History of the
Scottish People, 1560–1830, p345:
Riots were another matter. The town guard certainly had no stomach to face a
mob, while the Edinburgh ‘caddies’ (a brotherhood of unofficial guides who
knew every address in town, and who were occasionally entrusted by the
local authority with executing a council order) were likely to be first among
the crowd if they thought popular justice was to be meted out. The
composition of the town mob varied from time to time according to its
objectives, but it often contained artisans and mechanics of a more middleclass than working-class character, while in 1736 there were well -grounded
suspicions that quite prominent citizens as well as apprentices and
journeymen took part in the capture and lynching of Captain Porteous.
Christopher A Whatley, on the gradual benefits of union, from The Scots
and the Union, p358:
Even so, for all that the union created difficulties for the Scots, it also made
its mark in more favourable ways too, which sometimes only appear with
forensic interrogation of the numbers. Thus, while Trinity House of Leith
data show a rise in voyages overseas from 1704, after the union more of these
involved passages to and from Spain and Portugal – England’s ally; at
Aberdeen and Dundee coastal shipping increased sharply after 1707 and, i n
the last-named, within five years of the union England had replaced Norway
as the burgh’s main trading partner, with timber imports dropping to zero as a
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result of restrictions imposed by British commercial policy. Perhaps more
slowly, the same thing happened at Aberdeen, where by 1735 London had
replaced Veere as the main supplier of manufactured goods.
T C Smout, on the surprising similarities which emerged after Union
between the Church of Scotland and the Church of England, from A History
of the Scottish People, 1560–1830, p213:
It was only to be expected that in politics and government England and
Scotland would grow more alike after 1707. The same phenomenon in their
churches is much more surprising. The settlement of 1690, by abolishing
episcopal rule, and the Union of 1707, by confirming Presbyterianism as the
established polity for Scotland even in a United Kingdom, seemed to open
and to fix in perpetuity the gulf between the Church of Scotland and the
Church of England. Indeed, in matters of c hurch government, order and
theology the churches remained ossified at opposite poles of thought. The
drawing together came in the subtler (but nonetheless real and vital) spheres
of social outlook and position, in which the Scottish church came to occupy a
very similar standpoint to that of the English church. By 1790 neither
Presbyterian nor Anglican leaders had any time for puritanism, both believed
that the social order was already organised in a way highly satisfactorily to
God and both assumed the Lord to be moderate in His religious views as they
were themselves.
Christopher A Whatley, on the historical perspective of the Union of 1707,
from The Scots and the Union, p370:
For others – most – [the Union] offered entry to and the shelter of an empire
the expansion and defence of which the Scots themselves were to contribute
to and with their labour and lives. Left alone and with England’s ascendancy
within the union unchallenged, it is likely that it would have imploded within
a few years of its making. Where Scotland would have been in such
circumstances is hard to say, and takes us into the realms of speculative
history. By insisting that the union should work to the advantage of Scotland,
in ways that were only vaguely envisaged by those who had soug ht
periodically to achieve it from the time of the Revolution of 1688 –9, union
provided Scots with opportunities for personal and national achievement that
had been thwarted during the later stages of the union of the crowns, and by
the stifling effects on commercial ambition of muscular mercantilism. It was
a framework that, with countless adjustments, has lasted for three centuries.
Those Scots who signed the addresses delivered to William of Orange at
Whitehall late in 1688 that called for ‘ane intire an d perpetuall union betwixt
the two kingdomes’, would have been amazed and, no doubt, greatly
gratified.
CURRICULUM FOR EXCELLENCE IDEAS
Curriculum for Excellence ideas
Blockbusters
This is a game which can help revision and aid in the preparation for factual
tests. Classes will hopefully enjoy the competitive element of the quiz -based
lesson, and the answers to the questions may be easier to recall after playing
the game.
Method:
 Have the 25-hexagon blockbusters grid on the board before class come
into room.
 Use any of the references in the biographical dictionary or glossary of
terms or timeline to formulate answers.
 Have the answers on question sheet, in alphabetical order so they are easy
to find when participants select a question.
 Letters represent the answers.
 One capital letter represents a one-word answer.
 Two capital letters represent a two-word answer.
 A capital letter and a small letter which follows it represent the first two
letters in a one-word answer.
 A capital letter followed by a hyphen and a small letter represe nt the first
and last letters of a one-word answer.
 Names of two teams should be written in separate colours on the board (eg
Country party and Court party, or commissioners and MPs) ready to have
scores written below them as they accumulate.
 Split class into two teams.
 Explain the rules.
 Read out questions, choosing an answer hexagon in the centre of the grid
to start with.
 Each team that gets an answer right gets the number of points equal to the
number of words in the answer. They also get the answer hex agon circled
in their colour.
 The member of the team who got the answer correct can choose the next
answer hexagon.
 If a team manages to get across the grid, from side to side or top to
bottom, in a route of only their own colour, they get an extra five po ints.
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CURRICULUM FOR EXCELLENCE IDEAS
This means that tactically, teams will try to ask for questions that will
create a line.
 The last question asked is always worth ten points.
 The teacher has the discretion to award bonus points for more difficult
answers in order to try and maintain parity between the teams to keep the
quiz going down to the last question!
 Participants should be warned – no triumphalism when their team gets an
answer correct – marks will be deducted at the teacher’s discretion for
this!
Sample set of answers:
AAPAW – Act anent Peace and War
AFOS – Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun
CG – Captain Green
DOA – Duke of Argyll
DS – Darien scheme
EE – Ebenezer Erskine
EOG – Earl of Glasgow
Ep – Episcopalian
Eq – Equivalent
GC – Greenshields case
GLOC – George Lockhart of Carnwath
IY – Ill Years
JTSAF – James VI and I
LB – Lord Belhaven
LTF – Louis XIV
MOS – Master of Stair
MOT – Marquis of Tweeddale
M – Malt
NA – Navigation Acts
PR – Porteous riots
QA – Queen Anne
RS – Revolution settlement
SRW – Sir Robert Walpole
S – Stuart
SV – Squadrone Volante
(tiebreaker – WP – William Paterson)
CURRICULUM FOR EXCELLENCE IDEAS
Board games challenge
This is an enterprise activity which could take three or four lessons to follow
through, and could be tied in with other historical issues covered in the year,
ie Paper 1 topics.
Materials should be available, such as coloured pens and pencils, paper,
cardboard, scissors, sellotape, string, etc.
Students should work in groups of three or four.
In the first lesson each group should be given a topic based on which they
have to devise a board game. The Treaty of Union should be one, with Paper
1 topics also being used. If the Treaty of Union is the only topic being used,
it could be split into the four issues.
Each group should think of a popular board game, eg Monopoly, snake s and
ladders, trump cards, etc. They should then adapt the game to include a
requirement for knowledge of the historical topic in order to make progress
and win the game.
Students could start work on their games before the end of the first lesson if
time allows. If any extra materials are required by groups, they should tell the
teacher during the first lesson and the teacher should try and get these for the
second lesson.
In the next two or three lessons the students should complete their board
games and then play each others’ games.
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© Learning and Teaching Scotland 2009
ASSESSMENT IS FOR LEARNING IDEAS
Assessment is for Learning ideas
Cooperative learning activities
Students can benefit from cooperative learning techniques by conducting
research on a particular part of the course and then teaching the rest of the
class about what they have learned. This kind of activity can take a couple of
lessons to complete.
An example of this could be separating the class into small groups of about
three or four and giving each group a target of teaching the rest of the class
three or four historical facts about, say, a particular person involved in Treaty
of Union negotiations, or a prominent figure during the Act of Union debate.
Or they could research facts about a particular event or development, eg the
Greenshields Case or the execution of Captain Green.
Each group would have to research using notes, books or the internet (book a
computer room) and then devise a way of teaching the results of their
research to the rest of the class in the next lesson, using Powerpoint, or
flashcards, or the board.
The teacher should check in the first lesson that the three facts each group
have found out are correct. The teacher should offer assistance in preparing
material, for example having photocopies made if required.
This kind of experience gives the students something to focus on, which helps
to train them for times of revision or further research. In the second lesson
the whole class should learn a number of new facts in an interesting way,
which should be memorable as it is set asi de from ‘normal’ classroom
practice.
ASSESSMENT IS FOR LEARNING IDEAS
Peer assessment
Once students are familiar with the criteria for awarding marks to answers to
source questions, they are in a position to carry out peer -assessment.
A source question should be presented to the class . The teacher should go
over the source and discuss methods of answering, with students making
notes if they want.
Then each student should write an answer to the question. They should
exchange answers with each other and the teacher should go over the co rrect
way of answering, and students should decide what mark to award the answer
in front of them.
The exercise should be repeated with a totally unseen source question.
Students could either mark a classmate’s answer in the lesson or it could be
taken home to mark, with part of the homework to be making an appropriate
constructive comment under the answer.
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WEBSITE LINKS
Website links
www.activehistory.co.uk
This site comes recommended by the Times Educational Suppl ement and has
innovative suggestions for interactive and classroom activities to aid the
learning of history.
www.alba.org.uk
This is the website of the Scottish Politics Research Unit and Alba
Publishing. The site has recently included a useful set of detailed timelines
covering many periods of Scottish political history.
www.bbc.co.uk/scotland/history
The BBC contains a very useful timeline on British history as well as links to
specialised sites, and will soon have interactive maps.
www.britannica.com
The website of Encyclopedia Britannica, this contains many useful articles on
the Act of Union and related topics.
www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/browse/1700-1800.html
This section of the Channel 4 history website contains a section ‘The Scots
Detective’ which covers the whole of Scottish history and has factual
information, activities for schools and links to other websites.
www.history.ac.uk
The Institute of Historical Research exists to provide resources for those
wishing to teach or study history. Its site contains links to other history
websites and reviews of books and journal articles on the Act of Union
period.
www.historytoday.com
This website of the History Today magazine contains an archive of articles
published on all topics including Scottish history, as well as links to sites of
other institutions which deal in Scottish history.
www.ltscotland.org.uk
Learning and Teaching Scotland provides many other useful resources on the
period and on study skills in general or specific to Higher History.
WEBSITE LINKS
www.nas.gov.uk
The National Archives of Scotland recently carried out a lot of work on the
Treaty of Union period. The site contains digitised images o f historical
documents, as well as information on the records of the Scottish Parliament.
www.nls.uk/scotlandspages/timeline.html
This is on the site of the National Library of Scotland. The intera ctive
timeline allows pop-ups of extracts from the writings of Scots involved in
significant national events, including extracts from the memoirs of George
Lockhart of Carnwath on the Treaty of Union.
www.nationalgalleries.org
This is the site of the National Gallery of Scotland and the Scottish National
Portrait Gallery, among others. There are excellent images of portraits of
notable people involved in the period surrounding the Act of Union, as well
as accurate biographical details.
www.parliament.uk
The Parliament website contains good references to the Act of Union and its
position in British history.
www.schoolhistory.co.uk
Although limited in content about the Act of Union, this site does have some
useful references as well as lots of ideas about activities to do in history
classes which would tie in with A Curriculum for Excellence and Assessment
is for Learning
www.scottishcatholicarchives.org.uk
The Scottish Catholic Archives website contains information about useful
education material that can be obtained from its premises in Edinburgh.
www.rps.ac.uk
The Records of the Parliament of Scotland have been collated at the
University of St Andrews; they cover the period 1235 to 1707. This is an
excellent resource for analysing primary material.
www.scottishscreen.com
Scottish Screen holds archives of film of all types, and information about new
and imminent film or television productions that may be relevant to History.
It also contains advice about how to utilise Moving Image in Education (MIE)
techniques in schools, including history classes.
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WEBSITE LINKS
www.sqa.org.uk
The Scottish Qualifications Authority website contains information for
teachers and students, and includes all the Higher History descriptors as well
as past papers, mark schemes and advice for best practice.
www.wikipedia.org
Wikipedia contains many articles that have been checked by experts and it is
a useful tool for beginning a search for more detailed information on events
and people from the period.
TEACHING PLAN
Teaching plan
Ideally Paper 2 Treaty of Union should be taught in a 40 –hour period. With
timetable restrictions, variations between schools on lesson lengths and
opportunities for double-periods, it is unrealistic to present a prescriptive
plan. However, below is a suggestion as to the allocation of time to different
parts of the course, with an average of 45 minutes teaching time being
considered appropriate for ‘1 lesson’.
Explanation of Paper 2 issues
1 lesson
Background
1 lesson
Worsening relations with England
Revolution of 1688–9
King William
Darien Scheme
English and Scottish legislation
Other issues
2
1
2
1
1
Source practice
2 lessons
Arguments for and against union with England
Arguments for union
Arguments against union
2 lessons
2 lessons
Source practice
2 lessons
The passing of the Act of Union
Position of England
Arguments for federal union
Arguments for incorporating union
Debate on the Act of Union
Reasons for passing the Act of Union
1
1
1
3
2
Source practice
2 lessons
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lessons
lesson
lessons
lesson
lesson
lesson
lesson
lesson
lessons
lessons
TEACHING PLAN
Effects of union to 1740
Political
Economic
Social
Religious
Jacobites
1
1
1
1
1
Source practice
2 lessons
Perspective
1 lesson
Source practice
5 lessons
lesson
lesson
lesson
lesson
lesson
EXTENDED ESSSAY
Extended essay
Candidates are permitted to write their extended essay on the Paper 2 option.
Below is a guide to suggested essay titles and possible plans for writing the
essay.
Essay titles
Evaluation/assessment style questions:
 How far did the Treaty of Union bring about economic benefits for
Scotland?
 To what extent can it be argued that the arguments against union with
England were mainly religious in nature?
Isolated factor style questions:
 How important was the Darien Scheme in worsening relations between
Scotland and England between 1688 and 1706?
 To what extent did financial issues contribute to the passing of the Act of
Union in Scotland?
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EXTENDED ESSAY
Sample plans – evaluation/assessment
How far were the effects of the Treaty of Union in Scotland mainly
economic?
Introduction:
Context – background information on Treaty of Union, economic arguments
for and against union, outline of period 1707 –1740.
Factors – economic, political, social, religious, role of Jacobites.
Line of argument – economic effects felt, other effects also felt.
Main body of essay:
Economic effects – issues concerning the Equivalent, loss of textile markets
to English competitors, unpopularity of Malt Tax, improvements in
agricultural production, investment in Scotland, Royal Bank, Board for
Fisheries and Manufactures.
Political effects – office of Scottish Secretary, abolition of Scottish Privy
Council, issue of Scots peers in House of Lords, Highland clans’ loyalty to
either Hanoverian Succession or Jacobism, 1713 motion to repeal Act of
Union, dominance of Whigs.
Social effects – unpopularity of Union after 1707, issue of Scots law in House
of Lords, confiscation of Jacobite land, social plight of the Highlands, new
Scottish publications in the press, social disturbances across Scotland in
1720s and 30s, road-building and forts in Highlands.
Religious effects – preservation of Presbyterian Church, challenge to Church
of Scotland privileges by High Church Tories, Episcopalianism as an issue,
Greenshields Case, Toleration Act, Patronage Act, Marrow Affair, formation
of Associate Presbytery.
Jacobites – continued Jacobite support, attempted French -led invasion of
1708, Rising of 1715, role of Earl of Mar, attempted Spanish -aided rising of
1719, reduced Jacobite resistance before failed Rising of 1745.
Conclusion:
Summary – definite economic impact of Union.
Arguments – initial economic effect not felt by many, benefits gradually
realised by 1730s, political effect more immediate resulting in moti on to
repeal, social effects greatest in response to Jacobite issues and Malt Tax,
religious effects seen in controversy after Greenshields case and later
secession of some from Church of Scotland, Jacobites reacting to union with
series of attempted risings.
Judgement – economic impact part of wider set of linked effects of Union.
EXTENDED ESSSAY
Sample plans – isolated factor
To what extent can it be argued that the arguments against union with
England were mainly religious in nature?
Introduction:
Context – background information on Treaty of Union, relations between
Scotland and England, arguments against union.
Factors – religious, economic, political, social, succession.
Line of argument – religious arguments existed, several others also existed.
Main body of essay:
Religious arguments – fear of English domination of religious affairs, fear of
Anglicanism, fear of Episcopalianism, fear that Presbyterian Church would
disappear.
Economic arguments – increased tax burden, English trade would be favoured
over Scots, Darien example cited, fears for rights of royal burghs, possible
ruin of Scottish manufactures, loss of European trade to England.
Political arguments – reduction in status of Scottish nobility, undermining of
Claim of Right, dishonour of surrendering Scot tish independence, suppression
of Scotland by English minority, fear of ‘Scotlandshire’.
Social arguments – fears over Scots law, public opinion against union.
Arguments relating to the succession – Hanoverian Succession would apply
to Scotland, end of Stuart line, threats to Scottish identity.
Conclusion:
Summary – definite religious arguments against union.
Arguments – some Presbyterians feared imposition of Anglicanism on
Scotland, fear of economic collapse in Scotland due to English competition in
trade, political suppression by England, social opinion against union, end of
hopes for Stuart succession.
Judgement – religious opposition part of wider set of linked arguments
against union.
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