Britain and Europe, 1940-2000
• Europe a key issue in relation to British
identity post-war
• 1976-mid 1980s tears apart Labour Party
• Mid 1980s onwards tears apart Conservative
Party
Structure of Lecture
• 1. Initial reluctance: the legacy of 1940 (194061)
• 2. Becoming Europeans? (1961-75)
• 3. Inside or outside Europe? (1975-)
1. INITIAL RELUCTANCE
• 1940: defeat and occupation of France
• 1946: Churchill speaks in favour of a ‘United States of
Europe’
• 1950: Britain not involved in founding of European
Coal and Steel Community
• 1952: British refusal to participate in proposed
European Defence Community
• 1955: withdrawal of British representative in planning
of European Economic Community
• 1957: Britain not a signatory of Treaty of Rome setting
up EEC
i) The Legacy of 1940
• 1940 makes defence of national sovereignty a
central national totem
• Illusion of victory in isolation; contrast to France
(defeat) and Germany (shame) which encourages
turn to supranational cooperation
• Difficulty understanding the experience of
Europeans and therefore that united Europe was
political imperative not vague aspiration
• WWII fosters wariness of Germany and also
tensions with Free French of De Gaulle (who
opposes British entry to EEC)
ii) Labour’s suspicion of capitalist
Europe
iii) Economic Situation
• Crisis of balance of payments
• Need for export drive
• Talk of building a new Europe seems a
distraction
• A shattered Europe characterised by economic
chaos and struggling minority governments
seems to have little to offer
iv) World Power Status
• Britain feels less need for role in Europe given
its role as head of the Commonwealth and its
‘special relationship’ with the USA
• Issues of Empire and decolonisation more
pressing than Europe
• Support for USA in cold war, eg Korean War
2. BECOMING EUROPEANS? (19611975)
• 1963: President De Gaulle of France veto on
British application to join EEC
• 1967: Second British application to join
blocked by French
• 1973: British entry to EEC
• 1975: Referendum on Common Market
• 64.5% turnout; 67.2% vote yes
i) Shift of economic power
• In 1950s it becomes apparent that the
economies of France, West Germany and Italy
were growing faster than Britain: 1953-8:
British GNP rises 2.2%/year; France, 4.6%;
Germany, 6.9%
ii) Britain as a world power
• Loss of confidence in ‘special relationship’ and
Empire
• Symbolised by debacle of Suez in 1956
• Tensions with former colonies challenge idea
of Commonwealth
• Trade with Commonwealth stagnating and
that with Europe rising
iii) Cultural
• Rise of the holiday to
Europe; cheap flights:
1951: 1.5m; 1971:
4.2m; 1981: 13m
• Start of
experimentation with
European cuisine
• Elizabeth David
• Pasta, parmesan, olive
oil, peppers …
• European design
• Habitat, founded by
Terence Conran, 1964
• 1971 decimalisation of
currency (though
maintains imperial
measures
iv) Public opinion
• View of politicians that Europe didn’t matter
much to voters
• Opinion polls indicate that 1960-66 public in
favour of joining Europe; 1967-73 turns
against due to concerns about cost of living;
but was fluid and not well-informed
• Referendum of 1975 (first in history) forces
consideration of issue and leads to turn of
opinion and solid vote in favour
3. INSIDE OR OUTSIDE EUROPE? (1975-)
• 1985: Margaret Thatcher signs Single
European Act
• 1990: Belated entry to European Exchange
Rate Mechanism (but forced out by 1992 –
‘Black Wednesday’)
• 2001: Britain stays out of single currency
• 2013: David Cameron proposes new
referendum on membership of European
Community if reelected
i) Long shadow of 1940
• Continued gulf in attitude to European
partners
• Suspicion of German reunification (Margaret
Thatcher 1989) and monetary union
• Anti-German and anti-French rhetoric in
tabloids and popular culture (eg football)
ii) Problems of late entry
• Ongoing problem of disadvantageous terms
• Thatcher renegotiation and rebate 1984 (but
more a symbolic victory)
iii) Ideological
• In post-war years it had been suspicion on left that
Europe was a capitalist club; by 1980s suspicion came
from Conservatives towards the perceived socialism of
the European project (eg social charter). Support for
extending Europe via new members – creating a larger
free trade market – but antagonism to control and
regulation
• Thatcher Bruges speech, 1988: ‘We have not
successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in
Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European
level, with a European superstate exercising a new
dominance from Brussels’.
iv) Public opinion
• In contrast to 1960s, far
more political concern
from 1980s• Yet British also now far
more European-minded
than previously
• When Conservatives line
up against Europe in 2001
election it sees electoral
disaster (population more
concerned about bread
and butter issues?)
v) Final reflections
• Is the lesson of British relations with Europe since
1940 that despite inclinations against integration,
politicians accept the economic case for supranationalism once in power?
• When they don’t – Conservatives in 90s, Labour
in the early 1980s – economic and political reality
destroys them.
• For the Scots and Welsh, the European issue
helps in moving towards devolution; but are the
English bound by the powerful legacy of 1940?