Civil War Termination
Applying Historical Lessons to the Syrian Conflict
American University Intelligence Analysis Practicum, Spring 2014
Analysts: Benjamin Bestor, Max Bing-Grant, Adriel Domenech, Stephanie Heiken, Ashley Jones, Jackson Keith, Min Ji Ku,
Uri Lerner, Katy Magill, Jennifer McNamara, Leo Nayfeld, Bryce Schoenborn, Marie Scholz, Nicholas Weiland
Advisors: David Martin-McCormick, Aki Peritz
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At a Glance
The ongoing civil war in Syria is plagued by a set of structural facThesis:
tors that make the termination of this conflict a far-off prospect. The
The most prevalent factor in ending civil
wars is foreign involvement; however, when
fragmentation of opposition forces along ethnic and sectarian lines
the recipient of the foreign involvement is
and high levels of violence mean that negotiations have a low probaa fragmented force, it will be ineffective in
bility of success. Additionally, the Assad regime is unified and receives
kinetic support from Iran and Hezbollah and a steady stream of weap- terminating the war.
ons from Russia, while Western and other states’ support for opposiFindings:
tion forces through shipments of weapons and other supplies has less
1. Negotiations between the regime and
of an impact. This polarization of outside actors and their willingness
the rebels will be ineffective at this point
to provide arms and other forms of support has fueled the conflict.
because of the following factors: the
number of rebel groups, the incentives
Finally, all sides still believe they can win and feel little inclination to
for internal and external groups to spoil
give away concessions through negotiation. Together, these factors
any agreement, the unwillingness of
indicate that the Syrian civil war will not end soon.
external powers to guarantee an agreeIn this context, we sought to learn lessons from previous conflicts
ment, and the perception on both sides
that exhibited similar complicating factors. The historical cases we
that more will be gained through battle
analyzed provide insight into the possible future developments of the
than negotiations.
Syrian civil war and suggest key trends in civil war termination. The
2. The Assad regime will likely stay in power
research was guided by the following question: What lessons can be
because its forces are unified. Moreover,
drawn from civil wars of the past 40 years, especially regarding their
it receives various forms of assistance,
termination, that will inform our understanding of possible future
including direct military support, from
developments in the Syrian civil war?
Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia.
In pursuing answers to this question, we compiled a dataset con3. A military intervention without rebel
taining 42 cases of civil war since 1974, which were evaluated based
cohesion may topple the Assad regime,
on 49 variables regarding causes, conflict structure, turning points,
but is unlikely to terminate the civil war
and termination. These cases were analyzed in parallel with Syria,
because parties on all sides will continue
which suggested that it is the structure of the conflict, not causes, that
to fight.
most influences the available pathways (turning points) to termina4. If the Syrian opposition remains fragtion. Here, “structure” refers to those issues and conditions that drive
mented and there is no significant change
and shape a conflict, including the nature of the groups involved,
in the balance of foreign support, the
their fighting tactics, and other features. In Syria, the conflict is
Syrian conflict will last for at least another
structured by ethnic and religious tensions, rebel fragmentation, and
five years.
foreign involvement by state and non-state actors. Using these factors,
seven cases of particular relevance to Syria were identified and selected
for in-depth qualitative analysis: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Sudan, and Tajikistan.
The lessons learned from these seven historical cases, as well as the larger set of post-1974 civil wars, led to the formulation of an overarching conclusion: The most prevalent factor in ending civil wars is foreign involvement; however, when
the recipient of the foreign involvement is a fragmented force, it will be ineffective in terminating the war.
Introduction
cooperation and reconciliation more difficult.3 Further,
Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom conSubstantial scholarly and government research has
tend that the relationship between the number of ethnic
sought to understand how civil wars terminate. In the
groups and the duration of civil wars is non-linear. Specurrent Syrian conflict, ethnic and religious tensions,
cifically, conflicts tend to last longest when society has
fragmented opposition, and foreign involvement make
two or three large ethnic groups because social cohesion
the question of civil war termination especially difficult
within factions is at its peak.4
to answer. With over 125,000 deaths in the conflict to
Effects of Opposition Fragmentation: The ability of
date, the price for finding a solution to the ongoing viothe
opposition to maintain cohesion throughout a civil
lence continues to rise.1 The research conducted for this
war has a dramatic effect on the structure and terminastudy sought to lend a historical perspective to efforts
tion of the conflict. Opposition fragmentation leads to
attempting to bring the Syrian civil war to its conclusion
swifter government victory, due to the ability of a unified
by asking the following question: What lessons can be
government to settle with opposition groups individudrawn from civil wars of the past 40 years, especially regardally.5
ing their termination, that will inform our understanding
In addition, Paul Staniland argues that cohesion
of possible future developments in the Syrian civil war?
emerges from the society that existed before the civil war
We investigated seven cases of civil war that exhiband is built upon vertical and horizontal linkages in sociited factors similar to those present in Syria using both
ety. The domination of vertical linkages, a characteristic
quantitative and qualitative methods. These case studies
of authoritarian societies, generally results in atomization
included civil wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Lebaof the opposition around parochial networks.6
non, Mali, Sudan, and Tajikistan. Each conflict demonEffects of Intervention: The effects of foreign
strated structural factors that fundamentally shaped the
involvement on the structure, duration, and termination
processes that led to their termination. From analysis of
of civil wars are largely contested. While many scholars
these factors, we conclude that the most prevalent factor
view foreign involvement as a variable that unnaturally
in ending civil wars is foreign involvement; however,
prolongs a conflict, Regan and Aydin posit diplomatic
when the recipient of the foreign involvement is a fragintervention (implemented at the correct time) can
mented force, it will be ineffective in terminating the
shorten a conflict and reduce the level of violence.7 Simiwar.
larly, Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom conclude the same
is true of assistance on behalf of rebels if the assistance
Literature Review
is continually increased over time.8 Other scholars argue
The factors identified as being the driving forces of the
that the greater the support for one side, the shorter the
Syrian civil war are ethnic and religious tensions, oppoconflict.9
sition fragmentation, and foreign involvement. Each of
Negotiations: The literature also identifies two means
these factors has been examined extensively in the litera- by which civil wars can terminate in negotiated settleture on civil wars, so we provide a brief summary of the
ments. The first is when all veto players involved have
relevant theories to frame the challenges facing Syria.
agreed to stop fighting.10 The greater the number of veto
Effects of Religious and Ethnic Divisions: Much of
players involved in a conflict, the more difficult it is to
the existing literature on civil wars argues that conflicts
reach an agreement to which all veto players can agree.11
structured around religious and ethnic divisions will
The second means to bring about a negotiated setbe prolonged and violent. Monica Toft, of Harvard’s
tlement is an intervention that enforces a settlement.
Kennedy School, explains that political elites can purAccording to Walter, the “critical barrier” to resolution is
posefully frame conflicts in religious terms by escalating
ensuring the settlement’s terms are enforced in the long
religious radicalism. Elites seek to counter threats while
run.12 The greater certainty that parties have that a peace
attracting money, weapons, and fighters—a process Toft treaty will be enforced, the more likely they are to sign
refers to as “outbidding.” Religiously motivated violence an agreement.13 Successful agreements have historically
limits the ability of parties to bargain because of the
divided political power among combatants based on
absolutist nature of their positions.2
their respective positions on the battlefield. Additionally,
Similarly, Barbara Walter, as well as Karl DeRouen
such agreements include a third party that is willing and
and David Sobek, argue that ethnic wars last longer
able to enforce the terms of the settlement during demothan other civil wars because differing identities make
bilization and disarmament.14
2
Spoilers, like veto players, have interests in extending
a conflict and will often block settlements by committing acts of indiscriminate violence to increase distrust
between negotiating parties.15 The impact that spoilers
have can be mitigated by international actors, however,
and peace in these instances has generally proven sustainable.16
Methodology
In pursuing answers to our question, we compiled and
analyzed 42 cases of civil war since 1974 (or that were
ongoing in 1974) from the Correlates of War Project’s
Intra-State War Data set.17 We limited the definition
of civil wars to conflicts in which most of the fighting
occurs within the political borders of a single state and
in which the government is vying for political legitimacy against one or more rival groups. Additionally,
we excluded conflicts that saw fewer than 1,000 battle
deaths and/or fewer than 100 battle deaths on each side.
The post-1974 period was chosen for several reasons:
• Civil wars since 1974 are recent enough to exclude
anti-colonial struggles, which have a different
dynamic than modern civil wars.
• It is a period that is long enough to capture a wide
geographical breadth and depth of conflicts, particularly civil wars with religious overtones.
• Many of the same technologies employed in these
conflicts are still in use today.
We analyzed these conflicts against 49 variables concerning the causes, structure, turning points, and termination of each conflict. This analysis was conducted in
parallel with our analysis of Syria, and the results of this
process suggested that it is the structure of the conflict
that most influences the available pathways to conflict
termination.
Structure, for the purpose of this study, is defined as
the issues and conditions that drive and shape a conflict,
including the nature of the groups involved and their
fighting tactics. In Syria, we concluded that the conflict
is structured by the following:
• religious and ethnic tensions
• rebel fragmentation
• foreign involvement by both state and non-state
actors.
Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of this process
by showing how analysis of Syria’s structural challenges
in the context of other cases of civil war led to this
report’s conclusions.
Quantitative Analysis
Using Syria’s structural factors as selection criteria, quantitative analysis identified seven conflicts within our data
set that exhibited similar features. These civil wars are
those that occurred in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Sudan, and Tajikistan.
Quantitative analysis of the entire set of 42 cases
revealed how the civil wars terminated, their turning
points, and the types of foreign involvement. As shown
in Figure 2, 41 percent of the 42 civil wars examined
ended in either a government or rebel victory, while
16 percent terminated through negotiation of a powersharing agreement.
Analysis identified several major structural factors that
influence civil war termination, including
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
a government policy change
loss of support for the government
economic destabilization
foreign involvement
loss of support for the rebels
change of power
decisive military victory.
Figure 1. Graphic Depiction of the Study Design
3
Figure 2. How Civil Wars End
• ceasefire maintenance
• supervision of a partition.
The most common type of foreign involvement that
served as a factor leading to civil war termination was
kinetic support, present in 10 of the 32 conflicts that
had some form of foreign involvement (21 percent).
Syria’s Structual Challenges
As of April 2014, the factors most fundamentally shaping the direction of the Syrian civil war are structural,
and they include the following:
1.sectarian divisions
2.ethnic tensions
3.factionalism and infighting among rebels groups
4.foreign involvement in support of both the rebels
and the regime.
The most prevalent factor in terminating civil wars is
foreign involvement, which served as the decisive factor
that led to the termination of conflict in 50 percent of
the cases studied (see Figure 3). Foreign involvement can
take many forms, and is not limited to the deployment
of troops to the area of conflict. The types of foreign
involvement in the data set included
•
•
•
•
•
•
mediation
kinetic support
economic aid
material assistance
non-state support
peacekeeping
Figure 3. Decisive Factor Leading to Civil War
Termination
4
A brief explanation of each factor is provided below,
with emphasis on how these factors may shape the termination of the conflict.
First, sectarian divisions have increasingly shaped the
Syrian civil war since it began in 2011, even though the
conflict was not initially caused by religious tensions.
Divisions arose largely due to President Bashar al-Assad’s
tactics in fighting the rebels.18 While the Syrian military
contained a large number of Sunni conscripts in 2011,
many defected in protest of the regime’s treatment of
Syrian civilians. The remaining forces form a smaller
but extremely cohesive military core that is fiercely loyal
to the regime and is made up primarily of Alawites.19 A
significant portion of Assad’s counterinsurgency strategy
has been to clear contested urban areas of both rebels
and (mostly Sunni) civilians. Methods primarily include
the use of heavy artillery and blockades of supply routes
followed by occupation of reclaimed areas by Alawite
troops.20 Assad’s strategy has resulted in the creation
of sectarian enclaves throughout the country and has
increased the sectarian polarization of the population.21
External support has also exacerbated factionalism.
Iranian and Hezbollah support has been directed toward
Assad’s Alawite regime, due to their shared Shi’a faith.
Saudi Arabia and the other Sunni Gulf monarchies
have been directing money and supplies to rebel groups
(including al Qaeda affiliates, such as Jabhat al-Nusra).
Widening divisions within Syrian society and among
these international stakeholders makes full termination
of the conflict unlikely in the next several years.
Second, long-standing tensions between Syria’s Kurdish minority and the Arab majority are a major source of
ethnic tensions. Kurdish rebels control a pocket of territory in northeastern Syria—an enclave of relative stability compared to surrounding areas—and have attempted
to declare autonomy from Damascus. The Assad regime
has largely withdrawn from the region to concentrate
its resources around Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, and
small areas of Qamishli.22 Clashes between the Kurds
and other rebel groups (including the Islamist State of
Iraq and al-Sham [ISIS]) are common as the regime and
neighboring states, such as Turkey, seek to play Kurdish
and Sunni rebel groups against each other as part of a
strategy to challenge the Kurds’ ability to establish a stable autonomous region.23 Any future settlement will be
challenged to account for the level of autonomy Syrian
Kurds have achieved, despite the enclave not being a
current focus of the regime.
Third, rebel fragmentation has become the most
notable feature of the Syrian conflict since 2013 and
it weakens the opposition’s ability to counter Assad.
Numerous groups have splintered from the Western-backed Syrian National Council (SNC) and Free
Syrian Army (FSA). Acceleration of this process has
occurred due to the rapid influx of foreign fighters.24
In September 2013, several of the FSA’s most effective
fighting units broke away to form the Islamic Front, a
coalition of Islamist rebel groups that includes Jabhat
al-Nusra, al Qaeda’s sanctioned affiliate in Syria. The
Islamic Front explicitly rejects the authority of the FSA,
as well as the SNC, and is estimated to be the largest,
most effective opposition force.25
Fragmentation of rebel groups has strained the
regime’s resources by forcing it to fight on multiple
fronts. However, this advantage has failed to produce a
more systematic military campaign that translates into
political leverage for the rebels over the regime. Any
comparative advantage of a decentralized opposition
has been lost due to escalating rebel infighting since late
2013.26
Finally, foreign involvement, in the form of kinetic
support to both the regime and the rebels, has shaped
the war since its inception. Arms supplied by Russia
and direct military support from Iran and Hezbollah
have been decisive in Assad’s ability to capture and hold
territory and counter rebel forces.27 Conversely, material
support to the rebels from various external powers may
sustain their ability to continue fighting, but it has not
been sufficient to bring about significant gains against
Assad.28 The difference is primarily due to the different
levels of cohesion between the regime and rebels.
Regime cohesion, combined with direct foreign
military support, has turned the tide of the conflict in
Assad’s favor. Although the various rebel groups may
continue to fight for several years, the level of division
within the rebel movement will prevent them from
turning battlefield victories into a sustained military
advantage.
Figure 4. Syria’s Structural Challenges
Structural Influences on Civil War
Termination
Based on our analysis of Syria’s primary structural challenges, seven civil wars that exhibited the same features
were selected from the data set to serve as case studies.
Analysis of these cases revealed several lessons about the
influences that ethnic and religious tensions, rebel fragmentation, and foreign involvement have on the course
of civil wars. Again, these cases are
1.Afghanistan (1980–present)
2.Bosnia (1992–1994)
3.Iraq (2006–2007)
4.Lebanon (1975–1991)
5.Mali (2012–present)
6.Sudan (1983–2005)
7.Tajikistan (1991–1997).
5
In-depth qualitative analysis of how each structural
element manifested in these cases informs our understanding of the likely future of the Syrian conflict.
Ethnic and Religious Tensions
Ethnic and religious tensions generally define the structural divisions between combatants and inflame hostilities within states. Tension along these lines prolongs
conflict by encouraging fear of the loss of power and
representation in negotiated settlements, especially in
cases that feature a dominant minority group. These
tensions frequently occur and contribute to violence in
post-colonial states formed with little, if any, regard for
the historical differences among populations encompassed by new borders.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan, for example, has been described as a “patchwork of 21 distinct ethnic groups, further subdivided
by linguistic, tribal, religious, and clan affiliations, and
broken into small physical—hence political—units by
the geography of steep mountains and isolated valleys.”29
Political alliances formed along ethnic lines and minority
groups have often been marginalized throughout various
regimes. Omar Farooq Zain notes, “All potential forces
of disruption—ethnic, sectarian, and tribal—are casting
ominous shadows which could lead to disintegration of
the country.”30
When the first phase of the Afghan Wars began in
1978, the mullahs and uluma generally did not support
the Islamists in Pakistan.31 Instead, they looked toward
moderate or royalist parties.32 The shift away from tolerant Islam was due to religious “outbidding,” or a race to
become more purely Muslim.33 The race toward purity
was abetted by Pakistani and Saudi encouragement and
restrictions of funding to only Islamist parties.34 The radicalization of Afghans came as a result of the war, refugee
camps in Pakistan, and the ideology of the seven political
parties or “seven dwarves.”35 This fed into the rise of the
extremist Taliban in the 1990s.36
As the war progressed into the 1980s, the parties in
Peshawar divided along ethnic and religious lines. The
Sunni Tajiks slaughtered Shi’a Hazaras near Kabul.
Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan experienced
[Ethnic and religious tensions] prolong
conflict by encouraging fear of the loss
of power and representation in
negotiated settlements.
6
massacres of the Taliban by the Hazaras in 1997, followed by ethnic cleansing of Hazaras by the Taliban and
Uzbeks in 1998. The line between ethnic and religious
strife was blurred in all these cases.
Religious violence became a major factor in Afghanistan in the period between when the Soviets withdrew
in 1989 and when the United States and the international community intervened in 2001. Furthermore,
this religious violence, when tied to ethnic violence,
accelerated when foreign presence was limited to material non-kinetic support. Afghanistan’s government
has been relatively stable since the post-9/11 invasion.
Despite lingering challenges to security, intense thirdparty involvement by the United States and NATO has
brought parties together to work past ethnic divides.
Bosnia
Bosnia’s civil war erupted among the states of the former
Yugoslavia. In June 1991, both Croatia and Slovenia
proclaimed their independence from Serbian-dominated
Yugoslavia.37 Bosnia followed, passing a referendum
for independence proposed by the majority Muslim
government,38 but a significant majority of Bosnian
Serbs opposed this move and preferred to remain part
of Yugoslavia.39 Violence flared as both sides scrambled
to control as much territory as possible for their ethnic
faction.
Bosnia was largely split into two factions: the Serbs
versus the Croats and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims).40
While the majority of the republic’s population was
Bosniak, Serbs made up a powerful minority due to the
support of the Yugoslav regime.41 Serbs established the
Serbian Republika of Srpska within Bosnia’s borders
and began a series of attacks on Bosniak towns with the
backing of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA).42 Soon
after the United States and the European Community
recognized Bosnia’s independence in May 1992, Bosnian
Serbs launched their offensive with bombardment of the
capital city of Sarajevo, attacks against eastern Bosnia,
and the expulsion or killing of Bosniak civilians. The
Republic of Srpska and the JNA erected concentration
camps for forcefully displaced Croats and Bosniaks.
With their superior weapons, courtesy of the Serbian
regime in Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serbs took control of 70
percent of Bosnian territory in early 1993.43
The conflict did not take on a religious overtone until
the Bosnian Croats aligned themselves with the Serbs
against the Bosniaks. Realignment prompted the war to
be portrayed under a new paradigm as a conflict between
Christians and Muslims.44 Furthermore, Croatian and
Serbian parties regularly excluded Bosniak officials from
negotiation attempts.
Iraq
The civil war in Iraq was characterized by violence fueled
by decades of ethnic tensions between Iraqi Arabs and
the Kurdish minority in the north. During the 1980s,
Saddam Hussein’s regime massacred thousands of Kurds
with chemical weapons due to their suspected ties to
Iran. Violent targeting of Kurds by Arabs reemerged as
the stability of the country deteriorated during the civil
war in the 2000s.
The civil war was also fought along religious divisions
between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims. Violence increased
markedly in 2006 after the al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
bombing of the Shi’a Askariya Shrine, which prompted
a wave of retaliatory Shi’a militia attacks on Sunnis.45
Sunni insurgents further degraded stability by exploiting
extreme Salafism to attract support. Extremist Arabs
from neighboring countries, such as AQI, worsened the
conflict through the encouragement of Salafist doctrine.
Such groups were accredited with driving the majority of
the conflict-perpetuating sectarian violence.
Despite the continuance of conflict, post-war Iraq
now contains a semi-autonomous Kurdish region that
maintains a relationship with the central government
in Baghdad. While the future of this relationship is
uncertain—due to disputes over income distribution
and economic rights—Iraq knows more stability and
peace under this system than in years past. Fighting still
occurs, as is evident by the recent offensives by al Qaeda
to gain control over Fallujah and Ramadi; however, the
violence is not nearly on the level that it was during the
civil war.46
Lebanon
The Lebanese civil war also saw both ethnic and religious
violence, but as a mostly Arab state, ethnic tensions
played a relatively small role.47 The primary source of
ethnic conflict came from the large population of Palestinians, whose presence since the creation of Israel in
1948 contributed to a destabilizing shift in the country’s
demographics.48
Religious tensions played the largest role in driving
divisions within the Lebanese civil war.49 The National
Pact, established in 1943, created a political system that
linked representation to point-in-time demographics of
Christian, Sunni, and Shi’a communities. Most of the
political power was in the hands of the Maronite Christians, followed by the Sunnis; the Shi’a had the least representation.50 The structure of the government became
increasingly disproportionate as the growth rate of the
Christian community was outstripped by that of the
Muslims. By the 1970s, the distribution had reversed;
the Shi’a were the demographically dominant sect in
Lebanon. However, despite these changes, no alterations
were made to the existing political structure codified by
the National Pact.51 Political domination by Christians,
economic distress, and spillover from the Israel-Palestine
conflict led to the outbreak of war in 1975.
The initial Christian-versus-Muslim character of the
war broke down into both inter- and intra-sectarian
violence. Sectarian groups formed alliances of convenience with rivals against common enemies, only to later
break allegiance and resume hostilities. Additionally,
some groups were eliminated by others of the same sect
in bids for control of larger movements. For example,
the Maronite Phalangist militia led by Bashir Jumayyil
attacked and destroyed its rivals the Marada Brigade in
1978 and the Tigers in 1980.52 These dynamics persisted
throughout the conflict, as alliances and the distribution
of power shifted frequently.
Years of intense fighting resulted in a redefined powersharing arrangement. Lebanon remains a religiously
divided state, as these differences and tensions have not
been truly rectified.53 The government remains organized
along religious and sectarian lines. Therefore, it is likely
tensions will flare up again as a result of new demographic shifts and changes in relative power and capabilities of various groups.
Mali
The civil war in Mali serves as yet another example of a
conflict in which religious and ethnic differences played
a major structural role. The rebellion began as a separatist movement by the historically marginalized Tuareg
ethnic minority, who make up roughly 10 percent of the
population.54 The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a secular Tuareg separatist
group, led this rebellion as the initial opposition force.55
Tuareg and Malian Arab Islamist groups seeking to turn
Mali into an Islamist state joined the MNLA against
the government.56 A unified command structure was
never established, as this was a union based on military
necessity. The Arab Islamist, Tuareg Islamist, and secular
Tuareg rebel groups split after taking control of northern
Mali, largely as a result of ideological differences.57
The majority of Malians practice the Sufi tradition
of Islam, rather than the strict Salafist interpretation
espoused by the Islamist rebels.58 The attempt by Islamist rebels to impose Sharia was incompatible with
7
the MNLA’s secular vision of Tuareg independence.
Disagreement caused the alliance to break down along
ethnic and sectarian lines.
The future of Mali is uncertain. Ethnic and religious
divisions continue to plague both the rebels and the
government and may prevent the cohesion necessary to
terminate the civil war.59
8
one another. This separation augmented the strong sense
of loyalty people had to their respective regions, not in
terms of territory, but in terms of clan belongings, which
were largely based on ethnic and religious identities.68
While regional, ethnic, tribal, and clan identities were
certainly causes of the Tajik civil war, they also became
a primary structural factor.69 During the escalation of
the conflict in 1992–1993, the moderate attitudes of
Sudan
the opposition members started to radicalize toward
The Second Sudanese Civil War saw ethnicity play an
ethnic nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism.70 Also,
important role in the outbreak of conflict in 1983. The
the trans-regional Renaissance People’s Movement was
predominantly Muslim Arab north, which controlled
overtaken by clan rivalries when the group’s leader joined
the government, wanted to Arabize the black Christian
71
south.60 Throughout the 1980s, the conflict was divided the United Tajik Opposition. Violence was much more
along ethnic and racial lines. The primary rebel force, the acute in areas with a high regional mix, especially in the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), was comprised diverse Qurghonteppa region of southern Tajikistan,
and ethnic groups were targeted for murder, disappearof black southerners of different ethnicities. The loss of
ances, kidnapping, and the burning and looting of their
Ethiopian support for the rebels in 1991 exacerbated
homes.72
internal dissension within the SPLA and led to infightThe conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Lebanon,
ing between commanders.61 By August 1991, the SPLA
Mali, Sudan, and Tajikistan illustrate the all-toohad fractured along ethnic lines into smaller rebel facimportant roles ethnic and religious tensions play in
tions.62 One was comprised of Dinka fighters, the other
defining the structure of civil wars. Long-standing rivalof Nuer. A variety of other, much smaller ethnically
defined rebel factions emerged as well. These fought one ries between groups can allow existing tensions to erupt
into all-out war and contribute to the virulent fragmenanother in addition to the Sudanese government.63
tation of rebel groups.
The Sudanese conflict was also characterized by
religious tensions. The war began following the governRebel Fragmentation
ment’s declaration of Islamic revolution, which included As previously discussed, the Syrian civil war is characterthe national imposition of Sharia. This was a stark
ized by a large number of fragmented rebel groups. Fragdeparture from the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement that
mentation tends to lengthen the duration of conflicts by
had limited Sharia to the north.64 The south resisted
diminishing the ability of belligerents to reach terminathe extension of Sharia and fought to re-secularize their
tion points short of total annihilation of the enemy, even
region. The government’s policy remained a key point of with foreign intervention.
contention between the rebels and the north throughout
Afghanistan
negotiations from the 1980s to the 2000s.65
The Afghan civil war in the 1990s displayed significant
Tajikistan
disunity among factions opposed to the Taliban’s rule.
The Tajik civil war contained deep regional divides
Infighting within the Northern Alliance contributed
based largely on tribal and clan identities that stemmed
substantially to the eventual Taliban victory. Zalmay
from ethnic and religious identities.66 For example,
Khalilzad, a future U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan,
the Gharmi ethnic group is one of the original groups
argues that the Taliban were only able to emerge due to
of Tajiks and comprised the Gharm (or Karotegin)
“unhappiness with the infighting and perceived corrupregion. A deeply religious people, the Gharmis practiced tion of the existing mujahedin parties.”73 Militias that
Sunni Islam. Another region—the Gorno-Badakhshan
were forced out of Kabul continued operating under a
region—was primarily composed of the Pamiri ethnic
loosely unified command structure, but personal and
group and the territory’s major religion was Ismaili
ethnically driven objectives prevented a unified force
Islam.67 Tajikistan’s mountainous geographical features
against the Taliban from emerging. It was not until the
preserved strong local identities, thus exacerbating the
U.S. invasion in 2001 that a semblance of cohesion
divisions between ethnic and religious groups. Moreover, emerged.74
the Tajik infrastructure reinforced the isolation of each
This failure to come together bled into the Karzai
region by leaving territories largely disconnected from
administration, and continues to create problems repre-
Fragmentation diminishes the ability of
belligerents to reach termination points
short of total annihilation of the enemy,
even with foreign intervention.
sentative of underlying structural tensions. As noted by
Kathy Gannon, “Although Karzai has said that ordinary
Taliban and the country’s Pashtun majority have nothing
to fear from the new regime, the disproportionate influence still wielded by the Tajik- and Uzbek-dominated
Northern Alliance has spread fear throughout the country.”75
The ethnic fears that helped cause fragmentation
have somewhat subsided, but still play a role in current
Afghan politics. The war will continue if that fragmentation persists in Afghan national politics.
Bosnia
In the Bosnian conflict, the Yugoslav-backed Serbian
Republic of Srpska rebelled against the Bosnian government of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. The Serbs’
demographic strength meant they were not beholden to
a coalition and were able to act with unity of purpose.
Yugoslav material and kinetic support was thus unfiltered and cohesive. As a result, Bosnian Serbs occupied
70 percent of Bosnia by 1993.76
Divisions emerged within the other ethnically organized combatant parties. For example, the Croat political
parties and militias split on the matter of cooperation
with the Bosnian government.77 In May 1992, Croatia and Yugoslavia held a secret meeting and agreed to
cooperate.78 The leader of the pro-cooperation Bosnian
Croat party was subsequently killed and the militaristic
party took over.79 Bosnian Croats, who had been fighting
alongside Bosniaks, switched sides to secure a Croatian
enclave in Bosnia and the conflict entered a phase of
violent ethnic cleansing. The fragmentation of the Bosniak-Croat coalition extended and intensified the war.
Grievances multiplied and the resulting distrust made
negotiations more difficult.
Iraq
The civil war in Iraq began with an estimated 50–74
autonomous rebel militias with 20,000–50,000 total
fighters.80 Eventually, the insurgency consolidated
around five main groups: the Islamic Army in Iraq, the
Partisans of the Sunna Army, the Mujahadeen’s Army,
Muhammad’s Army, and the Islamic Resistance Movement in Iraq.81 Political parties themselves were also
fragmented. Shi’a, for example, comprised a minimum
of four major parties. The Mahdi Army was plagued by
tension as well, as independent cells formed and followers broke away from the command of Moqtada al-Sadr.
Iraqi politicians and Western officials alike observed
the Mahdi Army’s splintering and lack of coordination,
noting the emergence of death squads and army forces
not controlled by Moqtada. This level of fragmentation
among groups created an obstacle for U.S. forces in
Iraq; as the civil war evolved, U.S. troops were unable to
trace the perpetrators of violence back to a single unified
opposition.82
Lebanon
The Lebanese civil war quickly devolved from a fight
between Christians and Muslims into one comprised of
Maronite, Druze, Sunni, Shi’a, and Palestinian factions.
Partisan struggle was not contained to these core groups,
as each devolved into multiple smaller parties that frequently engaged in intra- and intergroup conflict both
politically and militarily.
Over the last six years of the war, the Syrian military
forces that occupied Lebanon acted largely as a peacekeeping force and became a major actor in Lebanese politics.83 Syria attempted to consolidate warring factions
through its proposed 1985 Tripartite Agreement,84 which
brought together several of the major factions. This
effort failed and conflict between factions continued.
Factional conflict from 1988–1990 generally persisted
among geographically defined regions controlled by
sectarian groups. Geographic consolidation allowed for
future dialogues as factions were more capable of representing major population groups and regions.
Mali
The Malian civil war has also been characterized by a
fragmented rebel movement. The initial alliance between
Tuareg and Islamist groups split due to ideological divisions, a process accelerated by French intervention. The
rebels were temporarily able to unite to capture territory from the Malian Army while the government was
weakened by the March 2012 coup. However, they never
fought under a unified command structure or shared a
vision for how territory would be governed once captured.85 This led to frequent infighting throughout the
life of the alliance. The MNLA separatists had a secular
agenda fundamentally incompatible with the Islamists’
strict interpretation of Sharia.86 The MNLA have since
declared support for the French intervention against
Islamists in hopes that the Tuaregs will be given some
level of autonomy through participation in peace talks.87
9
The French intervention force successfully exploited the
weak ties between Tuareg and Islamist rebels to hasten
the breakdown of the alliance.
Fragmentation has also plagued the Malian government. The Malian military lost confidence in the government’s handling of the rebellion after a series of rebel
victories. Consequently, the military executed a coup
d’état in March 2012. Additionally, the Malian military’s operational capacity has been limited, as it remains
divided over conflicting loyalties to the current and
deposed presidents.88 Divisions within the government
and military have continued unaddressed as European
Union forces have only focused on training the Malian
military.89 Lingering fragmentation makes full cessation
of the conflict unlikely.
Sudan
The Second Sudanese Civil War was characterized by a
relatively unified rebel movement fighting against the
Sudanese government for the first eight years of the
conflict. The war’s structure changed fundamentally in
August 1991, when internal dissension and infighting
among rebel commanders in the SPLA resulted in splinter groups. Disagreements over goals for the outcome
of the war sundered the rebel faction. Some rebel commanders sought to unify a secular Sudan, whereas others
wanted to secede from the north and create a separate
state. Another reason for the split was that some rebel
commanders accused SPLA leader John Garang of running the rebel movement dictatorially since its inception
in 1983.
Realizing that internecine fighting limited their ability
to fight the Sudanese government, Garang and splinter
group leader Riek Machar met in Washington, D.C.,
in 1993. The meeting, organized by the United States
Institute of Peace and the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, was designed to promote dialogue
and mediate an agreement between the rebel factions.90
This effort failed as each side viewed itself as the singular
legitimate voice of the rebel movement. Consequently,
the rebel movement remained fractured throughout the
1990s.
The Sudanese government capitalized on rebel infighting following the failed 1993 agreement by supplying
arms to Machar and six smaller rebel factions against
Garang’s SPLA Torit faction. Cooperation ceased in
January 2000 as Machar split from the Sudanese government, alleging that it did not honor a 1997 agreement.91
In January 2002, Garang and Machar merged their
respective factions to increase pressure on the Sudanese
10
government.92 While this did not restore complete rebel
unity, it nevertheless joined together the two largest rebel
factions against Khartoum.
The conflict in Sudan provides evidence of the ineffectiveness of fragmented rebel opposition in the face
of united government forces. For nearly a decade, the
SPLA Torit and SPLA United/Nasir factions fought each
other as well as the government. By merging in 2002,
the reunited SPLA was able to mount a stronger, more
focused campaign against the government. Within two
years of SPLA reunification, President al Bashir and rebel
leader John Garang agreed to hold preliminary peace
talks.
Tajikistan
In Tajikistan, the opposition consisted of the Renaissance People’s Movement, the Democratic Party (DP),
and the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP).93 The IRP was
further divided into two factions; the first was linked
to the Muslim Brotherhood and received support from
Ahmed Shah Masood94 in Kabul. The second was allied
with then-Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.95
While they shared some common goals, the opposition parties remained relatively independent due to their
ethnic-regional characteristics. For example, the DP,
based in Moscow, consisted primarily of ethnic Pamiris,
while the IRP, based in northern Afghanistan,, was composed of Gharmis.96 During the escalation of the conflict, the moderate attitudes of some opposition members “started to radicalize toward ethnic nationalism and
Islamic fundamentalism.”97 However, these rebel groups
banded together in a united coalition, seeking strength
in unity against their common enemy. The resulting
alliance was the fundamentally moderate United Tajik
Opposition.98
Fragmentation of opposition tends to lengthen the
duration of civil wars by making negotiation less feasible
and government victory more likely due to rebels’ diminished capabilities and inability to cooperate. This is not
to say that a cohesive rebel movement alone will necessarily achieve victory. On the contrary, governments that
suffer civil wars are weakened by legitimacy issues almost
by definition. Rather, in the absence of cohesion, any
foreign involvement on behalf of fractured rebels will
likely be unsuccessful.
Foreign Involvement
As seen in Figure 2, 50 percent of civil wars since 1974
have featured foreign involvement as the decisive factor
leading to civil war termination. Success or failure of
external intervention is linked to the degree of fragmentation among recipient groups. This research suggest
that, in conflicts similar to Syria, foreign involvement in
support of splintered groups will not lead to the termination of the conflict. However, successful termination
becomes more likely when foreign intervention either
addresses fragmentation or occurs after the unification of
recipient forces.
Afghanistan
The Afghan civil war experienced successful U.S. foreign
intervention in the late 1980s to expel Soviet forces.
Fragmented rebel groups, however, prevented the resolution of the civil war. The seven “dwarves” could not agree
to govern together once U.S. involvement ended. Withdrawal of U.S. support in the 1990s perpetuated this
disunity among the various factions in Afghanistan and
contributed to the rise of the Taliban by 1996.
American intervention in Afghanistan after 2001
united rebel factions against the Taliban. Tentative alliances were formed between formerly competing warlords, militias, and political parties. Foreign involvement
to this unified rebel force resulted in the collapse of the
Taliban regime and influenced the creation of an inclusive government.
Bosnia
The Bosnian civil war also experienced successful foreign involvement that addressed fragmentation. In
August 1993, Charles Redman, U.S. president Clinton’s
personal envoy, brought Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks
together and created the Croat-Bosniak Federation to
counter the Bosnian Serbs of the Republic of Sprska. In
March 1994, Croatia and Bosnia signed an agreement
to restore military cooperation, known as the Washington Agreement.99 Following Operation Storm100 and
NATO’s bombing of the Bosnian Serb Army’s missile
sites, Bosnian Serbs agreed to come to the negotiation
table. Even with all the parties at the table, U.S. Special
Envoy Richard Holbrooke faced challenges due to the
diversity of parties involved.101 To minimize the number
of parties, Holbrooke encouraged the fragile Croat-Bosniak alliance and moved to aggregate the various Serbian
groups, such as the Republic of Srpska and the Yugoslav
Successful termination becomes more
likely when foreign intervention either
addresses fragmentation or occurs
after the unification of recipient forces.
regime.102 As a result, the Yugoslav regime became the
representative of the Bosnian Serbs.103 American support
led to the termination of hostilities through mediation
and resulted in the Dayton Accords, which established
post-war borders leading to the creation of the state of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.104
Iraq
The Iraqi civil war featured fragmentation that was actually worsened by the 2003 U.S.-led military intervention. Myriad small and disparate groups vied for political
and material superiority while the American military
experienced difficulty moderating Iraq’s internal security situation. Each group hoped to oust the U.S.-led
Multi-National Force (MNF) to become the country’s
dominant power. Fragmentation rendered the efforts of
the MNF futile as the situation evolved. Sunni and Shi’a
each experienced deep divisions within various levels of
government. Shi’a parties experienced numerous intrasect political disputes while Sunni groups suffered from
a lack of organizational control and were divided along
tribal lines.
MNF efforts to mitigate internecine violence between
Shi’a and Sunnis found success as a result of two main
factors. First, the United States supplemented the MNF
with an additional 20,000 troops. Second, the Anbar
Awakening encouraged greater cooperation with the
MNF to moderate hostilities within Iraq. The Awakening began with a group of Sunni Sheiks who rejected al
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Their opposition to AQI prompted
their cooperation with the MNF.105 As the Awakening
spread beyond the Anbar province, it encouraged large
numbers of local populations to join the Iraqi Security
Forces. The movement’s expansion allowed MNF forces
to carry out more effective operations, thereby denying
AQI access to critical bases in Iraq. Termination of the
civil war eventually came as a result of the improved
security situation prompted by the MNF’s greater effectiveness.
Lebanon
The civil war in Lebanon saw early foreign intervention
efforts that failed to resolve the disunity plaguing warring factions. Syria, Israel, and multinational peacekeeping forces were focused on quelling violence rather than
reconciling fundamental tensions. This omission overlooked the central forces driving the conflict and resulted
in the persistence of sectarian and religious violence.
In the later stages of the war, however, Syria’s influence became a fundamental force that contributed to the
consolidation of various factions.106 Syria initially failed
11
to consolidate the warring factions through the 1985
Tripartite Agreement. However, by 1987, Syrian efforts
gained traction through its alignment with authorities
in Muslim-dominated West Beirut, who invited Syrian
armed forces into the city to establish order and quell
intra-militia violence. This marked the establishment of
the Syrian alliance with the Muslim-dominated parties
of the Lebanese government. As the Syrian alliance grew
in size, factional conflict became defined by geographic
regions divided along sectarian lines. This allowed reconciliation dialogues to begin to take hold, as factions were
more capable of representing major population groups
and regions.
Mali
The Malian civil war experienced a major turning point
in the form of a French-led military intervention to
reestablish immediate security in the country. The intervention expelled Islamist groups from northern towns in
a matter of weeks. The MNLA later declared its support
for the intervention and joined in peace talks with the
government.107
It remains unclear whether the current level of stability will be maintained, as France plans to withdraw and
hand control over to UN and Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) forces.108 Additionally, the poor military capabilities of the Malian government may undermine gains in stability. The Malian
Army has received training from several EU states but
remains weak, divided, and unable to effectively control
large amounts of territory outside Bamako. The current
government also lacks the capacity to institute reforms
that would be necessary to improve the conditions that
initiated the conflict.109 This failure to address the fundamental causes of fragmentation on both sides of the
conflict will result in the reescalation of violence upon
the withdrawal of foreign forces.
Sudan
The Second Sudanese Civil War experienced conflict
between different rebel factions as well as the government, following the division of the SPLA. The rebels
received non-kinetic support and limited kinetic support
while the government received non-kinetic support.110
Multiple foreign governments provided financial and
military assistance to Sudanese opposition forces, but
rebel infighting limited the effectiveness of this support.
However, once John Garang and Riek Machar merged
their respective factions in January 2002, they were able
to mount stronger opposition to the government, which
realized that its prospects for winning the war militarily
12
had diminished significantly following the reunification
of the SPLA Torit and United/Nasir factions.111 Consequently, Khartoum agreed to begin peace negotiations
with John Garang in early 2002. The turning point in
the negotiations came in July 2002 with the announcement of the Machakos Protocol, which outlined the
broad principles of the eventual peace agreement.112 The
peace process unfolded over several years, resulting in the
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.
Tajikistan
The Tajik civil war featured successful foreign intervention after the rebels united. Productive peace mediation
efforts followed. Although there were numerous actors,
such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and surrounding countries, the UN’s mandate from the Security
Council facilitated the mediation process.113 In fact, the
success of mediation was largely due to the ability of the
UN to promote effective dialogues.114
Foreign involvement has various effects on conflicts
and can take many different forms. As this research suggests, involvement is more likely to terminate civil wars
if the supported recipients have achieved unity in pursuit
of a singular goal.
Findings
Applying the lessons from the case studies to the current
conditions in Syria, we expect the following:
1.Negotiations between the regime and the rebels
will be ineffective at this point because of
a.the number of rebel groups
b.the incentives for internal and external groups
to spoil any agreement
c.the unwillingness of external powers to guarantee an agreement
d.the perceptions on both sides that more will
be gained through battle than negotiations.
The prevalence of civil wars terminated through negotiated settlements has increased since the end of the Cold
War.115 However, a negotiated settlement is unlikely in
Syria at this time due to the factors listed above.
The Syrian conflict contains myriad internal and
external groups with incentives to spoil future negotiations. Radical Islamist groups will likely be excluded
from any power-sharing agreement. Consequently, there
is a strong possibility they would prolong the conflict as
spoilers. ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra are currently among
the most effective fighting forces on the rebel side, and
the potential for them to spoil negotiations is high. Similarly, external powers such as Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah
have their own incentives to veto or spoil negotiations.116
A negotiated settlement would have to overcome
extreme distrust between diametrically opposed combatants. Barbara Walter argues that most negotiated
settlements require third-party enforcement to overcome
the security dilemma and to provide security while forces
on both sides demobilize. However, there is minimal
political will within the international community to
provide such an enforcement mechanism for any future
agreement in Syria. Hence, any current negotiations will
be ineffective.117
Finally, both the Assad regime and the rebels believe
they stand to gain more on the battlefield than through
negotiation. The regime cannot offer a meaningful
power-sharing agreement without implicitly accepting a
minority position in the future government.118 A series
of military victories between spring 2013 and April 2014
have further dissuaded Assad from negotiating. The
regime likely feels its interests will be better served by
continuing a war that has decisively turned in its favor.
Meanwhile, the opposition feels they would not receive
favorable terms in negotiations given their current weakness on the battlefield.
2.The Assad regime will likely stay in power
because its forces are unified. Moreover, it
receives various forms of assistance, including
direct military support, from Iran, Hezbollah,
and Russia.
Defections from the Syrian military in the early stages
of the conflict temporarily hampered the regime’s ability
to control the entirety of Syrian territory. The forces that
remain are highly cohesive, loyal to the regime, and are
composed largely of Alawites.119 They believe they are
fighting to avoid massacre by jihadist rebel groups.
As seen in the case studies above, foreign support is
most effective as a turning point in civil wars when the
side receiving support is cohesive. This holds true in
Syria. Assistance to the Assad regime from Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia has been critical to turning the war in
the regime’s favor. Evidence came in June 2013, when
Syrian forces recaptured the key strategic town of alQusayr from rebel forces. Assistance came in the form of
unprecedented kinetic military support from thousands
of Hezbollah fighters and forces from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard.120
Regaining control of al-Qusayr gave the regime access
to key supply routes from Lebanon, as well as transpor-
tation corridors between Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo.
The regime consolidated these gains in early 2014 by
recapturing several key towns along the Lebanese border
with direct Hezbollah military support.121
As of April 2014, the regime has cleared rebel forces
from all but one major town in the southwestern Qalamoun region.122 In accordance with the thesis of this
paper, the combination of regime cohesion and foreign
military support has changed the course of the war.
Ultimately, “victory” in Syria is a relative term: The
Assad regime will likely win the civil war, but the Syria
that results may look very different than it did in February 2011. The regime will likely be successful in capturing and controlling the area between Damascus and
the Syrian coast that is essential to its survival, but will
struggle to fully wrest areas in northern and eastern Syria
from the hands of the rebels.123 While the Assad regime
will maintain political power, the return to full security
and stability in the whole of Syrian territory is unlikely
for many years.
3.A military intervention without rebel cohesion
may topple the Assad regime, but is unlikely to
terminate the civil war because parties on all
sides will continue to fight.
Each of our case studies contain some type of foreign involvement. Where the intervention supported a
unified force, it was more successful in ending the civil
war. Conversely, foreign intervention on the side of a
fragmented force was incapable of bringing about an end
to the conflict.
Western military intervention on the side of the Syrian rebels would almost certainly be successful in toppling the Assad regime; however, it would be unlikely to
fully terminate the civil war because parties on all sides
could be expected to continue fighting. Intervention
might receive moderate levels of support from certain
rebel elements—such as the Syrian National Council
and the Free Syrian Army—but opposition could come
from Islamist groups such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra,
who are fundamentally opposed to Western involvement
in the Middle East.124 An insurgency against an intervention and continued infighting among rebel groups
seeking political and territorial control are both probable. Elements of the regime would also continue fighting
against both the intervention force and the rebels.125
13
4.If the Syrian opposition remains fragmented and
there is no significant change in the balance of
foreign support, the Syrian conflict will last for
at least another five years.
In several of our cases, including Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Lebanon, foreign attempts to arm fragmented rebel
movements did not bring a decisive end to violence.
Instead, intervention had the perverse effect of prolonging these civil wars. Our conclusions mirror the case in
Syria. Here, multiple external parties are funneling arms
to disparate rebel groups based on their own individual
interests rather than a coordinated strategy. Unorganized
foreign intervention has exacerbated divisions among
opposition groups, making either an outright rebel military victory or a negotiated settlement unlikely.
The steady stream of foreign aid and weapons has
sustained the rebels’ ability to fight, albeit in a highly
disorganized and uncoordinated manner. Foreign weapons and fighters have allowed select opposition groups to
capture fortified defensive positions. These will be difficult for the regime to reclaim in the near future, though
it will eventually succeed. Foreign support to fractured
rebel groups only serves to mitigate, rather than neutralize, the regime’s advantages. So long as the Assad regime
enjoys cohesion and foreign kinetic support against a fragmented rebel force, it will emerge victorious.
*****
This study has concluded that although foreign involvement is the most prevalent factor in ending civil wars in
general, foreign support of a fragmented force will fail
to terminate the civil war. Unless groups opposing Assad
are able to build a more cohesive coalition, negotiations
will fail and the Assad regime will remain in power. Any
intervention that merely removes Assad will not resolve
the conflict.
14
Notes
The “seven dwarves” were the Khalis faction, Hezbi
Islami,
Jamiat-i-Islami, the Islamic Union for the LibJenkins, 2014, p. 4.
eration of Afghanistan, the National Islamic Front for
2
Toft, 2007.
Afghanistan, the Afghanistan National Liberation Front,
3
Walter, 2004, and DeRouen and Sobek, 2004.
and the Revolutionary Islamic Movement.
4
Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom, 2004.
36 Edwards, 2002, p. 226.
5
37
Staniland, 2014, and Staniland, 2013, p. 38.
Kalyvas and Sambanis, 2005, p. 3.
6
38
Staniland, 2013, p. 37.
Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, 2002,
7
Regan and Aydin, 2006.
p. 40.
8
39
Collier, Hoeffler, Söderbom, 2004.
Pesic, 1996, p. 14.
9
40
Balch-Lindsey and Enterline, 2000, and Elbadawi and
Magnus, 2007, p. 27.
41
Sambanis, 2000.
According to a 1991 census, Bosnia’s population of
10
Veto players have the ability to unilaterally block settle- some 4 million was 44 percent Bosniak, 31 percent Serb,
ment of a civil war and continue fighting, even if others
and 17 percent Croatian. Magnus, 2007, p. 14.
42
reach an agreement.
Magnus, 2007, p. 28.
11
43
Cunningham, 2006, 2010, and 2013.
Magnus, 2007, p. 30.
12
44
Walter, 1997. See also Fearon, 2004.
Magnus, 2007, p. 37.
13
45
Walter, 2002.
Cordesman and Davies, 2008.
14
46
Walter, 2013.
Abdul-Zahra, 2014.
15
47
Stedman, 1997, and Kydd and Walter, 2002.
Makdisi and Sadaka, 2005, p. 59.
16
48
Stedman, 1997.
Palestinians did not have the right to vote but lent
17
Correlates of War Project, 2010.
moral support to Muslim movements’ desires for polit18
ical reformation. Maronites viewed Palestinian militia
Holliday, 2013.
forces as disruptive and destabilizing allies of the Muslim
19
Holliday, 2013.
factions. Specter and Zuhur, 2010, p. 722; Ghosn and
20
Holliday, 2013.
Khoury, 2011, p. 383; Terdiman, 2010, p. 727.
21
Holliday, 2013.
49
Terdiman, 2010, p. 727, and Makdisi and Sadaka,
22
Solomon, 2013.
2005, p. 59.
23
50
“Turkey’s Problems Grow . . . ,” 2013.
Terdiman, 2010, p. 727, and Hoffman, 1985.
24
51
Heggehammer, 2013.
Hoffman, 1985.
25
52
The Institute for the Study of War estimates there are
See Mason, 1989, pp. 197–199.
as many as 1,000 distinct rebel groups currently operat53
Ghosn and Khoury, 2011, p. 381.
ing in Syria, all with different external affiliations, capa54
CIA World Factbook, 2014.
bilities, and ideologies. This suggests that the conflict is
55
The MNLA seeks Tuareg independence from the cenunlikely to end in the near future. Walter, 2013.
tral
government. Unlike other rebel groups in Mali, the
26
Schulhofer-Wohl, 2013.
MNLA has a secular agenda.
27
Holliday, 2013.
56
Francis, 2013.
28
“Gauging the Syrian Conflict,” 2014.
57
Francis, 2013.
29
Rupert, 1989, p. 776.
58
“Mali Crisis: Key Players,” 2013.
30
Zain, 2006, p. 79.
59
International Crisis Group, 2014.
31
Barfield, 2010, pp. 41, 151.
60
The aim of Arabization by the Sudanese government
32
Rashid, 2001, p. 84.
was to impose Arabic customs, language, and culture on
33
Toft, 2007, and Ansary, 2012, p. 205.
the non-Arab southerners.
34
61
Edwards, 2002, p. 226.
Collins, 2007, pp. 1786–1787.
35
1
15
Mayotte, 1994, p. 511.
63
European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, 2002, p. 8.
64
LeRiche and Arnold, 2012, p. 32.
65
Biel, 2010, p. 30.
66
Akiner and Barnes, 2001.
67
Human Rights Watch, 2005.
68
Lynch, 2001.
69
Akiner and Barnes, 2001.
70
Wlodek, 2004, p. 81.
71
Ahmed, 1994.
72
Human Rights Watch, 2005.
73
Khalilzad, 190.
74
Rashid, 2008, p. 83.
75
Gannon, 2004, p. 39.
76
Magnus, 2007, p. 30.
77
Ramet, 2006, p. 434.
78
Magnus, 2007, p. 36.
79
Ramet, 2006, p. 434.
80
Dodge, 2007.
81
Dodge, 2007.
82
Cordesman and Davies, 2008.
83
Mason, 1989, p. 214.
84
Many stipulations of the Tripartite Agreement were
adopted four years later in the Taif Accords.
85
“Mali Crisis: Key Players,” 2013.
86
Francis, 2013.
87
Francis, 2013.
88
Francis, 2013.
89
Croft, 2014.
90
United States Institute of Peace, 1993, p. 1.
91
European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, 2002,
p. 146. The 1997 agreement between the government
and seven rebel factions provided for elections, a referendum on secession, a southern exemption from Sharia, equal representation, equitable sharing of natural
resources, and southern reconstruction.
92
Natsios, 2012, p. 163–164, and European-Sudanese
Public Affairs Council, 2002, p. 8.
93
Ahmed, 1994.
94
An Afghan political and military leader. He was a central figure in the resistance against the Soviet occupation
between 1979 and 1989 and in the following years of
civil war.
62
16
Ahmed, 1994.
Ethnic Tajiks originally from the Gharm and Qaranteguine Valleys to the east of Dushanbe. Lynch, 2001,
p. 56, and Foroughi, 2002, p. 46.
97
Wlodek, 2004, 81.
98
Lynch, 2001, p. 56.
99
Ramet, 2006, p. 439.
100
With Bosnia’s military assistance, Croatia launched
Operation Storm and successfully took over the Krajina.
Ramet, 2006, p. 464.
101
Watkins, 2003, p. 159.
102
Watkins, 2003, p. 159.
103
Watkins, 2003, p. 160.
104
Ramet, 2006, p. 466.
105
Roggio, 2007.
106
Mason, 1989, p. 214.
107
Francis, 2013. Ceasefires have been violated by both
sides and there has been consistent low-level violence in
northern Mali. The MNLA has also threatened to withdraw from the ceasefire on several occasions.
108
International Crisis Group, 2014.
109
International Crisis Group, 2014.
110
Meredith, 2005, pp. 590–594; Natsios, 2012, p. 173;
Ronen, 2002, pp. 113–114, 118; EuropeanSudanese Public Affairs Council, 2002, pp. 54–55, 57,
66, 82.
111
Natsios, 2012, pp. 163–164.
112
Natsios, 2012, p. 168.
113
Abdullo, 2001; Goryayev, 2001; and Slim and Suanders, 2001.
114
Goryayev, 2001.
115
Cunningham, 2013.
116
Cunningham, 2013.
117
Walter, 2002.
118
Walter, 2013.
119
Holliday, 2013.
120
O’Bagy, 2013.
121
Nassief, 2013.
122
Blanford, 2014a.
123
Blanford, 2014b.
124
Cordesman, 2013.
125
Holliday, 2013.
95
96
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