MULTI-STAKEHOLDER APPROACHES
TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
Analysis of Existing Multi-Stakeholder Approaches
Prepared by the
American University
Conflict Transformation & Peacebuilding Practicum Group
December 2015
Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 2 THEORIES OF CHANGE .......................................................................................................................... 2 Increasing Positive Interactions Between Sectors .................................................................................... 3 Training for Collaborative Work Across Sectors ..................................................................................... 3 Strengthening Social Cohesion and Community Engagement ................................................................. 4 CHALLENGES AND BEST PRACTICES ................................................................................................ 4 Inclusivity ................................................................................................................................................ 4 Community Impact .................................................................................................................................. 5 Sustainability ........................................................................................................................................... 6 S-GAP IN CONTEXT ................................................................................................................................. 7 Advantages .............................................................................................................................................. 7 Opportunities for Improvement ............................................................................................................... 8 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................................ 9 APPENDIX 1: Glossary of Multi-stakeholder Initiatives .......................................................................... 12 APPENDIX 2: Selection of GGPAC Indicators from Security Sector and Civil Society: Engagement for
Human Security Handbook and Curriculum Outline ................................................................................. 16 1 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform INTRODUCTION
Multi-stakeholder approaches to dialogue focus on bringing together large cross-sections
of society to include voices that are often marginalized from certain political or social processes.
Most commonly, multi-stakeholder dialogues include government officials, civil society
participants, and other important stakeholders. Civil society participants frequently consist of
leaders of community organizations, religious figures, and local non-governmental
representatives (i.e. tribal leaders etc.). When engaging the security sector, the military and
police are often included in the dialogue as important stakeholders as well.
This report will analyze the different ways organizations implement multi-stakeholder
approaches. In particular, in order to broaden participation in dialogues on security priorities and
reforms, the international organizations surveyed in this analysis use different tools and
strategies to bring together key stakeholders from civil society, government, and the uniformed
services. This report will provide an analysis of those strategies and also discuss the ways in
which these approaches affect the inclusivity, sustainability, and impact of their programming.
The programs and frameworks analyzed in this report include Todos Somos Juarez (TSJ),
Interpeace Program on Violence Reduction in El Salvador, Joan. B. Kroc Institute for Peace and
Justice (IPJ), Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts (GPPAC), United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), Saferworld, and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). An overview of these programs can be found in Appendix 1:
Glossary of Multi-stakeholder Initiatives. An analysis of these initiatives highlights the central
theories of change of multi-stakeholder dialogue initiatives for security performance and reform;
as well, it identifies common programming best practices and challenges to inclusivity,
sustainability, and community impact.
THEORIES OF CHANGE
The multi-stakeholder dialogue programs cited above are based on specific theories of
change that inform the approach to security sector reform taken by each organization. Common
objectives include increasing positive interactions between relevant stakeholders, teaching
stakeholders to work together, and strengthening community cohesion and engagement in
decision-making and reform processes.
2 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform Increasing Positive Interactions Between Sectors
Interpeace and TSJ use the multi-stakeholder dialogue approach to increase interaction
between security sector personnel, the government, and civil society. Interpeace supports longterm interaction between the government, civil society, and the community to create Track 6
dialogues, which they classify as multi-stakeholder dialogues between Track 1 (government
authorities), Track 2 (civil society organizations, private sector, and municipal authorities), and
Track 3 (community at large, including gang members).1 These dialogues are conducted based
on the theory that this will lead to policies that reflect local realities and community needs.2
Similarly, TSJ supports communication and collaboration between stakeholders; however, TSJ
operates on the theory that such communication will positively influence public policy and legal
systems, as exemplified by its work in Juarez, Mexico.3
Training for Collaborative Work Across Sectors
GPPAC and Saferworld implement training and capacity-building in order to improve the
ability of the community and the security sector to work together to achieve desired reforms.
The goal of the GPPAC program is to support communication between civil society and the
security sector, however, GPPAC believes increased training of both the security sector and civil
society will enhance their ability to work together to create positive change.4 Similarly,
Saferworld’s “community security approach” is based on the theory that interaction can
gradually build trust between the community and the authorities, and that this will allow
communities to be their own agents of change, enabling the community and the security sector to
collectively identify security concerns and responses.5 The approach of the two organizations
1
Interpeace. “Bridging Gaps: Interpeace and the Reduction of Violence in El Salvador,” 2011 Annual Report, 6.
Interpeace. “Bridging Gaps: Interpeace and the Reduction of Violence in El Salvador,” 2011 Annual Report, 2.
3
Sylvia Aguilera, Nadeji Babinet, and Luis Gomez Chow,“Decreasing Violence in Mexico
through Citizen Participation,” in Empowerment and Protection: Stories of Human Security, ed by Kristen Wall,
Jenny Aulin, and Gabriella Vogelaar, (The Hague, Netherlands: The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed
Conflict, 2014), 64.
4
Security Sector and Civil Society: Engagement for Human Security Handbook and Curriculum Outline: November
2013 Draft. Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. Web.
<https://www.peaceportal.org/documents/130617663/130620283/Handbook+and+Curriculum+Outline++December+2014+Draft/14ce1b12-0a66-4caa-8bda-acb04eca9c0e>, 9.
5
Kloe Tricot O'Farrell, Putting People at the Heart of Security: Reviewing Approaches, Exploring Solutions (May
11, 2015), 3, accessed October 12, 2015, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/899-putting-peopleat-the-heart-of-security-reviewing-approaches-exploring-solutions, 3.
2
3 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform provides equal attention to capacity building as a way to encourage the community and
authorities to address the root causes of insecurity.6
Strengthening Social Cohesion and Community Engagement
The IPJ, UNDP, and DCAF focus on strengthening community capacity as a way to
increase democratic influence over the security sector. The IPJ program in Kenya focuses on
capacity building in the belief that strengthening the community’s role will improve security.7
The UNDP approach also strives to increase community capacity; however, the focus here is on
strengthening social cohesion.8 The UNDP approach is based on the assumption that
communities with deep social cohesion are more secure, and communities that feel physically
secure are more likely to be socially cohesive.9 DCAF too works to strengthen the role of
community, operating on the theory that a democratically governed security sector, with highlevels of citizen participation, is more accountable to the community as a whole.10
CHALLENGES AND BEST PRACTICES
Inclusivity
The inclusion of representatives of all relevant parties is a critical component of multistakeholder dialogue programs. This objective must also be balanced with concerns for
“spoilers” or certain parties whose inclusion in the dialogue could potentially jeopardize the
goals of the program, such as leaders of criminal organizations and gang members. However, in
some contexts, a dialogue program focused on security that excluded such actors might prove
inadequate in stimulating positive change. In El Salvador, Interpeace balanced these challenges
by performing consultations within groups and facilitating interactions across sectors to prepare
6
Will Bennett, Community Security Handbook (Saferworld, 2014), 5, accessed October 12, 2015,
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/806-community-security-handbook., 4.
7
"Security and Safety - Chemchemi Ya Ukweli." Chemchemi Ya Ukweli. N.p., n.d. Web. 28 Oct. 2015.
<http://www.chemichemi.org/programs/security-and-safety/>.
8
United Nations Development Program. Community Security and Social Cohesion: Towards a UNDP Approach.
December, 2009.
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/thailand/docs/CommSecandSocialCohesion.pdf, 18.
9
Ibid.
10
Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert and Katrin Kinzelbach, ed. Public Oversight of the
Security Sector: A Handbook for Civil Society Organizations. Bratislava: UNDP, 2008. Accessed October 12, 2015.
http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Public-Oversight-of-the-Security-Sector, 16.
4 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform parties for potential future multi-stakeholder dialogues. UNDP encourages the inclusion of
participants from multiple political parties to “reduce the risk of the program being perceived as
politically motivated, or even fueling conflict.”11
As is a common best practice in conflict management, several of the programs partnered
with community organizations to map the relevant stakeholders and identify participants for the
multi-stakeholder dialogue initiatives. Saferworld cautioned that this approach to the design of
inclusive dialogues “often [involves] only the ‘community gate-keeper’ and those with influence
in the community, rather than garner participation from a broad section of society.”12 Despite
their best efforts at inclusivity, programs such as those developed by Mesa and GGPAC are open
to criticism for their top-down approach since they are implemented in partnership with a
national government and an international body, respectively.
Inclusivity can also be incorporated into training programs. DCAF created more
inclusivity in its multi-stakeholder training program by integrating gender issues with security.
DCAF works with international organizations and national security sector personnel to provide
curricula and training on gender inclusive approaches to security.13 For example, Sweden
referenced DCAF’s Gender and SSR Toolkit when it instituted the Gender Coach Program,
which paired senior security sector personnel with gender specialists who provided training in
gender approaches to security. The program successfully changed the operational behaviors of
senior security sector personnel, as well as the culture of the institution as a whole.14
Community Impact
Disaggregating program impacts from social and political developments is a common
challenge for multi-stakeholder dialogue initiatives. For example, Ciudad de Juarez, the site of
the TSJ and Mesa initiatives, is no longer the murder capital of the world, suggesting there have
been improvements in security concerns since the implementation of the multi-stakeholder
dialogue initiatives.15 However, in the absence of publicly available monitoring and evaluation
plans or reports, the specific impact of programs like Mesa is difficult to discern. Saferworld
assessed the improvement of working relationships across sectors that have a stake in
11
UNDP, Community Security and Social Cohesion, 35.
Bennett, Community Security Handbook, 23.
13
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF Programs: Gender and Security, accessed
October 25, 2015,http://www.dcaf.ch/Programmes/Gender-and-Security.
14
Toiko Tõnisson Kleppe, Gender Training for Security Sector Personnel: Good Practices and Lessons Learned,
accessed October 25, 2015, http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Gender-Training-for-Security-Sector-Personnel-goodpractices-and-lessons-learned-Tool-12.
15
Aguilera, Babinet, and Chow,“Decreasing Violence in Mexico through Citizen Participation, 69.
12
5 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform community-level and national security by identifying dialogue feedback that was incorporated
into national strategies. In Kosovo, one of Saferworld’s longest running programs, national
security policies such as the Law on Arms, the Community Policing Strategy and the National
Action Plan on Community Safety include feedback from local consultations.16 GPPAC provides
the best example of a robust monitoring and evaluation plan designed to measure the impact of
programming. Through a variety of polls, surveys, and index measurements, GPPAC assesses
impact using its own indicators as well as the Millennium Development Goals Post-2015
Indicators, Rule of Law and other security sector reform measures.17 Additional GGPAC
indicators are detailed in Appendix 2.
Sustainability
Multi-stakeholder dialogue programs cultivate community partnerships and incorporate
capacity-building initiatives or trainings to ensure sustainability. While support from an
international organization or government can aid in the launch of a multi-stakeholder dialogue
program, UNDP prioritizes strong relationships with community partners to prevent “[overreliance] on the support of one prominent...sponsor,” which could jeopardize the sustainability of
a program.18 With regard to training, Interpeace trained community facilitators for its dialogue
process in an effort to develop local capacities.19 Currently, GGPAC provides training modules
on civil society and security sector collaboration as part of its online community for continued
dialogue among practitioners. In addition to trainings, regularly scheduled engagement and
follow-on activities serve to sustain program activities and potentially positive community
impacts. Though TSJ is derived from a top-down approach that was government initiated, its
Mesa dialogues have sustained buy-in from stakeholders and remain active on a bi-weekly
basis.20 It is possible that the diverse scope of the Mesa programs, with ten commissions on
varying concerns around security, such as tracking crime and violence and improving
transparency, contribute to its sustainability.21 In lieu of regularly scheduled dialogues, IPJ has
key follow-ups built into their programming in Kenya. Follow-up sessions were planned by
dialogue participants and held several months after the initial two-day programs as well as two
16
Bennett, Community Security Handbook, 23.
Security Sector and Civil Society: Engagement for Human Security Handbook and Curriculum Outline:
November 2013 Draft. Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 5-6.
18
UNDP, Community Security and Social Cohesion, 37.
19
Interpeace. “Bridging Gaps: Interpeace and the Reduction of Violence in El Salvador,” 2011 Annual Report, 6.
20
International Crisis Group. “Back from the Brink: Saving Ciudad Juarez,” , 20.
21
Ibid.
17
6 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform years later in February 2015. Despite these efforts, program sustainability is subject to
community buy-in, funding, and availability of personnel with relevant expertise. On the latter
issue, UNDP suggests many community security and social cohesion (CSSC) programs are
compromised by frequent staff turnover or lack of personnel with necessary specializations. As
explained in UNDP’s multi-stakeholder dialogue framework, “a failure to match program
commitments with staff commitments risks undermining [a program’s] reputation and inhibiting
the organization’s ability to strengthen CSSC.”22
S-GAP IN CONTEXT
This analysis of multi-stakeholder dialogue initiatives helps to position Partners’ S-GAP
Framework within the field of existing cross sector security sector reform models. It also allows
us to evaluate the advantages of the S-GAP tool as well as opportunities for improvement. The
S-GAP model is designed to adapt to local dynamics, which helps facilitate the development of
bottom-up solutions in a field of programs frequently criticized for being top-down in nature. In
particular, the educate and caucus portions of S-GAP are useful for stimulating security reform
processes from outside the government and other traditional institutions of power. Also, S-GAP
is truly a toolkit for multi-stakeholder program design. The guidance provided on conducting
context and stakeholder analyses as well as the guiding questions and assessment tools within SGAP enable a variety of stakeholders to initiate and structure a locally relevant security reform
process.
In addition to its many advantages, within the S-GAP toolkit are opportunities for
improvement. Many of the other multi-stakeholder approaches analyzed here integrate action
plan implementation and monitoring and evaluation guidance which can help S-GAP become a
sustainable tool. Finally, future implementation of the S-GAP toolkit and potential add-ons,
such as as an accompanying workbook and online tools, would greatly increase the accessibility
of the S-GAP model in various contexts.
Advantages
● Adaptable framework: In comparison to other multi-stakeholder models for dialogue,
the S-GAP framework affords flexibility in implementation based on local dynamics,
considering such factors as previous attempts at dialogue, levels of violence or conflict,
22
UNDP, Community Security and Social Cohesion, 35.
7 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform or ripeness for cross-sector dialogue or reform. No other organization surveyed contained
separate components which could be implemented separately and according to conditions
on the ground.
● Toolkit for program design: Most programs are either designed by an outside
organization or in consultation with local actors. Partners does consultations but also
gives tools to the stakeholders to build capacity and strengthen ownership of the process,
beginning with local assessments. No other organization we surveyed marketed a similar
assessment tool that could be used by local stakeholders.
Opportunities for Improvement
● Develop more interactive S-GAP tools: Some of the initiatives we evaluated that were
particularly successful offered user-friendly and interactive program materials to enhance
learning and better facilitate implementation. The S-GAP toolkit could benefit from more
interactive tools such as workbook or an online platform that would make the framework
more accessible, increasing the ability of stakeholders to utilize the tool in different ways
according to the local context.
● More detailed M&E guidance: Guidance on how stakeholders should engage in
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is not currently integrated into the S-GAP model.
There should be more process oriented suggestions that stakeholders can use to design
M&E plans at the program planning stage. This could include guidance on monitoring
techniques, as well as the creation of their own indicators, in addition to incorporating
industry accepted indicators. Without incorporating M&E guidance into the S-GAP
toolkit, it will be difficult to market it as a sustainable tool.
● More guidance on follow-on activities: Many of the approaches in this analysis
provided process-based guidance on action plan implementation. The S-GAP toolkit can
also provide a tool which aids stakeholders as they plan next steps and create change on a
larger scale. A tool, similar to a stakeholder analysis tool, which helps stakeholders
analyze opportunities and challenges, can help inform next steps. Such an addition to the
toolkit should also provide suggestions for analyzing regional best practices and creating
ongoing dialogues between stakeholders.
8 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform BIBLIOGRAPHY
Community Security: Rethinking Policy and Strategy for Modern Security Challenges.
Saferworld, 2013. Accessed October 25, 2015.
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/763-community-securityrethinking-policy-and-strategy-for-modern-security-challenges.
Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert and Katrin Kinzelbach, ed. Public Oversight of the Security Sector: A
Handbook for Civil Society Organizations. Bratislava: UNDP, 2008. Accessed October
12, 2015. http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Public-Oversight-of-the-Security-Sector.
"Engaging the Security Sector." Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict.
Accessed October 28, 2015. http://www.gppac.net/news//asset_publisher/fHv91YcOz0CI/content/engaging-the-security-sector/
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF Programs: Gender and
Security. Accessed October 25, 2015. http://www.dcaf.ch/Programmes/Gender-andSecurity.
International Crisis Group. “Back from the Brink: Saving Ciudad Juarez,” Latin America Report
54 (2015): 1-31.
Interpeace. “Bridging Gaps: Interpeace and the Reduction of Violence in El Salvador,” 2011
Annual Report.
"Kenya: Our Work in the Field- Violence Prevention." Institute for Peace and Justice.
University of San Diego's Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies. Accessed October 28,
2015. http://www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/institutes/ipj/in-the-field/kenya.php.
Kloe Tricot O'Farrell. Putting People at the Heart of Security: Reviewing Approaches, Exploring
Solutions. May 11, 2015. Accessed October 12, 2015.
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/899-putting-people-at-the-heartof-security-reviewing-approaches-exploring-solutions.
Mesa de Seguridad y Justicia. “Decreasing Violence in Mexico through Citizen Participation.”
Accessed September 28, 2015. http://www.mesadeseguridad.org/red-ciudadana/.
9 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform "Security and Safety - Chemchemi Ya Ukweli." Chemchemi Ya Ukweli. Accessed October 28,
2015. http://www.chemichemi.org/programs/security-and-safety.
"Security Sector & CSOs." Human Security Working Group. Global Partnership for the
Prevention of Armed Conflict. Accessed October 28, 2015.
http://www.peaceportal.org/web/gppac-human-security-working-group/security-sectorcsos.
Security Sector and Civil Society: Engagement for Human Security Handbook and Curriculum
Outline: November 2013 Draft. Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict.
Accessed October 28, 2015.
https://www.peaceportal.org/documents/130617663/130620283/Handbook+and+Curricul
um+Outline+-+December+2014+Draft/14ce1b12-0a66-4caa-8bda-acb04eca9c0e.
Sylvia Aguilera, Nadeji Babinet, and Luis Gomez Chow, “Decreasing Violence in Mexico
through Citizen Participation,” in Empowerment and Protection: Stories of Human
Security, ed by Kristen Wall, Jenny Aulin, and Gabriella Vogelaar. The Hague,
Netherlands: The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 2014.
Toiko Tõnisson Kleppe, Gender Training for Security Sector Personnel: Good Practices and
Lessons Learned. Accessed October 25, 2015. http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/GenderTraining-for-Security-Sector-Personnel-good-practices-and-lessons-learned-Tool-12.
United Nations Development Program. Community Security and Social Cohesion: Towards a
UNDP Approach. December, 2009.
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/thailand/docs/CommSecandSocialCohesion.pdf.
United Nations Human Rights Council. “Summary Prepared by the Office of the United Nations
Commissioner for Human Rights: Honduras,” Working Group on the Universal Period
Review (2015): 1-20.
Will Bennett. Community Security Handbook. Saferworld, 2014. Accessed October
12, 2015. http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/806-communitysecurity-handbook.
10 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform Zahra Ismail, "Police-Youth Forum in Kenya Bridges Fears and Marks Next Steps Toward
Peaceful Elections - Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice Blog." Joan B Kroc
Institute for Peace and Justice Blog. N.p., 05 Dec. 2012. Accessed October 28, 2015.
http://sites.sandiego.edu/ipj/blog/2012/12/05/police-youth-forum-in-kenya-bridges-fearsand-marks-next-steps-toward-peaceful-elections/.
11 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform APPENDIX 1: Glossary of Multi-stakeholder Initiatives
Todos Somos Juárez: TSJ was a multi-stakeholder dialogue hosted by President Calderon of
Mexico, which brought together government and civil society members to discuss issues of
concern, public security included.23 From 2010-2012, the TSJ held a series of multi-stakeholder
dialogues, which produced a 160-point to-do list and 10 committees to address and organize
priority concerns.24 One of the most successful initiatives to come out of the TSJ, the Mesa de
Seguiridad (Mesa), is an on-going committee of civil society representatives, including
academic, NGO, and business interests, which uses the dialogue process to collaborate on issues
of public security in Juarez City, Mexico.25 Mesa is comprised of 14 organizations that meet on a
bi-weekly basis in various committees.26
Interpeace Program on Violence Reduction in El Salvador: The Interpeace program is a
dialogue initiative which builds bridges between government, civil society, and the broader
community, Interpeace’s dialogue process emphasizes greater inclusivity, and therefore seeks to
include the participation of gang leaders and members. Interpeace’s primary goal is to address
the root causes of violence and work towards developing comprehensive policy change.27 In
support of this goal, Interpeace is developing a strategy toward Track 6 dialogue, which is
classified as a dialogue between Track 1 (government authorities with focus on public security),
Track 2 (organized civil society organizations, private sector, and municipal authorities), and
Track 3 (community at large, including gang members).28 However, until the context is ripe for
multi-stakeholder dialogue, Interpeace is performing consultations within groups and facilitating
interactions between groups.29
Joan. B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice: In November 2012, IPJ hosted a two-day
dialogue “Building Alliances: Working Together to Prevent Violence in Nairobi,” which brought
together youth, civil society leaders, government officials, and representatives of the police.30
23
Aguilera, Babinet, and Chow,“Decreasing Violence in Mexico through Citizen Participation, 64.
International Crisis Group. “Back from the Brink: Saving Ciudad Juarez,” 1.
25
Mesa de Seguridad y Justicia, http://www.mesadeseguridad.org/red-ciudadana/.
26
International Crisis Group. “Back from the Brink: Saving Ciudad Juarez,” 20.
27
Interpeace. “Bridging Gaps: Interpeace and the Reduction of Violence in El Salvador,” 1.
28
Ibid, 6.
29
Ibid.
30
"Kenya: Our Work in the Field- Violence Prevention." Institute for Peace and Justice. University of San Diego's
Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, n.d. Web. 28 Oct. 2015.
<http://www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/institutes/ipj/in-the-field/kenya.php>.
24
12 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform During the dialogue, youth developed a list of activities to mitigate fear of the police, viewed the
documentary “Heal the Nation”, and participated in a facilitated discussion that related the film
to current violence in Nairobi as well as the upcoming March 2013 election.31 In addition, local
police and security sector representatives are invited to explain the community-policing process
to the youth and community participants, and encourage further collaboration among civil
society, youth, and security services.32 The program implements additional activities which
include community safety research findings launches, security service providers meetings,
stakeholder meetings, radio talk shows, and crime detection tool reviews.33
Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts: Global Partnership for the
Prevention of Armed Conflicts (GPPAC) partnered with the Alliance for Peacebuilding and the
Kroc Institute for Peace Studies for 3-year project to improve security sector engagement with
civil society by bringing multiple stakeholders together on human security.34 Through
consultation with experts in security sector engagement and the United Nations Institute of
Training and Research, GPPAC develops “training curricula for security forces on community
engagement and interacting with civilians, and for civil society organizations on how to best to
relate to the security sector.”35 The training modules are part of an online community to serve as
a knowledge hub and space for continued dialogue among practitioners. The online resource and
its associated network of experts will support a “set of civil-military consultations, funding for
pilot training of trainers and, in year 3, a conference that bring together civil society and security
sector professionals in direct dialogue with each other on the curriculum's themes and content.”36
United Nations Development Program: The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
developed a guide for stakeholders on how they can design programs to enhance Community
31
Zahra Ismail, "Police-Youth Forum in Kenya Bridges Fears and Marks Next Steps Toward Peaceful Elections Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice Blog." Joan B Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice Blog. N.p., 05 Dec.
2012. Web. 28 Oct. 2015.
32
Ibid.
33
"Security and Safety - Chemchemi Ya Ukweli." Chemchemi Ya Ukweli.
34
"Engaging the Security Sector." Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. Web. 28 Oct. 2015.
<http://www.gppac.net/news/-/asset_publisher/fHv91YcOz0CI/content/engaging-the-security-sector/>.
35
Ibid.
36
"Security Sector & CSOs." Human Security Working Group. Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed
Conflict, Web. 28 Oct. 2015. <http://www.peaceportal.org/web/gppac-human-security-working-group/securitysector-csos>.
13 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform Security and Social Cohesion (CSSC) using a multi-stakeholder approach.37 The CSSC tool [is
designed to be (?)] to be adaptable to various contexts. Depending on the context, the tool can be
used to enhance community security and cohesion in-line with one of seven pillars that also
serve as the intended outcomes of its work: 1) enhancing local governance and strengthening
local institutions; 2) strengthening the rule of law and security sector governance; 3) preventing
conflict and supporting peacebuilding; 4) providing alternative opportunities for employment and
better livelihoods; 5) improving the community environments and enhancing service delivery; 6)
addressing the proliferation of the tools of violence and the demand for weapons; and 7) taking a
public health approach to crime and violence.38
Saferworld: Saferworld develops initiatives for NGO and local community capacity-building
because they believe this is essential to increase community engagement with the security
sector.39 Saferworld’s programming is designed to be flexible and long-term in order to embed
the values of community safety at the individual, institutional and societal levels.40 The
Saferworld process is context specific, and therefore begins with a conflict analysis and
emphasizes participatory assessments and planning.41 Saferworld often works with local
partners, but sometimes finds it necessary to create community security working groups
(CSWGs) if the right partners are hard to find.42 Saferworld helps build CSWG capacity by
forming expert advisory groups to help guide the CSWG and by connecting the CSWG with a
wider network of support.43
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF): DCAF provides
advisory support and training to a number of organizations and developed a handbook for civil
society organizations.44 DCAF encourages a variety of programming, including awareness
raising, advocacy and training. Potential programming initiatives include focus group
discussions, public events, media engagement, public education, and training of security
personnel on human rights laws and standards.45 DCAF also supports programming that
37
UNDP, Community Security and Social Cohesion, 1-3.
Ibid.
39
O'Farrell, Putting People at the Heart of Security, 3.
40
Bennett, Community Security Handbook, 12.
41
Bennett, Community Security Handbook, 6.
42
Bennett, Community Security Handbook, 20.
43
Bennett, Community Security Handbook, 30.
44
Cole et al., Public Oversight of the Security Sector.
45
Cole et al., Public Oversight of the Security Sector, 76.
38
14 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform includes local participation and ownership.46 For example, DCAF mentions decentralized
security institutions, such as the provincial and district-level security committees in Sierra Leone,
as a means with which civil society organizations can influence security policy.47
46
47
Cole et al., Public Oversight of the Security Sector, 18.
Cole et al., Public Oversight of the Security Sector, 110.
15 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform APPENDIX 2: Selection of GGPAC Indicators from Security Sector and Civil Society:
Engagement for Human Security Handbook and Curriculum Outline
“Human security is defined in this project in accordance with the United Nations. “Human
security promotes people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented
measures that seek to reduce the likelihood of conflicts, help overcome the obstacles to
development and promote human rights for all.” Human security is measured by the degree to
which people perceive they are free from fear, free from want, and free from humiliation and
despair. Public perceptions are measured through a variety of polls, surveys and index
measurements.
Indicators of Impact:
● Decrease in human rights violations by security actors
● Increase in protection of civilian indicators
● More security sector strategists write policy papers or doctrine that recognizes civil
society perspectives on their relations with security forces, including the necessity for
civil society to be viewed as independent actors rather than as government contractors.
(Currently, only a few countries have policies or doctrine that reflect civil society
interests in human security, conflict prevention or peacebuilding).
● More security sector forces consult with and interact with civil society in a way that
identifies how to foster human security. (Currently, there is antagonism between security
forces and civil society in many countries).
● More civil society organizations will reach out to engage with security forces to begin a
dialogue or projects that will improve human security or civilian oversight of the security
sector, moving from “protest” to “proposal”. (Currently, there are few civil society
projects to engage the security sector).
● Civilians at the local level report that they perceive themselves to be more safe, more able
to live free live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair.
● Improvement in and other civil-military performance indicators, overall peacebuilding
performance per the MDG/post-2015 indicators, Rule of Law and other SSR indicators,
etc. (This project will identify relevant indicators from other indices to use for
monitoring and evaluation.)
16 Multi-­‐stakeholder Approaches to Security Sector Reform NIGERIA AND SIERRA LEONE
SUMMER 2015
Evaluation of S-GAP Implementation
Prepared by the
American University
Conflict Transformation & Peacebuilding Practicum Group
December 2015
Table of Contents TOP RELEVANT TAKEAWAYS .............................................................................................................. 2 IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: NIGERIA ..................................................................................... 2 IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: SIERRA LEONE ......................................................................... 3 1 S-­‐GAP Evaluation Nigeria & Sierra Leone TOP RELEVANT TAKEAWAYS
•
Educate implementation of S-GAP needs to be more concise and integrated into the
Caucus and Dialogue formats more fluidly
•
Caucus implementation had positive responses from participants
•
Localizing NGO involvement in the S-GAP implementation was highly positive, but has
drawbacks regarding impartiality
•
Caucus and Dialogue implementations need to have more time integrated into
programming to be most effective
During the summer of 2012, the S-GAP tool-kit was deployed in Nigeria and Sierra
Leone. Activity largely focused on the caucus and dialogue portions of the process. The Educate
approach was also looked to for guidance for the caucus and dialogue, but was not the primary
focus of this implementation. Caucus group participants were encouraged to identify central
concerns in the security sector during caucus sessions. Those participants then discussed their
key concerns with other stakeholders in the dialogue framework. Partners identified local NGO’s
to work with: CLEEN in Nigeria, and the Campaign for Good Governance in Sierra Leone.
IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: NIGERIA
Interviews with participants involved in the S-GAP implementation in Nigeria were
useful to understand how S-GAP should be implemented in the future. The interviews and notes
collated by the our team represent the data used for this evaluation. Interviews were performed
via Skype with participants being present at CLEEN headquarters. One issue to consider for the
future is that participants should not be interviewed at partner NGO locations, to ensure no
feeling of coercion or pressure is present. That being said, there was no direct indication of such
influence in these interviews but it is an issue to keep in mind.
The majority of interviewees indicated that S-GAP was an effective framework for
identifying the deficiencies in their security sector. Further, the participants identified that the
caucuses and dialogue assisted them in understanding other participants and their roles within
society. This created a foundation for further discussions. One area identified by interviewees as
in need of improvement was follow-up, to ensure that further implementation would occur.
There was high interest in participating in further caucuses and dialogues focused on issues
pertaining to the security sector. These dialogues were suggested to occur at least annually, but
perhaps even quarterly events would be beneficial. At least one participant indicated that without
a distinct action plan and follow-up events it was likely there would be backsliding or a lack of
2 S-­‐GAP Evaluation Nigeria & Sierra Leone action. That being said, participants felt that the flexibility of S-GAP was relevant to Nigeria and
that a good first step was taken in its implementation. Participants in this implementation of SGAP were separated into interest groups for follow-up action planning, and this appears to have
increased the impact of discussions.
Participants were concerned that they did not receive detailed notes from the event, so
they had no materials to build from and share with others. Recently Partners did develop a report
on the events in Nigeria and this would be useful to disseminate, however even partial immediate
notes would be powerful for participants to take from the dialogue and caucus. Participants were
excited to hear from diverse voices about the concerns they had, but there was also a call for
more voices to be present, policy-makers in particular. Participants indicated an interest in
having more discussion during the dialogue process and in allowing more time for discussion.
Participants were provided information on S-GAP via email before implementation, however
participants indicated they were not able to spend time educating themselves on the tool-kit. A
specific education period about S-GAP before moving forward with expanded programming is
essential. Participants indicated this would likely increase impact on the intended audiences.
Overall, the perceptions of the whole event were very positive. However, there was some
concern about what direction the project would take in the future and ensuring that program
outputs would be widely and continuously disseminated to maximize impact.
IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: SIERRA LEONE
This feedback is based on copious notes provided by Partners describing the
implementation of S-GAP in Sierra Leone and implementer interviews. Attempts were made to
conduct interviews with participants, unfortunately these did not bear fruit. Partners went to
Sierra Leone with a comprehensive understanding of the security sector and sectoral challenges
facing the country. Partners deepened a relationship with the Campaign for Good Governance
(CGG), a local NGO, which selected stakeholders and served as the public face of the project.
Anecdotally, this dialogue has increased awareness for CGG's mission and may indicate a
significant impact. The military in Sierra Leone had a particular interest in participating, and this
may have helped to generate more impact as well, though deeper analysis is suggested. This
relationship between local partners and Partners is an essential aspect of the S-GAP toolkit
because it localizes the actors and the relationships that are being established in the caucuses and
dialogues. This also encourages facilitators that know historically relevant background to help
deepen impactful discussion.
The consultative process elicited similar concerns among uniformed personnel, civil
society representatives, and civil servants, especially in the Performance section of the S-GAP
framework. Participants seemed ready and willing to understand that this toolkit was being
offered to them as a way to assist in identifying areas of weakness in the security sector.
Participants were put into pairs to discuss particular action items, however these items were not
chosen based on the individual’s area of interest and this may have limited follow-up action.
3 S-­‐GAP Evaluation Nigeria & Sierra Leone Participant involvement was balanced against their availability, however future events may need
to be longer to facilitate deeper discussions and more effective impacts.
This willingness to participate and conceptualize the security concerns of Sierra Leone is
something that needs to be considered for the implementation of S-GAP in other locations. Due
to this interest, the groups were able to effectively caucus, dialogue, assess and plan out their
implementation of S-GAP. The education portion of the project seemed to be a smooth process,
and the monitoring stage is still being implemented.
4 S-­‐GAP Evaluation Nigeria & Sierra Leone SECURITY
GOVERNANCE
ACCOUNTABILITY
PERFORMANCE
A Framework and Guide for
Improving Security
How does Partners understand security?
Security is defined differently depending on the country or region of the world, the sector
actors work in, or even the immediate context in which it is applied. Traditionally, security has
been defined by inter-state conflict and other military threats and issues related to state
sovereignty and territorial integrity. While these international security issues underpinned
much of the thinking about security until the early 1990’s, the end of the Cold War marked a
shift in the way many people now think about security. For many, focus began to shift from
inter-state threats and started to acknowledge the many other threats now facing the world,
most of which are unconcerned with state boundaries — global health pandemics, climate
change and environmental degradation, violent extremism, transnational organized crime,
and conflict over resources such as water, land and minerals.
Partners adopts a broadened definition of security— human security—which acknowledges a
range of threats to populations, communities and individuals which are at the core of longterm stability and development A key element of the concept is the emphasis on the
importance of meeting the security needs of individual citizens, both for individual well-being
and for the stability of the state.
The Security System: a broader group of actors that encompasses the security
sector but also includes a larger group of additional non-state actors
What is S-GAP?
The Security-Governance Accountability and Performance (S-GAP) Toolkit provides
local and national civil society and government leaders, and members of security
services a foundation for security policy-making that promotes a comprehensive
planning strategy. While the S-GAP Toolkit can be useful for these international
actors, it is primarily intended for local and national actors from civil society,
government, and the security sector. S-GAP is designed to help these local actors
to assess the quality of their own security system and identify windows of
opportunity to improve its functioning.
The purpose of S-GAP is to guide assessment and planning around improvements
to the security sector and the broader security system. In the ideal scenario, S-GAP
is used to guide a multi- stakeholder working group composed of civil society,
government, security sector, and, in some cases, international actors through a
comprehensive assessment process. It further provides a platform for planning
reforms and for conducting ongoing monitoring and re-assessment.
The S-GAP Toolkit contains two main tools:
The S-GAP Framework: The S-GAP
Framework is a tool for assessing the
functioning of a security sector and broader
security system. There are myriad factors
involved in supporting the proper
functioning of a strong system for ensuring
security. For the purposes of the S-GAP
Framework, Partners has organized these
factors into three categories: Governance,
Accountability and Performance. These
three categories, in the context of the SGAP toolkit, refer specifically to governance,
accountability, and performance of the
security sector.
The S-GAP Guide: The S-GAP Guide is a
toolkit that can used in a variety of ways. In
politically permissive context the Framework
can be used to facilitate dialogue amongst a
diverse group of users, ideally from different
sectors of society including civil society,
government, and the security services. The
S-GAP guide also provides guidance on how
to use the toolkit in more restrictive
environments for stakeholder education,
limited assessments, dialogues between
stakeholder groups, building constituencies
for policy improvements, and other uses
depending on what is feasible in a given
context.
S-GAP Framework
Governance of the security sector is the process by which citizens and the state define security, public
safety, and justice needs, and establish and implement laws and policies to address those needs. This
process must include the proper allocation of resources, promote the rule of law and human rights norms,
and result in professional, effective, legitimate and equitable institutions.
Institutional Mandates
• Guiding Principles for Defense and Security, Public Safety and Justice
• Separation of Security Management Responsibilities
• Guiding Principles for Emergency Response and Extraordinary Circumstances
Policy Environment
• National Security Strategy
• Budget Process
• Civilian Engagement and Participation
Legal Environment
• Human Rights Laws
• Courts Governance Security Sector Conduct
• Governance of Non-State and Non-Statutory Security and Justice Actors
Accountability of the security sector is the compliance of state security, public safety and justice actors with
robust internal and external conduct review mechanisms as well as with the laws and policies governing
their institutional missions; the transparency of these actors to the population they serve; and the ability of
non-state actors (media, civil society organizations and citizens) to publicize violations and seek redress in
cases of alleged wrongdoing by security, public safety and justice actors.
Supervising and Monitoring Processes
• State-based External Review and Oversight Mechanisms
• Internal Review Mechanisms
• Independent Review and Monitoring
Transparency
• Availability of Information
• Right to Freedom of Information
• Clarity for Disclosure of Sensitive Intelligence Information
Remedy
• Courts and Tribunals
• Transitional Justice Processes
• Informal Justice Processes
Performance of the security sector is the effective execution of the mandates of the various security,
public safety and justice institutions as defined by the civilian leadership in accordance with domestic and
international laws, policies and regulations, in order to meet the various security, public safety and justice
needs of the population.
Police Performance
• Adequacy of Human Resources (Police)
• Financial and Technical Resources and Preparation (Police)
• Police Effectiveness
Defense Sector Performance
• Adequacy of Human Resources (Defense Sector)
• Financial and Technical Resources and Preparation (Defense Sector)
• Defense Sector Effectiveness
Justice Sector Performance
• Adequacy of Human Resources (Justice Sector)
• Financial and Technical Resources and Preparation (Justice Sector)
• Justice Sector Effectiveness
The S-GAP Guide
The Guide provides a set of strategies, approaches and techniques
that can be used to create a coherent reform plan and skills to
monitor the implementation of that plan over time. The approaches
that the Guide highlights include education, caucusing, engaging in
dialogue, conducting assessments, planning and monitoring.
An inclusive multi-stakeholder process will not be possible in every
context. In many — if not most — cases, the situation will simply not be
“ripe” for this kind of collaboration. The S-GAP Guide explains a
number of ways the Toolkit can be used depending on the context.
While an ideal context will allow users to employ all of these
strategies, in some cases the Toolkit may need to be used in a more
limited way. The Guide will help users to identify which of these uses
will be most relevant in their context.
S-GAP Pilot Program
In June 2015, Partners Global in
collaboration with Nigerian civil
society organization CLEEN
Foundation, convened
consultations with uniformed
personnel, public servants and
civil society leaders. The
consultations laid the groundwork
for a multi-stakeholder dialogue
to unfold focused on enhancing
security for Nigerian citizens.
After the individual consultations, PartnersGlobal and CLEEN held a multistakeholder discussion around security sector governance in Nigeria. This
process allowed each group to first reach consensus among themselves on
key security priorities, concerns and recommendations. These were then
shared with the other stakeholder groups in a facilitated dialogue. Each of
the stakeholder groups identified their top ten priorities for security sector
reform in Nigeria using the S-GAP Framework. These priorities were then
discussed during a larger forum among the three stakeholder groups. By
the end of the multi-stakeholder dialogue, a series of actionable next steps
were identified through to help improve security in Nigeria
TOP FOUR SECURITY PRIORITIES
CREATE SPACE FOR CIVILIAN ENGAGEMENT & PARTICIPATION
STRENGTHEN JUSTICE SECTOR EFFECTIVENESS
INCREASE PUBLIC ACCESS TO RESOURCES & INFORMATION
PROMOTE INTERNAL REVIEW MECHANISMS
For more information on this process and additional pilot programs, visit www.securitygovernance.org.