Center for European Policy Analysis
January 29, 2014
Deterrence Paper No. 4: Some Damn Foolish Thing in
the Baltic States – Coming to Terms with Hybrid War
By Peter B. Doran and David Armitage1
Summary
The year 2014 left Europe in a precarious position.
The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia, the
occupation of Ukraine’s Donbas territories by proRussian armed groups, the downing of flight MH17
and persistent fighting in the East have unsettled
the strategic conditions of Europe. More troubling,
the Euro-Atlantic community’s traditional bulwarks
against state conflict are poorly suited to deter the
methods of low-intensity, hybrid warfare that Russia
has employed in eastern Ukraine. Without a nimble
adjustment, the risk of future conflict along NATO’s
frontier is unnervingly elevated. Thankfully, such a
change is entirely possible.
Bismarck’s Shadow
What was old is new again. Similar to today’s
troubled map of Europe, when German Chancellor
Otto von Bismarck surveyed his own strategic
horizon at the end of the 19th century, he saw
an equally unsettling set of conditions. If a war
between Europe’s Great Powers ever occurred,
Bismarck famously—and correctly—predicted the
cause would be, “Some damn foolish thing in the
Balkans.” More than a century later, the legacy of
that prediction casts a long, sobering shadow over
the security contours of contemporary Europe.
Then as now, large wars can begin in distant places
and over unanticipated causes. The danger in
2015 is that the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the
accompanying use of hybrid warfighting techniques
in Europe, increases the risk for East-West military
conflict.
Much like Bismarck’s fated contemporaries did,
one could easily believe that modern Europe is well
protected against the possibility of armed conflict.
Between 1989 and 2014, Europe enjoyed its longest
run of unthreatened peace between states since
the 43-year stretch between 1871 and 1914. Even
during the tense peace of the Cold War, economic
integration and the development of the European
Union (EU) opened the door to the prosperity
of Europe’s economic miracle. That prosperity
was facilitated by the establishment of collective
security mechanisms for quelling and mediating
conflict such as NATO and the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Following the end of the Cold War, stability and
affluence was offered to post-Communist Europe
through the build-out of Euro-Atlantic institutions.
Equally encouraging is the fact that existing EastWest trade flows create mutual dependencies
in the energy and industrial sectors of potential
adversaries. Similar dependencies existed in
Bismarck’s time. Indeed, no matter how high the
ramparts of European tranquility might seem,
“damn foolish” things can still occur – often with
catastrophic consequences. The task for the
Peter B. Doran is Director of Research at the Center for European Policy Analysis. David Armitage is a
Europe specialist at the U.S. Department of State and adjunct professor at American University’s School of
International Service. Dr. Armitage writes in a personal capacity; the views expressed in this report are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect those at the Department of State or U.S. Government.
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Center for European Policy Analysis
Euro-Atlantic community at the start of 2015 is to
prevent the repeat of a European conflict atop the
tunneling dangers to peace.
• Establishing NATO’s Partnership for Peace
(PfP) in 1994.
• Forging a pledge by Russia, the UK, and
the United States in the 1994 Budapest
Agreement to respect and protect Ukraine’s
territorial integrity.
Indirect Assault—The Latest Test for NATO
One of the great drivers of change in recent years—
and a significant trigger for future conflict—has
been the return of hybrid war to Europe. This is the
blending of traditional state-on-state confrontation
with elements of irregular warfare and insurgency
operations. Key features of hybrid war include the
use of decentralized planning, non-state actors and
non-conventional means (including social media)
to destabilize and ultimately defeat an opponent.
Whether it is the cyber-attack against Estonia in
2007, the limited territorial aims of the RussiaGeorgia conflict in 2008, the use of energy as a
weapon, financial coercion or the employment
of un-flagged soldiers and mercenary proxies (i.e.
“little green men”) in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in
2014, the style of European war is shifting.
• Signing the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding
Act, which enhanced relations with Russia
while also permitting Central and Eastern
Europeans the freedom to pursue NATO
membership.
• Signing the 2002 NATO-Russia Rome
Declaration, which reaffirmed Russia’s
commitment to show “respect for [the]
sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of all states and their inherent right
to choose the means to ensure their own
security.”
Unfortunately, the benign strategic environment
that produced these breakthroughs is gone.
The illegal seizure of Crimea by Russia and the
simmering conflict in eastern Ukraine have broken
the foundational settlement of post-1989 Europe.
Worse, NATO’s posture and defense mechanisms
are still holdovers of bygone eras. Take the
geographic distribution of Allied forces in Europe.
These are still concentrated to defend NATO’s
Warsaw Pact frontier c. 1985 – not to deter threats
to the Alliance’s new borders in 2015. Given the
kind of conflict NATO was originally constructed to
fight, it is easier to imagine the Alliance invoking
its collective defense mechanism (Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty) to repel a Soviet armored
spearhead through Germany’s Fulda Gap than
in response to the burning of a police station
in eastern Latvia by disguised Spetznaz forces.
No mere hypothetical threat, this was precisely
the kind of slippery hybrid challenge non-NATO
Ukraine faced in 2014. Unlike Ukraine, however, the
territorial integrity of NATO’s 21st century frontier
is guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S.
military and its Allies, including the Baltics.
Significantly, these practices are recognizably
different from the force-on-force collisions that
NATO’s collective defense structures were initially
designed to deter.2 Under previous collectivedefense concepts developed during the Cold
War, NATO’s primary task was to defend Western
Europe from a large-scale Soviet attack. After
1989, that threat abated. As Central and Eastern
Europe unshackled from the old Warsaw Pact and
sought to join the EU and NATO, Western leaders
found inclusive means to encourage military and
democratic reforms among former adversaries.
Simultaneously, the Alliance remained sympathetic
to Russia’s security concerns. To this end, the EuroAtlantic community took a number of historic steps,
including:
2 See Jakub Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, “Limited War Is
Back,” The National Interest (Number 133; Sep/Oct 2014):
37-44.
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The trouble with Russia’s recent use of hybrid
warfare is that it is designed to smolder below the
typical threshold of an Article 5 attack.3 Would all
28 Allied governments uniformly risk the potential
of nuclear escalation with Russia over a damaged
municipal building in Latvia, a cyber-attack against
Estonia, or the armed take-over of Lithuania’s
Kybartai railway checkpoint near Kaliningrad? This
is why hybrid war is so insidious. It masterfully
games the perceived “all or nothing” logic of Article
5. If Russia used the toolkit of hybrid war in the
Baltic States, and a call for Article 5 was issued but
and NATO into different aspects of regional security.
If a hybrid crisis ever unfolded in NATO’s Baltic
region, the Trans-Atlantic community would have
difficulty providing a deft, unified response.
At the start of 2015, the organizing challenge for
the Alliance is therefore to evolve beyond the “all
or nothing” logic of Article 5. This would provide a
more flexible deterrent to emerging hybrid threats.
Thankfully, it is possible to envision a re-vamped
approach – one which builds on NATO’s existing
advantages, projects determination through a
series of calibrated response
mechanisms, and still carries
“If Russia used the toolkit of hybrid war in the the ironclad assurance of the
Baltic States, and a call for Article 5 was Washington Treaty.
issued but unheeded, NATO could experience By far, the Allied network itself
represents NATO’s strongest
a disastrous political rupture at the onset of a bulwark. Shortly after Russia
illegally annexed Crimea, the
crisis.”
United States deployed troops
to North-Central Europe and
demonstrated the potent combination of defense
unheeded, NATO could experience a disastrous
capabilities and Allied solidarity, which can deter
political rupture at the onset of a crisis.
future hybrid probes. Thanks to the Washington
Treaty, similarly-structured force deployments can
Moving Beyond “All or Nothing”
be arranged between individual Allies without
needing to formally invoke Article 5. And the
In the wake of the illegal annexation of Crimea,
more public the arrangement the better. Article
NATO members are just beginning to come to
4 (consultations) already provides NATO with a
terms with their vulnerabilities to low-threshold,
significant degree of diplomatic flexibility in the
non-linear types of conflict instigated by major
event of a crisis. Less explored, but no less useful,
powers. For starters, it is not clear how NATO would
are provisions under Articles 2 (economic support)
cauterize a small breach into Allied territory without
and 3 (self-help and mutual aid). These clauses
drawing Europe into a potentially larger and more
could be better harnessed to address a wide array
dangerous fight. As a further complication, existing
of dangers from low-intensity, hybrid conflict.
institutional stovepipes in Europe separate the EU
3 The only previous use of Article 5 occurred in the wake
of September 11, 2001, an attack on the U.S. homeland
which caused the death of almost three thousand people, an
estimated $100 billion in property damage and lost production
of goods and services, the temporary shuttering of the
world’s largest stock market and a shutdown of the U.S. air
transportation network.
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Recommendations
Ukraine also could benefit greatly. Such an
effort should ensure that the Partnership
Coordination Cell is incorporated.
While the options for updating NATO’s toolkit are
many, some actionable steps could be activated
directly.
• Establish a NATO gendarme unit. Modeled
after the French gendarmes and Italian
Carabinieri, this multinational military police
unit could serve as a national-guard type
function, ensuring that the geo-strategic
utilization of hooligans and biker gangs are
minimized.
For all NATO:
• Stick to the defense spending pledge made
at Wales. Currently, 75 percent of NATO’s
investment in defense comes from the
United States. New promises to spend
more on security must be implemented by
Europeans – and especially by frontier NATO
states in North-Central Europe.
• Tout NATO enlargement in the Balkans. This
would signal that the goal of a “Europe,
whole, free, and at peace” is alive and well.
After all, NATO helps avoid war by turning
adversaries into Allies and increasing
security for all.
• Spur planners at the Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to strengthen
plans to counter unconventional warfare
scenarios. This might mean incorporating
elements of counter-insurgency (COIN)
with traditional defense tactics localized
to European theater operations. Likewise,
Allied Command Transformation (ACT)
could incorporate a new training doctrine
that would allow NATO members to focus
on deterrence. Ultimately, this should be a
“whole-of-NATO approach,” which includes
public diplomacy, intelligence sharing and
economic and energy preparedness.
For Central Europeans:
• Better utilize Article 3 to “separately
and jointly…maintain and develop their
individual and collective capacity to
resist armed attack.” A joint Baltic and/
or Visegrád crisis response configuration
under this clause could be a first step; one
with the United States could be another.
Allies can calibrate similar hybrid self-help
mechanisms under Article 2 provisions
for “promoting conditions of stability and
well-being…[and to] encourage economic
collaboration between any or all” Allies.
• Encourage all Allies to participate in defense
exercises in all Allied territories.
While this article has focused on NATO, the EU has
a role to play as well in promoting a Europe that is
whole, free, and at peace.
• Continue to develop and strengthen cyber
defenses. The November NATO exercise
“Cyber Coalition 2014” is a good start, but
more can be done. Above all, the focus of
this effort should be on risk management.
For the EU:
• Reorganize and upgrade the NATO Response
Force (NRF), to include increased training
and exercise cycles.
• Maintaining a dialogue with Russia is
important, but the EU needs to remain
united and tough. European leaders must
hold the line on the full implementation of
the Minsk Protocol; and they must not water
down sanctions.
• Revitalize PfP by reminding everyone of its
original intent. PfP could be used better to
engage key states in the Balkans and central
Asia. Non-NATO states such as Moldova and
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• The EU needs to push Ukraine to implement
difficult but necessary constitutional,
economic and political reforms. Standing up
to Russia does not excuse Ukraine’s leaders
from their responsibilities under the EU
Association Agreement. Implementation of
these reforms will make Ukraine stronger in
its current fight.
As it seeks ways to better protect its 21st century
frontier, NATO will now have to change the way it
responds to the emerging perils of low intensity,
hybrid war. This means creatively leveraging the
framework of the Washington Treaty, the underdeveloped linkages between Allies, and the
means NATO has at its disposal to better deter
hybrid dangers. In 1914, Europe “stumbled into
catastrophe” after Bismarck’s prediction proved
true in Sarajevo. A century later, the Trans-Atlantic
Alliance can prevent a stumbling repeat – but only if
it acts swiftly, smartly and with a unified purpose.
• EU member states need to implement
economic and energy reforms as well. This
will eliminate their own vulnerability to
Russian energy pressure. And EU institutions
need to devise better measures to control
democratic backsliding and political
corruption among existing member states.
• Promote EU enlargement in the Balkans.
This will undercut Russian influence and give
hope to states in wider Europe.
Realist,” Ukraine Crisis Media Center, November 9, 2014.
Conclusion
It is unfortunate that Putin’s actions are
undermining Russia’s long-term standing in the
world. Rather than enhancing Russia’s security,
the events of 2014 have undermined it. As has
been noted elsewhere, Russia cannot afford to win
the war; Putin cannot afford to lose it.4 Indeed,
the real threat to the Russian government is
not the external challenge of NATO but popular
dissatisfaction with authoritarian rule, economic
stagnation and corruption at home.5
This Article is a publication of the Center for
European Policy Analysis (CEPA), a Washington,
DC-based research institute devoted to the study
of Central Europe.
The views expressed are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of
CEPA.
Center for European Policy Analysis
1225 19th Street NW
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Washington, DC 20036
www.cepa.org
4 For example, see James B. Stewart, “Why Russia Can’t
Afford Another Cold War,” New York Times, March 8, 2014.
Michael Schuman, “Russia’s Lackluster Economy Means
Putin Simply Can’t Afford a New Cold War,” Time, November
20, 2014. Anne Applebaum, “How He and His Cronies Stole
Russia,” The New York Review of Books, December 18, 2014.
Giles Merritt, “The post-Russian World Order,” Europe’s World,
March 24, 2014, [Accessed: December 18, 2014]. Donald N.
Jensen, “Are the Kremlin Hardliners Winning?” Institute of
Modern Russia, October 1, 2014.
© 2015 by the Center for European Policy
Analysis, Washington, D.C. All rights reserved.
5 See Editorial Board, “The Winter of Mr. Putin’s
Discontent,” New York Times, December 4, 2014. Chris
Dunnett, “A Reply to John Mearsheimer: Putin is Not a
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