The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text
Author(s): Paul Ricœur
Source: New Literary History, Vol. 5, No. 1, What Is Literature? (Autumn, 1973), pp. 91-117
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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The Model oftheText: MeaningfulAction
Consideredas a Text
PaulRicoeur
MY
AIM IN THIS PAPER will be to testan hypothesis.I assume
thatthe primarysenseof the word "hermeneutics"concerns
the rulesrequiredforthe interpretation
of the writtendocumentsof our culture. In assumingthis startingpoint I am remaining
faithfulto the conceptofAuslegungas it was statedby WilhelmDilthey;
whereas Verstehen(understanding,comprehension)relieson the recognitionof what a foreignsubject means or intendson the basis of all
kindsof signsin whichpsychiclifeexpressesitself(Lebensiiusserungen),
Auslegung(interpretation,
exegesis)impliessomethingmorespecific: it
a
coversonly limitedcategoryof signs,thosewhichare fixedby writing,
includingall the sortsof documentsand monumentswhich entail a
fixationsimilarto writing.
Now my hypothesisis this: if thereare specificproblemswhich are
raised by the interpretationof texts because they are texts and not
spoken language, and if these problemsare the ones which constitute
hermeneuticsas such, then the social sciencesmay be said to be hermeneutical (I) inasmuchas theirobject displayssome of the features
constitutive
of a textas text,and (2) inasmuch as theirmethodology
the
same kind of proceduresas those of Auslegung or textdevelops
interpretation.
Hence the two questionsto which my paper will be devoted: (i) To
what extentmay we considerthe notionof textas a good paradigmfor
the so-calledobject of the social sciences? (2) To what extentmay we
as a paradigmforinterpretause the methodologyof text-interpretation
tion in generalin the fieldof the social sciences?
I. The Paradigm of Text
In order to justifythe distinctionbetweenspoken and writtenlanguage I want to introducea preliminaryconcept,that of discourse. It
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92
NEW LITERARY HISTORY
is as discoursethat language is eitherspoken or written.Now, what is
discourse?
We shall not seek the answerfromthe logicians,not even fromthe
exponentsof linguisticanalysis,but fromthe linguiststhemselves.Discourse is the counterpartof what linguistscall language systemsor
linguisticcodes. Discourse is language-eventor linguisticusage. This
pair of correlativeterms-system/event,
code/message-has played a
basic role in linguisticssince it was introducedby Ferdinand de Saussure and Louis Hjelmslev.The firstspokeoflanguage (langue)-speech
(parole), thesecondofschema-usage. We can also add competenceperformancein Chomsky'slanguage. It is necessaryto draw all the
epistemologicalconsequencesof such a duality,namely,that the linrulesfromthe linguisticsof language.
guisticsof discoursehas different
It is the French linguistEmile Benv6nistewho has gone furthestwith
thisdistinction.For him, thesetwo linguistics
are not constructedupon
the same units. If the sign (phonologicalor lexical) is the basic unit of
language,the sentenceis the basic unit of discourse.Thereforeit is the
linguisticsof the sentencewhich supportthe theoryof speech as an
event. I will retainfourtraitsfromthislinguistics
of the sentencewhich
will help me in a littlewhile to elaboratethe hermeneuticof the event
and of discourse.
Firsttrait: Discourseis always realizedtemporallyand in a present,
whereasthe languagesystemis virtualand outsideof time. Emile Benv6nistecalls thisthe "instanceof discourse."
Second trait: Whereaslanguagelacksa subject-in thesensethatthe
question"Who is speaking?"does not apply at itslevel-discourse refers
to itsspeakerbymeans ofa complexsetofindicatorssuch as thepersonal
pronouns.We will say thatthe "instanceof discourse"is self-referential.
Third trait: Whereas the signsin language referonly to othersigns
withinthe same system,and whereaslanguage thereforelacks a world
just as it lacks temporalityand subjectivity,discourseis always about
something.It refersto a world which it claims to describe,to express,
or to represent.It is in discoursethatthe symbolicfunctionof language
is actualized.
Fourthtrait: Whereaslanguageis onlythe conditionforcommunication,forwhich it providesthe codes, it is in discoursethat all messages
are exchanged. In thissense,discoursealone has not onlya world,but
an other-another person,an interlocutor
to whom it is addressed.
These fourtraitstaken togetherconstitutespeech as an event. It is
remarkablethat these four traitsappear only in the movementof effectuationfromlanguage to discourse. Every apologyforspeech as an
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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
93
is significant
event,therefore,
if,and onlyif,it makesvisiblethe effectuation by which our linguisticcompetenceactualizes itselfin performance. But the same apology becomes abusive as soon as this eventwhere it is valid, to undercharacteris extended from effectuation,
standing.What is it to understanda discourse?
thesefour traitsare actualized in spoken
Let us see how differently
and writtenlanguage:
(I) Discourse,as we said, existsonly as a temporaland presentinin living speech and in
stance. This firsttrait is realized differently
writing.In livingspeech,the instanceof discoursehas the characterof
a fleetingevent, an event that appears and disappears.That is why
thereis a problemof fixation,of inscription.What we want to fix is
what disappears. If, by extension,we can say thatone fixeslanguagesyntacticalinscriptioninscriptionof the alphabet,lexical inscription,
it is for the sake of that which alone has to be fixed,discourse. Only
discourseis to be fixed,because discoursedisappears.The atemporal
systemneitherappears nor disappears;it does not happen. Here is the
place to recall the mythin Plato's Phaedo. Writingwas given to men
to "come to therescue"ofthe "weaknessof discourse,"a weaknesswhich
was that of the event. The giftof the grammata-of that "external"
thing,of those "externalmarks,"of that materializingalienation-was
just that of a "remedy"broughtto our memory.The Egyptiankingof
Thebes could well respondto the god Theuth that writingwas a false
remedyin that it replaced true reminiscenceby materialconservation
and real wisdom by the semblance of knowing.This inscription,in
spiteof its perils,is discourse'sdestination.What does writingfix? Not
the eventof speaking,but the "said" of speakingwherewe understand
by the said that intentionalexteriorizationconstitutiveof the aim of
discourse thanks to which the sagen-the saying-wants to become
Aus-sage-the enunciation,the enunciated. In short,what we write,
what we inscribe,is the noema of the speaking. It is the meaning of
the speech event,not the eventas event.
What does writingfix? If it is not the speechevent,it is speech itself
in so faras it is said. But whatis said?
Here I would like to propose that hermeneuticshas to appeal not
only to linguistics(linguisticsof discoursevs. linguisticsof language)
as it does above, but also to the theoryof the speech act such as we
findit in Austin and Searle. The act of speaking,accordingto these
authors,is constitutedby a hierarchyof subordinateacts which are
distributedon threelevels: (I) the level of the locutionaryor propositional act, the act of saying; (2) the level of the illocutionaryact or
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NEWLITERARY
HISTORY
force,that which we do in saying; and (3) the level of the perlocutionaryact, that which we do by saying.When I tell you to close the
door, forexample, "Close the door!" is the act of speaking. But when
I tell you this with the forceof an order and not of a request,this is
the illocutionaryact. Finally,I can stirup certaineffects,
like fear,by
the fact that I give you an order.These effectsmake my discourseact
like a stimulusproducingcertainresults.This is the perlocutionary
act.
What is the implicationof these distinctions
for our problemof the
intentionalexteriorization
by whichtheeventsurpassesitselfin meaning
and lends itselfto material fixation?The locutionaryact exteriorizes
itselfin the sentence. The sentencecan be identifiedand reidentified
as being the same sentence.A sentencebecomes an enunciation(Austo othersas beingsuch and such a sentence
sage) and thusis transferred
with such and such a meaning. But the illocutionaryact can also be
exteriorizedin grammaticalparadigms (indicative, imperative,and
subjunctivemodes, and otherproceduresexpressiveof the illocutionary
and reidentification.
force) which permitits identification
Certainly,
in spoken discourse,the illocutionaryforce leans upon mimicryand
gesturalelementsand upon thenonarticulatedaspectsof discourse,what
we call prosody. In thissense,the illocutionary
forceis less completely
inscribedin grammarthan is the propositionalmeaning. In everycase,
its inscriptionin a syntacticarticulationis itselfgatheredup in specific
paradigmswhichin principlemake possiblefixatiodby writing.Without
a doubt we must concede that the perlocutionaryact is the least inscribable aspect of discourseand that by preferenceit characterizes
action is preciselywhat is the
spokenlanguage. But the perlocutionary
least discursivein discourse.It is the discourseas stimulus.It acts, not
by my interlocutor's
recognitionof my intention,but energetically,
by
directinfluenceupon the emotionsand the affectivedispositions.Thus
the propositionalact, the illocutionaryforce,and the perlocutionary
action are apt, in a decreasingorder,forthe intentionalexteriorization
which makes inscriptionin writingpossible.
Thereforeit is necessaryto understandby the meaningof the speechact, or by the noema of thesaying,not onlythe sentence,in the narrow
sense of the propositionalact, but also the illocutionaryforceand even
action in the measurethat thesethreeaspectsof the
the perlocutionary
are
codified,
gatheredinto paradigmswhere, consequently,
speech-act
and
be
identified
can
reidentifiedas having the same meaning.
they
ThereforeI am here givingthe word "meaning" a verylarge acceptationwhich coversall the aspectsand levelsof theintentionalexteriorization which makes the inscriptionof discoursepossible.
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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
95
The destinyof the three other traitsof discoursein passing from
discourseinto writingpermitsus to make more precisethe meaning of
thiselevationof sayingto what is said.
trait
(2) In discourse,we said-and thiswas the second differential
of discoursein relationto language--thesentencedesignatesits speaker
and personality.In spokendiscourse,
by diverseindicatorsof subjectivity
this referenceby discourseto the speakingsubject presentsa character
of immediacythatwe can explainin the followingway. The subjective
intentionof thespeakingsubjectand themeaningof the discourseoverlap each other in such a way that it is the same thingto understand
what the speakermeans and what his discoursemeans. The ambiguity
of the French expressionvouloir dire, the German meinen, and the
Englishto mean atteststo thisoverlapping.It is almostthe same thing
to ask "What do you mean?" and "What does that mean?" With
writtendiscourse,the author's intentionand the meaningof the text
cease to coincide. This dissociationof the verbal meaningof the text
and the mental intentionis what is really at stake in the inscription
of discourse.Not thatwe can conceiveof a textwithoutan author; the
tie betweenthespeakerand thediscourseis not abolished,but distended
and complicated.The dissociationof the meaningand the intentionis
stillan adventureof the referenceof discourseto the speakingsubject.
But the text'scareer escapes the finitehorizonof its author. What the
text says now mattersmore than what the author meant to say, and
every exegesis unfolds its procedureswithin the circumferenceof a
meaning that has brokenits mooringsto the psychologyof its author.
Using Plato's expressionagain, writtendiscoursecannotbe "rescued"by
all the processesby which spoken discoursesupportsitselfin order to
be undertood-intonation,delivery,mimicry,gestures. In this sense,
the inscriptionin "external marks," which firstappeared to alienate
of discourse. Henceforth,only
discourse,marksthe actual spirituality
the meaning "rescues" the meaning, withoutthe contributionof the
physicaland psychologicalpresenceof the author. But to say that the
is the
meaning rescuesthe meaning is to say that only interpretation
the
of
which
its
can
for
weakness
discourse
author
no
"remedy"
longer
'"save.5"
(3) The eventis surpassedby the meaninga thirdtime. Discourse,
we said, is what refersto the world,to a world. In spoken discourse
this means that what the dialogue ultimatelyrefersto,is the situation
This situationin a way surroundsthe
common to the interlocutors.
dialogue, and its landmarks can all be shown by a gesture,or by
pointinga finger,or designatedin an ostensivemannerby the discourse
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NEW LITERARY HISTORY
itselfthroughthe oblique referenceof those other indicatorswhich
are the demonstratives,
the adverbs of time and place, and the tense
of the verb. In oral discourse,we are saying,referenceis ostensive.
What happens to it in writtendiscourse?Are we sayingthat the text
no longerhas a reference?This would be to confoundreferenceand
world and situation. Discourse cannot fail to be about
demonstration,
In
something. sayingthis,I am separatingmyselffromany ideology
of an absolutetext. Only a few sophisticatedtextssatisfythis ideal of
a textwithoutreference.They are textswherethe play of the signifier
breaksaway fromthe signified.But this new formis valuable only as
an exceptionand cannot give the key to all othertextswhich in one
manner or anotherspeak about the world. But what, then,is the subject of textswhen nothingcan be shown? Far fromsayingthatthe text
is then withouta world,I will now say withoutparadox thatonlyman
has a world and not just a situation. In the same manner that the
text freesits meaning from the tutelage of the mental intention,it
freesits referencefromthe limitsof ostensivereference.For us, the
world is the ensembleof referencesopened up by the texts.Thus we
speak about the "world" of Greece, not to designateany more what
were the situationsfor those who lived them, but to designate the
nonsituationalreferenceswhich outlive the effacementof the firstand
which henceforthare offeredas possiblemodes of being, as symbolic
of all
For me, thisis the referent
dimensionsof our being-in-the-world.
of
references
ostensive
Umwelt
of
the
the
no
dialogue,
literature; longer
of everytextthat
but the Welt projectedby the nonostensivereferences
we have read, understood,and loved. To understanda text is at the
same time to lightup our own situation,or, if you will, to interpolate
which make
among the predicatesof our situationall the significations
a Weltof our Umwelt. It is thisenlargingof the Umweltintothe World
which permitsus to speak of the referencesopened up by the text-it
would be betterto say thatthereferences
open up theworld. Here again
itself
of discoursemanifests
the spirituality
throughwriting,which frees
and limitationof situationsby openingup a world
us fromthe visibility
for us, that is, new dimensionsof our being-in-the-world.
In thissense,Heideggerrightlysays-in his analysisof verstehenin
Being and Time-that what we understandfirstin a discourseis not
anotherperson,but aiproject,thatis, the outlineof a new being-in-theworld. Only writing,in freeingitself,not only fromits author,but
fromthe narrownessof the dialogical situation,revealsthisdestination
of discourseas projectinga world.
In thus tyingreferenceto the projectionof a world, it is not only
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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
97
Heideggerwhom we rediscover,but Wilhelmvon Humbolt,forwhom
the great justification
of language is to establishthe relationof man to
the world. If we suppressthis referentialfunction,only an absurd
remains.
game of errantsignifiers
of
(4) But it is perhapswiththefourthtraitthatthe accomplishment
discoursein writingis most exemplary. Only discourse,not language,
is addressedto someone.This is the foundationof communication.But
it is one thingfor discourseto be addressedto an interlocutorequally
presentin the discoursesituation,and another to be addressed,as is
the case in virtuallyeverypiece of writing,to whoeverknowshow to
read. The narrownessof the dialogical relation explodes. Instead of
being addressedjust to you, the second person,what is writtenis addressed to the audience that itself creates. This, again, marks the
spiritualityof writing,the counterpartof its materialityand of the
alienationwhichit imposesupon discourse. The vis-a-visof the written
is just whoeverknows how to read. The copresenceof subjects in a
dialogue ceases to be the model for every"understanding."The relation writing-readingceases to be a particular case of the relation
speaking-hearing.But at the same time,discourseis revealed as discourse in the universalityof its address. In escaping the momentary
characterof the event-the bounds lived by the authorand the narrowness of ostensivereference-discourseescapes the limitsof being face
to face. It is no longera visibleauditor. An unknown,invisiblereader
has become the unprivilegedaddresseeof the discourse.
To what extentmay we say thatthe object of the social sciencesconformsto the paradigm of the text? Max Weber definesthis object as
sinnhaftorientiertesVerhalten,as "meaningfullyoriented behavior."
To what extentmay we replace the predicate"meaningfullyoriented"
derived from the
by what I would like to call readability-characters
four criteriaof
our
to
of
the
text?
Let
us
try apply
precedingtheory
what a text is to the concept of meaningfulaction.
a. The FixationofAction
Meaningfulaction is an object forscience only under the condition
which is equivalentto the fixation'of a disof a kind of objectification
course by writing.This traitpresupposesa simpleway of being meaningfulwhich is similarto the dialogical situationas regardslanguage.
Meaningfulaction may be graspedand understoodwithinthe process
of interaction,which is quite similarto the processof interlocutionin
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98
NEW LITERARY HISTORY
the fieldof discourse. It is at thisstrategiclevel that the so-calledphithinkers.
losophy of actions operates among post-Wittgensteinian
G. E. M. Anscombein Intention,A. I. Melden in Free Action, and
Richard Taylor in Action and Purpose require no other conceptual
frameworkfor theirtheoryof action than the one which is at work
in ordinarylanguage. Science is another "language game" based on
semanticrules. It is one thingto speak of actions,purquite different
poses,motives,agentsand theiragency,and it is somethingelse to speak
of movementsas happening,of mental events (if thereare any), or of
physical or mental causes. The duality of linguisticgames, that of
ordinarylanguage and that of the behavioral and the social sciences,
is inseparable. As is known,the main discrepancybetweenboth lanof motive,conceivedas "reason
guage games concernsthe irreducibility
in
to
cause
Humean
terms as an antecedentevent
for,"
interpreted
distinct
and
linked
from,
to, itsconsequent.But is
logically
contingently
it truethat a scientificapproach mustnecessarilyexclude the character
of meaningfulness
and that ordinarylanguage alone preservesit? Is
therenot a scientificlanguage for which action would be both "objective" and "meaningful"?
The comparisonbetweeninterlocutionand interactionmay help us
at thisstageof our analysis. In the same way thatinterlocution
is overcome in writing,interactionis overcome in numeroussituationsin
which we treataction as a fixedtext.These situationsare overlooked
in a theoryof action forwhich the discourseof action is itselfa part of
the situationof transactionwhich flowsfrom one agent to another,
exactly as spoken language is caught in the process of interlocution,
or, if we may use the term,of translocution.This is why the underlevel is only "knowledgewithout
standingof action at the prescientific
observation,"or as G. E. M. Anscombe says, "practical knowledge"
in the sense of "knowinghow" as opposed to "knowingthat." But this
in the strongsense which
understandingis not yet an interpretation
deservesto be called scientificinterpretation.
My claim is that action itself,action as meaningful,may become an
object of science, withoutlosing its characterof meaningfulness,
by
similarto the fixationwhich occurs
virtueof a kind of objectification
in writing.By thisobjectification,
action is no longera transactionto
which the discourseof action would stillbelong. It constitutesa delineatedpatternwhich has to be interpreted
accordingto its innerconnections.
This objectificationr
is made possibleby someinnertraitsof the action
which are similarto the structureof the speech act and which make
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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
99
"doing" a kind of utterance. In the same way fixationby writingis
made possibleby a dialectic of intentionalexteriorization
inherentin
the speech-actitself,a similardialecticwithinthe processof transaction
preparesthe detachmentof the meaningof the action fromthe event
of the action.
First,an actionhas thestructureof a locutionaryact. It has a propositional contentwhich can be identifiedand reidentified.This "propositional" structureof the action has been clearly and demonstratively
expounded by AntonyKenny in Action,Emotion and Will. The verbs
of action constitutea specificcomplexof predicateswhich are similar
to relationsand which,like relations,are irreducibleto all the kinds of
predicateswhich may followthe copula "is." The class of action predicates in its turnis irreducibleto the relationsand constitutesa specific
setof predicates.Amongothertraits,theverbsofactionallow a plurality
of "arguments"capable of complementingthe verb, rangingfromno
argument (Plato taught) to an indeterminatenumber of arguments
(Brutus killedCaesar, in the Curia, on the Ides of March, with a ...,
with the help of. . . .). This variable polydicityof the predicative
structureof action-sentencesis typical of the propositionalstructure
of action. Anothertrait which is importantfor the transpositionof
the concept of fixationfrom the sphere of discourse to the sphere
of action concernsthe ontologicalstatusof the "complements"of the
verbsof action. Whereas relationshold betweentermsequally existing
(or nonexisting),certainverbsof action have a topical subject which
is identifiedas existingand to which the sentencerefers,and complementsof which do not exist. Such is the case with the "mental acts"
(to believe,to think,to will, to imagine,etc.).
AntonyKenny describessome othertraitsof the propositionalstructure of actions derivedfromthe descriptionof the functioningof the
verb of action. For example,the distinctionbetweenstates,activities,
and otherperformances
can be statedaccordingto the behaviorof the
tensesof the verbsof action which fixsome specifictemporaltraitsof
the action itself.The distinctionbetweenthe formaland the material
betweenthe notionof all
object of an action (let us say the difference
inflammablethingsand this letterwhich I am now burning) belongs
to the logic of action as mirroredin the grammarof the verbs of
action. Such, roughlydescribed,is the propositionalcontentof action
which gives a basis to a dialecticof event and meaningsimilarto that
of the speech-act. I should like to speak here of the noematicstructure
of action. It is the noematicstructurewhichmay be fixedand detached
fromthe processof interactionand become an object to interpret.
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NEW LITERARY HISTORY
Moreover,thisnoema has not only a propositionalcontent,but also
presents"illocutionary"traitsvery similar to those of the complete
classes of performativeacts of discoursedespeech act. The different
scribedby Austinat the end of How to do Thingswith Wordsmay be
taken as paradigmsnot onlyforthe speech acts themselves,
but forthe
A
actionswhichfulfillthe corresponding
acts.
typologyof action,
speech
the
model
of
therefore
is
acts,
illocutionary
following
possible. Not only
a typology,
but a criteriology,
inasmuchas each typeimpliesrules,more
rules" which,accordingto Searle in Speech-Acts,
precisely"constitutive
allow the constructionof "ideal models" similarto the ideal typesof
Max Weber. For example,to understandwhat a promiseis, we have
to understandwhat the "essentialcondition"is accordingto which a
given action "countsas" a promise.This "essentialcondition"of Searle
is not far fromwhat Husserl called Sinngehalt,which coversboth the
"matter" (propositionalcontent) and the "quality" (the illocutionary
force).
We may now say that an action,like a speech act, may be identified
not only accordingto its propositionalcontent,but also according to
its illocutionaryforce. Both constituteits "sense-content."Like the
speech act, the action-event(if we may coin thisanalogical expression)
developsa similardialecticbetweenits temporalstatusas an appearing
and disappearingevent,and its logical statusas having such and such
identifiablemeaning or "sense-content."But if the "sense-content"is
what makes possiblethe "inscription"of the action-event,
what makes
it real? In otherwords,what correspondsto writingin the field of
action?
Let us returnto the paradigm of the speech-act.What is fixedby
writing,we said, is the noema of the speaking,the sayingas said. To
what extentmay we say that what is done is inscribed? Certainmetaphorsmay be helpfulat this point. We say that such and such event
leftits mark on its time. We speak of markingevents. Are therenot
"marks" on time,the kind of thingwhich calls for a reading,rather
than for a hearing? But what is meant by this metaphorof the "imprintedmark"? The three other criteriaof the text will help us to
make the natureof thisfixationmoreprecise.
b. The Autonomizationof Action
In the same way that a textis detached fromits author,an action is
detached fromits agent and develops consequences of its own. This
autonomizationof human action constitutesthe social dimensionof
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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
101
action. An action is a social phenomenonnot only because it is done
by several agentsin such a way that the role of each of them cannot
be distinguished
fromthe role of the others,but also because our deeds
escape us and have effectswhichwe did not intend. One of themeanings of the notion of "inscription"appears here. The kind of distance
which we found between the intentionof the speakerand the verbal
meaning of a text occurs also between the agent and his action. It
is this distancewhich makes the ascriptionof responsibility
a specific
We
not
do
raised
"Who
smiled?"
"Who
hand?"
The
his
ask,
problem.
doer is presentto his doing in the same way the speakeris presentto
his speech. With simple actions like those which require no previous
action in order to be done, the meaning (noema) and the intention
(noesis) coincide or overlap. With complex actionssome segmentsare
so remotefromthe initialsimplesegments,which can be said to express
the intentionof the doer, that the ascriptionof theseactionsor actiona problemas difficult
to solve as thatof authorship
segmentsconstitutes
in some cases of literarycriticism.The assignationof an authorbecomes
a mediateinferencewell-knownto the historianwho triesto isolatethe
role of an historicalcharacteron the course of events.
We just used the expression"the course of events." Could we not
say thatwhat we?call the courseof eventsplaysthe role of the material
thingwhich "rescues" the vanishingdiscoursewhen it is written?As
we said in a metaphoricalway, some actions are eventswhich imprint
theirmark on theirtime. But on what did theyimprinttheirmark?
Is it not in somethingspatial that discourseis inscribed? How could
an eventbe printedon somethingtemporal? Social time,however,is
not only somethingwhich flees. It is also the place of durable effects,
of persistingpatterns.An action leaves a "trace," it makes its "mark"
when it contributesto the emergenceof such patternswhich become
the documentsof human action.
Anothermetaphormay help us to delineatethisphenomenonof the
social "imprint": themetaphorof the "record" or of the "registration."
introducesthis metaphor
John Feinberg,in Action and Responsibility,
in another context,that of responsibility,
in order to show how an
actionmay be submittedto blame. Only actions,he says,which can be
"registered"for furthernotice, placed as an entry on somebody's
"record," can be blamed. And when there are no formal"records"
(like those which are kept by institutionslike employmentoffices,
schools,banks, and the police), thereis still an informalanalogue of
theseformalrecordswhich we call reputationand which constitutesa
basis for blaming. I would like to apply this interesting
metaphorof
a record and reportingto somethingother than the quasi-judicial
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102
NEW LITERARY HISTORY
situationsof blaming,charging,creditingor punishing. Could we not
say that historyis itselfthe record of human action? Historyis this
quasi-"thing"on which human action leaves a "trace," puts its mark.
Hence the possibilityof "archives." Before the archives which are
writtendown by the memorialists,
thereis thiscontinuous
intentionally
processof "recording"human actionwhich is historyitselfas the sum
of "marks,"the fate of which escapes the controlof individual actors.
Henceforthhistorymay appear as an autonomous entity,as a play
with playerswho do not know the plot. This hypostasisof historymay
be denounced as a fallacy,but this fallacy is well entrenchedin the
processby which human action becomes social action when written
down in the archivesof history.Thanks to thissedimentationin social
time, human deeds become "institutions,"in the sense that their
meaningno longer coincideswith the logical intentionsof the actors.
The meaningmaybe "de-psychologized"
to thepointwherethesinnhaft
the
work
In the termsof P. Winch,
resides
in
itself.
(meaningfulness)
The
of
Social
the
the social sciences is a
in
Idea of
Science,
object
"rule-governedbehavior." But this rule is not superimposed;it is the
meaning as articulatingfrom within these sedimentedor instituted
works. Such is the kind of "objectivity"which proceeds from the
"social fixation"of meaningfulbehavior.
c. Relevanceand Importance
Accordingto our thirdcriterionof what a textis, we could say that
a meaningfulactionis an actionthe importanceofwhichgoes "beyond"
its relevanceto its initialsituation.This new traitis verysimilarto the
way in which a text breaks the ties of discourseto all the ostensive
references.Thanks to this emancipationfromthe situationalcontext,
whichwe called a "world,"
references
discoursecan developnonostensive
in the sense in which we speak of the Greek "world," not in the cosmologicalsense of the word, but as an ontologicaldimension.
What would correspondin the field of action to the nonostensive
referencesof a text?
We juxtaposed,in introducingthe presentanalysis,the importance
of an action to its relevance as regards the situation to which it
wanted to respond. An importantaction, we could say, develops
meaningswhich can be actualized or fulfilledin situationsother than
the one in which this action occurred.To say the same thingin differentwords,the meaning of an importantevent exceeds, overcomes,
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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
103
transcendsthe social conditionsof its productionand may be reenacted
in new social contexts. Its importanceis its durable relevanceand, in
some cases,its omnitemporalrelevance.
This thirdtraithas importantimplicationsfor the relationbetween
culturalphenomenaand theirsocial conditions.Is it not a fundamental
traitof the great worksof cultureto overcomethe conditionsof their
social production,in the same way a textdevelopsnew referencesand
constitutesnew "worlds"? It is in this sense that Hegel spoke,in the
Philosophyof Right, of the institutions(in the largestsense of the
word) which "actualize" freedomas a second nature in accordance
with freedom.This "realm of actual freedom" is constitutedby the
deeds and workscapable of receivingrelevancein new historicalsituations. If this is true, this way of overcomingone's own conditionsof
productionis the keyto the puzzlingproblemsraised by MarxismiconThe autonomyof supercerningthe status of the "superstructures."
infrastructures
has its
their
to
own
structuresas regardstheirrelation
A
work
does
text.
of
not
paradigm in the nonostensivereferences a
within
which
bears
it
only mirrorits time, but it opens up a world
itself.
d. Human Actionas an "Open Work"
Finally, according to our fourthcriterionof the text as text, the
meaning of human action is also somethingwhich is addressedto an
indefiniterange of possible "readers." The judges are not contempoist Weltgericht.
raries,but, as Hegel said, historyitself. Weltgeschichte
That meansthat,likea text,human actionis an open work,the meaning
of which is "in suspense." It is because it "opens up" new references
and receivesfreshrelevance from them that human deeds are also
which decide theirmeaning. All sigwaitingfor freshinterpretations
nificantevents and deeds are, in this way, opened to this kind of
practicalinterpretation
throughpresentpraxis. Human action, too, is
opened to anybodywho can read. In the same way that the meaning
of an eventis the sense of its forthcoming
the interpreinterpretations,
tationby contemporarieshas no particularprivilegein this process.
will be the
This dialectic betweenthe work and its interpretations
that we shall now consider.
topic of the methodologyof interpretation
II. The ParadigmofText-Interpretation
I want now to show the fruitfulness
of this analogy of the text at
the level of methodology.
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I 04
NEW LITERARY HISTORY
The main implicationof our paradigm,as concernsthe methodsof
the social sciences,is that it offersa freshapproach to the questionof
the relation between erkldren(explanation) and verstehen(understanding,comprehension). As is well known,Dilthey definedthis relation as a dichotomy. For him, any model of explanationis borrowedfroma different
regionof knowledge,thatof the naturalsciences
with their inductive logic. Henceforth the autonomy of the socalled Geisteswissenschaften
Is preservedonly by the recognitionof
the irreduciblefactorof understandinga foreignpsychiclife on the
basis of the signsin which thislife is immediatelyexteriorized.But if
verstehenis separatedfromerkliirenby this logical gap, how can the
social sciences be scientificat all? Dilthey kept wrestlingwith this
paradox. He discoveredmore and more clearly,mainly afterhaving
are
read Husserl'sLogicadtInvestigations,
that the Geisteswissenschaften
of
of lifeundergoa kind objectificasciencesinasmuchas the expressions
tion,whichmakespossiblea scientific
approachsomewhatsimilarto that
of the naturalsciences,in spite of the logical gap betweenNatur and
Geist, factual knowledgeand knowledgeby signs. In this way the
mediation offeredby these objectifications
appeared to be more important,for a scientificpurpose,than the immediatemeaningfulness
of the expressionsof life for everydaytransactions.
My own investigationstartswith this last perplexityin Dilthey's
thought. And my hypothesisis that the kind of objectification
implied
in thestatusof discourseas textprovidesa betteranswerto the problem
raised by Dilthey. This answerrelieson the dialecticalcharacterof the
relationbetween erkliirenand verstehenas it is displayedin reading.
will be to show to what extentthe paradigmof readOur tasktherefore
ing, which is the counterpartof the paradigm of writing,providesa
solutionforthe methodologicalparadox of social sciences.
The dialectic involved in reading expressesthe originalityof the
relationbetweenwritingand reading and its irreducibility
to the dialogical situationbased on the immediatereciprocitybetweenspeaking
and hearing.There is a dialecticbetweenexplainingand comprehending
situationdevelops a problemof its own
because the writing-reading
which is not merelyan extensionof the speaking-hearing
situationconstitutiveof dialogue.
It is here thereforethat our hermeneuticis most criticalof the Rowhich took the dialogicalsituation
manticisttraditionin hermeneutics,
as the standardforthe hermeneutical
operationapplied to the text. My
contentionis thatit is thisoperation,on the contrary,
which revealsthe
meaningof what is already hermeneuticalin dialogical understanding.
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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
105
Then, if the dialogical relationdoes not provideus with the paradigm
of readingwe have to build it as an originalparadigm,as a paradigm
of its own.
This paradigm draws its main featuresfrom the statusof the text
itselfas characterizedby (I) the fixationof the meaning, (2) its dissociationfromthe mental intentionof the author, (3) the displayof
nonostensivereferences,and (4) the universalrange of its addressees.
These fourtraitstakentogetherconstitutethe "objectivity"of the text.
From this "objectivity"derivesa possibility
of explaining,which is not
derived in any way from another field, that of natural events,but
which is congenial to this kind of objectivity.Thereforethere is no
transferfromone regionof realityto another,fromthe sphereof facts,
let us say, to the sphereof signs. It is withinthe same sphereof signs
that the processof objectification
takesplace and gives rise to explanait
within
thissphereof signsthat explanation
And
is
toryprocedures.
and comprehensionare confronted.
I proposethatwe considerthisdialecticin two different
ways: (I) as
from
to
as
and
proceeding
(2)
proceeding
comprehension explanation,
from explanation to comprehension.The exchange and reciprocity
betweenboth procedureswill provideus witha good approximationof
the dialecticalcharacterof the relation.
At the end of each half of thisdemonstration
I shall tryto indicate
brieflythe possibleextensionof the paradigmof reading to the whole
sphereof the human sciences.
a. From Understandingto Explanation
This firstdialectic--orratherthisfirstfigureof a unique dialecticmay be convenientlyintroducedby our contentionthat to understand
a textis not to rejoin the author. The disjunctionof the meaningand
the intentioncreates an absolutelyoriginalsituationwhich engenders
the dialectic of erkliirenand verstehen.If the objective meaning is
somethingother than the subjectiveintentionof the author, it may
be construedin variousways. The problemsof the rightunderstanding
can no longerbe solved by a simplereturnto the alleged intentionof
the author.
This constructionnecessarilytakes the formof a process. As E. D.
Hirsch says, there are no rules for making good guesses. But there
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106
NEW LITERARY HISTORY
are methodsforvalidatingguesses.1This dialecticbetweenguessingand
one figureof our dialecticbetweencomprehension
validatingconstitutes
and explanation.
In this dialectic both termsare decisive. Guessing correspondsto
what Schleiermachercalled the "divinatory,"validation to what he
called the "grammatical." My contributionto the theoryof this dialectic will be to link it more tightlyto the theoryof the textand textreading.
Why do we need an art of guessing?Why do we have to "construe"
the meaning?
Not only-as I tried to say a few years ago-because language is
metaphoricaland because thddouble meaningofmetaphoricallanguage
requiresan art of decipheringwhich tendsto unfoldthe severallayers
of meaning.The case of metaphoris onlya particularcase fora general
theoryof hermeneutics.In more generalterms,a text has to be construedbecause it is not a mere sequence of sentences,all on an equal
footingand separatelyunderstandable. A text is a whole, a totality.
The relationbetweenwhole and parts-as in a work of art or in an
animal-requires a specifickind of "judgment" for which Kant gave
the theoryin the Third Critique. Concretely,the whole appears as a
hierarchyof topics,or primaryand subordinatetopics.The reconstruction of the text as a whole necessarilyhas a circularcharacter,in the
sense that the presupposition
of a certainkind of whole is implied in
the recognitionof the parts. And, reciprocally,it is in construingthe
detailsthatwe construethewhole.There is no necessityand no evidence
what is essenconcerningwhat is importantand what is unimportant,
tial and what is unessential.The judgmentof importanceis a guess.
in otherterms,if a textis a whole, it is once
To put the difficulty
more an individual like an animal or a workof art. As an individual
it can only be reached by a processof narrowingthe scope of generic
conceptsconcerningthe literarygenre,the class of text to which this
text belongs,the structuresof different
kinds which intersectin this
text.The localizationand the individualizationof this unique textare
stillguesses.
Still anotherway of expressingthe same enigma is that as an individual the textmay be reachedfromdifferent
sides. Like a cube, or
a volume in space, the textpresentsa "relief." Its different
topics are
I Validity in Interpretation(New Haven, 1967): "The act of understandingis at
firsta genial (or a mistaken) guess, and there are no methods for making guesses,
no rules for generatinginsights.The methodical activityof interpretationcommences
when we begin to test and criticize our guesses" (p. 203). And further: "A mute
symbolismmay be construedin several ways."
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THE MODELOF THE TEXT
107
not at the same altitude.Thereforethe reconstruction
of the whole has
a perspectivist
It
to
that
of
is
similar
always possible
aspect
perception.
to relate the same sentencein different
ways to this or that sentence
consideredas the cornerstoneof the text. A specifickind of onesidedness is implied in the act of reading. This onesidednessconfirmsthe
"guess" characterof interpretation.
For all thesereasonsthereis a problemof interpretation
not so much
because of the incommunicabilityof the psychic experience of the
author,but because of the very nature of the verbal intentionof the
text.This intentionis somethingotherthan the sum of the individual
meaningsof the individual sentences. A text is more than a linear
successionof sentences.It is a cumulative,holisticprocess.This specific
structureof the text cannot be derived from that of the sentence.
Thereforethe kind of "plurivocity"which belongsto textsas textsis
somethingotherthan the polysemyof individualwordsin ordinarylanguage and the ambiguityof individual sentences.This plurivocityis
typicalof thetextconsideredas a whole,open to severalreadingsand to
severalconstructions.
As concernsthe proceduresof validationbywhichwe testour guesses,
I agree with Hirsch that theyare closer to a logic of probabilitythan
is
to a logic of empiricalverification.To show that an interpretation
more probable in the light of what is known is somethingotherthan
showing that a conclusion is true. In this sense, validation is not
verification.Validation is an argumentativediscipline comparable to
the juridical proceduresof legal interpretation.It is a logic of uncertaintyand of qualitative probability.In this sense we may give an
and
acceptable sense to the oppositionbetween Geisteswissenschaften
to
the
without
alleged dogma
concedinganything
Naturwissenschaften
of the individual. The method of conveyance of
of the ineffability
indices,typicalof the logic of subjectiveprobability,
gives a firmbasis
for a science of the individual deservingthe name of science. A text
is a quasi-individual,and the validation of an interpretation
applied
to it may be said, with completelegitimacy,to give a scientificknowledge of the text.
Such is the balance betweenthe geniusof guessingand the scientific
characterof validation which constitutesthe modern complementof
the dialecticbetweenverstehenand erkliiren.
At the same time,we are prepared to give an acceptable meaning
to the famous concept of a hermeneuticcircle. Guess and validation
are in a sense circularlyrelatedas subjectiveand objective approaches
to the text. But this circle is not a vicious circularity.It would be a
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I O8
NEW LITERARY HISTORY
which,
cage if we wereunable to escape the kindof "self-confirmability"
relation
between
threatens
this
to
Hirsch
guess
according
(pp. 165 ff.),
and validation.To the proceduresof validationalso belongprocedures
of invalidationsimilarto thecriteriaof falsifiability
emphasizedby Karl
The
of
falsification
is played here
role
in
his
Popper
Logic of Discovery.
An
conflict
the
between
by
competinginterpretations. interpretation
must not onlybe probable,but more probablethan another.There are
criteriaof relativesuperioritywhich may easily be derived from the
logic of subjectiveprobability.
In conclusion,if it is true that thereis always more than one way
are equal and
of construinga text,it is not truethatall interpretations
may be assimilatedto so-called"rulesof thumb" (Hirsch, p. 203). The
text is a limitedfieldof possibleconstructions.
The logic of validation
allows us to move betweenthe two limitsof dogmatismand skepticism.
It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation,to
confrontinterpretations,
to arbitratebetween them, and to seek for
an agreement,even if this agreementremainsbeyondour reach.
To what extentis thisdialecticbetweenguessingand validatingparadigmaticfor the whole fieldof the social sciences?That the meaning
of human actions,of historicalevents,and of social phenomenamay be
construedin several different
ways is well knownby all expertsin the
social sciences.What is less knownand understoodis thatthismethodois foundedin thenatureof the object itselfand, morelogical perplexity
that
it
does
not condemn the scientistto oscillatebetween dogover,
matism and skepticism. As the logic of text-interpretation
suggests,
thereis a specificplurivocity
belongingto themeaningof human action.
Human action,too, is a limitedfieldof possibleconstructions.
A traitof human action which has not been emphasizedin the preceding analysismay provide an interestinglink between the specific
plurivocityof the textand the analogical plurivocityof human action.
This traitconcernsthe relationbetweenthe purposiveand the motivational dimensionsof action. As many philosophersin the new fieldof
action theoryhave shown,the purposivecharacterof an action is fully
recognizedwhen the answerto the question what? is explained in the
termsof an answer to the question why? I understandwhat you intended to do, if you are able to explain to me why you did such and
such an action. Now, what kinds of answer to the question why?
make sense? Only those answerswhich afforda motiveunderstoodas
a reasonfor... and not as a cause. And what is a reasonfor... which
is not a cause? It is, in the termsof G. E. M. Anscombeand A. I.
Melden, an expression,or a phrase,which allows us to considerthe
action as thisor that. If you tellme that you did this or thatbecause
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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
IO9
of jealousy or in a spiritof revenge,you are asking me to put your
action in the light of this categoryof feelingsor dispositions.By the
same token,you claim to make sense with your action. You claim to
make it understandableforthe othersand foryourself.This attemptis
particularlyhelpfulwhen applied to what G. E. M. Anscombe calls
the desirability-character
of wanting.Wants and beliefshave the propertynot only of being forceswhich make people act in such and such
ways,but of makingsense,by virtueof the apparentgood which is the
correlate of their desirability-character.
I may have to answer the
what
as
want
this?
do
the
On
basis of these desirabilityyou
question,
charactersand of the apparentgoods which correspondto them,it is
possible to argue about the meaning of an action, to argue for or
against thisor that interpretation.In this way the account of motives
already foreshadowsa logic of argumentationprocedures. Could we
not say that what can be (and must be) construedin human action
is the motivationalbasis of this action, i.e., the set of desirabilitycharacterswhichmay explainit? And could we notsay thatthe process
of arguinglinked to the explanationof action by its motivesunfolds
a kind of plurivocitywhich makes action similarto a text?
What seems to make legitimatethis extensionfrom guessing the
meaningof a text to guessingthe meaning of an action is that in arguingabout the meaningof an action I put my wantsand my beliefsat
a distanceand submitthemto a concretedialecticof confrontation
with
of
view.
of
This
action
at
a
distance
opposite points
way
puttingmy
in orderto make sense of my own motivespaves the way for the kind
of distancingwhich occurswithwhat we called thesocial inscription
of
human action and to which we applied the metaphorof the "record."
The same actions which may be put into "records" and henceforth
"recorded" may also be explained in different
ways according to the
of
the
to
their
motivational
plurivocity
argumentsapplied
background.
If we are correctin extendingto actionthe conceptof "guess" which
we took as a synonymfor verstehen,we may also extend to the field
of action the concept of "validation" in which we saw an equivalent
of erkliiren.Here, too, the modern theoryof action providesus with
an intermediarylink between the procedures of literarycriticism
and thoseof the social sciences. Some thinkershave triedto elucidate
theway in whichwe imputeactionsto agentsin the lightof thejuridical
proceduresby which a judge or a tribunalvalidates a decision concerninga contractor a crime. In a famousarticle,"The Ascriptionof
Responsibilityand Rights" (Proceedingsof the AristotelianSociety,49
[1948-49], I71-94), H. L. A. Hart shows in a very convincingway
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I 10
NEW LITERARY HISTORY
that juridical reasoningdoes not at all consistin applyinggenerallaws
to particularcases, but each time in construinguniquelyreferring
decisions. These decisionsterminatea careful refutationof the excuses
and defenseswhich could "defeat" the claim or the accusation. In
saying that human actions are fundamentally"defeasible" and that
juridical reasoningis an argumentativeprocesswhich comes to grips
with the different
ways of "defeating"a claim or an accusation,Hart
has paved the way fora generaltheoryof validationin which juridical
reasoningwould be the fundamentallinkbetweenvalidationin literary
criticismand validation in the social sciences.The intermediary
function of juridical reasoningclearlyshows that the proceduresof validationhave a polemicalcharacter.In frontof the court,theplurivocity
common to textsand to actionsis exhibitedin the formof a conflict
of interpretations,
and the finalinterpretation
appears as a verdictto
which it is possibleto make appeal. Like legal utterances,all interpretationsin the fieldof literarycriticismand in the social sciencesmay
be challenged,and the question"What can defeata claim?" is common
to all argumentative
situations.Only in the tribunalis therea moment
when the proceduresof appeal are exhausted. But it is so onlybecause
the decisionof the judge is implementedby the forceof public power.
Neitherin literarycriticismnor in the social sciencesis theresuch a
last word. Or, if thereis any, we call that violence.
b. From Explanationto Understanding
The same dialecticbetweencomprehensionand understandingmay
receive a new meaningif taken in the reverseway, fromexplanation
to understanding.This new Gestaltof the dialecticproceedsfromthe
functionof the text.This referential
natureof the referential
function,
as we said, exceeds the mere ostensivedesignationof the situation
common to both speaker and hearer in the dialogical situation.This
abstractionfromthe surroundingworld gives rise to two oppositeattitudes. As readers,we may eitherremain in a state of suspenseas reworld,or we may actualize the potential
gards any kind of referred-to
nonostensivereferencesof the text in a new situation,that of the
reader. In the firstcase, we treatthe text as a worldlessentity;in the
second,we create a new ostensivereferencethanksto the kind of "execution" which the art of readingimplies. These two possibilitiesare
equally entailed by the act of reading,conceived as their dialectical
interplay.
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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
III
strucThe firstway of readingis exemplifiedtoday by the different
tural schools of literarycriticism.Their approach is not only possible,
but legitimate. It proceeds from the suspension,the epoche, of the
ostensivereference.To read in thisway means to prolongthis suspension of the ostensivereferenceto the world and to transferoneselfinto
the "place" wherethe textstands,withinthe "enclosure"of thisworldless place. Accordingto this choice,the textno longerhas an outside,
it has only an inside. Once more, the veryconstitution
of the text as
textand of the systemof textsas literaturejustifiesthis conversionof
the literarythingsinto a closed systemof signs,analogous to the kind
of closed systemwhich phonologydiscovered at the root of all discourse,and whichde Saussurecalled "la langue." Literature,according
to thisworkinghypothesis,
becomes an analogon of "la langue."
On the basis of thisabstraction,a new kind of explanatoryattitude
may be extendedto the literaryobject,which,contraryto the expectation of Dilthey,is no longerborrowedfromthe natural sciences,i.e.,
from an area of knowledgealien to language itself.The opposition
betweenNatur and Geist is no longeroperativehere. If some model
is borrowed,it comes fromthe same field,fromthe semiologicalfield.
It is henceforth
possibleto treattextsaccordingto the elementaryrules
which linguisticssuccessfully
applied to the elementarysystemsof signs
that underliethe use of language. We have learned fromthe Geneva
school, the Prague school, and the Danish school that it is always
possibleto abstractsystemsfromprocessesand to relatethesesystemswhetherphonological,lexical,or syntactical-to unitswhich are merely
definedby the oppositionwith other units of the same system.This
interplayof merelydistinctiveentitieswithinfinitesets of such units
definesthe notion of structurein linguistics.
It is this structuralmodel which is now applied to texts,i.e., to
sequences of signs longerthan the sentence,which is the last kind of
unit that linguisticstakes into account.
Claude L6vi-Straussformulatesthis
Id his Anthropologie
structurale,
in
the
workinghypothesis
followingway in regard to one categoryof
texts,that of myths: "Like everylinguisticentity,the mythis made
units.These constitutive
unitsimplythe presenceof
up of constitutive
those which generallyoccur in the structuresof language, namely
phonemes,morphemes,and semantemes.Each form differsfromthe
one which precedes it by a higher degree of complexity. For this
reason we will call the elements,which properlybelong to the myth
units" (p.
(and which are the mostcomplexof all): large constitutive
means
of
this
the
are
which
large
units,
233). By
workinghypothesis,
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I 12
NEW LITERARY HISTORY
at least the same size as the sentenceand which, put together,form
the narrativeproperto the myth,can be treatedaccordingto the same
rules as the smallestunitsknownsto linguistics.It is in order to insist
on this likenessthat Claude Levi-Straussspeaks of mythemes,just as
we speak of phonemes,morphemes,and semantemes.But in order to
remain within the limitsof the analogy between mythemesand the
lower-levelunits,the analysisof textswill have to performthe same
sort of abstractionas that practiced by the phonologist.To him, the
phonemeis not a concretesound,in an absolutesense,withits acoustic
quality. It is not, to speak like de Saussure, a "substance" but a
"form,"that is to say, an interplayof relations. Similarly,a mytheme
is not one of the sentencesof a myth,but an oppositivevalue attached
to several individual sentences forming,in Levi-Strauss' terms, a
"bundle of relations." "It is onlyin the formof a combinationof such
bundles that the constitutiveunits acquire a meaning-function"(p.
is not at all what the
234). What is here called a meaning-function
mythmeans,its philosophicalor existentialcontentor intuition,but the
arrangement,the dispositionof mythemes-in short,the structureof
the myth.
We can indeed say thatwe have explained a myth,but not that we
have interpreted
it. We can, by means of structuralanalysis,bringout
the logic of it throughthe operationswhich relate the bundles of relationsamong themselves.This logic constitutes"the structurallaw of
the mythunder consideration"(p. 241). This law is preeminently
an
of
and
not
at
all
of
in
the
sense
of
a reciting
object reading
speaking,
wherethe powerof the mythwould be reenactedin a particularsituation. Here the text is only a text, thanks to the suspensionof its
meaning for us, to the postponementof all actualizationby present
speech.
I want now to show in what way "explanation" (erkliiren)requires
"understanding"(verstehen)and bringsforthin a new way the inner
dialecticwhich constitutes"interpretation"
as a whole. As a matterof
with
a
of
fact,nobodystops
conception mythsand narrativesas formal
as thisalgebraof constitutive
units.This can be shownin different
ways.
of mythsby Lvi-Strauss,
First,even in themostformalizedpresentation
the units he calls "mythemes"are still expressedas sentenceswhich
bear meaning and reference.Can anyone say that theirmeaning as
such is neutralizedwhen theyenterintothe "bundle of relations"which
alone is taken into account by the "logic" of the myth? Even this
bundle of relations,in its turn,must be writtenin the formof a sentence. Finally,the kind of language game which the whole systemof
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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
113
oppositionsand combinationsembodieswould lack any kind of significance if the oppositionsthemselves,which, according to Levi-Strauss,
the mythtendsto mediate,were not meaningfuloppositionsconcerning
birth and death, blindnessand lucidity,sexualityand truth. Beside
these existentialconflictsthere would be no contradictionsto overcome, no logical functionof the mythas an attemptto solve these
contradictions.Structuralanalysisdoes not exclude, but presupposes,
the oppositehypothesis
concerningthe myth,i.e., that it has a meaning
as a narrativeof origins. Structuralanalysismerelyrepressesthisfunction. But it cannot suppressit. The mythwould not even functionas
a logical operatorif the propositionswhich it combinesdid not point
toward boundarysituations. Structuralanalysis,far from gettingrid
of this radical questioning,restoresit at a level of higherradicality.
If thisis true,could we notsay thatthe functionof structuralanalysis
is to lead from a surface-semantics,
that of the narratedmyth,to a
that of the boundarysituationswhich constitutethe
depth-semantics,
ultimate"referent"of the myth?
I fullybelievethatifsuch werenot the functionof structuralanalysis,
it would be reduced to a sterilegame, a divisivealgebra,and even the
mythwould be bereftof the functionwhich LUvi-Strausshimselfassigns to it, that of making men aware of certain oppositionsand of
mediation.To eliminatethisreference
tendingtowardtheirprogressive
to the aporias of existencearound which mythicthoughtgravitates
would be to reduce a theoryof mythto the necrologyof the meaningless discoursesof mankind. If, on the contrary,we considerstructural
analysisas a stage-and a necessaryone--between a naive interpretation and a critical interpretation,
between a surface-interpretation
and a depth-interpretation,
then it would be possibleto locate explanation and understandingat two different
stages of a unique hermeneutic arc. It is this depth-semantics
which constitutesthe genuine
between
object of understandingand which requiresa specificaffinity
the readerand the kind of thingsthe textis about.
But we must not be misled by this notionof personal affinity.
The
of
the
text
not
what
is
the
author
intendedto say, but
depth-semantics
what the textis about,i.e., the nonostensivereferenceof the text. And
the nonostensivereferenceof the text is the kind of world opened
of the text.
up by the depth-semantics
Thereforewhat we want to understandis not somethinghidden
behindthe text,but somethingdisclosedin frontof it. What has to be
understoodis not the initial situation of discourse,but what points
toward a possibleworld. Understandinghas less than ever to do with
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I14
NEWLITERARY
HISTORY
the author and his situation. It wants to grasp the world-propositions
opened up by the referenceof the text.To understanda textis to follow its movementfromsense to reference,fromwhat it says to what
it talks about. In this processthe mediatingrole played by structural
both the justification
of thisobjectiveapproach and
analysisconstitutes
the rectification
of the subjectiveapproach.We are definitely
prevented
fromidentifying
withsome kind of intuitivegraspingof
understanding
the intentionunderlyingthe text.What we have said about the depthsemanticswhich structuralanalysisyieldsinvitesus ratherto thinkof
the sense of the textas an injunctionstartingfromthe text,as a new
way of lookingat things,as an injunctionto thinkin a certainmanner.
Such is the referenceborne by depth-semantics.
The text speaks of
a possibleworld and of a possibleway of orientatingoneselfwithinit.
The dimensionsof thisworld are properlyopened up by, disclosedby,
the text. Disclosureis the equivalentfor writtenlanguage of ostensive
referenceforspokenlanguage.
we preservethe language of Romanticisthermeneutics,
If, therefore,
when it speaksof overcomingthe distance,of making"one's own," of
appropriatingwhat was distant,other,foreign,it will be at the price
of an importantcorrective.That whichwe make our own-Aneignung
in German-that which we appropriate,is not a foreignexperience,
but the power of disclosinga world which constitutes
the referenceof
the text.
This link betweendisclosureand appropriationis, to my mind, the
cornerstoneof a hermeneuticwhich would claim both to overcome
the shortcomings
of historicismand to remain faithfulto the original
intentionof Schleiermacher'shermeneutics.To understandan author
betterthan he could understandhimselfis to display the power of
disclosureimplied in his discoursebeyond the limitedhorizon of his
own existentialsituation.The processof distancing,of atemporalization,
to which we connected the phase of Erkliirung,is the fundamental
forthis enlargingof the horizonof the text.
presupposition
This second figure,or Gestalt,of the dialectic betweenexplanation
and comprehensionhas a strongparadigmaticcharacterwhich holds
forthe whole fieldof the human sciences. I want to emphasizethree
points.
First,the structuralmodel, takenas a paradigmforexplanation,may
be extendedbeyond textual entitiesto all social phenomena because
it is not limitedin its applicationto linguisticsigns,but applies to all
kindsof signswhich are analogousto linguisticsigns.The intermediary
link between the model of the text and social phenomena is consti-
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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
I 15
tuted by the notion of semiologicalsystems.A linguisticsystem,from
the point of view of semiology,is only a species withinthe semiotic
genre,althoughthis specieshas the privilegeof being a paradigmfor
the otherspeciesof the genre. We can say thereforethat a structural
model of explanationcan be generalizedas far as all social phenomena
which may be said to have a semiologicalcharacter,i.e., as far as it
is possibleto definethe typicalrelationsof a semiologicalsystemat their
level: the generalrelationbetweencode and message,relationsamong
the specificunits of the code, the relationbetweensignifierand signified, the typical relation within and among social messages; the
structureof communicationas an exchangeof messages,etc. Inasmuch
as the semiologicalmodel holds,the semioticor symbolicfunction,i.e.,
the functionof substituting
things
signsfor thingsand of representing
the
of
means
by
signs,appears to be more than a mere effectin social
life. It is its veryfoundation.We should have to say, accordingto this
generalizedfunctionof the semiotic,not only that the symbolicfunction is social, but that social realityis fundamentallysymbolic.
If we followthissuggestion,then the kind of explanationimpliedby
the structuralmodel appears to be quite differentfrom the classical
causal model, especiallyif causation is interpretedin Humean terms
as a regularsequence of antecedentsand consequentswith no inner
logical connectionbetweenthem. Structuralsystemsimplyrelationsof
a quite different
kind,correlativeratherthan sequentialor consecutive.
If this is true, the classical debate about motives and causes which
has plagued the theoryof action theselast decades loses its importance.
If the search for correlationswithinsemioticsystemsis the main task
of explanation,thenwe have to reformulate
the problemof motivation
in social groupsin new terms. But it is not the aim of this paper to
develop this implication.
The second paradigmaticfactor in our previous concept of textinterpretation
proceeds fromthe role we assigned to depth-semantics
betweenstructuralanalysisand appropriation. This mediatingfunction of depth-semantics
must not be overlooked,since the appropriation's losingits psychologicaland subjectivecharacterand receivinga
genuine epistemologicalfunctiondepends on it.
Is theresomethingsimilarto the depth-semantics
of a text in social
that
tend
to
I
the
for correlations
search
should
say
phenomena?
within and between social phenomena treated as semiotic entities
would lose importanceand interestif it would not yieldsomethinglike
a depth-semantics.In the same way that linguisticgames are forms
of life,accordingto the famousaphorismof Wittgenstein,
social struc-
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116
NEW LITERARY HISTORY
tures are also attemptsto cope with existentialperplexities,human
predicaments,and deep-rootedconflicts.In thissense,thesestructures,
dimension.They point toward aporias of social
too, have a referential
existence,the same aporias around which mythicalthoughtgravitates.
And this analogical functionof referencedevelops traitsvery similar
to what we called the nonostensivereferenceof a text,i.e., the display
of a Welt which is no longer an Umwelt,the projectionof a world
which is more than a situation.May we not say thatin social science,
to critical interpretations,
too, we proceed from naive interpretation
fromsurface-interpretations
to depth-interpretations
throughstructural
which
But
it
is
gives meaning to the
analysis?
depth-interpretation
whole process.
This last remarkleads us to our thirdand last point. If we follow
the paradigm of the dialecticbetweenexplanationand understanding
to its end, we must say that the meaningfulpatternswhich a depthwants to grasp cannot be understoodwithouta kind of
interpretation
similar to that of the reader who grasps the
commitment
personal
of
the
textand makes it his "own." Everybodyknows
depth-semantics
the objectionswhich an extensionof the concept of appropriationto
the social sciencesis exposed to. Does it not make legitimatethe intrusion of personal prejudices, or subjective bias into the field of
scientificinquiry? Does it not introduceall the paradoxes of the hermeneuticalcircle into the social sciences? In other words, does not
the paradigmof disclosureplus appropriationdestroythe veryconcept
of social science?The way in which we introducedthis pair of terms
withinthe frameworkof text-interpretation
providesus not only with
a paradigmaticproblem,but with a paradigmaticsolution.
This solution is not to deny the role of personal commitmentin
understandinghuman phenomena,but to qualifyit. As the model of
shows, understandinghas nothing to do with an
text-interpretation
immediate graspingof a foreignpsychic life or with an emotional
identificationwith a mental intention. Understandingis entirely
mediated by the whole of explanatoryprocedureswhich precede it
and accompany it. The counterpartof this personal appropriationis
not somethingwhich can be felt,it is the dynamicmeaning released
by the explanationwhich we identifiedearlier with the referenceof
the text,i.e., its power of disclosinga world.
must be applied
The paradigmaticcharacterof text-interpretation
This
means
that
ultimate
the
conditionsof
down to this
implication.
an authenticappropriation,as theywere displayedin relationto texts,
are themselvesparadigmatic.Thereforewe are not allowed to exclude
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THE MODEL OF THE TEXT
'I7
the finalact of personalcommitmentfromthe whole of objectiveand
explanatoryprocedureswhich mediate it.
This qualificationof the notion of personal commitmentdoes not
eliminatethe "hermeneuticcircle." This circle remainsan insuperable
structureof knowledgewhen it is applied to human things,but this
qualificationpreventsit from becominga vicious circle.
Ultimately,the correlationbetweenexplanationand understanding,
betweenunderstandingand explanation,is the "hermeneuticcircle."
UNIVERSITY
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OF PARIS