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FIGURES
Figure 2.1 – Schematic of Research Context............................10
Figure 3.1. USAF Peace Operation Flight Hours per Year 1990-1995......13
Figure 3.2--Fighter Crew Training Opportunities During Peace Operations
..................................................................15
Figure 4.1:
Coalition aircraft lost to enemy action by day and threat
type. .............................................................30
Figure 5.1 -- LALD/HD Delivery Profile................................40
Figure 5.2 -- LOFT Delivery Profile...................................41
Figure 5.3 -- F-15E bomb deliveries and hits: entire squadron.........44
Figure 5.4 -- Average Radar and Visual Bomb Deliveries and Hits: NonDeployed Crews ....................................................45
Figure 5.5: Average Radar and Visual Bomb Deliveries and Hits: Deployed
Crews .............................................................45
Figure 5.6 – Typical S-Shaped Learning Curve..........................47
Figure 5.7 -- Visual delivery probability of hit for F-15E instructorand non-instructor pilots as a function of bombs dropped in the past
30 days. ..........................................................53
Figure 5.8 -- Radar delivery probability of hit for F-15E instructor-and
non-instructor WSOs as a function of bombs dropped in the past 30
days. .............................................................57
Figure 5.9 – Predicted Probability of Hit (Ph) for Visual Bombs for F15E Crews Who Deployed to Saudi Arabia February through June 1997 .58
Figure 5.10 -- Predicted Probability of Hit (Ph) for Radar Bombs for F15E Crews Who Deployed to Saudi Arabia February through June 1997 .60
Figure 5.11 – Predicted Probability of Miss for F-15E Crews Who Deployed
to Saudi Arabia 1997 ..............................................61
Figure 5-12 – F-15E Targets Attacked and Hit by Crews With and Without
Practice in a Notional Replay of the First Ten Days of Desert Storm
..................................................................63
Figure 5-13 – F-16C Targets Attacked and Hit by Crews With and Without
Practice in a Notional Replay of the First Ten Days of Desert Storm
..................................................................63
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Figure 5.12 -- Visual delivery probability of hit for F-16C instructor
and non-instructor pilots as a function of bombs dropped in the past
30 days. ..........................................................68
Figure 5.13 -- Predicted Probability of Hit (Ph) for F-16C Instructors
and Non-Instructors January 1997 Through February 1998. ...........70
Figure 5.14 – Predicted Probability of Miss for F-16C Pilots 1997 and
Early 1998 ........................................................71
Figure 5.15 – Graphic Depiction of F-15E Low Level LALDHD Bomb Accuracy
..................................................................73
Figure 5.16 – Graphic Depiction of F-15E Low Level LOFT Bomb Accuracy
..................................................................73
Figure 5.17 – Graphic Depiction of F-16C Low Level LALDHD Bomb Accuracy
..................................................................74
Figure 5.16 – Typical Medium Altitude LGB Delivery....................75
Figure 6.1 – Graph of Air-to-air Missile Shot Groups Showing Number of
Shots and Percentage of Invalid Shots in Each Group ...............83
Figure 6.2 – Predicted vs Actual Invalid Air-to-air Missile Shots Based
on Days Since Last Shot ...........................................84
Figure 7.1 – Decision Tree of Policy Options for Mitigating the Negative
Impact of Peace Operations on USAF Fighter Crew Combat Skills .....99
Figure 7.2 – Actual daily sortie allocation of 71st Fighter Squadron
Summer 1997 vs allocation required to achieve a minimum of one
training sortie per week per pilot (two to one trade rate). ......105
Figure 7.3 – Actual daily sortie allocation of 71st Fighter Squadron
Summer 1997 vs allocation required to achieve a minimum of one
training sortie per week per pilot (one to one trade rate). ......107