THE PEACEFUL ATOM IN RET:OOSPECT AND PIDSPECT
Arnold Kramish
Physics Division
The RAND Corporation
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8 March 196o
address based on a study of ''U.S. Foreign Policy
and the PeacefUl. Atom'' for the Council on ForEign
An
Relations, New York, and presented at a luncheon
for Cincinnati business leaders, sponsored by the
Cincinnati Council on World Affairs, at Queen City
Club, March 7, 196o.
Reproduced by
The
RAND Corporation
•
Santa Monica
•
California
The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the Corporation
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THE PEACEFUL ATOM IN RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
I must confess that I was a bit taken aback by the
announced title of my talk, "The Economics of Nuclear Power in
the World of the Sixties."
There are no demonstrated seers in
the field of the economics of nuclear power and I would be the
last to claim such competence.
And while I shall talk briefly
of nuclear power costs I would prefer to invoke the broader,
and actually more proper, definition of economics which is the
science which investigates the manner and means in which nations
and communities obtain whatever is desirable or necessary for
the maintenance and improvement of life.
(economic spectrum
As such the . . . . . .
includes social -and--political iN.puts.
Cer-P
tainly the atom impinges upon all of these areas and is destined
to play an increasingly significant role--particularly during
the 1960's.
While the peaceful uses of atomic energy through the
application of the limited amounts of radioisotopes then available were a reality long before fission, fusion and nuclear
bombs came into being, the world Atoms for Peace programs can
certainly be said to have been sparked by President Eisenhower's
dramatic speech before the United Nations on December 8, 1953.
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From Albert Einstein's historic letter of August 2, 1939, which
can be said to have initiated interest in an atomic bomb, to
the actual completion of that bomb, six years were required.
Now six years have passed since the President enunciated his
plan and it would seem that an accounting is called for to see
which of his expectationsforfAtoms for Peace have become
realities.
The President affirmed his desire to submit to Congress
any plan that would accomplish four broadly-stated goals.
first goal was
11
The
to encourage worldwide investigation into the
most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and
with the certainty that they had all the material needed for
the conduct of all experiments that were appropriate."
The
major utilization of fissionable materials is for the production of nuclear power and for nuclear heat.
With respect to
nuclear power there is now a certain worldwide disenchantment
which is shared by all of the major nuclear nations and this
includes Russia whose initially-announced, grandiose atomic
power plans were thought to belittle the U.S. program.
Never-
theless, the U.S. atomic power program is the broadest in
scope in terms of concepts investigaged and in the attack on
special metallurgical and other technical problems.
However,
it cannot be denied that the push for installed kilowatts has
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weakened both here and abroad.
In 1955 some confident predic-
tions were that as much as 2 million kilowatts of nuclear power
capacity would be in service in the U.S. by the end of 1960.
Less than a fifth of that amount appears to be in prospect.
By the mid 1960's 5 million kilowatts were predicted; perhaps
40 percent of that amount will be on the line.
Even the British program, which until very recently seemed
to be quite large--a program which contemplated the installation of 6 million electrical kilowatts by 1966, appears to be
in the process of a cutback to 50-75 percent of that value.
The current coal surplus is of course the major reason for
this reduction.
The most publicized foreign victim of the current nuclear
power anemia is the Joint U.S.-Euratom program with the six
nations which comprise the European Coal and Steel Community.
Of a cooperative program involving the installation of one
million kilowatts by the end of 1963, only one plant, the SENN
plant in Italy, rated at one-sixth that amount, will be in
operation.
At the present time, there is still some hesitation
for a remaining group--a French-Belgian combine--to sign up.
If they do, their plant should be completed about 1965, but
the total installed under the U.S.-Euratom program will still
amount to about a third of the original expectations.
Euratom
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is really a victim only if its decreased atomic kilowatt goals
are interpreted as a weakness in the viability of the Community's
long-range political aims toward an integrated European community.
But there is no reason to interpret this "setback" in that
manner.
Instead the situation has produced what may possibly
result in a more extensive, advanced research and development
program carried out by that Community independently and in
partial cooperation with the United States, Canada and Great
Britain.
The de-emphasized Euratom atomic power plans were of
course the result of an unexpected and drastic improvement in
the oil supply situation which has occurred in the four years
since the Suez crisis--the crisis which initially sparked the
large-scale plans in Euratom and elsewhere.
Certainly a
favorable conventional fuel position cannot be regretted unless
the overall effect were to slow research and development on
advanced and more economic nuclear power systems which inevitably will be required with the continued increase in power
demands.
But since the research and development programs in
the U.S., in Canada, in Britain and in Western Europe now seem
to have vitality and direction, I believe there is really no
major criticism of the technical aspects of the U.S. atomicenergy-for-power program.
Important elements of the U.S.
program relating to extent of subsidy, fuel pricing, proper
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relationships of industrial participation, et cetera, continue
to be questioned--but these arguments should not be allowed to
detract from the very substantial achievements of those nuclear
scientists and engineers working in government laboratories
and in industry.
Delays, re-examination of costs, et cetera,
do not necessarily mean lack of progress; they often mean
encounter, discovery or solution of new technological problems-and this is progress.
The obvious lesson here is that_j,_n_stal_l_ed kilowatt
of atomic power are meaningless.
tot_~l~
It was a rash economist--
and one must admit there were a few around--who would have
predicted the achievement of competitive nuclear power by 1960.
In regard to actual costs the Atomic Energy Commission has
just released its studies for a long-range development program.
These studies indicate that as of 1959 power reactor technology
could produce power ranging approximately from 9.3 to 13.3
mills per kilowatt hour.
Critics of the Commission program
would probably say, "Well, if this is possible why don't we
have some of these plants already on the line?"
The major
element in the reply, aside from lead-time, would be that at
the present time a coal-fired plant using fuel rated at 35<i
per million BTU provides power at a cost of 7 mills per kilowatt hour.
With coal available in this area at about haifF
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that cost, resulting in something like 5 mill power, it is
obvious that I have been plunged into a den of nuclear power
pessimists.
It would be rash in the extreme for anyone to
promise competitive atomic power in the Ohio River Valley for
a long, long time to come.
The Commission studies indicate, however, that by 1967-68
these reactors can be built and developed to a point where
they would produce power in the range of 6.7 to 11.3 mills
per kilowatt hour.
The lower part of this range is indeed
interesting for a number of geographical areas, here and
abroad, and it would be most regrettable if this research
development program toward competitive nuclear power costs did
not proceed rapidly apace.
Curiously these cost projections, which now seem to be on
a fairly sound basis, would probably not have been available
at this time without the impetus provided by the Euratom
program under the earlier theory that Europe was likely to
provide the broad basis for competitive nuclear power long
before the U.S.
Much of the acceleration of research and
development programs of both industry and government should
be placed in the credit column of the supposedly ill-fated
Joint U.S.-Euratom program.
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The second of the President's goals was to "begin to
diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic
stockpiles."
Needless to say no such plan has been submitted
to Congress and no plan appears on the horizon.
Extremely
large amounts of fissionable material are committed, but as
yet are unassigned, by the U.S. to peaceful atomic programs.
The quantities committed by other nations are trivial in comparison.
For example, for operations conducted through the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States has
promised 5,070 kilograms of fissionable materials.
have promised 20 kilograms and the Russians 50.
The British
Nevertheless,
even the large amounts committed by the U.S. are but a small
fraction of the existing world stockpiles of fissionable
materials and it is extremely doubtful in view of the apparent
unwillingness of other nations to match U.S. amounts that the
United States should make even further paper commitments.
So
it is evident that the second of the President's goals is still
far from fulfillment.
Almost as distant is his third objective,
but it is this aspect that holds much of the immediate promise
for action.
The third goal was to "allow all peoples of all nations
to see that, in this enlightened age, the great powers of the
earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in
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human aspirations first, rather than in building up the armaments of war. 11
Here again it is doubtful that we have begun
to make much progress in fulfilling this task although certainly the technical implementation for it is close at hand
but the full political awareness and plan of action are lacking.
With initial emphasis in our Atoms for Peace program on
whichlal~eady
power for those nations
have power, we have in
a very practical sense virtually excluded those nations
11
of
the East, 11 and a number t'oflthe West," which we wish to convince of our peaceful intent and eagerness to aid.
What can
the atom do for those nations which are poor both in power
and in the industrial maturity which requires power?
It is certainly odd that, here in this area of the Atoms
for Peace program which could most effectively convince the
larger portion of the world's populations of the atom's
peaceful potential, we confront a curious anomaly in the U.S.
Atoms for Peace
progr~m.
Most of these areas can use only
small nuclear power plants.
This phase of the U.S. atomic
power program has been conceived and conducted largely under
military sponsorship.
The utility of such plants to the mili-
tary cannot be denied, but the utility and political impact
of these same plants for the less developed areas of the world
are of far greater significance.
Only recently the Atomic
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Energy Commission has called for some small plants independent
of the military program, but by and large, the identification
of small plants with military needs is still the dominant
theme.
Manifesting itself with emotional impact for many
peoples of the world is the improvement of their food position.
Here again a major area of food research--that of food sterilization and pasteurization--has been almost entirely under the
military thumb and, because of many diverse reasons, this
program has now collapsed and has almost expired.
The program
should be revived--and revived quite strongly--but in so doing
we should not miss the opportunity to remove it entirely from
military sponsorship and to conduct a wide program of research
on those unique food problems which beset areas of the world
other than our own.
Thus in these two fields where there is
much room for further understanding and research, the development of more economic small power plants and the development
of food supply improvement processes present as yet almost
entirely unexploited possibilities toward the fulfillment of
the third goal of the Atoms for Peace program.
Fortunately other radiation projects are bearing fruit if
food sterilization is not.
One dramatic development of practi-
cal and emotional interest to less developed areas is the
possibility of elimination of injurious insects and pests.
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Through nuclear techniques the screw-worm fly on the island
of Cura9ao has been entirely eliminated and in southeastern
United States the same menace to cattle is passing into
oblivion.
Using similar techniques there seems to be hope
that the tsetse fly in the African colonies of Belgium can
be eradicated.
Other applications of radiation, particularly
through the use of radioactive isotopes have certainly become
an important part of American industry, agriculture and health.
Appreciation of these techniques is growing abroad, but it
would seem that, if we wish to emphasize and accelerate the
use of radioisotopes, more U.S. research should be sponsored
on the unique problems likely to be encountered in areas we
wish to aid.
The fourth and final goal was to "open up a new channel
for peaceful discussion, and initiate at least a new approach
to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both
public and private conversations if the world is to shake off
the inertia imposed by fear, and is to make positive progress
toward peace."
Whether or not the 1953 proposal had a major effect in
opening up the limited channels which now exist is problematical.
Certainly this period following the death of Stalin was a
period of re-examination and re-formulation of goals and
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methods in the Soviet Union.
At the summit there has been
one meeting since, in 1955, at which the Atoms for Peace
proposal can claim no particular influence.
And eight days
hence will convene a major ten-power disarmament conference
at which the issue of the atom will presumably occur, but
again most probably not in the context of any of the goals in
the Atoms for Peace proposal nor aided by the few international
mechanisms thus far established by the peaceful atom.
One
cannot isolate a single mechanism thus far developed in the
Atoms for Peace program which seems destined to play any role
in the resolution of the more thorny problems of mutual military posture.
There have, however, been two lower-level gigantic Atoms
for Peace conferences held in Geneva and these produced an
intermingling of scientific experts of the East and West on
an unprecedented scale.
Also at smaller, more frequent meet-
ings, scientific exchanges have begun to flow and recently
the U.S. and the
u.s.s.R.
exchanged reciprocal delegation
visits of high-level atomic energy officials.
It is diffi-
cult at this time to assess the real meaning and effect of
this flow of information and scientists; certainly an inference
of relaxation of tensions is not yet warranted, since these
exchanges are still in nowise related to military posture.
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However, one would like to feel that through these exchanges,
through the gradual infusion of mutual understanding, some of
the world's major problems, which presently seem to involve
a twisted maze of political and technical complexities, will
some day begin to untangle and begin to show signs of
resolution.
But I am also convinced that as a nation, we should not
and need not depend upon the slow diffusion of understanding
to solve the world's ills.
Although the Atoms for Peace
program has yet to prove itself in all of its expected phases,
it has given us at least one major lesson.
The lesson is that
a concept was evolved with vast emotional appeal for the entire
world.
Further we initially showed every sign of implementing
that concept unilaterally, if necessary, and the Soviet Union
was almost forced to some degree of cooperation.
They learnt
this lesson well, for that is precisely the technique used
in their test cessation approach.
up."
So the score is now "one
The next move, which undoubtedly will contain both
peaceful and military nuclear overtones may well be the
decisive move.
Which nation possesses the ingenuity of mind
and the flexibility of action to be able to move first?