Clive Gray CULTURAL POLICY UNDER NEW LABOUR: STRUCTURAL, BEHAVIOURAL AND POLICY CONSTRAINTS

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CULTURAL POLICY UNDER NEW LABOUR:
STRUCTURAL, BEHAVIOURAL AND POLICY
CONSTRAINTS
Clive Gray
Centre for Cultural Policy Studies
Warwick University
Structure, Agency and Labour’s Cultural Policy
• Focus is on the structural context within which national
governments operated between 1997-2010
• The specific choices that were made in this period were not
structurally determined, and were not simply a policy
continuation of the grand scheme of things laid down by the
previous Conservative national governments (cf. free
admission to the national museums and galleries), even if
some specific policies remained exactly the same
• However, the room for manoeuvre that Labour Governments
and Ministers had was constrained by the structural
characteristics of the cultural policy sector
The Cultural Policy Sector in Britain: I
• A priority for Governments?
• 1997: new Departmental name (National Heritage to DCMS)
• New status – new significance?: but - no effective executive or
implementation role
• Increased expenditure (especially in comparison with other
departments) – new significance?
• But – DNH/DCMS as buffer mechanism and money conduit –
limited (if any) direct control over detail of expenditure
(arm’s-length principle over specifics)
• No other evidence that DNH/DCMS was important for the
overall work of Governments
The Cultural Policy Sector in Britain: II
• ‘Arm’s-length but hands-on’ (Taylor)?
• Emphasis on policy direction and not detailed control?
• But – high levels of policy ambiguity and no effective control
of implementation
• Minimal levels of effective executive power over important
cultural providers (cf. Regional Cultural Consortia and Local
Cultural Strategies; cf. cultural industries policy)
• Leading to little, if any, evidence of direct policy direction
The Cultural Policy Sector in Britain: III
• Consequences: financial incentivisation?: not directly, but –
• Instrumentalisation: money for non-cultural ends that use
‘culture’ as the means (cf. London Olympics; The Millennium
Dome; Tate Liverpool/Modern as regeneration strategies)
(Largely top-down approach)
• Attachment: alignment with multiple non-cultural ends to get
necessary resources for cultural activities (the Yosser Hughes
approach: ‘I can do that, give us a job’) (cf. museums/galleries
and social inclusion) (Largely bottom-up approach)
• Increasing (competitive) project funding as policy
continuation?
‘Sound and Fury…’: I
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•
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In the grand scheme of things what changed?
Organisationally:
LCSs and RCCs introduced and left to die
Continuing regional restructuring in ACE
Devolution to Scotland and (effectively and eventually) Wales
– leading (eventually) to the creation of Creative Scotland and
a more co-ordinated approach to the cultural sector as a
whole (?)
• Possibility for charitable Trust creation (cf. museums) and
contracting-out of service provision (cf. sports/leisure sectors)
(latter as policy continuation of previous Conservative policy)
‘Sound and Fury…’: II
• Managerially:
• ‘Modernising government’ (NB. This was very different to
NPM – emphasis on effective service delivery and policy
outcomes, not on economic versions of managerial efficiency
based on ‘value for money’)
• ‘Evidence-based policy’ as an off-shoot of this – based on
medical models (relevance to the cultural sector?)
• Cultural/creative industries policy as normal industrial policy
• None of this dealt directly with the ‘cultural’ dimension of the
sector, largely as a result of inability to rigorously assess
delivery/outcomes in ‘cultural’ terms (policy ambiguity)
‘Sound and Fury…’: III
• Financially:
• Continuing ‘competition’ for funds (cf. policy continuation)
• Changes in lottery distribution (cf. the Olympics – contributor
to increased money for the cultural sector in comparison with
other ‘good causes’)
• Discretionary funding for cultural activities in local
government in England and Wales remained – leading to
concerns about funding levels in times of austerity (2007
onwards)
• National museums entrance fees changes (cf. local authority
and Trust museums increasingly charging for entry)
‘Sound and Fury…’: IV
• Ideologically:
• ‘Steady as she goes…’? : did the attitude of governments
between 1997-2010 show any real difference to that of
governments before or since then?
• Greater social dimension in comparison with previous 18
years? – largely through instrumentalisation
• ‘God help the government who meddles in art’? (cf. more
recent library closures and central government nonintervention)
• Based on ‘ritual rationality’ rather than
instrumental/economic/social/political rationalities?
‘Signifying Nothing…’?
• ‘Small earthquake in Chile: not many killed’
• Lots of claims of importance – ‘a golden age’: but –
• Never a policy priority for central government (and no
preferential treatment when the cuts started)
• Still subject to instrumentalisation/attachment strategies
• Still operating on the same policy models and rationality
assumptions
• Problems of causality/attribution/measurement still exist
• So: no evidence of changes to the dominant approach to
culture, and no evidence of changes in outcomes of cultural
policies - the dominance of structure over agency?
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