WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES
Supreme Court Decisions From Carroll to Ross
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Paul Stuckle
Independent Research
1st Summer Session, 1982
Professor Larkin
••• By either course we might bring some
modicum of certainty to Fourth Amendment
law and give the law enforcement officers
some slight guidance in how they are to
conduct themselves.
Justice White,
dissenting in Coolidge v. New Hampshire
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PART ONE:
PROBABLY CAUSE TO SEARCH
It has been said frequently, and with surprising accuracy, that
history repeats itself. For legal scholars, nowhere is the lesson of
history more applicable than in the constitutional law of warrantless
searches of automobiles. After approximately sixty years of litigation,
beginning in 1925, the Supreme Court's holding in the 1982 case of the
United States v. Ross, 1 ends up basically where it all began. Without needlessly attempting to tarnish the infinite wisdom of the Court, as this was
an admittedly "troubled area, .. those sixty year_s were filled with more curves,
yellow flags, and incredible finishes than the Indianapolis 500. For in
the law of automobile searches, the United States Supreme Court took us all
on a ride.
Searches and seizures are governed by the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution which is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment states:
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.2
Even though the Fourth Amendment does not specifically mention automobiles,
there is no question that vehicles are entitled to protection under the
Amendment. As the Court said in United States v. Chadwick, 3 "automobiles
are 'effects• under the Fourth Amendment, and searches and seizures of
automobiles are therefore subject to the Constitutional standard of reasonableness."4
The crucial issue in all search and seizure cases is whether the
Fourth Amendment's requirements have been complied with. If not the exclusionary rule, i.e., any evidence obtained illegally will not be admissible
in court, takes effect. The exclusionary rule for federal prosecutions was
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established by the Supreme Court in 1914 in Weeks v. United States.
It
was applied to state prosecutions in the 1961 Supreme Court decision of
Mapp v. Ohio. 6 The underlying rationale of the exclusionary rule was
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explained by the Court in Walder v. United States:
The Government cannot violate the Fourth Amendment--in the only
way in which the Government can do anything, namely through its
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agents--and use the fruits of such unlawful conduct to secure a
conviction . . . Nor can the Government make indirect use of such
evid:nce for its case, ••. or support a conviction on evidence
obta1ned through leads from the unlawfully obtained evidence, . . .
All these methods are outlawed, and convictions obtained by means
of ~hem are i~validated, because they gncourage the kind of
soc1ety that 1s obnoxious to free men.
With these rudimentary Fourth Amendment principles in mind, this paper
shall take an inqepth look at the constitutional law of warrantless searches
and seizures of automobiles. The primary issues to be discussed include:
the scope of vehicle searches; the requisite of pr~babl~ cause to search;
time constraints on searches; and the troubled area concerning containers
and automobile compartments. The paper will not cover two other doctrines
connected with automobile searches: search incident to arrest and inventory
searches. A search incident to arrest occurs when a police officer lawfully
arrests the occupant of a vehicle, he may then search the area that is within
the occupant•s immediate control. An inventory search problem takes place
/when there is not probable cause to search the vehicle after it has-oeen
seized. Rather, this paper is concerned primarily with warrantless probable
cause automobile searches. We begin back in the 1920s, as prohibition
created a huge black market for the transportation of illegal alcohol, and
the courts were first faced with the constitutional law problem of searches
involving automobiles.
In 1925, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Carroll
v. United States. 9 The defendant, Carroll, was convicted for transporting
intoxicating liquor in an automobile in violation of the National Prohibition
Act. Carroll argued to have the conviction set aside on the grounds that
the search and subsequent seizure of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment, and therefore that the use of liquor as evidence was impermissible
under the exclusionary rule. The facts in Carroll showed federal prohibition
agents patrolling a known .. bootlegging .. highway between Grand Rapids and
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Detroit when they spotted the defendant's vehicle. The defendants were
known by the agents 'to engage in the illegal transportation of liquor.
The agents stopped the defendants and searched their car. Upon ripping out
the upholstery of the seats, the agents found sixty-eight bottles of the
illegal contraband. The officers were not anticipating that the defendants
would be driving on the highway at that particular time, but upon spotting
them the officers believed the defendants were carrying liquor, and soon
followed the search, seizure, and arrest.
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Mr. Chief Justice Taft delivered the majority op1n1on of the Court.
The opinion first delineated sections of the National Prohibition Act,
which granted law officers the authority to seize contraband when they
discovered any person in the act of transporting liquor. However, a
supplemental act which had passed through the Senate, the "Stanley Amendment," prescribed stiff penalties for officers who made a warrantless search
of any property. A committee from the House of Representatives advocated
strongly against the proposed Amendment:
Not only does this Amendment prohibit search of any lands, but it
prohibits the search of all property ••• But what is perhaps more
serious, it will make it impossible to stop the rum-running automobiles engaged in like illegal traffic. It would take from the
officers the power that they absolutely must have to be of any
service, for if they cannot search for liquor without a warrant,
they might as well be discharged. It is impossible to get a
warrant to stop an automobile. Before a warrant could be
secured the automobile would be beyond the reach of the officer,
with its load of illegal liquor disposed of.lO
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The controversy was resolved between the two Houses in a compromise. An
officer was punished who, "searched a 'private dwelling' without a warrant,"
and sanctions were also to be used against an officer who searched any
"other building or property, where and only where, he makes the search
without a warrant, maliciously and without probable cause." 11 Chief Justice
Taft reasoned:
In other words, it left the way open for searching an automobile,
or vehicle of transportation, without a warrant, if the search
was not malicious or without probable cause. The intent of Congress
to make a distinction between the necessity for a search warrant
in the searching of private dwellings and in that of automobiles
and other road vehicles in the enforcement of the Prohibition Act
is thus clearly established by the legislative history of the
Stanley Amendment. Is such a distinction consistent with the
4th Amendment? We think that it is. The 4th Amendment does not
denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable.l2
The Carroll Court took a survey of the leading search and seizure
cases and found that none of them ruled on the validity of a warrantless
seizure of contraband in a moving vehicle. The majority then laid their
cards on the table, not knowing at the time that almost sixty years of
confusion would follow:
On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and
seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is,
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upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to
the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains
that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the
search and seizure are valid.l3
The majority, .. having established that contraband goods concealed and
illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched
without a warrant, .. 14 now had to define· the circumstances under which such
a search could be made. The Court concluded that it would be manifestly
unreasonable to permit law officers to stop every automobile solely on the
. grounds they might find contraband. For road trave 1ers have a right to
free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a
competent officer authorized to search, probably cause for believing that
their vehicles are carrying contraband ... 15 The majority stated:
The measure of legality of such a seizure is, therefore, that the
seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for
believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has
contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported . • •
_the line of distinction between legal and illegal seizure gives
the owner of an automobile in absence of probable cause, a right
to have restored to him the automobile; it protects him . . •
from use of the liquor as evidence against him . . . On the
other hand, in a case showing probable cause, the government
and its officials are given the opportunity to make the
investigation necessary to trace reasonably suspected contraband
goods and to seize them. Such a rule fulfills the guaranty of
the 4th Amendment. In cases where the securing of a warrant is
reasonably practicable, it must be used . . . In cases where
seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer
acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court
probable cause.l6
The Court refused to accept Carroll's argument that a search and
seizure is only justified if one has been arrested. Chief Justice Taft
declared the search did not have to be incident to arrest:
The right
to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right
to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer
has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law ... 17
Having determined that the standard for the automobile exception to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement was the existence of probable
cause, the Court went on to precisely define the term. Quoting the earlier
case of Stacey v. Emery, 18 the Court said:
lf the facts and circumstances
before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in
believing that the offense has been committed, it is sufficient ... 19 The
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majority had no problem in determining that probable cause existed against
Carroll, due to the fact that the geographic area surrounding the traffic
stop was an active center for the transportation of liquor, and because the
defendants were known to be "bootleggers." Carroll's conviction was affirmed,
and the black letter law rule that a warrantless search of an automobile
for concealed contraband is permissible upon probable cause.J was firmly
established--or so it seemed.
Forty-five years after Carroll, the Supreme Court decided the case of
Chambers v. Maroney. 20 After the second armed robbery ~ithin a week, the
police were given a description of·. the robber$'
car and of their clothing.
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The police then stopped a car which met the description and which was
carrying four men and the described clothing. The men were arrested and the
car was taken to the station house where the police conducted a warrantless
search of the car finding guns, ammunition, and property stolen in the
robberies. At a Pennsylvania state court trial the evidence found in the
car search was admitted and petitioner was convicted. He petitioned for
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habe~us corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District
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of Pennsylvania. The District Court denied his petition without a hearing,
holding that the search of the car did not violate the petitioner's constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.
~1r. Justice White delivered the majority opinion of the Court.
Peti:tioner claimed that the evidence taken from the vehicle search constituted
fruits of an illegal arrest. The majority disagreed, finding sufficient
probable cause for the police to stop the vehicle after getting a description
from observers of the robberies. However, the Court quickly pointed out
that the police station search of the car, conducted some time after the
arrest could not be justified as a search incident to arrest. The Court
quoted~the case of Preston v. United States: 21 "Once an accused is under
arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a
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warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest."
White distinguished
Preston and other cases from the situation presented in Chambers by pointing
out that in the present case the police had probable cause to both "arrest
the occupants of the station wagon; and to search the car for guns and
stolen money." 23
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The Chambers opinion stated, however, that neither ·~carroll nor other
cases in this Court require or suggest that in every conceivable circumstance
the search of an auto even with probable cause may be made without the extra
protection for privacy that a warrant affords." 24
But the circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a
particular auto for particular articles are most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car
is readily movable. Where this is true, as in Carroll and the case
before us now, if an effective search is to be made at any time,
either the search must be made immediately without a warrant or
·. the car itself must be seized and held without warrant for whatever
period is necessary to obtain a warrant for the search.25
(emphasis added)
The Chambers majority, acknowledging the Fourth Amendment's requirement
of a pre-search warrant issued by a magistrate on the issue of probable
cause, stated: "only in exigent circumstances will the judgement of the
police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a
search." 26 (emphasis added) Of course, exigent circumstances exist in the
Carroll type stop, as the Court explains: "the car's contents may never be
found again if a warrant must be obtained." 27
But what are the "exigent circumstances" when the suspects are in
custody and the automobile is safely guarded at the police station? If the
police had probable cause to arrest the occupants, then surely a magistrate
would find probable cause and issue a warrant to search the vehicle. If
the car is safe at the station house, why not require the police to wait
: for a warrant before commencing search? In a classic Supreme Court excerpt,
the Chambers' majority advocated:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgement,
only the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a
search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the "lesser" intrusion
is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the "greater." But
which is the "greater" and which is the lesser intrusion is a
debatable question . . . For constitutional purposes, we see no
difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before
presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.
Given probable cause ~o search, either course is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. 8
With the above statement, the Court created what is now known as the
Carroll-Chambers rule. This doctrine, stripped to its bare essentials, gives
the police two options. First, if the police have probable cause and exigent
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circumstances exist (i.e., the vehicle is movable, the occupants are alerted,
etc.) then pursuant to Carroll the vehicle may be searched at the scene.
Why did the police not follow this first option in the present case? The
Court explains in a footnote:
lt was not unreasonable in this case to
take the car to the station house. All occupants in the car were arrested
in a dark parking lot in the middle of the night. A careful search at that
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po1n
was 1mpract1cal.''
The second option, created by the Chambers opinion,
is that the on-the-scene probable cause to search continues in the car to the
station house:
. . . unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure
of the car and the denial of its use
anyone until a warrant
is secured. In that event there is little to choose in terms of
practical consequences between an immediate search without a
warrant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is obtained. 30
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Chambers appeared to be a great victory for the police, as once again
the Court has upheld the police officer's determination of probable cause
as a substitute for the magistrate. Was the necessity for a magistrate in
automobile cases being written out of the Fourth Amendment? The Chambers
opinion was not without its critics. Professor Wayne LaFave, considered
the premiere authority on search and seizure, offered these comments:
This passage from Chambers is remarkable . . • As for the assertion
that it is a debatable question" whether seizure of the vehicle
is a lesser intrusion than a search of its interior, no clear
explanation was offered as to why this is s~ nor was any reference
made to it in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 1 in which a somewhat
similar question was not found at all debatable a few months
earlier. (In Van Leeuwen, a unanimous Court held that the proper
course of action, given probable cause to search packages placed
in the mails, was to withhold routing and delivery of the packages
for the brief period necessary to obtain a search warrant). Nor
did the Court suggest what Variety of circumstances .. could make
holding of the vehicle until a warrant was obta~2ed a greater
intrusion than an immediate warrantless search.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Chambers, believes that the Court has
gone too far in their extension of Carroll:
I believe it clear that a warrantless search involves the greater
sacrifice of Fourth Amendment values . . • the lesser intrusion
will almost always be the simple seizure of the car for the period-perhaps a day--necessary to enable the officers to obtain a search
warrant . . . Since the occupants themselves are to be taken into
custody, they will suffer minimal further inconvenience from the
temporary immobilization of their vehicle ••. Indeed, I believe
this conclusion is implicit in the opinion of the unanmious Court
in Preston. The Court concluded (in Preston) that no (Fourth
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Amendment) exception was available, stating that "since the men
were under arrest at the police station and the car was in police
custody at a garage, there was no danger that the car would be
m?ved out of the locality or jurisdiction • . . The Court now
d1scards the approach taken in Preston, and creates a special rule
for ~utomobile searches that is seriously at odds with generally
appl1ed Fourth Amendment principles.33
The Chambers majority did take the trouble to distinguish Preston on
the ground that in the Preston case, "the arrest was for vagrancy; it was
apparent that the officers had no cause to believe that evidence of crime
was concealed in the auto." 34 The Court is saying that Preston may have had
the exigency of mobility, but not probable cause to search. Under the
Carroll-Chambers rule, both criteria are essential to a valid warrantless
search to be conducted either at the scene or at the station house.
In fact, the next major Supreme Court case, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 35
found the opposite result than in Preston. In Coolidge, the Court decided
the police had probable cause, but not exigent circumstances to conduct a
station house search. Coolidge was a confusing opinion, which ended up with
only a plurality of Justices, but it negated the fear some critics had that
•_ ·r , -vehicles\~ay~~iways be subject to search without a search warrant. The police
in Coolidge were several weeks into the investigation of a murder and the
defendant was a prime suspect. After arresting the defendant, the police
then seized his vehicle and searched it later at the station house; in both
situations no warrant had been issued. The plurality distinguished Coolidge
from the Carroll-Chambers rule on the ground that in the present case the
police had knowledge of the probable role of the automobile in the commission
of the crime. The defendant knew he was under investigation and could have
easily destroyed any evidence present in the car, but instead left it parked
in his driveway. The plurality stated:
The word "automobile .. is not a talisman in whose presence the
Fourth Amendment fades away and disapears . . • In short, by no
possible stretch of the legal imagination can this be made into
a case where "it was not practicable to secure a warrant," and the
automobile exception, despite its label, is simply irrelevant.
Since Carroll would not have justified a warrantless search of
the Pontiac at the time Coolidge was arrested, the later search
at the station house was plainly illegal, at least so far as the
automobile exception is concerned. Chambers is of no help . . .
since that case held only that, where the police may stop and
search an automobile under Carroll, they may also seize it and
search it later at the police station. Rather, this case is
controlled by Dyke v. Taylor. There the police lacked probable
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cause to seize or search the defendant's automobile at the time
of his arrest, and this was enough by itself to condemn the
subsequent search at the station house. Here there was probable
cause, but no exigent circumstances justified the police in
proc~eding without a warrant. As in_Qyke, the later search at the
stat1on house was therefore illegal.~
Justice White, dissenting in Coolidge, was critical of the plurality's
decision. He points out how difficult the rule for search and seizures of
automobiles, particularly the mobility doctrine, has become:
The majority now approves warrantless searches of vehicles in
motion when seized. On the other hand, warrantless, probable cause
searches of parked but movable vehicles in some situations would be
valid only upon proof of exigent circumstances justifying the
search. Although I am not sure, it would seem that, when the
police discover a parked car that they have probable cause to
search, they may not immediately search but must seek a warrant.
But if before the warrant arrives, the car is put in motion by
its owner or others, it may be stopped and searched on the spot
or elsewhere •.• Although (Carroll and Chambers) may, as the Court
argues, have involved vehicles in motion prior to their being
stopped and searched, each of them approved the search of a vehicle
that was no longer moving and, with the occupants in custody, no
more likely to move than the unattended but movable vehicle parked
on the street or in the driveway of a person's house. In both
situations the probability of movement at the instance of family
or friends is equally real and hence the result should be the same
whether the car is at rest or in motion when it is discovered.37
The Court had another opportunity to define the exigent circumstances
problem in Cardwell v. Lewis. 38 In Cardwell the defendant was arrested
,at the police station and his car was subsequently seized from a nearby
parking lot. The search of the car differed from previous cases as it was
an exterior search for paint samples and tire threads. Once again, the Court
was unable to come up with a majority of Justices. The plurality opinion,
authored by Blackmun considered the issue to be: 11 whether the examination
of an automobile's exterior upon probable cause invades a right to privacy
which the interposition of a warrant requirement is meant to protect ... 39
40
The plurality expressed the fundamental view of Warden v. Hayden
that instead of property rights, the Fourth Amendment's main concern is the
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protection of individual privacy. Blackmun defended the automobile exception
to the Fourth Amendment by stating: .. Generally, less stringent warrant
requirements have been applied to vehicles ... 41 He then continued to justify
the underlying rationale of the automobile exception:
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One has ~ lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
because 1ts function is transportation and it seldom serves
as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects.
A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It
travels public thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents
are in plain view.4Z
The plurality, setting up the argument that the exterior of an automobile
has no privacy interest, quoted Katz v. United States; 43 What a person
knowingly exposes to the public • . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection ... 44
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After laying this Fourth Amendment foundation, the Court stated:
With the search limited to the examination of the tire on the
wheel and the taking of paint scrapings from the exterior of the
vehicle left in the public parking lot, we fail to comprehend what
expectation of privacy was infringed. Stated simply, the invasion
of privacy, if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoretical.
Under circumstances such as these, where probable cause exists, a
warrantless examination of the exterior of a car is not unreasonable
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.45
The plurality then addressed the exigent circumstances problem, as the
police had seized the car and made the exterior search at the station house.
We do not think that, because the police impounded the car prior
to the examination, which they could have made on the spot, there
is a constitutional barrier to the use of the evidence obtained
thereby. Under the circumstances of this case, the seizure itself
was not unreasonable.46
The opinion,having gone this far, had only the choice to compare the present
case with Chambers and not Coolidge. In distinguishing Coolidge, the plurality
remarked that, Since the Coolidge car was parked on the defendant's driveway,
the seizure of that automobile required an entry upon private property ... 47
However, the car in Chambers was stopped and seized on a public highway.
This is obviously a weak, almost ridiculous argument. The fact remains that
in both Coolidge and the present case, the cars were parked and the defendants
were already under arrest. The exigency of someone moving the vehicle, or
getting to evidence before the vehicle was seized, seems to be more imperative in Coolidge than in Cardwell. In the former case, which required a
warrant before station house search, the car was in a private driveway
where it was easily accessible to family or friends. In Cardwell, which
did not require a warrant, the car was left by the defendant in a public
downtown parking lot, arguably a lesser exigency, since family and friends
were presumably farther away. And of course, which the Court refuses to
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admit, once a vehicle is seized and is under police guard at the station
house, absolutely no exigent circumstances exist at all. There is no
reason, except for administrative convenience, why a warrant need not be
procured post seizure of the vehicle. However, with the fiction of Chambers,
that the exigency continues to the station house, the Court forced itself
to argue on tenuous grounds: namely, by distinguishing cases according to
the vehicle's mobility or immobility/or whether seized on public or private
places.
The petitioner in Cardwell argued his case was consistent with Coolidge,
as probable cause to search the car had existed in both cases long before
the arrests. Also, in both cases, the car was seized after the defendants
were in police custody. Under these circumstances what kind of emergency
conditions existed to justify a warrantless search and seizure? The plurality
responded:
Assuming that probable cause previously existed, we know of no case
or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable
cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first
practicable moment. Exigent circumstances with regard to vehicles
are not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable
and arises only at the time of arrest. The exigency may arise at
any time, and the fact that the police might have obtained a warrant
earlier does not negate the possibility of a current situation's
necessitating prompt police action.4 1
As Professor LaFave summarizes in his Search and Seizure treatise:
The four Cardwell dissenters would have none of this. They objected
(i) that even if there had been no search of the car, the fact
remained that the car had been seized, an activity also encompassed
within the Fourth Amendment's protections; (ii) that the question was
whether the vehicle was movable, thus implying that it was not relevant that the car was found on public rather than private property,
and (iii) that there was no reason whatsoever why the police could
not have armed themselves with a search warrant in advance.48
Although both Coolidge and Cardwell can be distinguished from Chambers
by the mobility doctrine, it is harder to distinguish the two between themselves. The only real distinction between the two searches is that the
Cardwell car itself was not searched, only its exterior. The only distinction
for seizure purposes between the two is on the private/public grounds argument.
If this seems unsatisfactory to answer why Coolidge required a warrant and
Cardwell did not, we must take comfort in the fact that neither case received
the votes of five Supreme Court Justices.
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The next major Supreme Court opinion was Texas v. White 49 in 1975.
A majority per curiam opinion added nothing new to the law, but solidified
the Chambers rule. Justice Marshall dissented, believing that the majority
had created a black letter rule where none had existed before:
C~ambers did not hold, as the Court suggests, that police officers
w1th probable cause to search an automobile on the scene where it
was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house
without first obtaining a warrant. Chambers simply held that to
be the rule when it is re~6onable to take the car to the station
house in the first place.
PART TWO:
CONTAINERS
As the Carroll opinion mandated, a warrantless automobile search
where the police have probable cause, includes a search for concealed contraband. Therefore, a majority of state courts and lower federal courts considered
the scope of warrantless automobile searches to extend to containers, i.e.,
suitcases, paper bags, etc., found within the vehicle. This practice was
questioned by the Supreme Court in the 1977 case of United States v. Chadwick. 51
In Chadwick, a locked footlocker had been seized by federal agents
from the open trunk of a parked automobile during the arrests of those who
had been in possession of the footlocker at the automobile's location outside
a train terminal. The agents transported the footlocker to the federal
building in Boston, Massachusetts. Acting with a probable cause belief that
the footlocker contained contraband, but without a warrant, the agents opened
the locker and discovered large quantities of marijuana. The District Court
granted defendant's motion to suppress, holding that warrantless searches
were per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless they fell within
-some established exception to the warrant requirement; and that the search
of the footlocker without a warrant was not justified under either the
exception for searches of automobiles or for searches incident to arrest.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
District Court. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed.
In the majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court
quickly pointed out that once the footlocker had been lawfully seized, no
exigent circumstances existed which would permit a warrantless search:
There was no risk that whatever was contained in the footlocker
tru~k would be removed by the defendants or their associates.
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The agents had no reason to believe that the footlocker contained
explosives or other inherently dangerous items, or that it contained
evidence which would lose its value unless the footlocker were
opened at once • . . it is not contended that there was any exigency
calling for an immediate search.52
The Court then went on to discuss the Government's claim that the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects only interests traditionally
identified with the home. The Government had argued that only homes, offices,
and private communications implicate the Fourth Amendment because of the
highly valued privacy interest associated with those items. The Government
reasoned that all other situations had a lesser privacy interest and
therefore the reasonableness of a search and seizure depended solely on
the presence or absence of probable cause. The majority opinion struck
down this position forcefully, but acknowledged the need for a historical
review:
As we have noted before, the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places; more particularly, it protects people from unreasonable
government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of
privacy . . • it would be a mistake to conclude, as the Government
contends, that the Warrant Clause • . . intended to guard only
against intrusions into the home •.• There is a strong historical
connection between the Warrant Clause and the initial clause of
Fourth Amendment, which draws no distinction among "persons, houses,
papers, and effects" in safeguarding against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Moreover, if there is little evidence that the
Framers intended the Warrant Clause to operate outside the home,
there is no evidence at all that they intended to exclude from
protection of the Clause all searches occurring outside the home . • .
Our fundamental inquiry in considering Fourth Amendment issues is
whether or not a search or seizure is reasonable under all the
circumstances . • • Once a lawful search is begun, it is also far
more likely that it will not exceed proper bounds when it is done
pursuant to a "judicial authorization" particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Further,
a warrant assures the individual whose property is searched or
seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need
to search, and the limits of his power to search. Just as the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," the protections a
judicial warrant offers against erroneous governmental intrusions
are effective whether applied in or out of the home.53
Burger then voiced the opinion that the respondents in this case
expected the contents of the footlocker to remain free from public scrutiny.
They had double locked the footlocker and had placed "personal effects"
inside. The Court analogized this situation as the equivalent of a homeowner locking his doors to keep out trespassers. Upon this premise the
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majority believed the respondents were entitled to the protection of the
Warrant Clause, and therefore the search of the footlocker was unreasonable.
Obviously Chadwick is not a per se automobile search. It is at best
remotely an automobile search. The footlocker was in the trunk of the car
for only a few moments, the car trunk was not closed, and the vehicle was
never in motion. Nevertheless, the Court was faced with the automobile
exception argument as the Government advocated that the rationale behind
automobile cases permitted warrantless searches of luggage. The majority
agreed that luggage, as well as automobiles, are effects for Fourth Amendment purposes. Beyond that, however, the analogy ended.
But this Court has recognized significant differences between
motor vehicles and other property which permit warrantless searches
of automobiles in circumstances in which warrantless searches would
not be reasonable in other contexts .•• The factors which diminish
the privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply to respondent's
footlocker. Luggage contents are not open to public view ••.
Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation,
luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum,
a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.54
The Chadwick opinion presents some interesting speculations--basically
because it provides no answers and certainly no guidance for law enforcers
or the courts. Why the Court bothered to distinguish the automobile exception from Chadwick's luggage, without mentioning what would happen if the
luggage had been seized from a moving vehicle, is one of the great mysteries
of irresponsible Supreme Court case law. Chadwick does tell us that luggage
has a greater privacy interest than an automobile. Thus a warrant is
required before luggage can be searched after it has been lawfully seized.
But with what one can determine from Chadwick, the above rule only applies
to luggage which is wholly isolated from automobiles; i.e., in situations
where the police arrest a defendant who is walking and carrying a suitcase.
What then is the rule when the police, acting with probable cause, discover
a container in their warrantless search of an automobile at the scene?
Two possibilities readily come to mind: First, by negative inference, it
seems that the Court is saying that if the facts present in Chadwick had
fallen within the automobile cases, i.e., the footlocker had been in a
moving or readily movable vehicle in a public place, where the police had
probable cause and exigent circumstances had existed, then even though the
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car could have been searched on the spot without a warrant (Carroll}, or
seized and taken to the station house and searched without a warrant
(Chambers), that the footlocker in the car would still require a warrant
before it could be searched because of its greater privacy interest. Or,
the second possibility: Is the opinion in Chadwick saying that because of
the facts presented it was not an automobile case and since there were no
exigent circumstances a warrant was required; thus leaving open the possibility
that if the footlocker was sufficiently connected with the vehicle it would
have become an automobile case; and therefore if exigent circumstances and
probable cause existed to search the vehicle,.then the locker also could
have been searched at the scene or later at the station house?
Unfortunately, the majority's final proposition serves only to totally
confuse the issue:
In our view, when no exigency is shown to support the need for an
immediate search, the Warrant Clause places the line at the point
where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive
domain of police authority. Respondents were therefore entitled
to the protection of the Warrant Clause with the evaluation of a
...
neutral magistrate, before thei5 5privacy interests in the contents
of the footlocker were invaded.
,
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Again, by negative inference the Court seems to imply that if exigent
circumstances had existed the result may be indeed different. Carroll and
Chambers only allow warrantless automobile searches· when both probable cause
and exigent circumstances (the dynamic duo) are present. Hypothetically,
~then .containers in vehicles could be fully searched without a warrant whenever
._,.
the automobile exception is in full force. But the Court saturated the
entire opinion in Chadwick discussing the omnipotent privacy interests in
luggage! Without overly editorializing, this author found the majority
opinion in Chadwick to be ambiguous, vague, and virtually worthless.
Professor LaFave is equally puzzled with the application of Chadwick
to automobiles:
As the Supreme Court put it, the district court "saw the relationship between the footlocker and Chadwick's automobile as merely
coincidental." It is fair to say, therefore, that Chadwick does
not settle the question of whether containers in a car may be
searched in an otherwise lawful warrantless search of a vehicle;
a majority of the Court has neither embraced nor repudiated the
claim of the Chadwick dissenters that "if the agents had postponed
the arrest just a few minutes longer until the respondents started
to drive away, then the car could have been seized, taken to the
agent's office, and all its contents--including the footlocker-searched without a warrant. u56
16
Yes, the dissenters, Blackmun joined by Rehnquist, were more than
subtly cynical of the majority's position in Chadwick. But what is the
answer? The majority, jumping on the strained nexus between the footlocker
and the vehicle, ducked the issue. The result was total confusion and the
1979 case of Arkansas v. Sanders. 57
In Sanders, Little Rock, Arkansas, police officers placed the airport
under surveillance acting upon a reliable informant's tip that a suspect
would arrive on a flight and retrieve a green suitcase containing marijuana.
The suspect picked up the suitcase from the airline's luggage service and
placed it in the trunk of a taxicab. The police, apparently briefed on the
Chadwick decision, waited until the taxi began to drive away before they
pulled it over. Upon the officer's request,the
taxi driver opened the
_.....
trunk and the policemen seized and opened the unlocked suitcase. The
officers discovered marijuana. At his state court trial, the defendant
moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the suitcase, contending the
search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court upheld the
lawfulness of the search and the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the conviction, ruling that the trial
court should have suppressed the evidence because it was obtained through
an unlawful search of the suitcase. On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
Justice Powell delivered the opinion for a majority of the Court.
The Court first defined the issue:
This case presents the question whether, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant before
searching luggage taken SSom an automobile properly stopped and
searched for contraband.
(emphasis added)
From the first lines of the opinion, it appeared that the Court was contradicting itself. The majority stated that the automobile was properly stopped
and searched for contraband--thus implying under the Carroll-Chambers rule
that both probable cause and exigent circumstances were present. But the
Court said the issue was whether police could search luggage taken from an
automobile in the absence of exigent circumstances. The Court seemed to be
saying that while ·an exigency may exist to search the vehicle and even seize
it, no exigency is present regarding the enclosed container. This appears
to be a non sequitu~-it does not follow that emergency conditions exist to
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search the person, but not his pockets. The real issue the Court should
have addressed, since the vehicle fell within the exigent circumstances
doctrine, is whether in the presence of emergency conditions the police
are required to obtain a warrant before searching luggage~in an othe~~ise
permissible setting for a warrantless search of the vehicle. Unless the
Court is of the opinion, and as Sanders goes on to show they are, that
exigencies for automobiles (effects) and containers (effects) are to be
treated as two distinct phenomena, even when they are combined within the
same act, transaction, or occurrence.
The Sanders majority confessed.. they granted
certiorari due to the
.
confusion surrounding the Chadwick decision. Applying the facts in Sanders,
the Court found that the police did indeed have the requisite probable cause
to believe contraband was present in the taxi and were acting prudently to
stop the vehicle, search 'it, and seize the suitcase. The majority reasoned
that if the police after seizing the suitcase, had taken it to the station
house, and waited for a warrant before searching it, then everything would
have been constitutionally permissible. The Court stated:
A lawful search of luggage generally may be performed only pursuant
to a warrant. In Chadwick, we declined an invitation to extend
the Carroll exception to all searches of luggage, noting that
neither of the two policies supporting warrantless searches of
automobiles applies to luggage. Here, as in Chadwick, the officers
had seized the luggage and had it exclusively within their control
at the time of the search. Consequently, there was not the slightest
danger that the luggage or its contents could have been removed
before a valid search warrant could be obtained.59
The State had argued the search was proper, "not because the property
searched was luggage, but rather because it was taken from an automobile
60
lawfully stopped and searched on the street."
In effect, the State would have us extend Carroll to allow
warrantless searches of everything found within an automobile,
as well as of the vehicle itself . . . This Court has not had
occasion previously to rule on the constitutionality of a
warrantless search of luggage taken from an automobile lawfully
stopped. Rather, the decisions to d~te have involved searches
of some integral part of the automob1le.6 1
The Court cited cases dealing with the integral parts of automobiles
including glove compartments, passenger compartments, trunks, and behind
the upholstery of seats. The Court then held:
A closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as mobile
as the vehicle in which it rides. But as we noted in Chadwick,
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the exigency of mobility must be assessed at the point immediately
before the search--after the police have seized the object to be
searche~ and have it securely within their control. Once police
~ave se1zed a suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its mobility
1s no way affected by the place from which it is taken. Accordingly,
as a general rule there is no greater need for warrantless searches
of lugga ge taken from automobiles than of luggage taken from other
places. 62
The majority seems to be saying, in the area of containers, the exigency
of mobility becomes eradicated at the point it is safely within the custody
of the police. The Court did not recognize any difference between the privacy
interest in a suitcase which had been taken from an automobile and one
taken from a variety of other places.
0ne is not less inclined to place
private, personal possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase is
to be carried in an automobile rather than transported by other means or
temporarily checked or stored ... 63 The Court stated forcefully:
Accordingly, the reasons for not requiring a warrant for the search
of an automobile do not apply to searches of personal luggage taken
by police from automobiles. We therefore find no justification for
the extension of Carroll and its progeny to the warrantless search
of one's personal luggage merely because it was in an automobile
lawfully stopped by the police.64
Sanders does have the advantage of creating a rule: a suitcase may be
lawfully seized without a warrant from an automobile if the requisite probable
cause and exigent circumstances exist, but before it can be searched a
warrant must be issued by a neutral magistrate. However, the opinion does
have its shortcomings; specifically, does the new rule extend to all containers
in automobiles, or just those which are universally accepted as private
repositories for personal effects? In a well reasoned dissent in Sanders,
Justice Blackmun joined by Rehnquist lays a heavy verbal assault upon the
majority:
The Court today goes farther down the Chadwick road, undermines the
automobile exception, and, while purporting to clarify the confusion
occasioned by Chadwick, creates in my view, only greater difficulties
for law enforcement officers, for prosecutors, for those suspected of
criminal activity, and, of course, for the courts themselves. Still
hanging in limbo, and probably soon to be litigated, are the briefcase, the wallet, the package, the paper bag, and every other kind
of container.6~
The dissenters agree with the State's argument in both Chadwick and
Sanders; if contraband may be searched without a warrant, then luggage and
other containers deserve the same treatment. Blackmun argues:
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The luggage, like the automobile transporting it, is mobile. And
the e~pe~t~tion of privacy in a suitcase found in the car is probably
not s1gn1f1cantly greater than the expectation of privacy in a locked
glov~ compartment or trunk •.• Moreover, the additional protection
provlded_by a search warrant will be minimal. Since the police, by
hypothes1s, have probable cause to seize the property, we can assume
that a warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming
majority of cases.66
Although the search incident to arrest doctrine is beyond the scope of
this work, the following excerpt from Blackmun's dissent in Sanders is valuable
in pointing out how confusing the law for warrantless searches of automobiles
has become:
The impractical nature of the Court's line drawing is brought into
focus if one places himself in the position of the policeman confronting an automobile that properly has been stopped. In approaching
the vehicle and its occupants, the officer must divide the world of
personal property into three groups. If there is probable cause to
arrest the occupants, then under Chimel v. California, he may search
objects within the occupant's immediate control, with or without
probable cause. If there is probable cause to search the automobile
itself, then under Carroll arid Chambers the entire interior area of
the automobile may be searched, with or without a warrant. But under
Chadwick and the present case, if any suitcase-like object is found
in the car outside the immediate control area of the occupants, it
cannot be searched, in the absence of exigent circumstances, without
a warrant . • . Or suppose the arresting officer opens the car's
trunk and finds that it contains an array of containers--an orange
crate, a lunch bucket, an attache case, a dufflebag, a cardboard box,
a backpack, a totebag, and a paper bag. Which of these may be searched
irrmediately, and which are so "personal" that jhey must be impounded
for future search only pursuant to a warrant? 6
Professor LaFave believes the essence to Chadwick and Sanders is:
"a warrant is needed to search a container found in
, a vehicle only when the
container is one that generally serves as a repository for personal effects
or that has been sealed in a manner manifesting a reasonable expectation
68
that the cont~nts will not be open to public scrutiny."
Part of LaFave's
analysis must rest on what the Court said in footnote 13 in the Sander's
majority opinion:
Not all containers and packages found by police during the course
of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun
case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation
of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward
appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will
be open to "plain view .. thereby obviating the need for a warrant.69
Obviously, such irrational line drawing, utterly devoid of any practical
utility, could not last for long. The Court had to go one way or the other,
20
and in 1981\in Robbins v. California, 70 a plurality op1n1on implemented
a blanket warrant requirement on containers-~all containers. In Robbins,
California Highway Patrol officer~ stopped an individual's station wagon
because he had been driving erratically. The officers smelled marijuana
and placed the suspect under arrest. They then opened the tailgate of the
station wagon, discovered the luggage compartment and found two packages
wrapped in green opaque plastic. The officers opened the packages and
discovered they contained several bricks of marijuana. The defendant moved
to suppress the evidence but was convicted in his state court trial. The
California Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the warrantless search was permissible as the officers could have inferred the packages
contained marijuana due to their outward appearance. On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court reversed. Although unable to form a majority
opinion, five members of the Court agreed the search violated the Fourth
Amendment.
Justice Stewart authored the ·plurality opinion. He quickly struck
down the State's claim that the automobile exception justifies a search of
closed containers by relying on Chadwick and Sanders.
Those cases made cl~ar . . . that a closed piece of luggage found
in.a lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected to the
same extent as are closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else.
The respondent, however, proposes that the nature of a container
may diminish the constitutional protection to which it otherwise
would be entitled--that the Fourth Amendment protects only containers
•·used to transport persona 1 effects... By persona 1 effects the
respondent means property worn on or carried about the person or having
some intimate relation to the person.71
The plurality would have none of this--the Fourth Amendment protects
effects whether considered personal or impersonal. The crucial question,
according to the plurality, is whether the individual intended those effects
to be kept private, free from public scrutiny. 0nce placed within such a
container, a diary and a dishpan are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment ... 72 Once an individual intended an effect to be private by placing it
in a container, the kind of container he chose was simply irrelevant. In
Stewa r+' s words:
. . . even if one wished to import such a distinction into the
Fourth Amendment, it is difficult if not impossible to perceive
any objective criteria by which that task might be accomplished.
What one person may put into a suitcase, another may put into a
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~ap~r
bag. And as the disparate results in the decided cases
1nd1cate, no court, no constable, no citizen, can sensibly be
as~ed to dis~inguish the relative "privacy interests .. in a closed
su1tcase, br1efcase, portfolio, duffle bag, or box./3
The State then tried to argue that under footnote 13 of Sanders,
{which excluded certain containers from full Fourth Amendment protection),
the packages fell within the plain view exception. The California appellate
court had stated: "any experienced observer could have inferred from the
appearance of the packages that they contained bricks of rnarijuana." 74
The plurality struck down this contention also:
Expectations of privacy are established.by general social norms,
and to fall within the second exception.of the footnote in question
a container must so clearly announce its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its
contents are obvious to an observer. If indeed a green plastic
wrapping reliably indicates that a package could only contain
marijuana, that fact was not shown by the evidence . . • We reaffirm
today that such a container may not be opened without a warrant,
even if it is found during the course of the lawful search of an
automobile.75
··.
Justice Powell concurred·in the judgement stating that he could not
join the plurality as the new "bright line" went too far and was not supported
by prior decisions.
It would require officers to obtain warrants in order to examine
the contents of insubstantial containers in which no one had a
reasonable expectation of privacy . . • While the plurality's blanket
warrant requirement does not even purport to protect any privacy
interest, it would impose substantial new burdens on law enforcement.
Confronted with a cigar box or a ·Dixie cup in the course of a probable
cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the conscientious policeman would be required to take the object to a magistrate, fill out
the appropriate forms, await the decision, and finally obtain the
warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while the
warrant is sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer
from his normal police duties. Expenditure of such time and effort,
drawn from the public's limited resources for detecting or preventing
crimes, is justified when it protects an individual's reasonable
privacy interests •.• The aggregate burden of procuring warrants
whenever an officer has probable cause to search the most trivial
container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the advancement
of important Fourth Amendment v~~ues. The sole virtue of the
plurality's rule is simplicity.
It does appear that something is just not right with the Robbins
decision. The plurality has now carried Chadwick to its ultimate, but
unfortunately illogical~conclusion. The Court has gone away from the
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general societal definition of expectations of privacy and has replaced
it with an individual's definition of his expectation of privacy. The
difference is that between an accepted societal norm and an individual's
intention. Luggage, by its very definition and character.exemplifies on
J
its face an expectation of privacy. The same cannot be said of a Dixie
cup or package of gum. The problem is that no line can be drawn; it is
a short step down from the suitcase to the briefcase, but the downward
spiral conceivably could continue to the gum package. Equal protection
must have also played a part in the plurality's opinion: while the Chadwick
Court probably had the image of the individual's expectations of privacy
in his American Tourister three-suiter in mind, how could the Court give
him full Fourth Amendment protection and not the less fortunate individual
who carried his valuables in a Safeway grocery bag? However, the important
state interests in efficient law enforcement could ill afford to play this
game of semantics, and it was not long before the words of Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting in Robbins became a reality .
.i)
I would return to the rationale of Chadwick and Chambers and hold
that a warrant should not be required to seize and search any
personal property found in an automobile that may in turn be
constitutionally seized and searched without a warrant. I would
not abandon this reasonably 11 bright line 11 in search of another.77
It turned out that the Robbins dissneters did not have long to wait.
On June 1st, 19S2, the Court decided United States v. Ross. 78 In Ross,
:District of Columbia police officers acting upon an informant's tip that
the defendant was selling drugs out of his car, drove to the location,
stopped the car and arrested Ross. During a search at the scene, an officer
discovered a closed paper bag in the trunk of the car. Without a warrant,
the officer opened the paper bag and found that it contained heroin. The
officer drove the defendant's car to police headquarters where another
warrantless search of the trunk revealed a zippered leather pouch which
contained $3,200 in cash. In Federal District Court Ross moved to suppress
the evidence; his motion was denied and a conviction followed. The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that while the officers had probable cause
to stop and search the car--including the trunk--without a warrant, they
were constitutionally forbidden to search either the paper bag or the pouch
without a warrant. The Court of Appeals stated their reasons for reversing
Ross's conviction:
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No s~ecific, well-delineated exception called to our attention
perm1ts the police to dispense with a warrant to open and search
.. unworthy container,s. Moreover, we believe that a rule under
which the validity of a warrantless search would turn on judgements
about the durability of a container would impose an unreasonable and
unmanageable burden on police and courts. For these reasons and
b~cause the Fourth Amendment protects all persons, not just those
w1th the resources or fastidiousness to place their effects in
containers that decisionmakers would rank in the luggage line,
we hold that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement forbids the
warrantless opening of a closed, opaque paper bag to the same
extent that it forbids the warrantless opening of a small unlocked
suitcase or a zippered leather pouch./9
The majority opinion for the Supreme Co~rt was delivered by Justice
Stevens. He was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist,
and O'Connor. With the retirement of Justice Stewart, and the addition of
Justice O'Connor, the dissenters in the Chadwick-Sanders-Robbins line of
cases now had a majority vote. From the Court's statement of the issue in
Ross, it became evident that a change was forthcoming:
(The issue is) the extent to which police officers who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to
believe that contraband is concealed somewhere within it--may
conduct a probing search of compartments and containers within
the vehicle whose contents are not in plain view.80
Ross was to be a scope decision; instead of delineating what kind of containers
deserved protection, the Court set out to define how far a search could extend.
For the Court realized the Court of Appeals' decision to reverse Ross's conviction had merit. It had become impossible to distinguish under Fourth
Amendment analysis, which containers were worthy of protection and which
were not. The time for clarification for all facets of the criminal justice
system had arrived.
For countless vehicles are stopped on highways and public streets
everyday and our cases demonstrate that it is not uncommon for
police officers to have probable cause to believe that contraband
may be found in a stopped vehicle. In every such case a conflict
is presented between the individual's constitutionally protected
interest in grivacy and the public interest in effective law
enforcement.81
The Court then began to lay its foundation for a new rule concerning
warrantless automobile search and se1zures. First, they relied on Carroll
and that the logic behind that decision applies as easily to 1982 automobile
cases as it did in 1925: The rationale justifying a warrantless search of
an automobile that is believed to be transporting contraband arguably applies
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with equal force to any movable container that is believed to be carrying
82
an 1.11.1c1•t su bs t ance. u
Now the Court agreed with Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Robbins:
• • . ~he controlling question should be the scope of the automobile
except1on to the warrant requirement . . . a future case might present
a better opportunity for thorough consideration of the basic principles
in this troubled area.83
As the majority says in Ross, 11 the case has arrived ... Many observers
feel that the case should have arrived with Chadwick, or Sanders, or Robbins.
However, the Court with all its grace and elusiveness, tells us that Ross
is really a case of first impression:
Unlike Chadwick and Sanders, in this case (Ross) police officers had
probable cause to search respondent's entire vehicle. Unlike Robbins,
in this case the parties have squarely addressed the question whether,
in the course of a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile,
police are entitled to open containers found within the vehicle.
We now address that question. Its answer is determined by the scope
of the search that is authorized a~ the exception to the warrant
requirement set forth in Carroll.
The Court then reviewed a number of cases to determine what the scope
had been in the past. The Carroll search was found reasonable even though
federal agents were allowed to tear open the upholstery of the car itself.
The Ross majority stated that in Carroll:
the scope of the search was no
greater than a magistrate could have authorized by issuing a warrant based
on the probable cause that justified the search ... 85 In the Chambers station
house search, the police found evidence which was concealed in a compartment
under the dashboard.
No suggestion was made that the scope of the search (in Chambers)
was impermissible. It would be illogical to assume that the outcome
of Chambers--or the outcome of Carroll itself--would have been
different if the police had found the secreted container enclosed
within a secondary container and had opened that container without
a warrant. If it was reasonable for prohibition agents to rip open
the upholstery in Carroll, it certainly would have been reasonable
for them to look into a burlap sack stashed inside; if it was
reasonable to open the concealed compartment in Chambers, it would
have been equally reasonable to open a paper bag crumpled within it.
A contrary rule could produ~e absurd results inconsistent with the
decision in Carroll itself.86
By this time, things began to get rather dim for Mr. Ross and his
paper bag filled with heroin. For the Ross Court by resurrecting the Carroll
rule, mentioned part of the holding in that case which had been shuffled
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under the rug in Chadwick-Sanders- and Robbins. In Carroll the scope of a
probable cause warrantless search extended to contraband goods concealed
within a vehicle. Besides the obvious concealed parts of an automobile
itself--glove compartments, trunks, etc.--where else to conceal contraband
than movable containers? As the Ross Court explained: Contraband goods
rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a car; since by their very
nature such goods must be withheld from public view, they rarely can be
placed in an automobile unless they are enclosed within some form of container ... 87 Upon this basis, the Court is really implying that Carroll
itself permitted the search of containers. For the same exigency presented
.
during the Carroll era--discovery of prohibited alcohol--is present today,
specifically furthering the goals of efficient law enforcement. The majority
felt the practical effect of Carroll would be destroyed if a legitimate
warrantless search for contraband did not include a search of containers
found during the course of such a search. As Justice Stevens noted:
the
decision in Carroll merely relaxed the requirements for a warrant on grounds
of impracticability. It neither broadened nor limited the scope of a lawful
search based on probable cause ... 88
When a legitimate search is underway, and when its purpose and its
limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between
closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, or between
glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages,
in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt
and efficient completion of the task at hand. This rule §PPlies
equally to all containers, as indeed we believe it must. 8
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With that statement, the Robbins decision died, and for all practical
purposes the eulogy was given for Sanders. From this point on, no distinctions
will be drawn as to whether a suitcase deserves more protection than a
package or a paper bag; any container that is the object of a legitimate
search is susceptible to such a search without a warrant. The Court did
remember Justice Stewart's statement in Robbins that the Fourth Amendment
provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its
contents from plain view ... 90 However, the majority argued on how different
situations create different expectations of privacy and greater or lesser
•
Fourth Amendment protection:
The luggage carried by a traveler entering the country may be
searched at random by a customs officer; the luggage may be
searched no matter how great the traveler's desire to conceal
the contents may be. A container carried at the time of arrest
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ofte~ ~ay be ~e~rched without a warrant and even without any
spec1f1c susp1c1on concerning its contents. A container that
may concea~ the.object of a search authorized by a warrant may
b: opened 1mmed1ately; the individual's interest in privacy must
g1ve way to the magistrate's official determination of probable
cause. 91
The Court reasoned in the light of the above statement that an individual's
Jrivacy interest in respect to his vehicle and containers within it may have
to yield when faced with probable cause he is iilegally carrying contraband.
\s Carroll allowed an officer with probable cause to rip open the seats-~n obvious and flagrant infringement of privacy--how can the glove compartment,
the trunk, the suitcase, or the paper bag expect more? With such an analysis,
largely based on the definite revitalization and arguably extension of
Carroll itself, the majority in Ross deliver~d its holding, a new rule
regarding warrantless searches of automobiles.
The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no
narrower--and no broader--than the scope of a search authorized by
a warrant supported by probable cause. Only the prior approval of
the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise is as the magistrate
could authorize. The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile
thus is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search
and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may
be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower
may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an
upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens
are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search
of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed in
the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify
a search of the entire cab . . . . • . • • . • • . . . . • . . • . .
If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle,
it justifies the search of every part of t~2 vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search.
Mr. Ross, the heroin pushing respondent, with his conviction reinstated,
was not the only critic of the Ross decision. Justice Marshall dissented,
a part of which follows:
The majority today not only repeals all realistic limits on
warrantless automobile searches, it repeals the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement itself. By equating a police officer's
estimation of probable cause with a magistrate's, the Court
utterly disregards the value of a neutral and detached magistrate.
11
11
.................................
The Court derives satisfaction from the fact that its rule does
not exalt the rights of the wealthy over the rights of the poor.
A rule so broad that all citizens lose vital Fourth Amendment
protection is no cause for celebration.93
27
In conclusion, the Court has had to make some very difficult constitutional law decisions in trying to create a peaceful co-existence between the
automobile and the Fourth Amendment. However, that is the function of the
Supreme Court.
As the cases illustrate, automobiles and the Fourth Amend.,
ment are natural antagonists. The Court was forced to promulgate the
"automobile exception .. rather than lose incriminating evidence. As with any
'
exception, problems mount when courts try to define i~ without straying too
far from the rule. The ideal is to accord automobiles as much protection
as possible and yet realize to have a workable rule the mainstays of the
Fourth Amendment may have to bend. Chadwick-Sanders and Robbins applied too
much Fourth Amendment protection and created havoc fo'r 1aw enforcers and the
courts. Ross may have gone too far the other way. But Ross is a step in the
right direction; the Court has revived and extended a rule that is possible
for the entire criminal justice system to understand and apply.
28
Footnotes
1
50 L.W. 4580 (1982).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3
433 U.S. 1, 97 S.CT. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977).
4
433 u.s. 1 ' 12' 13.
5
232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).
6
367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
7
347 u.s. 62 (1954).
8
347 u.s. 62, 64-65.
9
267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).
10
267 U.S. 132, at 146.
11 Id at 146-147.
12 Idat147.
13 Id at 149.
14 Id at 153.
15 Id at 154.
16 Id at 156.
17 Id at 158-159.
1897 U.S. 642, 24 L.Ed. 1035.
19 97 u.s. 642, 645.
20 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970).
~ 1 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964).
22 376 u.s. 364, 367.
23 399 U.S. 42, at 47-48.
24 Id at 50.
25 Id at 51.
26Id.
27Id.
28 Id at 52.
29 Id at 53. n. 10.
30 Id at 53.
31 397 U.S. 249, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970~.
32 w. LaFave, Search and Seizure~ 7.2, at 513, Vol 2 (1978).
33:;" ==
.
399 U.S. 42, at 65.
34Annot., 26 L.Ed.2d 893, 907 (1970).
== ---
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•
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29
35
403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
36
403 U.S. 443, at 462-463.
37 Id at 527.
38
417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974).
39
417 U.S. 583, at 589.
40
387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967).
41
417 U.S. 583, at 589-590.
42 Id at 590.
43 389 U.S. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).
44 389 u.s. 391.
45 417 U.S. 583, at 591-592.
46 Id at 593.
47 Id at 595-596.
48 w. LaFave, Search and Seizure~ 7.2, at 516-517, Vol 2 (1978).
49:" =
=
423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 394, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975).
50 423 U.S. 67, at 68.
51 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977).
52 433 U.S. 1, at 4.
53 Id at 7-10.
54 Id at 12-13.
55 Id at 15-16.
56 w. La Fave, Search and Seizure~ 7.2, at 538-9, Vol 2 (1978).
51;; .
: 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979).
58 442 U.S. 753, at 754.
59 Id at 762.
60Id.
61 Id at 763.
62 Id at 764.
:;
63Id.
64 Id at 765.
65 Id at 769-770.
66Id.
67 Id at 771-772.
68 w. LaFave, Search and Seizure~ 7.2 at Supp. p. 149-150, Vol 2 (1978).
69"; -442 U.S. 753, at 765 n. 13.
70
U.S. ---, 69 L.Ed.2d 744, 101 S.Ct. _ , (1981 ).
30
71
69 L.Ed.2d 744, at 750.
72
Id at 751.
73Id.
74
103 Ca1.App.3d 34, at 40.
75
69 L.Ed.2d 744, at 752.
76 Id at 752.
77 Id at 761.
78
50 L.W. 4580 (1982).
79 Id at 4582.
80
1d at 4581.
81 1d at 4582.
82 1d at 4583.
83 1d at 4585.
84 1d at 4585-4586.
85 1d at 4586.
861d.
871d.
881d.
89 1d at 4586-4587.
90 1d at 4587.
91 ld.
92 1d at 4587-4588 .
. 93 1d at 4588, 4592.
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