Chapter Seventeen
The Popularisation of Tea: East India Companies, Private Traders, Smugglers and the
Consumption of Tea in Western Europe, 1700-17601
Chris Nierstrasz
Introduction
In the Seventeenth Century, tea was still considered a luxury in Europe. A century
later, it had become a popular drink within reach of all layers of society, at least in many
parts of Western Europe. In this development, the opening of direct trade in 1713 between
Europe and Canton—the only Chinese port where tea was sold to the European East India
companies—has traditionally been seen as a critical step. Nonetheless, the English East India
Company had already come to the conclusion that ‘tea was an article of general
consumption in England’ as early as 1705.2 Even in the absence of a precise date for the
take-off of popular consumption, the explosive growth of tea imports following the
establishment of direct trade with Canton is impressive. Tea imports grew exponentially as
the Dutch (VOC) and English (EIC) East India companies, established players in the tea trade,
expanded their trade under pressure of competition from new entrants, such as the Ostend,
Swedish, Danish, and French Companies. However, a study that focuses solely on quantities
has strong limitations. Therefore, rather than focusing merely on the quantities of tea
imported by the East India companies in this period--the traditional approach taken by
existing scholarship on the globalization of the tea trade--this chapter adopts a broader
approach, which also takes into account the qualities or types of tea which were traded at
the time. The chapter will make a distinction between different kinds of tea, focusing
especially on the role of Bohea, a cheap black tea preferred by poor consumers in Europe. In
addition, I will argue that ‘fringe groups’ or those who have been regarded as ‘small players’
in the tea trade, including the Ostend and Scandinavian companies, private traders and
smugglers, were essential for the popularisation of tea consumption in Europe.
1
The popularisation of tea: Increasing imports and new entrants
The increasing quantities of tea imported to Western Europe signaled its
popularisation throughout society. Previous literature has linked the drop in the price of tea
in Europe to the growth of consumption and the establishment of direct trade with Canton. 3
This interpretation has recently been challenged, within a more general discussion about
the impact of Asian goods on European markets before the transport revolution in the
Nineteenth Century. Historians such as Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson have argued
that all Asian trade to Europe entailed the high shipping costs associated with sailing ships.
As a consequence, this trade has to be viewed as, in essence, a trade in luxuries, only
available to the rich few.4 Rather than focusing, as Williamson and O’Rourke have done, on
all these ‘luxuries’—or on Dutch cloves, pepper, coffee and British textiles—, this chapter
will focus on one specific commodity: tea. Other studies have pointed to evidence of
popular consumption of tea. It has been argued that evidence of such popularization of
consumption cannot only be found in the convergence of prices of tea, but also in the
studies of probate inventories. These inventories demonstrate that around 1730 utensils
used for the preparation of tea were even widespread among the poorest of the poor in the
Dutch Republic.5 These conclusions are further underlined by Blondé and Rijckbosch in their
contribution to this volume. Discussing the consumption of hot drinks in Flanders, they
show that tea was drunk throughout all layers of society and that it had even become a daily
routine for many citizens.
That the consumption of tea became popular at some point in time in the first part
of the Eighteenth Century seems indisputable, but determining how this happened is a
different matter. It is quite clear from the records of the chief importers of tea, the VOC and
EIC, that imports grew due to several innovations in trade. In the Seventeenth Century, both
companies struggled to bring back tea, let alone increase the amount sent home. As no
European company had direct access to China, tea was obtained through Asian middlemen.
Only the VOC was able to obtain a stable, albeit limited, supply of tea for Europe from the
2
Chinese junks that made their way to Batavia in search of pepper. In fact, it was the
successful import of Dutch tea into England that pushed the EIC to open direct trade with
China, via Canton.
The opening of direct trade to Canton by the EIC has often been seen as a significant
moment in the popularisation of tea, because it is thought to have enhanced efficiency since
it allowed a direct exchange between tea and silver. However, instead of focusing on how
direct trade helped to popularise the consumption of tea, this debate evolved into a
discussion about which company became most efficient in the tea trade after this change. I
would however argue that we need to take into account the combined trade of several
different companies, rather than focusing on only one, in order to fully understand the
establishment of a mass market for tea. From this perspective, the most important event
was the entrance into the market of a number of new traders, such as the French, Ostend,
Danish and Swedish companies.6 As the number of competitors increased, the VOC and EIC
were forced to expand their direct trade and to import more and more tea in order to
discourage their competition from importing more tea.
From the evidence of the sales records of the VOC, it is clear that a steep decrease in
the sales price of tea occurred on the Dutch market between 1713 and 1735. The fall in
prices followed an ‘up-and-down’ pattern, in which the downward tendency of prices
coincided with several vital moments. These vital moments included the establishment of
the Canton system which, in addition to the Dutch, also attracted the French and the English
companies; and the arrival of new entrants trading directly with Canton, including the
Ostend Company (active 1724-1727), the Swedish East India Company (active from 1731)
and the Danish East India Company (active from 1732).7 These price drops should not be
solely attributed to the arrival of the new companies. The VOC and EIC, in pre-emptive
strikes against their competitors, increased imports as soon as they heard a new company
wished to enter the trade. These changes point to the link between the growth of
consumption on the one hand, and an increase in supply and a decrease in price on the
other. To understand the drop in prices in Europe, we need to understand the varieties of
tea these companies actually traded in.
3
The popularisation of tea: Different flavours and different markets
An examination of the varieties of tea traded in the Eighteen Century offers new
ways of understanding how the consumption of tea in Europe changed. The present-day
distinction between green and black tea, or unfermented and fermented tea, already
existed in the Eighteenth Century. This distinction is the result of different treatment of the
leaves of the tea plant (Camellia sinensis). The black tea types Pekoe, Souchong, Congou and
Bohea and the green types Hyson, Bing and Singlo were most common in the cargos of the
European ships returning from China. Among the green tea types, Hyson ranked above Bing.
Singlo was the lowest quality of green tea types. Likewise Pekoe and Souchong were the
highest quality of black tea types, followed by Congou and finally Bohea.
Apart from a general decline in sales prices in Europe due to the increase in supply,
the spread of consumption was also facilitated by a drop in the purchase price of tea in
Canton. In the early period (1713-1730), these prices dropped in value two to three times on
average.8 This often overlooked factor in the popularisation of tea was due to changes in the
production of tea, as Chinese producers switched to more professional and capital-intensive
ways of organising tea cultivation.9 The decline in prices at Canton was not spread equally
across different kinds of tea. Chinese merchants in Canton considered black and green tea
to be separate commodities. This was due to the fact that they were produced and
processed in different areas, and were traded exclusively by merchants from these regions.
Unfermented or green tea was preferred in Asia. However, for long-distance trade, black
tea, with its fermented leaves, was a more suitable product. The Chinese had only started
considering black tea an item for export when European merchants arrived in their ports.10
Figure 21.1: EIC Purchase price of Green tea (Hyson, Singlo and Bing) in Canton,
1715-1760 (in pounds sterling per lb weight)
4
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
Hyson
0.08
Singlo
0.06
Bing
0.04
0.02
0
Source: British Library (BL), L/AG/1/6/8-14
5
Figure 21.2: EIC Purchase price of Black tea (Bohea, Congou, Pekoe and Souchong) in
Canton, 1715-1760 (in pounds sterling per lb weight)
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
Bohea
0.08
Congou
0.06
Pekoe
Souchong
0.04
0.02
0
Source: BL, L/AG/1/6/8-14
K. N. Chaudhuri has clearly established that the prices of tea dropped two or three
times in the early period (1713-1730), but he did not differentiate between different
varieties of tea. According to the data presented here, the consumption of tea in Europe
was particularly stimulated by a drop in prices of all black tea in Canton, while green tea
remained relatively expensive. A study of the purchase prices of the EIC show that while all
green tea types maintained a stable price,black tea types decreased between three to five
times across the board. In other words, the general drop in the price of tea was in actual
fact exclusive to black tea types. The drop is noticeable throughout the whole range of black
teas, from the high quality Pekoe to the low quality Bohea. Before this shift in prices, the
cheapest green tea, Singlo, was less expensive than the cheapest black tea, Bohea.11 After
the reduction in price, Bohea swiftly became the tea European consumers wanted in big
quantities, a fact that illuminates the connection between popular consumption in Europe
and price drops in China in the early Eighteenth Century. 12
6
The different companies adapted their import strategies to suit the growing demand
for cheap black tea, a process which took different amounts of time in different parts of
Europe. The Ostend Company revolutionized the tea trade by dealing predominantly in
cheap black Bohea tea, sometimes importing only this type.13 Threatened, the Dutch and
English forced the Ostend Company out of business. At first, the tea normally bought by the
Ostend Company was left unsold in Canton. When the VOC established direct trade with
China in 1728, it quickly moved into predominantly buying Bohea. In this way, the
composition of Dutch tea import to Europe changed; Bohea became the main type
imported.14 The Ostend/Dutch example was soon followed by the Swedish, Danish and the
French companies in the 1730s and 1740s. The EIC was the only company to adopt a
different strategy, by trying to corner the market in green tea instead--a plan that failed.15
The EIC only started to concentrate on Bohea tea after 1745; meanwhile, the popular
market for tea in England was left open for its competitors to grab.16
Figure 21.3: Bohea and other tea in the return cargo of the EIC, 1715-1760 (in per
cent of the total cargo of tea)
100
80
60
40
Other tea
20
Bohea
Source: BL, L/AG/1/6/8-14
7
1760
1757
1754
1751
1748
1745
1742
1739
1736
1733
1730
1727
1724
1721
1715
1718
0
Figure 21.4: Bohea and other tea in the return cargo of the VOC, 1715-1760 (in per
cent of the total cargo of tea)
100
80
60
40
Other tea
20
Bohea
1758
1755
1752
1749
1746
1743
1740
1737
1734
1731
1728
1722
1725
1719
1716
1710
1713
0
Source: NA, VOC, 6989 (1700-1742) and Liu Yong, The Dutch East India Company’s
Tea Trade with China, 1757-1781 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), Appendix 4 (1742-1794).
Tea and Smuggling: Taxation and freedom of trade
It is particularly surprising that it took the EIC 20 years to alter its trade and pursue
the same strategy as virtually all the other companies, since the main market for Bohea tea
was in Britain. So why did the EIC follow a different strategy?
When we compare the quantities of tea imported by the VOC, and the price the tea
sold for on the Dutch market, with the equivalent figures for the EIC, something remarkable
becomes apparent. Both companies brought back similar total amounts of tea, but the EIC
sales of tea brought in considerably higher amounts of money: it received between one and
a half to two times as the VOC for its tea. Although we know that the EIC was relatively
more engaged in the trade of expensive tea in the early Eighteenth Century, this alone
cannot account for the large difference in sales prices.
8
The answer lies in the different policies adopted by the British state and the Dutch
Republic towards the trade with Asia. While the Dutch Republic kept taxation on imports
low in order to encourage trade, the British state taxed import heavily in order to increase
the income of the state. In the case of the EIC, import duties were first paid to the Company
at the point of sale of the tea, by the buyers. The EIC then deducted the total duties to the
state from what it had earned at the sale. The duty on tea at the sale, plus the further excise
imposed on consumption after the sale, meant that the rate of taxation on tea in Britain
could exceed 100 per cent of the net cost to the buyer.17 In other words, half of what the
British buyer paid for tea was import duties and excise. In contrast, the VOC hardly paid any
customs on arrival in the Republic and had special arrangements for the re-export of Asian
goods, so in the case of the VOC taxation is not reflected in the sales prices. 18
The general policy adopted by the British state in relation to the taxation of Asian
goods had a profound effect on the trade in tea. Instead of protecting the income of the
state against the increase in consumption of Asian goods at the expense of existing
products, which seems to have been the goal, this taxation meant that the EIC was slower to
develop and cater for non-luxury markets. The relatively small quantities of tea, particularly
of Bohea, imported by the EIC illustrates this. Since taxation came on top of the cost-price of
tea, tea was pushed out of the reach of more consumers. This left the lower end of the
British tea market open to agents willing to avoid taxation, and to deal in illicit tea. It also
gave several continental East India companies the opportunity to exist in, and even increase
their share of, the market, while the EIC imports stagnated in the 1730s and 1740s.
Tea and smuggling: Private trade from Asia
The VOC and its competitors were in a prime position to profit from the
opportunities generated by the English taxes on tea. However, for the VOC, expanding tea
imports was fraught with problems that it was unable to solve. In order not to lose ground
in the tea trade, the VOC found a solution that allowed it to import more tea at a profit,
without investing more of its resources. Surprisingly perhaps, the VOC found this solution in
allowing private trade to its servants and subjects in Asia.
9
Financially deeply invested in the spice trade, the VOC searched for alternatives in
order to expand its trade in tea without exporting more silver.19 Increasing the export of
silver to fuel trade proved impossible after 1736, as lending more silver meant the VOC ran
into structural debt.20 The problem of the limited amount of silver available for Canton was
partly resolved by using the control the VOC held over several spice-producing areas.
Instead of buying tea with silver in Canton, the VOC exchanged the silver for pepper, tin and
fine spices in Batavia; the demand for pepper and other spices in China had brought the
Chinese junks to Batavia in the first place. After 1728 the VOC partly by-passed its old
trading partners, and started exporting pepper and tin to Canton itself. These goods were in
demand and sold for a profit which could be used to purchase tea. However, a balance had
to be struck in order to optimise profit; over-supplying either the European or the Chinese
market threatened to reduce the profit. The VOC preferred to refrain from sending more
pepper to China in order to uphold its profitability, and to guarantee imports to Batavia.
However, when necessary, the trade in Batavia was sacrificed in order to support the trade
in pepper to China.
Although the measures taken by the VOC to increase trade had a positive effect, the
company still felt that there was further room to increase its tea imports to Europe. In order
to expand trade in tea further, the VOC took the unorthodox measure of allowing private
trade on its ships to Europe. In 1743, private traders from Batavia were allowed to invest
their money in tea on VOC ships for Europe. The VOC provided room on its ships in return
for a ‘recognition’ fee. This fee covered the costs of transport and was paid in recognition of
the VOC monopoly on trade to the Dutch Republic. Tea imported in this way was brought to
the Republic and sold at VOC auctions. Once sold, the VOC extracted a fee of between 30
per cent and 40 per cent on the sales value of the tea, and handed over the rest of the
money to the private traders. This private trade was very successful for ten years. The
private traders regularly imported more tea than the official VOC trade. Between 1745 and
1754, 10.44 million lb of tea imported on ‘recognition’ was sent to the Dutch Republic, while
the company itself sent only a little more: 11.39 million lb.21
10
Identifying all these goods simply as ‘tea’ would be misleading, as the VOC aimed for
different markets for its own tea and for the tea of the private traders. The VOC focused on
the more expensive tea it bought in Canton, while private traders had to content
themselves with cheap Bohea brought to Batavia by the Chinese junk trade. The latter was
tea that had not been sold in Canton, as not all tea had been purchased. Duties to the
Emperor had already been paid during the trading season, so traders and Chinese officials in
Canton had an interest in selling the leftover tea without imposing taxes, meaning
substantially lower purchase prices than during the trading season.22 As a consequence,
there were lower relative amounts of Bohea traded officially by the VOC, as the company
concentrated on the more expensive and luxurious varieties. In 1753, as it feared the
outbreak of war in Europe and did not want to send ships to Canton, the VOC was forced to
return to purchasing tea in Batavia. This tea, which normally would have been bought by
private traders, was now purchased by the VOC, leaving the private traders empty-handed
that year. The tea offered by the Chinese junks to the VOC was mostly Bohea, sold at
extraordinarily low prices.23 This was not unusual. The fact that it was low-quality, cheap tea
that was generally accepted on recognition from Batavia is further illustrated by remarks in
official company documents. The private traders were regularly warned that the VOC would
not accept tea on ‘recognition from private traders’ that sold for less than 20 stuivers per
Dutch pound of weight, which was considered to be the lowest price for the bottom of the
market. 24 This division of trade between the Company and private traders clearly
demonstrates how the latter came to play a crucial role in providing tea for popular
consumption in Europe.
The smuggling of Bohea tea into England has been strongly linked to the Dutch
Republic. This is unsurprising given the Dutch Republic’s geographical close proximity to
Britain, strong domestic market and large merchant fleet.25 The low taxation on the import
and export of tea in the Dutch Republic, and many other tea importing countries, meant
cheap black tea was available for smuggling. This black tea could be stored, albeit not for a
very long time, which meant that smugglers could acquire and sell the tea at opportune
moments.26 To the British authorities, the smuggling was a constant nuisance and a drain on
its income. More importantly, it also meant that the EIC started having problems supplying
11
the people who were willing to pay the taxes. In the 1740s, the English imports went into
steep decline. If the EIC was not able to supply the domestic market, who could resist
drinking smuggled tea?
Tea and smuggling: The British reply
A strong response was needed if the British state and the EIC were to avoid losing an
important source of revenue and trade to their competition. The situation became so
desperate that in 1745 the British government decided to sharply reduce the taxation on tea
in order to give the EIC tea sales a chance to recover.27
As the EIC found it impossible to meet demand in the short run, and in order to
provide their loyal customers with tea and prevent them from seeking suppliers among the
smugglers, the Company was obliged to import tea on license from the Dutch Republic. In
1747 and 1748, in order to address the short-term shortage of tea, the EIC Directors took
the unusual decision to license tea merchants to bring tea from Europe to Britain. The EIC
accepted the tea on license for a fee, and brought it over from the Dutch Republic. In both
years, the amount of tea imported reached well over one million imperial pounds (lb). The
tea was sold and the profit returned to the owners. For example, the first shipment of tea
by Gerrit Blaauw in July 1746 was bought for 656,789 Dutch guilders and sold at 993,697
guilders, indicating a profit of 51 per cent. Other shipments made by the same merchant
resulted in a profit of 72 per cent and 6 per cent. The dominant tea in all these shipments
was Bohea.
Protecting the home market was not enough: the EIC also had to find a way to
supply the domestic market with tea. In order to pay for this, the EIC augmented the exports
of silver to Asia. In the period between 1740 and 1747, the EIC exported 489,766 lb of silver
per year to Asia on average, while in the period 1747-1755 it exported on average 854,425
lb per annum.28 The composition of the EIC’s tea cargo changed dramatically as it followed
its competitors in pursuit of Bohea. After 1747, the imports of Bohea were drastically
12
increased, making it the variety imported in greatest quantity (See Figure 18.3). The EIC also
had to find an answer to the VOC’s enhancement of its imports of tea, through the use of
intra-Asian trade and its profits. In order to profit from Asian products, the EIC decided to
send out more ships to its Asian possessions to acquire goods for China. At the same time,
the EIC made sure that several of its ships and their silver still sailed directly to Canton, so
that these ships could start ordering the tea. The other ships would arrive later, but with
Asian merchandise that could be sold at a profit in Canton. The reaction of the VOC was to
expand direct investment in Canton by sending more Asian goods such as pepper and tin on
VOC ships. As a result, the whole system of the tea trade changed, and from that moment
onwards the competition for tea in Canton was fierce. In the wake of increasing competition
and higher volumes of tea purchased, the European companies witnessed a diminishing
return on their tea.
The import of more silver and Asian merchandise into Canton had a deep impact on
the trade in both Canton and Batavia. First of all, the price of silver and of Asian
commodities fell, leading to a deterioration of the trading position of all the companies
trading in pepper and tin, although the VOC must have been the main victim. However, it
remained worthwhile to pursue such a policy, as long as profits were still made. All these
developments struck a severe blow to the Chinese junk trade to Batavia. As more silver and
Asian goods were brought to Canton, Chinese traders had no need to look for goods in
Batavia. As the prices of these articles dropped in Canton, Chinese merchants had less
incentive to sail to Batavia to obtain these goods in exchange for tea. In consequence, the
Chinese junk trade to Batavia went into decline in the 1750s.29 The reaction of the VOC was
to increase the purchase of tea directly in Canton by establishing a committee to organize
such trade.
The decline of Chinese trade activity in Batavia signalled not only the decline of the
city. It also dealt a devastating blow to the Dutch private trade in tea to Europe. Only a few
years earlier, the private trade in tea from Batavia had given the VOC an advantage over its
competitors. However, as Chinese merchants started to avoid Batavia, the ‘recognition’
trade in tea dwindled into insignificance and only occasionally flared up. Chinese merchants
13
simply did not bring the same quantity of tea to Batavia as they used to, so the ‘recognition’
traders had none to buy. The import of recognition tea had certainly created a market for
cheap tea in England, but the decision of the EIC to buy more Bohea from 1745 brought this
trade to a halt within ten years. The VOC was doubly weakened by these events, as now it
also had to increase the investment of its own capital in Bohea tea. It had trouble obtaining
good tea from that moment, which heralded the end of a period in which the VOC and its
private traders dominated the tea trade. From then on, the EIC set out to catch up with the
other companies in the tea trade until it dominated the whole trade.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the combined trade of East India companies, private
traders and smugglers popularised the consumption of tea in Western Europe. The opening
of direct trade to Canton, and the participation of ever more East India companies in the
market for tea, made this trade highly competitive. The main competition aimed to
enlarging the trade in black tea, as a big drop in price in this variety offered new possibilities
for expansion. The EIC followed its competitors into the competition for Black tea in 1748,
20 years after the VOC had done so. In the years before 1748, the VOC had even doubled its
imports of tea by allowing private traders to import large amounts of cheap black tea from
Batavia in exchange for a fee. The reason why the EIC struggled in this competition was the
crippling imposition of high taxes on tea by the English state. Only after the state eventually
lowered taxation in 1745 the EIC started exporting more silver and applied the force of
intra-Asian trade to move into the market for cheap black tea. The increase in imports of
pepper and tin at Canton dealt a devastating blow to Batavia and its private trade to Europe.
Still, the smuggling of tea into England would continue for a long time after. Therefore, East
India companies, private traders and smugglers changed the rules of the game: different
factors worked together as triggers for the popularisation of tea consumption in Western
Europe.
14
1
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council
under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013)/ERC Grant Agreement
no. 249362. The title of the project directed by Professor Maxine Berg at Warwick University is
'Europe's Asian Centuries: Trading Eurasia 1600-1830'.
2
K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 388.
3
Chaudhuri, The Trading World, 388-9.
4
Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson, ‘When did Globalisation Begin?’ European Review of
Economic History, 6 (2002), pp. 23-50.
5
Jan de Vries, ‘The Limits of Globalisation in the Early Modern World’, Economic History Review, 63
(2010), pp. 721-722; Anne McCants, ‘Poor Consumers as Global Consumers: the Diffusion of Tea and
Coffee Drinking in the Eighteenth Century’, Economic History Review, 61, S.1 (2008), pp. 172-200;
John Burnett, Liquid pleasures: A Social History of Drinks in Modern Britain (London: Routledge,
1999), p. 52.
6
Philippe Haudrère, La Compagnie Française des Indes au XVII siècle (1719-1795) (Paris: Librairie de
l’Inde, 1989); C. Koninckx, The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Company (17311766) : a Contribution to the Maritime, Economic and Social History of North-Western Europe in its
Relationships with the Far East (Kortrijk: Van Ghemmert, 1980).
7
Dutch National Archives (NA), The Hague, VOC, 4589-4594.
8
British Library (BL), London, IOC, L/AG/1/6/8-14 and Chaudhuri, The Trading World, pp. 538-539,
Appendix 5, C.19.
9
Zhuang Guotu, ‘The Impact of the International Tea Trade on the Social Economy of Northwest
Fujian in the 18th Century’, in J.L. Blussé and F.S. Gaastra (eds), On the Eighteenth Century as a
Category of Asian history : Van Leur in Retrospect (Ashgate: Aldershot, 1998), pp. 193-210.
10
Liu Yong, The Dutch East India Company's Tea Trade with China, 1757-1781 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), p.
68.
11
BL, IOC, L/AG/1/6/8-14
12
Louis Dermigny, La Chine et l’Occident, le commerce à Canton au XVIII siècle, 1719-1833 (4 vols,
Paris, 1964), Vol. II.
13
Vol. 51, A 152, Östadsarkivet, Landsarkivet i Göteborg (Chris Östad archive, Country Archive of
Gothenburg). I would like to thank Hanna Hodacs for sharing this source with me.
14
NA, VOC, 6989.
15
Chaudhuri, The Trading World, pp. 391-392.
16
BL, IOC, L/AG/1/6/9-17 and BL, IOC, E/3/109/20, 22-4, 31-3, E/3/110/1a-b.2, 6 and 7a-c.
17
Chaudhuri, The Trading World, p. 393, n. 35; Hoh-Cheung and Lorna H. Mui, ‘“Trends in Eighteenth
Century Smuggling” Reconsidered’, The Economic History Review, 28 (1975), p.29.
18
A.C.J. Vrankrijker, Geschiedenis van de Belastingen (Bussum: Fibula-Van Dishoeck, 1969).
19
J. P. de Korte, De jaarlijkse financiële verantwoording in de VOC, Verenigde Oostindische
Compagnie (Leiden: Nijhoff, 1984) and Femme Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company: Expansion
and Decline (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003).
20
Femme Gaastra, Bewind en beleid bij de VOC : de financiële en commerciële politiek van de
bewindhebbers, 1672-1702 (Zutphen : Walburg Pers, 1989).
21
NA, VOC, 4589-4594.
22
Yong, The Dutch East India Company’s Tea Trade with, p. 4, map 1 and J.L. Blussé, ‘The VOC and
the Junk Trade to Batavia: A Problem in Administrative Control’, in Strange Company, Chinese
settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1986), p. 137.
23
Yong, The Dutch East India Company’s Tea Trade, pp. 212-5, Appendix 4.
15
24
J.A. van der Chijs (ed.), Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek. 1602 – 1811 (Batavia/The Hague:
Bataviaasch Genootschap, 1885 - 1900), deel V: 1743-1750, p. 618, 5 augustus 1749, Bekendmaking,
dat de Regering wederom thee ‘op vragt’ voor particulieren naar Nederland zoude overvoeren (5
August 1749, Announcement, that the High Government would once again transport tea on freight
for private traders to the Netherlands.)
25
Dermigny, La Chine et l’Occident, le commerce à Canton, Vol. II, pp. 673-74, 677-78; J. De Hullu,
‘Over den Chinaschen Handel der Oost-Indische Compagnie in de Eerste Dertig Jaar van de 18de
Eeuw’, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 73 (1917), p. 105;Kristof Glamann, DutchAsiatic Trade, 1620-1740 (Copenhagen: Danish Science Press, 1958), p. 213.
26
Hoh-Cheung Mui and Lorna M. Mui, ‘Smuggling and the British Tea Trade Before 1784’, American
Historical Review, 84 (1968), p. 44, n. 1, Dermigny, La Chine et l’Occident, le commerce à Canton, Vol.
II, pp. 673-4, 677-78; W.A. Cole, ‘Trends in Eighteenth-Century Smuggling,’ Economic History Review,
2nd Ser., 10 (1958), pp. 405-7.
27
Mui and Mui, ‘Eighteenth Century Smuggling’, p. 29.
28
Chaudhuri, The Trading world, p. 512, Appendix 5, Table C.4.
29
Blussé, Strange Company, p. 136.
16