Copyright 2010 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy
Vol. lO4
THE EFFECT OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALIZATION
ON MORAL REASONING: A REPL Y TO
PROFESSOR VISCHER AND PROFESSOR
WENDEL
Michael Hatfield'
INTRODUCTION
I am grateful to Professor Vischer and Professor Wendel for their responses to my essay, Professionalizing Moral Deference;! I learned a great
deal from each piece. I also appreciate their patience in enduring my finalization of the essay and am indebted to them both for their personal indulgence and intellectual stimulation.
The aim of my earlier essay was to open a new discussion of lawyers
and morality through my reflections on the so-called "Torture Memo."2
Specifically, my essay focuses on the effect of legal training and practice on
lawyers' moral reasoning. 3 It explores the ways in which we, as lawyers,
"come to engage in ... strategic reasoning," and express "concern[] about
Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law.
Michael Hatfield, ProfessionaliZing Moral Deference, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY I (2009),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/25ILRCo1l2009n25Hatfield.pdf (link); Robert K. Vischer, Professionalizing Moral Engagement (A Response to Michael Hatfield), 104 Nw. U. L.
REV.
COLLOQUY
33
(2009),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009127ILRCo112009n27Vischer.pdf (link); W.
Bradley Wendel, Deference to Clients and Obedience to Law: The Ethics of the Torture Lawyers (A Response
to
Professor Hatfield),
104 Nw.
U.
L. REV. COLLOQUY 58
(2009)
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/29/LRCo1l2009n29Wendel.pdf (link).
2 Hatfield, supra note I, at 1-2. I have elsewhere summarized the reasoning in the Torture Memo
as follows: "18 U.S.C. section 2340A does not prohibit as 'torture' merely cruel and inhuman interrogation techniques, but only those interrogation techniques that inflict pain akin in severity to death or organ failure. But if we are wrong, to the extent 18 U.S.C. [s]ection 2340A prohibits interrogation techtechniques the President approved, the law would violate the American Constitution. This is because it
is inherent in the Presidential office to determine what interrogation techniques shall be used, and neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has a greater power than the President on the subject. However, if
the President's commands were found subject to 18 U.S.c. [s]ection 2340A without violating the Constitution, then, nevertheless, the President's endorsement of such interrogation techniques could still be
justified as a matter of necessity and self-defense, being the moral choice of a lesser evil: harming an
individual enemy combatant in order to prevent further Al Qaeda attacks upon the United States." Michael Hatfield, Fear, Legal Indeterminacy, and the American Lawyering Culture, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 511, 514 (2006).
3 See. e.g., Hatfield, supra note I, at 4, 11.
!
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[the] cost to our moral reasoning skills."4 The core argument is that "lawyers are professionalized in a manner that undermines moral reasoning
skills,"5 and that "[t]o suggest that we who are officers of the American
judicial system are deficient in moral reasoning is to suggest a deep problem."6 To address this deep problem, I suggest lawyers accept personal
moral accountability for professional projects undertaken, idealizing those
lawyers who choose their professional projects on personal moral grounds.?
Thus, I believe lawyers-such as the authors of the Torture Memo-are
subject to criticism on grounds of morality and not merely professional
technique.
The responses of Professor Vi scher and Professor Wendel, though
thought-provoking, do not address my focus on the effect of legal training
and practice on lawyers' moral reasoning. Instead, the responses of Professor Vi scher and Professor Wendel focus on the role of moral reasoning in
legal reasoning.
1.
MORAL REASONING
In response to my essay Professor Vischer urges increasing moral engagement between lawyers and clients, while Professor Wendel emphasizes
the value of understanding law as a shared craft. 8 I appreciate Professor
Vischer's and Professor Wendel's responses on their own terms. Professor
Vischer's response expresses optimistic encouragement of greater moral
engagement between individual lawyers and clients, while Professor Wendel's response provides a valuable reminder that the complexity oflegal institutions intentionally and necessarily exceeds that of moral engagement
between individuals.
Professor Wendel misunderstands the essay, however, when he opens
his response by suggesting that I would "have lawyers act directly on the
claims of their own consciences rather than on the requirements of law."9
This overlooks that I expressly disclaim any suggestion "that moral analysis
be substituted for legal analysis."l0 His response then addresses the reasons
a lawyer's moral analysis ought not to be substituted for legal analysis, describing differences between laws and morals and the legitimacy of legal
4
5
6
Id. at 5.
Id.at4.
Id.
? Id. at 11 ("If we choose to implement a client's objective, it ought to be because doing so reflects
what we personally value, not because we have been assured that what we help our clients do does not
reflect our 'nonprofessional' personal morality."). See also id. at 5-6.
8 See, e.g., Vischer, supra note 1; Wendel, supra note 1. Their responses apply their general approaches to legal ethics issues. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225 (2006); W. Bradley Wendel, Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time a/Terror:
The 2008 F. W Wickmire Memorial Lecture, 31 DALHOUSIE 1..J. 247 (2008).
9 Wendel, supra note 1, at 59.
10 Hatfield, supra note 1, at 5.
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institutions. 11 If, on the whole, what Professor Wendel intends to convey is
that the law is to be valued as "an accumulation of hard-won institutional
wisdom"12 that "serves us best when we presume its wisdom rather than our
own,"13 and that lawyers should "respect the law as an external stop" to our
"personal instinct of what [is] best to be done," I certainly agree. In fact, I
have made those points, in those words, elsewhere. 1s
Like Professor Wendel, Professor Vischer suggests that I would have
"a lawyer's own moral convictions ... shape her personal decisionmaking
and professional decisionmaking in identical ways."16 Professor Vischer
worries that I champion an unrefined moral intuition as a sufficient guide to
both moral and legal reasoning. 17 But I do not claim that moral intuition
ought to replace legal reasoning. As mentioned above, I clearly deny "that
moral analysis be substituted for legal analysis," or that "legal duties ought
to track moral duties exactly."18 Nor do I claim a native and infallible intuition subject neither to constraint nor improvement, a claim that Professor
Vischer rightly fears might lead us "into fairly heady epistemological waters."19 I do not use the term "intuition" in a way that precludes refinement,
development, or strengthening through the study of moral philosophy, for
example, which Professor Vischer would expand in the law school classroom.20 Rather, I would supplement this proposal by asking law students to
consider how their broader legal education may influence their own moral
sensibility.
Neither Professor Vischer nor Professor Wendel responds to the essay's central suggestion as to the effect of legal training and practice on
lawyers' moral reasoning. Both instead interpret the essay as encouraging
the supplanting of legal reasoning with moral reasoning. 21 This is not my
suggestion. I distinguish between moral and legal reasoning, and I suggest
that lawyers qua lawyers suffer impaired moral reasoning. 22 My focus is on
11
12
See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 1, at 60, 64.
See Hatfield, supra note 2, at 521.
13 ld. at 513.
14 ld. at 522.
15 See supra notes 12-14.
16 Vischer, supra note 1, at 34.
17 See id. at 33-34, 36.
18 Hatfield, supra note I, at 5.
19 Vi scher, supra note 1, at 36.
20 See id. at 44.
21 See, e.g., id. at 33; Wendel, supra note 1, at 60.
22 See Hatfield, supra note 1, at 4,5, 10. The essay's only characterization of the legal reasoning in
the Torture Memo was that it was "bad." ld. at 3. Rather than criticizing the Torture Memo's legal reasoning, the essay began with the criticism that the torture lawyers had concluded that torture "is a morally acceptable objective for a legal memorandum." ld. at 4. Once the project objective was accepted as
morally sound, the objective "drove them to make a bad legal argument." ld. at 3. Describing the distorted legal analysis was not the essay's purpose, nor was suggesting that it would have been a better
memo had the torture lawyers given freer reign to their bad moral reasoning. Instead, the essay's pur-
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the moral reasoning lawyers use when choosing projects, not the legal reasoning lawyers use when implementing projects.23
II.PROFESSIONALIZATION AND MORAL REASONING
The essay aims to provoke discussion on whether or not becoming and
being a lawyer may negatively affect moral reasoning. 24 Three reasons a
negative relationship between moral reasoning and legal training may arise
are suggested. First, lawyers are professionalized to reason strategically.25
Second, lawyers are not only professionalized to reason strategically but also become so personally habituated in doing so that it becomes a fixed part
of their personality.26 Lawyers cannot easily "turn on" and "turn off' the
lawyering mindset (and I suspect that a poll of lawyers' family members
would confirm this). Third, given that moral and legal reasoning are deceptively similar in structure and consequence, it is especially difficult to "turn
off' the lawyers' strategic orientation when considering moral questions. 27
Accordingly, when it comes to honest moral reasoning, which is never strategic, lawyers' habituated strategic reasoning imposes a substantial COSt. 28
Strategic reasoning pursues pre-determined objectives. 29 And lawyers,
day in and day out, reason from the client's calculated objectives. 30 This
habituated deference to someone else's value calculations is a specific characteristic of lawyers' strategic reasoning. 3l This is what I called "moral deference."32 Of course, moral deference is not unique to lawyers, but rather
is an enduring human tendency often associated with morally repugnant actions, including lynching, genocide, and torture. 33
And this is the speculative end of the essay's provocative suggestions:
Jay Bybee and John Yoo's professionalization as lawyers made it more
pose was to suggest that the lawyers' professionalization as lawyers made them more likely, rather than
less likely, to conclude that the project objective was morally sound in the first place. Jd. at 7. I want to
condemn the morality of choosing the project, and not merely the legal reasoning articulated after the
project was chosen.
23 See, e.g., id. at II. Note that I state: "If! would not foreclose on a particular orphanage, I should
The orphanage may still be foreclosed
not be encouraged to help someone else to foreclose upon it. .
upon ... , but not with my help. Some other lawyer may help, but not at a cost to my conscience." Jd.
If I declined this representation, it would not be because I decided such a foreclosure was not legally
permissible, but rather that it was morally impermissible for me to participate in it. The legal reasoning
related to foreclosures is not the issue.
24 See, e.g., id. at 4, 11.
25 Jd. at 4-5.
26 ld. at 6-7.
27 Jd. at 7.
28
29
30
ld. at 5, 7.
ld. at 5.
Jd.
3]
Jd. at 5.
32
33
Jd. at 6.
Jd. at 8.
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likely, rather than less likely, that they would become persuaded that torture
is morally justified.34 This is because the typical utilitarian justification of
torture demands deference to "intelligence experts who assure you that torture yields good information"; deference to the professionalism of torturers
to "torture effectively rather than sadistically"; and deference to the detention apparatus' competence in detaining and torturing "only those most
likely to have valuable information."35
Neither Professor Vi scher nor Professor Wendel reflects on the suggestion that lawyers are exceptionally bad at moral reasoning as a result of the
process of becoming-and the experiences of being-a lawyer. I am sure
their reflections would have been illuminating; I was especially interested
in how Professor Vischer would respond, insofar as he promotes lawyers as
moral engagers rather than mere legal technicians. 36 Perhaps scholars adept
at empirical research will explore how legal professionalization tends to affect lawyers' moral reasoning. We should be interested.
III. IDEALIZING MORAL CONSISTENCY
The essay suggests that the legal profession should idealize the lawyer
who works for ends she morally endorses rather than idealizing the lawyer
who does noe 7 We could, for example, focus law students' attention on the
practicing lawyer's right to choose her projects, and encourage choices that
would be personally morally fulfilling. 38 Specifically, I encourage law students to consider whether they would find it personally and morally fulfilling to represent someone who failed to be a good Samaritan and watched
someone drown rather than rescuing him.39 Whether or not defending the
"bad Samaritan" is morally fulfilling has nothing to do with what the tort
law requires. 40 There is no moral paternalism here. 41 It is simply a matter
of emphasizing the discretion lawyers have to bring their personal moral
values to bear on the direction of their careers. This suggestion seems quite
modest in that these choices are clearly permitted (though, I contend, underemphasized). My suggestion has nothing to do with deceiving the client as
to what the law provides. 42
Professors Vischer and Wendel, on the other hand, seem to believe that
I advocate a sea change--each expresses concern that my proposal will un-
34
35
36
37
38
39
Id. at7.
Id.
See Vischer. supra note 1, at 38.
Hatfield, supra note 1, at 6 & n.19.
Seeid.at5.
ld.
40 Professor Wendel suggests this would encourage a distortion of tort laws. See Wendel, supra
note I, at 59.
41 Professor Vischer implies this makes me a moral paternalist. See Vischer, supra note I, at 37.
42 Professor Vischer appears to suggest this is my view. See Vischer, supra note I, at 45.
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duly limit the legal rights of clients. 43 Yet, if one does not object to lawyers
choosing clients for reasons of personal financial reward, how could one
object to lawyers choosing clients for reasons of personal moral reward?
How is choosing clients based on personal moral fit a more problematic restriction on potential clients' assertion of their legal rights than choosing for
better personal pay? Even if I do not want a project that involves foreclosing on widows and orphans, regardless of the fee, I am nearly certain that
someone up or down the building's elevator bank would be happy to take
the project because of the fee. 44
Professor Wendel focuses on the very important duties lawyers owe
clients, describing the ways in which a lawyer's imposition of her own morality on the attorney-client relationship would distort it. 45 My suggestion is
to idealize the lawyer who chooses to form an attorney-client relationship
with those individuals whose projects dovetail with her own moral values. 46
I do not suggest idealizing lawyers who deceptively impose their moral
agenda on a client through distorted legal advice or otherwise.
Professor Vischer similarly focuses on existing attorney-client relationships. He sensibly flags the ethical complications of a lawyer's withdrawal
from an engagement due to the lawyer's moral objections. 47 I agree that an
attorney withdrawing from an existing relationship is complicated. A lawyer personally opposed to divorce ought not advertise as a family lawyer,
accept a family law client, and then abandon the client when she learns the
client wants a divorce. However, the lawyer who chooses not to practice as
a family lawyer on the grounds that divorce is inconsistent with her own
personal moral values is in an altogether different situation. It is the latter
sort of consideration that I want to encourage, not the former. 48
Idealizing the lawyer whose selection of projects reflects her personal
moral values is intended as a partial solution to the negative effect of legal
professionalization on moral reasoning. It is one way to encourage lawyers
to "struggle" with the risk of "a dis-integrated moral personality," that is to
say the risk of having one set of moral values in one's personal life and
another in one's career. 49 I believe that such struggle would sharpen the
moral reasoning skills of lawyers. And, better yet, I believe it would lead to
a profession in which lawyers invest their limited time "working from the
See, e.g., id. at 38; Wendel, supra note 1, at 64-65.
See Hatfield, supra note 1, at 11.
45 See Wendel, supra note 1, at 64-{)5.
46 Hatfield, supra note I, at 5-6.
47 Vischer, supra note 1, at 33-34.
48 Professor Bruce Green analyzes the conflicts of a family law lawyer who opposes divorce. Bruce
A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, II GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19,
36-38 (1997).
49 Hatfield, supra note I, at II.
43
44
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conviction that they are personally responsible [for the matters they undertake] rather than from the conviction that they are not. "50
But there are other reasons to emphasize the professional spaces for a
lawyer's personal morality. I anticipate that lawyers who work for ends
they morally endorse are happier than those who do not. Happiness is likely to confer benefits on others. Lawyers who are morally happy are probably less likely to suffer from drug abuse, marital discord, and suicide, for
example, and will, therefore, do a better job for their clients. 51
IV. MORAL ACCOUNT ABILITY
I believe that when a lawyer accepts a project, she knows what she is
accepting. In important and practical ways, she begins with an answer rather than a question, though the form of written legal memoranda usually
suggests to the contrary. 52 True, as the legal reasoning proceeds, the details
of the answer are elaborated. 53 But in the main, when she accepts the job,
the lawyer knows what the job is. She is paid to answer "how," not "NO."54
In large part, it is for this reason the lawyer is morally accountable for
the job she performs and is not shielded from moral criticism on the
grounds that she is just doing her job. The choice to adopt a particular
project is a moral choice, and law students ought to be taught and encouraged to choose projects that reflect their personal morality, rather than encouraged to accept a vision of lawyers as those who implement projects
regardless of personal morality. I believe it follows that one should condemn lawyers who undertake projects one morally opposes, in addition to
condemning any poor craftsmanship demonstrated in carrying the projects
out.
This is a broader issue, however, on which Professor Wendel and I disagree. 55 There is a craft of lawyering, and failing to remain within its boundaries subjects a lawyer to discipline (or malpractice claims).56 Professor
Wendel would limit one lawyer's criticism of another to grounds related to
50
Id.
See, e.g., Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 874, 876-78, 880-81 (1999). According
to a 1990 study, lawyers top the list of professionals with major depressive disorder. Id. at 874. A 1991
researcher estimated that fifteen percent of all lawyers are alcoholics. Id. at 876. A 1990 study found
that twenty-six percent oflawyers have used cocaine at least once, which is "a rate over twice that of the
general population." Id. at 877. Several studies show that the divorce rate among lawyers is, likewise,
higher than among other professionals, id. at 878, and a 1992 study found that the "suicide rate for white
male lawyers may be over twice that of other white males." ld. at 880. "[L]awyers are indeed unhappy .
. . ." Jd. at 881.
52 See Hatfield, supra note 1, at 4, 11.
53 ld.
54 Jd.
51
55
56
See Wendel, supra note 1, at 68-70.
See, e.g., id. at 58-59 & nn.2-4.
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craft standards,57 whereas I would not limit the criticism of lawyers to the
craft-arena. I do not claim that a lawyer could never prepare a well-crafted
memo concluding that torture is legal; I do claim that she should not do so.
For the obvious reasons, today we tend to focus on Jay Bybee and John
Y 00, the ensuing revelations of the torture, and the accompanying and ongoing fallout. We think of the August 1, 2002 Torture Memo, which invoked the Medicaid statute to conclude that torture was legal if the
President ordered it. 58 But even if the so-called "war" on terror had never
been, and the facts of the past few years never come to pass, some lawyer
might have craftily argued that the President could legalize torture. Perhaps
John Y 00 would have devoted a year and a team of eager research assistants
to carefully crafting just such a memo. And he may have done so in a way
that no lawyer alleged to be beyond the bounds of craft. Even so, lawyers, I
believe, could conclude it was an immoral project.
In my mind, the most distressing problem with the August 1,2002 Torture Memo is not that the lawyers were "insufficiently genius," and that the
memo itself was "too hasty, too short, and too shoddy."59 It is that welltrained and highly-placed lawyers chose the project of narrowing the definition of torture so as to maximize its use. 60 Those lawyers deserve moral
condemnation for choosing the project, in addition to any professional discipline for the manner in which they discharged it. 61 As the choice of the
project is the first choice in the project's history, that seems an especially
appropriate place to emphasize constraint. That choice is grounds for moral
accountability, and it is the most important decision the lawyer makes. 62
CONCLUSION
Moral condemnation stings us, and that is why even its threat can affect behavior. If a lawyer anticipates moral condemnation for his choice of
project, he is likely to struggle with the moral issues it implicates. That
struggle, I think, is good. 63 I think it is likely to improve moral reasoning.
Conversely, habitually avoiding the struggle with some version of "I'm just
the lawyer" impairs moral reasoning. 64 I believe that lawyers struggling
57
ld.
See Hatfield, supra note 1, at 1-2 & nn.I-5; Vischer, supra note 1, at 34-36; Wendel, supra note
1, at 58-59.
59 Hatfield, supra note 1, at 4.
58
60 See Louise-Philippe F. Rouillard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture Under International
Law: The Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 9,23-30 (2005).
61 See Wendel, supra note 1, at 58-59 & nn.I-4.
62 Hatfield, supra note 1, at 3. Note that I state: "I believe these lawyers began with the objective of
justifying torture. They concluded that they were obligated to justifY torture, and then they set out to do
so. .
They made a bad moral conclusion, and I believe it drove them to make a bad legal argument."
Jd
63 Hatfield, supra note 1, at 11.
64 Id. at 7-9.
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with the moral implications of potential projects would necessarily improve
the quality of our legal system. Professor Wendel disagrees. 65
Of course, there are those who believe torture is morally justified. Indeed, the essay claims that lawyers are especially susceptible to the argument that it is. On any serious moral issue, there will be serious
disagreement about who deserves moral condemnation and who deserves
moral praise. But that is the nature of serious moral debate. By condemning those with whom we disagree on serious moral issues, we express our
concern for them-for their moral reasoning skills, for their moral personality, perhaps for their souls. We signal to them our conviction that they
ought to apologize or repent, or perhaps atone. 66 We signal the same to society in general, and to those we believe have been victimized by those we
condemn. Such expressions reflect and protect our own moral dignity, the
moral dignity of those to whom we express our condemnation-and the
moral dignity of those whom we condemn.
Wendel, supra note 1, at 60.
See LINDA RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS: ATONEMENT IN MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS (2009)
(discussing restitution, repentance, and atonement in morality, law, and politics).
65
66
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Vol. ]04
Copyright 2009 by Northwestern University Schoo! of Law
Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy
PROFESSIONALIZING MORAL DEFERENCE
Michael Hatfield'
1. THE TORTURE MEMO
As I write this Essay, legal memoranda about torture, once again, are
headline news.] This Essay considers these memoranda. However, this Essay does not address the legality of torture or the legal limits of interrogation or even if lawyers who provide bad advice on these issues should be
punished. 2 Instead, this Essay uses what has come to light about the "torture memoranda" to consider broader issues about the contemporary state of
becoming and being an American lawyer. With new memoranda being released, for the sake of convenience, this Essay refers only to the best-known
example (at least as things currently stand), which is the August 1, 2002
memo to Alberto Gonzales signed by Jay Bybee and prepared by John
YoO.3 Without substantive consideration of counterarguments, that memorandum concluded that torture was not illegal-at least not if the President
ordered the torture. 4 To many, it seems undeniable that the memorandum
Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. J.D., New York University School of
Law. I would like to thank Professor Thomas C. Hilde (University of Maryland Institute for Philosophy
and Public Policy and editor of ON TORTURE (2009» for his editorial, professional, and personal support, as well as The Heinrich Boll Foundation of the German Green Party and The George Washington
University for their support of the symposium On Torture, where I presented an earlier version of this
Essay. I also would like to thank my symposium co-participants from whom I learned so much, especially Chinese human rights activist and Woodrow Wilson Visiting Fellow Dimon Liu; Professor David
Luban, Georgetown University Law Center; Aryeh Neier, Open Society Institute; Santiago Canton, Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commisson on Human Rights; Professor Andrew Zimmerman,
The George Washington University; Professor Britter Arredondo, The George Washington University;
Professor Stephanie Athey, Lassell College; and Professor Rebecca Witmann, University of Toronto.
] See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Interrogation Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A.,
NYTIMES.COM, Apr. 16,2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/us/politics/17 detain.html?pagewanted=print (link).
2 C/, e.g., Peter Finn, Holder Urged to Probe Allegations of Torture, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar.
18, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentiarticle/2009/031l7/AR2009031702639.html
(chronicling the ACLU's efforts to convince the Attorney General to launch a criminal investigation into
the conduct of the Bush administration) (link).
3 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Atl'y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President
(Aug.
I,
2002)
[hereinafter
the
Torture
Memo],
available
at
htlp:llfll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf (link). See Paul M.
Barrett, A Young Lawyer Helps Chart Shift in Foreign Policy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12,2005, at AI.
4 The Torture Memo, supra note 3, at 1-2,33-39,46.
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was not written in a good-faith effort to constrain any possibly illegal behavior, but rather as a shield against future prosecution. s
II. THE QUESTION
The overwhelming consensus of the American bar is that torture, even
when called "enhanced interrogation," is not permissible. 6 I do not write to
question or defend this conclusion. I begin with it. I write for those who
accept that conclusion, and I write to ask: how do otherwise competent
lawyers persuade themselves that torture is permissible? How could otherwise good lawyers get such a serious issue so wrong?
The question has no readily apparent answers. We ought not to answer
that Jay Bybee, John Yoo, or others were merely political hacks.? That is
not an explanation. Rather, it would only push the question into a slightly
different format. We ought not to answer that they were otherwise immoral
men. No one has alleged that to be the case. Nor can we answer that they
were poorly trained, under-educated, or generally incompetent--they had
risen, after all, to the position of legal advisers to the President of the United States. 8 There is no reason of which I know to characterize these lawyers as anomalously defective.
5 According to Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques, these memoranda were intended to
"create a shield to make it difficult or impossible to hold anyone accountable for" torture. The Origins
of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques: Part / of the Committee's Inquiry into the Treattnent of Detainees in US Custody: Hearings Before the S Comm. on Armed Services, 1 10th Congo 9 (2008) [hereinafter The Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques Hearings] (link); Richard Neuborne et ai.,
Torture: The Road to Abu Ghraib and Beyond, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 31 (Karen 1.
Greenberg ed., 2006) (quoting Stephen Gillers). Richard B. Bilder and Detlev F. Vagts note that Donald
Rumsfeld invoked the "advice of counsel" defense in a televised interview. See Richard B. Bilder &
Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA,
supra, at 151,160 nJ2.
6 See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL
1. REV. 67 (2005) (providing a detailed criticism of the infamous Torture Memo) (link). Calling the
Torture Memo a legal analysis of which no one "could be proud," id at 68, Wendel cites several sources
identifYing ethical lapses and even blatant incompetence in the preparation of the memo: "'[I]n my professional opinion, the August 1, 2002 OLC Memorandum is perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal
opinion I have ever read. '" Id at 68 n.2 (quoting Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R.
Gonzales to be Attorney General of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congo
158 (2005) (statement of Harold Hongiu Koh). See also Gail H. Miller, Defining Torture, 3
FLOERSHEIMER
CENTER
OCCASIONAL
PAPERS
SERIES
(2005),
available
at
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/cms/uploadedFiles/FLOERSHEIMERIDefining%20Torture.pdf (explaining
the technical definition oftorture under international and U.S. law) (link); Robert K. Goldman, Trivializ-
ing Torture: The Office Of Legal Counsel's 2002 Opinion Letter And International Law Against Torture, 12 No.1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (2004) (discussing the legal prohibitions of torture beyond those
contained in international treaties) (link).
? See,
e.g,
Scott
Horton,
Yoo
Two,
HARPERS.ORG,
Apr.
3,
2008,
http://www.harpers.orglarchiveI2008/04/hbc-90002785 (link).
8 As a legal matter, the purpose of an Office of Legal Counsel memo is to advise the President as to
the state of the law and to serve as a legal interpretation binding on the executive branch of the federal
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If these were not anomalously defective lawyers, the question becomes
harder to answer: how could well-trained, competent, otherwise moral lawyers conclude that torture is permissible? It is the same type of question
that would arise if well-trained, competent, otherwise moral lawyers concluded that slavery is permissible so long as it is termed "permanent employment." If we cannot trust the arguments of well-trained, competent,
otherwise moral lawyers on the torture issue, I believe we ought to consider
not merely the individual lawyers involved, but also the process of becoming and being a lawyer.
I believe these lawyers began with the objective of justifying torture.
They concluded that they were obligated to justify torture, and then they set
out to do so. Whoever was ultimately responsible for requesting the Torture Memo apparently had such an objective, and the lawyers, apparently,
accepted that position as a morally acceptable starting point. They made a
bad moral conclusion, and I believe it drove them to make a bad legal argument. 9
That characterization raises a reasonable and appealing response. If
the problem is that a bad moral conclusion drove bad legal reasoning, then
perhaps the solution is to tell lawyers to put moral reasoning aside and focus on legal reasoning. lo Perhaps the problem is simply that the Torture
Memo was "crummy legal advice" motivated by the personal morality of
the lawyers.11 If so, the solution is to insist that the morality of the greater
good requires that a lawyer's personal moral convictions be laid aside so
that the lawyer can focus on the craft of lawyering. 12
To interpret the problem with the Torture Memo as one of craftsmanship makes the issue into a matter of sufficient memo length and citations.
The solution for failing to cite contrary authorities is to cite them, and then
to argue their inapplicability. Ignoring an authority is poor craftsmanship;
citing and distinguishing that authority is good craftsmanship. To diagnose
the problem as one of poor craftsmanship suggests that, among all the possible legal memoranda, one memorandum could perhaps be crafted to reach
the same conclusions in a defensible manner. It is just not this one. Perhaps some mad genius lawyer counterpart to the mad genius scientist could,
government. See Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the
Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. l303, l305 (2000) (link).
9 A separate issue is whether their moral conclusions were formed prior to their engagement in the
memorandum production or as a result of that engagement. See David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and
Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279,279-83 (2003) (link).
10 W. Bradley Wendel, WF. Wickmire Memorial Lecture: Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of
Terror, DALHOUSIE L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 23, on file with SSRN.com, last revised Apr. 4,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsoI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1372744 (link).
II Id. (manuscript at 14).
12 Id. (manuscript at 5-6, 13).
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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY
in fact, tightly argue to the pro-torture legal conclusions. 13 But is the problem really that these lawyers were insufficiently genius? That their memos
simply were too hasty, too short, and too shoddy?
Such a formulation conceives of the practice of law as one of technical
rather than strategic advice. But lawyers reason strategically.14 Lawyers
are not paid to answer "yes" or "no." The lawyerly response is always,
"This is how we get there,"--or, at least, as near to there as we can get
from here-with the definition of "there" determined by the client's situation, of course.
Diagnosing the problem as one of craft distracts us from a more troubling question. Lawyers fail to meet professional performance standards on
a daily basis. It is, I suppose, the common cold of our profession. And it is
an ethical issue. But it is not headline news.
On the other hand, that highly trained officers of the American judicial
system-a system with a legitimate claim of belonging among the most just
in the world, and moreover the judicial system of the most powerful nation
in the world-would accept that torturing those held in American custody is
a morally acceptable objective for a legal memorandum .... Now that is
headline news. What went wrong with these lawyers? Everyone agrees the
Torture Memo is shoddy. But why were these lawyers willing to write it?
III. ANSWERING THE QUESTION
Why would well-trained, competent, otherwise moral lawyers accept
that torture is a morally acceptable objective for a legal memorandum, and
then prepare and sign such a shoddy memorandum to accomplish that objective? I suggest that the answer to this question is that lawyers are professionalized in a manner that undermines moral reasoning skills. To suggest
that we who are officers of the American judicial system are deficient in
moral reasoning is to suggest a deep problem. I do not do so casually.
I can cite no empirical study, but I can generalize from my personal
experience as a law student, lawyer, law professor, and friend and colleague
of many other law students, lawyers, and law professors. Beginning in law
school, we learn to lay aside our moral sense when facing complicated,
13 See id. (manuscript at 25). If the only rightful means of criticizing these lawyers is "digging into
the law" on torture, id., we must concede before we "dig" that we may be surprised by what our digging
unearths. Surely the pro-torture lawyers conceive the problem this way, insisting that enough openminded and skillful consideration of the law would swing the consensus of the bar behind their conclusions. If we were to dig in good faith, should we not assume that the consensus of the bar might be
changed? I label the lawyer who could swing the consensus to be "the mad genius lawyer."
14 Strategic reasoning does not involve rejecting the notion that there are genuine obligations of
lawfulness, or insisting that some arguments are technically implausible. See id. (manuscript at 15, 25).
I simply do not think that clients ask, "What are my rights and duties?" See id. (manuscript at 14). Instead, I think they ask, "What are my options?" And I do not think lawyers ever answer, "You are legally permitted to do such-and-such," id. (manuscript at 16), but rather, "The first option is such-and-such,
but that requires this-and-that. Let me explain how the second option differs."
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high-stakes issues. We are taught to accept a division between lawyers'
morality and clients' morality, and the primary principle of zealous advocacy, as if these were part of the natural order. 1s As lawyers, we spend our
days reasoning backwards from the conclusion we ultimately want to reach
for our clients, rather than forwards from principles we discover by "digging" into the law. Sometimes we have to adjust how close to the conclusion we can come, but we start with a clear objective of, at least
approximately, where we must arrive. The objective, of course, reflects the
client's goals and situations. I think that is a noncontroversial description
of what lawyers do every day. This Essay explores my reflections on how
lawyers come to engage in this type of strategic reasoning, my concerns
about its cost to our moral reasoning skills, and my limited hope for how we
may be able to recover.
A. Professionalizing Moral Deference
The act of being professionalized as a lawyer begins with moral desensitization. We were taught to override our moral intuition in our first year
of law school. 16 We were taught to ignore our intuition that a debt is morally owed, and were taught instead to debate only the price of refusing to pay.
We were taught to ignore that a passerby is morally obligated to prevent a
man from drowning, and instead to debate only the risks of a tort suit if the
passerby watches the drowning man die.
How would first-year law students learn to think about debts if, alongside the statute of limitations, they learned that the first systematic legal
ethicist concluded it unethical to plead the statute for a client who is "conscious he owes the debt?"17 I am not suggesting that moral analysis be
substituted for legal analysis. Nor am I suggesting that legal duties ought to
track moral duties exactly. 18 I am suggesting only that when a difference
between the two exists, law students could learn to focus on whether or not
the difference is justifiable, and whether or not they, as individual lawyers,
would choose the passerby as a client. Whether there is a duty under tort
law to rescue a drowning man does not answer whether I want to be hired
so that I can defend someone's right to watch a man die. Day-in, day-out
during law school, fact situations raising obvious moral issues are recharacterized as having none.
15 I do not doubt there may be a substantial difference between what our law students are learning
and what our professional ethicists are intending to teach about zealous advocacy, for example. I am
considering what it is I believe law students and lawyers think they hear when ethicists speak, rather
than what ethicists actually say.
16 Others, of course, have also noted that law schools do not teach students to think through the
moral consequences of their actions, only to obsess about "precedent" without any understanding of the
moral choices lawyers make. See Neuborne et aI., supra note 5.
17 See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 175-176 (5th ed. 2008).
18 Wendel, supra note 10 (manuscript at 15).
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The moral issues are easily swept away by the claim that the lawyer is
not the moral endorser of his or her client's objectives.!9 If the client has
the legal right to foreclose on the orphanage, the lawyer is not personally
responsible for helping the client foreclose, even if the lawyer is morally
opposed to it. From the beginning, we are taught that we may suspend our
personal moral identity while we wholeheartedly invest the remainder of
ourselves in advocating clients' objectives. 20 What if, instead of idealizing
the image of a lawyer who is not the moral endorser of her client's objectives, we idealized for students the image of a lawyer working toward objectives she does morally endorse?
From the beginning of law school, a lawyer is idealized as a zealous
advocate for her client's objective. This biased zealousness is justified by
an appeal to the adversarial American legal system. 2 ! Each side has a lawyer, and each lawyer is devoted to one side. The professional role is to further the client's objective, even if, personally, the lawyer opposes it. The
young lawyer learns to defer to the client's moral conclusions about the objective. But the young lawyer also learns to defer to the legal system's conclusions that this is what lawyers should do. We are told to suspend our
personal moral instincts and to have faith that the legal system accomplishes a greater moral good by our accepting a truncated personal moral role
than it could accomplish if we accepted full personal moral responsibility
for what we help our clients do. We are professionalized into believing that
we are at no personal moral risk so long as we do a professional job (for
which we will be well paid). We are told to accept the moral good of moral
deference-both to our clients and to the system. We are professionalized
to believe that moral deference is simply what lawyers do, as if it were a
self-evident, natural principle that pardoned our moral misgivings.
Lawyers begin learning moral deference in law school, and then that
deference is internalized through the routine practice of law. 22 Through
2,400 hours a year on the job, lawyers internalize that there is "a speciaJ[,]
professional morality" that has nothing to do with the morality of nonprofessional lives. 23 Lawyers transition "from one form of [moral] life to the
19 The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that "[a] lawyer's
representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement
of the client's political, economic, social, or moral views or activities." ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 1.2(b) (2002) W.nk). An example is a lawyer
who opposes smoking but lobbies for a tobacco company.
20 I believe this answers Burt Neuborne's question, "Is there something that we are doing in American law schools that is allowing the best and the brightest ... to drift into a situation where they think
that all they have to do is find an argument that will justify their client's goal ... ?" Neuborne et a!.,
supra note 5, at 14. This understanding of the profession is termed "neutral partisanship." DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 9 (2007).
21 See LUBAN, supra note 20, at 9.
22 See Luban, supra note 9, at 301.
23
ld.
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other, with no sense of tension or contradiction."24 How could such fluidity
not become a "fixed part" of a lawyer's "moral personality"?25 Deference
to others' moral conclusions becomes not only intellectually justified, but
personally comfortable and natural. And, as a matter of moral psychology,
the more lawyers defer to clients, the more "rightness" they begin to see in
the client's objectives. 26 This self-deluding process is part of how lawyers
earn their pay, and it seems to me inescapable that such a process undermines the capacity for moral reflection.
B. Moral Deference and the Pro-Torture Argument
I believe lawyers come to regard moral deference as natural. I believe
this comes from the process of becoming and being a lawyer. I believe it
undermines lawyers' moral reasoning, in large part because moral and legal
reasoning are so similar. Both moral and legal reasoning involve considering competing values in high-stakes matters. Lawyers do this daily. Lawyers get comfortable doing it. But lawyers do it strategically. Their
professional skill lies in cutting through the complicated issues on highstakes subjects in order to advance the client's objective, not reflectively
discerning the moral rightness or wrongness of the objective pursued. But
honest moral reasoning is never strategic.
I speculate that a strategic, lawyerly mentality made Jay Bybee and
John Y00 more, rather than less, susceptible to the argument that torture is
morally permissible. The high-quality training they had received, and the
high-quality experience they had gained, was in moral deference-deferring
to others to decide what the project is, and then thinking strategically about
how to implement it. This type of moral deference is not only inherent in
contemporary lawyering, it is essential to the pro-torture argument.
Deference is essential to the pro-torture argument in several ways.27 It
is essential to defer to intelligence experts who assure you that torture
yields good information. It is essential to defer to the good faith and skills
of the torturers to torture effectively rather than sadistically. It is essential
to defer to the detention apparatus so that only those most likely to have
valuable information are detained and tortured. In other words, in order to
justify torture, you must defer to the moral clarity and practical abilities of
everyone involved in the torture institution. Your personal, moral squeamishness must give way to these experts who know the "real truth." They
are the only ones who can really say what works, what does not, what is tru24
25
ld.
ld.
See id. at 281-83,301-04.
In particular, I have in mind the deference required to accept the "ticking time bomb" rationale.
See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. 1. REv. 1425, 1426 (2005); see
also Stephanie Athey, The Terrorist We Torture: The Tale of Abdul Hakim Murad, in ON TORTURE 87
(Thomas C. Hilde ed., 2008) (providing a critical history of the recent usage ofthis narrative).
26
27
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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW COLLOQUY
ly right, and what is truly wrong. Your only moral job is to support them.
It is your moral job to be adult enough, sober enough, serious enough, and
strong enough to defer to their moral clarity and authority.28
C. Moral Deference and Lawyering
The pro-torture argument demands substantial moral deference, and the
mainstream of the American bar assumes moral deference is justifiable.
Are we really surprised, then, that lawyers whose "client" had concluded
that torture was a morally justified objective were willing to pursue the 0 bjective (and that, eventually, even if not initially, most likely came to share
the moral conclusion behind the objective)?29 I believe lawyers are inclined
to set aside initial moral squeamishness and get comfortable cutting through
competing values on high-stakes subjects-once told which way to cut.
Without deference, lawyers do not know in which direction to argue.
Deferential reasoning is an intentional diffusion of moral responsibility.30 I believe it fits our natural inclination, which, despite what we may tell
ourselves, is to follow rather than lead. 3! We want to believe that someone
else knows better. We want to believe that we need not take the risk of fo 1lowing our own conscience, or even the trouble of discerning its voice. As
lawyers, we are told to defer to the client, to the system, and to accept the
role as the most helpful (and among the best paid) followers of all.32
But I believe this inclination to surrender personal conscientiousness in
deference to another's moral conclusions is a perennial evil. Moral deference opens the Bible as the first sin. It is behind all state-sanctioned uses
of violence. It promotes lynch mobs. It enabled Nazi atrocities. It was
evident in the subjects of Stanley Milgrim's study, who administered electric "shocks" to screaming patients because they were told to do so by the
instructor. 33 Milgrim's subjects chose to administer "shocks," over their
28 See Darius Rejali, Torture Makes the Man, in ON TORTURE, supra note 27, at 165-83 (discussing
the "manliness" of torture). We have "the worry that we have become sissies and our enemies know it."
Jd at 180.
29 See Luban, supra note 9, at 281-83,301-04.
30 The intentionality of the lawyer's deference distinguishes it from the more commonly understood
"diffusion of responsibility." It is a "well-known fact," for example, "that groups of people are often
less likely to respond helpfully in emergency situations than are individuals." Luban, supra note 9, at
283. In the lawyer-client situation, however, the diffusion is not a result of a dysfunctional group dynamic but an intentional choice.
3! By contrast, it is notable that the military lawyers who did, by and large, consistently object to
torture are trained to provide moral analysis as well as legal analysis. Neuborne et aI., supra note 5, at
27 (quoting Michael (Dan) Mori).
32 My conclusion reflects the observation by Tzvetan Todorov that, "in any human collectivity,
there is a convinced, resolute minority who act, and a passive, indecisive majority who prefer to follow,
and that the minority almost always prevails." Tzvetan Todorov, Torture in the Algerian War, in ON
TORTURE, supra note 27, at 23 (Arthur Denner trans.).
33 See LUBAN, supra note 20, at 239-66 (analyzing Stanley Milgrim's famous experiments in the
context of professional legal ethics).
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own moral hesitation, out of trust that the guy in the lab coat and the system
that placed the guy in the lab coat in charge had greater moral clarity in the
situation than they did. This is moral deference.
The lawyer defers to the client's conclusions about the morality of the
objective. The lawyer defers to the legal system's conclusion that the
client, rather than the lawyer, is morally responsible for the objective. This
moral passivity, moral silence, moral deference, is what we associate with
lynch mobs, Nazis, those who shock patients because they are told to, and
those who conclude torture is permissible because experts tell them it
should be. And, I fear, most lawyers have accepted moral deference as justified, as if it were essential to being a good lawyer, and without considering how it affects the capacity to be a good person.
Moral deference is a problem deeper than legal ethics. It seems to be a
recurring temptation for everyone, and, best as I can tell, there is no effective cure. Neither intellectualism nor rational enlightenment seems sufficient-at least not sufficient to remove genocide and torture from human
experience. The German intellectual heritage did not prevent Nazism, and
enlightened French culture did not prevent the French from torturing Algerians. 34 The Germans were well-educated and well-cultured, as were the
French. So were Jay Bybee and John Yoo. It did not protect their victims.
D. Darkness and Light
But there is good reason not to despair. While most of Stanley Milgrim's subjects "shocked" screaming patients because they were told to do
so, a great many of them did noes While most German lawyers who were
asked wrote tidy legal opinions to support their Nazi clients' objectives,
some did not. 36 While some U.S. government lawyers claimed torture was
legal, some did not. 37 There are always beacons of light, and this provides
good reason not to despair. 38
34 Not even the memory of having been tortured is sufficient. See Todorov, supra note 32, at 18-26
(discussing-and dismissing-the potentially "favorable" and "unfavorable" factors influencing an individual's likelihood of becoming a torturer).
35 See LUBAN, supra note 20, at 240-41 (emphasizing that about one-third ofthe subjects refused to
continue administering shocks).
36 In contrast to the more political lawyers, some German lawyers, mostly in the Abwehr (the Third
Reich's military intelligence agency), consistently argued for the application of the Geneva and Hague
conventions to those captured by the German army during World War II. See Scott Horton, Through a
Mirror Darkly: Applying the Geneva Conventions to "A New Kind of Warfare," in THE TORTURE
DEBATE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 136. Most of these lawyers ultimately became victims of the
Gestapo. Id.
37 See discussion infra note 39 and accompanying text.
38 While it is encouraging to remember these beacons, I cannot believe the solution is simply to figure out how to "systematically produce more beacons" among American lawyers. See Todorov, supra
note 32, at 18-26. I do not believe that we can realistically hope to socially engineer lawyers to be willing to be shot by Nazis, rather than simply to sign the legal memoranda the Nazis request.
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The U.S. government lawyers who, by and large, consistently objected
to torture were the Judge Advocate General ("JAG") lawyers. It was the
JAG lawyers, rather than the civilian lawyers, who dissented from the protorture objective. 39 The dissenting role of these lawyers in the torture debate has been well documented by the Senate Armed Services Committee. 40
What drove the JAG lawyers to dissent? In the simplest terms, I believe it was their fear-a fear of the consequences of violating the categorical imperative, the golden rule. It was a fear in their guts, not in their heads.
They feared that Americans torturing those in their custodial care would ultimately result in Americans being tortured. And this fear was not abstract.
It was a deep realization that powerless men, men with children, wives, and
memories of sunshine and ease would be maimed and mutilated. It was a
fear that they could be among the victims. It was the fear that they could
pay dearly for endorsing torture-if not themselves personally, then those
with whom they personally identified: fellow soldiers. I believe it was this
empathetic identification that differentiated those who dissented from those
who did not. It was the fear of suffering the consequences of their own deCISIOns.
Perhaps the right kind of fear is essential to moral resolve. Perhaps
deeply fearing that we will become the victims of our own moral decisions
imparts moral clarity. Those who support state violence always believe
they will be protected by the state rather than subjected to its violence. 41
Those who support torture believe they will be protected by the torture they
support; they do not believe they will ever be subjected to it. 42 The deep
fear that our own moral decisions will damn us cannot be lost. To put it in
old and unambiguous language: the deep worry that we will go to hell if we
take the wrong turn keeps us on the straight path. The JAG lawyers, it
seems, could more easily imagine what that hell would look like and how it
is they would get there. 43 I suggest that their imaginations allowed them to
connect the risks of their reasoning with the reality of human pain in a way
that made them realize the moral risk was their own and not someone
else's. There was no room for deference. The risk could be neither delegated nor avoided. It was inescapably personal. It was the risk of hell.
Neuborne et aI., supra note 5, at 16-17.
See The Origins ofAggressive Interrogation Techniques Hearings, supra note 5; 151 CONGo REC.
S878972-S88013 (daily ed. July 25,2005) (documenting many of the lawyers' activities).
41 See Athey, supra note 27, at 98.
42 See id. Perhaps torture supporters blame the victim; that is, perhaps they believe there is something about the victim that makes torturing him at least somewhat justifiable. Often such a belief is
based on some distinction the torturer creates between himself and the victim. Cj Luban, supra note 9,
at 291.
43 Cj Pilar Calveiro, Torture's New Methods and Meanings, in ON TORTURE, supra note 27, at 124
(William Nichols & Thomas C. Hilde trans.). These lawyers did not have an obscured awareness of the
implications for "one's other, one's equal, and oneself'; for them it was not a "game." Id.
39
40
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
I fear that, as lawyers, we have been convinced that we do not risk hell
when we implement our client's objectives. 44 If we cannot resurrect a fear
of hell among ourselves, then at the very least we should stop telling ourselves that overcoming personal moral squeamishness is the great call of the
law. We should stop the professional program of suffocating the light that
flickers in personal consciences. If I would not foreclose on a particular orphanage, I should not be encouraged to help someone else to foreclose upon
it. If I would not drown a man to make him talk, I should not be encouraged to help someone else to do it. The orphanage may still be foreclosed
upon, or the man drowned, but not with my help. Some other lawyer may
help, but not at a cost to my conscience.
It should not be controversial to claim that the rule of law is better protected by those who are responsive to conscience than it is by those who intentionally disregard conscience for pay and promotions. But it is. It is
inconsistent with the self-understanding of the contemporary bar. One
long-term project needs to be pulling away the comfortable insulation lawyers feel in deferring to the bar' s self~serving assurance of what is moral: 5
To extend the religious imagery, I submit that God has delegated nothing to
the American Bar Association. What is morally required of each us is not a
bar committee's decision. Lawyers, as individuals, need to struggle with
the discomfort caused by a dis-integrated moral personality, and with the
numerous moral anomalies routinely defended in the name of a well-paying
professionalism. Each of us must choose what kind of person to be. That
choice ought to determine our professional choices. If we choose to implement a client's objective, it ought to be because doing so reflects what
we personally value, not because we have been assured that what we help
our clients do does not reflect our "nonprofessional" personal morality.
I speculate that many fewer lawyers would sign off on torture if legal
education did not begin with dis-integrating the skills for intellectual agility
from the skills for moral resolution. How different the bar would be if law
schools convinced young lawyers that what they implement for clients does
reflect their personal morality. How different the bar would be if lawyers
spent 2,400 hours a year working from the conviction that they are personally responsible rather than from the conviction that they are not. But, as
it stands, we do not train moral leaders in our law schools; we train facilitators. We do not expect lawyers to say "no;" we expect lawyers to figure out
"how." I cannot pretend to be shocked by the results.
44 Perhaps clients are taking their cues as to the morality of their actions from their lawyers' silence,
while the lawyers are taking their cues from the clients. Luban describes this process as "pluralistic ignorance," in which the lawyers and the clients reinforce one another's wrong beliefs. Luban, supra note
9, at 284 (emphasis omitted).
45 See generally LUBAN, supra note 20 (analyzing the implications of professional ethics for human
dignity and the rule of law).
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