Ficino and Pomponazzi on the Place of Man in the Universe
Author(s): Paul Oskar Kristeller
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr., 1944), pp. 220-226
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707386 .
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NOTES
AND DOCUMENTS
FICINO AND POMPONAZZI ON THE PLACE OF MAN
IN THE UNIVERSE
BY PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER
In attemptingto understanda given body of ideas, the studentof intellectual historywill not only seek to determineits truthor its philosophical
and historicalsignificance;he will also inquire how far theseideas were old
or novel at the time a writerfirstexpressedthem. To be sure, the history
of thoughthas shiftedback and forthbetweenan emphasis on originality
and an adherenceto permanentprinciples,and the emphasisprevailing at
of authors. Yet neitherextreme
a givenperiodhas oftenguided the efforts
has ever at any timebeen realized. What we actually findeverywhereis a
mixtureof old and new elements,in varyingproportionsto be sure.
There are several reasonsforthe acceptanceand repetitionof old ideas.
One factoris certainlythe intellectualinertiawhichleads a man to receive
without question what he has been taught, or to reject without proper
examinationother proposed ideas which would conflictwith his familiar
views. More important,in the case of a moderatelyindependentmind, is
the impossibilityof any individual's constructinga new systemof the universe from the ground up withoutthe use of borrowedmaterials. This
fact makesclear the importanceof investigatingthe sourcesand background
of a philosopher,providedwe do not stop withnotingthat certainideas have
been takenfromcertainsources,but proceedto inquire whytheyhave been
borrowedand how they have been transformedto become part of the new
synthesis. Another factor which definitelymakes for continuity,though
this may sound like a paradox, is polemic and discussion. The current
views against which a thinkerreacts mark also the starting-pointfor his
own thought,determinethe range and directionof his ideas, and oftenconstitute the necessary complementto his own system. This is one of the
reasonswhypupils seldomsucceed in maintainingintactthe systemof their
masters. Ideas lose theirforeewhen the conditionsin oppositionto which
they were conceiveddisappear, just as a man leaning with all his force
against a wall will collapse when the wall is suddenlytaken away. Moreover,everyphilosophicalthoughtis a responseto a commonworld. There
are certainbasic facts whichno thinkercan disregard,and certainenduring
problemswhichgive continuityto theirvaryingsolutions. Finally, certain
problemsadmit of only a limited number of basic solutions,which recur
moreor less regularlyin the historyof ideas, thoughthe details may vary.
This accountsforthe fact that thereare a few persistenttrendswhichmay
be tracedthroughthe entirehistoryof thought.
220
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FICINO
AND
POMPONAZZI
ON
MAN
221
On the otherhand, thereare no less powerfulfactorscontributingto a
continual change and variety of ideas. Most thinkersderive some degree
of noveltyfromtheir own personal outlook,or even from a conscious endeavor to be original or "up-to-date." Favorable circumstancesmay help
them to reach conclusionsfor which the premiseshave been prepared by
their predecessors. Intellectual, political, or social conditions prevailing
at the time may force them to modifyideas they would preferto restate,
circumstances. More importantis the
whichwere conceivedunder different
basic fact that each individual and each age starts life anew, has a new
approach to truth,and may hence make a specificallynew contributionto
the realm of ideas. Even in the extremecase in whicha thinkeris merely
copying or summarizingthe work of previous writers,his selection and
emphasiswill depend on his preferences,if not on specificideas. In view
of this necessarycombinationof old and new elements,the historyof ideas
will oftenappear like the variationson a musical theme.
This point of view is particularlyhelpful in understandingthe history
of a specifictrend or traditionwhich may be traced over a longer period,
such as Platonismor Aristotelianism. Such a traditionis held togetherby
a commonorientationtoward a great thinkerof the past and toward some
of his basic ideas. But it is by no means a successionof simple repetitions
of theories established once and for all at the beginning. Otherwise it
would have no interestwhatsoever. What actually takes place is a process
of continualadaptation,in whichthe basic ideas are gradually transformed
historicaland intellectualsituationand
and readjustedto the ever-changing
to thespecificinterestsand problemsof individualthinkers. A later thinker
who triesto interpretor to restatethe ideas of an earlierthinkerwill always
translate old conceptsinto new termsand will reconstructthe old system
according to his own views. He will select and emphasize some elements
of the previoustraditionand omit or disregard others. He will also combine themwithideas borrowedfromoutsidesources or added by himself.
It is obviousthat the historianof philosophymust adjust his methodto
this state of affairs. For a long time the entirestudy of past philosophies
had beenlimitedto statingand criticizing" opinions," and this still remains
the necessarybasis or the final goal of any interpretation. But more recentlythe historyof philosophyhas come to be a special discipline aiming
at a philosophicalunderstandingof past thinkersthroughthe resourcesof
historical and philological scholarship. In pursuing this task, some students have been inclinedto treat the great thinkersas isolated figuresand
to emphasizeonly the novel and original aspects of theirthought. Others,
on the contrary,have been more interestedin the continuingtradition of
certain ideas and tendencies,and have emphasized the permanent and
recurringfactors at the expense of the changing and varying details. I
should thinkthat a combinationof both methodsis needed. The historian
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222
NOTES AND DOCUMENTS
should recognizethe recurringbasic ideas and attitudes in their various
appearances,but he should also describeand explain what is specificin the
different
appearances and its relationto the basic principles. The method
should be flexible,of course, according to the number and significanceof
the novel elementsfound in each representativeof a given tradition. In
thisway the historianof philosophywill do justice to the fact that an intellectual traditionconsistsin the varyingmanifestationsof permanent,basic
principles.
When we apply this methodto the historyof Platonismor Aristotelianthat Platonism and
ism, we are confrontedwith the additional difficulty
Aristotelianismare, so to speak, complementaryto each other. Closely
related fromthe beginning,their very relation has been subject to a continuallychanginginterpretation. The reason is to be found in the relation
betweenPlato and Aristotlethemselves. Modernhistoricalresearchhas led
to the conclusionthat the philosophiesof Plato and Aristotlewere not simsystemsof thought,but ratherstages
ply two oppositeor merelydifferent
in a gradual developmentwhichled fromthe matureworksof Plato through
the dialogues of his old age and throughthe early works of Aristotle (as
reconstructedout of preservedfragments) to the treatises of Aristotle's
mature period. But this historicalinsightcannot preventus fromrecognizing that there really is a basic differencebetween the philosophiesof
Plato and Aristotle.
This ambiguous relation has determinedthe historyof Platonism and
Aristotelianismever since. There were periods in which the contrast
betweenthe two traditionswas stronglyemphasized,but even then the followers of Plato could not help borrowingproblemsand conceptsof Aristotelian origin,nor could the Aristotelianseliminatethe Platonic elements
containedin the systemof theirmaster. At othertimesa so-calledeclectic
tendencyheld that Plato and Aristotle"disagreed in words,but agreed in
theirdoctrines"; but the disagreementin words still remainedquite puzzling for the interpreters,and they were obliged in their attemptedsynthesis to subordinatethe views of one masterto those of the other. Thus
the two currentsrepresenttwo different
poles of philosophicalorientation,
of
each
other.
withoutbeing entirelyexclusive
On the contrary,we might
say thateach belongsto thehistoryof the other,and that just in thosetimes
when one of the two traditionsdefinitelyprevails over the other,it is also
bound to continueand to representthe heritageof that othertradition.
In medievalEurope, Platonismas modifiedby Augustinewas theprevailing trend in philosophy and theology up to the twelfth century, and
remainedan importantsecondarycurrentlong thereafter. Aristotelianism
on the otherhand became predominantin the thirteenthcentury,and retained much of its hold up to the sixteenthcenturyand even afterwards.
Yet from the fifteenthcentury on both Platonism and Aristotelianism
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FICINO
AND POMPONAZZI
ON MAN
223
entereda novel phase under the influenceof the new humanisticmovement.
Both currents,to be sure, continuedthe precedingtraditionsof the Middle
Ages, but at the same time they formulatedthe traditionalproblemsand
doctrinesin novel termsand thus representnew stages in the historyof
thosetraditions. Let us considereach of themin one of their chiefrepresentatives,that is, in Ficino and in Pomponazzi.
Ficino's main work,the Theologia Platonica, is an attemptto prove the
of thesoul by rationalarguments. The problemof immortality
immortality
acquires this importancefor him for the followingreasons. Ficino argues
that we are taughtby a basic experiencethat contemplationof the invisible
and of God is the major activityof human life and constitutesthe very
goal of our existence. But at the same timewe findthat in our presentlife
this goal is attained only in an imperfectfashion,that is, by veryfew persons,and by themonlyfor a brieftime. Hence we must assume that there
will be a futurelife in whichthe highestaim of our existence,the immediate
knowledgeand enjoymentof God, will be attained by a large number of
of thesoul thus
humanbeingsand in a permanentfashion. The immortality
appears as a necessarypostulatefor maintainingthat contemplationis the
goal of human life.'
Pomponazzi also dedicates one of his mostimportantworksto the problem of immortality,but his solution is just the opposite from Ficino's.
There are no rational proofsfor the immortalityof the soul; and since the
doctrineof immortality
mustbe upheld as a religioustruth,it can be based
only on the authorityof the Bible and of the Church, but not on philoat least in the sphere of
sophical arguments. This denial of immortality,
reason,is based on a characteristicpremisewhichagain is just the opposite
ofFicino's emphasison contemplation.The human intellectalways depends
on corporeal,empiricalobjects,and thereis no reason to assume any higher
activityof the human mind whichwould bring it into contactwith purely
intelligibleentities. But Pomponazziis no materialist. Althoughthe intellect is corporealwithregard to its objects,as a subject of thoughtit is immaterial,and in thissense it may be said thatthehumansoul,thoughmortal
in its essence,does at least participate in immortality. Pomponazzi thus
replaces the conceptof immortalityas a perfectlife after death with that
of a participationin immortalityduring the present life. The meaning
of this change becomes apparent in his coneeption of virtue. Whereas
Ficino still accepted the conventionalopinion that immortalityis a moral
postulate in order that virtue and vice may be properlyrewarded after
death,Pomponazzi emphaticallydenies the moral value of such recompense.
The essentialreward of virtue is virtue itself,the essential punishmentof
vice, vice itself. Thus moral doctrineis freed of all metaphysicalpremises,
and at the same timethe goal of human existenceis conceivedas something
1 See: P. 0. Kristeller,The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino (New York, 1943).
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NOTES AND DOCUMENTS
attainable during our present life, and not to be expected in another,
futurelife.2
Ficino and Pomponazzi thus represent two philosophical attitudes
from,if not opposed to each other,whichmay be roughly
basicallydifferent
identifiedwiththe generaltrendof the Platonic and Aristoteliantraditions
that in spite of this contrast
respectively. It is henceall the moresignificant
theyhave somethingin commonwhichseemsto be characteristicof Renaissance thought. The veryfact that such basic importanceis attachedto the
showsa predominantinterestin man and his metaproblemof immortality
physicalposition,not nearly so markedin the previousperiod.3 Moreover,
the contrastingideas of futurecontemplationand of self-containedvirtuous
conduct are but alternativesolutions to the same basic problem,that is,
to the question: what is the ultimateaim of human life? Finally, in the
passages we have selected in order to illustrateFicino's and Pomponazzi's
doctrineof the place of man in the universe,bothof themmake verysimilar
statements,emphasizingthat man is the center of the universe and is
related to all otherparts of the world. Even if Pomponazzi borrowedthe
idea fromFicino, the fact that these statementsare found in entirelydifferentand evenopposedcontextsmakesthe coincidenceall themoreinteresting.
The passages acquire additional significancefromtheir similarityto Pico's
famousOration on theDignity of Man.4
of man was a
It would be entirelywrongto claim that the glorification
new discoveryof the Renaissance. The praise of man because of his invention of the arts is quite familiar in Greek literatureand thought,and so
is the simile of man as microcosm. The intermediateposition of the soul
betweenthe corporealand the intelligibleworld is definitelysuggestedby
Plato and furtherdeveloped by the Neoplatonistsand Hermetics. On the
otherhand, the superiorityof man over other creaturesis definitelyindicated in Genesisand in severalotherpassages of the Old Testament. Early
Christianemphasison the salvation of mankindand on the incarnationof
Christimplieda conceptionof the dignityof man whichwas furtherdeveloped by someof the ChurchFathers,Lactantiusand Augustinefor example.5
These ideas were neverentirelyforgottenduringthe Middle Ages. But
I am under the impressionthat since the beginningof Renaissance humanism the emphasis on man becomes more persistent,more systematic,and
2 Petrus Pomponatius,TractatusDe
ImmortalitateAnimae, translatedby William Henry Hay II (Haverford, 1938).
3 G. Gentile,II concettodell'uomonel Rinascimento,in 11 pensiero italiano del
Rinascimento(Florence, 1940).
4 "Of the Dignityof Man," translatedby Elizabeth L. Forbes, this Journal III
(1942), 347-54; E. Cassirer,ibid., 123-44; 319-46.
5 G. Garin, "La 'dignitas hominis' e la letteraturapatristica," Rinascita, I,
no. 4 (1938), 102-46.
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FICINO
AND
POMPONAZZI
ON
MAN
225
moreexclusive. Petrarch,who in his unsystematicway oftenexpressesideas
which were to be elaborated in the sueceedingperiod, insists that nothing
is admirable but the soul, and that thereis only one importantsubject of
human thought,man himself.6 Before the middle of the fifteenthcentury
Giannozzo Manetti, the Florentine humanist,composed a treatise On the
Excellency and Dignity of Man as a counterpartto Innocent III's work
On the Misery of MalJ.7 With Ficino the glorificationof man assumes a
moredefinitephilosophicalsignificance. He emphasizesmainlytwo aspects:
man's universalityand his centralposition. Man's universalityis reflected
in his relationto all parts of the universeand in his unlimitedaspirations.
His positionin the centerof the universe,moreover,gives man an importance unrivaled by any other being except God himself. Pico, obviously
followingFicino, modifieshis theoryon one characteristicpoint. Man is
no longerthe centerof theuniverse,but he is detachedfromthe entireseries
of existingthingsand freeto choosehis own formof life. Thus the dignity
of man is no longer conceivedin termsof his universality,but in termsof
his liberty.8 These ideas of Ficino and Pico exerciseda wide influencein
the later Renaissance. A good example of this influenceis Vives' Fable on
Man, based entirelyon Pico's conception.9
The passages from Ficino about the universal rule of man over the
elementsseem also to have somethingin commonwith the Baconian program of the dominionof man over nature. His conclusion that man is
endowed with an almost god-like mind because Archimedeswas able to
constructa model of the heavenlysphere,may even suggestGalileo's assertion that God's knowledgeof mathematicsis differentin quantitybut not
in kind fromour own mathematicalknowledge.10Of course in the latter
two cases no direct influenceis likely, and the emphasis and contextare
but the comparisonmay help to clarifysome implications
entirelydifferent;
on bothsides.
The positionof man in the universehas a bearing not only on man, but
also on theuniverse. Hence the statementsof Ficino, Pico, and Pomponazzi
have a definitesignificancenot only in the historyof the conception of
man, but also in the historyof cosmology. The medieval conceptionof the
universewas dominatedby the idea of a hierarchyof substances,whichgoes
6 Francesco Petrarea, Le familiari,bk. IV, no. 1 (ed. V. Rossi, v. I [Florence,
1933], 159). Id., Le traiteDe sui ipsius et multorumignorantia,ed. L. M. Capelli
(Paris, 1906), 24 f.
7See Gentile,op. cit., 90 ff.
8 See Kristeller,op. cit., 117 ff.,407 ff.
9 Joannes Ludovicus Vives, Fabula de homine,in Opera Omnia, IV (Valencia
1783), 3-8.
10 Galileo Galilei, Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo, giornata
prima (Edizione Nazionale, VII [Florence, 1897], 128 f.).
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226
NOTES
AND DOCUMENTS
back to Neoplatonicsources. Whereas in the fieldof biology this idea of
hierarchysurvivedup to fairlyrecenttimes,in the fieldof cosmologyit was
definitelyabandoned by early modernscience. In the astronomyof Kepler
of rank and perfectionbetween
and Galileo thereis no roomfor differences
heaven and earth, or between the various stars or the various elements.
But even beforethe new astronomywas definitelyestablished a gradual
disintegrationof the old idea of hierarchytook place, most definitelyin
Nicholas of Cusa and later in GiordanoBruno.
It would seemthat the conceptionsof Ficino and Pico played theirmore
modest part in this disintegration. To be sure, Ficino takes a hierarchy
of his metaphysicalsystem. But
of fiveprinciplesas theverystarting-point
he immediatelyasks how the various levels of that hierarchyare related to
each other; and he seeks a central link which throughits attributescould
mediatebetweentheoppositeextremesof theuniverse,and throughits manifold aspirations and movementscould transmitforces and qualities from
one end of the universeto the other. This questionactually transcendsthe
limits of the traditionalnotion of hierarchy,and implies a dynamic conception of the universesuch as was developed by the natural philosophers
of the sixteenthcentury. Whereas on this point Pomponazzi merelyfollows Ficino, Pico goes one step farther. He also maintainsthe notion of a
hierarchy;but forhimman is no longera definiteelementin the hierarchial
series, not even its privileged center: he is entirely detached from the
hierarchyand can move upward and downwardaccordingto his free will.
Thus the hierarchyis no longerall-inclusive,while man, because of his possessionof freedom,seemsto be set entirelyapart fromthe orderof objective
reality.
The last observationpoints to a more general characteristicof Renaissance thought: it is a period of transition,in a specificsense which does
not apply to most otherperiods of thought. To be sure there are always
varietiesof opinionand orientation. But the philosophiesof the thirteenth
or of the seventeenthcenturywere based on commonprinciples. Renaissance thoughthas commonproblemsand commonaspirations,but no common principles or solutions. The disintegrationof old principles that
appears during the Renaissance has not only a negative value in clearing
the way for the formulationof new principles that was bound to come.
It has also a positivesignificance,because it is generatedby new formsof
experienceand new problemswhich were destined to be absorbed in the
succeedingsynthesisof the seventeenthcentury.
ColumbiaUniversity.
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