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The
Robert E. Gross
Collection
A
Memorial
to the
Founder
of the
Business Administration Library
Los Angeles
^.
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s:
o
CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE PRESE N^
GERMAN WAR.
^'^.efc^M
LONDON:
Printed for
John Wilkie,
at
Church-Yard,
the Bible, in
176®.'
St, Paul'j
-^
A
^ A
fT
Jl.
-\
A
ADVERTISEMENT.
AS
Author of
the
ventured to
ceived opinion,
differ
may
it
thefe Confideratlons
has
from the commonly
re-
be of ufe to confirm his fen-
timents with the highefl: and
authority
mod
unexceptionable
that of his FrufTian
Majefty, who, in
a writing, faid to have been drawn up
by himfelf,
fpeaks in the following manner
;
:
"AS
no German prince has a right to meddle
with the internal policy of Great Britain,
nor with the
conftitution of
its
government
;
I
have fome reafons
to hope, that the
Englifn nation will not meddle
with the domeftic affairs of the
Empire.
And I
entertain thofe hopes
the more; becaufe England
has no reafon to medc^Je with this
quarrel from any
confideration of
although
man
it
its
ccn-,merce, or otherwife.
had a greater inclination
court than for another, yet I think
reafonable to pretend,
tliat
And
one Gertoo un-
it
luch powerful and ref-
peftable princes, as thofe of the
be obliged to rule their conduct
tions
for
Empire are, lliould
upon the inclina-
of thofe amongft the Englifh,
who
i^rive to
make
ADVERTISEMENT.
n
make
their
that are of
countrymen enter
into foreign quarrels,
no manner of concern to England.'*
Refcript to a manifcflo of his Prufllan Majefty,
delivered and printed at
jVliniller at
London,
tiie
fame time, by
in the year
his
1754.
CO
N
S
I-
CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE PRESENT
GEPvMAN WAR.
^^^^^ H E
^?"rfi?N
fs
i
&^^^3
author of the following Confide*
rations does not pretend to
more know-
ledge or better intelligence than other
perfons
he propofes only to offer to
:
the publick the calm difpaflionate reflec-
of
tions
our
a
affairs,
private
man, upon the prefcnt
and the method we have
of carrying on the war
to
him
others
his
of
chofen
Refledions, which appear
:
to be jufl, and
may approve
lately
(late
which therefore he fuppofes
thtrnfclvcs to the underftandings of
fellow fubjects,
who
fliali
read
them
as
he intends to write, without any view to particular
men
;
but to contribute that httle he
to the publick fervice.
they will then be
well founded, he
negkded
is
is
capable of
If his obfervations are falfe,
fure
:
if
they are true and
they are of importance
cno-'gh to defcrve our regard.
B
The
i
[
The
gaged
in, is a
War
our attention
*i
yet that
is
fefiedly
at
is
time en-
at this
How much foever
with France.
may
warped towards
in
1
only war, which England
be diverted, or our affedions
power of Europe;
this or the other
the only State, which
France
war with.
time of peace, and
England
is
its
pro-
natural rival
enemy
only formidable
its
is
in
So far are we from having declared
war with any other State, that Britain has fcarce a
conteft fubfifting with any other power in Europe.
time of war.
Ruflia, Sweden,
Denmark, Holland,
of Germany, and the
may each
ill
•,
the
Empire
feveral particular States of
it,
of them, at different times, wifh us well or
now no
but Britain has
oppofition of interell
with any of them, and in a general national rcfpeft
has very
little
to
hope or
from them.
fear
we take a comparative view of the ftrength of
two nations, whatever may be faid at prefent of
our naval force, it mufl be allowed that France is
If
the
fuperior to us in
its
Could we indeed
land force.
revive die old Gallic conftitution, which prevailed
under the pofterity of
was divided,
as
Hugh
Germany
who
of independent princes,
to the fovercign,
other, as
they
provinces in our
Burgundy and
is
Capet
when France
a number
paying homage
;
now, among
after
made war with him,
pleafed
own
:
or had
poflcffion,
we
or one an-
the maritime
and the Dukes of
Bretat^ne for our allies
;
we might
then carry on a war ot equally with the crown of
J'rance at land, and hope for fuch vidories
as rhofe
^^
3
[
and Agincourt.
But from
when the whole of France was united to
of CrefTy,
the time
crown, and the
the
of the States and no-
liberties
fubjeded
abfolutely
bility
1
Poi6tiers,
to
power,
its
the
kingdom of France has been, in the extent of
its coiintry, the number of its inhabitants, and the
greatnefTof
maps
will teach
on
ters
revenue, fuperior to Britain.
its
us the
of thefe
firft
all
;
we have
learned the
lafl:
;
may
did not at
him
difpofe
all
:
to
and
cv-Z^r^
^
winter from a
^"'^^^^
own
l^*^7^^^
and whofe argument
y /^//^
magnify the French
^f^^CVy*
N Revenue.
France
"Ji^fU^J/-^^^
is
ftronger
land,
at
not
only
England, but than any other power
The Empire
try,
if
into a great
in
of Germany in the extent of
and the number of its inhabitants
not fuperior, to France
;
may
its
Orto^o^'
its
coun-
be equal,
but the divifion of
it
States,
^^^
^V/ /
A''^^^^^
W^a2a Jrh
whole force united under one^ <<}tdJ'yk^-
abfolute monarch, renders
rior to France.
than
Europe.-^^iJ,^^^^
number of feparate independent
while France has
Hence
Germany
it is,
greatly infe-
that France has for a
century pad been formidable to the
reft
of Europe
and has twice been able to fupport a
lono-
j
war
againft the united alliance of the whole.
"Whenever any power
up
Um
know-
be allowed to have the beft
lege of thofe of other countries
/
^^hdl-hxJ^
the wri-
gentleman, who, by being the mafter of our
finances,
^
'''^^^^'^
The
political arithmetic agree in the fecond
the third
^^
in
Europe
to a degree of ftrength,
much
(liall
have grown
greater than that
4
[
of any other power
over
it
]
from thenceforward be-
intereft of the other States, to
comes the
ful
-,
mutually to
tacked by
affift
is
the univerfal
tics,
which has held good
Brit
eftablifhing
in
caufe of the
a
as
monarchy
and
;
all
maxim
mud
is
related
of poli-
from the
ages,
of governments.
pugnaut, univerji vincuuiur,
torian
and
it,
each other^ when they are at-
This
it.
be watch-
growth of
to guard againft the
it,
Dum
ftngidi
by ,the hif-
Roman
extending the
be a principal,
oi;
at leaft
a concomitant caufe, in the growth of every other.
It
reft
was from
that France and the
this principle,
of Europe were jealous of Charles the Vth,
when Germany, Spain, and
thp Netherlands, with
the Indies, were united under one head.
'
" And
"
all true
Englifimen, f.nce the decay cj she Sparii/h
"
monarchy
y
*'
fecurity of their religion^ liberty
*'
their hoKcur,
"
**
chiefly
have. ever taken
their ivealth,
it
for granted, that the
and
upon thep'oper meafures
to timeagainfl the
and prcprty
their trade
to be taken
;
that
depend
from time
growing pozver cf France.'' I'his
was the language of parliament in their addr^fs to
King William juft before his death-, and of that
Koufe of Commons, which has been thought his
and to have beft confultcd
wifeft,
the
nation's
intereft.
The
three
indangcrcd
alone
powers of Europe, ,which are moft
by
France, and which by their union
can carry on an cfiefiual land war againft
France
.
:
5
[
are
Fi-ance,
Spain, and Savoy, Ruffia,
may any
]
Germany, Holland, and England
Denmark, and Sweden,
of them accede to fuch an alliance, but
Germany, Holland, and England, muft be
b,aris
of every confederacy, which can be of any avail
againft the land
I
the.
power of France.
never read the hiftory of the two grand
alliarir
ces which were formed by King Wiliam againft
the growing povyer of France,
without feeling the
warmeft fentiments of gratitude
Never
verer of Europe.
to that great deli-
did' King of England ap-
pear with greater dignity, than he did in that great
Congrefs, held at the
Hague
in the year
1691,
Emperor and Em_pi^e, the Kings of Spain,
Sweden, and Denmark, by their feveral ambaifadors, the Eleftors of Germany by their particular minifters, and (eve;ral of them in their own
when
the
pexfons, v/ith
Germany,
all
of Europe
;
a,E leafl?
fifty
of the greateft Princes of
attended to hear,
and
all
him plead t he caufa
of.
An
men upon
tilh
league
augufl:
worthy of a King of England to fight
alliance
head
common
This was an
joined in one
and declaration againil France.
pay
alliance
the French frontiers, befide thofe in Bri-
*.
And
though King William was not
•:
* Lewis XI\'th had generally
this
war
;
at the
which brought down 200,000
fometimcs
Germany and
fix.
five
End never
the
armies in the courfe of
lefs
than four.
Thofe
ia
Flanders often amounted to joojcco foldiers
befide garrifons kept in the froiuier towns.
,
;
The French monarch
6
I
]
the moft fuccefsful warrior, yet the weight of this
broke the power of the French, and made
alliance
them
fue for thejjeaceof jRyfwic k.
faith
which was oblerved
And
the
oood
conducing that
the equal regard, which was paid
to
Princes concerned, gave fo general a fatifin
the
treaty, and
the
all
fadlion, as to lay a firm
foundation of confidence
honour of the Englilh government ; and enabled King William to form a fecond like alli-
in the
ance,
when
the death of the
fcizure of that whole
France,
made
it
King of Spain, and the
monarchy for the grandfon of
neceflary.
France, in confequence of that
firfl:
alliance, be-
held five armies of 50,000
three
tiers,
men each upon its fronof them commanded by the Electors of
Bavaria, Saxony, and Brandenburgh, not fighting
with one another for the French diverfion, but in-
vading of France upon the Rhine, befide the grand
army of the Empire under the Duke of Lorrain,
and the united force of England and Holland in
Flanders.
was
An J,
at length
troops of
all
though the ftrength of France
exhauflcd by contending with the
Europe yet the long oppofition,
-,
made to the united efforts of Denmark,
Sweden, Germany, Savoy, Spain, Holland, and
which
it
England, proves the immenfe height of power,
had at one time, including his lard and naval
forces,
450,000 men in pay. Neither the TurkiHi Empire, nor the
Roman, had cv«r fo many wars at once to lupport.
jiarch
/*
^
4
^
'k
i
*vf
y^^'^AiRE
•
,^/a^ /m<^^^^^^;nr.^^^
JeSiiic. cap. XV,
^^hich
A
7
[
]
which that kingdom may arrive
hite necefTity there
We have
fince
and the abfo-
at,
was of forming fuch an union.
heard fo
much
of the attempts of
France towards an univerfal monarchy, and the balneceflary to be preferved in op-
lance of power,
made a pretence for
fo many meaner purpofes ; that we now naufeate
the fubjed, and do not Hke to hear any more of it.
pofition to
it
;
and have feen
it
Yet a meafure, which was once
to
tinue
be
may
France
to
right
not have a
is
the fame, and
midable to Europe
which
either
Europe
:
its
XlVth
is
it is
in general, or
now
at
though
;
and
yet the king-
land forces are
at leaft,
ticular, can be indangered by
which England
muft con-
And
Prince, equally able
encerprizing with Lewis the
dom
right,
eternity.
ftill
for-
the only State
England
in par-
and the only
State,
war with.
Every meafure, which has a tendency to the
uniting the powers of Europe among themfelves
and againft France, muft therefore be for the general
good of Europe, and the
of England
particular intereft
:
and every meafure, which tends to
fet the States
of Germany, Holland, and England,
war with each other, or amongft themmuft be a meafure calculated for the good
cither at
felves,
of France, and the prejudice of the other powers
of Europe.
For the fame reafon every meafure,
tending to the continuance or increafe of fuch a
war, muft be for the benefit of France, and the
prejudice
2
8
[
prejudice of
thfc'
fiVdj
Eufope
becaufe it is a weakening of
ahd keeping thofe powers ac
:
tif Fl*4iice"i
variance, from
]
whom
France can have nothing to
in their union.
kkr, but
^Ev^r
immediately preceding
times
the
firice
fhe tfdaty of Wellphalia,
flant
aim
blifh
an
Frehch government to
iht
equality
keep th^m
as'
i^th'Gther, both
trtoch as
of Sweden,
crc'wh
the Enipire, had
of Auftria
:
many
years preceding that
and therefore, when Guftavus Adol-
and
his
it,
fucceeding
\vho!e courfe of the
France, to ferve
war
:
generals,
its
through the
and the Cardinals Rich-
and Mazarine, while they were perfecuting
in France,
Faith
in
became the Defenders of the Proteftant
This independency of the fe-
German
States,
which was
Princes call the Liberties of
Syfbem
it
Germany.
fo firmly eftablidi-
cd by the treaty of Weftphalia,
man
The
purpofes, willingly entered into alliances with
him,
veral
divided from
in teligion.
and the Proteftant States of
fb'f
phus declared war againft
lieii
and
been indangered by the power of the Houfe
treaty,
own
Germany,
poffibfe
and
in intereft
efta-
and independence
pbv^tr
b'f
of princes in
a nlimber
aiVrbn^
fb"
of
has been the con-
it
And
of Germany.
guarantied this
treaty
;
is
what the Ger-
Germany, and the
the French willingly
knowing,
that while they
kept Germany thus divided, they themifelves (hould
bd the
lefs
indangered by
it.
h
9
[
war between England and Holland, or
of thefe and G ermany, or in Ger-
If every
y_
bet ween
many
be,
ei t her
between any two States of the Empire,
itfelf,
lb far as
goes, a prejudice to Europe, and a
it
fecuricy to France
wars
]
fliall
and much
of Europe,
courage
j
follows, that whenever fuch
it
arile between any two German States
more between any two principal powers
will be the policy of
it
France
Thus
and inflame them.
court, in Charles the IId*s time,
the
to en-
French
encouraged the
war with the EngliHi, and
afterwards excited the court of England to declare
Dutch
to
undertake
a
war againft Holland, promifing
tance of their
fleet,
to both the
afTif-
but leaving them both in battle
to deflroy each other*
On
the other hand, whatever wars fhall arife be-
tween any two States of Europe, or any two orinces
of
the,
Empire,
it
will be the intereft
State, except France, to
if
it
of every other
thefe differences,
can be done, by their mediation and
Oifices.
good
V
•
If every war,
which
arifes
between any two
,^
par-*
ticular States of the Ernpire, be itfe'f a misfortune,
^
and contrary to the intereft of Europe
"^
be
^
compofe
(lili
the greater, and the mifchicf fo
extenfive, if France
war, and
flial'l
make
cordingly
itfelf a
fhall join itfelf to either
to keep the difpute alive fo
wc
find
j
much
the evil will
much
the
more
party in the
of the two
the longer.
fides,
Ac-
that this has been the conftant
:!^.^^^.fe^^^^^
.
'^
lO
[
]
mix itfelf in all quarrels in the
Empire, and keep up the difputes of the contendpolicy of France, to
ing parties
as
long
as
reduced, or thc7
it
can
both
fhall
one or the other
till
;
is
their intereft to
fee
agree.
Should England or Holland take the oppofite
part
any
in
fuch difpute, this would
misfortune
greater
be a
ftill
and could only ferve to ex-
;
tend and multiply the evil, and lengthen the conti-
nuance of
it
and, whoever be
^
the parties, or
mud
whatever be the event of the war,
Europe
tbrtune to
and
j
fo
long as
it
be a mif-
continued
mull be a weakening of Germany, and a
fervice to
the caufc of France.
Thus
Germany be con-
the whole force of
let
fidcred as
equal to a hundred
powers of
it
:
and
let
any two
be at war together, whofe force fhall
So
be to each other as eight to ten of thofe parts.
far as this
war goes,
is a lofs to
it
Europe by
the de-
iUuflion or diminution ot the force of eighteen
parts.
If the
quarrel be adopted
other powers of
diminution
Germany, that produces a lofs or
many more parts If France, to
of fo
keep up the
:
conteft,
and add to the
by any of the
(hould take the weaker fide,
power whofe
force
is
eight, fo as
make it fupexior to ten, the evil is not leflened,
but made greater. Should England be fo unforto
tunate
as
to join
land force of
I
L_
in
fifty into
the
contefb,
and fend
its
the war, and France therc_
upon
;
II
[
]
•upon fend a force of eighty
England would bs but
little
ance; the Englifh would
the force of
more
the
is
;
the party afTifted by,
-,
benefited by the aili-
tiill
be the weaker fide
Europe would be diminiflied
fo
much
This
and France only be advantaged.
a kind of reafoning which muft hold invariably
juft
in
all
the part of
Hefle
ages.
And
whether Britain
fliall
take
Hefie againft Saxe, or of Saxe againft
of Auftria againft Pruffia, or of Prufiia
;
againft Auftria
;
the intereft of
Europe
is
hurt, the
powers of Germany are weakened, and France only
O
can be aggrandized at the expence of both.
Should the reader think
nute, and
make
Europe can be
thefe
fo
a doubt,
much
this reafoning too
whether the caufe of
affe^led
by the difputes of
minor States of the Empire
;
I
am
not dif-
pofed to augment the importance of them
then,
if
the intereft of
mi-
:
buc
Europe be not concerned
them, that of England muft be much
lefs fo
;
in
becaufe
no German difpute can be an objed: worthy the
Britiih regard, but only as the intereft of Europe is
affefted by it.
Whether Wittenburg or Wirtemburgh, LunenburghorLawenburgh, Sultzbach or
Anfpatch, fliall get the better in any difpute, is an
affair,
which may engage the
dices,
and fometimes the
Eledor: but
among
all
paflions, the preju-
intereft
of any particular
thefe party quarrels of
Germans
themfelves are beneath the notice of the
imperial crown of thefe
none of them, but
as
C
realms.
members of
2
knows
Empire i.i
Britain
the
general
12
[
genera], and
as
adttiated againft
Infiiort,
mon
parts
]
of one great whole, to be
common enemy, y/
France the
either there is fuch a thing,
com-
as a
of Europe, and Germany is or may
be of ufe to Britain and the common caufc^ ; or
it
intereft
cannot.
If there
is
no fuch
Germany cannot be of
common
ufe to
it,
caufe,
or
then certainly
it
cannot be ofufc for England to lavifh its rarliions
about it. If there be fuch a caufe, and Germany
ever can be of ufe to England by ferving it, it
can
be fo only by its union.
Germany divided
into
faaions,
other
and fighting one half of
half,
cannot
the caufe of Europe.
of the Emperor and Empire, and
which compofe
therefore
quarrels
in
againO:
the
tlie
feveral States,
ading under one head, can be
it,
of any avail for this purpofe.
fions
it
weaken France, or ferve
Nothing but a hearty union
the
The fowing
Empire, and.
between any of
its
abettino-
divi-
the
members, may ferve
humour of a particular eledor ; certainly does
ih've the ciuife of France, but never can the intereft
the
of England.
I don't determine,
whether the Germans are likely
in any one point ; and much
foon to agree together
lefs in
uniting with England and the States General
war with France: but till they do thus agree,
England has nothing to do with their little internal
in
a
quarrels.
The
only chance we have however for
fuch an union, and the only means of accelerating
Br4^^^AiC^ "i^^^ddt^tsfAK^ilti ^^^t^^^^gfe^;^
13
[
it,
is
to leave the
.1
French to themfelves
conquer Germany, for that
to harrafs
it
as
much
invpoflible to do,
is
but
they pleale, and malcc
as
themfelves as odious as
not to
j
we can
defire.
Europe
If a regard for the intereft of
ought to keep us from meddling
in
general
German do*
meitic vi^ar, the particular intereft of Germany will
be no lefs hurt by our engaging in it.
One of the
any
which can happen
greateft calamicies,
is
in
A
doubtlefs that of a civil war.
to a country,
war between
two members of the Empire
is
head, under which
tliey are all
united, a civil war.
There may be feme
difference between the degree of
in refpeft to that
obedience, due from the feveral States to the head of
the Empire, and that of the fubjeds of any parti-
kingdom to theirs ; but fo far as
of the Empire is affeded, and fo far as
cular
argument
One
ing
is
concerned, this
is
a
the intereft
the prefent
German
civil
war.
of the moft mifchievous circumftances attendcivil
wars has generally been, that each
fide,
being more animated by their party hatred, than by
the love of their country,
call
in
a foreign force to
ways enter
that
to ferve their
of the country
ticular
in
the weaker
own
too apt to
Thefe
al-
purpofes, and not
general, or
party, which invites
a precedent, and
is
its affiftance.
them.
of the parThis begets
excites the other party to take
the fame dcftruclive meafure.
over-run with armies
much
Thus
the State
greater than
its
own
and every part of the country ravaged to the
is
•,
c]e-
ftrudlion
H
[
,
]
ftru6lion of the individuals
the war terminates in an
what
this
the general hiftory of
is
what age of the world you think
common
deed
perhaps
Place the fcene where you will,
civil wars.
the
at length
very different from
had originally intended.
either of the parties
Every one knows, that
till
;
ifiue,
was
courfe of them.
powers of Europe
in-
have
the
to
much imploy'd
fo
or in
has been
Our own country
enough,
fortunate
this
fit,
all
againft each
ether, during the period of our civil war, ihat they
had no
to attend to the Englifh concerns.
leifure
Though
France
did
us
kind
the
of
office
fending a minifter, under the pretence of a media-
our difference?, and blow them up
tor, to inflame
into a civil
war
as foon as
it
could
but
j
its
troops
were otherwife imploy'd.
has been fo unhappy, as to have adif-
Germany
pute
between
arife
of
tv*'o
its
leading Princes about
the right to four great dutchies in one of its remotell:
What
provinces.
I
do not know
thoufand of
fpent fo
fomewhere
nor
;
my
many
the
I
names of
fuppofe does one
fubjeds
fellow
millions about
in Silefia,
thefe are,
;
I
man
confefs
in ten
though we have
them
:
but they
one of the moll eaftern
lie
in-
land provinces of Germany, with twenty intermediate States between us
and them.
Such
a difpute
Germany was doubtlcfs a misfortune to
However, as the revenues of neither of the
arifin2; in
it.
parties are inexhauftible
a war,
if
they were
•,
the probable iffue of fuch
left to
themfelves, would be,
that
;
[
15
]
them would find their revenues brought^to an end, and would be obliged to
that one or the other of
Whether
fubmit.
Pruffia or
Auftria carried
its
point, cannot be a matter of the lead confequence
to
England
befide that the country itfelf
for,
:
is
too great a diftance for us to be affefled by
at
it
England has
adlually taken both fides of the con-
troverfy, and
therefore cannot be really intcrefied
But the misfortunes of Germany are
fpeedily determined.
Unhappily for the
in either.
not fo
poor people, the one
fide
Germany,
tereft of
the French,
called in
Can
and the other the Engli(h.
this
be for the in-
to have the flame of a civil
war
fed with a flock of fewel infinitely greater than
own? To have
the revenues of
its
England and France
poured into the Empire, fo much the longer to
enable the Germans to defi:roy each other, and multhe miferies of this civil
tiply
parts of the
But
it
Empire
may
be faid perhaps, that,
not take any part in thefe
neverthelefs will
ing
is
far this
war through
:
if Britain
German
the
does
wars, France
and therefore England's interfer-
only a neceflTary oppofition to France.
may be
all
?
How
right in refpedt of England, (hall be
confidered hereafter j.but
we
are
now
treating of
it
only in relation to the intereft of Germany. Doubtlef)
then
the intereft of France, as often as
it is
of the German princes go to war, to
weakc-r party, and blow
the French
may
aflift
up the contention.
any
the
This
pradife by thcmfelves, to a certain
i6
[
and for a certain time
tain degree,
mans
their
fee
(hall
make
ihall
own
how
balance even
and
;
if,
Germany
as often as
France
?
that
all
will al-
enough to keep the
England can do by its
many more
and enabling the
into the quarrel,
Gt^rmans to cut each others throats fo
That
Ger-
England adopts the
fid:*,
be the drawing fo
ofFicioufnefs, will
longer.
the
to fend troops
ways take care
parts of
But
Germany reheved
is
till
;
and the French
intereft,
themfelveS odious.
France declares on one
other,
]
is,
much
the
leave the French to thcmfelves,
much
may make
they will doubtkfs do as
mifchief as they canj
but in time they
themfelves generally
Germans
hated, and the
England,
fo
long
as
enough
wife
it
courted by both parties, and by
may
of peace vanilhes, the inftant
which
5
we
good
its
mediate a peace between them
of the parties
to agree
:
and
continues neuter, will be
:
offices
but the hope
declare for either*
are thereby fet the farther at
That is, we double the calamity to Germany, and divide with France the odium of it.
variance.
But
many,
ral
the French are left to themfelves in Ger-
if
this will increafe their influence in the feve-
courts
of
cannot help
ties
are
For a time
it.
So long
that.
cxafperated
itfelf,
it
may
;
but Britain
contending par-
againlt each other, England^
by efpoufing the caufe of
benefit the fide
it
as the
adopts
;
either,
cannot probably
certainly cannot benefit
and on!y makes the influence of France over
the othtr fide fo
much
the ftronger.
Would
.4
Germany be over-run by
Humanity teaches us
the French ? I anfvver, No.
but Germany is not
to wifh hurt to no country
Would we
then have
all
;
If the French will
ours.
the
German
up
ftir
yield to them,
any country
weak enough
England anfwerable
is
Europe
in
among
divifioiiS
Princes, and they are
for this
to be over-run
is
?
to
If
by the
French, whither can their armies (efpecially when
we
into
war with them) be better turned, than
are at
Germany
A
?
country, which they never
can.
conquer, which can beft bear their invafions, and
the powers of which alone, by uniting together, are
Germans themfelves have fo
little afFe6tion for Germany^ as to call in foreign
troops to opprefs it ; are we bound to feel a greater
able to repeil them.
If
concern for their country than they
make
itfelf
the general
to refcue oppreffcd States
negledl
its
own
their
But
own
fhall
opprefled
?
we
Is
;
and exhauft
wars, in order to fave
who
of themfelves, and
wards
?
Britain to
Knight Errant of Europe,
will
deliverance
itfelf,
men
not do any thing to-
?
fufFer the Proteftant intereft
This
is
and
in fpite
a queftion put into the
to be
mouths
of many good people, and therefore deferves a particular
anfwer.
We
happen now
minal Proteftant Prince on our
to
fide
;
have one no-
and therefore
the Proteftant intereft has been fpecioufly held out
to our view.
for
the
But
in the laft
war we were fighting
Queen of Hungary, and
this
Proteftant
Prince had only a Popifti King of France for his
D
defender.
;
I3
[
Did we
defender.
at
all
concerned
]
then think the Protcftant interefl
war
in that
in this? This great
And why
?
religion,
writings
his
We fet
void of
and every good principle.
Have
made
out even
as
a
us think better of his religion
in this
war with confidering him
an enemy to our Proteftant Ele6lorace
;
an army of Ruffians to invade him.
What
then, that has at once changed
from
him
a defpifer of all religion,
the Proteftant.''
In the
fir ft
vva3
man
then univerfally decried by us,
faith,
we
(hould
champion of Proteftantifm
But not
place, if
in
?
as
and hired
is
it
our opinion,
to the defender of
to infill
on
we recoiled
this.
the ftate of
Eu-
rope at the time of the breaking out of the prefent
war, what one Popifti power had attacked the Proteftant religion, or
had ftiewn the
leaft intention to
infringe the liberties of any one Proteftant State
Something of
that fort
but
time
at
that
there Was not
Palatine or a
a
Even
Saltzburgher complaining.
that
moft
gotted iloufe of Auftria was then praftifing
its
religious tyranny over
than
it
?
might have happened before
its
Proteftant
hid been ordinarily ufed
novation had been made
in
to.
the
bi-
lefs
iubjeds,
Not one
Empire
of
in
in-
pre-
judice of the Proteftant intercft, except only that
the
K.
of
P.
had
built
a
Popilh church at
Brlin, and had ihe foundationftone
name,
in
laid in his
own
the midft of his Proteftant dominions.
Should the Proteftants of Germany therefore,
fuch a time, have pretended,
tliat
their religion
in
was
in
L.
19
[
fence of
the Papifts
it,
may
there never was a time,
when
ground of complaint, than
mencement of
this war.
led a religious
war
might
?
down
again
-,
for
the Proteftants had hTs
at
the time of the
How then
The
for the de-
very juftly conclude,
never will lay them
they
that
]
and that they took up arms
in danger,
truth
is,
com-
can this be cal-
fuch an
aflfertion.
pafs in an Englifh afiembly, willing to beit.
They might be
Emprefs Queen was going todeftroy
any thing that was faid to
lieve
told, that the
Germany
the Proteftant religion, and the fyftem of
:
but no one of the Proteftant powers upon the continent
was under the
to their religion,
apprehenfion of danger
leaft
from the Houfe of
that time,
at
Auftria, whatever might have been their jealoufies
from the K. of P.
Should any one doubt
next
the
which
place
round Europe, we
in
fhall
this,
who
confider,
engaged
are
of
this
find
as
States fighting againft us, as
who
rather
wifti
ill,
which therefore they
caufe
in
teftants,
are
ftiil
-,
many
-,
wifli well, to
in
parties,
we look
Proteftant
and more,
our caufe,
do not think the
Swedes and Saxons are
the Ruffians,
farther
the
If
for us
certainly
of Proteftantifm.
arms againft us
the
than
are
war.
him
let
though not Pro-
from being
Papifts-,
and
Dutch and Danes have given no proof of their
I do not mean the
wiftiing fuccefs to our caufe.
defence of
H—
r,
but the war, in which
porting the K. of P.
we
Does any one think,
D
2
are fup-
that the
French
20
[
]
French attack the Hanoverians, becaufe they are
P/oteftants
ai
mies
Did
Or
?
tiiither
they
were in
then
we may
Europe
to be
of the
poffeffion
country
Surely
?
allow the other Proteftant States of
judges of the
have expreffed the
call this
apprehenfions of danger
leaft
We
it.
of their reli-
intereft
and not one of thefe
:
may,
we
if
hardily
plcafe,
K. of P. the defender of the Proteftants
but no one Proteftant State
us for what
?
the leaft attempt of that fort, while
gion, as well as ourfelves
threatened to
them to Popery
to convert
is
make
they
that the end of their fending their
he has done
Europe
in
;
Proteftant State aft v/ith us,
nor will any
;
thank
will
German
except only thole,
^hich we have bought, and taken into our pay.
In the
of
this
laft
place, let us confider the operations
war, and what are the effeds, which
aftually produced
lowed
;
which
to be the beft rule to
in
form
a
very
ftant
champion, was the entering
-,
is al-
concerted operation of this Prote-
ing of Saxony, the
pire
has
judgment upon.
The
firft
it
every other cafe
and fetting
firft
all
and
feiz-
Proteftant State of the
Em-
into,
the Proteftant
^
Stat*. s at
va-
riance with each other.
The
reader will remember, that
confiJering, whether
but how
far
it is
tifis
Pruftian
a religious one.
we
are not
warwas
now
ajuft one;
Whether
Pruffia
pr Saxony be in the right, the hurt done to the
Proteftant
;
21
[
Proteftant
interefl:
in
]
Germany, by
Proteftant Eledorates at variance,
and the PopiOi States alone can
of
flru(5lion
fetting
juft the
two
fame
rtjoice in the de-
There have been times, when
eitaer.
the zeal ot thr Popes of
quent
is
Rome made them
confiftorics to confult,
how
hold fre-
they might bell
deftroy that peililent northern herefy, as our religion
was once
called,
when
the reformation was
6rfl:
adop-
Germany and there
have been bigotted Emperors who have formed
leagues, and made many attempts, in conjundtion
with the court of Rome, for the deftruftion of Prote-
ted by the northern powers ol
ftants-,
;
which Providence was pleafed
But what
is
there,
that
the
bittcreft:
our religion could have devifed,
ferve their purpofe, as
to difappoinir.
enemies of
fo effeftually to
the lighting up a war be-
tv/een ihefe Proteftant States themfelves
?
without raifmg any jealoufy of Papifts
the cruelty
of perfecution
;
;
Which,
without
without the odium of
incurring any breach of faith, fhould
fet thefe Propowers upon worrying each other, with ingreater deftruftion than any the iharpeft
teftant
finitely
perfecution ever produced, and ruining the whole
north of Germany.
Could a Gregory or
a Ferdinand have wifhed for
any thing more, than that Saxony, where the reformation
end
:
firft
its
began, fhould be ravaged from end to
country
fuburbs burnt,
banilliment,
its
wafted,
its
its
cities
ruined,
their
princes and nobles driven intp
merchants
beggared,
its
peafants
forced
22
I
]
made
forced into arms, and
to (heath their fwords
bowels tf their countrymen, or
in
thofe of
their Proteflant neighbours, Bohemians,
Hunga-
in the
and
rians,
Silefians
or elfe forced to
•,
fly
forfhelter
armies of France, there to fight under
the
into
Popirti banners, againft
their
Proteflant brethren,
and made to march over the bodies of Proteftant
Enghflimen *.
Could
the
doomed our
to
have
of jefuitifm have
malice
coolefl:
Faith to a heavier vengeance, than
Saxons,
Proteftant
ftabbing Proteftant
Britons, Proteftant Hanoverians, murdering Proteftant
Wirtenburghers,
Proteftant Heflians fight-
ing aginft Proteftant Palatines, Proteftant Swedes
"mvadiug Proteftant Pruflians, and Proteftant Bohemians,
armed
of
Hungarians,
coming
Silefians,
all
um-^er Popifh ftandards, to cut the throats
Proteftant
more have we
tionally)
Brandenburghers.
(eventually,
feen
All
and
this,
though not
inten-
brought about by the councils of Prote-
ftants themfelves,
money
and
to effedl
and have
in
one year given more
than the amount of
it,
fums, which the court of
Rome
all
the
has contributed for
* The troops, which marched over general Kingfley a.t the
Minden, and which muft have been firll cut to pieces,
battle of
if
our horfe had come up, were Saxon infantry.
The
regi-
ments, which the French oppofed to Prince Ferdinand's attack
at
Bergen, were Saxons
man
;
and throughout the war, the Ger-
corps in the French army, have been
made
the greateft
fuffcrers.
the
f
t
23
]
the deftrufllon of Proteftantifm, from the birth of
Luther, to
But
No
this
Ihall
France be fuffered to conquer
who
one,
day.
is
H—
r ?
the leaft acquainted with the
in
State of Europe, and the conftitution of the
Em-
can fuppofe the crown of France fliould enthought of making a real and permanent
pire,
tertain a
conqueft of
and
make
r.
France enters Germany
of the Empire,
ally
treaty of
H—
Weftphalia
-,
and
and
as fuch
a real conqueft there
ing with
its allies
in the
as
that
:
as a friend
guarantee of the
cannot pretend to
would be quarrel-
very adt of afTifting them.
An Eledlorate of the Empire
is
not to be annihilated,
but by the deftrudtion of the whole Germanic confti-
For a King of France
tution.
of
H—
r,
and
would be
member
fo
eje6t a
to m»ake himfelf
E
—
whole family out of its rights,
great an a6l of violence, that every
empire would
in the
rife
againft
Swe-
it.
den and Denmark, could not but take the alarm
it. And if France were to pretend to hold the E
at
—
in its
own
right,
mediate States
r
what muft become of the
Would
te
inter-
the French conquer the-m
That muft commit them in eternal quarrels
with every member of the Germanic body. Would
the Empire fuffer a great part of Germany, and two
too
?
or three Eledtorates at once to be cut off from
its
dominions, and made a part of the kingdom of
France? Tis the very thing which England fhould
wifh the French to attempt, in order to unite all
Germany
againft them.
Would
1
n
r
Would they
tached from
]
then hold theEIedorate by
other dominions?
all their
de-
itfelf,
H—
that
r in
might prove the church yard ot the French, as
Well as Italy has been, and the other parts of Ger-
cafe,
many. Nor would Engl-ind have any reafon
France,
the
a
1
its
a
with enemies, and feparated
country, furrounded
from
envy
to
impraflicable tafk of defending
But
other dominions.
conftitution of Europe,
reality,
the
makes every thing of
this
kind abfolutely impoflible.
in
All that France can
can be
propofe, after the greateft fuccefs there,
only to take a temporary poffeffion of the country
during the war
to hold
;
in depofite,
it
as the
K.
And, if this
good man ought
of P. did the Electorate of Saxony.
were
to
doubtlefs every
happen,
to be forry for
it
but wherein confifts that fuper-
:
lative greatnefs of the evil,
that Britain fhould thus
move Heaven and Earth, and
prevent it.
The French 'tis
rifk every
would
true,
themfclves of the revenues ot the country
the taxes, which the people
reign,
land
now pay
bs fo
much impoverifhed
the acquifition
fo
A
.''
all
to their fove-
Or would
^
the
very formidably inriched by
French army,
would themfclves probably
tnoney they could
;
polTefs
and
But would Eng-
would be paid to France.
crown of France be
danger to
find
raile there
in the country,
a ufe for all the
but fuppofe a very
:
difintercfled general fliould be able to remit a couple
of hundred
Ver(ailies,
thoufand pound
which
Frctich revenue
is
from
probably
more
would ever gain by
3
H
it j
r
than
is
to
the
there
any
j
^5
[
any kind of oeconomy
our having put ourfclves
in
expence
in three years time to an
to prevent France
]
pounds out of Germany
But the poor people,
?
may
it
True, they do
compaffion.
we ought
of twelve millions
from getting fix hundred thoufand
be faid, deferveour
fo
and for that rea-
;
make
their
country the theatre of a war, which mull
ruini
fon
A
them.
them
to let
alone, and not
fmall State, which
invaded by the
is
armies of one infinitely greater than
under
lefs
is
But
there
that
is,
a
and
ufelefs,
is
a
misfortune
great
refiftance
all
;
doubt-
nothing to do but fubmit.
has
it
itfelf, is
way of doubling
this
misfortune; and
by having another great
almoft
State,
equal to the invader, undertake the defence of
If the country fubmit,
tain
and may
;
in the
which are tolerable
fter,
muft be fed
that
ought
to have as
and each
if it
and
it,
An army
by them both.
will get
to
be defended,
is fiire
it.
main-
;
all
it
has
to be opprefied
many headed monand the defending army
is
a
many mouths,
but
army
beginning yield upon terms,
but
:
then two armies in
has but one
it
as the attacking
j
they can from the poo^
inhabitants.
We
turning
have
a
indeed
country
what was the reafon
try was conquered
;
heard,
with
concern,
a
mere
defert.
into
?
Not
that
is
becaufe
But
coun-
a realbn for preferv-
ing itj but to prevent the danger of
E
the
of
its
being
lofl.
The
26
[
The
]
more humanized laws of war,
prefent
do
nor admit of burning of towns, and deftroying of
countries,
*'
where
there
Before Chrijiianily
no oppofition
is
was
ejiablijijed
made.
world:
in the
" when vanquijhed provinces were laid wajle, and de" populated^ fays Marfhal Saxe, the fortifying of
" great towns might wear fome appearance of rea" fan hut now that war is carried on with more
J
*'
moderation and humanity ^ as beings by thefe mea-
*'
fures^ produolive of
"
queror^
more advantage
to the
con-
Thefe more violent ravages are
Cffr.'*
only committed in time of aftual war, and are Iblely
the confequents of oppofition.
And when two great
armies are carrying on a war in a country, each of
them
make
will
this deftrudlion
;
when
it
happens
to be necelTary fcr them, to prevent their enemies
finding fubfilfence in
Each of them
it.
it,
will
or purfuing them through
be apt to do
it,
without
afking themfelves whether they are die invaders,
or the defenders of
The
it.
Spaniards burnt their
Ann's war
j
and,
if
own
country in
Queen
the French fhould be able to
throw over a body of men into England, while our
armies
are
fighting in
Germany,
do not
it
ought to
be done here.
I
be done or not,
but every horfe, cow, and
fay
whether
it
would
flicep,
ought to be driven off or deftroyed, and every
ftack,
are
mill,
evils,
and oven,
burned or ruined.
which are not
prevented,
but
Thefe
made
in
27
[
country by refiftance
in a
its
:
]
they never follow, from
being invaded, but frequently
arife
out of
its
Nothing of this kind was pracwhile the French were vidorious, and
being defended.
tifed in
in
PI
—
quiet
r,
of
poiTeffion
it
:
they would not deftroy
own
advantage.
But let
army come to drive them out, or let a
defending army be obliged to abandon it, each
the country then for their
a fuperior
behind them,
will be apt to leave as little as polTible
to
accommodate
Such
their enemies
are the calamities, to
in
their
purfuit.
which we wilfully ex-
pofe a fmall State, by making
it
the feat of war,
between two potentates much greater than
itfclf.
Companionate minds might ftill entertain a doubt
about thefe things, and fufpeft that there might
be fome
unknown
it.
evils in a
H—
French army's
polTef-
we had not already tried
But we have now made the experiment, and
fing themfelves of
know
been
the worft of
in polTenion
r,
if
The French have
it.
of this country.
Did
already
the fun
refufe to ihine, or the rivers ceafe to flow,
that account
land.
?
Britain
vernment
They
ftill
certainly did not here in
continued an ifland, and
upon
Eng-
its
go-
fubfifted, though the French had
on the government of FI r. But the poor
people were miferable.
Without doubt they were
fufferers, and defcrved ourcompaffion, butpofTibly
ftill
—
feized
not to that degree, which m,ay have been reprefented.
Inftead of confuking our imaginations, or
hearkening to exaggerated delcriptions
E
2,
at a diftance
-,
there
?.8
[
there
is
method
a furer
]
of judging,
and that
by
is,
confulting the fufferers themfelves, and liftening to
What
the language of their adlions.
on that occafion
nouncing
?
H
The
made
their Englifh connections,
all
do
did they
n chancery re-
convention of Clofter-Seven
:
by which,
the
they a-
greed to give the French the pofTefFion of the counto
try, defiring
Happy,
if
live
in
a quiet flate of neutrality.
might have continued
they
fo
:
but
loon after the K. of P. gained the vidory of Rofbatch, and he did not think
to remain at peace.
the
army
The
it
proper to allow them
His arguments prevailed, and
up their arms again.
of Obfervation took
unnecefTarily giving offence,
do good
and therefore
;
dation on this
dark
this
in
leaft is clear
j
head.
I
not the
is
But whatever
myfterious tranfav5lion
that, fince the
to
;
elfe
may
be
one thing at
H — ns by themfelves
were content to fign a neutrality, and
flay in their country,
way
attempt no farther eluci-
let
we need not put
the French
ourfelves to
the annual expence of four or five millions to keep
them
out,
Here
I
may
be told, perhaps, of the
Duke de
army was
and every benevolent mind will
Richlieu's extortions, while the French
in
the
country
doubtlefs
feel
•,
a jufl
concern for
which the poor people indured
to attempt to lefTcn them.
rolledl,
-,
the
far be
fufFerings,
it
from
But the reader
me
will re-
that thefe opprefTions were alledged as
one
of the pleas for the convention of Cloilcr-feven's being
broken
j
n
«9
[
]
broken ; and that therefore fome allowances are to be
made for the aggravations, which are iiarural upon
And
fuch an occafion.
did not this general render
And
did not fome
condemn him by
a contrary be-
himfelf odious by his exccfles
of
his
own
haviour
?
officers
Both
of
thefe
?
therefore
truth of what I have faid, about the
laws of war
demned
:
elfe the
civilized
one could not have been con-
for the breaking
them, or the other honour-
But befide
ed for obferving them.
confidered, that
prove the
more
H — rby
its
this, it
is
to be
union with P. was be-
come obnoxious to the other Princes of the Empire.
They had with indignation feen the K. of
P. twice fet all Germany in a flame, ravage fome
of the
fineft parts
of
lives
his
own
of the empire, and facrifice the
fubjecls,
fands, to his ambition
aflual
By
fufferers,
this
and
and
many
;
all
theirs,
by thou-
of them had been
were kept in fear by him.
conjunftion therefore of the
H-
——
>
caufe with his, the French gained a fpecious pretence to gratify their
own
rapacity, at the poor
H
malice, and their generals
ns coft ; and at the
fame time the merit of fervingthe Empire, and re-
venging the caufe of
doing.
The
its
fuffering
extraordinary
fufferings of the
poor people,
is
to the Englifh account, but to the
E — e appeared in Germany, in
as
the
interefl:
poor people of
members
not to be placed
P — n. Had
r
the
as inoftenfive a light,
of England, and the
H—
in fo
part therefore of the
good of the
Ihould have led us to wifh,
the French might not have ventured on thofe excefTes.
1-30
2
But they knew, that none of the other
Princes of the Empire would refent them
that
cedes.
:
they had then, before their eyes much greater fevepradlifing in Saxony * ; and
rities,
therefore,
might not be
difplcafed to fee a few of the
extortions brought
might be apt
to
thatE
—
which they
te,
to think, had been one of the caufes
After
them.
home
fame
all, it
of
mufb be allowed, chat fome of-
ficers are
more rapacious than
H—
ns had then the misfortune of having the
others,
and the poor
French army commanded by one of
But
them.
in general,
we have
and neither they nor
the
the French are a
word of
fair
enemy,
exercifed any unne-
celTary cruelties to each others fubjeds.
Nor
could
the country therefore have any fufFcrings to fear be-
yond
the allowed ufage of
count
war upon an
nor would a French army
:
more than one Campaign,
probability,
but keep out of
ir,
Englifli ac-
ftay there, in all
if
we would
and take from the French court
hope of drawing over an Englifh army to meet
all
them
there.
In the courfe of the
mies travcrfe
tries
known
The
is
the
city
execuuon
:
we faw French
war,
Germany, and
of friends and
country,
*
all
lafl:
enter into the coun-
Their coming into any
foes.
doubtlefs a bad thing, but
Germans themfelves
of Lcipfic was then
ar-
afl. ally
and the merchants made
-Tcfpondent.s and kept under guard,
to
till
we have never
confider
uoder ^
draw
tills
their hills
fort
it
in fo
of military
upon
their ccr-
were accepted.
very
Mi
3«
[
very
terrible a light,
millions to prevent
as to
]
throw away millions
after
it.
If one French General's condu6t prove an excep-
we have every
tion to the received laws of war,
The
year a very ftrong evidence to confirm them.
Landgraviate of Hcfie,
in
North Germany
French to
fuffers the
country, and
his
as fine a
country as any
and yet their Landgrave
poflTefs
themfelves every year
come
into his capital
our fervice.
And
them
we, here in England, thought
having entered
fo very lightly of their
third year
•,
that
his
;
troops being at that very time fighting againft
in
lets
fum of 340,000/. and
his troops for the
us have
of
;
is
we made
it
now
rejoicings for the
the
adion
of Warbourg, in which we had at moft killed only
as many prifoners, and
Tower guns for it, as a victory gained ;
though we knew, that by that very aflion, the
1500 French, and taken
fired
the
French had taken
ceflive
poflefilon of Caflel.
If
two fuc-
Landgraves have every year expofed
country, and their
own
their
palace to be pofTefled by
the French, for the benefit of letting us their troops
Then, though we cannot pofitively
the damage, this gives us at lead a nega-
for 340,000/.
afcertain
tive meafure of
it
;
and proves, that
it
cannot ex-
ceed that fum.
The
reader will obferve, that
vantage to
this eftimate
-,
I
give every ad-
and fuppofe them to
the lives of their foldiers at nothing.
fet
However,
if
'
2^
[
if
]
Landgrave did not repent, and we fired guns
at the time when the French army
the
of rejoicing,
got poffcnion of Caflel
can their getting one ftep
;
farther, appear fo very tremendous a thing, that
fpend three, four, and five mil-
this nation fhould
lions to prevent
it.
H——
But
r
EngHQi account
defend
attacked folelyuponan
and therefore England ought to
;
Certain
it.
now
is
that the Eleftorate
it is,
ed merely on an Englifh account
always be the cafe
Is
?
to give our enemies
French
pretend
had taken any
lefs
than
future quarrel,
it
it
to
— And
ground of offence
did in this
fay,
defend
it ?
?
That
why
at-
fhall
march
becaufe, as we, by our fupe-
have the advantage
at fea,
it is
we
the French therefore only
;
two
Who does
becaufe the French know, that
their troops thither
rioricy
Ele<5lorate
part in the difpute between the
America
any
in
Could the
?
the
that
not fee then, that the fingle reafon,
is
invad-
pofTible for that country
nations about our poireffions in
tacked,
is
will not this
in attacking the
America, and the Eaft and
French fettlements
in
Wefb
French, »by their fuperiority at
Indies
;
fo the
land, and their greater nearnefs to
H—
r,
are fure to
have the advantage, by meeting the Englifh troop.s
They would not go thither, unlefs they
there.
were
go
certain of finding us there
:
they always will
thither, as long as the Englifli councils refolve
to oppofe them there.
The
reafon
is,
that
it is
not worth their while to march their troops fo far
from
7
33
C
]
from home, from any other motive but
that.
I
would not be underftood to depreciate the Eledtorate^
or to
the value of
let
it
below that of other countries:
but no particular diftricl in
enough
dom,
far
make
to
worth the while of
its
king-
troops To
its
own dominions, merely
of maintaining them
rich
is
a great
march
that of France, to
like
out of
it
North Germany,
for the lake
One Ger-
at free quarter.
may treat another in that manner as
when this war (hall be concluded, the
Eledor of Saxony may perhaps choofe to go and
eat up another E -te by way of retahation for our
having, as he may think, fo largely contributed
man
Prince
;
for inftance,
—
to the deftruftion of
may have
fections
;
his
He,
Saxony.
German
German^
prejudices, or af-
pafTions,
and one German power
other, without giving
as a
may
attack an-
umbrage to the Empire but
King of France, it can:
to a great King, like the
not be an objed.
he fend a great army, the
If
them
them out of it
people cannot maintain
they
drive
will
:
:
a
if
if
little
one,
he duly adjuft
the proportion of troops, between v/hat will keep
the country in fubjedion, and what
it
port, the expedition
pay
will
at
befl but
charges; and nothing will remain to the
France.
Indeed,
According
which
a
how
fliould there be
can fupits
owii
Crown of
any thing
?
to the prefent laws of war, the utmoftj
French army could do, would be to oblige
the people to quarter their foldiers, and to pay to
the crown of France the fame taxes, which they
F
noW
do
3^
C
J
own fovereign *. Would a fingle
floren ot that money find its way to Paris, in that
cafe, more than does now to London ? Are gene-
do
to
their
fuch good managers for the crown re-
ral officers
venue
Would
?
it,
their
own
pockets
?
tural fovereign
Or
cheerfully, than to their na-
wili
it
be col'efted, and remit-
upon cheaper terms by
And
yet,
till
own
thoufand
thirty
commiiffioners of this revenue, than
civil officers to their
into
it
Will the people pay their taxes
more
?
or pretences to put
are,
to their enemies
ted to Paris,
em-
not they find ufes enough to
wh-re they
ploy
it
can be by the
Eledlcr in time of peace?
we can prove hov much comes to
fear the King of France's
England, we need not
being enriched by
Hanover
it
in
time of war.
in itfelf therefore
objttd to induce a great
cannot be a
kingdom
to fend
fufficient
its
troops
thither merely to dilh'efs the poor inhabitants
which
turn
it
it
them
is
can propofe to draw nothing to
cent
The
and
Irom which
itfelf,
but the
unjuft invafion ol the rights of inno-
people.
All Europe, after
would condemn
*
by
likely to ruin all their difcipline,
into thieves and banditti; and
odium of an
:
one campaign
the cruelty and meannefs of fuch
reader will remember, thai in
all
that \va= faid about
the French adminidration, the chief document cf
ofthe French council,
for the leceivcrs
to be accountable to a
Mr. Faidy,
it,
was adecree
of the Eleftoral revenue to
for the
produce of them.
And
confidering, that the decree does not mention a fyllable of /«creafjjg the taxes, the violence
feems to have been offered to the
affections of peopl.-, rdthcf than to their purfes.
a beha-
35
[
kingdom
a behaviour in a great
fhould thus confefs
feeking to revenge
its
like
France
inferiority to
;
which
enemy, by
its
quarrel on a defencelefs coun-
its
which had not the
try
]
concern
Jeaft
in
And no
it.
meafure could make the French more obnoxious to
the Empire,
would then be
one
we would but keep out of it. It
German caufe, and not an Englifh
if
a
'
and the Electorate would have aright to
;
Empire
for the afllftance of the
might
is
;
there
German
but from the nature of things
army never would
evident, that the French
fore,
more than a fingle
would not think
The French
winter.
worth
it
it
ftay
there-
their while to
go
they were fure to find an army in
thither, unlefs
to fight with, and juftify their
Englilli pay
call
proteflion. It
perhaps, as the
fuffer a litde at fird
councils are flow
to
its
com-
ing; thither.
o
now
I
is
there,
that
is
the
on the war
add,
that
whenever an Englifli army
they always will go thither
mod
for
becaufe
-,
advantageous method of carrying
them, and the mofl difadvantageous
muft be
bng
for England.
It
war
becaufe England has fo great a fupe-
fhali laft
riority at
:
fea,
fo as
that they have
as
the prefent
no other country to
The French have now no one place to fight
we find for them a field cf battle in
Germany. They cannot invade England if they
could, there would not be a man of their army in
go
to.
us in, unlefs
:
Germany. But their troops probably would noc
embark on board their tranfports, after having feen
their fleet deftroyed,
which
F
2
fliould
have protected
them
J
3^
[
them-, or,
if
]
they would, they could not get out.
cannot fend over their tro ps
They
number
to attack us in the Wefl:-Indies
defend themfclves,
if
a ftifficient
in
no, nor to
;
a pure regra'd to Britains
good
could have prevailed with us to attack them there
laft
winter
becaule their ports are
;
all
blocked up.
The French troops therefore, muft either have remained at home unemployed, or be fent into Germany. And, at a time, v;hen they were precluded
from invading England, and their Weft- India
iQands lay
naked and expofed to us
r.ll
whither
;
could they wifh to transfer the war, rather than
into
be
Germany, where they have nothing
in fear for;
and where could they
us meet tl-cm, rather
we have nothing
Should any
for
have
where
?
anfwer
in
nothing
wifli to
a country,
in
th.in
hope
one
has
Britain
that
to
to lofe, or
to
to this,
lo e
alledge
Germany,
in
I
anfwer, yes.
more than France has.
it has
England has its grcateft ftake there
any
;
H
to
-r
tiiis,
really
to
and
ot fo
tance,
doubt, whether that country be
much importance
anfwer his doubts
what then
but
:
are
if it
we
to Britain
fo
much
infjlt,
vvorth to
from getting
crown,
I
cannot
that,
in
?
Why
have
Germany,
to
which cannot be of
us; or to prevent the French
into a country,
nothing to tempt their
9>vvn
;
be not of that impor-
figliting for
we' been fpending twelve millions
defend, only from
demur
Should the reader
lofe.
raife a
ftay,
where they
will find
or to remit to their
when they have been
^hcre
^
Shall
[
37
1
Hanoverians be quartered
Shall then the innocent
and oppreffed by the French troops, and the
upon,
EngVidi not attack them? Not,
palTion for the Eledorate
we
bring upon the country,
of our wars
feat
as a part
will
cruel a hardOiip (hall
we thus make
if
the
it
or when will there be an end of
:
the poor people's forrows,
them,
French
ior then the
:
And how
always go thither.
we have any com-
il
by thus confidering
if
of ourfelves, we furnifh
with the means of annoying us
all
nations
and make the Hano-
-,
verians backs rue the fmart of every quarrel, which
may happen
to arife between Britain,
powers upon the coiuir.ent
But fome perhaps may
upon cur
the Eledorate
its
We
caufe.
will
defend
it
may,
if
who will attack
we will revenge
we pleafe, rcfolve that we
fay,
at a greater
power
againft
it
in
may
parliament
Britilh hearts
prorecSl
it
:
ought to
either
Slates of the
to over-run
feel for
begin
?
The
in
it
Empire,
it
;
we
an evil,
from
us.
and generous
j
but they cannot
;
or from any of the
if
they choofe fuddenly
doubt
of the war, has afforded
our inability
diftance
its
it
is
from the French, when they are
Do wc
it.
This
addrefs for
pleafed formally to attack
lefTer
but,
;
time of peace,
any.
wliich necclfarily arifes out of
The
Europe
in
expence to maintain that
government, than our own
cannot dele;od
let
acco.inr,
againft every
without being
and any other
?
or"
this
but too
this refpcd.
?
The
many
How
courfe
proofs of
did the v/ar
Germany, opened with our
with the Emprefs Queen.
And
fcene in
^eing in alliance
the
the
P—
of
K.
38
r
]
under the encouragement of
a,
France, was threatening to invat'e the
We
looked over
vain
;
and
P
a,
ment
m;.rch
to
RufTia,
We
home.
at
this Ruffian diverfion,
Poland, would
V
?
B
n had
We
find
men
of
into
afterwards perceived,
that
which was to march through
be ineffeftua!
for
in
that Prince imploy-
what then was to
:
That was the only
be done
to the court
thoufand
fifty-five
order to
in
te.
Europe
North, and agreedto
fen t to the far theft
hundred thoufand pounds
give five
E
the other parts of
all
defending
were then forced to
it
and that
;
our inability
fee
which
re fource,
failed.
and by
;
renouncing our treaty with Ruffia, and giving up
our old
alhes,
we cculd
were made to buy off an
And
not repell.
a ftate of dependence
which
being thus brought into
upon
how to improve
we are at length reduced
it
evil,
a fingle ally, he
knew
from one ftep to another,
till
to an appearance at Icaft
of b.ing tributaries to a K. of
P
a.
Here, perhaps, a generous Englilh breaft may
revolt againft the expreffion, and difdain to
money we pay to P
our ally, and we pay him
that the
He
is
it is,
tween them.
which conftitutes the
A
fubfidy
is
diff^eren-e be-
in
confiJeration of
fervices done, orbenefits to be received.
inftance, the five-hundred thoufand
0ito
a tribute.
an honorable penfion,
given by one State to another,
X
is
a fibfidy, bat not
Let us confider then the nature of each,
a tribute.
and what
a,
own,
>iA!X^/
^^^
Thus, for
pounds we were
^c- iUSfiAyi^'^^'i^
39
[
to pay toPcufTia,
we were
it
therefore the
money we pay
the
upon
letting us his troops,
paid him,
him
to
a has done for
Was
?
his
having
and
Eledlorate,
done to Britain
fervice
But
a fubfidy.
is
P
K. of
Proteftant
a
Saxony, a
?
fallen
deftroying
Was
that the
of merit, which conftitutes this payment a fub-
aiSt
fidy
a
money
that the
is it,
as a
done by the Landgrave of Heffe, and
a fervice
what
army of fifcy-five thoufand m^n
and the expofing of his country
:
Hanover, and the
frontier to
is
would have been a fubfidy, becaufe
to have an
in return for
]
Will
?
this nation take
upon
hundred thoufand German
avow
the fhedding of
the blood of
itfelf
as a benefit received
it
and
Proteftants,
?
Is ic
then his having attacked the Emprefs Queen? whether juftly or net,
is
be the beneSt received
that the lighting
much more
up
concern
his
tageouHy for England,
is
That cannot
we have already
for
;
whether advan-
;
only ours.
war
a civil
in
the involving that part of
ought moft to
wifli the welfare of,
the Diet, and
;
whatever ic
to France.
Eleflorate.
True,
fiie
refufed to defend the
alledged her
own danger
and therefore he incrcafed that danger
her fo
much
clofer union with our
before
with
the other Princes of the Empire,
But the Emprefs Queen
prefllng
which we
it,
in a quarrel
cannot be a fervice done to England
may be
feen,
Germany, and
:
:
and by
the more, drove her into a
enemy
:
by which fhe had been
induced to put into the hands of France,
Nieuport
40
I
]
may
and
Nieuport and Oftjnd-,
pofTiblybe driven
to cede to the Ruffians, iuch a part of their conyi,
may
quefls, as
thereby diftradl
more.
Are
German
tlie
make
this a fubfidy
he fought with the French,
at
Rofbatch
with their
tack him
The French,
otherwife
difpofition to
the
he had
go out of hi%
Once indeed
Imperial army
as his
own
enemies,
to fave appearances
maiched out of
allies,
;
?
in the
but fought them
;
and not ours.
much
councils (o
futh valuable confiderations ta
thefe
to
Britain, as
give them a vote in the Di et, and
way
thtir
to at-
not fhewn the lead
to fcrve us.
Does he then fupply our army with troops ?
in the campaign of Crevelt,
it is faid,
There were,
two
Pruflian regiments
of horfe,
who
refufed to
charge the French, and thereby lod us the
we ever had, of
opportunity,
defeating them.
fuppofing, that they had done their duty
three
regiments cannot be
Ann's war, the fubfidy paid
fifty
thoufand pounds
purchafe
of.''
fervice he can
which
It will
do
much
be
difficult
to IJiitain
If
we
wc look
fliali
have
;
a,
But what
is
fum is the
name any real
greater
to
though
it
may
be eafy
do elfcwhere.
into the thr.e
ftill
fix-
Queen
which, we fent his
this
to fee the mifchi-f, he can
In
But
two or
K. of P
to a
for
;
troops to fight the French in Savoy.
the benefit,
-,
an equivalent for
hundred and fevcnty thoufand pounds.
was
faireft
lafl;
more rcufon
tr-iati- s
with him,
to think, that he
is
4>
[
bound
left at liberty
nience.
parties,
Some general excommon caufe, which he
no fervice whatfoever.
to
preflions there are about a
IVems
]
own conve-
to interpret to his
What is the common caufe,
who have no commion enemy
between two
?
We
are not
war with the Houfe of Auftria, and he will teli
us, he is not at war with France.
The treaty docs
at
not oblige him to yield us any fpecific affiftance
we give him more than
yet
which
the fubfidies,
German
to our
up our money
have
upon the
to
is
it
;
all at
it
;
the ufe he
own
battlts,
man
and not ours *
ries,
to enable
us.
If by any of
is
to
make of it,
himfelf to
thefe
to us
;
;
he
is
to fight
and by his vido-
demand
the
more of
treaties,
he
guaran-
the Electorate, his a6lions have already Ihewn,
that he
underftands by
not attacking
treaty,
it
it
nothing more, than the
himfelf: for fo far was he, after the
from fending an army
to keep the
French out of Hanover, that he withdrew
The rer.ucrrmy
the more worth
it,
r
troops, to ftrengthen him fell, without
his
*
it
one payment, immediately
being obliged to fend a
firil
deliver
and that fcems the only thing
his
ties
We
paid
determined, that he will have
ratification
raife
we
v.^ar,
put together.
allies all
becaufe he wants
will
Qiieen Ann's
;
amount of
to him, for this one cogent reafon,
there certainly
he
in
the Whole
Iiis
his troops
Tee th'n trei-y in the appendix,
which
perufl, becaaie he will find no treaty
is
li!ie
fiace the time of Kiiig John.
out
42
[
out of
fums
Wefel,
given,
order to
in
i
that
of a
it is
much
which
And
tribute.
if
as to
keep off an at-
is
the
B
n
flri(5t
buy
definition
famous fentence reverfed
fee that
Ferro, Liberanda
72cn
But the K. of
B
price *,
the
redemption
of
un-
mull
it
Auro,
:
ejt.
P
a
may fubmit
-n
times
off an
will fingly
dertake the defence of fo remote a country,
fubmit to
The
in.
a confideration paid to
fuffering,
of
evil
is,
them
let
feem not calculated to
therefore,
purchafe a defence, fo
tack
]
is
a great Prince
to pay
which
Rome.
him
juft fourteen
was agreed
Still
and
;
there
is
for
the
no end
of the troubles of the Eledlorate, upon this miftaken plan of defending
it
difcovered to Europe our
it
im
for
weak
the power of every the
Germany
to
infult
us,
now, that we have
part,
we have put
mcanefl: Prince in
and make us buy
we can defend
again: for
I
;
it
have already hinted the
it
over
againft none of them.
pofTibility of an Elector
of Saxony's fecking an indemnification for
his fub-
jects fufferings, on another Electorate, which he
may
But
think to have too largely contributed to them.
Britain
may
not always have the honour of a
crowned head to contend with.
Suppofe
a
Duke
of Wirtemberg, as he has already changed his
•
A
reli-
thoufand pound weight of gold.
gion,
43
[
]
gion, pofllbly with a view to a tenth Eledorate
-,
fhould be fed with that hope, and perfuaded by the
H
Imperial court to invade
defend
tain
it
him
againft
itfelf
are a
match
But we have heard of
they are.
entering the
Empire under
the
title
of troops of the
Court of Vienna's encouragement,
engage
to
why may
of the
in
that Prince's fervice.
the Rhine, and break
river,
which
in
their treaties,
which
haps
To
of
Britain,
of
P
embaraffmenr,
a
may
power even
B—
per-
choofe to hold
between
the
two
k and Wertemberg
by attempting things out of
its
:
power,
give that petty Prince the honour of beating
* By the Pyrenean
doned the Portuguefe.
tugal, with a
treaty, the
French court formally aban-
But Marfhal Schomberg went into Por-
body of French troops
money of Lewis
them
renunciation,
a fpecific
compleat the
his majefty
the balance
may
This has been the
?
French have executed
the
after
contending houfes of
and
them on one
our future treaty cannot be thought
in
of *.
even
Or
down
become troops
to crofs over and
of Wirtemberg on the other
method,
fol-
and French
not the French themfelves march
their troops to
fide
and fo
for his,
a French army's
enough may be brought, by the
diers of fortune
money,
an ex-
Or, a peace being made,
of Burgundy.
circle
Not without
?
Bri-
We may think the troops
pence of many millions.
of the Eledorate
Could
r.
the
in the nj^me of the
King of
Braganza.
whom
Portugal.
ing joined by the Portugueze forces,
tory at Villa Viciofa
;
he paid with the
XlVth, though he pretended
;
which
Thefe
to
maintain
troop?, be-
obtained a complete vic-
fixed the
crown
in the
houfe of
Voltaire.
G
2
us.
whom
us, with
it
[
44
is
a difgrace to us to contend.
]
By
are the effeds of a milluken ad. ol duty.
Such
thus confidering a diRant country as a pact of Bri-
and difcovering too great a tundnefs for
tain,
cxpofe the poor people ot
mifery, and
intail
come
fon,
and
B
n,
They may juftly
them.
within our compalTion
we ought
we
perpetual ignominy on
to defend
by attempting
it,
to continual broils
it
but for that very rea-
;
from
to ftparate our caufe
theirs,
becaufe they are far removed out of our protedicn.
Could the Electorate ever have been deiigned to
make a part of us, and to be thus tender to us as
the apple of our eye i it would have been placed
under the guard of our frcnt, and not out of the
*.
reach even of our hands
But the two houfes of parliament,
have promifed that they
were
if they
The
it
is
faid,.
defend the Electorate.
improvident as to promife fuch a
we have now found
thing,
*
fo
will
to
it
be impoffible
:
author hope?, that nothing in thef? fheets w:I! be mif-
interpreted to the difadvantage of a country, for whichlie thinks
that every
rood fubjeft ought
the pointing out
of fccuring
it
from the prefent
would
he
have the
to hira the
a.id futjrc
fniceveft regard.
knowingly
(sy
wiiich fliould not cxprefs the moll
towards the beR
of foverei.ns.
any
att;ici<,s
of our enemies,
thing on
rcfpc?51i'al
He
'Tis
moil eHectual method
prircipal end of thee conndc.aiions.
which makfs one
lets
to
what appears
the
Much
fubjcdt,
duty ard rL-veience
confjders the
argument of
the next head, of perfeft and imperfecl obligation, as a point of
ethics,
k
ever,
and not of
if tlie
politicks
:
and therefore the rcadtr may pafs
oiijcdiion does no: Hrikc
him.
the
'
45
[
]
the fault therefore muil: be in the
mifc, and not
the non-performance of
in
caufe no promife binds to
is
made
may
there
might
be thofe,
court, by
their
of
leaft idea
;
be-
•,
This
Bat
fufiice.
who
having
after
running the nation into a
German
may hope
greater expence for the
then the
a pro-
it
impoflibilities.
and
anfwer,
Ihort
the
pofTibly,
making fuch
war, than
to
make
it
had
their ex-
cufe to the people, by pretending that they have
confequence of a former vote
done
it
Thus
are Britain's treafures to be lavifhed
only in
miiJions,
war
away in
and more money fpent on the German
alone, than the
whole
and land
fea
in the
Duke
ftead
of feeking to redrefs ourfelves,
who
difp'Jting
no one
fervice coll
of Marlborough's campaigns
did
will
avow
The
time
If
it.
it
we
;
and
in-
are to be
has been wrong, ;md
the paft, let no one adopt the fu-
may come,' when the nation, being exhaufted by the German war, and perhaps intimidated by that very Prince it is now upholding,
may be forced to give up its own conqueils to buy
him a peace. Then every member of the adminiture.
ftrationwilldifown thisexceflive regard to
and each individual
was always againft
then believe him,
let
v/ill
it.
let
fay,
It
that
he expe6t that
him openly difown
them ftand up each
in his place,
Germany,
for his part he
it
we Ihould
now.
Now
and declare that
they are for fcrving their country, and defending
Germany,
French
in
in a practicable
their
iflands,
way
-,
by attacking the
by which only they
can e\er be formidable to Brit
in,
and thereby
fe-
curing
46
[
]
curing an ample indemnification for that part of
Germany,
which
for
any concern.
Now
we ought to have
may put a flop to the
alone
they
ruinous part of the war
and fave their country
;
;
and fave themfelves from the charge of having
gained the good opinion of the public, by exprefsly
making
declaring againft thefe meafures, and then
them
ufe of that popularity to carry
thought
Now
of.
but
i
ding againft each other,
be exhaufted
fures
fliall
of
bcft conquefts,
its
are
all
if
till
But
their
countries
ti-ea-
an injured nation, robbed
;
muft then conclude, that they
public
the
upon
high
being
faith
and
j
is
it
once engaged,
be obferved.
The
it
eafily
may
we
be
faid,
ought facredly to
a valuable confideration
as that given to creditors of
vance money upon
fubjed
a
may
public faith, engaged by aft
of parliament, upon
tion,
fave themH^lves
they will go on, bid-
equally blameable.
prance
that
may
they
I fay,
and fave the public
to an infinitely
any other men could have
greater heighch, than
is
it,
tiie
publick,
given;
who
ad-
doubtlefs a perfect obliga-
and ought to be obferved with the ftrideft
But does any one really think, that a
fan6lity.
complimenial
adj.refs
parlianient, carries in
Has
it
of either, or both houfes of
fuch a complete obligation
?
the addrefs of either houfe, the validity of an
acl of parliament
commons,
houfe of
are in
commons
.-'
The
refolutions of a houfe of
point ot obligation on that fame
(for
upon
a future one they lay
no obligation at all) to be confiJered as any other
declaration of the refolutions of private men. They
ought
47
[
]
no more than they
ought
to declare
far as
things then appear to them, to be confiftent
really intend, fo
with fincerity, and fo long as things continue in the
flate,
which they appeared
time of declar-
in at the
ing thofe refokitions, they are bound to keep to
them, to preferve the chara6ler of conftancy.
upon
trial
made, they
to be either impofTible, or
much
attended with
If
find the thing refolved on,
impradlicable, or to be
greater difficulties than they
had imagined, or greater expence than the thing
itfelf is
worth, they
may
then,
upon
this better in-
formation, alter thofe refolutions, without any im-
peachment either of their fincerity or their conftancy.
Every civilian knows, that this is the nature of an
imperfed obligation, or of a promife, made without a valuable confideration
And
every other
man may know how
tion of the houfe of commons
They began
they did this
no peace,
and they never
;
might add, we
German
the Spanifh war and
Germany
more
thought any
fuffered
our heads to
at
•,
againft the
and inftead of
laft
the French,
for fear he fhould get,
Hill
after
politicks
conquering for ourfelves, we
in
far a refolu-
depended on.
the lad war with a refolution, as
be turned with
money
to be
the Spaniards fhould renounce the
till
1
is
it.
and refolved that they would make
;
right of fearch
more of it.
to be given for
forgot both
and fpent our
King of
Pruflla,
what we are now fpending
millions to prevent his lofing.
Should any one
ftill
urge, that the promife to de-
fend the EIe6lorare, was not a fimple promife, but a
I
perfed
43
[
Jierfcft obligation, I
now anfwerin
the parhiment never did
The words
agiiinfi
and gratitude
and
iiifults
the ^r([ place, that
promife
of the addrcfs are
in juPice
hound
]
j
to defaid
IVe think
to ajfifi
it.
ourfelves
your Majcjly
that may he made upon
attacks^
any of your :Majejlf s dominions^ though not belonging
to the Crown of Great Britain, in refcntment of the
part your Majefiy has tiihn in a caufe, "wherein the
kingdom are immediately, and fo ejfenconcerned.
The declaring, that they think
inter ejls of this
ttJ.Vy
themfeives
bound
in juftice
and gratitude to
in the defence of his Majefty's foreign
iurely a very different thing
'
affill
dominions,
is
from thetaking upon
themfelves the whole and abfolute defence of them.
The
very promife of afllfling another, carries in
it,
the fuppofition of the pcrfon himlelf, exerting his
own
force in the fame caufe
fifting
;
otherv^ifc
not
it is
af-
And
him, but doing the thing ourfelves.
? Have
Have they
has the parliament failed in this promife
they not done more than was promifed
not taken
all
the Elcdoral troops,
?
which are
in
the
from not affifting,
the
whole*?
Even formal
expence
of
bjrn the
field,
*
and
into their pay,
The argument
far
here does no: require, nor does the auchor
intend any dilrefpedful fuppoiicion, that the Elfe^lbrate has not
contributed what
tenance of
impiloy
a
its
its
whole
promife to
it
cm to
garriTon?,
force.
niHiV,
its
own
and
The
dt-'L-nce.
its civil
Pouibly the main-
govern ojept,
may
nearly
dlftmftion intended,, isy between
and a promife abiblutely to defend, which
a;e lurely very different engagements.
treaties
49
[
of
treaties
]
and mutual
alliance
aMance
betweert
independent nations, do not bind either party to
any farther
afiiftance,
than the obligation fpecifi-
Thus
cally exprefTed.
which that addrefs referred to
treaty,
by the
;
with Ruflla, the Emprefs was to
treaty
with but fuch a fpecific
were to
And
inftance, to take the
for
affift
even
liance
affift
troops, and
her with fuch a fpecific
of the moll perfeit and
in cafes
full al-
where two States exprefsiy covenant to
•,
fift
each other
totis
the
Dutch and
us,
viribus, as
yet
all
is
us
we
fum of money.
number of
af-
the cafe between
the v/riters on the law of
nations agree, that this covenant does not imply an
upon one
obligation
feream^
is
Grotius.
Cfj
fidem
the
State,
to ruin
Succuram
fence of another.
the de-
perituro^ fed ut ipfe
non
judgment of Seneca, adopted by
Defendi dehent focH, Jive in tutelam fefe
aliorum
dederun', five
Illud vero addamus,
flint.
itfelf in
ne
mutua
auxilia pa5Ii
tunc quidem
focium, Ji nulla fpes Jit boni exitus
:
teneri
boni en'im^ non
mall caufa focietas contrahitur *.
We
tude^
this
think ourfelves bound in jufiice
to
affift
againft infillis
the very language of
any one fuppofe, that
tion,
like that,
which
Piiffend.
&
?
:
is
not
compliment? Andean
this contains a perfect obligais
between two independent
confideration given
and grati-
and attacks
made by
nati >ns,
In the
firft
a fpecific alliance
upon
a valuable
place, in rcfpedt
Grot. Lib. zdo. cap. 2510.
H
gf
50
[
party bound,
of the
England
it
]
cannot
and
;
peopk of
bound only by an
for they can be
:
parliament
affeft the
as to the houfe itfelf,
it is
in
aft
of
them
a d(;claration of their prefent fentiments, and can-
not preclude them from the right of altering thofe
upon
fentiments,
farther information
the fecond place, ihe party, to
is
:
becaufe, in
whom
the promife
made, being not to give any
in confequence of
fpecific valuable
that declaration,
confideration
can have no i^nS: right conveyed thereby to the
Should
performance.
be faid, that what had
it
been already done, was the valuable confideration
given, every one mufh fee that a favour voluntarily
conferred before hand, cannot
make
The
fideration of a future covenant.
which that confers,
right,
the fpecific con-
titude.
But an obligation of gratitude,
idea of
it,
party
the
leaves
only proper
an obligation of gra-
is
in the
very
obliged, a right of'
iudg.ng of the nature and extent of the grateful
turns he
But
is
to
was then
it
that this fliould be the re-
faiJ,
turn, the afTifting in cafe of attack.
the
re-
make.
obligation
arifcs
out
ot
the
If therefore
declaration
of
Parliament, then that promife can imply an obligation to nothing more, than what was meant by
it
at ihe
time of making
who remembers
muft
alfo
leall
a
parties,
Now
there
is
no one,
paffing of that addrefs, but
the-
remember,
year after,
it
it
that at that time,
was the avowed
and
for at
fenfe of all
and confirmed by repeated affurances, that
8
not
51
[
we
(hould be fent to the continent.
man
not a
]
Whether
or not, as fubfidics, to hire
money
made
fliould lend
foreign troops, was
and
a matter of doubt,
upon the motion, turned upon the fubtreaties with Ruflia, and with the Landgrave
the debate
fidy
But
of Hefle.
parties exprefsiy declared, that
all
man
they would n ot fend a
Could
when
out of the kin.^dom^^ //
^^
^J^-j.
be conceived, even the next {t^\ori%^fiCe!iiJuijH&tij^
it
repeated affurances were given that no
^^^2}
that the nation
Germany,
troops fhould be fent to
Englifh-j/^^^^;g^
bound by the obligation of a
fend thither a greater body of Britifli
then a'flually flood
promife, to
the
than
too *,
intrufted with
William
mouths
be under
and thofe to
troops,
Duke
a^ foreign
General
or than our great deliverer
?
carried
him,
with
out
4//
^
of Marlborough was ever
of the great rivers in
tlie
only
Kirg
the
to
Netherlands
?
If
the nation then ftood bound by the obligation of
fuch a promife, why did any gentleman miflead the
*
Nothing
in thefe Oieets will
be intended to ferve one party
in compar.ng the
againlt another,
B.itifti forces,
fcit to the
continent in this war, and in former ones, the contraft
is
heigh-
tened by the greater number being fent to be under a foreign
But if the nation is to rifk fo great a Lcdy of its
general.
fubjefls under
one.
any general
;
farely
I could w-lh indeed, that
becaufe then
abilities,
as
we
more
iw^\v.
we cannot have
too good an
he had been an En<>li(hmab
have valued ourfclves upou
certainly ours.
Whereas,
if
;
his great
the ptrfept fy it^m
of our adopting Gernuin qnarrels fhould be continued, it may
very poflibly be our charce, in the ne;:t war, tu have all thofe
abilities
//
employed
ag.iinft us.
H
2
publick
duAM'elt»-.d. Si, wUiLy^i-^ ^CtmtJC^Mi*.
^
dun'
52
t
]
publick by fuch aflurances to the contrary
If the
?
addrefs did not contain any fuch promife, whence
this failure in his
own
?
men may talk big about the publick
but every one knows what is meant by a re-
In fhortj
faith,
folution of the houfe.
might be of
declaration
P
It
they thought that fuch a
ufe
a from entering the
kindnefs done to
Certainly
it.
it
it,
the K. of
deter
to
Eleiftorate,
or intended at lead, to
was a proper
aft
fubfifted
that fuch
a
than
intention
an
if
refolution
and
degree,
all
har-
between his MajeRy and
in
to
implied
aflift
any
pradicable
a
for us,
thing
a
in
And,
too heavy a
it
And
then to try another.
more
reafonable
manner.
we found one way of doing
burden
flricl
let
But no one ever thought before,
fubjeds.
his
make
of duty, to
the world fee, by fuch a declaration, the
mony, which
was a
it
if,
upon
Germany failing us, or dewe found that our afiiftance muft
the other powers in
claring againft us,
at laft be ineffecftuai
their
coafts,
and
j
then to attack the French on
in the
Eaft and Weft-Indies, fo
much
the more vigoroufly, in order to obtain by
our conquefts, an indemnity to our friends for
their
paft
fufferings,
any future attacks.
fint
cint^
iis^
and a
full
fecuricy
Ncc fervanJa
againft
prcmijfa,
qu,e
quibus prom:feris inutilia^ nee ft plus tibi noce-
quam
illi
prcf.nt,
cut promiferis
*,
* Ci:. dc OfF.
The
53
[
The
reader
omit the
this
this head
on
fatisfied
may by
time probably be fully
and therefore
:
on another
infifting
fets afide the obligation
is
1
plea,
I willingly
which
totally
And
of any promife.
that
the change in the ftate of the parties, which has
been twice made fince that declaration.
a
promife,
it
the K. of
againft
reft
yet
P
body of Heffians, and
fifty-five
who were
and
a
and
any
to take a
thoufand Ruffians
to fight for the defence
not bound by
E
in every
other
Ruffians
to
in
way
?
a,
to fend a man to fight in
who would embroil the
with the Empire
e
granting afliftance
P
it
of ours, and
caufe
of
renounced,
new agreement made with theK. of P
who was
;
does a promife of
one way, give a claim to
The
P
it
promife wgs, to pay
fight againft
ns
;
is
the paying
ns to fight againft Ruffians, due to the per-
formance
ought
?
nation expreffed
the Britifn
Still
•,
its
duty
as it
and though the Ruffian force was thrown
into the oppofite fcale, took
all
;
If afcer that, the aiTiftance o:.ered be
ir.
be
it
and the French, the
a
of the Empire being widi us
into our pay,
Let
was to defend the Eleflorate
upon
itfelf
the pay of
the Hanoverian troops that were fighting in the
field in
Heffians befide
made
own country, and a body of
when the H
n chancery
defence of their
;
a fecond total
and agreed
change
to leave the
in the ftate
French
of parties,
in poffeffion
of their
country.
J
54
[
Here was
country.
]
a total renouncing of
all
their
connedions with Britain, though their troops were
then aftually in
That
pay.
its
made without
is faid,
neutrality was,
it
knowledge of the Englifh
without the knowledge of
the
government, certainly
parliament; and that therefore could not be bound
by
its
A total change therefore hav-
confequences.
ing been twice made
in the (late
that which fubfifted at the time of
drefies,
the plea of obligation
all
of
parties,
making
from
thofe ad-
from them
ceafed.
'Tunc fidem jallam^ tunc inconftantia crimen audiam,
ft cum omnia
non
pricfiitero
eadem
qua erant fromittenle me,
/int.,
promijfum. AlioquiUy q-dcquid mutatur^
libertatemfacit de integro confukndi^
The
reader will excufe
As
fidered this point.
I
my
am
^ me fide liberat*.
having fo largely contaking that fide of an
argument, which has the popular prejudice
it,
it
was neceflary that
objeftion behind
my
far
fubjed:,
me
which
unanfwered.
is
from condemning,
againfi:
fhoukl leave no plaufible
I
I
now return to
Germany
fingly confined to
I
fulnefs for every thing,
defire to exprefs
:
my
thank-
which has been done dur-
ing the war, in every other part of the world.
The
intention of thefe flieets, Has been to inquire,
and fubmit
to the publick confiJcration,
the prefent courfe
Englifli
we have
whether
taken, of transfering the
war with France into Germany be not
a
* Sen. de Benef. Lib. iv. cap. -5.
me^fure.
;
55
[
]
meafure, calculated for the hurt of Germany, rather than of France
intereft
;
and tending to promote the
of France, rather than of England.
profecution of this argument
fliew,
that' Britain's
In the
have attempted to
1
joining and
making
itfelf
a
party in any of the internal quarrels of the Empire,
and efpecially
its
fending troops thither upon any
fuch account, mufl: be, at
all
times, contrary to
the intereft of Europe, and contrary to the intereft
of Germany
-,
and
in the prefent cafe,
contrary to
the intereft of Proteftantifm, and contrary to the
peace and true intereft of Hanover.
confider
and
light,
Getman
the
reafons for
offer
to
v/ar,
a
in
I
doubting, whether
it
be not a method
England ruinous and impradicable
end
over
if
too long perfifted
to
my
the publick confideration
of carrying on a war with France,
therefore,
am now
more important
in,
which
•,
and
is
to
which
muft probably
the giving to France an undue afcendency
in
us
;
and expofe us to the neceffity of fuing
for peace, at the expence of our
moft valuable con-
Whether on the other hand, there be not a
method of carrying on thb war, by which we have it
quefts.
in
our power
at this
time to maintain our fupsriority
over our enemy, and
which we may
intail
it
to our pofterity
be enabled to carry
on the war
the expence of France, and not of Britain
laft
conclude
it
;
and
by
at
aC
remove the
between the two nations
by a pf ace, which
chief ground of rivalQiip
:
fiiall
and thereby give fecurity to Britain for many years
to come.
I
Hiould
56
I
my
of
part
defign, if
to guard againft
cefTary
have mentioned
at prefent
not
i Ihould
latter
]
did not fee
I
the
fufpicion,
this
ne-
it
any
that
thing, which fhall be offered to prove the impracticablenefs of this part of the war,
is
intended as d
plea for the abruptly putting an end to the whole.
Providence has been pleafed to prefent to our view,
the means of folid peace and independence
have referved for the peculiar glory of
:
and to
his Majefly's
reign, the p'acing our ifland in a ftate of happinefs,
unknown
to our anceflors in any period of our hif-
Britain
tory.
now
by
gains,
a Britifh fovereign,
greater advantage over France, than even
the
a
Henry
Second brought with him to the crown, with
We
half the provinces oi France in his pofTeflion.
have now
a more important alternative offered to
our choice, than
We
us again.
will
probably ever be propofed to
have now no
lefs
an option to make,
than whether we will lavifh away five millions a
year in Germany, without a
that or
pofTibiiity
of doing
England any good, and annually run the
kingdom
ten millions
in
debt
•,
till
it
fliali
be at
length exhaufled, and unAble to defend either
whether we
five
will realize to this nation a
millions a year
pence
;
and
raifing a
totally
f >r
ever,
difable
at
degree formidable to Britain.
rifk
our countries ruin
tends to nothing
;
in a
or
our enemies ex-
France hereafter from
power, which can ever be
marine
:
revenue of
in
Whether we
any
will
German war, which
we will conquer for
or whether
ourfelves
57
[
onrfelves and
Germany
indemnification for the
3
both, by feciiring an ample
pad
fufferings of the Elec-
and effediially detering our enemies from
torate,
Let us but go on, and
by one more eafy conqiieft, di fable the navy or
France from ever rifing again, and the peace of
any future invafion of
this ifland
is
ir.
then fixed on
firm and proper bafis
its
and we may thenceforward look on
all
the
;
quarrels
of the continent with indifference.
And what is
this
Germany
to Britain
?
Could we
but be true to ourfelves, and purfue the advantage,
which providence has put into our hands, and by
make ourielves madersof
we might then give the French the offer
feizing our enemies iflands,
that trade
:
of peace or war, as long as they pleafcd: for
motives tor our g-ing to war
the means of their
be at an end.
pleafe
man
let
;
the
the
all
to war with us,
Let then the French rage
till
fuffcr
Rhine
to
French
to Belgrade
;
all
armies
paffage,
their
thefe
they
feveral
Ger-
in
;
the
let
march from
;
and
piL
from Manheim
cannot build them a fing'e
annoy our coaft with.
calmly look on
to
Danube
utmoft
tlie
would
as
they fhall learn to unite
lage every city in
frigate to
all
them, and
them bribe and threaten the
Courts,
Empire
coming
v/ith
fecuriry
;
Britain
may
then
and thankful for
its
own
independence, need
arife
upon the occafion, than thofe of Chriftian
Not that any thin;^ of this nature
feci
no other fentiments
compail^on.
really
would happen.
On
i
tlie
contrary the peace
of
1
t
58
]
of Germany would be better fecured, as well as
For the great fource of their
that of Britain.
wealth being cut off with their iflands, the French
would thenceforward be
armies
out of their
them
Germany,
in
as little able to
own
as the
territory,
Germans
are
Should
France.
their armies into
march
their
and maintain
now
to fend
prove too
this
great a happinefs, for us to be allowed to conquei
for ourfelves
P
—
a's
muft then
v/e
;
war, which
have
I
and impradicable.
faid,
a war that
is
now
I fhall
K. ot
fight for the
glory, and a foreign intereft, in a
give
is
my
German
ruinous
reafons for
And,
it.
In the
Hands
firfl
fingle
France.
place, this
a war, in which Britain
is
and alone, to contend
And how much
at land
with
we may flatter
our own ftrength, and
foever
ourfelves with the notion of
the French weaknefs, France
is
at this time, as
it
has been for a century pad, fuperior to us at land.
I have in the beginning of thefe confiderations, put
this
who
among my
generally
poftulata
fet
;
but our news writers,
the opinions of the times, have
been fo ftrongly exhibiting the greatnefs of theEnglifii
that
force,
allowed to rank
however
will
I
it
know
not
I may be
The reader
whether
below the French.
remember, that
ing of our naval flrength
;
I
and
am
if
not
freak-
we could be per-
fuaded to ufe that power more, and talk
we might
now
c.f
perhaps be ading a wifer part.
comparing the land force of the two
it
kfSf
But
in
nations, the'
we
59
[
we may happen
]
year to have the better general,
this
Europe has
been complaining of the exorbitant power of France.
Either this meant nothing at all, or it meant, that
fourfcore years pad,
yet for thefe
all
France was more powerful than any other
Stronger than
Germany
for inftance,
ftate.
and certain-
Holland, or than England, which
has ordinarily kept up fewer land forces, than
ly ftronger than
either
Soon
of the other two.
after the revolution,
War
France alone maintained a
againfl Spain,
Ger-
many, Holland, and England, with Denmark and
Sweden in the fame alliance. And for feveral years
on a war of equality, frequently
carried
offence againfl
them
And
all.
in
a
war of
the beginning
of this century, France, and part of Spain, fupported
war
a
of
ten
years
refifbance,
againft
England, Holland, and Germany, with Denmark,
Savoy, and Portugal, united in the fame caufe.
From
that time
all
parties
among
us have been
complaining, that the treaty of Utrecht gave the
And
French too much power.
1
fuppofe the reve-
rence for the preceding adminiftrations, during the
two
reigns, has not been fuch as to
laft
make
us
fay,that the fuperior abilities of our former minifters,
have given fo great a check to the French land
force, as to turn the
favour.
barrier
the
it
:
In the
whole balance of power
it
in
our
war, France difmantled the
up
new power
in
to counter-balance the natural head
of
of Flanders, and
Empire
can
laft
raifed
a
then be fuppofed that France, which was
able to brave
all
Europe
I
in
2
two preceding wars,
is
Co
[
now
IS
all
at
prefent war,
its
land
once,
to
force
the
in
reduced
fo
]
beginning
England alone
And
?
without having fufiered any material
France maintained a kvtn
grand
that too
lois in it, tho*
v/ar againft the
y.-ars
alliance, after the lofs of forty
its beil
of the
low, as to be inferior in
thoufand of
troops at Blenheim, and after having t\venty
thoufand more killed and taken at Ramillies,
fiili
held out live years longer.
But how can Fngland be
alone, when it
mous K. of P
now
a
?
Auftria, he
confidering
France
Not,
war with
a willing
is
a'i!y.;
but we
it
art^
againit
aJrc-ady eng.iged in
is
:
Againft the
it.
force of England
the
war with France, can
again ft France
I fear,
and when Britain
•,
and
has an alliance with the ir.asnani-
for he has never declared
Houfe of
faid to ftand fingle
be the ftrongcr
ii)r
a
adopt-
ing another Prince's quarrel with the Houfe of
Auftria
is
?
We
may
eafily perfuatie our/elves that
an ally againft France
ihew any thing
in
;
biit it
may
the convention of the iith^of
April, or the fucceeding treaty,
which
may
tell us,
vince bim of
it.
he
nor be ea y to
Poflibly he
will
con-
that that
convention regards only the liberty of the Germanick body
•,
and that France, though occafionally
in the pream^ble,
cles themfelves,
is
nor any thing
Englifh v/ar with
means only the
not once mentioned in tht arti-
it.
intereft
That
clfe
the
relative to the
common
intereft
of their two houfcs againft
the
6i
C
the archducal
fer to a
and that
-,
]
convention cannot re-
this
war with France, becaufe the two
parties
covenant not to make any treaty of peace, truce,
without comprehending each other
or neutrality,
in
it
which,
:
lie
may
only refers to their
allege, proves that the treaty
German
quarrels, becaufe he
wants no treaty of peace or truce with France, being
I do not fay that this
peace with it already.
would be a juft plea j but if he fhould think proper
to make it, England then (lands alone in its war
at
with France, as
much
Majefty of
with his
as if
P—
it
had not that alliance
againft the
Emprefs
Qticen.
But
Oill
however he
is
an
ally.
By
a treaty
which
him with money, only becaufe
he wants it, and which therefore he will never
ceafe to want j and which, upon reading it over,
obliges us to furnifh
we
fh'all
be apt to think, will not oblige him to
money or troops, Ihcuid we
furnifh us either with
fo much.
Nothing is m.ore common, than to hear tlie wars of the two great aliian.
ces condemned as confuming wars ; becaufe EngYet all the fubfidies,
land, it was faid, paid all.
which King William paid to German Princes, at a
time when they had two hundred thoufand men
fighting againft Fnince, do not amount to the
half of the fubfidy, we now pay to the K. of P
WiiDt
,
them ever
alone,
his
he'.l;
who
could not, or would notgarrifon one of
Queen Anne's war, for the
thoufand pounds, we not only fent
to-'ns for us. In
fubfidy of
fifty
eight
:
^2
[
]
eight thou fand PrufTiansto fight the French in Savoy,
but had twelve thou fand more in our pay in FlanWe now pay him fix hundred and feventy
ders.
thoufand, for which he
have we gained by
one
us 'an ally, and fuf-
this ally
Two
?
him
own
to fight his
driving the
German
of
reft
then
the
:
to en-
battles, againft enemies,
no quarrel with
Britain has
which
What
things
him money
the being obliged to pay
is
able
calls
French ourfelves.
fers us to fight the
:
the other
the
is
Princes into a clofer
union with France, and making ourfelves obnoxi-
ous to Europe for fupporting
fuppofed that Britain
thefe
can
:
be
it
the ftronger for either of
?
But
he
is
this ally
is
is
fo
;
man of great
he not a
and one of the
Doubtlefs
abilities?
cleareft proofs
of
it,
is
his
obliging us to pay him fix hundred and feventy
thoufand pound for nothing.
In
certainly the greateft Prince, ever
Yet with
before.
that
all
man
Queen Anne's
great abilities, he
and we
iis.
call
We
him an
is
known
we
is
all
a
his
but juft able to ftand himfelf
ally,
and fancy that he fupports
confefs he lives by miracle, and are
the Prince, which
dependence on.
is
paid to any Ger-
war, and with
dering every year that he does not
this
is
to Britain
enormous fum, which
five times greater fubfidy, than
Prince in
that refpedl he
fall
:
won-
and yet
we have placed our only
We take a pleafure in recounting the
number o£renemiss he
has to contend with, without
once
63
t
]
once confideiing, that we make all thofe enemies
Inftead of
ours, by upholding him againft them.
bethinking ourfelves of the exorbitant expence he
of to us,
tance
we make
that an
argument of
and prove him to be the beft
;
his
is
impor-
ally, that Bri-
more than them
Queen Anne's war was a
tain ever had, becaufe he colls us
all.
Baron Bothmar
valuable ally
in
for he lent us, at the ufual price, a
:
The
regiment of dragoons.
Prince of
Buckbug
is
fo in this war ; without making us any enemies, he
furnifties us for our money with a brigade of artille-
But our magnanimous ally furnifhes us with
is upon the
new enemies, inftead of new troops
gain,
drawing
we
away
our forces, inleaft fuccefs
ry.
;
ftead of adding to
in clear
money
fand pounds
them
juft fix
;
and
is
every year to us
hundred and feventy thou-
than nothing.
lefs
But when we have enabled him to conquer all
his enemies, he will then help us to conquer ours.
The Britifh crown and parliament can avow nothing bjt what
law of right
is
lies
juft
;
but arbitrary Princes, whofe
only in their
always govern'd by the
own
ftri6lefl:
breafts, are not
rules
of gratitude.
Their practice has often been to look out for
ftruments
allies,
fit
for their purpofe,
and perfwade to do
whom
them
themfelves to do
their bufinefs for
firft,
and then to leave them to
their
own
as they can.
in-
they can call
Their regard to their fu-
ture advantage, fometimes weighs more with them,
than the remembrance of paft benefits.
Should he
think
%
t
]
think that our fears for the Eledorate
make
his befl'
fecurity tor the continuance of his fubfidy, he
not think
On
for his intercft
it
the other hand,
Britain
hi?,
may
than
it
find
it
will to
But he
is
for
remove
thofe fears.
many perfons may think that
a much harder ta'k to conquer
conquer its own enemies, if he
be not one of them
wc conquer
to
may
:
him
If he fiiould be one, the lefs
the better.
certainly a very great Prince.
So we read
incur papers about three hundred times a-year.
Whe-
thcrthe true ftandard of a Prince's greatnefs confift, in
his
making
own
his
countries m.ferable,
not concerned
him
in.
people happy, or thofe of other
is
a quellion, which
we
arc
But however, we may admire
as a great warriour, or
whatever be our idea
of his greatnefs, he can never be a ufeful ally to
Britain, or contribute in
What
is it
ths lead degree to ours.
that this revival
muft probably end
in
?
by means of his fuperior
of his claim to Silefia
Poffibly, during his
abilities,
life,
and by making
fometimcs France help him, and fometimes England, he
may
mean time he
be jull able to keep
it
:
but
quarrel never to be ended with the
in a
in the
has involved himfelf and his family
Houfe of
Auftria, which will feize every opportunity to re-
cover
it.
3!ricain,
it
Cap
then a Prince be a ufeful ally to
or afford us any real aHlftance,
fo
mined enemy catching
him
who
needs
much himfelf, and knov/s that he has a deter?
at
every occafion tofurprizc
Bcfure that cither of them can be of any
fer-
vicc
65
t
mud
vice to Britain, they
Which from
themftlves.
]
at lead be
the nature of their quar-
Should our pre-
they never can be free from.
rej
fent
ally
Queen
beat his
and force the Emprefs
rival,
to a treaty
produce the lead
that cannot
:
out of danger
degree of confidence between them.
Silefia
the Auftrian family fo great an objcft in
fo very neceflary to the defence of the reft
Turkifh Frontier, that they never
it
up.
A treaty
td
and
of their
really will give
be nothing more than a fuf-
will
All the faith of treaties
penfion of fighting.
He
an end with them.
is
itfelf,
knows
that the
firft
is
at
inftant
they can attack him to advantage, they will break
from the very fam^
the treaty,
which he revived
houfes are committed
never end,
till
claim.
his
in
In
principle,
fhort, the
an eternal war, which can
one of them
is
abfolutely fubdued.
Neither of them therefore can be of the
one think ofgainingalTiftance from
it
either
?
To
France they may either of
natural ally: becaufe
it is
France to keep up continual wars
France
of t wo fpent
faw agonizing inaftruggleforeach
other's deftrudion
them be a
leafb fervice
Did ever any
to Britain, while the other furvives.
warriors, which
upon
two
the intereit of
Empire.
in the
will naturally fupport the weaker.
But Eng-
land has no intereft to ferve by the internal wars of
the
Empire
:
on the contrary, we can never hope for
any good from
it,
but
in its
union.
The
of England therefore, fince there can be
between them,
is
to let
K
them
intereft
no peace
fight out their quarrel.
66
[
"When one of them
rel.
]
fubdued, the other will
is
be glad of our alliance, and then only will be worthy of having
And
what
teflants to
tle,
it.
this flaughter
is all
end
in
?
of German Pro-
Probably he will either fall
or fee Silefia loft in his lifetime,
at leaft will
in bat-
his fuccelTor
not have the fame opportunities,
or
make France and England
al-
the fame addrefs to
exhauft themfelves in his defence and
probaWy be forced to give it up after feeing
an ample vengeance taken on his own dominions,
ternately
:
will
for
•,
all
the ravages
committed on the Auftrian.
Will he then appear to have been the friend of
Proteftantifm, for having in his lifetime twice ra-
vaged one Proteftant Eledorate, held
rod over anorher, and
Papifts, a pretence totally to ruin his
this
the Prince,
is
him up
raifed
becaufe we
whom,
And
own.
becaufe the French
to imbroil one part of
know
a continual
death given to the
his
fit
that he can too
firft
Germany, and
eafily join
with
to imbroil another, we call a great man, and
thmk that we can never enough admire him. Nay,
are nurfing and making greater, to enable him to
demand of Britain lb much the more, and to ferve
them
France
fo
much
For to France only
the better.
he can be a ferviceable
ally
:
to
B
n he can
be at moft, but the terror of an Eleftorate, the
Idol
of the
cruud,
and
the
Hero of
a
News
Paper.
I
67
C
I return therefore
this
German
:
news of war
firft
pofitlon, that in
and the land forces of France are
thofe of England.
more numerous than
may
my
to
war, Britain ftands fingle and unaided
againft France
We
]
be told perhaps, that riches are the
*,
fi-
and our news papers will teach us to
value ourfelves upon our having contracted eight
new debt
or twelve millions of
know
if
it
may
we had paid
ney
all
this year, (for I
be confider'd differently) as
off fo
many of
will not hire troops
the powers of
the old.
much as
But mo-
to fight in a caufe,
Europe
are averfc to.
which
Will the
or any of the States of the
RulTians, or Swedes,
Empire lend us forces to fight againft themfelves ?
Have not the Dutch and Danes refufed us ? Can
a help us ? On the contrary, is
the King of P
he not daily fending recruits to our enemies
ravaging Saxony he
bitants to defpair,
is
driving
^
By
Proteftant inha-
its
and laying them under the hard
necefiity of reforting for bread to their Prince
vier's ftandards in the
French army.
ces of our enemies are
Great Britain
in the
the nature of
its
number
of
refour-
France exceeds
infinite.
government,
The
Xa-
its
is
people, and by
able to fend
out
many of its fubjefts to its military fervices, as
their King fhall be pleafed to order: and befides
its own fuperior refources, France has Switzerland,
as
Germany, and Flanders
What has England to oppofe
Italy,
shing but the bodies of
K
its
2
own
to recruit out of.
to
all
thefe
?
No-
fubjeds, which can
very
68
[
very
ill'be
fpared from
]
agriculture and
its
fadures, and the levies from the diftridj of
manuHano-
We
may think that we have been rather fuccefsfal in Germany in the two lafl: campaigns,
which perhaps may eafily be accounted for but
is it poffible not to fee the inequality, in the numbers of men p.t lead, which there is between us and
ver and Hefle.
:
our enemies
?
Can England then, by its money alone, be a
match for all Europe ? If we were fo, is it fit that
we fhould wantonly declare it, and thereby give
umbrage to every other ftate ? Money may, in a
qualified
fenfe,
war
it
',
but
be allowed to
muft
find
men
be the fjnews of
make up
to
and fubftance of our armies, which,
ftate of
have
fent
Europe
their fixt
impofiible.
war continuing, and
as they
.the
is
now
In fliort,
meafure and bounds
parties
are, increale
double of what
Erench navy equal
the flefh
in the
;
prefent
things
all
and the pre-
remaining affected
the French revenue to
you cannot render the
it is,
to the Englilh
•,
fame addition of wealth to England
nor could the
make
its
num-
ber of land forces equal to the French.
Thus
that
far
the
French.
The
.than
we have argued upon
Englifli
But
is
revenue
that the
real
ordinary revenue of France,
that
of England.
French revenue
is,
the fuppofition,
was greater than the
What
I confefs I
ftate of the cafe ?
I fear,
is
greater
the amount of the
do not know ; but I
form
:
%
[
form
my judgment upon
given us the
his office,
]
the view of
by
laft feflions,
which was
it,
a gentleman,
may be fuppofed
who from
to underftand
it
beft
and who very candidly ftated the fubjed, and.
The
fequences.
were then told,
anticipated,
ftanding revenue of France,
is
left
had pleafed, to draw the con-
his hearers, if they
twelve millions
-,
five
we
of them are
and the remaining feven, fubjecl to
any deficiencies
make
in the other five,
revenue of France.
ed two millions
-,
the prefent
Befide this, they have borrow-
and thefe nine millions make
the whole fund of France for carrying on the war
which he was pleafed
to fay,
was a fum, very
adequate to the expence of fuch a war.
let
what
us confider,
The
pofe to this.
is
;
in-
Now then
the Englilh revenue to op-
(landing revenue of England for
is only the land and malt tax,
which amount to two million feven hundred and
fifty thoufand pound
to which may be added, fo
carrying on a war,
:
much
as
can
be taken out of the finking fund
though fome perfons may confider that
pre-engaged.
But allowing however
we have
half to be taken thence,
this,
twelve millions
four
;
and
eight millions on annuities, and
Go
on then for two
France
at the three years
on the finking fund.
years longeron this plan
:
end^ will be fix millions in debt
we reckon
a million
then four million
French revenue of feven million.
we have borrowed for this year,
to oppofe to the
But befide
:
as already
;
and England,
if
the twelve millions borrowed, will be
thirty-
70
[
If
thirty-fix.
we
will allow but the eight millions
borrowed, England
this
is
Can we need
a
?
more convincing proof,
But why are the
fum very inadequate
war
No
?
be twenty-four millions in
will
a ruinous war
debt.
]
French
one chofe to
aflc
nine
millions,
expence of fuch
the
to
that
a
a
though
the queftion,
every thing was dated with the greateft fairnefs
and
fum than
greater
no
fix
all
Fifteen
precifion.
mil'ions
fleet this year.
hundred thoufand pounds
the
certainly
is
a
But France has fitted out
Our navy cods us five million
nine.
fummer employed
j
though
it
has been
no one offenfive
in
fervice.
This at once reduces the ftock of the two nations
for the land war, to nine millions,
Add
horfes
to
-,
this,
and ten millions.
the charges of tranfporting
men and
the fleet of tr.mfports to be kept always in
readinefs for every
emergency
French pay
Englifli and
;
the difference of
and the
•,
much
greater
facility, which the French have of recruiting and
fupporting their troops from the Rhine and Main ;
many
confider thefe, and
are under
millions a
and we
\
fum
fliall
at all
which we can efied
other difadvantages
not think the French nine
inadequate to any purpofes,
at that
Their ordinary revenue,
if
diftance with our ten*
they have feven millions,
on the prefent plan of the war
bring more
at all, than
men into
we can by
we
the
field,
will
enable them to
without borrowing
getting every year eight mil-
lions in debt.
Every
i
7-
[
]
Every one, who has thought on the
fubjecl of
war, muft have confidered the three different kinds
of
it
a war of offence, a war of equality, and a
:
And
of defence.
the
laft
is
an army
general will find
but
if it
every one knows, that of thefe,
moft difidvantageous and the moll
Where
ficult.
war
dif-
to defend itfelf only,
is
employment
a
for all his attentions
be to defend a long trad of country
:
un-
;
kfs the attacking general be greatly inferior in his
art,
The
he will ufually prevail.
who ads
the general,
choice,
reafon
offenfively, has
when and where
the attacking general
fers
little,
but
is
own
to dired his main force
whereas the defender muft equally divide his
if
that
is,
in his
it
one inftance, he
fail in
ready to try another
;
and
:
fuf-
and fome
:
where, at fome unguarded time, he will find an
opportunity to come with five thoufand, where the
defenders have but one.
Lines of defence
perhaps be made effedual
where there
paffable canals,
the
Dykes of them
:
is
and
may
cut by im-
in countries,
no marching but on
yet,
even
there,
the
French never formed
lines,
which the Duke of
Marlborough did not
pafs
but an inland
country, like
:
open
Hanover and Heffe, is not to be coarmy ; and that ought not
vered, but by a fuperior
to
do
it,
but to
berland found
ad
offenfively.
fo
in the firft
it
ceeding general, with
fo ever fince.
all
The Duke of Cumcampaign
his abilities,
;
our fuc-
has found
it
Both fummers the French have for-
ced their way into Heffe at
vering, as well as
Hanover
leaft,
:
which he was co-
and the French have
every
;.'
72
[
]
every year brought a fuperiority of numbers into the
field
as great a fuperiority,
:
ought
as they
ber of their forces at home.
know
I
our Genera], by the fuperiority of
good
in
policy to fend to that fervice, whatever be the
num-
indeed that
his genius,
has
been able to drive them back again, and linger out
the reft of the campaign, without fuffering
return
and
;
with the
we
this
this
the very kind of war,
is
which the
intereft
wifh
Juft the contrary meafure
for.
to
a vidory, and are elated
call
Yet
fuccefs.
them
of the French
confidered, the defirable one for
fliould
make them
politically
is,
England
:
to bring
the matter to an imm.ediate iflue, and feek the
Krench upon the firft open ground, they have to
and force them to a pitched
pafs,
it is
To this
Duke of Cum-
battle.
eaCly anfwered, that neither the
berland nor Prince Ferdinand were ftrong enough
do
to
and
I
this.
fay
acknowledge that they were not
I
they never
further, that
may
whatever force we
fend to
will always fend a greater.
England
!
It
will
be
in
a land
:
for
Germany, France
has more troops than
and while the Englifh councils
fmgly to engage
:
perfift
war with France, they
ever muft be inferior, and ever muft a6t only on the
defenfive.
Can we think of loading our revenue with a
more money than we did
greater debt, and raifmg
laft
year
^
And
ftirely
would wifh again
fifteen millions
6
to
no friend of
fee
fo
his
country
great a proportion of
devoted folely to Germany,
with
fcarce
n
[
]
new regiment, or new fleet of offence,
fent out all the fummer upon an Englifli fervice.
If
after all this, and the affurances that the German army
fcarce a fingle
was
French came
ninety- five thoufand ftrong, the
into the field twenty thoufand
we
when
are
in its
bankrupt
men
hope to equal them
to
?
fuperior to us,
If France, even
can overmatch us, when in the
(late,
heighth of our credit, can we afk a ftronger proof
that this war
felves
we
upon
will,
a ruinous one
is
little
know
fore we equal them, and
war
tience
But
let
utmofl: length,
fliall
be exhaufl:ed.
in
that
we
mufl:
till
us fuppofe, that
burfl-
be-
our credit or our pa-
order to give this argument
England than were
value our-
will therefore fpin out the
its
to
may
advantages, and fwell as
trifling
our enemies
We
?
its
we had more men
full force,
to
enlifl:
in
we had more
countries to recruit out of; and that we couki borrow more millions fl:ill to pay them ; and could,
by means of thcfe, bring a larger army into the
field
no
France, or that
the French could oppofe us with
than
a war which
it is
in
carrying
is
it
on
in a
to
victory can
this is
our enemy.
:
method, which can tend to
decifive iflue in our favour, nor
damage
:
not only ruinous, but impradticable
to
any efl^edual
'Tis in a country where a
do us no good, and where a defeat can
do the French no eflTential hurt. No wife government ever thought that the end of making war,
was merely the
all
killing
of men.
Britain Ihould
others be the moft tender of rifking the
L
lives
of
of
its
its fubjcifls
r 74 1
upon fuch a hazard.
The
great intent
is by viftory to conquer an enemy's country,
and by leflcning either his provinces, his fubjefts.
Or his revenues, to bring him to reafon.^ England
of war
is
morally fure of efFedling
this
but can hope for nothing of
Germany.
is
kind by
to be reaped in
it
Britain propofe
Germany
every where
its
elfe
war
Germany
to gain territory or
towns
Would they be worth having
? What then is the reward ?
?
were given us
if
;
in
Suppofe us to gain a complcat victory
there any fruit of
Does
this
-,
?
in
they
Inflead
of feeing the French upon the Wefel, (or that other
brook the Memel, which
we
ears
Britilli
never heard
them upon the Main
that
much
greater
a
dillancc
from
England,
at
fo
is,
and
that is, we fiiould have
fo much nearer to France
the war to carry on at fo much greater expence, ar.d
before,)
fliould find
;
;
have our provifions, our military
much
cruits to fend fo
would
find
Let us
if the
open
all their
try the
fupplics fo
Ilores,
;
and our
re-
and our enemies
much
the nearer.
chance of war a fecond time, and
French arc generous enough to give us an
(which they certainly won't do, unlefs
field,
they are as flrong as
gazines are
victory
we)
let
If they fiiould beat,
again.
may
own
the farther
^
loft
:
us fight them over
all
our advanced ma-
but fuppofe us to gain a fecond
what would be the
fruit
of it
.''
1 he French
then, perhaps, retreat over the Rhine into their
country.
But would any Englifliman wifh to
fol-
15
[
follow
them
thither
?
]
Britain invade France, fingly,
and by its own flrength, upon the Rhine, among
all its
The Duke of Marlborough,
v*ith
frontier
towns?
the fingle flrength of Britain, would not have done
it
Had
of Blenheim.
after the battle
have we now a battering
gular fortifications
?
he then, or
tra'n fufficient to force re-
Vv^ith all the intermediate ftates
of Gefi+rany for our enemies, could we ftnd them
and that
hea^^.y- ftrtlilery,
infinite
apparatus requifite
ttf^ ilege of a great town ? When we had got it,
would we keep it, if we could ? Could we keep it
if we would ? Or rather, Lng before the neceffary
for
be fent from hence, or be brought to
ftores could
our army,
would have drawn troops
the French
enough from
their great garrifons
and
frontiers,
as
well as from their interior militia, to furround and
cut
it
now
off
from every
pofTibility
exert, to dcftroy an Englifli
fee
of return.
France
would then
army, which it fhould
puts not forth half the ftrength,
it
cooped up among the ftrong towns on
its
fron-
tiers.
If
we
are fo very fanguine, and think the Britifli
force equal to the whole
power of France
at land,
it were better fure not to cool the ardor of our troops
by marching them five hundred miles into Germany. Inftead of attacking this Bull by the horns
on
his
German
frontier, let
his flank, or pierce
him
us rather gore
to the heart:
Let
him
in
us give
our enemies troops the pain of a long march, and
not our
own
•,
and land, as our anceftors did,
L
2
at
Ca-
7C
[
]
Calais,
or Boulogne, or Newhaven, and march
Paris
this
:
be a
will
much
fhorter,
to
much
and a
cheaper method of carrying on the war, as well as
a
much more
eJtfeclual
means of bringing the French
Let us make our enemies country the
to terms.
of war, rather than our
feat
we
friends, if
really
think ourfelves ftrong enough to cope with
whole land force
-,
and
it
will
be a
fupply our army with
artillery
up
Roan and
the Sein, to take
much
thei):
e^^Jfif.^^l^i'-
and the neceg^rj^
Paris, than
to
fe""^^
it ,wiOuld
be to fend them over the Maine, the Neckar, and
the Rhine, to take Strafnuro-.
'&•
But the abfurdity of England's ever thinking to
of fortified places on the Confines between France and Germany, is fufficient, without
pofiefs itfelf
mentioning the hazard of fuch an attempt
ing
it
no: impoflible to take a town,
know what
abfolutely fo to
a war, therefore,
us
-,
we cannot
where fortune
our
itfelf
avail ourfelves even
and the mofl repeated
it
do with
to
would be
1 his
is
cannot help
of our vi6lories,
could only multiply
fuccefs
and double our charges
difficulties,
it.
allow-
:
:
that
is,
it
method of carrying on a war with France, which
from the very nature of it, is impracticable.
is
a
If in
the prefent courfe of the war, Britain can
get nothing by
hand, can
the
the
lofe
number of
common
its
vicftorics,
France, on the other
nothing by a defeat.
the
killed
Except only in
and wounded, which ia
courfe of battles,
may
be
fct at
about
the
If
77
[
1
the double of that of the conquerors, what other
have our enemies to
lofs
Be
out of Germany.
towns, which they
before
brought fo
much
Still you'll
?
at
the
may
it
their's
we
all
can gain
leflened,
to
land's expence mufl:
go
us, that they
certainly will
or the
ftate
their
own coun-
cleared to them.
is
march
on.
Our enemies
go
we attempt
the
if
But Eno-o
thither.
don't intend to
go, if
lefs
will the
to bankruptcy, for
nearer
Germany
fay
Or
?
be fo for the next furnmer,
French don't chufe
tell
was any one of the
:
having no army to pay out of
True,
are driven
Will they have a fingle fortification the
?
French revenue be
try
To
it
They
?
fhall quit in their retreat,
for the greatell victory
their
fuftain
not
will
thither
they
j
to leffen our ex-
pence, and withdraw a great part of our troops.
Where then is the end of our labour? Can the
French wifh for a more advantageous plan of carrying on a war, than this in which they know that
-,
no
decifive ftroke can be ilruck
and
which they
in
by us againft them
England muft be cxhaufctd, were
Its
And
plan
if
?
we
tent.
can
we hope
treafures
There
ad
and
?
to maintain our conquers,
war upon
by
fo difadvantageous
are people fo very inconfiderate,
a
that
are but fighting with the French, they are con-
But
furcly
it
becomes a wife
choice of the province, which
to
its
credit five times greater than they are
perfifting in a land
-,
are fure, that in the long run
in,
to confider,
where
it
it
ftate in
fhall
fend
making
its
troops
can fight to greatell
ad van-
78
L
advantage
where
:
expence, and be
weakeft, and
will turn to
can put
it
itfelf at leafl
flrongefl
itfelf
own
its
]
beft
enemy
its
where
;
where
;
to mofl:
enemy
its
is
viflories
its
account, and by hurting
him
Germany
adverfary in his mofl: efiential interefV, reduce
its
The war
the foonelt to fue for peace.
in
anfwers no one of thefe purpofes.
France cannot be
hurt in any material intereft, but
mnft
carry
its
we can
end
in the
The utmofb
them a few men
point by ruining our credit.
propofe,
only to
is
kill
and what have we done, even
thefe four years
pad
a General that
had
}
Our
fo
:
that refpeft, for
in
Britifh troops never
large a ufe of
them
faw
but
:
France fcarce knows in its hiilbry fo innocent a war.
Was the battle of Haftenbeck fo much in our favour ?
or their
lofs
of
men greater
trifling affairs, as thofe
*5
and giving
Did we
find the
?
Will fuch
of Crevelt and Warburg, pro-
duce any confequcnce, except the
guns
own
than our
Tower
over more men ?
firing the
a pretence to fend
French army the weaker
fum-
laft
mer, for thofe prodigies of valour, fhew^n the year
before
by two
ofMinden? Let
ty,
Englilli
brigades
the General
and brought up the
at
the
have done
horfe,
as
battle
du-
his
he ought,
to
charge the French, or trample down three or four
thoufand Saxon and French foot.
lefs
have been a very good thing
* Fifceen Millions fpent, and
is it
fifteen
It
:
would doubt-
that
might have
hundred enemies killed
:
much honour, to fire guns
and ihew that we value them
not doing Frenchmen's heads too
of triumph upon fuch an otcafioni
at ten thoufand
pounds a fcJp
?
more
79
[
]
more than double the number, which the French
really loft there, and would have made the vidlory
more brilliant. But where would have been the
fubftantial
benefit
the main of the
Endand
to
war
have been
How
?
affected
would
by
it ?
The French army perhaps might not have been
able to make a (land quite \o foon
and might
-,
have crofied
Main
the
and the Engiifh might
;
And
have entered Frankfort.
to
England the taking
a
before a French town, or will
one
?
The
men.
only
therefore
lofs
is
Frankfort worth
French cock
it
bo£;t
Was
.''
an Englifli
after be
would have been of
But France cannot be hurt by the mere
of men, which, were
when
But
our
is
five times greater,
by draughts from
prefently fupply,
replace
it
it
its
it
lofs
could
militia
;
or
Germany.
our hufbandmen
pleafed, with recruits in
it
fo large
ftate
and manufacturers
fy the pitting five
or are
?
fo very ufelefs to
it ?
as to jufti-
and twenty thoufand Engliflimen,
again ft thirty or forty thoufand French, merely to
try their valour,
and which
with a bett of at
leaft five millions to three
ing upon the main
fibility
all this,
;
depend-
without the pof-
?
diftinguifhing art of this war
confifted in
tles,
And
moft men
of any one national advantage accruing from
the victory
The
?
fhall kill the
and
has hitherto
the raifing trifling fkirmilhes into bat-
victories.
We
overlook the ruining our
troops, in the praifes of their valour
who knew,
that they could not
any method
fo effedtuaily, as
;
make
and there are
their court in
by magnifying the victories
;
So
L
]
tories
of our German army, and
lolTes
of the French.
But with
aggravatlncy the
all their lofTes,
French have been every year ftronger
'
than we
as
:
ought to
be.
miftaken,
if
much
ftronger as in
In reahty,
we think
fear
I
in
the
Germany
good pohcy they
we muft be much
that France
is
but juft fupe-
Could France furnifh out armies upon
the Rhine, the Mofelle, and the Maefe, with two
rior to us.
more
in
Spain, and Savoy,
and can we
now
flatter
at the
all
ourfelves that
all
fame time
refources are
its
exhaufted by fending one fingle army to invade
Hanover
Do we
?
not
now
fee the
for a fecond
ready
the effects of it
felt
French court making
army
pofitions
.''
dif-
and have we not alWhat then was the foun?
dation of thofe vain boafts, which are given out in
the beginning of every fefTion
-,
that the
French are
and the next German campaign muft be
their laft ? far from being bankrupt by maintaining
ruined
their
;
ground
all
the
fummer
to ours, their
fuperior
felf in a capacity to
in Hefie,
with an
government now
form two armies
j
army
finds
it-
and muft we
nor therefore have taken a wrong meafure of their
ftrength,
when we
reprefented their finances as un-
equal to the expcnce of one
"We have before
?
of mak*
Upper Rhine-, fliall we
Lower Rhine ^ To what
feen the imprafticablenefs
jng war with France on the
now
then march
purpofe
?
To
to the
take Wefel.
That
is
not the French
fron-
[Si
frontier,
]
but the King of Pruflia's.
But we would
army
prevent the French from forming an
The
want of Wefel did
f*rom refolving to
march
there.
not prevent the French
their
year 1757, and neither would
army
it
that
now.
way
in the
In order to
we muft form a greater army
we may be repulfed and
there
But fuppofe we could prevent the
beaten back.
French from forming their army upon the Lower
Rhine they would then order it upon the Roer or
effetft
that therefore,
ourfelves,
elfe
-,
the
Maefe
and
:
it
is
quence to them, where
go
after
it ?
matter of the
a
it
The French
is
formed,
we do but
cannot propofe to conquer
England by fending armies into Germany
only hope is to exhauft and weary us out by
war, which
we muft
confe-
leaft
if
carry on with
their
:
a land
them upon fuch
and to divert us from
;
their iflands, by employing our attention in Germany. They have found that the miftaken zeal of
very difadvantageous terms
the nation, and our eagernefs to fight a
Frenchman
any where, have made us willing to meet them on
the ground of their
and they
And
are
now
were that fecond army to be on the Maefe,
would anfwer
Lower Rhine
much the
nate,
own chufing with one army,
trying to decoy us with another..
their intention better than
;
nearer
becaufe their troops
home
and our credit
:
And
it
one on the
would be fo
if the nation
be
ob'ft'i-
not break fooner, rather
will
than not exhauft us, they
v.'ill
M
trail
us on with a
.
riiird
82
!
third
army on
their frontiers
But
let
]
the Mofelle, or on
which we
any other part of
choofe *.
ihall
us fuppofe the nation to be powerful anci
zealous enough to
raife
with the other
we could draw down good
five,
for another army,
moon
for
•,
upon
not to be had.
more, and
kill
far
this earth
Go
A
*
I
on the
have fliewn they are
Still
in
we (hould
till
think
it
not a
Rhine from
find ourfelves as
We might the
young Prince of fpirit, who has
may
each,
right of the
a peace as ever.
a fecond chara«fter,
troops
out of the
faid,
on thus for three campaigns
20,000 French
Emerick.
from
had almofl
I
battalion remained
Bafil to
twenty millions, and that,
next cam-
diflinguifhed himfelf in
command
time to have a
in
Could he have had the good fortune to have killed fifit would have been about the fize
teen hundred I'renchmen
of our former viflories and under the noife of fuch a triumph,
chief.
:
;
he mioht have gained another ellablifhmcnt, and a refolucion
form an army for him. The novehy of a foreign general
now
over.
But furely
it
could have been in the
nerals
J
will not be eafy
leall
and two armies,
to
is
fhew how Britain
benefited by having
(if it
to
could have found
two fuch Ge-
men)
inftcad
of
two more millions of its treafure to be fpent in
Germany on the fupport of them; and all this expence incurred
for the fake of regaining Wcfcl for an ally, which he himfelf had
one
;
and
at leaft
magnanimoufly abandoned, when the works of
and would not defend,
own fake or
the number of
cither for his
it
were
ours.
intire,
While
troops, which
with half the treafure, and half
are fent to Germany, to ferve no one Englifh or good German
purpofe,
we might
of the French
pofTefs ourfelves
iflands,
which they could never retake from us and gain to his Majefty
a hundred thoufand fubjeds and to Britain a revenue of four
Befides fecuring Hanover, an-J putting an end
or five millions
;
;
:
p
thi?
expence of the war when
we
pleafe.
paign
83
[
paign be ftronger in the
fliould
we
field
]
But how
than France,
avail ourfelves of this fuperiority
What
?
would be the advantage of it ? None. The court
of France would know of that fuperiority ; and
would order their army not to march that year into
Germany, and would anfwer their purpofe juft as
well, by having put us to twenty millions expence,
and by having kept their
while they were at none
troops and their money at home would have fo much
:
the better a fund for the next year's war,
when Eng-
In fhort, this
land would be exhaufted.
is
a war,
which France never can be hurt by, and never can
A land war with England alone is an
be weary of.
advantage, and which France has not enjoyed thefe
'Tis the triumph, and not the trial
hundred years.
of their arms to fight us fingle
thev
know
their
own
intereft,
in
Germany*
•,
and
if
they will never fend
an over-powerful army thither to drive us out of
and put us upon bethinking ourfelves of ours.
it,
But when we had beat tine French out of Germany, we would go and afTift the king of PruiTia.
Acrainll whom ? The army of the Empire ? Britain
has no quarrel with the Empire of
been already fhewn, that
it
its
ov/n
;
and
it
has
never can be the intereft
of Britain to abet the quarrels of the members of the
*
that
after
It will
not be a juflification of this part of the war, to fay
we have had
jreat fuccefs elfewhere
;
becaufe I fhall here-
(hew that the war in Germp.ny has not
in
tlie
leaft
degree
contributed to our fuccefles in any other part of the world, but
either hiidered or retarded them.
M
2
Em-
S4
[
]
Empire again ft each other. Can we give to France
a greater plcafure than to fee us, their declared enemy, employed in a war with the empire, their mod
dangerous
army
And
rival
Shall
?
v,'e
then attack the Auftriaii
The Emprefs Queen
?
is
not at war with us.
has not Britain enemies enough already, with-
out going into Eaft Germany to feek for more
But they
And
our
we fubjecls of the king of
By a treaty which obliges
are
ally.
We
thing.
a^ he did
PrulTia
He
?
r,
Silefia.
In the fame terms
which he was going to attack.
Are then
afliftance.
the Britifh
Are
very numerous, that we
troops never to fee an end of their labours
men and
treafures
fo
?
our fubje6ls to feek out Bohemians,
fend
fliould
is
us to no fuch
guarantied
H
But he needs our
our
?
enemies of the king of Pruflia.
are all
Hungarians, Bofnians and Sclavonians, Bannatines
and Warafdiners, and twenty other people of the Eaft,
whom we never had the leaft concern ? Are
with
we
that
fure
and Swedes,
his
M
we can conquer
all in
of
may
P
the next fummer,
when
all his
Are we
would not
fhip
Is
it
and
leaft
.''
?
us
we
we
him
ftiould help
fure that he
his not
fure that the price
would
needing ouraf-
of
his
friend-
with the importance of
it ?
would return our kindnefs,
certain that he
help
If
enemies, are
rife
that
as
not need our afliftance
be the better friend to us for
fiftance
fo intirely,
the French will invade the
Eleflorate with frelh force
to conquer
Auftrians, Ruffians,
one Jfummer
againft
the
French
have a treaty to oblige him to
it
.''
-,
Let us
and not
at
truft
it
S5
[
it,
as
it
now
merely to his
is,
not in the laft
I
who were
he no longer
nnakers, as foon as
Did he
gratitude.
war quit the French,
his
wanted them
?
Thefe and a thoufand other queftions ought to be
anfwered, before we refolve on fending our army
We
Germany.
into Eaft
once profefTcd never to
our troops beyond the mouths of the great
truft
of the
rivers
Ems
and Wefer: but whither are they
K. of Pruffia's battles.
to go, that are to fight the
army is to go fo far
Germany, how is it to ad ?
If our
P
And
a?
are
into the inland parts of
Britons
Shall
it
K. of
join the
then doom'd to fight,
not only under a foreign general, but under a foreiga
king too
He
?
will
probably ufe them foon, know-
ing that they will foon be weary of being fo ufed.
Shall they then
magazines
?
ad by
themfelves
Shall they follow
den to Breflaw
If the nation
?
Where
?
are their
them too from
Emb-
now brought
is
a
million and half in debt for the article of forage,
how many
Not
to
back,
afl<:
millions will fupply us at that diftance
how Englifhmen
are to find
they (hould be expofed and routed
if
fappofe
him and them
lige his
enemies to treat with him
pole this
more
their
German
to be vidorious,
prince to be a
;
more
grateful ally than any other
ever was to us
y
againft France,
and that he would
What
and
let
;
?
way
us
and to oblet
us fup-
faithful
German
and
prince
really affift us
could he do for us
?
He
might join our army, and beat the French out
Be it fo. Still Britain mull: be at the
of Hanover.
expencc, and dill keep up an army there, and our
fub-
[
86
go on.
]
Probably
fubfidies
muft
upon
and he might then
Has
it,
ft ill
infift
would
his
upon
rife
a million.
he not without this been attempting an increafe
already
But
?
fubfidy remain the fame, and let the
let his
French be driven out of Germany
would
Britain receive thereby
?
What
;
advantage
Why when the French
make war
could no longer come into Hanover, and
make peace. Nothing lefs.
So long as we could keep his M'
of P
in
humour, and he ftiould find himfelf at leifure to
with us, they muft
guard
French might ceafe to invade the elecBut why ftiould that oblige them to fue
peace ? Is the French government at an end,
us, the
torate.
for
when
Will
they have no lonoer an
be the
The
army
in
Germany
their provinces, their people, or their
for their armies not crofting the
lefs,
Hanoverians,
may
together,
ftiould the
hurts
them
if the Prufllans
be at
reft
?
Surely,
it is
Rhine?
and they agree
fummer but why
peace, when nobody
for a
French cry out for
?
revenues
-,
not enough that they do
we muft hurt them before they will
fue for peace.
For that then we muft attack them
in their iftands, and take from them all they have
not hurt us
left
:
;
that will drive
them
to a peace, or pay us the
annual expence of a naval war.
recur at
ourfelves
come
Why
at
laft
;
to our
why
fleet,
If then
take fo immenfely wide
a point
which
we muft
and make the peace
lies
ftreight
for
a circuit, to
before us
?
run the nation thirty millions more in debt, to
do
^
F
do
87-
two or three
that'
have been done
which might
years hence,
by which we might have
winter,
laft
]
fecured a peace and indemnification for
French expence
the
and by
;
Hanover
now
which,
at
that
North America is ours, we fhall have it in our
own power to put an end to the war, whether the
No matter whether they
French choofe it or not
:
with
will treat
us
not have a fhip at
The
at us.
peace
we
•,
from
;
they
can-
nor a pofTibihty of coming
fea,
channel and our
fliould
time
that
fleet
would keep thg
not want to get any thing froni'
them, and they would not be able to get any thing
from
us.
Many
of
my
readers
might
think'
to purfue this argument any farther
have heard
I
.
it
faid that
the Emprefs Queen,
make
peace with him, that
flie
his,
and
aflift
helped him
it
is
of
he would
a condition
But we mufl have
:
whereas,
he has been nearly as often beaten
torious.
But be
fhall
a Pruffian,
it
fo,
let
am
afraid,
them both come
then have two armies in
and
an Auftrian army
auxiliaries, in Britifh pay.
I
her
to beat her five times fucceflively, before
hitherto,
We
make
in
(hould join her forces to
us againft France.
Ihe could confent to fight againft her ally
aid.
no end
K
fuppofitions in favour of this
raifing
P
unneceflary
but ftrongly
the nation has been, there
prepoiTefTed as
of
it
•,
:
as vic-
to our
Hanover
Hanoverian
:
The poor Hanoverians,
would not thank us for bringing two
Perhaps,
fuch forts of guells into their country.
''
they
88
[
J
they would as foon choofe to fee the French therf,
as a Fruflian
-
army and an Auftrian.
Let them then go out of
tion with the Englifti
it,
and both,
in conjunc-
army, march and attack the
we are not upon fo good
when the Gerarmies invading France upon their
French upon the Rhine.
Still
a plan as the old Revolution fyftem,
mans had
three
own
account, and in their own pay.
Let usfuppofe
them then to be generous enough to fight the French
upon their own pay, and that the Empire and the
Dutch would join them, and all declare war againft
France.
Should we not then wilh all that flower of
the
German youth,
which
thofe hundred thoufands,
the French, for thefe four years pad, have with plea-
ken
fore
cuttiDg. each others throats, fhould
then, I fay, wifh
them
all
our battalions, and thicken our fquadrons
nion caufe
we
fet
And
?
is
intereft,
in the
com-
not this the very pofition, which
out with in thefe Confiderations
the French
we not
alive again to ftrengthen
that
;
it
was
and not the Englilh, which was
ferved by civil wars in
Germany
having granted every thing on
And
?
this
thus, after
head which the
fondeft prefumption could have afked
;
after
having
heaped up fuppofitions upon each other without end
ferve the prefent fyllem,
to
and made the greateft
improbabilities concur to favour
ter ail,
ilate
in
;
it,
we
ihould, af-
be brought two or three years hence, to that
of Europe, which
with this
ftill
being exhaufted of
I
in
former wars we
fat
out
remaining difference, of England's
its treafures,
and Germany of
its
troops.
S9
[
So much
troops/.
]
better things
were the old grand
thin the new. continental connexions.
alliances,
In ihort,
we
if
impradicable German war,
of the nation be
ruinous and
are to perfiii in this
the wealth and power
let
as great as they 'will,
it is
England
What-
and not France which muflTue for a peace.
ever be our fuccelTes, France
is-
untouched
when-
;
ever the French government knows that they can
fend thither an
tack us
not fend
v/ill
army -fuperior
whenever we
;
:
campaign
made
are thereby only
in
then fliould Prance fue for peace,
money
home, and
at
upon
their troops
v/hen at
and keep their
ftill,
their fron-
holding the appearar^ce pf marching intoGerruin.iis. compleated
for we mud be
fame expence-,. and after having got fix
rnany,. apd c'4r
at ft^lfdie
;
and
thirty millions in
and
forty.
,
deb:,- mufl:
But we
go on
to eigi^t
'
^.
<n/...
have be?n fo long ta.Iking of the magna-
..--
-
^
nimity of our ally^ that
up
Germany, they
the flronger for the next.
worft they have only to ftand
tiers,
them, they
But, far from being ruined by the
intermifiion of a fingle
Why
to ours, they will at-
are too ftrong for
many
_
perjbns ^ill not give
He
their opinion of his ability to i^rvt us.
ha^
been called the magna^nirnous by too great an authority tP admit a
power
to
do great things
fuch perfons,
and
doubt
r.efleft
it
may
a li:tle
of- his
for us.
having,
jn
hiji
For the fake of
be of ufe to think of
on .what foundation
N
ic
his wiil-
that general
per-
;
9°
[
how
far
clined to
much our
of his being fo
perfuafioii refls,
or
]
we can determine whether he
The
do us good or hurt.
chiefly confift
will himfelf
One of
and
in-
entering into
much from
for having prefumed to differ fo
;
friend,
moft
be an apology to the reader
this confideration will
ceived opinion
is
what
as
the re-
have to offer
I
will
of reminding him of pad fads, he
judge of
their confequences.
the inconveniencies,
neceffarily
arifing
out of the number of our prefent news writers,
their being all
of them obliged
Hence whatever happen
to
aim
is
at popularity.
to be the prevailing opinion
of the time, thefe are vying with each other, which
fhall fay
moll
in favour
the conclufions
And
drawn from
as at leaft ninety nine
ple take their opinions
is
of that opinion
it
;
and carry
hundredth parts of the peo-
from the papers, every thing
Wife men
hereby run to excefs.
weaker men write
;
to the greateft height.
repeat
what
not thinking themfelves con-
cerned to exercife their judgment, about matters derived from fo (light an authority
;
but they are heard
as their own, and thereby acquire the ftrongeft authority.
talk
tlie
Great
news
in
men in
common
matter of their opinion
for their country
their
country retirements
converfation,
•,
vifiters
not as really
but merely to find chat
;
fools
repeat this
them, with the addition of Such a great
me
:
man
after
told
and thus by the feafon when gentlemen come
up for them
to town, thcfe crude fancies are ripened
Siud kriously reprefentcd as the fenfe
of the nation.
Let
;
91
r
3
feveral violent prejudices,
Let any man recolka the
which the kingdom has run
moft of them derived from
fo far
as the laft war,
back
into,
and he
the
find
go
magnanimity
this fource.
when
will
Not
to
and the perfidioulne!s
of the Queen of Hungary,
were the favourite topicks
,
of the K. of P'
with
only how the prefent war opened
let
him think
the moft violent
encomiums on
condua of General Blakeney.
three
the bravery and
Not
good
a day paft for
reading fome
months together, without our
favour.
article or other in his
And
all
thefe things
true, during a time, when
affirmed, and received for
fiege and the
from the very circumftances of the
inand, every
man might have known,
that
no one
from him or
the
line
could have received a fingle
writers
and when, for any thing thefe
;
garrifon
gentleman might have been dead
of St. Philips began.
a fortnight before the fiege
upon fo fiight
Yet what was faid by the news-writers
the
was repeated by gentlemen in
could
tell,
this old
a foundation,
country and by winter
-.
ment,
.
A
this
was
when they came
to parlia-
nation,
confidered as the fenfe of the
Afthe credit of it.
and he was made a lord upon
of
favourite
the
became
ter him the K. of P
?
Britain
Had he done any thing for
thefe authors.
thejeaftjaHad he in his former life ever (hewn
Had we not long been
?
vou rabledifpofitiont^
m
caufe of
France,
the
^^^^S^i^;;:^^^^^
empire, and embroiling
raifinc a civil war in the
moft folemn treaties give
our aUies, and making the
Did we not think him at
xvay to his ambition ?
/
I
1
9^
[
penning
lead capable cf
i
which were
..teemorialsj
appeals to the people againll our government, and
keeping a miniller here to converfc;
among our
merchants, and fprcad thele feeds of difaffcction
Did he not appear to us as a prince^ that
in
?
the
mere wantonnefs of malice, waj braving the nation's
honour
at fea
;
terms of our
court
fpeaking in
of our
rebels
condemned
and even
treaties,
in Silefia,
after
"We
fet
?,
he had gotten
attacking our
allies
own
his
by fending one
Had we
breaking again
as
enemies the French
at others
ambafiador
an
for
him
difrefpecSlfur
gracious fovereign at
lare
and infulting him
;
mod
.the
not
the faith of
all
afiefli,
he claimed
to fave
our
?
out in the pre fen t war with the fame opi-
nion of him, and the
firll
fcene of
it
was, as was then
thought, to have been opened with fuch a determined
act of hoftiliry as princes
knew
do not
olften forgire.
We
the court of RuHia's difpofition to attack him,
and gave50050oopolinds for 55000 Ruffians to make
a di verfion, feeniingly to eat
enough
him up. Soldiers are apt
when in an enemy's
to riot in their hoitilitics,
country, and Ruffian foldiers were not then
to be
more gentle ravagers than Germans
:
known
but
ic
was defermirted by the exprefs articles of this treaty,
that they fhould have all the plunder ^ and tlwt they
might be
fare to
them nothing
licence
take enough,
elfc
to live
upon
we were
:
to
allow
whatever be the
of war, fuch things do not ordinarily make
the artkles of a treaty.
Con-
Confideiing
it
I
93
[
merely as a treaty for the hire of
was not a dear one. It was
and 15,000 cavalry to be kept
troops,
it
infantry
adjoining to Lithuania
•,
this
with
man dominions
v/ere to be
to
make
a
40
infantry,
thoufand horfe were to march,
a diverfion
in
40,000
Livonia,
and there to remain
;
they Paould be wanted
Thirty thoufand of
for
50
and the
if his
fhould be attacked,
or
in
till
galhcs.
fifteen
majefty's Getj
make
order to
and the other ten thoufand infantry
j
embarked on board the gallies, in order
defcent.
For this England was to pay
the Ruffians one hundred thoufand
their troops
remained
Livonia
in
thoufand more, as loon
as,
in
;
pounds while
and four hundred
confequence of the
have paflfed the frontiers of
and the King of England engaged
requifition, they lliould
their
country
;
to procure for
By
them
article the
Ruffian trcops
1 1
fljall
a palllige through Poland.
th, All
the plunder^
i^hicb the
gain from the enemy\ of what
na-^
lure and quality fo ever, fr.all he for the advantage of
thofe
fame
troops.
Art. 7th. Whereas her Imperial Majefiy
cularly interefted in the tranquillity of the
is
farli-
North, and
confidering alfo the prcxi:vity of the auntrics, 'wherein
the diverfion in qiicftion
"duill
probably be made, and
the facility her troops will have offuhfiftlng immediately
jn
an enewfs country
fhe takes upon herfelf alone^
during fuch a diverfion, the fubfiifience and treatment
-,
^f ibefaid trccps byfea and land
1
;
as alfo the heavy
f.r'
[
94
1
which they may have occafton for, and of
Signed at Peterburgh,
the details thereunto belonging.
artillery,
30th Sept. 1755.
The
dread of thefe guefls diverted his
P
n
1
y from his intended attack upon the E
to
after
months
three
him
dominions, and brought
3VI
fign the treaty of Weftminfter
j
folely to
keep
all
diredt
foreign troops out of the Empire, with a
French
view to the Ruffians on our fide, and the
on
his.
We thought he
y<
might keep
RufTians for his fake.
borTthe harder
ti3es
From
it
;
anddifguftedjhe
this tlrne
he nolonger
we had been ufed
him,
to give
and we inftantly turned round in our opinion. He
was the hero of the age, the protcdor of the German liberties, and the champion of Proteftantifm.
England, our fecond king and defender
principles
of our faith. Even thofe men, whofe
of their
part
foregoing
the
had kept them, during
the
drank
now
lives, repining at one German king,
of our two kings, as cordially as if they had
He
was
in
health
been born
our
ftreets
at Berlin.
for this
Illuminations were
new
think, like the mighty
king's
birth-day
made
-,
and
in
I
Mr. Vernon, he had two
Every thing
rejoicing nights in about a fortnight.
had Pruffian caps for
became Pruffian.
We
then
our
ladies
to look fmc with, and PrulTian
more
we had
both,
which was more than
bones to (hew
their
men
the
frightful
crofsi
and
Fruffian ale
•^••^r^*-^^'
J&^ajM;tcz^,
-//X.
^u^^t.^
m ^M.
95
[
mob
the
for
to get
3
Let any one
drunk with.
then have tried to infert an article in any of our papers,
which (hould have tended
in the lead degree
to moderate this excefTive regard to
in
doubt
either
tiie
good
faith,
him
or to bring
;
the reHgion, or the
making
wifdom of
this favourite,
enemies,
would not have been received
it
in
Europe
all
his
the pro-
;
would have objected, that fuch an article
would make their paper unpopular, and would upon
prietors
no terms have been brought
to print
'Tis a melancholy truth, and not
honour of our national gratitude
whom we
had never thought our
we had been
fhewn
tion,
much
but
this
friend,
for the
prince,
and who,
ufed to think, (I don't fay rightly)
adions a negle6l of
his
in
and
-,
it.
in his writings
all
had
moral obliga-
a contempt of every
reli-
gious principle, became at once the ftandard of
excellence in
war and
his popularity
with us for a
politics
;
much
all
and has retained
longer term, than
our great and good king William could hold
with
all
the merit of having been the faviour of
it,
Hol-
land, of Britain, and of Europe.
He
is
nov/ called our ally
due to that
things,
any
we
title
;
and there is a reverence
and therefore none of the hard
ufed to fay of him, are
intelligent
been doing
:
man, who
at the
now
fhall recoiled
true
:
but
what we had
court of St. Peterfburgh, and the
evident tendency of the RulTian treaty, will find
it
very hard to perfuade himfelf, that he cap ever for/
y^f^^^'^J^p^^
ce*"
.....
[
get
96
^
3
or that three months after,
It
when
the treaty
of Weftminiler was made, any two courrs
rope might ftand
The
rior,
Eltid
his
favour
be inftantaneoufly con-
efpecially
;
many
fights a great
who
writers,
Berlin.
mob may
thoughtlefs
verted in
cordially affedted to each other,
lefs
London and
than thofe of
battles
is
a war-
and the news
;
pay their whole court to the popular
But the
eledoral
the
he
as
opinion, would then foon afcribe to
excellencies.
Eu-
in
muft
hoUfes
who
reader,
have
him
other'
all
confiders
how
regarded
each
other at the figning the treaty of Peterfburgh, will
not help putting the queftion to himlelf
fiich fervent
the
refentments
£i^Q fo ibon,
The
m
:
Can then
the breads of princes
months time only, our of deadly hatred
in three
Do
up
love fhoot
even
of
men
private
moft premeditated rancour
after the
may
operations of fear
be inftantaneous
?
fub-
:
?
but
love and friendfiiip are plants of a (lower growth.
The
one might fear for Hanover, and the other fof
Pruflla
pend
;
and both might thereby be brought to
their hatred
and
;
after that they
tainly talk in terms of the
cor.fidence, were
fee
y
it
mod
any, their mutual
diftrufts.
would cer-
cordial affedion
only to conceal,
fuf-
and
if there ihould
But
if
the condi-
tions of our future peace with France are to depend
*T!pon his favour,
iiffiftance
we can
from the
^hinl^ that
we have
hope for very little
of a man, who may
furely
friend fhip
given him lb inexpiable a caufc
of^iatred.
/%
Should
V
cc
^-^
97
[
Should the
]
have any doubts about the
reader
him
juftnefs of this reafoning, let
try
by experi-
it
This treaty of Weftminftcr confided but of
one article, and Iblely regarded the keeping of all
foreign troops out of the empire.
What was the
ment.
effect
We obferved
.''
kept out the Rufilans
our part of the treaty, and
but he might think, not;
with {landing our fervile profeffions of eileem of him,
that the fureft hold he had of us, were our fears
and therefore having obtained
his
own
;
purpofe to
keep out the Ruffians, he flighted Wefel, which
his father
had been
at
an
infinite
expence
in fortify-
He knew how much
ing, and let in the French.
our dread of him would once make us bear, and we
then
knew
that he could at any time join with his
fure friends the
French
and therefore
j
from refenting any breach of
mitted to
Britain, far
a former treaty, fub-
make another with him,
in
which we feem
up
humbly
to deprecate his forfaking us,
our
hundred and feventy thoufand pounds to
fix
buy our
The
and may try
fecurity.
at the end,
and
ofi'er
reader will find this treaty
if
he can
make any
thing
more of it.
But may we not hope from
affiftance in
affifted
ly
9
our future peace,
him
in his
wars
his gratitude for his
affer
Have
?
having
fo large-
then the houie of
Auftria's returns for our having fo long fupporteof-
them, and fpent
fo
many
millions in their fervice,
been fuch as to admit of our hoping any thing from
the gratitude of
German
courts
O
?
Will any Prince
in
98
[
in
]
Germany once think of our money,
after
it
fpent
is
What
?
very Prince in the
this
who were
was
.
made
We
and when
laft
As
?
war made to the French,
foon as his
o\<'n
purpofe
and he had got what he wanted, he
fervcd,
tiicm, and
gary.
makers
his
moment
the
were the returns, which
a
treaty with the
thought he afterwards broke
this nation
was
left
Queen of Hunindeed,
it
rejoicing at Prince Charles's
upon the Queen of
Hungary in time of full peace, to bring him back
again, and prevent our ally from growing too great.
Itaving i^afled the Rhine,
fell
Does he not now know, whether we chufe to lee it
has owed all his importance to the
or not, that he
cunning of
us
and
?
his
it
is
management between
the French and
not the ufual policy of
men
in fuch
circumftances to fecure their enemies, as foon as
they have wearied their friends
hope but
that, fhould he
?
Have we
then any
have the prefcribing the
terms of our peace at the end of the war, his great
objeft will be to
after
having got
Such only
tion's
make
all
are like
exhaufting
the
French nation
to be the effefts
itlelf to raife
of our own.
TafFer his
firft
French, to be
ftript
of
their
tain
made
all
fo ftrong as to be
other petty
of this na-
upon
his plea-
Will he then think
his interefl to
and
?
him, and making the
conditions of our future peace depend
fure, inftead
his friends,
he can out of the Englifli
German
and natural
fettlements,
it
allies,
for
the
and Bri-
independent on him,
connedlions, from whence
cnly he can derive his greatnefs
?
1 oo long have
thefe
99
[
German
thefc
]
Princes, though
not
their people,
found the fweets of thofe contefts between the French
which we have
them for
them to wifli to fee Britain gain fuch an afcendency by a future peace,
as would at once put an end to their gainful imporand Us,
in
their troops
;
l^een courting
for any one of
tance.
And what is the merit, he may then afk us, by
which we can pretend to have obhged his gratitude ?
The
which
Englifli nation,
is
obliged to them for
i
a very different light
1
receiving nothing for
is
money we annually pay him, may think
the
we have had our
that
that he
But he may confider
it.
;
may
he
million's
perhaps
tell
it
us,
worth for our million
;
money as the purchafe of an
Weftern Germany; and that fo long
that he received our
immunity
as
for
we continue
to pay
it,
and he confines
his rava-
ges to the Eaft, he fully difcharges every obligation
he
is
under.
His power over us
end
and
:
but fhould
raifing
is
now,
I
him up
come
hope,
we have gone
on,
to be the arbiter of
to an
fupporting
Germany,
what part would be exempt from the effefls ofit ?
then that favoured land, which we have fo
Would
long moved heaven and earth in defence of; by
in two fucceeding wars,
upon us the burden of bribing one half
which the French haye,
artfully laid
of Germany, and fighting the other
devoted Eledorate
at
lad efcape
O
2
him
?
would this
His demands
would
:
lOO
[
]
would
rife with his greatnefs, and the time muft
have come wlicn our money or our patience would
be exhauded
fooner or later he would be want:
we
ing fomething more of us than
to pay for
its
which he has
immunity.
fo
(hould be able
Would
long watched
for,
then the prey,
appear the
inviting, for Britain's being obliged to give
proteftion of
or would the morfel be the
it ?
having fpent there
delicious, for our
of
lions in the defence
But
fo
many
lefs
mil-
it ?
which has been fo long
whether Britain ought to have any conti-
that great queftion,
agitated,
now been determined, and
nental connexions, has
all
lefs
up the
parties happily agree, that
mult have
it
its
con-
tinental connections.
As
this is the
firft
time thcfe terms have been
heard of in a political debate, and their author did
not explain his meaning
in
them,
for the reader, before he can
the fubjedl,
to fettle in his
underftand by them.
mean,
either a
A
v;ith
form any judgment on
continental conne6l:ion
tion
:
to
may
it
;
it
may mean
a
a very large part, or a very fmall
alliance,
liam, between England and
Europe
is
connexion with the whole continent
The grand
part.
will be neceffary
own mind, what he
of Europe, or with a part of
connexion
it
againft France,
a treaty with any
formed by King Wilall
the other ftates of
was a continental connec-
German
Prince for a body
pf troops, as with a Prince of Buckbug for a regi-
ment
'01
[
ment of
it
poffible
pofition,
and
]
a continental connefllon.
artillery, is
Is
for us to form any judgment upon
a pro-
exprefled in terms fo very
vague
which
indefinite
ginning of
is
Two
?
things then occur in the be-
The one
this difcufTion.
is,
that this
great queftion, faid to have been fo long agitated,
and now determined, never was a queftion before
becaufe
trie
terms of
it
a propofition, from the Conqueft to this time
other
is,
that
the terms of
it
it
never can be a queftion
are fo very
However,
in
the
:
becaufe
as to
them, and precife-
at all.
as the fubjeft requires
the only fair
tion,
-,
vague and general,
have no determinate meaning
ly to exprefs nothing
;
were never before put into
way which
our confidera-
know of
I
treating
on
by an induftion of the feveral particular fenfes,
in which the propofition may be underftood, and
it, is
weighing the merits of each.
If the terms be underftood in their moft general
fenfe,
at
and the queftion
any time, or
fort
in
be,
whether Britain ought
any cafe whatfoever, to have any
of connexion with the whole, or any part of
the continent of
Europe
This feems to be a quef-
?
tion too general to be ever agitated at all
is
impofllble for any
arife
fairs,
fome
man
;
becaufe
to fay, that there
certain occafions
may
and circumftances of
which may unavoidably force us
connexion with the continent
:
to
it
not
af-
have fome
at leaft, this quef-
tion
102
[
]
tion cannot have been agitated fince the
ment, becaufe that was
tion,
a(5l
of
fettle-
a continental connec-
itfeJf
and a very happy one, though intended per-
haps to be not quite
fo great
The
an one.
fetch-
ing a future Qiieen from the continent, which good
Enghflimen may wifh perhaps might for this time
not be from Germany, would be a continental conIf therefore the terms of this queftion arc
nexion.
nnderftood
utmofl: latitude,
in their
it
cannot have
of fettlement.
But whewas
determined
then,
or has been
ther the queftion
more happily fettled now, we fhall gain very little
been agitated
fince the ail
knowledge by the
ed, that there
tain's
decifion
may
for becaufe
:
having a continental connexion may not be
by no means follow,
wrong,
it
tinental
connedion which
will
therefore be right
wards, and fay,
we muft
elfe
:
Omne
(hall
it
that every con-
queftion to an
read our logic back-
jninus indudit majtis.
we muft
iffue,
particular continental
or with a part of
tinent of
A
it.
fenle
fay
is
the
the whole continent,
conne<51:ion
with the whole
meant, becaufe the whole con-
Europe never was conneded
other part of the world
Holy Land.
what
then, in the next place,
a connection with
cannot be the
fairly
In or-
bring the
connexion which we intend.
A continental conneftion,
may mean
mufl
enter into,
der to fpeak definitively, therefore, and
the
allow-
it is
pofTibly be a cafe, wherein Bri-
Or
;
againft
at leaft fince the
if it
any
wars for
were, Britain's being in
amity with, or equally well affeded towards every
nation
103
[
]
nation fn Europe, though a very good moral virtue,
we had
conid heartily wifh
which
1
more
of, yet politically exprefles
fuch an equal connexion with
rope
as to
is,
all
the operating effects of
connedlion with any of them.
it,
in
war
no
Befide that the fubin the
very
excludes that of a general amity.
Britain*s continental
mud
mud ei-
connexions therefore,
be with a part of Europe
;
and
ther be with a greater part of
it.
it
Eu-
the having
as
under confideration was war, which
idea of
becaufe
:
the nations of
all
and peace, the very fame thing
]e6l
a great deal
nothing
if fo,
they
or a fmall part of
it,
If our connections are to be
with the greater
part of the continent, then in order to
make
the pro-
applicable to the prefent cafe, the reader
pofition
will find
himfelf under a neceffity of fubjoining a
farther queftion
-,
Whether
Britain's continental
con-
nections are to be connections of friendfhip, or con-
nexions of enmity
?
for of the feveral great
of Europe, whicii ufed to be our
connexions of
friendfliip
powers
we have no
with any one of them.
Holland nor Denmark
N<;ither
allies,
have any con-
will
nexion with US; and the Emprefs and Empire of
Germany, and Ruflla, and Sweden, are in conjunction with the
French our enemies.
If therefore con-
connexions mean connexions with the great
tinental
powers of Europe, they mufl: mean connexions of
enmity
:
for of friendfhip with us they have none.
All the connexions therefore which
at prefent with thefe,
zles
muft,
I fear,
we
can have
be at the
muz-
of our mufquets.
Where
[
Where
An
then are
fum of
the yearly
fand pounds,
ledlorate
]
continental connedlions?
gh,
fix
in confideration
hundred and
content
is
and
;
our
B
of
Eledlor
I04
not to
the
for
Britain,
fevcj^ty
hurt
of
thou-
E-
another
defence
of
it,
has an alliance with the continent of Hefle.
could get no other connedion
connexion
is
the
laft
be underftood
German
other
fenfe,
its
:
continental conneflions, can
to be a juftification of the prefent
in,
to
the propofition mean, that Britain ought
have fome continental
if
or
conne<Slions
one part of the conti-
nent refufe to accept of any connexions with
it
which
which the propofition, that
and that therefore,
;
It
muft have fome
war.
Does then
always
it
and therefore took up with that
;
and only
muft have
Britain
;
it,
ftill
muft have them, and muft therefore feek them
another
our
ter,
?
ifland,
For
a
fink, unlefs chained
by fome connexion
to the continent
whether the propofition
For
rather too much.
trine,
that
let
that having fo long remained above
muft now
it
moment
it
is
in this
if
in
us lament the fate of
:
and then afk
fenfe does not
we adopt
wa-
and moored
this
prove
new doc-
abfolutely neceflary for Britain to
have fome continental connedion, it will thence follow, that if the part of Europe, which has the right
on its fide, will not accept of our conn^dions, we
muft then make them with thofe that are in the
wrong
:
if
the party, which
be connected with
us,
is
the ftrongeft, will not
we muft then conned ourI
felves
:
105
[
felves with the weakeft.
raign the juftice of
my
]
I will not
prefume to
ar-
country, lb far as to fuppofe
indeed it cannot
that the former has been our cafe :
adually
always have been fo, becaufe Britain has
been in
this
war connefted on both
fides
:
but ^
debt of fix and twenty millions, contraded fince thefe
long remain a very
laft continental conneftions, will
feeling conviction of our
having taken the weaker
fide againft the ilronger.
But not to lofe fight of our fubjed: in this
the great
fmoke-ball of a pompous phrafe
from
agitated
been
really
queftion, which has
only one, in
the revolution to this day j and the
far it ought
How
is,
concerned,
which England is
:
to unite
nent
itfelf
And
?
in alliances
the reader
of war upon the conti-
muft have obferved, that the
whole tendency of thefe Confiderations has^ been to
true revolution
eftablilh, and bring us back to the
fyftem
:
that the only
enemy upon
the continent,
which Britain can be indangered by, is France:
Europe will unite
that whenever the other nations of
againft France, it will
in an effedual alliance of war
join in that allithen be the intereft of England to
of Europe,
Hate
but that in every divided
ance
:
and
man
much more
in
every divided
Princes with each other,
it
fl:ate
muft,
of the Gerif
the fore-
going principles are true, invariably be the intereft
of Britain never to concern itfelf with them ; at leaft
compofi
farther than by offering its mediation to
p
them
:
[
them
fide
io6
that the French
:
of a
German
]
having taken one
nation's
contefl:,
fo far
is
from being a juft
motive for England's taking the other, that for
that very
reafon
keep out of
This
is
^
;
and
this
one of the
firfl:
was the
more to
by which
fole principle,
fat
governed himfelf through
which, after having
that
on the
his
grand
whole
alliance,
been the faviour of his
firft
country, and then of Britain, completed his
character,
And
the
twenty years after the Revo-
'Twas the forming
reign.
much
beft pol iticians, that ever
iLngliili throne,
own
fo
the principle, which a6luated our greatefl.
ftatefmen, for the
lution
we ought
it.
and made him the deliverer of Europe.
nothing but that alliance could have broke the
chains,
which France was then preparing for
Had King
it.
William, when he came to the crown
of England, inftead of
fetting himfelf at
the head
of Europe, and uniting the feveral princes of
arms again ft France, been
himfelf the head of a
fo
ill
advifed as to
German
party,
it
and form
German connexions, and brought
only petty
Britifti force into
in
make
the
the internal broils of the empire
Monarch might have inwardly thanked
him, but not a power in Europe would havejoined
the French
him.
And
raife treble
had the nation been
difpofed
to
the fums, which his wars really coft,
all
our treafures had been fpcnt
had been enflaved.
X
in
thcji
vain, and
Europe
107
[
But
knew
the Britidi
be mifled by fuch councils.
Inftead of
mind too
great
his
intercft to
]
well
German
we
fee
actuating thejoint councils of Europe, with
all
chufing to be the head of a
him
the Princes of it attending
neral good, againft the
have heard,
congrefs
eafily
him
to confult for the ge-
common enemy. There
at the time, a pi6lure
form one
made of
own
but the reader's
;
fadlion,
for himfelf,
was,
I
that great
imagination will
by perufing the
lift
in
the margin of thofe great perfonages, which affifted
in
it,
with the number of troops they refpedively
agreed to
raife, for
the purpofes of this alliance *.
Such
* Thefe
all affifted
at the Conjrrefs.
Eleftor of Brandenburg
Elector of Bavaria
The Prince his brother
Duke of Saxe Eyfenach
Duke
Prince Philip Palatine
The
of Lunenburg
DukeofZell
Duke
Duke
Prince
of Wolfenbuttel
Landgrave of Heile Caflel
Prince Chriftian Louis of Brandenburg
Prince
ftadt
Prince of
Wirtemberg
The Prince his brother
Duke of Courland
Waldeck
Prince Ferdinand his brother
Prince of Anhalc Zeerborft
Prince of Naflau
Stadtholder of Priefland
Prince of Nafiau Saarbrug
Governor of Bois le Due
Landgrave of Homburg
Three Princes of Holften-Beck
DukeofHolftein
Prince of NafTau Dillemburg
Prince of NafTau Idllein
Prince of Lommeici
Prince Palatine of Bi^kenfelt
Duke Adminilhator of Wir-
Count of Horn
Count of Erbacic
Count Tirimont
Count de Brouay
tembcrg
Two
of Zulfback
of Wirtemberg Nevv-
Princes of Anfpach
Landgrave of Hefle D' Aimlladt
P
2
Count
loS
[
Such was
him
at
the
]
the aiiguft aflembly
Hague.
which attended
But couid we now
him
raife
up, to take a view of the ftate of parties in Europe,
how
Count
Count
Count
Count
Count
Count
Count
Count
Count
de Gryal
d'Arco
de Rivera
de Sanfra
de Lippe
d'Efpenfe
de f ugger
de Denhof
de Carelfon
!^aron of Pallant
Baron of Spacin
The
Ccnthe
From the king of Sweden,
Count of Oxenltern
From the king of Poland,
M. Moreau
From the eleflor of Bavaria,
Baron of Broomgardcn
M
Prielmeyere
From
Gennal
Barfus
General d'Autel
General Pain, &c.
From
Vandieft
Smettau
the eledor of Saxony,
M. Haxhaufem
From
the eledor of Treves,
Baron de Leyon
M. Champagne
From the eleftor of Mentz,
M. Talberg
M. Meyers
From the eleftor of Cologne,
General and Baron Berufaw
M. Soelmaker
From the eleflor Palatine,
M. Hertermans
From the duke of Savov,
Count de
Pielat
Prefident de la
From
the eleftor of Branden-
burgh,
M.
M.
His Brother
Marquis of Cafhlemonlayo
Marquis of Callanago, governor
of the Spanifli Netherlands
General Chauvert
General d' Elwicht
a^ba/Tadors and foreign minifters prefent were.
From the Emperor,
Count de Winditfgratz and
Berka
Chevalier de Campecht
From the king of Spain,
Don Emanuel de Colonna
From the king of Denmark,
Count of Rebenklam
M.
The Rhinegrave
M.
Tour
the duke of Zell,
Zieger
From
the bifhop of Munller,
M. de Nort
From
—
IG9
[
how would our
labours of his
nerous
feated
!
]
great Deliverer grieve to fee the gelife
counreraded and de-
to fee Britiih councils
and
employ'd in fomenting quarrels
From
Baron Gortz
Reppelaar
From the duke of Wolfem-
M.
Gottorp,
M. Tourken
From the prince of
buttle.
Baron Crofek
Counfellor
king William's
own
the princes
From the dake of Hanover,
M. Klekk
From the duke of Hollleia
the landgrave of HefTe
Ca/Tcl,
Of
Britifh treafures
among
fiibjefls
who
Liege,
Mean
attended him to
this
folemnity, were the
Duke
Duke
Earl
Earl
Earl
Earl
Earl
Earl
Bifhop of London
Lord Dramlendrits
Lord Durfley
Earl of Portland
Earl of Monmouth
Duke of Schomberg
of Norfolk
of Ormond
of Devonfhire
of Dorfet
of EfTex
of Nottingham
of Scarborough
of Selkirk
The
His brother count Meinhard,
&c. *
quotas agreed on were as follow;
—
The Emperor
K. of Spain in Flanders
States General
20,000
20,000
•
D. of Savoy, and troops of Milan
—
E. of Bavaria
E. of Saxony
Landgrave of HclTe
Circles of Suabia and Franconia
D. of Wirtemberg
E. of Brandenburgh
»—
Prince of Liege
Bifhop of Munfter
E. Palatine
Prince of Lunenburg
•
* Rapin,
20,000
18,000
1 2,000
8,000
10,000
6,000
20,000
6,000
7,000
4,000
i6,oco
vol. Ill, fo], 164.
of
!
no
[
whom
of the empire,
it
]
was
his great care to re-
common
concile to each other, and unite in ,the
caufe
B
to fee
!
in any grand
tion of an E
n, inftead of taking
humbly feconding
alliance,
r
B
of
our alliances
in
them only
a
diminutive,
in
found
-,
defenfive,
!
ftalk
when we were funk
and a fingle
raife
confound
te
fo
with a
as a little fubfidy treaty
landgrave of Hefie,
think to
E
mighty ftatefman's ghoft
the
indignant by the man, who,
low
tribute, to prevent
any more than one proteftant
And how would
ambi-
gh, and offering up
(what he might think) an annual
his deftroying
the lead
the
fhould
eleflor,
and attempt to
ruinous,
and
mipraclicable meafure with that grand alliance, in
which he had fought
at the
head of Europe, by the
pompous equivocal
help of a
phrafe of continental
connexions
I
all
know
that
it
has been faid, that England paid
of king William
in thefe alliances
flattering
the
country had any money
Dutch, however, paid
fidies
both thefe
in
fifths of the
cbjecl
?
for the
ta
in
it
their third part
alliances,
:
Europe.
The
land
v/hole
no
The
of the fub-
and brought three
but whatever we paid, the
a true patriot
But what was it
fum granted that
fervice,
was
it
but England.
was great, and worthy of
frierxl to
pay
troops
and
;
vanity, to fuppofe that
nation's
and
we did
that
year,
was 2,380,698!.
maintain the troops in England and
1691,
This was
Ireland,
and
III
[
snd
]
thonfand Danes, hired for
fix
tliC
recovery of
that ifland, and for our part of the grand alhance.
The
effective
pay of thefe land forces, being 69,636
to 1,880,698 1. and the remaining
men, announted
hundred thoufand pounds,
five
as appears
by the
re-
and following years, were
folutions of the preceding
the train, general officers, levy money, tranf-
for
fubfidies, hofpitals in Flanders,
ports,
The
gencies.
appropriating particular fums to each
had not then been brought into ufe;
particular fervice,
but in the diftribution of
this five
hundred thoufand
pounds among the
feveral fervices here
what
of
proportion
fidies
Some of
?
would
and contin-
fingly
can be
it
thefe
allotted
articles
up
eat
fuch
enumerated,
fum.
a
fub-
for
the prefent war
in
But
fup-
moderation of thofe times to have left
one hundred thoufand pound for fubfidies this was
all that could be paid among the German princes,
the
pofe
:
'who maintained four armies of .forty and fiftv
thoufand men each upon the frontiers of France :
and
this
was
in
thofe days
William's enemies, and by
reprefented
men of
ples before the peace of Utrecht,
war
:
that
is,
by thoufands,
we paid our money
to put
all
to
lies
;
Germany by
German
who
others throats
;
We
millions, without
fon, that
Britain
it
to be
fhould be our
and
it
is
princes
the em.pire in arms acrainft
nay, a great part of
abling thofe,
kino-
as a ruinous land
to
France, and that was a ruinous war.
it
by
the like princi-
right,
muft have
now
any
employed
allies, to
al-
in en-
cut each
for this onlv
its
fend
real
rea-
continental con-
nedions.
I
do
I
do not mean
I
afterwards
grow
12
]
to fay, that thefe fubfidies did not
The
larger.
reader
may
the
fee
gradual increafe of them in the hiftory of the pubrevenue, with every thing
lic
known on this fubjed.
man fubfidies, which we
the Britifh and
many, and
rial
in
Dutch
I
elfe
which can be
have extrafted the Ger-
paid in the year
1
704, when
marched into Gerconjundion with part of the Impeforces
army, beat the French, with the ruin of forty
thoufand of their
befl:
troops *.
In the year 1706 f, the fubfidies to our allies
but the whole expence for the land
;
were increafed
* For payment of her majefty's proportion of ^
I.
s;
> 55,272 00
3
of her quota of 40,000!.
37>5<^'3 co
To the king of Denmark,
1 1,848
00
To the landgrave of Heffc CafTcl,
To the elctSlor of Treves,
5,924 00
To the flates of Suabia,
31*^2 00
712 00
To the eJeftor Palatine,
ToMonf.Moncado, foilofb of waggons and horfes, 8,coo 00
To the marquis Miiemont,
400 00
the fubfidies to be paid to her
allies for
part
—
—
151,2c
f
To
the king of
Denmaik,
1*3
[
army, including
own
Dur
our
all
]
amounted
For
pd.
quota,
and the pay of
fubfidies,
more
no
to
than
this our enemies were
2,814,5831. 15 s.
obliged to maintain an army in Portugal, Spain,
Italy,
Savoy, Germany, and Flanders
oppofed by equal ones of our
and were
;
allies, in all
thofe fc-
veral parts of Europe, with the deftru61:ion of twenty
thoufand French at the battle of Ramillies, and the
lofs
of a whole army, and half a million of trea-
fure, at the fiege
I
know
and
of Turin.
battle
has been faid, that our
it
fupply their feveral quotas
•,
that theirs was kept complete
deficient
that
:
to fay,
is
thoufand men, our
fifty
of
thoufand
fifty
allies
;
did not
might be
the reft
inftead
of two hundred
fupplied only a hundred
and
own quota
of which, with our
all
;
allies
but the Dutch proved,
thoufand men, were brought to fight
againfl:
France, for an expence to England of 2,815,0001.
We
have
Germany
fand men
and
this year fpent the
for
fifty
Is
thoufand
having none
we pay
it.
?
double of that fum
not the addition of a hundred
men
If our
a better thing
magnanimous
ally,
than the
to
whom
a greater fubfidy than, in the year 1706,
J)aid to all
our
allies
us a hundred and
in
have never had ninety thou-
alone, and
put together, would
fifty
thoufand
againft th^prench, fhould
fay he dl'i'nothing, for
we
men
fend
to help us
quarrel with him, and
want of the other
Q^
now
we
fifty ?
Britain
a "4
Britain cannot indeed
]
now complain
to
its allies,
for any failure in their fcveral contingencies
;
magnanimo'js
bound
ally will
tell
that he
us,
is
for our
to
In (lead of forming alliances again ft France
none.
with the great powers of the continent,
continental connections
vifhes
away
:
that
is,
it
can put no meaning
it
Till fuch great occafions
Britain to adt in
Germany, and
forms
contentedly la-
treafures for a fomething,
its
can draw no troops from, called by a
which
it
which
it
name,
fine
to.
return
fliall
again for
conjundion with Holland, and
the other parts of liurope, united in
the true intereit of
a real alliance
againft France
Britain, or of
any part of Germany, can never
for our troops
upon the
-,
We
continent.
call
have indeed
too long been making ourfelves parties in the internal quarrels of the
Empire, to hope foon to
fee that
and the other dates of the continent united in fuch
an alliance
but till then we can have no conneclion
:
.
with
tal
Previous to Britain's having any continen-
it.
connection, that continent muft be
itlelf.
To
which
is
terms.
talk of
iifelf
conneded
forming a connexion with
unconne6tcd,
is
in
that,
a contradidion in
'Tis advifing us to catch hold of a loofe
heap of duft, which
far
from yielding any
flay to
us, -can ferve only to raife a cloud to blind our eyes
with.
But when
all
that continent
with France in an alliance againft
we would
efpoufe
;
the fending
is
conncdted
us^^^
the caufe
ouiiBops
in fuch a cafe, upon fuch a pretence,
is little
thither
better
than
:
"5
f
'
than the running our head againft a wall, and fay-
we muft have a connexion with
ins:
The
principles already laid
down
it.
contain, I think,
a full anfwer to a plea, which has been often urgi^d
for the Gerrpan war, that
ever, as
of
my
fwer.
it
it
readers
may
think
it
requires a particular an-
may
If others do not, they
^
follows
How-
a diverfion.
is
has been ufed by great authority, fome
pafs
over what
or at leaft they will excufe the writer,
:
if
they fhould meet with
in the courfe
of
fome
which they may think too nearly bor-
things,
this anfwer,
der on what has been faid before.
and muft be confiftent with each
property of error only to
fiy
without refpecling any
common
But every
of
it,
and
juft
All truths are
'Tis the
other.
out into endlefs lengths,
point or centre
argument muft have
the feveral parts
like the angles in true meafuring, all coincide
clofe in
with each other.
The German war
then,
diverfion to the French
it is
from
vented their carrying their operations
as they
might otherwife have done,
engaged
has been a
alleged,
their naval
;
and pre-
at fea, fo far
if that
had not
their attention.
If the war in
of diverfion,
I
Germany be
confidercd as a war
would then premifc, that the very
idea of a war of diverfion, fuppofes that Britain
it
a
war of
neceffity
;
choice, and
and
if fo,
I
is
makes
not brought thither by
have already obferved, that
0^2
it
Oc
..6
t
it
the
is
duty of every
wife
choice of the province, which
to
where
;
fend
troops
its
make war
can
it
it is
making
in
ftate,
it fliall
where
aft in, to confider
greeted: advantage
\
]
itfelf ftrongeft,
to
and
enemy weakeft where it has itfelfieaft to loft^, and
and where its viftories are hke to
its enemy mod
have the befl: effeft, and fooneft bring its enemy to
its
j
;
peace.
The
•
*
prefent
war
France began wi^h a conteft
w^ith
about the foreign fettlements, and colonics of the
two
nations.
A
matter, in which the parhament
declared that the immediate and efiential interefts of
ihefe
cLJiiA^A,
kingdoms
v-'e ^d<?ftfe
to
land v/ar in
are concerned.
Germany
found ourfelves
tht:
?
were
It
fruitlefsj
and
prefTed,
England
France, and
courfe of victory.
tories
hy then fhould
into a
it
could not be, becaufe
It
mofl:
lofing moft at fea; for
fuperior to
V\
divert any of the courfe of
is
in
on that element
has been in a continual
could not be becaufe our vic-
becaufe
we
are gaining thofe
very points which we fought for
;
and making the
moft valuable acquifitions, which we could
for.
The
only acquifitions, which,
taken the French
iflands,
it
pradlicable for us to keep.
?
to change the fcene
it
on
in
A
ftate
wifli
when we have
could be of any advan-
tage to us to gain, and the only ones, which
enemy's expence
we
danger of
Is
it
may
it
is
then to increafe the
fometimes think
fit
of a war, becaufe, by carrying
one particular manner, they have
power, with a few troops, to employ a
in their
it
much
greater
number
1^7
[
number
]
of their adverfaries.
1 hus Britain, by put-
men on board its fleet, might obHge
French to keep a much greater number on its
ting 10,000
the
and
If the length of the north
coafts.
wefl: coaft
of France from Dunkirk to Bayonne be 800 miles,
then ten thoufand men on board our fleet, require
80,000 men on the French coaft, for the French
to find an equal match within an hundred miles to
But this cannot be the fort of
oppofe to them *.
diverfion intended by the
If
we would make
mufl: be
by fending
German
war.
Germany, it
more troops than France
a diverfion in
thither
can, or an equal number, or an inferior number.
to the
firft
cafe
if
•,
As
the land force of France be greater
than that of Britain, then, in the
Eng-
place,
firft
land cannot fend a greater force to Germany, than
France can.
In the next place,
greater force thither,
finitely greater
muft
it
if
it
could fend a
muft then put
expence than France
;
itfelf to in-
and therefore
create thereby a greater diverfion of
its
own
And, in the lafl:
place, il England could fend to Germany a greater
force than France, the French court, knowing that
our army would be fuperior, would order their own
and in that cafe the
to ftay at home that fummer
diverfion made would be only of Englifh treafures,
in an armament beyond our natural ftrcngth, withrevenues, than of
its
enemies.
:
* This
is
what
Sir
William Monfon
fays
in
one of
fwcrs to Lord EfTcx's Queries, Armies at laud cannot
his anily,
but
^rmies at Tea have wings.
out
ii8
[
]
of doing our enemy any hurt
while the French money and troops having been
cut a
kept
poffibillty
at
home» would be the more ready
Germany
us in
•,
And we
the next year.
to attack
have already
feen the folly of invading France in that cafe
or
;
of marching into Eaft Germany.
Let us next fuppofe that England
Where
an equal force to France.
fuch a diverfion
England puts
?
great expence to
France
repell
at in
is
it
:
and
iifelf to at
its
own
{landing
England, then
in
two unequal powers you take what equal
the fuperior will
aS
army
to
a land force are
the fourccs for
creatcr in France than
will,
leaft as
and hire frefh troops,
raife
employing
if
fend
fliould
the advantage in
is
remain fuperior,
if
from
parts
as
you
much
as
But do we really tranfport troops into Germany upon as cheap terms as France can march men
before.
over the Rhine or Maefe, making the country maintain
them
in their paffage
?
Are Englifh regiments
raifed or fupported as eafily as
French
?
Still tht-re-
fcre the diverfion will be againft us.
But
can
the truth
make
is, all
to France in
the diverfion, which Britain
Germany,
is
by, fending fewer
troops at double the expence, to a6l againft a greater
number of French.
Thus
it
has been every year
I
the war hitherto, and thus it will continue.
admit that we have happened to have a fuperior Geor"
neral
;
but
troops to?
how cruel a hazard is this expofing our
The fuperiority of Britifn valour is a
4
very
i
:
^^9
[
very popular topic, and
we
]
are readily difpofed
to
admit the force of every argument to prove
thac
twenty thoufand Engliflimen can beat thirty
thou-
fand French
but a ftatefman,
:
this principle,
tician
:
and
if
who
ihaJl
ad upon
will be thought a very fliallow
poliEnglifh foldiers are fo much more
va-
luable than French, he muft have too lictJe
a regard
for the hvcs of his countrymen, who wiJi
rifk
upon terms
Where
fome great and Important intereft
is
hope no ten thoufand Englifhmen
will
at flake,
I
refufe to
fight with double the
and much more when
fent with
them
fo very unequal.
thirteen
number of French
Englifh fhips were
troops to relieve Minorca, I
am
fure that
no Enghfii commander would refufe, in
fuch a cafe,
like Mr. B:ng, to fight with twelve
French Ihips [
where fo great an objeft is at flake. But
in Germany*
where no Engliih intereft can be concerned,
and no
German intercfl, if rightly underflood, the
matching
twenty-five thoufand Englifhmen againft
thirty thout
fand French, merely on the confidence
of our greater
-
valour, and
thoufand,
flill
is
by
worfe the expofing them againft forty
much too expenfive an affair to be
diofen upon any account as a French
diverdon ;
and by much too ferious an afi'air to be
confidcred
in any fenfe as an Englifh one.
The German war
therefore, allowing
diverfion, is not an eligible diverfion
tain
muft put
itfelf in
;
it
to be a
becaufe Bri-
a greater expence to
make
it,
than
I20
[
Than
can
it
its
enemy
German war
the
]
to repel
no diverfion
is
lion every
one knows
from one
part,
a diver-
where we would not have
(iiverfion at all.
we have
into
go,
it
to fear
lefs
Germany
from
is
no
not a diverfion of the Forces
It is
not a diverfion of the Treafures of
It is
:
By
at all.
But the bringing the war
of France
add, t^at
meant, the turning of a war
is
to another part, where
it.
now
I
it.
France.
As
to the former,
it
the French forces, but
For what one
they pleafe,
march them down
port them, or a
Though
?
would
fuffer
they have
I
protefl
They may,
.''
to their coaft,
Have they
fleet to
them
in their paf-
doubt whether the French troops
feen their
men
fo important a concern
now
that
of war deftroyed, and the
upon
is
their coaft
at flake,
man
to fay, that an invafion
the
rench
may
and
fhips to tranf-
themfelves to be imbark'd,
Britifh fleet continually
1-
French court to em-
but in Germany
in,
there they muft remain.
fage
be an employment for
not a diverfion of them.
fervice has the
ploy their troops
if
may
is
is
it
yet where
becomes no
;
impoflible
;
or that
not at fome time or other, by fome
very fortunate concurrence of circumfl:ances, be able
to land ten thoufand
then
this,
men upon our
we may
fafely fay,
fleet
•,
that
But
though
and by the favour of winds, and
and long nights, may throw over
for once
coafl:s.
they might happen to elude the vigilance
for once
of ocr
I think,
•,
ten thoufand
tides,
men
yet th^re will be the chances of a thou*
fand
I
121
t
fand to one again ft
}
the fame accidents concurring
to,
enable theni to lend over ten thoufandmore in due time
camped or cantoned upon our
therefore abfolutely fecure
fand would
men
Thirty or forty thoufand
to fupport them.
makes us
fouth coaft,
becaufe the
;
en-
firft
ten thou-
be difpofed of, long before a fecond ten
thoufand could arrive to fupport them.
As
this reafoning
feems juft
in icfelf,
the evidence of fads to confirm
the French troops
are not
now
we have
fo
Why
it.
that
is it,
upon the
ftationed
coails oppofite to ours, but becaufe both nations fee
the impratfticablenefs of bringing
Bricifh councils certainly are
why
and we may
fairly
conclude that the French
court thinks in the fame manner,
which hinders
troops
?
The
?
this-, elfe
our national troops fent out of the king-
are
dom ?
them over
convinced of
their
invading us
That may be a
invade France
;
but
it
reafon,
?
Is
what
elfe
it
it
is
the want of
why we
fhould not
cannot be a reafon
why
a
country, which has always two or three hundred
men
thoufand
is
pay, fhould not invade us.
It
not therefore the want of troops, but of the means
to bring
them over, which prevents
invading us.
•
in its
might then
the French
from
Were their fleet fupeiior to ours, wc
leave Germany as naked as we pleafed,
not a battalion would be fent thither.
All would
be brought down upon their coaft, and a hundred
thoufand of them,
if
they v/tre necefiary, ftnt over
to ours.
France therefore has not a
upon
ov.-n coaft for
its
R
the
German
man
war.
the lefs
It
does
not-
122
[
army
not-fcnd-Its
from choice, but
to
]
to invade the
neceffity
England, and have no
German dominions
becaufc they cannot get
;
ground
otiier
meet us on.
to
If this be not a diverfion of the French forces
from England,
neither
was
any diverfion of them
it
from the defence of their colonies and
Thefe
iflands.
French trade and
and
their councils
are too interefting a concern to the
revenue,
therefore
to be
negleded
in
:
we have always found
the
French court
ready enough to fupport them, as long as the lead
chance remained of their getting their forces over
The number of
thither.
and ammunition for
in
the
tranfports,
their colonies,
which we took
this
and the
Cape Breton and Quebec, and
beginning of the war, fhew
garrifons, v/e found in
the long
they
refiftance
have made
prove that they were well fupported.
therefore the
to fend
them
want of troops, or
-,
much
and
the income -of the whole
'
s/
lefs
the
their
inability
'ports were blocked
America,
in
was not
It
their unwillingnefs
German
if
v^'ar,
they had
one half of the value of
utter
•,
Electorate would
worth to the French nation,
there,
with troops
up by the
an army
Martinico
to convey tnem,
wheri
not be
;
but
while their
Englifli fleets;
which
prevented their fending over forces every where fuperior to ours.
If the
•
German war be
not a diverfion of the
French troops from any other
of their treafures.
fervice,
neither
is
it
What the quantity of thefe really is,
may
8
123
[
may
]
not be eafy to determine
have fome millions to
them
Germany
in
our enemies
fpare, elfe they need
which
;
;
certainly,
notfpend
not their way into ling-
is
nor inftantly to put an end to the war, though
land,
may
give them the advantage in the end.
But
though the fources of their revenue were the double
of what they now are, yet the German war would
it
be a diverfion of them from no other fervice, which
could annoy us
;
becsufe they have no other to
ploy them
in againft us.
whenever
Britain
its
Too
em-
treafures of France,
by the enormous wafte of
fliall,
own, be reduced
formidable.
Thefe
to auv a peace, wiil foon
grov'/
I
long have they been trembling
for their Eaft and Weil- India colonies, as well as
7^
not to fee the abfolute
their ArT^tritl^rrieLtiements,
neceflity
of a
fleet to
care after a peace, if
we
leave
nurfeiy of their feamen,
their
while the war continues,
employ
might
noefe
-,
put us
fleet
:
fugar trade intire,
doubtlefs, be to attend to their m.arine.
will,
to
them and their firfc
them that far the greateft
proteft
their
pofiibly
fiiips
but to what avail
fo
much
the
impoffible
for
But
them
They
of Danes, Swedes, or Ge-
treafures
buy
is
it
to that purpofe.
When
?
that
could only
more upon oucj^uard, give our
l^f of them in
an opportunity of taking one
their paflfage into the
French harbours, and oblige the
unmanned, when the^ had got
reft to lie rotting there
in
?
While
their ports are all
cannot fend out a Angle
it is
blocked up, and they
man of
war, but by ftealth,
abfolutely impra(5licab!e for
navy to an equality with ours.
R
2
them
to raife
Where
are
their
their
failorj
,
124
[
]
They can only be made by
but how can that be done,
long voyages at fea
when they have neither men of war nor merchantbe found
lailors to
?
;
men, which can venture out of
own
the fun;ars of their
neutral
their
iflanc.s are
as Duilius did his rowers at land
men.
little
to fear
the
In fhort,
the ftate of parties
now
are
;
no
and
•,
home
in
Will they then attempt to form them
fliips ?
would have
harbours
btou«>ht
?
Our
Britifh tars
from fuch land- made
fea-
war continuing, and
prefent
remaining
Europe,
in
they
as
make Eng-
accefTion of treafure could
land equal to France at land, nor France equal to
En";land
at
&
But
fea.
fay others,
though
yet in the beginning
was a feafonable diverfion
fpent
X^
force in
their
have attended
that
it
may
not be fo now,
of the quarrel the German war
to their
•,
if
our enemies had not
Germany,
might then
they
marine with more
might have made them formidable
the very idea of our choofing the
diveifion, fuppofes that
How
firft.
early in
and
But
effect,
to us.
German war
we muft have been
as a
there
the war foever therefore
French began to fpend
their
money
in
the
Germany,
we began as foon, and certainly fpent as much and
money employed on our marine, would have
carried it to as much greater a hcighth, as the French
;
that
navy could have been improved by the favings of.
theirs
and if our navy was at firft fuperior to theirs,
:
then, if to unequals
rity
would
flill
you add equals, the fuperio-
be oui5.
But
in
fad, in the begin-
ning
j
'
^i
I
'25
[
^X^.i'J
]
German war
wholly to their marine, and had no
In the
all.
attend^ ^ "^t^^
at *^^ g S ^v
the French court did
fling of the quarrel,
whend^^S <i^ ^
.^ r"^ "?
year of the war therefore,
firil
only fuch a diverfion could have been of any fervice
wc had
and by the next year, when Sr^ ^r)^ jS
their Tailors were fhut up in our prifons, and their sS" ri.. ^ ij£
Ihips in their own porrs ; when Toulon, Breft,
£ {.^'^^ -1
to us,
Jlochforc,
it
;
and even
Louifburg,
were blocked up
;
when
brought home
at
'\§
an end, their fugars
«
bottoms, and their breed
in neutral
-
'^v^
X t'
x^'v'J
^
from that time we
^
^
recur to fa6ls, and rccol-
"^
failors therefore totally ceafed,
did not want
5^
Cape Francoife
was deftroyed,
their filhery
Weft-India navigation
their
of
not
t>
:^t
C^
"^^
%
'^
'
it.
If from reafoning
Ie£b the courfe
we
of the French conduct
in the begin
ingof the war, that will prove, a pofteriori*, thejuft
nefs of our reafoning on this head.
The
only profpefl v/hich the French had of in-
•^
was, by furprifing us in ^Os!^^
the beginning of the war, before we were prepared
vadlng us with
for
the
*
^v^
t? 2l "^i o
them. Then the nation wasjuftly alarmed with ^j ^ >>^^
~"
danger of an invafion, and owed a more grate- jj ^
Tue
nation's fecond orator reafons
bids us look into
to
fuccefs,
a prion, from faEls, and
our hiftory for arguments a priori
:
fccming;
have confideied his own arguments, which were drawn from
Queen
Elizabeth's reign,
as
a hundred and
a priori, than any from queen Ann's.
much
later date,
we
But our
are content to give
from them, the more humble
title
fifty
fa(5ls
years
more
being of a
the argument
drawn
of an argument a pofteriori.
»
[
ful return, than
126
paid him, to the noble lord,
it
equipped and mann'd a
fpeed, as prevented the
only
all
J
who
with fo incredible a
fleet
enemy, and furprized not
other nations, but even ourfelves
:
and
at
the fame time, with equal forefight and fteadinefs,
crippled the French marine in the very beginning,
and prevented
their
manning
the fleet they had pre-
pared at Ereft and Rochfort to invade us, by feizing
all their fhips in their
got
fifteen
thoufand of their
That was
power.
return to Europe,
till
feamen
befl:
our
in
the French feafon for invading
All their attempts fince have been the
us.
we had
effects
But during
of defperation rather than of council.
the year 1756, while the French had any hope
all
left
of invading us, they never thought of entering
Germany
;
and
fo far
was the Ele6lorate from be-
ing in any danger of an attack, that
troops from thence over hither.
we brought
England was then
too great an objed in the French councils, for them
then to
many.
away
trifle
felves totally fallen
us
at
their
But the next
money and troops in Gerwhen they found themr
year,
from that great hope of ruining
once, then they took the after-game of try-
ing to do
it
of Germany
more gradually
:
And
;
whatever
and therefore thought
may
be
now pretended
of our having chofen the German war as a diverfion, every one mufc remember, that the army of
obfervation was an
verfion.
Twas
army of defence and not of
the child of our
fears,
fond concern to keep the French out of the
di-
and our
E
te,
and not of any councils of diverfion to draw them
into
127
I
into
Then
It.
we had
that
only
]
was when our enemies founcJ'
it
raifed a fufficicnt
land force to guard
onr coaft from furprize, and to repel any invafion,
that they began to think of fending troops into Ger-
many
at the
and when by
:
mouths of
many of
then
;
vigilance of our fquadrons,
their harbours,
found
lofs
of fo
it
impradicable to go any where
was that they pafied the Rhine,
it
making every
effort,
ftill
and running every hazard, to
fuccour their colonies.
At
length they found to
go
their coft that they could not
knew
and the
their tranfports in their pafiage to their co-
lonies, they
elfe
tlie
tifither
but they
-,
that the Englifh forces could, and that they
could not
refill
them
there
only they were vulnerable
tereft lay
;
their iflands,
in
and expofed
;
;
and therefore
that
was the part wliere
their belt
trading in-
which were now naked
it
was a diverfion of the
Englifli, to draw
Germany, where they knew
French choofing, and not of the
the BritiHi force into
themfclves to be invulnerable, and were always fure
to be fuperior to us.
I
hope
have
I
in
no parr of the foregoing fheets
difcovered any want of humanity for the inhabitants
of the Eleftorate, or of duty to our
vereign.
low
I
common
would always confider them
fubjects,
as
and our fellow proteftants
•,
our
I
fofel-
wifh
Hanover could be joined to this ifland, that
we might confider them as our countrymen. But till
that
then,
it is
for the intereft of both, that
the diftance which nature has placed
they ketp
them
at,
and
that
'^S
[
know
that Britain fliould
)<
of the empire,
as a part
but
powers of
j'
]
nothing of
T
Eleclorate,"
and the other
if that
urope fliould ev er unite
liance againft France.
tlie
attain in
an
al -
then for England fing-
ill
own force to attempt to defend it, is
taking the certain way to bring the French into it?
and making that the feat of war in every future
Tis giving up all the advantages of our
quarrel.
lyT^nd by
and joining our idand on to the continent,
fituation,
by
is
its
finding for our
giving up
all
enemy
a field to beat us
the benefit of our naval fuperiority,
which
for the lake of a diftant land-war,
now
tory
have
I
think fliewn to be ruinous and impradica-
I
It
ble.
It
in.
is
itfelf
carrying
on
it
where vic-
a country,
in
can do us no good, and where a defeat
Not
can do our enemy no hurt.
in the prefent cafe,
mention that
fcems to be exhaufliing our
it
man, who never can have
treafures to fupport a
in his power,
to
and who
is
of his having ever had
it
yet to give us the proofs
it
in his will to
do us any
fervice.
Providence has been pleafed to put the whole advantage of the war into our hands
are giving
power
it
to our enemies.
to conquer for
the French from ever entering
y£a/i\ Act
to be taking the courfe, in
do,
is
after
to be ruined for
defending
...
it.
/>
^
and
have
I
fear v/e
it
Hanover, and fecure
fuch an indemnification, as
^^
;
We
it,
fliall
it
in
for
eff'e(flually
again.
which the
our
We
it
deter
fcem
mod we
can
and difabled from ever
Let any difcerning man afis:
him- y^M
^
4^cuax ^^xnz^ix^OrUAeJy^ y^t^^^ -^^^^^
-Sy <«/Ve3^i<^
^Mryx^af/yi^, 'in.^irCC(nMri»
^
5^?^
,
129
[
]
what one thing we have done
himfelf,
Germany
to make
In
or the French fufFered there,
this year,
them want
more than
a peace
the lad.
It
is
not
now
the bufinefs of France to exert
as
did in former wars, with three or four armies
it
in
Germany.
Tis
out from thence
not the
It is
interefl:
force,
of France to beat
would open our
that
;
whole
its
The
eyes.
French themfelves have found already, and then the
people of England would foon fee, that the crown
of France can get nothing
can
nothing
lofe
and the French,
:
them, would not
fuffer their
twelvemonth round.
intereft
to the
it,
army
Perhaps
it
if
we
intreated
flay there a
to
may
not
be the
of either of the two generals to put an end
war
:
it
certainly
not the French intereft
is
though
j
it
not in his power to
his fuccefs fhould
be five times greater
and our foreign general has
do
Hanover, and Britain
in
than any he has yet met with. Put his three campaigns
into one
:
not the expences of them, they will re-
main a heavy load of debt on our revenue our
millions in Germany, too like to our moments, pere:
unt i3 imputantur
campaigns
velt,
all
;
but put the
into one
Minden,
;
vi<fl:orics
of his three
three fuch as thofe of Cre-
and Warburgh,
all
a
in
fummer,
could have no eftefb on France towards putting an
end to the war.
The French
court at the
could but have their army driven
home
•,
word
and would
be as ready the next year to invade the Eledlorate
as the laft.
In fhort, there has never any reafon yet
been given to convince
with
little
more than
its
us, that
France
may
nor,
ordinary revenue, keep on
S
the
130
[
<he war
in its prefent
France, while
ning
its
it is
]
Hate for ten years to come.
itfelf fuffering
enemy every year
it
vidory and
be
Many
perfons
its
know
I
ftrange to hear of ruin in the midft of
The
fuccefs.
never appeared
faid,
millions nearer
ten
ruin, will not fue for peace.
will think
nothing, and run-
Englifh nation,
fb great
as
it
it
will
has the
laft
But may we not deceive ourfelves by making
year.
the vaft increafe of our debt the mcafure
of our
Can our conquefts be rendered in the leaft
degree more fecure, for any the greateft fuccefTes
greatnefs
^
hope for
in
cure the prefent,
is
x/e can
ufelefs
French
The only way
go on to make more
Germany
to
?
to fe-
not
:
ones on the Mifliflippi, but by feizing the
and
iflands,
holding
India trade in depofite for
whole Weft-
their
Hanover
;
and thereby
cutting off the means of their prefent fupplies to
invade
it,
as well as
making them
willing to fubmit
to any terms to recover a part of their lofTes
any poiTible way
.''
Is
left for
the French to fave or recover
their colonies, but only
by beating or exhaulling us
in
go
Germany
thither
.'*
?
Could they do
Shall
we be
either, if
we would
millions the
know
lefs
not
the better able to defend
our conquefts for our having three years hence
v/
there
in our pockets
fifty
,''
we have money enough j^
I acknowledge that hitherto we have felt no want
of it but furely the moft fanguine among us will not
I
it is
faid that
;
fay that an
expence of
tinued 15 years longer.
fifteen millions is to
be con-
Should other wife and good
131
[
men
]
fuch an enormous
we cannot fopport
think, that
yet no one,
as a friend
expence beyond another year ;
of his country, would be fond of giving
his reafons
who
think that
for
There
it.
are
we
the t^reater debt
fay they,
we
the whole.
I fhall
others indeed,
incur, the better
much
-,
the nearer wiping out
(hall
be fo
This
third fort are not the
reafon with-,
I
becaufe then,
people which
only wifn that the two for-
mer would bethink themfelves in time of the danaers, to which they expofe the publick from them,
by running the war into an expence
our abihties.
I
am
as thankful
of Montreal
ed
•,
man
any
as
fo
much beyond
by the regiments
taking
for the
but that fervice has been
compleat-
which were there
before
;
the nation therefore has this year been a t no expence
of tranfports, &c.
upon
that
account.
Nor
has
any expedition which we know of been formed this
year, any more than the lad, againft the French iflands.
Vv'hile the only poflTeffions
of value belonging to our
enemies out of France, have
quefts, our
men
broken back'd
lain
open to our con-
of war have been watching a few
fliips in
the Villain for
want of other
employment i yet without any new expedition hitherto failed, or any frefh national attempts, more than
the continuation of thofe of
have increafed.
millions
i
I
but will not the
be eighteen millions
laft year,
our expences
have hitherto fpoke of
?
real
fifteen
charge of thisyear 1760
And have we not even ftill heard
S 2
of
,
13^
]
[
of memorials, complaining, that enough
for the
German
BritiHi
war muft
the
neceflarily
German feem
We
now,
are
As
ferv^ice ?
not done
is
demands
the
be reduced
for
the
thofe for
•,
to be increafing.
it
faid,
is
going to create twelve
millions
new
twenty
If indeed a Britifh parliament will concur,
:
with an
debt,
expence polTibly of
mind of our gracious
fove-
reign, fo very erroneous a ftandard of loyalty.
Can
to fix in the unbiaffed
Gentlemen
thinic
tional induftry
a year
;
of going on thus to load our na-
with the
of twelve millions
intereft
for a fervice, in which, fuppofing our
we
to be as fuccefsful as
pleafe,
it
will
army
be hard to
point out any benefit, even of the fmallefl: value,
which can
We may talk as we pleafe
refult to Britain.
of a French bankruptcy
that our enemies
may
but can any
j
Will any man avow the running
dred millions farther in debt
?
that our credit can extend fo far
his
prove,
country a hun-
Dare we imagine,
-,
tures and exports, bear the load of
I will leave the
man
not go on feven years longer^
or our manufac-
fuchan
intereft?
reader to pidure to himfelf,
what
mufc happen long before we have gone fuch a length.
Shall
we
then,
when
have been drawing
all
their
and quarrelling with us
the neighbouring nations
money out of our hands,
for their principal
the confufions of bankruptcy
of
diftruft,
-,
;
with
all
in that general flare
which every individual muft have of
his neiL,hbour
i
with our fwords pofTibly aimed at
each other's throats
-,
fhall
we then be
able to
raifc
ten
1'/^
,
133
[
]
ten millions within the year to protefb the Eleflo^
or to defend ourfelves.
rate,
Some of my
readers will recolleflupon this occafion,
the hiftory of one of the
of the ancient
firft
ftatcs
;
which, tho' under a popular government, was efteemed the wifeft
gaged
val,
:
till
war
in a
at
that fatal period
home with
which was fuperior
to
;
when, being en-
their only
them
dangerous
at land,
they triumphed over every year at fea with a
two hundred
fail
;
and naval power were
their
enemy's
their
own
port of a
when
they at length,
open
to
and
war, to go upon a diftant land-war, in fuplittle
Ihall foon,
remote
ftate,
fcarce heard of before,
I
hope,
fee the
alliance.
and
;
fhall
occafion for pofterity to pafs the fame
upon our German war,
the Sicilian
:
as the wife
Hie primum
:
in
nobiUtatiSy imperii, gloria
not give
judgment
Roman
opes illius
commintit^y deprejfaqtie fnnt
esijlimatur.
We
miftake of perfifting in
any fuch impratflicable attempts
(iAT^CcA
of
them, negledled
and made important only by that
men/mm
fleet
their riches
at their greatefl: heighth,
coafl: lay all
ri-
but which
did
upon
civitatis vi^<e^
hoc portu Athe-
naufrr.gium favium
Cic. in Ver.
//c^rrLe^c^ A^Atre ^A^^ Un^^'^'^t
[
134
]
I
^ranjlation cf a Convention betivcen his Majejiy
and
the
King of
at London^ the
Pn{Jjia, concluded andfigned
nth of April 1758.
TRANSLATION.
TT 7 HERE AS
Vf
a treaty between their Britannic
and Pruflian Majefties was concluded and
figned
^Ti
the i6th day of January 1756,
tlie fti-
pulations whereof tended to the prefervation of the
general peace of Europe, and of
ticular
and whereas
:
fince
Germany
in par-
that period France has
rot only invaded the Empire with numerous armies,
and attacked
lies,
their aiorefaid
Majefties and their al-
but has alfo excited other powers to aft
manner
:
and whereas
extraordinary efforts
it
is
in lilve
fo notorious, that the
made by
to defend himfelf againft the
his Pruflian
\vho.have attacked him on fo
Majefty
number of enemies,
many
fides at
once,
have occafioned a very great and burthenfome expence
-,
whilft,
on the other hand,
his
revenues have
been greatly diminifhed in thofe parts of his
nions which have been the feat of the war
their Majefties
domi;
and
having mutually determined to cbn-
tinue their efforts for their reciprocal defence and
fecurity, for the
recovery of their poffeffions, for
the proteftioa of their allies, and the prefervation
of
'i:>
[
of the
moll
;
his Britan-
refolved, in confequence of thefc
nic Majefty has
to give an
confiderations,
money,
J
of the Germanic body
liberties
immediate fuccour,
to his Prnffian Majefty, as the fpeedieft
effeflual
and
\
in
and
Majefties have
their aforefaid
thought proper, that a convention fhonld be made
tlierenpon, in order to declare
and
reciprocal intentions in this refpeft
;
afcertain their
for
which pur-
pofe they have appointed and authorized their re-
name and on
In the
fpedive minifters, viz.
the
part of his Britannic Majefty, his privy counfellors.
Sir
Robert Henley, knight,
great feal of Great Britain,
keeper of the
lord
John
earl
Thomas
prefident of his council,
lord commiflioner of his treafury,
Newcaftle,
firft
Robert
of Holdci^nefTe, one of
earl
cretaries
of
William
Pitt,
cretaries
of
his
of
ftate,
;
and
of his principal
fe-
name and on the part
Dodo Henry
privy counfcUor of em-
in the
PrulTian Majefty, the Sieurs
baron of Knyphaufen,
bafly
his principal fe-
Philip earl of Hardwicke, and
efquire, another
ftate
of Granville,
Holies duke of
his
and minifter plenipotentiary
Britannic Majefty,
d*affaires at the faid court
municated
at the court
and Lewis Michell,
;
who,
after
his
having com-
to each other their refpedive full
have agreed upon the following
of
his charg^
powers,
articles.
I.
His Majefty the king of Great
Britain engages to
caufc to be paid, in the city of
London,
to
the
perfon
136
[
who
perfon or perfons
purpofe by
his
fliall
]
be authorized
M
that
Majefty the king of Pruflia, the fum
of four milhons of German crowns, amounting to
fix hundred and feventy thoufand pounds fterling ;
which
intire
after the
fum
fliall
be paid at once, immediately
exchange of the
requifition of
ratifications,
upon the
his Pruflian Majefty.
II.
His Majefty the king of PruiTia engages, on his
part, to employ the faid fum in keeping up and augmenting his forces, which fhall aft in the moft ad-
V'
vantageous manner for thej^QQimon caufe, and for
the
End
propofed by their
aforefaid
and mutual
reciprocal defence
Majefties, of
fecurity.
III.
The High
viz.
as
On
contracting Parties moreover engage,
the one part,
King and
as Eledtor
Pruffian Majefty
•,
his Britannic
•,
Majedy, both
and, on the other part, his
not to conclude any treaty of
peace, truce, or neutrality, or any other convention
or agreement whatfoever, with the powers
who have
taken part in the prefent war, but in concert, and
by mutual
confent, and exprefsly comprehending
each other therein.
4i/f'
Q^cJii
^al-(j0U^J^'l'^^'&Ar^
(i^/n\
'37
[
]
IV.
This convention
cation
thereof fhall
within the term of
be
and the
ratifi-
be exchanged en both
fides,
fnall
ratified
;
weeks, to be reckoned from
fix
the date of the figning of this convention, or fooncr,
if pofTible.
In witnefs whereof,
fters
We
the under written mini-
of his Majefty the King of Great Britain, and
of his Majefty the King of Pruffia, by virtue of
our
full
powers, have figned this prefent convention,
and have
fet
Done
the feals of our arms thereto.
at
London,
the year of our
ERRATA.
Page
1
the iith day of April, ia
Lord 1758.
line 14. for dfjire,
16.
117. line
F
I
3.
N
for
I
;>/,
S.
read han}e
read their.
dejired,
^i
r^.
<vr3BTv