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UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATIONS
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Pre-U Certificate
MARK SCHEME for the May/June 2010 question paper
for the guidance of teachers
9774 PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
9774/02
Paper 2 (Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 1),
maximum raw mark 50
This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of
the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not
indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners’ meeting before marking began,
which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.
Mark schemes must be read in conjunction with the question papers and the report on the
examination.
•
CIE will not enter into discussions or correspondence in connection with these mark schemes.
CIE is publishing the mark schemes for the May/June 2010 question papers for most IGCSE, Pre-U,
GCE Advanced Level and Advanced Subsidiary Level syllabuses and some Ordinary Level syllabuses.
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Topic 1 Epistemology
Section A
[Extract from Bertrand Russell: The Problems of Philosophy. 2]
1
(a) With reference to this passage, explain what kinds of philosophical problems are
raised by Russell's discussion of appearance and reality.
[10]
Russell begins with the central question of epistemology: is there any knowledge that cannot
be doubted? Immediate experience seems to be indubitable, but can indeed be doubted, e.g.
the colours on a table viewed from different perspectives by different people will change, yet
presumably the properties of the table are constant. Also, there are difficulties with
perception in general, e.g. red under sodium lighting appears black; the texture of a smooth
table at the microscopic level is anything but smooth; parallel lines appear to converge in the
distance; touch depends on the toucher – how hard he presses and what part of the body he
presses with. The table perhaps has properties which cause all these sensations, but we
cannot know the table directly – the real table is not, after all, known directly to us.
We ‘know’ a table through sense-data. The sense-data are not the table, however, so how
are the sense-data and the table related? Is there such a thing as ‘matter’? Berkeley’s
idealism denies that matter exists independently of being perceived. To explain the
consistency of sense experience, Berkeley posited the existence of God as the perpetual
perceiver. Leibniz suggests that the table is real because it is perceived by a ‘colony of
souls’. Neither disputes, however, that there is a ‘real’ table. So far, we have established that
what we know about real tables (etc.) is not the real table, but sense-data, which appear to
depend upon the relations between us and the object. What we directly see and feel is
merely appearance, so how can we ever know what reality is like?
(b) Critically assess Russell’s views on the nature and existence of matter.
[15]
Russell distinguishes between the scientific view of matter (which describes light, heat and
sound as wave motions) from authentic experience of matter. He holds (for example) that our
experience of light is not the same as how we might describe light to a blind man. What we
know directly is not the external world. The phenomenon of light as we experience it is not in
the external world – it is caused by it. The notion of light is somehow composed in how we
experience the waves, and Russell argues that similar relations hold for other experiences,
e.g. colour, sound and space. Russell therefore tries to clarify the relation between
appearance and reality, e.g. sensations of touch, sound, smell and taste are perceived when
the (human) body is in an appropriate space relative to objects. We can know properties of
the relations required to preserve the correspondence with sense-data, but we cannot know
the nature of the terms between which the relations hold. With time, for example, it passes
slowly or quickly in relation to what we are doing. Ultimately, physical objects in themselves
remain unknowable, so physical objects are similar to sense-data.
Analysis of Russell’s views can take any coherent form selected by the candidate: for
example some might analyse a selection of Russell’s comments on the nature and existence
of matter. Like Berkeley, Russell thinks it possible that material objects are constructed out of
elements of experience, although he calls them sense-data as opposed to ideas. Objects are
real, but known only indirectly from sense-data – a view often known as ‘indirect realism’.
Russell’s approach might be contrasted with (for example) direct/naive realism, or with
phenomenalism.
© UCLES 2010
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Section B
2
Critically assess reliabilism as a theory of knowledge.
[25]
Reliabilism moves away from justifying knowledge through foundations or coherence, and looks
instead at how the individual relates to the world – at reliable and unreliable ways of collecting
beliefs. Reliabilism claims simply that knowledge is certain where S (the subject) believes P (a
proposition, like: Grass is green) to be true, and S’s belief is produced by a reliable process.
Candidates might refer to the work of scholars such as Goldman or Plantinga. Assessment of
reliabilism is therefore likely to focus on what is, or is not, a reliable method. For example a
method can be reliable but fallible, such as measuring somebody’s temperature through a
thermometer, and it is hard to see how any fallible measuring device can produce properly
reliable information where data varies. Moreover we can gain reliable information from false
beliefs – for example reliable measurements of latitude can be made by believing that the sun
rotates around the earth. Some seek to avoid such problems by using external reliabilism, i.e.
justification by what happens outside the person who knows P, which might be thought to be
reliable because justification comes through other people (e.g. I have arthritis can be confirmed
by a doctor). External reliabilism tracks the causal chains which confirm my belief about how the
world is, taking into account all the possible sufficiency conditions for knowledge such as Gettier
conditions. Some prefer an internalist theory, on the basis that what is known internally is more
certain.
Both forms of reliabilism are very problematic. External reliabilism cannot avoid making
judgements about what is, and what is not, a sufficiency condition (and so on), and so in the end
it appeals to internalist justification: e.g. Stich argues that choices depend on cultural bias.
Internalist theories seem to be circular, since any method used to check on reliability must itself
be subject to check. If we say that reliabilism works if we use both externalist and internalist
methods, this seems little better, since one incomplete theory is used merely to justify another.
© UCLES 2010
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OR
3
‘It is impossible to uphold phenomenalist theories of perception.’ Critically examine this
claim.
[25]
As a radical form of empiricism, phenomenalism has antecedents in Berkeley’s subjective
idealism, and Kant’s ‘epistemological phenomenalism’, for example. So-called ‘classical
phenomenalism’ refers to J.S. Mill’s view that material objects are “permanent possibilities of
sensation” – a description which (unlike Berkeley’s view of God as the guarantor of the
consistency of sense-perception) holds that such permanent possibilities are sufficient for an
object’s existence. The regularity of experience in the world of possible sensations is in other
beings as well as in the individual, so there really is an external world. Mill’s account can be
criticised on a number of fronts – for example it offers no explanation of why these permanent
possibilities offer themselves – they just do, which seems rather inadequate by comparison (for
example) with realist explanations that material objects exist, and are the cause of our sense
experience.
Another form of phenomenalism derives from the likes of Mach, Russell and Ayer, known as
‘linguistic phenomenalism’ – every empirical statement reduces to a set of statements referring
exclusively to sense-data: e.g. sentences about ‘tables’ are to be translated into sentences which
refer exclusively to actual or possible sensory experiences. This version relies on an incredibly
complex set of ‘subjunctive conditionals’/’counterfactual’ descriptions about the sense-data of
what would be observed. Such descriptions render the theory too cumbersome, since the
counterfactual descriptions (such as the possible sense-data descriptions of what I might
perceive if I opened a book which might be in the library next door) would seem to be infinite.
How, further, to use Dancy’s example, would I describe the subjunctive conditionals
corresponding to the statement, ‘there is a red rose in the dark’? Phenomenalism is thus beset
with problems, not least being the further issue that describing counterfactuals seems to require
the existence of an enduring and material observer, which goes against the phenomenalist
reductionist agenda.
Candidates might argue in defence of phenomenalism that it is a laudable attempt to explain the
problem of the continued existence of material objects when they are not observed. If it is
objected that its account is incomplete or unsatisfactory, then phenomenalists can argue that no
other account of perception is complete or satisfactory.
© UCLES 2010
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Topic 2 Philosophical and Theological Language
Section A
[Extract from A.J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic: 115]
4
(a) With reference to this passage, explain why Ayer claims that language about a
transcendent God is meaningless.
[10]
According to Ayer, proving the existence of a transcendent God could be done only by an
a priori proposition, but all a priori propositions reduce to meaningless tautologies. The
existence of God is not a genuine empirical hypothesis, so is not even probable. The notion
of God as a person with non-empirical attributes is not an intelligible notion. All talk of a
transcendent God merely serves to foster the illusion that there is a real entity corresponding
to the name ‘God’. Belief in a transcendent God is commonly joined to belief in an after-life,
but that is not a genuine hypothesis either, since it usually rests on belief in an immortal soul,
which is yet another meaningless metaphysical assertion. The assertion that religious
‘truths’ about a transcendent God are not literally significant is supported by what theists
themselves say – for example that ‘God is a mystery that transcends all understanding’, but
by definition anything that does this must be completely unintelligible. If a mystic admits that
the objects of his visions cannot be described, then he must also admit that he is bound to
talk nonsense when he describes them. In describing his vision, the mystic gives us no
information about the external world: he merely gives us indirect information about the
condition of his own mind. This disposes also of the argument from religious experience: a
man who claims to see God can give no verification for what he claims to see, whereas
normal empirical observations have verifiable sense contents. Religious philosophers who
fill their books with claims about a transcendent being are candidates for the psychiatrist’s
couch.
(b) Evaluate Ayer’s attack on religion.
[15]
Ayer’s attack on religion stems from his acceptance of the verification principle as the
criterion of assessing the meaning of statements, including religious statements: statements/
propositions that are not logical statements and propositions, and that cannot be verified in
sense experience, are meaningless. Ayer’s consideration of strong verification and
verification in fact led him to assert that meaning can be granted through the reduced criteria
of weak verification and verification in principle. According to Ayer, religion is not verifiable
even weakly or in principle.
This attack is seen by many as inept, since religious statements can be verified weakly
e.g. the resurrection of Jesus might be held to be verified by associated documentary
evidence (the New Testament). Also, as a criterion of meaning, the verification principle fails
its own test, since it cannot be confirmed by any empirical evidence, weakly or in principle.
Ayer claimed that, as a principle, it was exempt from its own rule, but that seems arbitrary.
The general consensus is that Ayer’s attack on religion fails.
On the other hand, the verification principle can be used to identify statements that look
meaningful but are not. Hick gives some useful examples, e.g. ‘overnight the entire physical
universe has instantaneously doubled in size, and the speed of light has doubled’, where the
assertion cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by any empirical observations, so what at first
sight looks like a genuinely factual assertion fails the test of what passes for a genuine
factual assertion, i.e. that it must make an experienceable difference whether the facts are as
alleged or not. Some might argue that the verification principle is stronger when taken with
other types of arguments against religion, for example those based on the falsification
principle.
© UCLES 2010
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Section B
5
Examine critically the view that ‘good’ is a factual property.
[25]
The view that good is a factual property is often advanced as a solution to the problems raised by
ethics about how ‘good’ or ‘bad’ are to be defined. According to G.E. Moore, ‘good’ is either a
natural factual property, or a non-natural factual property, or else it is non-cognitive.
The first of these views is known as Ethical Naturalism, and it holds that good is complex and
analysable. So for example Utilitarians might define good in terms of happiness, and Christians
might define it in terms of God’s will. Ethical Naturalism is usually attacked through the ‘naturalist
fallacy’ / the ‘is-ought’ or ‘fact-value’ gap. In the sentences:
She is old and lonely (fact) / you ought to euthanise her (value);
Hitler killed 6 million Jews (fact) / Hitler was a bad man (value) –
– there is a gap of justification between the is and the ought / the fact and the value, and it seems
clear that some could derive different ‘oughts’ and values from the same facts (you ought to help
her / Hitler was good), which implies that something is wrong with Naturalism.
Ethical Naturalism holds that just as ‘yellow’ is a simple and unanalysable property, ‘good’ is also
simple and unanalysable yet factual (as in Moore’s so-called Intuitionism), but this is generally
rejected because different people can have different intuitions about all sorts of things (such as
capital punishment), so how do we choose between them?
Candidates might conclude that Non-Cognitivism is a better alternative, or they might seek to
defend Naturalism, for example by accepting Neo-Naturalist theories where ‘good’ can be defined
objectively (as opposed to absolutely) as ‘that which improves the human condition’.
OR
6
Evaluate the significance for religious belief of Wittgenstein’s concept of language games.
[25]
Wittgenstein describes language as an indefinite set of social activities, each serving a purpose,
each different activity being a language game: cursing, blessing, ordering, hypothesising, and so
on. Each language game is defined by its users and is meaningful to those who use it. Those
who have no use for a language game have no right to criticise those who have, so to demand
verification or falsification of religious language using scientific/empirical criteria is not
appropriate. The statements ‘I believe in God’ and ‘I do not believe in God’ are not contradictory
statements, but are simply different perspectives that people can take. Trying to say something
factual about God is nonsense, although in the Notebooks, Wittgenstein suggested that life is
meaningless if there is no dependence on a transcendent God. However, God lies beyond any
set of facts, so no set of propositions can describe a transcendent God.
This appears to provide a powerful defence of meaning for religious statements, where
verification is internal, without need for external justification. It is doubtful, however, that it gets us
very far. People lose their faith because something provides evidence that their beliefs are
wrong, which suggests that the role of external justification is important for common sense: hence
D.Z. Philips points out that if language games don’t need evidence, how do we know that
believers aren’t making a bungle? On Wittgenstein’s interpretation, I appear to be fully justified in
adopting any nonsensical language I like, whereas I would prefer to be told that I was in need of
being rescued from intellectual nonsense. Language games do overlap, not least the scientific
and religious language games – that is the main point of natural theology, and seems preferable
to Wittgensteinian anti-realism and fideism. Whatever evaluation is offered can gain Level 6 by
breadth or depth or both.
© UCLES 2010
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Topic 3 Philosophy of Religion
Section A
[Extract from John Polkinghorne: Science and Creation. The Search for Understanding: 1–2]
7
(a) With reference to this passage, explain why Polkinghorne sees natural theology as
being crucially important for understanding the world.
[10]
Natural theology uses the insights of science in order to reach a clearer understanding of the
world. It works on the premise that the world is God’s creation, so it must reveal God’s
power and intentions. It works alongside revelation from scripture and religious experience
to give humans a unified world view. Scientific data must therefore be used in the attempt to
understand ultimate questions. Science is the most profound context available for answering
questions about the world, from the very small (the domain of Quantum Mechanics) to the
macro universe (physics and cosmology). Theology must use all kinds of knowledge and
take a total world view, otherwise it will be incomplete: Polkinghorne gives the example of
armchair theologians who expose themselves (and others) to ridicule by writing about
creation without reference to the science of the origins of the universe, which in recent years
(with Inflationary theory) may not even require an absolute beginning in a single Big Bang.
Equally, understanding the world is not just about understanding its physical process:
physical description and theological interpretation must, sensibly, go hand in hand. In issues
such as the fine-tuning of the universe, for example, science can throw up questions that
point beyond itself and transcend its power to answer (p.23). Science is not just a
speculative system – it is reflected in the reality that we perceive, and is a vehicle of God’s
revelation of himself to humans.
(b) Assess critically Polkinghorne’s attempt to lead physics to theology.
[15]
The subject-matter is broad here, so candidates could discuss several aspects of
Polkinghorne’s view, either in breadth or in depth, or both. Polkinghorne thinks that it is
amazing that the world is intelligible at all, although others might comment that if it were not
intelligible, the comment could not be made – intelligibility is just part of what is. The same
kind of argument is often used to dispose of the fine-tuning argument, since the anthropic
principle is seen by many as just a description of the universe we inevitably find ourselves in
– if it were not intelligible through the parameters it possesses, no comment would be
possible, although of course Polkinghorne, like Swinburne, sees that as an evasion. Some
might challenge Polkinghorne’s essentially Christian interpretation of the role of physics,
e.g. in his use of the ‘Logos’ theology. Some might challenge his view that the human
characteristic of seeking ultimate solutions is symptomatic of the presence of God within us –
human curiosity might be said to be a sufficient driving force. Polkinghorne’s concept of the
soul in terms of dual aspectism is consonant with the Christian concept of humans as a
psycho-somatic unity, which Polkinghorne justifies with reference to the wave-particle duality
of light, which might seem fanciful.
Polkinghorne’s attempt to integrate science and religion is valuable in that for many nonreligious people it demonstrates that religion is not necessarily a closed system.
© UCLES 2010
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Section B
8
Does the fact that something exists rather than nothing mean that there is a God?
[25]
This question is, in terms of the syllabus, directed primarily at the Cosmological Argument, but
candidates are at liberty to make use of any relevant material in their answers. In terms of
Christian theology, for example, the main tradition concerning the creation of the universe is that
it was brought about by God ex nihilo – from nothing, which suggests that one answer to the
question is that God directed it so. As an interpretation of Genesis 1, however, the Hebrew
syntax almost certainly supports the concept of God ‘creating’ by putting pre-existent chaos into
some kind of order.
The Cosmological Argument suggests that empirical observation reveals (at least) three primary
objects of experience – motion, causation and existence, and it posits the existence of God as
the unmoved mover, uncaused cause, and uncreated Creator. The general reason given for God
acting in this way is that the cosmos exists as an outpouring of divine love, or that it exists by
virtue of the fact that God’s essence is his existence, so the universe exists by virtue of God’s
nature. Russell assumes that it is easier to accept that the universe just ‘is’, so the question has
no answer. Modern physics postulates (e.g. through inflation theory) that the universe might in
fact be self-perpetuating and might always have been here, so there once having been nothing is
not necessarily a valid concept.
Some candidates might point the question in an eschatological direction, for example by
suggesting that there is something rather than nothing because that ‘something’ is consistent with
the religious viewpoint that God has a plan for the universe. Some might suggest that the
positive energy in the universe is balanced by the negative energy, in which case the total energy
might in fact be zero, so in that sense, nothing exists already. Essays should be judged entirely
by quality of response.
OR
9
‘The concept of life after death is incoherent.’ Critically assess this claim.
[25]
The point of the question centres on the apparent incongruity between ‘life’ and ‘death’ where the
concept of life is alleged to occur after an event which by definition signifies the end of life.
Simple empirical observation shows that bodies rot, however long the process takes, so the idea
that dead bodies can somehow regenerate belongs to fiction rather than serious philosophy.
Candidates may assess the claim in the question in any way they see fit. Some might consider
the Freudian view that life after death is a symptom of religious neurosis, specifically of an
infantile inability to accept the permanence of death by assuming a dependence upon the ability
(and the will) of an omnipotent God to regenerate life where life is lost. Others might consider a
Marxist or Nietzschean analysis, suggesting that all concepts of life after death are rooted in the
psychology of power and oppression.
Promises of life after death are believed by the masses in order to compensate for the aridity and
pain of their lives, and are propagated by religious authorities as a mechanism for controlling the
population by issuing promises that by definition can never be checked because they can never
be verified.
Some might argue that verification is not impossible: hence according to Hick it is eschatological,
although Hick’s argument rests on what might be seen as an incoherent asymmetrical
verification, in so far as life after death can never be shown to be false if it is indeed false. Hick’s
scenarios of ‘Mr X’ might be held to show the coherence of a concept of life after death, although
this is generally rejected because a replica cannot coherently be regarded as the same person as
the person who died. Some might argue that there is no logical problem with the concept of life
after death, depending on its mode and its causation (e.g. in relation to an omnipotent God).
© UCLES 2010
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Topic 4 New Testament: The Four Gospels
Section A
[John 1:1-18]
1
(a) Examine the significance of this passage for an understanding of who Jesus was. [10]
Candidates might wish to consider the nature of the Prologue itself although this is not
essential.
A key question among interpreters is the original source of the Prologue, and its relationship
to the rest of the Gospel. Scholarly opinions vary as to the exact genre of the Prologue, with
some writers arguing for a source in the hymnic traditions of the early church (BeasleyMurray) or the Gnostic faith (Bultmann, [1971]), while others downplay the apparent lyric
form and argue that even the more overtly poetic sections of the Prologue (e.g. 1:1-5) are
“rhythmic prose” (F. F. Bruce) or “elevated prose” (Morris).
Following earlier attempts to locate the hymn (and particularly the Logos theme) within the
broader Hellenistic world, Bultmann sought to trace the hymn’s origin to Gnostic circles, via a
sect of John the Baptist’s adherents. He argues that the hymn was originally directed to
John, and only later adapted to Christian usage, when the final editor of the Gospel set it
here to introduce the work as a whole. Ridderbos, however, rightly points out the numerous
problems inherent in this suggestion. Besides the fact that the Gnostic texts Bultmann works
from post-date the Gospel by several centuries, and the lack of evidence suggesting that
such Gnostic movements were even current at the time of the fourth Gospel’s composition,
the contexts of redemption described in Gnosticism and the Prologue are mutually exclusive
and too incompatible to allow for such adaptation from one to the other. Brown’s proposal
that the hymn-like sections were written independently of the Gospel itself—but within the
same Christian circles as that of the Evangelist—best explains both their apparent
independence from the rest of the Gospel and their intrinsic similarities to the theology both
of the Gospel and of the Johannine Epistles. (Richard Van Egmond)
Although tangential to the question, the argument might be that if the Prologue is intended to
be about John the Baptist then it does not add to an understanding of Jesus.
Candidates are expected to identify key features of Christology: Jesus pre-existent; unique
language use of ‘the logos’; relationship to the Father; creator; giver of life; light; victor over
darkness; relationship to John the Baptist; ‘full of grace and truth’ is replacement of the Law;
the Christ.
Answers may cover some or all of the various arguments and discussions of the teaching of
the Prologue but are likely to focus on an understanding of ‘logos’ and the nature of the
incarnation. More developed answers may reflect on John’s high Christology in comparison
with the synoptic tradition in order to establish ‘significance’. Anticipate that some students
may challenge the past tense of the question and consider that John is offering an
understanding of who Jesus is. Others may begin to ask ‘significant for whom?’ or ‘significant
with respect to what?’ which would provide an opportunity for further analysis of the literary
historical context of the text as well as reflections on contemporary significance.
© UCLES 2010
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(b) ‘The synoptic gospels are concerned with the “Christ of faith” not the “Jesus of
history”.’ Discuss.
[15]
This question may be successfully answered by close reference to the development of
scholarly reflections on the purpose of the synoptic gospels and/or by close reference to the
text. Clarity about the terms used in the question are essential for this question to proceed
but this may only be revealed contextually.
It was in response to Schleiermacher’s attempt to combine the ‘historical Jesus’ with the
‘Christ’ of dogma that David Strauss (1808-74) wrote Der Christus des Glaubens and der
Jesus der Geschichte (1865). His most famous work Leben Jesu (1835), had applied the
‘myth theory’ to the life of Jesus of Nazareth.
In 1906 Albert Schweitzer published Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung (History of the
Jesus-life research). It was published in English in 1910 as The Quest of the Historical
Jesus.
Schweitzer pointed out how Jesus’ image had changed with the times and with the personal
proclivities of the various authors. He took the position that the life of Jesus must be
interpreted in the light of Jesus’ own convictions, which he characterized as those of ‘late
Jewish eschatology’.
An evaluation of the historical accuracy of any part of the synoptic texts may be offered to
support ‘Jesus of history’ claims with analysis of the triple tradition as perhaps having some
of the strongest claims. Aramaic words of Jesus quoted in the text may also be used to
support Jesus of history, as well as reflections on the survival of Christianity itself. In addition
passages with no particular theological direction or function in the text may be used to
support eye witness claims (e.g. Mark 14:51-52).
To support ‘Christ of Faith’ candidates may reflect on the genre of a ‘gospel’. Reflection on
the prologues of the synoptic tradition could be fruitful. They may draw on the record of
miracles, the resurrection or the teachings of Jesus all of which support claims about Jesus’
identity as the Christ. Any texts which suggest that the gospels are for the creation and
nurture of faith and for apologetic/polemic may also be drawn upon. Expect wide ranging
responses.
Evaluation is needed with any conclusion based on the evidence presented. Some may
conclude that the Gospels are working at both levels.
© UCLES 2010
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Section B
2
Assess what place and importance the apocalyptic teachings of Jesus have in the New
Testament.
[25]
Candidates might begin by explaining what is meant by apocalyptic literature although not too
long should be spent on this.
Answers may properly be limited to the apocalyptic teachings of Jesus in the set texts but in
considering their place and importance others may make wide ranging reference to other New
Testament apocalyptic writings such as I Thessalonians 4, I Corinthians 15, II Peter, Revelation
and also the non-canonical Apocalypse of Peter.
The synoptic apocalypses are Matthew 24 & 25, Mark 13 and Luke 21.
Whatever interpretation Jesus wished his disciples to put upon his apocalyptic utterances, it is
clear that, at least in the earlier part of the Apostolic age, a speedy Second Coming of Christ was
expected. Most authorities regard early Christianity as a fervently apocalyptic religion, intent on
the imminent “Second Coming” of Christ to preside over the Last Judgment and the end of the
world. Early Christian apocalypticism is evident in the Gospels, which are permeated with
language taken from Daniel. The so-called Little Apocalypse, a sermon by Jesus found in
Matthew (24–25) with parallels in Mark (13) and Luke (21), foretells the imminence of collective
tribulation and chastisement before the coming of the “Son of Man” who will “sit upon the throne
of his glory” and separate “the sheep from the goats.”
Candidates may wish to discuss whether the synoptic passages are additions to the text, probably
beginning with Mark or if they form an integral part of Jesus’ own teachings. An evaluation of the
place and importance may seek to make comparison with the relative place and importance of other
parts of the narrative in order to form an assessment. (For example how significant is the
apolcalyptic tradition in comparison with the passion narrative, or in comparison with other teachings
of Jesus?) Responses may consider the unfulfilled nature of some apocalyptic material and the
movement in John towards a focus on realised eschatology in order to establish importance.
OR
3
‘Jesus was a law-breaker not a law-maker.’ Discuss.
[25]
Scholars such as Kummel have argued that Jesus did break the law and that this was the reason
for his trial. Some see him as consciously and deliberately anti-Torah. Evidence which students
might bring to support this could be questions of healing on the Sabbath, working on the Sabbath,
and ritual washing and fasting. Others may draw upon his challenges to the Pharisees – those
brought directly and those delivered in parables to show that he challenged the authority of the
law. The accusation of blasphemy might also be drawn upon. ‘Love God, Love your neighbour as
yourself’ may be used to support the idea that Jesus saw himself as replacement for the law, as
might numerous texts from the Johannine tradition. As replacement Jesus can be seen as both
law breaker and law maker. The ultimate movement of Christianity away from the Jewish law,
post crucifixion, might also be used in support.
Others, such as Bultmann, have argued that Jesus was an observant Jew. Banks: ‘Jesus neither
moves out from the Law in making his own demands nor relates those requirements back to it.’
Candidates may draw upon Jesus’ observation of Jewish traditions such as Passover. Did Jesus
break the spirit of the Law may be a further line of enquiry.
A discussion presenting evidence from the text is anticipated with built in awareness of literary
criticism.
© UCLES 2010