A Model of Activism, Mobilization, and
Polarization
Raghul S Venkatesh
University of Warwick
21 October 2014
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
1 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
"People at the top might devote time and resources to
supporting a political party strongly opposed to
redistribution. People at the bottom would have an
opposite response." - McCarthy et. al, Polarized America
Current debate on polarization in elections (goes against
Downsian convergence theory)
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
2 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
"People at the top might devote time and resources to
supporting a political party strongly opposed to
redistribution. People at the bottom would have an
opposite response." - McCarthy et. al, Polarized America
Current debate on polarization in elections (goes against
Downsian convergence theory)
What is Polarization - divergence in political platforms of
candidates (on tax policy, gay rights etc.)
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
2 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
"People at the top might devote time and resources to
supporting a political party strongly opposed to
redistribution. People at the bottom would have an
opposite response." - McCarthy et. al, Polarized America
Current debate on polarization in elections (goes against
Downsian convergence theory)
What is Polarization - divergence in political platforms of
candidates (on tax policy, gay rights etc.)
Re‡ection of a polarized electorate
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
2 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
"People at the top might devote time and resources to
supporting a political party strongly opposed to
redistribution. People at the bottom would have an
opposite response." - McCarthy et. al, Polarized America
Current debate on polarization in elections (goes against
Downsian convergence theory)
What is Polarization - divergence in political platforms of
candidates (on tax policy, gay rights etc.)
Re‡ection of a polarized electorate
Political participation of extreme elements in elections politicians cater to their preferences
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
2 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Models of political competition have focused on campaign
…nancing, lobbying
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
3 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Models of political competition have focused on campaign
…nancing, lobbying
Party activists (Aldrich - 1983 ) are di¤erent from traditional
lobbies
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
3 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Models of political competition have focused on campaign
…nancing, lobbying
Party activists (Aldrich - 1983 ) are di¤erent from traditional
lobbies
Who are Party Activists?
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
3 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Models of political competition have focused on campaign
…nancing, lobbying
Party activists (Aldrich - 1983 ) are di¤erent from traditional
lobbies
Who are Party Activists?
make donations, door-to-door campaigning, canvass potential
voters
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
3 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Models of political competition have focused on campaign
…nancing, lobbying
Party activists (Aldrich - 1983 ) are di¤erent from traditional
lobbies
Who are Party Activists?
make donations, door-to-door campaigning, canvass potential
voters
ideological incentives to contribute
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
3 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Models of political competition have focused on campaign
…nancing, lobbying
Party activists (Aldrich - 1983 ) are di¤erent from traditional
lobbies
Who are Party Activists?
make donations, door-to-door campaigning, canvass potential
voters
ideological incentives to contribute
Activists Vs Lobbyists
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
3 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Models of political competition have focused on campaign
…nancing, lobbying
Party activists (Aldrich - 1983 ) are di¤erent from traditional
lobbies
Who are Party Activists?
make donations, door-to-door campaigning, canvass potential
voters
ideological incentives to contribute
Activists Vs Lobbyists
price taker vs price setter
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
3 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Models of political competition have focused on campaign
…nancing, lobbying
Party activists (Aldrich - 1983 ) are di¤erent from traditional
lobbies
Who are Party Activists?
make donations, door-to-door campaigning, canvass potential
voters
ideological incentives to contribute
Activists Vs Lobbyists
price taker vs price setter
short term mobilization vs long term implicit contract
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
3 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Aldrich (1983) develop motivations for activism
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
4 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Aldrich (1983) develop motivations for activism
notion of ’party cleavages’, in the sense of polarized party cadre
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
4 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Aldrich (1983) develop motivations for activism
notion of ’party cleavages’, in the sense of polarized party cadre
did not model political competition and e¤ects of such party
cleavages on mobilization
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
4 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Aldrich (1983) develop motivations for activism
notion of ’party cleavages’, in the sense of polarized party cadre
did not model political competition and e¤ects of such party
cleavages on mobilization
In the context of the "great-polarization" debate, I develop a
model of elections where,
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
4 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Aldrich (1983) develop motivations for activism
notion of ’party cleavages’, in the sense of polarized party cadre
did not model political competition and e¤ects of such party
cleavages on mobilization
In the context of the "great-polarization" debate, I develop a
model of elections where,
activists are polarized
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
4 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Aldrich (1983) develop motivations for activism
notion of ’party cleavages’, in the sense of polarized party cadre
did not model political competition and e¤ects of such party
cleavages on mobilization
In the context of the "great-polarization" debate, I develop a
model of elections where,
activists are polarized
candidates depend on activists for mobilization
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
4 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Motivation
Aldrich (1983) develop motivations for activism
notion of ’party cleavages’, in the sense of polarized party cadre
did not model political competition and e¤ects of such party
cleavages on mobilization
In the context of the "great-polarization" debate, I develop a
model of elections where,
activists are polarized
candidates depend on activists for mobilization
mobilization a¤ects voter preferences
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
4 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Research Question and Results - Overview
How does activism-led elections a¤ect polarization of candidate
platforms?
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
5 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Research Question and Results - Overview
How does activism-led elections a¤ect polarization of candidate
platforms?
activist polarization necessary, but not su¢ cient!
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
5 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Research Question and Results - Overview
How does activism-led elections a¤ect polarization of candidate
platforms?
activist polarization necessary, but not su¢ cient!
cases where party cleavage does not a¤ect candidate platforms
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
5 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Research Question and Results - Overview
How does activism-led elections a¤ect polarization of candidate
platforms?
activist polarization necessary, but not su¢ cient!
cases where party cleavage does not a¤ect candidate platforms
What a¤ects activist-mobilization in political competition?
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
5 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Research Question and Results - Overview
How does activism-led elections a¤ect polarization of candidate
platforms?
activist polarization necessary, but not su¢ cient!
cases where party cleavage does not a¤ect candidate platforms
What a¤ects activist-mobilization in political competition?
activist ideological preferences
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
5 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Research Question and Results - Overview
How does activism-led elections a¤ect polarization of candidate
platforms?
activist polarization necessary, but not su¢ cient!
cases where party cleavage does not a¤ect candidate platforms
What a¤ects activist-mobilization in political competition?
activist ideological preferences
marginal costs of mobilization
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
5 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Research Question and Results - Overview
How does activism-led elections a¤ect polarization of candidate
platforms?
activist polarization necessary, but not su¢ cient!
cases where party cleavage does not a¤ect candidate platforms
What a¤ects activist-mobilization in political competition?
activist ideological preferences
marginal costs of mobilization
What would happen if there is "collective-action" (multiple
distinct groups) in activism?
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
5 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Research Question and Results - Overview
How does activism-led elections a¤ect polarization of candidate
platforms?
activist polarization necessary, but not su¢ cient!
cases where party cleavage does not a¤ect candidate platforms
What a¤ects activist-mobilization in political competition?
activist ideological preferences
marginal costs of mobilization
What would happen if there is "collective-action" (multiple
distinct groups) in activism?
polarization depends on extent of cleavage
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
5 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Research Question and Results - Overview
How does activism-led elections a¤ect polarization of candidate
platforms?
activist polarization necessary, but not su¢ cient!
cases where party cleavage does not a¤ect candidate platforms
What a¤ects activist-mobilization in political competition?
activist ideological preferences
marginal costs of mobilization
What would happen if there is "collective-action" (multiple
distinct groups) in activism?
polarization depends on extent of cleavage
and on density of participation by activist groups
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
5 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Research Question and Results - Overview
How does activism-led elections a¤ect polarization of candidate
platforms?
activist polarization necessary, but not su¢ cient!
cases where party cleavage does not a¤ect candidate platforms
What a¤ects activist-mobilization in political competition?
activist ideological preferences
marginal costs of mobilization
What would happen if there is "collective-action" (multiple
distinct groups) in activism?
polarization depends on extent of cleavage
and on density of participation by activist groups
free-riding by less extreme activists!
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
5 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Electoral Instances of Activism
Tea-Party Activism: US GOP Mid-term (2010)
revived right-wing activism
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
6 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Electoral Instances of Activism
Tea-Party Activism: US GOP Mid-term (2010)
revived right-wing activism
main political platform - perceived underservingness of welfare
recipients
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
6 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Electoral Instances of Activism
Tea-Party Activism: US GOP Mid-term (2010)
revived right-wing activism
main political platform - perceived underservingness of welfare
recipients
less government, lower taxes and regulation
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
6 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Electoral Instances of Activism
Tea-Party Activism: US GOP Mid-term (2010)
revived right-wing activism
main political platform - perceived underservingness of welfare
recipients
less government, lower taxes and regulation
majority identi…ed as strongly conservative Republicans
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
6 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Activism and Mobilization
Mobilization
Contrast Obama’s 2008 and 2012 campaigns:
"In her free time, Thomas knocks on as many doors as
she can. She asks her neighbors whom they support, tries
to educate and convince those who are on the fence..." Time, September 10, 2008
"The out…t that put upwards of 8 million volunteers on
the street in 2008.....is a ghost of its former self. Its sta¤
has shrunk from 6,000 to 300, and its donors are
depressed.... Virtually no one in politics believes it will turn
many contests this fall. " - Time, September 9, 2010
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
7 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Activism and Mobilization
Mobilization
But, why should candidates care about mobilization?
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
8 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Activism and Mobilization
Mobilization
But, why should candidates care about mobilization?
Persuasive Role - shifting voter preferences (Madestam et
al.(2013))
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
8 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Activism and Mobilization
Mobilization
But, why should candidates care about mobilization?
Persuasive Role - shifting voter preferences (Madestam et
al.(2013))
Informative Role - noisy campaigns (Austen-Smith(1987))
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
8 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Rest of the Presentation
1
Raghul
Literature Review
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
9 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Rest of the Presentation
1
2
Raghul
Literature Review
Baseline Model - Persuasive Activism and Results
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
9 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Rest of the Presentation
1
2
3
Raghul
Literature Review
Baseline Model - Persuasive Activism and Results
Noisy campaigns - Informative Activism and Results
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
9 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Rest of the Presentation
1
2
3
4
Raghul
Literature Review
Baseline Model - Persuasive Activism and Results
Noisy campaigns - Informative Activism and Results
Multiple Activist Groups
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
9 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Introduction
Rest of the Presentation
1
2
3
4
5
Raghul
Literature Review
Baseline Model - Persuasive Activism and Results
Noisy campaigns - Informative Activism and Results
Multiple Activist Groups
Conclusions
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
9 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Literature Review
Literature Review
Party Activism - Aldrich(1983(a), 1983(b))
Candidate preferences - Wittman (1983), Calvert(1985),
Bernhardt, Duggan and Squintani(2009)
Persuasive Role of activism - Madestam et al. (2013)
Informative role of campaign contributions - Austen-Smith
(1987), Coate (2004), Schultz (2007)
Models of in‡uence - Milgrom (1988), Milgrom and Roberts
(1990),
Costly voting - Feddersen (1992), Feddersen and Sandroni
(2006), Osborne (1995)
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
10 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Actors - Two Candidates, Two Activists and a Median Voter;
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
11 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Actors - Two Candidates, Two Activists and a Median Voter;
Policy Space - [ 1, 1]
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
11 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Actors - Two Candidates, Two Activists and a Median Voter;
Policy Space - [ 1, 1]
Candidates have mixed motivations - care about both ideology
and bene…ts of o¢ ce
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
11 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Actors - Two Candidates, Two Activists and a Median Voter;
Policy Space - [ 1, 1]
Candidates have mixed motivations - care about both ideology
and bene…ts of o¢ ce
Candidate ideology: p L = α and p R = α
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
11 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Actors - Two Candidates, Two Activists and a Median Voter;
Policy Space - [ 1, 1]
Candidates have mixed motivations - care about both ideology
and bene…ts of o¢ ce
Candidate ideology: p L = α and p R = α
Candidates simultaneously announce policy positions Xi (where
i 2 f L, Rg, and Xi 6= pi )
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
11 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Actors - Two Candidates, Two Activists and a Median Voter;
Policy Space - [ 1, 1]
Candidates have mixed motivations - care about both ideology
and bene…ts of o¢ ce
Candidate ideology: p L = α and p R = α
Candidates simultaneously announce policy positions Xi (where
i 2 f L, Rg, and Xi 6= pi )
Candidate Utility:
( Xi pi )2 + b if i wins
UiC =
( X i p i )2
otherwise
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
11 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Activists’bliss points: A L =
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
β and A R = β
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
12 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Activists’bliss points: A L = β and A R = β
Activists decide on contributions ci (where i 2 f L, Rg)
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
12 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Activists’bliss points: A L = β and A R = β
Activists decide on contributions ci (where i 2 f L, Rg)
Activist Utility (Non-Homothetic preferences):
( X L Ai )2 ciγ if L wins
UiA =
( XR Ai )2 ciγ if R wins
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
12 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Activists’bliss points: A L = β and A R = β
Activists decide on contributions ci (where i 2 f L, Rg)
Activist Utility (Non-Homothetic preferences):
( X L Ai )2 ciγ if L wins
UiA =
( XR Ai )2 ciγ if R wins
where γ > 1, is a measure of elasticity of marginal cost of
mobilization
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
12 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Activists’bliss points: A L = β and A R = β
Activists decide on contributions ci (where i 2 f L, Rg)
Activist Utility (Non-Homothetic preferences):
( X L Ai )2 ciγ if L wins
UiA =
( XR Ai )2 ciγ if R wins
where γ > 1, is a measure of elasticity of marginal cost of
mobilization
interpret as MRS between the ideological loss and
mobilization/contribution
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
12 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Activists face a cost of participating in the political process
γ
The cost function of activists is m(ci ) = ci
De…nitions
00
Let elasticity of marginal cost of mobilization be em = c. m 0 = γ
m
1
induces a tradeo¤ between ideology and costs of mobilization
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
13 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Mobilization plays a "persuasive role"
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
14 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Mobilization plays a "persuasive role"
Median voter with ideal point µ
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
14 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Mobilization plays a "persuasive role"
Median voter with ideal point µ
( X L µ)2 + c L c R if L wins
Um =
( XR µ)2 + c R c L if R wins
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
14 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Mobilization plays a "persuasive role"
Median voter with ideal point µ
( X L µ)2 + c L c R if L wins
Um =
( XR µ)2 + c R c L if R wins
c L c R or c R c L is the ’net mobilization’to the voter
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
14 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Mobilization plays a "persuasive role"
Median voter with ideal point µ
( X L µ)2 + c L c R if L wins
Um =
( XR µ)2 + c R c L if R wins
c L c R or c R c L is the ’net mobilization’to the voter
If X L = XR , and c L > c R , then c L c R is the least additional
mobilization required to tilt the election in favour of candidate R
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
14 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Timing
1
Raghul
Candidate bliss points ( α, α) and Activist bliss points ( β, β)
and elasticity γ are common knowledge
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
15 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Timing
1
2
Raghul
Candidate bliss points ( α, α) and Activist bliss points ( β, β)
and elasticity γ are common knowledge
Candidates L and R simultaneously announce policy platforms
XL , XR
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
15 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Timing
1
2
3
Raghul
Candidate bliss points ( α, α) and Activist bliss points ( β, β)
and elasticity γ are common knowledge
Candidates L and R simultaneously announce policy platforms
XL , XR
Activists observe platforms, and simultaneously choose
contributions c L and c R to candidate L and R respectively
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
15 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Timing
1
2
3
4
Raghul
Candidate bliss points ( α, α) and Activist bliss points ( β, β)
and elasticity γ are common knowledge
Candidates L and R simultaneously announce policy platforms
XL , XR
Activists observe platforms, and simultaneously choose
contributions c L and c R to candidate L and R respectively
Nature draws the median voter’s bliss point µ from an uniform
distribution [ 1, 1]
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
15 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Timing
1
2
3
4
5
Raghul
Candidate bliss points ( α, α) and Activist bliss points ( β, β)
and elasticity γ are common knowledge
Candidates L and R simultaneously announce policy platforms
XL , XR
Activists observe platforms, and simultaneously choose
contributions c L and c R to candidate L and R respectively
Nature draws the median voter’s bliss point µ from an uniform
distribution [ 1, 1]
The median voter observes policy platforms of candidates,
contribution of activists, and decides the winner
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
15 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Baseline Model
Timing
1
2
3
4
5
Candidate bliss points ( α, α) and Activist bliss points ( β, β)
and elasticity γ are common knowledge
Candidates L and R simultaneously announce policy platforms
XL , XR
Activists observe platforms, and simultaneously choose
contributions c L and c R to candidate L and R respectively
Nature draws the median voter’s bliss point µ from an uniform
distribution [ 1, 1]
The median voter observes policy platforms of candidates,
contribution of activists, and decides the winner
Equilibrium concept is Symmetric SPE in pure strategies
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
15 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Main Result
Proposition
(i) For em < 1, as activists become more extreme, equilibrium
∂x
platforms are less polarized, ie, ∂β
< 0.
(ii) For em > 1, as activists become more extreme, equilibrium
∂x
polarization increases, ie, ∂β
> 0.
(iii) For em = 1, the equilibrium platforms are independent of the
polarization of the activists.
When elasticity parameter, em < 1, more extreme activism
results in less extreme candidate platforms!!
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
16 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Main Result
Proposition
(i) For em < 1, as activists become more extreme, equilibrium
∂x
platforms are less polarized, ie, ∂β
< 0.
(ii) For em > 1, as activists become more extreme, equilibrium
∂x
polarization increases, ie, ∂β
> 0.
(iii) For em = 1, the equilibrium platforms are independent of the
polarization of the activists.
When elasticity parameter, em < 1, more extreme activism
results in less extreme candidate platforms!!
ie, Activist Divergence causes Candidate Convergence
(henceforth AD-CC)
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
16 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Main Result
Proposition
(i) For em < 1, as activists become more extreme, equilibrium
∂x
platforms are less polarized, ie, ∂β
< 0.
(ii) For em > 1, as activists become more extreme, equilibrium
∂x
polarization increases, ie, ∂β
> 0.
(iii) For em = 1, the equilibrium platforms are independent of the
polarization of the activists.
When elasticity parameter, em < 1, more extreme activism
results in less extreme candidate platforms!!
ie, Activist Divergence causes Candidate Convergence
(henceforth AD-CC)
Further, when em = 1: Activist preferences does not a¤ect
equilibrium platforms of candidates
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
16 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Main Result
Proposition
(i) For em < 1, as activists become more extreme, equilibrium
∂x
platforms are less polarized, ie, ∂β
< 0.
(ii) For em > 1, as activists become more extreme, equilibrium
∂x
polarization increases, ie, ∂β
> 0.
(iii) For em = 1, the equilibrium platforms are independent of the
polarization of the activists.
When elasticity parameter, em < 1, more extreme activism
results in less extreme candidate platforms!!
ie, Activist Divergence causes Candidate Convergence
(henceforth AD-CC)
Further, when em = 1: Activist preferences does not a¤ect
equilibrium platforms of candidates
Main Takeaway: Not
β, but a combination of ( β, 21emOctober
what 16 / 31
) is 2014
Raghul (University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Voters are in‡uenced by: announced policy of candidates and
persuasive mobilization by activists
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
17 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Voters are in‡uenced by: announced policy of candidates and
persuasive mobilization by activists
Activists face a tradeo¤:
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
17 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Voters are in‡uenced by: announced policy of candidates and
persuasive mobilization by activists
Activists face a tradeo¤:
mobilization reduces the expected ideological loss
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
17 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Voters are in‡uenced by: announced policy of candidates and
persuasive mobilization by activists
Activists face a tradeo¤:
mobilization reduces the expected ideological loss
cost of contributing - depends on em parameter
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
17 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Voters are in‡uenced by: announced policy of candidates and
persuasive mobilization by activists
Activists face a tradeo¤:
mobilization reduces the expected ideological loss
cost of contributing - depends on em parameter
Two e¤ects at play:
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
17 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Voters are in‡uenced by: announced policy of candidates and
persuasive mobilization by activists
Activists face a tradeo¤:
mobilization reduces the expected ideological loss
cost of contributing - depends on em parameter
Two e¤ects at play:
mobilizing support increases the win-probability of the candidate
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
17 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Voters are in‡uenced by: announced policy of candidates and
persuasive mobilization by activists
Activists face a tradeo¤:
mobilization reduces the expected ideological loss
cost of contributing - depends on em parameter
Two e¤ects at play:
mobilizing support increases the win-probability of the candidate
contribution comes at a personal cost to the activist
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
17 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Candidates themselves face the following tradeo¤,
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
18 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Candidates themselves face the following tradeo¤,
Candidates trade-o¤ their own ideology to cater to preferences
of activists, in order to mobilize support
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
18 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Candidates themselves face the following tradeo¤,
Candidates trade-o¤ their own ideology to cater to preferences
of activists, in order to mobilize support
0
Lets look at the marginal costs of mobilization: m (c) = γcγ 1
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
18 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Candidates themselves face the following tradeo¤,
Candidates trade-o¤ their own ideology to cater to preferences
of activists, in order to mobilize support
0
Lets look at the marginal costs of mobilization: m (c) = γcγ 1
Remember, when 1 < γ < 2 (or 0 < em < 1), marginal costs of
mobilization is concave
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
18 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Candidates themselves face the following tradeo¤,
Candidates trade-o¤ their own ideology to cater to preferences
of activists, in order to mobilize support
0
Lets look at the marginal costs of mobilization: m (c) = γcγ 1
Remember, when 1 < γ < 2 (or 0 < em < 1), marginal costs of
mobilization is concave
When activists face concave marginal costs of mobilization:
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
18 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Candidates themselves face the following tradeo¤,
Candidates trade-o¤ their own ideology to cater to preferences
of activists, in order to mobilize support
0
Lets look at the marginal costs of mobilization: m (c) = γcγ 1
Remember, when 1 < γ < 2 (or 0 < em < 1), marginal costs of
mobilization is concave
When activists face concave marginal costs of mobilization:
marginal bene…ts of mobilizing support outweighs the marginal
cost of mobilization
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
18 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Candidates, who move …rst, can observe this
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
19 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Candidates, who move …rst, can observe this
Hence, candidates move closer, as long as the marginal cost
remains concave!
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
19 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Candidates, who move …rst, can observe this
Hence, candidates move closer, as long as the marginal cost
remains concave!
When activists have homothetic preferences, quadratic
ideological loss and costs of mobilization,
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
19 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Intuition for AD-CC
Candidates, who move …rst, can observe this
Hence, candidates move closer, as long as the marginal cost
remains concave!
When activists have homothetic preferences, quadratic
ideological loss and costs of mobilization,
their preferences do not matter in equilibrium!
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
19 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Equilibrium Mobilization
Proposition: Mobilization increases in equilibrium: i.as activists
∂c
∂c
become more extreme ( ∂β
> 0); ii.as elasticity increases ( ∂γ
> 0).
could be intepreted as a "Stakes-are-higher" phenomenon
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
20 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Equilibrium Mobilization
Proposition: Mobilization increases in equilibrium: i.as activists
∂c
∂c
become more extreme ( ∂β
> 0); ii.as elasticity increases ( ∂γ
> 0).
could be intepreted as a "Stakes-are-higher" phenomenon
the …rst part is straightforward
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
20 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Equilibrium Mobilization
Proposition: Mobilization increases in equilibrium: i.as activists
∂c
∂c
become more extreme ( ∂β
> 0); ii.as elasticity increases ( ∂γ
> 0).
could be intepreted as a "Stakes-are-higher" phenomenon
the …rst part is straightforward
second part is related to the persuasive role of activism
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
20 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Equilibrium Polarization
Proposition
The electoral game has an unique symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium in candidate platforms ( X L = x, XR = x ).
∂x
Furthermore, ∂α
> 0 and ∂x
∂b < 0
equilibrium platforms taken by candidates in the model are
polarized
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
21 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Equilibrium Polarization
Proposition
The electoral game has an unique symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium in candidate platforms ( X L = x, XR = x ).
∂x
Furthermore, ∂α
> 0 and ∂x
∂b < 0
equilibrium platforms taken by candidates in the model are
polarized
polarization increases when candidates are more ideologically
apart
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
21 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Equilibrium Polarization
Proposition
The electoral game has an unique symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium in candidate platforms ( X L = x, XR = x ).
∂x
Furthermore, ∂α
> 0 and ∂x
∂b < 0
equilibrium platforms taken by candidates in the model are
polarized
polarization increases when candidates are more ideologically
apart
polarization decreases when bene…ts of o¢ ce increases
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
21 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Results for Baseline Model
Equilibrium Polarization
Proposition
The electoral game has an unique symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium in candidate platforms ( X L = x, XR = x ).
∂x
Furthermore, ∂α
> 0 and ∂x
∂b < 0
equilibrium platforms taken by candidates in the model are
polarized
polarization increases when candidates are more ideologically
apart
polarization decreases when bene…ts of o¢ ce increases
Refer to Bernhardt Duggan and Squintani (APSR, 2009)
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
21 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
voters do not observe the platforms of candidates (negative
campaigning by the other side)
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
22 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
voters do not observe the platforms of candidates (negative
campaigning by the other side)
they only observe a noisy platform
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
22 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
voters do not observe the platforms of candidates (negative
campaigning by the other side)
they only observe a noisy platform
Activism, in this case, plays the role of providing direct
information about true platform of candidates
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
22 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
voters do not observe the platforms of candidates (negative
campaigning by the other side)
they only observe a noisy platform
Activism, in this case, plays the role of providing direct
information about true platform of candidates
example: explaining Obamacare, immigration reforms etc.
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
22 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
Formally, let Xi be the true policy stance of either candidate
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
23 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
Formally, let Xi be the true policy stance of either candidate
Policy observed by median voter is, X̃i = Xi + η i , where η i is
the noise in platforms
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
23 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
Formally, let Xi be the true policy stance of either candidate
Policy observed by median voter is, X̃i = Xi + η i , where η i is
the noise in platforms
E(η i ) = 0, Variance of η i : σ2 = a(ci )
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
23 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
Formally, let Xi be the true policy stance of either candidate
Policy observed by median voter is, X̃i = Xi + η i , where η i is
the noise in platforms
E(η i ) = 0, Variance of η i : σ2 = a(ci )
Functional form of a(ci ):
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
23 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
Formally, let Xi be the true policy stance of either candidate
Policy observed by median voter is, X̃i = Xi + η i , where η i is
the noise in platforms
E(η i ) = 0, Variance of η i : σ2 = a(ci )
Functional form of a(ci ):
0
00
000
a (.) < 0, a > 0, a < 0, a(0) > 0
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
23 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
Formally, let Xi be the true policy stance of either candidate
Policy observed by median voter is, X̃i = Xi + η i , where η i is
the noise in platforms
E(η i ) = 0, Variance of η i : σ2 = a(ci )
Functional form of a(ci ):
0
00
000
a (.) < 0, a > 0, a < 0, a(0) > 0
0
a is the marginal variance of platform
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
23 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
De…nition
Let the elasticity of marginal variance be en =
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
00
c. a 0
a
21 October 2014
24 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
De…nition
Let the elasticity of marginal variance be en =
00
c. a 0
a
In case of noisy campaigns, e¤ectiveness or e¢ ciency of activism
plays a critical role
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
24 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
De…nition
Let the elasticity of marginal variance be en =
00
c. a 0
a
In case of noisy campaigns, e¤ectiveness or e¢ ciency of activism
plays a critical role
en is a re‡ection of how e¤ective campaign activism is
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
24 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
De…nition
Let the elasticity of marginal variance be en =
00
c. a 0
a
In case of noisy campaigns, e¤ectiveness or e¢ ciency of activism
plays a critical role
en is a re‡ection of how e¤ective campaign activism is
measures the e¢ ciency of marginal noise reduction (high
en ) e f f iciency)
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
24 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign - Informative Activism
De…nition
Let the elasticity of marginal variance be en =
00
c. a 0
a
In case of noisy campaigns, e¤ectiveness or e¢ ciency of activism
plays a critical role
en is a re‡ection of how e¤ective campaign activism is
measures the e¢ ciency of marginal noise reduction (high
en ) e f f iciency)
In addition to em , candidates now care about e¤ectiveness of
activism en
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
24 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign and AD-CC
Proposition: AD-CC result holds if en <
1 em
2
One immediate inference is em < 1 and en <
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
1
2
21 October 2014
25 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign and AD-CC
Proposition: AD-CC result holds if en <
1 em
2
One immediate inference is em < 1 and en < 12
Therefore, when activism has to be very ine¢ cient, and costs of
mobilization very low, for AD-CC to hold
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
25 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Noisy Campaigns - Model and Results
Noisy Campaign and AD-CC
Proposition: AD-CC result holds if en <
1 em
2
One immediate inference is em < 1 and en < 12
Therefore, when activism has to be very ine¢ cient, and costs of
mobilization very low, for AD-CC to hold
When campaigns are noisy, and activists are fairly e¢ cient in
∂x
reducing variance of noise, ∂β
>0
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
25 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Suppose there are N activist groups on either side of the
political spectrum
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
26 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Suppose there are N activist groups on either side of the
political spectrum
De…nition
Let A j = f A1j , A2j , ........, A Nj g, j 2 f L, Rg, be set of N activists
supporting candidate L and R
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
26 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Suppose there are N activist groups on either side of the
political spectrum
De…nition
Let A j = f A1j , A2j , ........, A Nj g, j 2 f L, Rg, be set of N activists
supporting candidate L and R
Activist preferences over policy is ordered in the following way:
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
26 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Suppose there are N activist groups on either side of the
political spectrum
De…nition
Let A j = f A1j , A2j , ........, A Nj g, j 2 f L, Rg, be set of N activists
supporting candidate L and R
Activist preferences over policy is ordered in the following way:
A pL =
Raghul
1 + (p
(University of Warwick)
1)ε, A pR = 1
(p
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
1) ε
21 October 2014
26 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Suppose there are N activist groups on either side of the
political spectrum
De…nition
Let A j = f A1j , A2j , ........, A Nj g, j 2 f L, Rg, be set of N activists
supporting candidate L and R
Activist preferences over policy is ordered in the following way:
A pL = 1 + ( p 1)ε, A pR = 1 ( p 1)ε
Most extreme activists are at 1 and 1
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
26 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Suppose there are N activist groups on either side of the
political spectrum
De…nition
Let A j = f A1j , A2j , ........, A Nj g, j 2 f L, Rg, be set of N activists
supporting candidate L and R
Activist preferences over policy is ordered in the following way:
A pL = 1 + ( p 1)ε, A pR = 1 ( p 1)ε
Most extreme activists are at 1 and 1
Most moderate activists are at 1 + ( N 1)ε and 1
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
(p
21 October 2014
1) ε
26 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Suppose there are N activist groups on either side of the
political spectrum
De…nition
Let A j = f A1j , A2j , ........, A Nj g, j 2 f L, Rg, be set of N activists
supporting candidate L and R
Activist preferences over policy is ordered in the following way:
A pL = 1 + ( p 1)ε, A pR = 1 ( p 1)ε
Most extreme activists are at 1 and 1
Most moderate activists are at 1 + ( N 1)ε and 1
(p
1) ε
Refer to the distance between the most extreme and most
moderate as "ideological band"
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
26 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Suppose there are N activist groups on either side of the
political spectrum
De…nition
Let A j = f A1j , A2j , ........, A Nj g, j 2 f L, Rg, be set of N activists
supporting candidate L and R
Activist preferences over policy is ordered in the following way:
A pL = 1 + ( p 1)ε, A pR = 1 ( p 1)ε
Most extreme activists are at 1 and 1
Most moderate activists are at 1 + ( N 1)ε and 1
(p
1) ε
Refer to the distance between the most extreme and most
moderate as "ideological band"
Ideological band, IB = ( N 1)ε
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
26 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Ideological band, IB = ( N
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
1) ε
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
27 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Ideological band, IB = ( N 1)ε
We de…ne two measures of political participation
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
27 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Ideological band, IB = ( N 1)ε
We de…ne two measures of political participation
De…nitions
Political Participation 1.0 (PP1 ): N is …xed, ε changes, a¤ecting the
spread of ideological band, IB
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
27 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Ideological band, IB = ( N 1)ε
We de…ne two measures of political participation
De…nitions
Political Participation 1.0 (PP1 ): N is …xed, ε changes, a¤ecting the
spread of ideological band, IB
De…nitions
Political Participation 2.0 (PP2 ): spread of ideological band (IB)
remains constant, but N changes by adjusting ε
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
27 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Ideological band, IB = ( N 1)ε
We de…ne two measures of political participation
De…nitions
Political Participation 1.0 (PP1 ): N is …xed, ε changes, a¤ecting the
spread of ideological band, IB
De…nitions
Political Participation 2.0 (PP2 ): spread of ideological band (IB)
remains constant, but N changes by adjusting ε
PP1 measures whether participation is con…ned to an ideological
elite, or is more broad-based
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
27 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists
Ideological band, IB = ( N 1)ε
We de…ne two measures of political participation
De…nitions
Political Participation 1.0 (PP1 ): N is …xed, ε changes, a¤ecting the
spread of ideological band, IB
De…nitions
Political Participation 2.0 (PP2 ): spread of ideological band (IB)
remains constant, but N changes by adjusting ε
PP1 measures whether participation is con…ned to an ideological
elite, or is more broad-based
PP2 measures the density of electoral participation within an
ideological band
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
27 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists - Results
Proposition: Polarization in equilibrium increases when, (i ) PP1
decreases; (ii ) PP2 is less dense (N decreases)
Result (i ) suggests that when activism is restricted to a tiny
"ideological elite", polarization increases in elections
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
28 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists - Results
Proposition: Polarization in equilibrium increases when, (i ) PP1
decreases; (ii ) PP2 is less dense (N decreases)
Result (i ) suggests that when activism is restricted to a tiny
"ideological elite", polarization increases in elections
Polarization not as stark as in single activist case, because
marginal importance of activist support decreases with N
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
28 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists - Results
Proposition: Polarization in equilibrium increases when, (i ) PP1
decreases; (ii ) PP2 is less dense (N decreases)
Result (i ) suggests that when activism is restricted to a tiny
"ideological elite", polarization increases in elections
Polarization not as stark as in single activist case, because
marginal importance of activist support decreases with N
Result (ii ) suggests there is Downsian convergence when density
of activism increases!
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
28 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists - Results
Proposition: Polarization in equilibrium increases when, (i ) PP1
decreases; (ii ) PP2 is less dense (N decreases)
Result (i ) suggests that when activism is restricted to a tiny
"ideological elite", polarization increases in elections
Polarization not as stark as in single activist case, because
marginal importance of activist support decreases with N
Result (ii ) suggests there is Downsian convergence when density
of activism increases!
Failure of "collective action" in activism
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
28 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Multiple Activist groups
Multiple Activists - Results
Proposition: Polarization in equilibrium increases when, (i ) PP1
decreases; (ii ) PP2 is less dense (N decreases)
Result (i ) suggests that when activism is restricted to a tiny
"ideological elite", polarization increases in elections
Polarization not as stark as in single activist case, because
marginal importance of activist support decreases with N
Result (ii ) suggests there is Downsian convergence when density
of activism increases!
Failure of "collective action" in activism
There should be an optimal mix of low N, and high ε: to ensure
there is a choice to the electorate, but that these choices aren’t
too extreme!!
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
28 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Conclusions
Conclusions
An uni…ed theory to study activism and mobilization in elections,
in the context of political polarization
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
29 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Conclusions
Conclusions
An uni…ed theory to study activism and mobilization in elections,
in the context of political polarization
In case of Persuasive Activism, we …nd:
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
29 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Conclusions
Conclusions
An uni…ed theory to study activism and mobilization in elections,
in the context of political polarization
In case of Persuasive Activism, we …nd:
1
Raghul
a combination of activist ideology and mobilization costs a¤ect
equilibrium polarization
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
29 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Conclusions
Conclusions
An uni…ed theory to study activism and mobilization in elections,
in the context of political polarization
In case of Persuasive Activism, we …nd:
1
2
Raghul
a combination of activist ideology and mobilization costs a¤ect
equilibrium polarization
mobilization in elections increase when the stakes are higher
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
29 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Conclusions
Conclusions
An uni…ed theory to study activism and mobilization in elections,
in the context of political polarization
In case of Persuasive Activism, we …nd:
1
2
a combination of activist ideology and mobilization costs a¤ect
equilibrium polarization
mobilization in elections increase when the stakes are higher
In case of Informative Activism, we …nd:
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
29 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Conclusions
Conclusions
An uni…ed theory to study activism and mobilization in elections,
in the context of political polarization
In case of Persuasive Activism, we …nd:
1
2
a combination of activist ideology and mobilization costs a¤ect
equilibrium polarization
mobilization in elections increase when the stakes are higher
In case of Informative Activism, we …nd:
In addition to above, e¢ ciency of activism plays a critical role in
determining equilibrium polarization
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
29 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Conclusions
Conclusions
In the presence of multiple activists:
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
30 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Conclusions
Conclusions
In the presence of multiple activists:
increasing the density of activism causes downsian convergence
in platforms
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
30 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Conclusions
Conclusions
In the presence of multiple activists:
increasing the density of activism causes downsian convergence
in platforms
decreasing the ideological band of activism polarizes platforms
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
30 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Conclusions
Conclusions
In the presence of multiple activists:
increasing the density of activism causes downsian convergence
in platforms
decreasing the ideological band of activism polarizes platforms
there is a need for an optimal mix of number of activists and
their ideological a- iations!
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
30 / 31
A Model of Activism, Mobilization and Polarization
Conclusions
Thank You
Raghul
(University of Warwick)
Activism, Mobilization, and Polarization
21 October 2014
31 / 31