PLEASE NOTE this is a sample reading list for the 2015-16 academic year
– precise seminar content may change from year to year.
Seminar Topics and Reading
Introductory Books
Heil, J. Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction (3rd ed.)
McGinn, C. 1991. The Character of Mind: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. (Originally published 1982.)
Kim, J. 2006. The Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Westview Press. (2nd ed.)
Anthologies
Chalmers, D. Philosophy of Mind: Clasical and Contemporary Readings
Rosenthal, D., ed. 1991. The Nature of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lycan, W. ed. 1990. Mind and Cognition: a Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Guttenplan, S., ed. 1994. A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell Reference.
Week 2: Type Identity Physicalism
(1) Explain the distinction between type and token.
(2) Is it plausible to think that mental states can be analysed in terms of their causal roles?
(3) How might type identity theories try to respond to the claim that mental states are variably or multiply
‘realisable’ in creatures with different physical natures?
Main Reading:
D. Lewis, ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’, Journal of Philosophy 1966, (available on JSTOR), repr. in
his Philosophical Papers Volume I
Putnam, H. 1979. ‘The Nature of Mental States’, in Mind Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Vol.2.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Lycan ed. Mind and Cognition. (Also in Chalmers ed.)
Heil, J. Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction Ch. 5: The Identity Theory
Further reading:
Lewis, D. 1994. ‘Reduction of Mind’, in S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Reprinted
in D. Lewis. Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology.
Armstrong, D.M. 1977. ‘The Causal Theory of Mind’. Reprinted in Rosenhtal ed. The Nature of Mind (Also in
Chalmers ed.)
Place, U. T. 1956. Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology 47:44-50. Reprinted in (W.
Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Also in Chalmers ed.
Smart, J. J. C. 1959. Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68:141-56. (Also in Chalmers ed.)
Week 3: Anomalous Monism
‘Mental Events’, by Davidson, in his Essays on Actions and Events. Also in Chalmers ed.
Evnine, S. 1991. Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Polity. Ch.4.
‘Philosophy as Psychology’, by Davidson, in Essays on Actions and Events
‘Anomalous Monism and the Irreducability of the Mental’, by McLaughlin, in Lepore and McLaughlin ed.
Actions and Events
‘Psychophysical Laws’, by Kim, in Lepore and McLaughlin ed.
Week 4: Functionalism
N. Block, ‘What is Functionalism’, and ‘Troubles with Functionalism’ in Block ed., Readings in the Philosophy
of Psychology (Also in Chalmers ed.)
H. Putnam, ‘The Nature of Mental States’, in his Mind, Language and Reality. Also in Chalmers ed.
S. Shoemaker, ‘Some Varieties of Functionalism’, and ‘Functionalism and Qualia’ in his Identity, Cause and
Mind
D. Lewis, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identification’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1972 (Also in
Chalmers ed.)
Block, N. & Fodor, J. A. 1972. What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review 81:159-81. Reprinted
in (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press, 1980).
Week 5: Modal Arguments for Dualism
How might a physicalist explain away the anti-physicalist arguments from conceivability?
Kripke, S. Naming and Necessity, Lecture 3, repr. In Rosenthal ed. The Nature of Mind. (Also in Chalmers ed.)
Chalmers, D. J. 2002. ‘Does conceivability entail possibility?’ In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds)
Conceivability and Possibility. (See also, Chalmers, ‘Natrualistic Dualism’ in his The Conscious Mind)
Hill, C. ‘Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem’, Philosophical Studies 1997
(Also in Chalmers ed.)
Gendler and Hawthrone, Introduction., Conceivability and Possibility
Yablo, S. ‘Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1993
Nagel, T. 1974. ‘What is it like to be a Bat?’, Philosophical Review 83: 435-50. Reprinted in T. Nagel. Mortal
Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. (Also in Chalmers ed.)
Jackson, F. 1982. ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127-36. Reprinted in Lycan ed. Mind
and Cognition. (Also in Chalmers ed.)
Jackson, F. 1986. ‘What Mary didn’t Know’, Journal of Philosophy 83: 291-5. Reprinted in Rosenthal ed., The
Nature of Mind
Week 7: The Phenomenology of Experience and the Appeal to Introspection
P. Snowdon, ‘How to Interpret Direct Perception’, in Crane ed, The Contents of Experience
J. Valberg, ‘The Puzzle of Experience’, in Crane ed.
H. Robinson, Perception, ch. II
B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, ch. 1
Week 8: The Content of Experience
M.G.F Martin, ‘Perceptual Content’ in Guttenplan ed. A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind
Crane, T. ‘Introduction’, Crane ed. The Content of Experience
G. Harman, ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 4
J. Searle, Intentionality, ch. 2
Week 9: Other Minds and the Metaphysics of Mind
Avramides, A., (2001), Other Minds, ‘Overview’. London: Routledge.
Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.II.
Putnam, H. (1979). ‘Other Minds’, reprinted in Putnam, H. Mind, Language & Reality.
Ayer, A.J. (1954). ‘The Problem of Other Minds’, in Philosophical Essays. London: Macmillan.
Austin, J.L. (1970). ‘Other Minds’, in J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock, eds. Philosophical Papers of J. L. Austin.
2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Malcolm, N., (1962), “Knowledge of Other Minds”, in V.C. Chappel (ed.) The Philosophy of Mind Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Week 10: The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds
Ayer, A.J. (1954). ‘The Problem of Other Minds’, in Philosophical Essays. London: Macmillan.
Hyslop, A., (1976) “Other Minds as Theoretical Entities”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 54: 158-161.
McDowell ,J., (1982), “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 455-79.
Reprinted in McDowell, J. Meaning, Knowledge and Reality.
Melnyk, A., (1994), “Inference to the Best Explanation and Other Minds”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
72:482-91.